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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:07,907 --> 00:00:09,309 We've lost engine number two. 2 00:00:09,376 --> 00:00:11,511 High above the Mediterranean, two pilots 3 00:00:11,578 --> 00:00:13,146 struggle with a stalled engine. 4 00:00:11,578 --> 00:00:13,146 struggle with a stalled engine. 5 00:00:13,213 --> 00:00:14,347 Engine relight. 6 00:00:14,414 --> 00:00:15,415 - Negative. - Stop. 7 00:00:15,482 --> 00:00:16,216 Stop. 8 00:00:16,282 --> 00:00:17,817 Engine one has flamed out. 9 00:00:17,884 --> 00:00:20,487 45 miles from land, the pilots 10 00:00:17,884 --> 00:00:20,487 45 miles from land, the pilots 11 00:00:20,553 --> 00:00:22,455 make a difficult decision. 12 00:00:22,522 --> 00:00:25,291 Prepare to ditch. 13 00:00:22,522 --> 00:00:25,291 Prepare to ditch. 14 00:00:25,358 --> 00:00:27,594 Oh my God, be merciful. 15 00:00:27,660 --> 00:00:29,829 Passengers are forced to make life or death 16 00:00:29,896 --> 00:00:32,432 decisions on their own. 17 00:00:29,896 --> 00:00:32,432 decisions on their own. 18 00:00:32,499 --> 00:00:34,234 Do not inflate your vest! 19 00:00:39,572 --> 00:00:42,041 The accident will tear families apart... 20 00:00:39,572 --> 00:00:42,041 The accident will tear families apart... 21 00:00:43,309 --> 00:00:47,313 ...set in motion a massive rescue effort at sea, 22 00:00:47,380 --> 00:00:51,451 and trigger a multinational investigation 23 00:00:47,380 --> 00:00:51,451 and trigger a multinational investigation 24 00:00:51,518 --> 00:00:55,155 to discover why both engines on one of the world's most popular 25 00:00:51,518 --> 00:00:55,155 to discover why both engines on one of the world's most popular 26 00:00:55,221 --> 00:01:00,326 planes stopped in midflight. 27 00:00:55,221 --> 00:01:00,326 planes stopped in midflight. 28 00:01:00,393 --> 00:01:02,662 Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our approach. 29 00:01:02,729 --> 00:01:03,797 We lost both engines. 30 00:01:27,587 --> 00:01:30,223 August 6, 2005. 31 00:01:27,587 --> 00:01:30,223 August 6, 2005. 32 00:01:30,290 --> 00:01:34,427 Bari, Italy, an ancient port town on the Adriatic sea 33 00:01:34,494 --> 00:01:36,296 where the past meets the present. 34 00:01:34,494 --> 00:01:36,296 where the past meets the present. 35 00:01:38,965 --> 00:01:42,402 Just north of this historic city, Bari International 36 00:01:38,965 --> 00:01:42,402 Just north of this historic city, Bari International 37 00:01:42,469 --> 00:01:45,605 Airport serves 10 major Airlines and more than 1.5 38 00:01:45,672 --> 00:01:47,407 million passengers each year. 39 00:01:50,009 --> 00:01:55,381 One of those carriers is Tunisia's Tuninter Airlines. 40 00:01:50,009 --> 00:01:55,381 One of those carriers is Tunisia's Tuninter Airlines. 41 00:01:55,448 --> 00:01:58,718 Captain Chafik Gharbi is a pilot with Tuninter. 42 00:01:58,785 --> 00:02:03,223 Today, he's in command of flight 1153. 43 00:01:58,785 --> 00:02:03,223 Today, he's in command of flight 1153. 44 00:02:03,289 --> 00:02:06,626 The 45-year-old Tunisian is a military-trained pilot 45 00:02:03,289 --> 00:02:06,626 The 45-year-old Tunisian is a military-trained pilot 46 00:02:06,693 --> 00:02:09,596 with a flawless flight record. 47 00:02:09,662 --> 00:02:14,567 Gharbi's co-pilot is 28-year-old Ali Kebaier. 48 00:02:09,662 --> 00:02:14,567 Gharbi's co-pilot is 28-year-old Ali Kebaier. 49 00:02:14,634 --> 00:02:15,802 How much fuel are you adding? 50 00:02:15,869 --> 00:02:17,837 400 kilograms. 51 00:02:17,904 --> 00:02:19,105 2,700 total? 52 00:02:17,904 --> 00:02:19,105 2,700 total? 53 00:02:19,172 --> 00:02:19,973 Yes. 54 00:02:22,308 --> 00:02:24,143 Captain Gharbi and his co-pilot 55 00:02:22,308 --> 00:02:24,143 Captain Gharbi and his co-pilot 56 00:02:24,210 --> 00:02:26,880 flew from Tunis to Bari this morning to collect 57 00:02:26,946 --> 00:02:29,849 34 Italian passengers. 58 00:02:29,916 --> 00:02:31,918 Now they're going to fly them to Djerba, 59 00:02:29,916 --> 00:02:31,918 Now they're going to fly them to Djerba, 60 00:02:31,985 --> 00:02:35,321 a tunisian resort island. 61 00:02:42,529 --> 00:02:44,931 Among the passengers is 31-year-old police 62 00:02:44,998 --> 00:02:47,200 officer, Luca Squicciarini. 63 00:02:47,267 --> 00:02:49,736 His girlfriend, Paola, is traveling with him. 64 00:02:47,267 --> 00:02:49,736 His girlfriend, Paola, is traveling with him. 65 00:02:54,707 --> 00:02:57,410 Our first choice wasn't Djerba, it was Cape Verde. 66 00:03:00,046 --> 00:03:02,615 The thing with Cape Verde is that it was a period 67 00:03:02,682 --> 00:03:04,684 of terrorist activities. 68 00:03:04,751 --> 00:03:07,620 The flight would have left from either Rome or Milan. 69 00:03:04,751 --> 00:03:07,620 The flight would have left from either Rome or Milan. 70 00:03:12,058 --> 00:03:13,927 Since they are two large airports, 71 00:03:13,993 --> 00:03:16,195 Paola was afraid that there would be an attack, 72 00:03:16,262 --> 00:03:18,264 so we chose not to go to Cape Verde. 73 00:03:16,262 --> 00:03:18,264 so we chose not to go to Cape Verde. 74 00:03:22,602 --> 00:03:24,337 It was my first trip with Paola. 75 00:03:22,602 --> 00:03:24,337 It was my first trip with Paola. 76 00:03:24,404 --> 00:03:26,172 We met the previous winter. 77 00:03:26,239 --> 00:03:28,474 We had plans to marry the following year. 78 00:03:30,743 --> 00:03:31,978 To tighten your belt, 79 00:03:32,045 --> 00:03:33,546 pull on the loose end of the strap. 80 00:03:33,613 --> 00:03:35,982 To release your seatbelt, lift the upper portion 81 00:03:36,049 --> 00:03:37,183 of the buckle. 82 00:03:37,250 --> 00:03:38,418 Ladies and gentlemen, your life vests 83 00:03:38,484 --> 00:03:40,153 are located beneath your seats. 84 00:03:40,219 --> 00:03:42,589 To inflate the vest, pull firmly on the red cord 85 00:03:40,219 --> 00:03:42,589 To inflate the vest, pull firmly on the red cord 86 00:03:42,655 --> 00:03:44,424 only when you're leaving the aircraft. 87 00:03:44,490 --> 00:03:47,860 If you need to refill the vest, blow into the mouthpiece. 88 00:03:53,266 --> 00:03:57,537 TSLBB flight 1153, permission for takeoff granted. 89 00:03:53,266 --> 00:03:57,537 TSLBB flight 1153, permission for takeoff granted. 90 00:03:57,604 --> 00:03:58,338 Roger that. 91 00:03:58,404 --> 00:03:59,772 Cleared for takeoff. 92 00:03:59,839 --> 00:04:02,575 Final prep for departure. 93 00:03:59,839 --> 00:04:02,575 Final prep for departure. 94 00:04:02,642 --> 00:04:07,080 The crew is flying a French-made ATR 72. 95 00:04:02,642 --> 00:04:07,080 The crew is flying a French-made ATR 72. 96 00:04:07,146 --> 00:04:11,517 The small turboprop is perfect for short flights. 97 00:04:11,584 --> 00:04:13,086 It doesn't need a lot of maintenance 98 00:04:11,584 --> 00:04:13,086 It doesn't need a lot of maintenance 99 00:04:13,152 --> 00:04:16,856 or guzzle a lot of fuel. 100 00:04:16,923 --> 00:04:21,694 Just after 2:30 in the afternoon, the plane takes off. 101 00:04:16,923 --> 00:04:21,694 Just after 2:30 in the afternoon, the plane takes off. 102 00:04:21,761 --> 00:04:26,633 49 minutes after takeoff, flight 1153 is 400 miles away 103 00:04:21,761 --> 00:04:26,633 49 minutes after takeoff, flight 1153 is 400 miles away 104 00:04:26,699 --> 00:04:28,401 from its destination, Djerba. 105 00:04:37,844 --> 00:04:40,079 So we started chatting with other passengers. 106 00:04:40,146 --> 00:04:41,414 We were all excited. 107 00:04:41,481 --> 00:04:42,782 We talked about the vacation. 108 00:04:41,481 --> 00:04:42,782 We talked about the vacation. 109 00:04:47,186 --> 00:04:50,423 Then 75 miles from the nearest land 110 00:04:47,186 --> 00:04:50,423 Then 75 miles from the nearest land 111 00:04:50,490 --> 00:04:57,864 and 23,000 feet above the sea, the plane's right engine stops 112 00:04:50,490 --> 00:04:57,864 and 23,000 feet above the sea, the plane's right engine stops 113 00:04:57,930 --> 00:04:58,931 working. 114 00:04:58,998 --> 00:05:01,434 What? 115 00:04:58,998 --> 00:05:01,434 What? 116 00:05:01,501 --> 00:05:04,303 We've lost engine number two. 117 00:05:04,370 --> 00:05:06,239 Let's get to 17,000 feet. 118 00:05:04,370 --> 00:05:06,239 Let's get to 17,000 feet. 119 00:05:06,305 --> 00:05:09,609 TUI1153 request 170. 120 00:05:09,676 --> 00:05:10,910 TUI1153... 121 00:05:10,977 --> 00:05:14,213 Captain Gharbi begins an emergency descent. 122 00:05:10,977 --> 00:05:14,213 Captain Gharbi begins an emergency descent. 123 00:05:14,280 --> 00:05:15,615 Sending 170. 124 00:05:15,682 --> 00:05:18,384 When you have a single-engine flameout, you would descend 125 00:05:15,682 --> 00:05:18,384 When you have a single-engine flameout, you would descend 126 00:05:18,451 --> 00:05:19,619 down to a lower altitude. 127 00:05:19,686 --> 00:05:22,188 The air is thicker, the propeller is more efficient. 128 00:05:22,255 --> 00:05:23,723 Under current conditions, 129 00:05:23,790 --> 00:05:27,026 the ATR 72 can best fly on one engine 130 00:05:23,790 --> 00:05:27,026 the ATR 72 can best fly on one engine 131 00:05:27,093 --> 00:05:30,363 at an altitude of 17,000 feet. 132 00:05:27,093 --> 00:05:30,363 at an altitude of 17,000 feet. 133 00:05:30,430 --> 00:05:34,400 Power lever flight idle, start button. 134 00:05:34,467 --> 00:05:37,370 The crew struggles to restart the right engine. 135 00:05:34,467 --> 00:05:37,370 The crew struggles to restart the right engine. 136 00:05:37,437 --> 00:05:39,939 Negative. 137 00:05:40,006 --> 00:05:42,608 Fuel supply, check. 138 00:05:40,006 --> 00:05:42,608 Fuel supply, check. 139 00:05:42,675 --> 00:05:44,477 But then, less than two minutes 140 00:05:44,544 --> 00:05:46,379 after the first engine quits... 141 00:05:49,615 --> 00:05:50,349 Stop. 142 00:05:50,416 --> 00:05:51,284 Stop. 143 00:05:51,350 --> 00:05:52,552 Engine number one, it's flamed out. 144 00:05:52,618 --> 00:05:54,787 ...both of the plane's engines have stopped. 145 00:05:52,618 --> 00:05:54,787 ...both of the plane's engines have stopped. 146 00:06:01,828 --> 00:06:04,464 The engine shut off. 147 00:06:04,530 --> 00:06:06,699 Our first thought was of a terrorist attack 148 00:06:04,530 --> 00:06:06,699 Our first thought was of a terrorist attack 149 00:06:06,766 --> 00:06:09,302 since there were so many at the time. 150 00:06:09,368 --> 00:06:11,571 We tried to figure out what was happening, 151 00:06:11,637 --> 00:06:14,474 so we looked towards the cockpit to see if someone was 152 00:06:11,637 --> 00:06:14,474 so we looked towards the cockpit to see if someone was 153 00:06:14,540 --> 00:06:16,075 trying to sabotage the plane. 154 00:06:21,748 --> 00:06:24,183 The plane is now falling to the sea 155 00:06:21,748 --> 00:06:24,183 The plane is now falling to the sea 156 00:06:24,250 --> 00:06:26,052 at 800 feet per minute. 157 00:06:26,119 --> 00:06:26,853 Mayday. 158 00:06:26,919 --> 00:06:27,854 Mayday. 159 00:06:27,920 --> 00:06:29,355 Mayday. 160 00:06:29,422 --> 00:06:31,290 TUI1153. 161 00:06:29,422 --> 00:06:31,290 TUI1153. 162 00:06:31,357 --> 00:06:32,759 We have lost both engines. 163 00:06:32,825 --> 00:06:35,361 Request immediate landing at Palermo. 164 00:06:35,428 --> 00:06:37,830 The crew still hopes to reach an airport, 165 00:06:35,428 --> 00:06:37,830 The crew still hopes to reach an airport, 166 00:06:37,897 --> 00:06:40,133 but they have 70 miles of ocean to cross 167 00:06:40,199 --> 00:06:42,635 before they're over land. 168 00:06:40,199 --> 00:06:42,635 before they're over land. 169 00:06:42,702 --> 00:06:45,805 Crews are trained for almost anything. 170 00:06:45,872 --> 00:06:47,507 There's a checklist for them to follow 171 00:06:47,573 --> 00:06:50,009 to solve most problems, including what 172 00:06:47,573 --> 00:06:50,009 to solve most problems, including what 173 00:06:50,076 --> 00:06:51,878 to do when both engines die. 174 00:06:51,944 --> 00:06:52,845 ...checklist. 175 00:06:52,912 --> 00:06:55,081 Fuel supply, check. 176 00:06:52,912 --> 00:06:55,081 Fuel supply, check. 177 00:06:55,148 --> 00:06:57,984 The pilots don't know why their engines have stopped. 178 00:06:58,050 --> 00:07:02,255 The only clue they're getting is a low fuel feed warning. 179 00:06:58,050 --> 00:07:02,255 The only clue they're getting is a low fuel feed warning. 180 00:07:02,321 --> 00:07:04,323 A low pressure warning light tells 181 00:07:04,390 --> 00:07:07,360 a pilot that there's low fuel pressure going to the engine. 182 00:07:04,390 --> 00:07:07,360 a pilot that there's low fuel pressure going to the engine. 183 00:07:07,426 --> 00:07:10,263 Now that could be a mechanical problem or that could 184 00:07:10,329 --> 00:07:12,865 be a contamination problem. 185 00:07:10,329 --> 00:07:12,865 be a contamination problem. 186 00:07:12,932 --> 00:07:14,500 The crew follows the steps 187 00:07:14,567 --> 00:07:18,337 laid out by the manufacturer to relight their dead engines. 188 00:07:14,567 --> 00:07:18,337 laid out by the manufacturer to relight their dead engines. 189 00:07:18,404 --> 00:07:19,972 Fuel supply, check. 190 00:07:20,039 --> 00:07:23,943 Power lever flight idle, start button. 191 00:07:24,010 --> 00:07:26,712 Engine relight, negative. 192 00:07:30,783 --> 00:07:32,385 Get Choukri. 193 00:07:32,451 --> 00:07:34,320 The captain asks the cabin crew 194 00:07:34,387 --> 00:07:37,190 to bring the onboard engineer, Choukri Harbaoui, 195 00:07:34,387 --> 00:07:37,190 to bring the onboard engineer, Choukri Harbaoui, 196 00:07:37,256 --> 00:07:38,791 to the cockpit. 197 00:07:38,858 --> 00:07:39,959 Palermo approach. 198 00:07:40,026 --> 00:07:43,462 This is TUI1153 We have lost both engines. 199 00:07:40,026 --> 00:07:43,462 This is TUI1153 We have lost both engines. 200 00:07:43,529 --> 00:07:45,031 Request immediate landing. 201 00:07:49,135 --> 00:07:51,470 The closest airport is in Palermo on 202 00:07:51,537 --> 00:07:53,806 the Italian island of Sicily. 203 00:07:53,873 --> 00:07:56,609 TUI Palermo. 204 00:07:53,873 --> 00:07:56,609 TUI Palermo. 205 00:07:56,676 --> 00:07:59,111 Affirmative, you are clear for landing. 206 00:07:59,178 --> 00:08:01,781 Palermo approach, what is our distance to the airport? 207 00:07:59,178 --> 00:08:01,781 Palermo approach, what is our distance to the airport? 208 00:08:01,848 --> 00:08:07,854 Your distance to Palermo is now 48 nautical miles. 209 00:08:01,848 --> 00:08:07,854 Your distance to Palermo is now 48 nautical miles. 210 00:08:07,920 --> 00:08:10,790 An ATR 72 will fall from the sky 211 00:08:10,857 --> 00:08:15,828 at a predictable rate, one foot down for every 16 feet forward. 212 00:08:10,857 --> 00:08:15,828 at a predictable rate, one foot down for every 16 feet forward. 213 00:08:20,566 --> 00:08:23,469 If they can't restart their engines soon, 214 00:08:23,536 --> 00:08:25,738 they'll be forced to ditch in the sea. 215 00:08:23,536 --> 00:08:25,738 they'll be forced to ditch in the sea. 216 00:08:30,109 --> 00:08:31,611 Ditching at sea is a very difficult 217 00:08:31,677 --> 00:08:34,480 decision to make because it's the hardest thing to do. 218 00:08:34,547 --> 00:08:39,652 You have swells, waves, wind. 219 00:08:34,547 --> 00:08:39,652 You have swells, waves, wind. 220 00:08:39,719 --> 00:08:41,454 Is anybody going to see you? 221 00:08:41,520 --> 00:08:45,091 How long can the plane float for? 222 00:08:41,520 --> 00:08:45,091 How long can the plane float for? 223 00:08:45,157 --> 00:08:47,226 Landing a passenger plane on water 224 00:08:47,293 --> 00:08:50,263 is extremely dangerous. 225 00:08:47,293 --> 00:08:50,263 is extremely dangerous. 226 00:08:50,329 --> 00:08:53,699 In 1996, an Ethiopian Airlines pilot 227 00:08:53,766 --> 00:08:57,970 was forced to bring his 767 down on the Indian Ocean. 228 00:08:53,766 --> 00:08:57,970 was forced to bring his 767 down on the Indian Ocean. 229 00:08:58,037 --> 00:09:03,309 The ditching was recorded by a tourist on a nearby beach. 230 00:08:58,037 --> 00:09:03,309 The ditching was recorded by a tourist on a nearby beach. 231 00:09:03,376 --> 00:09:07,013 50 people survived, but 125 people died. 232 00:09:03,376 --> 00:09:07,013 50 people survived, but 125 people died. 233 00:09:10,449 --> 00:09:12,818 The crew of this small plane doesn't usually 234 00:09:10,449 --> 00:09:12,818 The crew of this small plane doesn't usually 235 00:09:12,885 --> 00:09:14,387 include an engineer. 236 00:09:14,453 --> 00:09:19,025 When there is one on board, he usually travels in the cabin. 237 00:09:14,453 --> 00:09:19,025 When there is one on board, he usually travels in the cabin. 238 00:09:19,091 --> 00:09:21,427 I remembered this person looked at the stewardess 239 00:09:21,494 --> 00:09:24,764 and shook his head, as if saying no after the second engine 240 00:09:21,494 --> 00:09:24,764 and shook his head, as if saying no after the second engine 241 00:09:24,830 --> 00:09:25,631 had shut off. 242 00:09:40,947 --> 00:09:45,584 That gesture showed there was nothing left to do. 243 00:09:40,947 --> 00:09:45,584 That gesture showed there was nothing left to do. 244 00:09:45,651 --> 00:09:49,655 The crew of flight 1153 has tried all it can. 245 00:09:45,651 --> 00:09:49,655 The crew of flight 1153 has tried all it can. 246 00:09:49,722 --> 00:09:52,091 They're running out of time and options. 247 00:09:54,460 --> 00:09:56,262 Flight engineer, Choukri Harbaoui, 248 00:09:56,329 --> 00:09:58,097 has joined in the struggle to get 249 00:09:58,164 --> 00:10:02,234 flight 1153's engine started. 250 00:09:58,164 --> 00:10:02,234 flight 1153's engine started. 251 00:10:02,301 --> 00:10:03,169 You've run the checklist? 252 00:10:03,235 --> 00:10:05,271 Yes. 253 00:10:03,235 --> 00:10:05,271 Yes. 254 00:10:05,338 --> 00:10:07,073 The captain hopes the engineer 255 00:10:07,139 --> 00:10:10,476 will know something that isn't covered by the checklist. 256 00:10:10,543 --> 00:10:11,844 Attempt to restart the engines. 257 00:10:10,543 --> 00:10:11,844 Attempt to restart the engines. 258 00:10:11,911 --> 00:10:13,245 Right engine first. 259 00:10:13,312 --> 00:10:14,814 Fuel supply, check. 260 00:10:14,880 --> 00:10:17,783 Engine two start power button, on. 261 00:10:14,880 --> 00:10:17,783 Engine two start power button, on. 262 00:10:17,850 --> 00:10:22,154 Engine relight, negative. 263 00:10:22,221 --> 00:10:25,891 Palermo approach, TUI1153. 264 00:10:22,221 --> 00:10:25,891 Palermo approach, TUI1153. 265 00:10:25,958 --> 00:10:29,295 Any closer airport where we can land? 266 00:10:25,958 --> 00:10:29,295 Any closer airport where we can land? 267 00:10:29,362 --> 00:10:32,331 Negative, 1153. 268 00:10:32,398 --> 00:10:35,634 Palermo airport is the closest airport to your position. 269 00:10:32,398 --> 00:10:35,634 Palermo airport is the closest airport to your position. 270 00:10:35,701 --> 00:10:39,171 We're not going to make it. 271 00:10:39,238 --> 00:10:40,373 Prepare to ditch. 272 00:10:43,209 --> 00:10:44,343 Oh my God, be merciful. 273 00:10:51,884 --> 00:10:53,285 No one said anything. 274 00:10:51,884 --> 00:10:53,285 No one said anything. 275 00:10:53,352 --> 00:10:55,621 I noticed something wasn't right because the two 276 00:10:55,688 --> 00:10:57,123 engines shut off. 277 00:10:57,189 --> 00:11:00,292 More than once, I tried to get the stewardess's attention, 278 00:10:57,189 --> 00:11:00,292 More than once, I tried to get the stewardess's attention, 279 00:11:00,359 --> 00:11:02,428 asking what I should do. 280 00:11:02,495 --> 00:11:06,065 If I had to put on the life jacket, if I had to stand, 281 00:11:02,495 --> 00:11:06,065 If I had to put on the life jacket, if I had to stand, 282 00:11:06,132 --> 00:11:08,167 if I should take off my shoes. 283 00:11:08,234 --> 00:11:09,769 I got no answer. 284 00:11:09,835 --> 00:11:11,804 She was in shock and started to cry. 285 00:11:09,835 --> 00:11:11,804 She was in shock and started to cry. 286 00:11:14,940 --> 00:11:16,375 The senior flight attendant 287 00:11:16,442 --> 00:11:18,644 does give passengers direction. 288 00:11:16,442 --> 00:11:18,644 does give passengers direction. 289 00:11:18,711 --> 00:11:23,783 The captain has decided to land the plane at sea. 290 00:11:18,711 --> 00:11:23,783 The captain has decided to land the plane at sea. 291 00:11:27,086 --> 00:11:29,121 I'll let you imagine the panic on board. 292 00:11:27,086 --> 00:11:29,121 I'll let you imagine the panic on board. 293 00:11:29,188 --> 00:11:32,024 People were screaming and crying. 294 00:11:32,091 --> 00:11:35,528 Please, stay calm and follow your crew's instructions. 295 00:11:32,091 --> 00:11:35,528 Please, stay calm and follow your crew's instructions. 296 00:11:38,364 --> 00:11:40,132 There were people in the front seats 297 00:11:40,199 --> 00:11:41,367 that had a baby girl. 298 00:11:40,199 --> 00:11:41,367 that had a baby girl. 299 00:11:41,434 --> 00:11:43,669 She had been playing and was so excited. 300 00:11:43,736 --> 00:11:46,005 To now see the panic in her mother's face 301 00:11:46,072 --> 00:11:49,442 made me feel so sad. 302 00:11:46,072 --> 00:11:49,442 made me feel so sad. 303 00:11:49,508 --> 00:11:55,681 TUI1153, what is your fuel load? 304 00:11:49,508 --> 00:11:55,681 TUI1153, what is your fuel load? 305 00:11:55,748 --> 00:11:59,885 Cockpit fuel quantity 1,800 kilograms. 306 00:11:55,748 --> 00:11:59,885 Cockpit fuel quantity 1,800 kilograms. 307 00:11:59,952 --> 00:12:02,621 Captain Gharbi's fuel gauge shows that he has 308 00:12:02,688 --> 00:12:04,957 plenty of fuel, but for some reason, 309 00:12:05,024 --> 00:12:06,859 neither engine will restart. 310 00:12:05,024 --> 00:12:06,859 neither engine will restart. 311 00:12:06,926 --> 00:12:09,395 Just 10 minutes after the trouble began, 312 00:12:09,462 --> 00:12:13,999 the plane is 7,000 feet above the ocean and falling. 313 00:12:09,462 --> 00:12:13,999 the plane is 7,000 feet above the ocean and falling. 314 00:12:14,066 --> 00:12:16,802 Outside, it's completely silent. 315 00:12:16,869 --> 00:12:19,538 But in the cabin, there's panic. 316 00:12:16,869 --> 00:12:19,538 But in the cabin, there's panic. 317 00:12:19,605 --> 00:12:23,409 Please remain in your seats with your seatbelts fastened. 318 00:12:19,605 --> 00:12:23,409 Please remain in your seats with your seatbelts fastened. 319 00:12:23,476 --> 00:12:24,610 My first instinct 320 00:12:24,677 --> 00:12:26,979 was to undo my seatbelt to prevent getting 321 00:12:27,046 --> 00:12:29,315 trapped when we hit the water. 322 00:12:27,046 --> 00:12:29,315 trapped when we hit the water. 323 00:12:29,381 --> 00:12:31,250 I didn't want to be trapped in my seat 324 00:12:31,317 --> 00:12:32,751 and go down in a horrible way. 325 00:12:35,988 --> 00:12:37,523 Do not inflate your vests 326 00:12:37,590 --> 00:12:39,725 until you've left the plane. 327 00:12:39,792 --> 00:12:41,360 A plane ditching at sea 328 00:12:39,792 --> 00:12:41,360 A plane ditching at sea 329 00:12:41,427 --> 00:12:43,929 will more than likely fill with water. 330 00:12:43,996 --> 00:12:46,632 That's why safety procedures call for passengers 331 00:12:46,699 --> 00:12:51,637 to only inflate their life vests once they've cleared the plane. 332 00:12:46,699 --> 00:12:51,637 to only inflate their life vests once they've cleared the plane. 333 00:12:51,704 --> 00:12:54,373 Otherwise, they could become trapped inside 334 00:12:51,704 --> 00:12:54,373 Otherwise, they could become trapped inside 335 00:12:54,440 --> 00:12:58,244 the flooded fuselage and drown. 336 00:12:58,310 --> 00:13:02,448 The dead engines aren't the only problem confronting the crew. 337 00:12:58,310 --> 00:13:02,448 The dead engines aren't the only problem confronting the crew. 338 00:13:02,515 --> 00:13:06,418 Many of their instruments get their power from the engines. 339 00:13:02,515 --> 00:13:06,418 Many of their instruments get their power from the engines. 340 00:13:06,485 --> 00:13:09,989 Without the engines, some vital gauges are dead. 341 00:13:10,055 --> 00:13:13,592 On a two-engine flameout, you go on your standby instruments, 342 00:13:10,055 --> 00:13:13,592 On a two-engine flameout, you go on your standby instruments, 343 00:13:13,659 --> 00:13:15,427 which is you have an attitude indicator, 344 00:13:15,494 --> 00:13:17,296 you have an altimeter. 345 00:13:15,494 --> 00:13:17,296 you have an altimeter. 346 00:13:17,363 --> 00:13:18,797 Fuel supply, check. 347 00:13:18,864 --> 00:13:21,767 The crew continues to try to restart their engines, 348 00:13:21,834 --> 00:13:25,838 but it's become clear that they've run out of time. 349 00:13:21,834 --> 00:13:25,838 but it's become clear that they've run out of time. 350 00:13:25,905 --> 00:13:27,306 They're not doing anything. 351 00:13:27,373 --> 00:13:28,908 Confirm distance, please. 352 00:13:28,974 --> 00:13:33,646 Your distance is now 20 miles. 353 00:13:28,974 --> 00:13:33,646 Your distance is now 20 miles. 354 00:13:33,712 --> 00:13:34,446 Boats. 355 00:13:34,513 --> 00:13:37,016 I see boats. 356 00:13:34,513 --> 00:13:37,016 I see boats. 357 00:13:37,082 --> 00:13:38,884 Palermo approach. 358 00:13:38,951 --> 00:13:40,920 TUI1153. 359 00:13:40,986 --> 00:13:44,023 We can't make it to the airport. 360 00:13:40,986 --> 00:13:44,023 We can't make it to the airport. 361 00:13:44,089 --> 00:13:46,692 We see two boats on the left side. 362 00:13:46,759 --> 00:13:48,861 We're going there. 363 00:13:46,759 --> 00:13:48,861 We're going there. 364 00:13:48,928 --> 00:13:50,196 If you can, please call. 365 00:13:53,432 --> 00:13:56,268 Captain Gharbi turns his plane toward the boats. 366 00:13:58,771 --> 00:14:00,673 Can you send helicopters or something 367 00:13:58,771 --> 00:14:00,673 Can you send helicopters or something 368 00:14:00,739 --> 00:14:02,908 similar, fast, fast, fast? 369 00:14:02,975 --> 00:14:03,943 Emergency. 370 00:14:04,009 --> 00:14:06,946 All marine units, aircraft in distress 371 00:14:04,009 --> 00:14:06,946 All marine units, aircraft in distress 372 00:14:07,012 --> 00:14:10,916 20 nautical miles off Palermo. 373 00:14:10,983 --> 00:14:13,452 Even before the plane hits the water, 374 00:14:10,983 --> 00:14:13,452 Even before the plane hits the water, 375 00:14:13,519 --> 00:14:15,087 rescuers are on their way. 376 00:14:18,457 --> 00:14:20,492 I had very little information. 377 00:14:20,559 --> 00:14:22,161 We didn't know the nature of the crash 378 00:14:22,228 --> 00:14:25,764 or anything about the plane. 379 00:14:22,228 --> 00:14:25,764 or anything about the plane. 380 00:14:25,831 --> 00:14:27,333 Autopress, dump. 381 00:14:27,399 --> 00:14:28,934 Although it's a rare maneuver, 382 00:14:29,001 --> 00:14:32,304 there is also a checklist for ditching a plane in the water. 383 00:14:29,001 --> 00:14:32,304 there is also a checklist for ditching a plane in the water. 384 00:14:32,371 --> 00:14:33,472 Valve, full close. 385 00:14:33,539 --> 00:14:35,074 Before ditching, the crew 386 00:14:33,539 --> 00:14:35,074 Before ditching, the crew 387 00:14:35,140 --> 00:14:37,977 ensures all landing gear is retracted to help 388 00:14:38,043 --> 00:14:39,511 the plane land more smoothly. 389 00:14:39,578 --> 00:14:42,214 Landing gear lever up. 390 00:14:39,578 --> 00:14:42,214 Landing gear lever up. 391 00:14:42,281 --> 00:14:44,917 When pilots ditch, they want their airplane 392 00:14:44,984 --> 00:14:47,753 as streamlined as possible so that it glides 393 00:14:44,984 --> 00:14:47,753 as streamlined as possible so that it glides 394 00:14:47,820 --> 00:14:50,556 across the water when it hits. 395 00:14:50,623 --> 00:14:54,093 Pilots must not only monitor the systems on the plane, 396 00:14:50,623 --> 00:14:54,093 Pilots must not only monitor the systems on the plane, 397 00:14:54,159 --> 00:14:57,363 they also have to assess conditions at sea. 398 00:14:57,429 --> 00:14:59,965 They don't want to hit a wave head on. 399 00:14:57,429 --> 00:14:59,965 They don't want to hit a wave head on. 400 00:15:00,032 --> 00:15:03,369 If you hit perpendicular to the waves 401 00:15:03,435 --> 00:15:06,839 or swells with the aircraft, it's like hitting concrete. 402 00:15:03,435 --> 00:15:06,839 or swells with the aircraft, it's like hitting concrete. 403 00:15:06,905 --> 00:15:10,142 The plane will break up. 404 00:15:10,209 --> 00:15:13,912 Passengers can see what's coming. 405 00:15:10,209 --> 00:15:13,912 Passengers can see what's coming. 406 00:15:13,979 --> 00:15:16,982 I was hanging on tight to the seat in front of me. 407 00:15:17,049 --> 00:15:19,918 And through the window, I could see the impact was imminent. 408 00:15:17,049 --> 00:15:19,918 And through the window, I could see the impact was imminent. 409 00:15:23,989 --> 00:15:27,293 The crew is 700 feet above the sea. 410 00:15:27,359 --> 00:15:29,295 You're with me, Ali, huh? 411 00:15:27,359 --> 00:15:29,295 You're with me, Ali, huh? 412 00:15:29,361 --> 00:15:31,463 Careful. 413 00:15:31,530 --> 00:15:33,198 Choukri, ready? 414 00:15:33,265 --> 00:15:33,999 Ready. 415 00:15:34,066 --> 00:15:35,868 Here we go. 416 00:15:34,066 --> 00:15:35,868 Here we go. 417 00:15:35,934 --> 00:15:37,303 There is no other God but Allah. 418 00:15:37,369 --> 00:15:39,138 Muhammad is his messenger. 419 00:15:39,204 --> 00:15:41,440 In the name of God merciful, merciful. 420 00:15:39,204 --> 00:15:41,440 In the name of God merciful, merciful. 421 00:15:56,488 --> 00:15:59,191 At a speed of 145 miles an hour, 422 00:15:56,488 --> 00:15:59,191 At a speed of 145 miles an hour, 423 00:15:59,258 --> 00:16:01,560 the plane collides with the sea. 424 00:16:16,475 --> 00:16:18,777 I lost consciousness. 425 00:16:16,475 --> 00:16:18,777 I lost consciousness. 426 00:16:24,717 --> 00:16:26,618 I woke up in the water. 427 00:16:26,685 --> 00:16:29,221 I was two or three meters underwater. 428 00:16:26,685 --> 00:16:29,221 I was two or three meters underwater. 429 00:16:31,957 --> 00:16:34,626 I came up to the surface wearing only my pants. 430 00:16:34,693 --> 00:16:38,464 I had lost my life jacket and clothes on impact. 431 00:16:34,693 --> 00:16:38,464 I had lost my life jacket and clothes on impact. 432 00:16:38,530 --> 00:16:41,934 I got to the surface and grabbed on to a bag. 433 00:16:38,530 --> 00:16:41,934 I got to the surface and grabbed on to a bag. 434 00:16:44,403 --> 00:16:45,604 I was in shock. 435 00:16:45,671 --> 00:16:48,273 I was surrounded by everything. 436 00:16:45,671 --> 00:16:48,273 I was surrounded by everything. 437 00:16:52,044 --> 00:16:54,313 My thoughts were constantly with Paola. 438 00:16:52,044 --> 00:16:54,313 My thoughts were constantly with Paola. 439 00:16:54,380 --> 00:16:57,549 I thought I was going to die because I was spitting blood. 440 00:16:57,616 --> 00:16:59,651 I felt my lungs filling with blood. 441 00:16:57,616 --> 00:16:59,651 I felt my lungs filling with blood. 442 00:17:08,694 --> 00:17:10,362 Captain Gharbi survives 443 00:17:10,429 --> 00:17:12,431 but has been seriously injured. 444 00:17:10,429 --> 00:17:12,431 but has been seriously injured. 445 00:17:12,498 --> 00:17:15,768 Copilot Ali Kebaier has also survived. 446 00:17:15,834 --> 00:17:18,771 But flight engineer Choukri Harbaoui is killed. 447 00:17:15,834 --> 00:17:18,771 But flight engineer Choukri Harbaoui is killed. 448 00:17:21,840 --> 00:17:24,143 No one aboard the nearby boats saw 449 00:17:21,840 --> 00:17:24,143 No one aboard the nearby boats saw 450 00:17:24,209 --> 00:17:28,881 flight 1153 crash into the sea. 451 00:17:28,947 --> 00:17:31,250 The plane is broken into three pieces. 452 00:17:28,947 --> 00:17:31,250 The plane is broken into three pieces. 453 00:17:31,316 --> 00:17:33,619 The tail section and much of the fuselage 454 00:17:33,685 --> 00:17:36,121 sink to the bottom of the sea. 455 00:17:33,685 --> 00:17:36,121 sink to the bottom of the sea. 456 00:17:36,188 --> 00:17:39,191 But the largest section containing the two wings 457 00:17:39,258 --> 00:17:41,360 stays afloat. 458 00:17:39,258 --> 00:17:41,360 stays afloat. 459 00:17:41,427 --> 00:17:46,732 It becomes a makeshift life raft for survivors. 460 00:17:46,799 --> 00:17:49,635 But not all of the passengers have survived. 461 00:17:46,799 --> 00:17:49,635 But not all of the passengers have survived. 462 00:17:49,701 --> 00:17:52,838 Many haven't it made it out of the plane and to the surface. 463 00:17:57,009 --> 00:18:00,078 Helicopter pilot Stefano Burigana is one of the first 464 00:17:57,009 --> 00:18:00,078 Helicopter pilot Stefano Burigana is one of the first 465 00:18:00,145 --> 00:18:02,614 to arrive at the scene. 466 00:18:02,681 --> 00:18:04,516 When we approached the airplane, 467 00:18:04,583 --> 00:18:07,252 we could see the wings floating. 468 00:18:04,583 --> 00:18:07,252 we could see the wings floating. 469 00:18:13,292 --> 00:18:15,494 There were several people in the water 470 00:18:15,561 --> 00:18:19,031 around the aircraft, all floating, 471 00:18:15,561 --> 00:18:19,031 around the aircraft, all floating, 472 00:18:19,097 --> 00:18:24,870 and everybody with their jacket inflated. 473 00:18:19,097 --> 00:18:24,870 and everybody with their jacket inflated. 474 00:18:24,937 --> 00:18:27,606 Burigana spots Luca Squicciarini floating 475 00:18:27,673 --> 00:18:30,242 away from the main wreckage. 476 00:18:27,673 --> 00:18:30,242 away from the main wreckage. 477 00:18:30,309 --> 00:18:33,946 There was one man without his jacket 478 00:18:34,012 --> 00:18:37,182 and he was the farthest from the airplane. 479 00:18:34,012 --> 00:18:37,182 and he was the farthest from the airplane. 480 00:18:37,249 --> 00:18:43,288 I decided to go over him and throw one of our life jackets 481 00:18:37,249 --> 00:18:43,288 I decided to go over him and throw one of our life jackets 482 00:18:43,355 --> 00:18:44,122 to him. 483 00:18:47,826 --> 00:18:49,995 The Coast Guard arrives and begins 484 00:18:50,062 --> 00:18:52,831 pulling survivors from the sea. 485 00:18:52,898 --> 00:18:56,335 Within the hour, the crash site is teeming with rescuers. 486 00:18:52,898 --> 00:18:56,335 Within the hour, the crash site is teeming with rescuers. 487 00:18:56,401 --> 00:18:59,671 They search for survivors from the water and from the air. 488 00:18:56,401 --> 00:18:59,671 They search for survivors from the water and from the air. 489 00:18:59,738 --> 00:19:02,975 23 people are pulled from the Mediterranean sea, 490 00:19:03,041 --> 00:19:09,681 but 16 have died in the crash, including Paola di Cialla. 491 00:19:03,041 --> 00:19:09,681 but 16 have died in the crash, including Paola di Cialla. 492 00:19:09,748 --> 00:19:12,651 It's quite likely that none of those who died ever 493 00:19:09,748 --> 00:19:12,651 It's quite likely that none of those who died ever 494 00:19:12,718 --> 00:19:15,687 had a chance to swim to safety. 495 00:19:15,754 --> 00:19:17,256 Their serious injuries would have 496 00:19:15,754 --> 00:19:17,256 Their serious injuries would have 497 00:19:17,322 --> 00:19:19,925 prevented them from escaping after the plane hit the water. 498 00:19:23,662 --> 00:19:26,131 In this accident, most of the survivors 499 00:19:26,198 --> 00:19:30,335 were seated in the rear of the plane, most 500 00:19:26,198 --> 00:19:30,335 were seated in the rear of the plane, most 501 00:19:30,402 --> 00:19:32,204 of those who died, up front. 502 00:19:35,007 --> 00:19:37,876 Those sections, along with some valuable clues, 503 00:19:35,007 --> 00:19:37,876 Those sections, along with some valuable clues, 504 00:19:37,943 --> 00:19:39,645 are now at the bottom of the sea. 505 00:19:43,749 --> 00:19:46,785 The one section that didn't sink is towed to the port in Palermo 506 00:19:46,852 --> 00:19:49,054 and taken to a nearby hangar. 507 00:19:46,852 --> 00:19:49,054 and taken to a nearby hangar. 508 00:19:55,928 --> 00:19:59,364 A team of agents from Italy's National Flight Safety Agency, 509 00:19:55,928 --> 00:19:59,364 A team of agents from Italy's National Flight Safety Agency, 510 00:19:59,431 --> 00:20:03,435 the ANSV, began looking for leads. 511 00:20:03,502 --> 00:20:04,770 Their job? 512 00:20:04,836 --> 00:20:09,341 Find out why Flight 1153's engines stopped in midflight. 513 00:20:04,836 --> 00:20:09,341 Find out why Flight 1153's engines stopped in midflight. 514 00:20:09,408 --> 00:20:12,911 We need to collect as much as evidence as possible 515 00:20:09,408 --> 00:20:12,911 We need to collect as much as evidence as possible 516 00:20:12,978 --> 00:20:18,383 in order to fulfill two main answers, what happened 517 00:20:12,978 --> 00:20:18,383 in order to fulfill two main answers, what happened 518 00:20:18,450 --> 00:20:21,453 and why had it happened? 519 00:20:21,520 --> 00:20:23,589 They are led by chief ANSV 520 00:20:21,520 --> 00:20:23,589 They are led by chief ANSV 521 00:20:23,655 --> 00:20:25,891 investigator Vincenzo Pennetta. 522 00:20:25,958 --> 00:20:29,061 I arrived in Palermo the day after the accident 523 00:20:25,958 --> 00:20:29,061 I arrived in Palermo the day after the accident 524 00:20:29,127 --> 00:20:33,599 on the seventh, very early in the morning. 525 00:20:33,665 --> 00:20:36,034 A flight test engineer by training, Pennetta 526 00:20:33,665 --> 00:20:36,034 A flight test engineer by training, Pennetta 527 00:20:36,101 --> 00:20:40,339 has led several air crash investigations. 528 00:20:40,405 --> 00:20:44,576 The engines and central fuselage of Tuninter flight 1153 529 00:20:40,405 --> 00:20:44,576 The engines and central fuselage of Tuninter flight 1153 530 00:20:44,643 --> 00:20:47,346 have been recovered. 531 00:20:44,643 --> 00:20:47,346 have been recovered. 532 00:20:47,412 --> 00:20:49,314 The rest of the plane lies somewhere 533 00:20:49,381 --> 00:20:51,183 off the Sicilian coast. 534 00:20:51,249 --> 00:20:53,151 The main challenge of the investigation 535 00:20:51,249 --> 00:20:53,151 The main challenge of the investigation 536 00:20:53,218 --> 00:20:56,688 was the fact that the flight recorder, and the cockpit voice 537 00:20:56,755 --> 00:20:59,191 recorder, and also the front fuselage 538 00:20:56,755 --> 00:20:59,191 recorder, and also the front fuselage 539 00:20:59,257 --> 00:21:03,495 were 1,500 meters under the sea. 540 00:21:03,562 --> 00:21:06,598 While the Italian Navy conducts a deep water search 541 00:21:03,562 --> 00:21:06,598 While the Italian Navy conducts a deep water search 542 00:21:06,665 --> 00:21:10,402 for the rest of the wreck and the crucial black boxes, 543 00:21:10,469 --> 00:21:13,438 Italian investigators are given some assistance by the plane's 544 00:21:10,469 --> 00:21:13,438 Italian investigators are given some assistance by the plane's 545 00:21:13,505 --> 00:21:15,574 European manufacturer. 546 00:21:15,641 --> 00:21:18,143 ATR's Giuseppe Caldarelli is here 547 00:21:15,641 --> 00:21:18,143 ATR's Giuseppe Caldarelli is here 548 00:21:18,210 --> 00:21:22,180 to find out if there's a flaw with the company's plane. 549 00:21:22,247 --> 00:21:25,751 Anytime there is an accident and also when people die, 550 00:21:22,247 --> 00:21:25,751 Anytime there is an accident and also when people die, 551 00:21:25,817 --> 00:21:27,319 for me, is a big accident. 552 00:21:30,589 --> 00:21:33,558 Worldwide, hundreds of ATR 72 seconds 553 00:21:33,625 --> 00:21:36,962 crossed the skies each day. 554 00:21:33,625 --> 00:21:36,962 crossed the skies each day. 555 00:21:37,029 --> 00:21:39,631 Those aircraft have a very sound 556 00:21:39,698 --> 00:21:43,201 structure and robust systems, and are very cost efficient. 557 00:21:39,698 --> 00:21:43,201 structure and robust systems, and are very cost efficient. 558 00:21:45,771 --> 00:21:47,739 Together, Pennetta and Caldarelli 559 00:21:45,771 --> 00:21:47,739 Together, Pennetta and Caldarelli 560 00:21:47,806 --> 00:21:52,010 set to find out why both engines on such an advanced airplane 561 00:21:52,077 --> 00:21:54,780 died in midflight. 562 00:21:52,077 --> 00:21:54,780 died in midflight. 563 00:21:54,846 --> 00:21:56,782 TUI1153. 564 00:21:58,583 --> 00:22:00,452 Before it happens again. 565 00:21:58,583 --> 00:22:00,452 Before it happens again. 566 00:22:04,790 --> 00:22:06,024 Captain Gharbi, how are you? 567 00:22:06,091 --> 00:22:06,925 I'm getting better. 568 00:22:06,992 --> 00:22:08,026 Thank you. 569 00:22:08,093 --> 00:22:09,961 Investigators want to know what 570 00:22:08,093 --> 00:22:09,961 Investigators want to know what 571 00:22:10,028 --> 00:22:13,465 happened in the cockpit of Tuninter flight 1153 572 00:22:13,532 --> 00:22:15,434 when the engines died. 573 00:22:13,532 --> 00:22:15,434 when the engines died. 574 00:22:15,500 --> 00:22:17,469 Without the cockpit voice recorder, 575 00:22:17,536 --> 00:22:20,005 they must rely on the recollections of surviving 576 00:22:20,072 --> 00:22:22,274 passengers and crew members. 577 00:22:20,072 --> 00:22:22,274 passengers and crew members. 578 00:22:22,340 --> 00:22:24,042 The main cause of the double engine failure 579 00:22:24,109 --> 00:22:25,944 could be a lack of fuel. 580 00:22:26,011 --> 00:22:28,480 But according to Captain Chafik Gharbi, 581 00:22:26,011 --> 00:22:28,480 But according to Captain Chafik Gharbi, 582 00:22:28,547 --> 00:22:32,084 lack of fuel was not the problem. 583 00:22:32,150 --> 00:22:34,820 What were your fuel readings? 584 00:22:32,150 --> 00:22:34,820 What were your fuel readings? 585 00:22:34,886 --> 00:22:41,026 The fuel quantity indicator said 1,800 kilograms of fuel. 586 00:22:34,886 --> 00:22:41,026 The fuel quantity indicator said 1,800 kilograms of fuel. 587 00:22:41,093 --> 00:22:42,494 What is your fuel load? 588 00:22:42,561 --> 00:22:46,031 Cockpit fuel quantity 1,800 kilograms. 589 00:22:42,561 --> 00:22:46,031 Cockpit fuel quantity 1,800 kilograms. 590 00:22:46,098 --> 00:22:47,966 Fuel supply, check. 591 00:22:48,033 --> 00:22:52,404 Was there any warning that you were low on fuel? 592 00:22:48,033 --> 00:22:52,404 Was there any warning that you were low on fuel? 593 00:22:52,471 --> 00:22:55,273 There was definitely no low-fuel warning, 594 00:22:55,340 --> 00:22:59,311 just a low feed pressure light. 595 00:22:55,340 --> 00:22:59,311 just a low feed pressure light. 596 00:22:59,377 --> 00:23:01,279 The absence of a low-fuel warning 597 00:23:01,346 --> 00:23:04,015 and the presence of a low feed pressure warning 598 00:23:01,346 --> 00:23:04,015 and the presence of a low feed pressure warning 599 00:23:04,082 --> 00:23:06,785 is a major clue. 600 00:23:06,852 --> 00:23:09,387 This set of alarms usually indicates 601 00:23:06,852 --> 00:23:09,387 This set of alarms usually indicates 602 00:23:09,454 --> 00:23:14,726 that there is a problem in feeding the engine with fuel. 603 00:23:09,454 --> 00:23:14,726 that there is a problem in feeding the engine with fuel. 604 00:23:14,793 --> 00:23:17,696 Since the plane's gauges indicated that there was 605 00:23:17,763 --> 00:23:20,599 fuel on board that did not get to the engines, 606 00:23:20,665 --> 00:23:24,703 ATR's Giuseppe Caldarelli looks for flaws in the fallen plane's 607 00:23:20,665 --> 00:23:24,703 ATR's Giuseppe Caldarelli looks for flaws in the fallen plane's 608 00:23:24,770 --> 00:23:26,204 fuel delivery system. 609 00:23:31,109 --> 00:23:34,813 Four years earlier, an Airbus operated by Air Transat, 610 00:23:31,109 --> 00:23:34,813 Four years earlier, an Airbus operated by Air Transat, 611 00:23:34,880 --> 00:23:36,782 developed a leak in the fuel line that 612 00:23:36,848 --> 00:23:38,483 feeds the plane's right engine. 613 00:23:40,318 --> 00:23:42,921 Over time, the plane leaked all of its fuel 614 00:23:42,988 --> 00:23:44,823 and both engines failed. 615 00:23:42,988 --> 00:23:44,823 and both engines failed. 616 00:23:44,890 --> 00:23:47,092 The pilots were forced to glide their plane 617 00:23:47,159 --> 00:23:50,328 to an emergency landing. 618 00:23:50,395 --> 00:23:52,631 That incident has a lot of similarities 619 00:23:50,395 --> 00:23:52,631 That incident has a lot of similarities 620 00:23:52,697 --> 00:23:54,800 to the Tuninter crash. 621 00:23:54,866 --> 00:23:58,436 His team looks for breaks or blockages in the fuel lines 622 00:23:54,866 --> 00:23:58,436 His team looks for breaks or blockages in the fuel lines 623 00:23:58,503 --> 00:24:01,473 and evidence that the fuel pumps malfunctioned and stopped 624 00:24:01,540 --> 00:24:02,874 fuel flow to the engines. 625 00:24:01,540 --> 00:24:02,874 fuel flow to the engines. 626 00:24:07,112 --> 00:24:10,315 While Caldarelli waits for technicians to complete tests 627 00:24:07,112 --> 00:24:10,315 While Caldarelli waits for technicians to complete tests 628 00:24:10,382 --> 00:24:13,151 on pumps and lines, Pennetta decides 629 00:24:13,218 --> 00:24:15,020 to start a new line of inquiry. 630 00:24:13,218 --> 00:24:15,020 to start a new line of inquiry. 631 00:24:19,424 --> 00:24:22,561 He explores the possibility that the fuel that was on board 632 00:24:19,424 --> 00:24:22,561 He explores the possibility that the fuel that was on board 633 00:24:22,627 --> 00:24:25,030 was somehow contaminated. 634 00:24:25,096 --> 00:24:28,533 Fuel contamination can derive from four 635 00:24:25,096 --> 00:24:28,533 Fuel contamination can derive from four 636 00:24:28,600 --> 00:24:30,235 or five different sources. 637 00:24:34,840 --> 00:24:37,843 Kerosene-based jet fuel is very delicate. 638 00:24:37,909 --> 00:24:40,345 If stored or transferred improperly, 639 00:24:37,909 --> 00:24:40,345 If stored or transferred improperly, 640 00:24:40,412 --> 00:24:42,948 it can be polluted with water, sand, 641 00:24:43,014 --> 00:24:45,884 or fungus, even sticky residue from the hoses 642 00:24:43,014 --> 00:24:45,884 or fungus, even sticky residue from the hoses 643 00:24:45,951 --> 00:24:47,786 of refueling tankers. 644 00:24:47,853 --> 00:24:51,256 Any of these could prevent the fuel from properly igniting 645 00:24:47,853 --> 00:24:51,256 Any of these could prevent the fuel from properly igniting 646 00:24:51,323 --> 00:24:53,792 and could have caused the engines to shut down. 647 00:24:56,728 --> 00:24:57,896 How much fuel are you adding? 648 00:24:57,963 --> 00:24:59,764 400 kilograms. 649 00:24:59,831 --> 00:25:03,902 The plane last took on fuel in Bari. 650 00:24:59,831 --> 00:25:03,902 The plane last took on fuel in Bari. 651 00:25:03,969 --> 00:25:06,137 Samples from the tanker that supplied it 652 00:25:06,204 --> 00:25:08,707 are taken for testing. 653 00:25:08,773 --> 00:25:11,743 Pennetta needs to prove that one of these contaminants 654 00:25:11,810 --> 00:25:15,947 got into flight 1153's fuel, prevented combustion, and 655 00:25:11,810 --> 00:25:15,947 got into flight 1153's fuel, prevented combustion, and 656 00:25:16,014 --> 00:25:19,351 caused both engines to fail. 657 00:25:19,417 --> 00:25:22,387 Sediments can be transferred from the tanker truck 658 00:25:19,417 --> 00:25:22,387 Sediments can be transferred from the tanker truck 659 00:25:22,454 --> 00:25:24,322 to the aircraft. 660 00:25:24,389 --> 00:25:26,925 So the fuel filter can be clogged 661 00:25:24,389 --> 00:25:26,925 So the fuel filter can be clogged 662 00:25:26,992 --> 00:25:31,096 and so the engine can have some problems. 663 00:25:31,162 --> 00:25:34,032 Technicians remove the truck's fuel filters to look 664 00:25:31,162 --> 00:25:34,032 Technicians remove the truck's fuel filters to look 665 00:25:34,099 --> 00:25:35,967 for evidence of contamination. 666 00:25:39,137 --> 00:25:43,008 Hoses and couplings are swabbed for sticky residue or colonies 667 00:25:43,074 --> 00:25:46,678 of microorganisms and submitted for testing at an Italian Air 668 00:25:43,074 --> 00:25:46,678 of microorganisms and submitted for testing at an Italian Air 669 00:25:46,745 --> 00:25:47,812 Force laboratory. 670 00:25:52,284 --> 00:25:54,452 The fuel is filtered for minute particles 671 00:25:54,519 --> 00:25:55,954 suspended in the fluid. 672 00:26:01,993 --> 00:26:04,262 And carefully examined for impurities. 673 00:26:01,993 --> 00:26:04,262 And carefully examined for impurities. 674 00:26:12,270 --> 00:26:15,040 The truck's filters are also inspected for residue 675 00:26:12,270 --> 00:26:15,040 The truck's filters are also inspected for residue 676 00:26:15,106 --> 00:26:16,408 or sediment from the tanks. 677 00:26:19,844 --> 00:26:23,248 Meanwhile, in Palermo, Caldarelli and his technicians 678 00:26:19,844 --> 00:26:23,248 Meanwhile, in Palermo, Caldarelli and his technicians 679 00:26:23,315 --> 00:26:28,653 have completed tests on flight 1153's fuel lines and pumps. 680 00:26:23,315 --> 00:26:28,653 have completed tests on flight 1153's fuel lines and pumps. 681 00:26:28,720 --> 00:26:31,556 The tests are thorough, the results conclusive. 682 00:26:35,126 --> 00:26:40,932 But the fuel feed lines were OK, were no leak. 683 00:26:35,126 --> 00:26:40,932 But the fuel feed lines were OK, were no leak. 684 00:26:40,999 --> 00:26:44,135 If the fuel delivery system was working 685 00:26:44,202 --> 00:26:46,671 and the two pilots remember having ample fuel... 686 00:26:44,202 --> 00:26:46,671 and the two pilots remember having ample fuel... 687 00:26:46,738 --> 00:26:52,277 The fuel quantity indicator said 1,800 kilograms of fuel. 688 00:26:46,738 --> 00:26:52,277 The fuel quantity indicator said 1,800 kilograms of fuel. 689 00:26:52,344 --> 00:26:54,279 ...then why had the engines failed? 690 00:26:56,915 --> 00:27:00,151 When test results from the Bari fuel tanker come in, 691 00:27:00,218 --> 00:27:02,053 they, too, are conclusive. 692 00:27:02,120 --> 00:27:04,823 The fuel filters, hose couplings, and tanker 693 00:27:02,120 --> 00:27:04,823 The fuel filters, hose couplings, and tanker 694 00:27:04,889 --> 00:27:07,926 fuel at Bari airport are clean. 695 00:27:07,993 --> 00:27:12,097 So fuel contamination as a source of double engine 696 00:27:07,993 --> 00:27:12,097 So fuel contamination as a source of double engine 697 00:27:12,163 --> 00:27:14,532 flameout was then excluded. 698 00:27:14,599 --> 00:27:16,501 At this point, the investigators 699 00:27:14,599 --> 00:27:16,501 At this point, the investigators 700 00:27:16,568 --> 00:27:18,737 still don't know what caused the downing 701 00:27:18,803 --> 00:27:22,207 of Tuninter flight 1153. 702 00:27:18,803 --> 00:27:22,207 of Tuninter flight 1153. 703 00:27:22,273 --> 00:27:24,309 But something has been eating at Pennetta. 704 00:27:28,780 --> 00:27:31,116 If the plane was filled with fuel, 705 00:27:31,182 --> 00:27:34,519 and since the fuel is stored in the plane's wings, 706 00:27:31,182 --> 00:27:34,519 and since the fuel is stored in the plane's wings, 707 00:27:34,586 --> 00:27:36,821 why did the wing section float? 708 00:27:36,888 --> 00:27:40,258 Floating on the wing indicates that the weight of the wing 709 00:27:36,888 --> 00:27:40,258 Floating on the wing indicates that the weight of the wing 710 00:27:40,325 --> 00:27:41,659 was not so high. 711 00:27:41,726 --> 00:27:46,197 We have been told by ATR that if the amount of fuel that was 712 00:27:41,726 --> 00:27:46,197 We have been told by ATR that if the amount of fuel that was 713 00:27:46,264 --> 00:27:50,335 supposed to be into the wing, around 2,000 kilograms, 714 00:27:50,402 --> 00:27:55,373 were on the fuel tanks, the wings maybe would 715 00:27:50,402 --> 00:27:55,373 were on the fuel tanks, the wings maybe would 716 00:27:55,440 --> 00:27:57,909 not have been able to float. 717 00:27:55,440 --> 00:27:57,909 not have been able to float. 718 00:27:57,976 --> 00:28:00,779 Pennetta suspects the plane didn't have as much fuel 719 00:28:00,845 --> 00:28:06,184 as the pilots thought, but he doesn't know how that could be. 720 00:28:00,845 --> 00:28:06,184 as the pilots thought, but he doesn't know how that could be. 721 00:28:06,251 --> 00:28:08,887 Two weeks into the investigation, Pennetta 722 00:28:06,251 --> 00:28:08,887 Two weeks into the investigation, Pennetta 723 00:28:08,953 --> 00:28:11,523 gets an important lead in the case. 724 00:28:11,589 --> 00:28:13,458 After two weeks of the event, we 725 00:28:13,525 --> 00:28:16,094 received some technical documentation 726 00:28:13,525 --> 00:28:16,094 received some technical documentation 727 00:28:16,161 --> 00:28:18,963 from the aircraft operator. 728 00:28:19,030 --> 00:28:21,299 According to the logs, Captain Gharbi 729 00:28:19,030 --> 00:28:21,299 According to the logs, Captain Gharbi 730 00:28:21,366 --> 00:28:26,504 flew the same aircraft the day before the accident. 731 00:28:26,571 --> 00:28:31,476 After that flight, he reported a problem with his fuel gauge. 732 00:28:26,571 --> 00:28:31,476 After that flight, he reported a problem with his fuel gauge. 733 00:28:31,543 --> 00:28:34,279 When he left the aircraft the day before, 734 00:28:31,543 --> 00:28:34,279 When he left the aircraft the day before, 735 00:28:34,345 --> 00:28:37,515 he reported that the right display fuel 736 00:28:37,582 --> 00:28:39,417 indicator was out of service. 737 00:28:37,582 --> 00:28:39,417 indicator was out of service. 738 00:28:39,484 --> 00:28:41,553 So it needed to be replaced. 739 00:28:41,619 --> 00:28:44,489 The fuel quantity indicator, or FQI, 740 00:28:44,556 --> 00:28:48,593 is a gas gauge that tells pilots how much fuel is left on board. 741 00:28:44,556 --> 00:28:48,593 is a gas gauge that tells pilots how much fuel is left on board. 742 00:28:52,130 --> 00:28:54,999 The lights on the FQI were malfunctioning 743 00:28:55,066 --> 00:28:59,804 and Captain Gharbi made a note of this in the maintenance log. 744 00:28:55,066 --> 00:28:59,804 and Captain Gharbi made a note of this in the maintenance log. 745 00:28:59,871 --> 00:29:01,739 We were able to see that the fuel 746 00:29:01,806 --> 00:29:06,644 quantity indicator was changed the day before the event. 747 00:29:01,806 --> 00:29:06,644 quantity indicator was changed the day before the event. 748 00:29:06,711 --> 00:29:09,280 The maintenance log raises the possibility 749 00:29:06,711 --> 00:29:09,280 The maintenance log raises the possibility 750 00:29:09,347 --> 00:29:12,283 that the FQI that the mechanic installed 751 00:29:12,350 --> 00:29:14,819 was not the right one for the plane. 752 00:29:12,350 --> 00:29:14,819 was not the right one for the plane. 753 00:29:14,886 --> 00:29:18,490 It doesn't seem to have the right model number. 754 00:29:18,556 --> 00:29:22,527 Tuninter flies two models of ATR aircraft, the ATR 755 00:29:18,556 --> 00:29:22,527 Tuninter flies two models of ATR aircraft, the ATR 756 00:29:22,594 --> 00:29:26,631 42 and the larger ATR 72. 757 00:29:30,935 --> 00:29:33,371 The fuel quantity indicators for each plane 758 00:29:30,935 --> 00:29:33,371 The fuel quantity indicators for each plane 759 00:29:33,438 --> 00:29:36,474 look identical except for a different model number 760 00:29:36,541 --> 00:29:39,344 at the top of each unit. 761 00:29:36,541 --> 00:29:39,344 at the top of each unit. 762 00:29:39,410 --> 00:29:45,016 The ATR 72 should have model number 2500. 763 00:29:39,410 --> 00:29:45,016 The ATR 72 should have model number 2500. 764 00:29:45,083 --> 00:29:47,352 But according to the logs, mechanics 765 00:29:47,418 --> 00:29:53,791 installed a unit with the model number 2250 instead. 766 00:29:47,418 --> 00:29:53,791 installed a unit with the model number 2250 instead. 767 00:29:53,858 --> 00:29:57,996 Tuninter's maintenance logs offer a valuable clue. 768 00:29:53,858 --> 00:29:57,996 Tuninter's maintenance logs offer a valuable clue. 769 00:29:58,062 --> 00:30:00,932 But for Pennetta, there's no definitive proof 770 00:30:00,999 --> 00:30:02,934 that the wrong fuel quantity indicator 771 00:30:00,999 --> 00:30:02,934 that the wrong fuel quantity indicator 772 00:30:03,001 --> 00:30:05,503 was installed on the plane. 773 00:30:05,570 --> 00:30:09,474 It could have been a mismatch in that aircraft documentation, 774 00:30:05,570 --> 00:30:09,474 It could have been a mismatch in that aircraft documentation, 775 00:30:09,541 --> 00:30:11,409 so we need to prove that. 776 00:30:14,979 --> 00:30:16,681 There is only one way to know for certain 777 00:30:16,748 --> 00:30:19,384 whether flight 1153 had the right fuel 778 00:30:19,450 --> 00:30:25,523 quantity indicator, go find it at the bottom of the sea. 779 00:30:19,450 --> 00:30:25,523 quantity indicator, go find it at the bottom of the sea. 780 00:30:30,061 --> 00:30:33,865 Not until three weeks after the crash of Flight 1153 do 781 00:30:33,932 --> 00:30:37,535 investigators recover wreckage from the sea. 782 00:30:33,932 --> 00:30:37,535 investigators recover wreckage from the sea. 783 00:30:37,602 --> 00:30:39,571 The data from the plane's black boxes 784 00:30:39,637 --> 00:30:43,107 confirms what the pilots had been saying. 785 00:30:39,637 --> 00:30:43,107 confirms what the pilots had been saying. 786 00:30:43,174 --> 00:30:45,243 There was no warning of low fuel, 787 00:30:45,310 --> 00:30:49,447 so there appeared to be enough fuel to make the flight. 788 00:30:45,310 --> 00:30:49,447 so there appeared to be enough fuel to make the flight. 789 00:30:49,514 --> 00:30:54,285 The black boxes can't solve this mystery. 790 00:30:49,514 --> 00:30:54,285 The black boxes can't solve this mystery. 791 00:30:54,352 --> 00:30:59,290 Investigators hope that the tail and front section can. 792 00:30:54,352 --> 00:30:59,290 Investigators hope that the tail and front section can. 793 00:30:59,357 --> 00:31:02,160 They are hauled aboard a Naval vessel from the sea. 794 00:31:09,567 --> 00:31:14,272 The moment the cockpit is hauled in, Pennetta is there. 795 00:31:09,567 --> 00:31:14,272 The moment the cockpit is hauled in, Pennetta is there. 796 00:31:14,339 --> 00:31:19,444 There's only one thing he wants to see inside. 797 00:31:14,339 --> 00:31:19,444 There's only one thing he wants to see inside. 798 00:31:22,880 --> 00:31:26,117 So when the wreckage was recovered from under the sea 799 00:31:26,184 --> 00:31:28,253 and put on a ship deck, I realized 800 00:31:28,319 --> 00:31:31,256 that as a matter of fact, a fuel quantity indicator 801 00:31:28,319 --> 00:31:31,256 that as a matter of fact, a fuel quantity indicator 802 00:31:31,322 --> 00:31:34,192 for an ATR 42 was installed. 803 00:31:34,259 --> 00:31:38,196 It was like we found the smoking gun. 804 00:31:34,259 --> 00:31:38,196 It was like we found the smoking gun. 805 00:31:38,263 --> 00:31:43,835 The wrong FQI was installed on flight 1153. 806 00:31:38,263 --> 00:31:43,835 The wrong FQI was installed on flight 1153. 807 00:31:43,901 --> 00:31:46,371 Pennetta finally has the break he's been looking for. 808 00:31:48,973 --> 00:31:51,409 The ATR's fuel quantity indicator 809 00:31:51,476 --> 00:31:54,312 collects data from the sensors in the fuel tanks 810 00:31:51,476 --> 00:31:54,312 collects data from the sensors in the fuel tanks 811 00:31:54,379 --> 00:31:57,882 and calculates how much fuel is in the tanks. 812 00:31:57,949 --> 00:32:01,286 But since the fuel tanks on the 42 and the 72 813 00:31:57,949 --> 00:32:01,286 But since the fuel tanks on the 42 and the 72 814 00:32:01,352 --> 00:32:04,622 are different sizes, fuel quantity indicators 815 00:32:01,352 --> 00:32:04,622 are different sizes, fuel quantity indicators 816 00:32:04,689 --> 00:32:06,991 can't be swapped between them. 817 00:32:09,994 --> 00:32:12,297 Technicians conduct refueling tests 818 00:32:09,994 --> 00:32:12,297 Technicians conduct refueling tests 819 00:32:12,363 --> 00:32:20,004 with the wrong FQI installed on an ATR 72 820 00:32:12,363 --> 00:32:20,004 with the wrong FQI installed on an ATR 72 821 00:32:20,071 --> 00:32:22,974 and the results are chilling. 822 00:32:20,071 --> 00:32:22,974 and the results are chilling. 823 00:32:23,041 --> 00:32:29,080 The results show that if you install an FQI type, we'll say 824 00:32:23,041 --> 00:32:29,080 The results show that if you install an FQI type, we'll say 825 00:32:29,147 --> 00:32:35,820 42, on an ATR 72 aircraft, if I have no fuel into the aircraft 826 00:32:29,147 --> 00:32:35,820 42, on an ATR 72 aircraft, if I have no fuel into the aircraft 827 00:32:35,887 --> 00:32:38,122 in the fuel tanks with zero fuel, 828 00:32:38,189 --> 00:32:43,361 the fuel quantity indicator showed me 1,800 kilograms. 829 00:32:38,189 --> 00:32:43,361 the fuel quantity indicator showed me 1,800 kilograms. 830 00:32:43,428 --> 00:32:45,263 Precisely the amount of fuel 831 00:32:45,330 --> 00:32:48,666 that the captain reported having when his engines flamed out. 832 00:32:45,330 --> 00:32:48,666 that the captain reported having when his engines flamed out. 833 00:32:48,733 --> 00:32:53,104 Cockpit fuel quantity eight, 1,800 kilograms. 834 00:32:48,733 --> 00:32:53,104 Cockpit fuel quantity eight, 1,800 kilograms. 835 00:32:53,171 --> 00:32:58,109 Investigators conclude at 23,000 feet above the Mediterranean, 836 00:32:58,176 --> 00:33:00,578 the wrong fuel indicator led the crew 837 00:32:58,176 --> 00:33:00,578 the wrong fuel indicator led the crew 838 00:33:00,645 --> 00:33:04,048 to believe that they had ample fuel when their tanks were 839 00:33:04,115 --> 00:33:05,550 actually empty. 840 00:33:04,115 --> 00:33:05,550 actually empty. 841 00:33:05,616 --> 00:33:08,653 Engine relight, negative. 842 00:33:08,720 --> 00:33:10,188 They're not doing anything. 843 00:33:10,254 --> 00:33:13,491 The engines could not possibly have been restarted. 844 00:33:10,254 --> 00:33:13,491 The engines could not possibly have been restarted. 845 00:33:13,558 --> 00:33:18,596 With hundreds of ATR 42s and ATR 72s still flying, 846 00:33:13,558 --> 00:33:18,596 With hundreds of ATR 42s and ATR 72s still flying, 847 00:33:18,663 --> 00:33:21,065 the implications are stark, 848 00:33:21,132 --> 00:33:22,533 Could there be other planes 849 00:33:21,132 --> 00:33:22,533 Could there be other planes 850 00:33:22,600 --> 00:33:25,036 flying with the wrong gauge? 851 00:33:25,103 --> 00:33:26,604 The first safety recommendation 852 00:33:26,671 --> 00:33:35,046 was to mandate all operators that use ATR 42 and 72 aircraft 853 00:33:26,671 --> 00:33:35,046 was to mandate all operators that use ATR 42 and 72 aircraft 854 00:33:26,671 --> 00:33:35,046 was to mandate all operators that use ATR 42 and 72 aircraft 855 00:33:35,113 --> 00:33:38,750 in their fleet to check whether the right fuel 856 00:33:38,816 --> 00:33:43,588 quantity indicator was installed on the aircraft. 857 00:33:38,816 --> 00:33:43,588 quantity indicator was installed on the aircraft. 858 00:33:43,654 --> 00:33:45,623 Pennetta and Caldarelli have uncovered 859 00:33:45,690 --> 00:33:48,359 the error that caused both of flight 1153's 860 00:33:45,690 --> 00:33:48,359 the error that caused both of flight 1153's 861 00:33:48,426 --> 00:33:50,228 engines to quit in midair. 862 00:33:58,703 --> 00:34:01,139 But the case isn't closed. 863 00:34:01,205 --> 00:34:03,141 Standard flight procedures should 864 00:34:03,207 --> 00:34:05,376 have uncovered the error before takeoff 865 00:34:03,207 --> 00:34:05,376 have uncovered the error before takeoff 866 00:34:05,443 --> 00:34:06,778 and prevented the disaster. 867 00:34:10,448 --> 00:34:14,051 Captain Gharbi's aircraft went in for repairs in Tunisia 868 00:34:10,448 --> 00:34:14,051 Captain Gharbi's aircraft went in for repairs in Tunisia 869 00:34:14,118 --> 00:34:17,221 the night before the crash. 870 00:34:14,118 --> 00:34:17,221 the night before the crash. 871 00:34:17,288 --> 00:34:21,225 The plane's FQI indicated the two tanks together held 790 872 00:34:21,292 --> 00:34:24,996 kilograms of fuel in the tank. 873 00:34:21,292 --> 00:34:24,996 kilograms of fuel in the tank. 874 00:34:25,062 --> 00:34:28,533 After the new fuel quantity indicator was installed, 875 00:34:25,062 --> 00:34:28,533 After the new fuel quantity indicator was installed, 876 00:34:28,599 --> 00:34:31,335 it showed that there was almost four times as much 877 00:34:31,402 --> 00:34:37,141 fuel on board, 3,100 kilograms. 878 00:34:31,402 --> 00:34:37,141 fuel on board, 3,100 kilograms. 879 00:34:37,208 --> 00:34:40,411 The following morning, Captain Gharbi noticed that the fuel 880 00:34:40,478 --> 00:34:41,946 levels had gone up. 881 00:34:40,478 --> 00:34:41,946 levels had gone up. 882 00:34:42,013 --> 00:34:45,349 He assumed that fuel had been added. 883 00:34:45,416 --> 00:34:47,985 But when fuel is added to an aircraft, 884 00:34:45,416 --> 00:34:47,985 But when fuel is added to an aircraft, 885 00:34:48,052 --> 00:34:51,289 a refueling slip must be left in the cockpit. 886 00:34:51,355 --> 00:34:53,825 Where is the refueling slip? 887 00:34:51,355 --> 00:34:53,825 Where is the refueling slip? 888 00:34:53,891 --> 00:34:56,794 The pilot asked to the flight dispatcher, 889 00:34:56,861 --> 00:34:58,563 where was this refueling slip? 890 00:34:56,861 --> 00:34:58,563 where was this refueling slip? 891 00:34:58,629 --> 00:35:01,766 But the flight dispatcher was not able to find 892 00:35:01,833 --> 00:35:03,901 this refueling slip. 893 00:35:03,968 --> 00:35:06,671 I'll get it to you when you get back from Djerba. 894 00:35:03,968 --> 00:35:06,671 I'll get it to you when you get back from Djerba. 895 00:35:06,737 --> 00:35:09,106 Roger that. 896 00:35:09,173 --> 00:35:12,076 There was no refueling slip because the plane 897 00:35:09,173 --> 00:35:12,076 There was no refueling slip because the plane 898 00:35:12,143 --> 00:35:14,145 hadn't been refueled. 899 00:35:17,515 --> 00:35:19,750 In spite of regulations, the captain 900 00:35:19,817 --> 00:35:24,255 left without that vital piece of paper. 901 00:35:19,817 --> 00:35:24,255 left without that vital piece of paper. 902 00:35:24,322 --> 00:35:26,891 There are some standard regulations requiring 903 00:35:26,958 --> 00:35:31,629 the pilot to take off only when he is sure about the quantity 904 00:35:26,958 --> 00:35:31,629 the pilot to take off only when he is sure about the quantity 905 00:35:31,696 --> 00:35:34,131 of fuel. 906 00:35:34,198 --> 00:35:36,434 With the wrong fuel indicator on board 907 00:35:34,198 --> 00:35:36,434 With the wrong fuel indicator on board 908 00:35:36,501 --> 00:35:40,004 and less fuel than he believed, Captain Gharbi 909 00:35:40,071 --> 00:35:44,408 makes it to Bari, Italy, and tops off 910 00:35:40,071 --> 00:35:44,408 makes it to Bari, Italy, and tops off 911 00:35:44,475 --> 00:35:47,078 his plane for the next leg of the trip to Djerba. 912 00:35:44,475 --> 00:35:47,078 his plane for the next leg of the trip to Djerba. 913 00:35:52,116 --> 00:35:53,117 How much fuel are you adding? 914 00:35:52,116 --> 00:35:53,117 How much fuel are you adding? 915 00:35:53,184 --> 00:35:55,286 400 kilograms. 916 00:35:55,353 --> 00:35:56,554 2,700 total? 917 00:35:56,621 --> 00:35:57,922 Yes. 918 00:35:57,989 --> 00:36:02,093 Believing he has 2,700 kilograms of fuel on board, 919 00:35:57,989 --> 00:36:02,093 Believing he has 2,700 kilograms of fuel on board, 920 00:36:02,159 --> 00:36:06,097 Captain Gharbi begins his flight to Djerba. 921 00:36:02,159 --> 00:36:06,097 Captain Gharbi begins his flight to Djerba. 922 00:36:06,163 --> 00:36:09,634 If the correct fuel quantity indicator had been installed, 923 00:36:09,700 --> 00:36:11,168 the captain would have known that he 924 00:36:09,700 --> 00:36:11,168 the captain would have known that he 925 00:36:11,235 --> 00:36:15,373 had only 540 kilograms, not nearly 926 00:36:15,439 --> 00:36:17,608 enough to make the crossing. 927 00:36:15,439 --> 00:36:17,608 enough to make the crossing. 928 00:36:17,675 --> 00:36:18,409 Mayday. 929 00:36:18,476 --> 00:36:19,210 Mayday. 930 00:36:19,277 --> 00:36:20,545 Mayday. 931 00:36:20,611 --> 00:36:23,915 TUI1153 request immediate landing in Palermo. 932 00:36:20,611 --> 00:36:23,915 TUI1153 request immediate landing in Palermo. 933 00:36:23,981 --> 00:36:25,650 We've lost both engines. 934 00:36:35,660 --> 00:36:38,462 Pennetta's investigation comes to a close. 935 00:36:38,529 --> 00:36:41,399 He draws up his final report. 936 00:36:38,529 --> 00:36:41,399 He draws up his final report. 937 00:36:41,465 --> 00:36:46,437 His colleague, Giuseppe Caldarelli, voices a bold view. 938 00:36:46,504 --> 00:36:49,473 Even with no fuel and dead engines, 939 00:36:49,540 --> 00:36:53,578 Flight 1153 could have made it to land. 940 00:36:49,540 --> 00:36:53,578 Flight 1153 could have made it to land. 941 00:36:53,644 --> 00:36:57,181 The aircraft was in a position that 942 00:36:57,248 --> 00:36:59,016 allowed it to reach Palermo. 943 00:36:57,248 --> 00:36:59,016 allowed it to reach Palermo. 944 00:36:59,083 --> 00:37:00,952 TUI1153. 945 00:37:01,018 --> 00:37:03,187 Caldarelli wonders if the pilots 946 00:37:03,254 --> 00:37:05,423 did everything they could have to get 947 00:37:03,254 --> 00:37:05,423 did everything they could have to get 948 00:37:05,489 --> 00:37:07,391 the plane safely to Palermo. 949 00:37:07,458 --> 00:37:10,227 Investigators get some unexpected answers 950 00:37:10,294 --> 00:37:13,598 by having seasoned pilots fly the exact same plane 951 00:37:10,294 --> 00:37:13,598 by having seasoned pilots fly the exact same plane 952 00:37:13,664 --> 00:37:15,533 with the exact same problems. 953 00:37:15,600 --> 00:37:18,636 OK, we are now in big trouble because this second engine 954 00:37:15,600 --> 00:37:18,636 OK, we are now in big trouble because this second engine 955 00:37:18,703 --> 00:37:19,637 has gone off. 956 00:37:23,441 --> 00:37:26,344 Vincenzo Pennetta's investigation into the crash 957 00:37:26,410 --> 00:37:29,981 of Tuninter Flight 1153 has uncovered the events 958 00:37:26,410 --> 00:37:29,981 of Tuninter Flight 1153 has uncovered the events 959 00:37:30,047 --> 00:37:32,216 that led up to the accident. 960 00:37:32,283 --> 00:37:36,621 Now he and Giuseppe Caldarelli need to resolve one question. 961 00:37:32,283 --> 00:37:36,621 Now he and Giuseppe Caldarelli need to resolve one question. 962 00:37:36,687 --> 00:37:38,055 We're not going to make it. 963 00:37:38,122 --> 00:37:40,391 Did mistakes made by the pilots 964 00:37:38,122 --> 00:37:40,391 Did mistakes made by the pilots 965 00:37:40,458 --> 00:37:42,259 cost people their lives? 966 00:37:44,128 --> 00:37:48,532 Caldarelli and his team study the plane's specifications 967 00:37:44,128 --> 00:37:48,532 Caldarelli and his team study the plane's specifications 968 00:37:48,599 --> 00:37:52,336 and draw a surprising conclusion. 969 00:37:48,599 --> 00:37:52,336 and draw a surprising conclusion. 970 00:37:52,403 --> 00:37:55,439 According to manufacturer data, an ATR 971 00:37:55,506 --> 00:38:02,747 is able to glide three miles for every 1,000 feet of descent. 972 00:37:55,506 --> 00:38:02,747 is able to glide three miles for every 1,000 feet of descent. 973 00:38:02,813 --> 00:38:04,949 With the help of a tailwind that day, 974 00:38:02,813 --> 00:38:04,949 With the help of a tailwind that day, 975 00:38:05,016 --> 00:38:11,022 Flight 1153 could have been able to glide 70 miles to Palermo. 976 00:38:05,016 --> 00:38:11,022 Flight 1153 could have been able to glide 70 miles to Palermo. 977 00:38:11,088 --> 00:38:15,026 The crew might have been able to make it. 978 00:38:15,092 --> 00:38:17,161 Landing gear lever up. 979 00:38:15,092 --> 00:38:17,161 Landing gear lever up. 980 00:38:17,228 --> 00:38:19,430 So what had the pilots done wrong? 981 00:38:24,368 --> 00:38:27,405 To answer that question, Pennetta and Caldarelli 982 00:38:27,471 --> 00:38:30,908 recreate flight 1153 in the flight simulator 983 00:38:27,471 --> 00:38:30,908 recreate flight 1153 in the flight simulator 984 00:38:30,975 --> 00:38:33,811 at the ATR facility in France. 985 00:38:38,582 --> 00:38:42,720 Test pilots try to glide an ATR 72 for 70 miles 986 00:38:38,582 --> 00:38:42,720 Test pilots try to glide an ATR 72 for 70 miles 987 00:38:42,787 --> 00:38:44,588 from the altitude at which flight 988 00:38:44,655 --> 00:38:46,924 1153 lost its second engine. 989 00:38:44,655 --> 00:38:46,924 1153 lost its second engine. 990 00:38:54,365 --> 00:38:56,534 The simulation was requested to see 991 00:38:56,600 --> 00:38:59,904 the range of the aircraft starting from the second engine 992 00:38:56,600 --> 00:38:59,904 the range of the aircraft starting from the second engine 993 00:38:59,970 --> 00:39:01,105 out. 994 00:39:01,172 --> 00:39:05,176 Double-engine flameouts, you have to be very aware 995 00:39:01,172 --> 00:39:05,176 Double-engine flameouts, you have to be very aware 996 00:39:05,242 --> 00:39:09,346 of the configuration of the aircraft in order to keep 997 00:39:09,413 --> 00:39:12,850 as much as possible the altitude and distance 998 00:39:09,413 --> 00:39:12,850 as much as possible the altitude and distance 999 00:39:12,917 --> 00:39:14,385 to fly before the crash. 1000 00:39:15,953 --> 00:39:17,321 Stop! Stop! 1001 00:39:15,953 --> 00:39:17,321 Stop! Stop! 1002 00:39:17,388 --> 00:39:18,489 Engine number one has flamed out. 1003 00:39:18,556 --> 00:39:21,158 With both engines out, the priority 1004 00:39:21,225 --> 00:39:24,895 is to keep the plane gliding as far as necessary. 1005 00:39:21,225 --> 00:39:24,895 is to keep the plane gliding as far as necessary. 1006 00:39:24,962 --> 00:39:29,133 To do that, pilots can change the angle of their windmilling 1007 00:39:24,962 --> 00:39:29,133 To do that, pilots can change the angle of their windmilling 1008 00:39:29,200 --> 00:39:30,267 propellers. 1009 00:39:30,334 --> 00:39:32,436 You have the maximum glide performance 1010 00:39:32,503 --> 00:39:34,505 when you minimize the drag. 1011 00:39:32,503 --> 00:39:34,505 when you minimize the drag. 1012 00:39:34,572 --> 00:39:37,742 It's very important to think to feather the propeller 1013 00:39:37,808 --> 00:39:40,344 in order to reduce the drag. 1014 00:39:37,808 --> 00:39:40,344 in order to reduce the drag. 1015 00:39:40,411 --> 00:39:42,613 Feathering the props involves changing 1016 00:39:42,680 --> 00:39:46,150 their angle against the wind. 1017 00:39:42,680 --> 00:39:46,150 their angle against the wind. 1018 00:39:46,217 --> 00:39:47,885 The maneuver reduces drag. 1019 00:39:50,554 --> 00:39:53,424 When you want to feather the propeller in flight, 1020 00:39:50,554 --> 00:39:53,424 When you want to feather the propeller in flight, 1021 00:39:53,491 --> 00:39:55,526 you first have to reduce the power 1022 00:39:55,593 --> 00:39:57,762 lever to idle and put the condition 1023 00:39:57,828 --> 00:40:00,564 lever back to feather position. 1024 00:39:57,828 --> 00:40:00,564 lever back to feather position. 1025 00:40:00,631 --> 00:40:02,900 The crew did not feather their props 1026 00:40:02,967 --> 00:40:05,669 when their engines quit. 1027 00:40:02,967 --> 00:40:05,669 when their engines quit. 1028 00:40:05,736 --> 00:40:08,706 The windmilling propellers created enormous drag. 1029 00:40:11,976 --> 00:40:15,946 If the crew of flight 1153 had feathered their props, 1030 00:40:16,013 --> 00:40:20,284 they may have been able to glide further than they did. 1031 00:40:20,351 --> 00:40:23,888 By the time Captain Gharbi's second engine flamed out, 1032 00:40:20,351 --> 00:40:23,888 By the time Captain Gharbi's second engine flamed out, 1033 00:40:23,954 --> 00:40:27,424 he was just below 22,000 feet. 1034 00:40:27,491 --> 00:40:29,960 To further reduce drag at that altitude, 1035 00:40:27,491 --> 00:40:29,960 To further reduce drag at that altitude, 1036 00:40:30,027 --> 00:40:34,799 the plane should be slowed to 158 miles per hour, the ATR 1037 00:40:30,027 --> 00:40:34,799 the plane should be slowed to 158 miles per hour, the ATR 1038 00:40:34,865 --> 00:40:38,102 72's ideal gliding speed. 1039 00:40:38,169 --> 00:40:41,238 Surprisingly, to glide as far as possible, 1040 00:40:38,169 --> 00:40:41,238 Surprisingly, to glide as far as possible, 1041 00:40:41,305 --> 00:40:44,675 a pilot doesn't want to fly as fast as possible. 1042 00:40:44,742 --> 00:40:47,044 The faster a plane flies, the more 1043 00:40:44,742 --> 00:40:47,044 The faster a plane flies, the more 1044 00:40:47,111 --> 00:40:51,382 the airflow pushes against it, creating resistance. 1045 00:40:51,448 --> 00:40:57,655 Every plane has an optimal speed to achieve the furthest glide. 1046 00:40:51,448 --> 00:40:57,655 Every plane has an optimal speed to achieve the furthest glide. 1047 00:40:57,721 --> 00:41:02,359 The crew of flight 1153 continued flying up to 55 miles 1048 00:40:57,721 --> 00:41:02,359 The crew of flight 1153 continued flying up to 55 miles 1049 00:41:02,426 --> 00:41:05,396 an hour faster than their optimal gliding speed. 1050 00:41:02,426 --> 00:41:05,396 an hour faster than their optimal gliding speed. 1051 00:41:05,462 --> 00:41:07,965 That added to the drag on the plane 1052 00:41:08,032 --> 00:41:11,435 and reduced the distance they could glide. 1053 00:41:08,032 --> 00:41:11,435 and reduced the distance they could glide. 1054 00:41:11,502 --> 00:41:14,605 By feathering his props and reducing his speed, 1055 00:41:14,672 --> 00:41:17,408 a simulator pilot in France was able to get 1056 00:41:14,672 --> 00:41:17,408 a simulator pilot in France was able to get 1057 00:41:17,474 --> 00:41:21,078 the plane as far as Palermo. 1058 00:41:21,145 --> 00:41:23,013 You're with me, Ali, huh? 1059 00:41:21,145 --> 00:41:23,013 You're with me, Ali, huh? 1060 00:41:23,080 --> 00:41:25,216 Careful. 1061 00:41:25,282 --> 00:41:27,318 Choukri, ready? 1062 00:41:27,384 --> 00:41:29,587 Flight 1153 hit the water 1063 00:41:27,384 --> 00:41:29,587 Flight 1153 hit the water 1064 00:41:29,653 --> 00:41:33,257 26 miles from shore, well short of what the plane 1065 00:41:33,324 --> 00:41:34,425 was capable of achieving. 1066 00:41:33,324 --> 00:41:34,425 was capable of achieving. 1067 00:41:48,973 --> 00:41:52,076 The simulation confirmed that the crew might have been 1068 00:41:48,973 --> 00:41:52,076 The simulation confirmed that the crew might have been 1069 00:41:52,142 --> 00:41:55,679 able to make it to land and highlights the importance 1070 00:41:55,746 --> 00:41:59,016 of proper training to deal with unlikely situations 1071 00:41:55,746 --> 00:41:59,016 of proper training to deal with unlikely situations 1072 00:41:59,083 --> 00:42:02,219 such as a twin-engine flameout. 1073 00:42:02,286 --> 00:42:05,256 In aviation, it's a very rare event. 1074 00:42:02,286 --> 00:42:05,256 In aviation, it's a very rare event. 1075 00:42:05,322 --> 00:42:07,224 Vincenzo Pennetta's report 1076 00:42:07,291 --> 00:42:09,627 urges airlines to train their pilots how 1077 00:42:09,693 --> 00:42:11,795 to ditch without engine power. 1078 00:42:09,693 --> 00:42:11,795 to ditch without engine power. 1079 00:42:11,862 --> 00:42:13,864 Better pilot training is just one 1080 00:42:13,931 --> 00:42:18,302 of 17 safety recommendations in the accident report. 1081 00:42:13,931 --> 00:42:18,302 of 17 safety recommendations in the accident report. 1082 00:42:18,369 --> 00:42:22,106 Perhaps the most important, that ATR redesigned 1083 00:42:18,369 --> 00:42:22,106 Perhaps the most important, that ATR redesigned 1084 00:42:22,172 --> 00:42:24,275 the fuel quantity indicator. 1085 00:42:24,341 --> 00:42:26,844 In order to prevent a fuel quantity 1086 00:42:26,911 --> 00:42:31,582 indicator type 42 on a 72 aircraft and vice versa. 1087 00:42:26,911 --> 00:42:31,582 indicator type 42 on a 72 aircraft and vice versa. 1088 00:42:31,649 --> 00:42:33,651 To prevent mechanics from installing 1089 00:42:33,717 --> 00:42:37,554 the incorrect part, Pennetta believes that the only answer 1090 00:42:33,717 --> 00:42:37,554 the incorrect part, Pennetta believes that the only answer 1091 00:42:37,621 --> 00:42:40,891 is to design the FQIs so that they only fit 1092 00:42:37,621 --> 00:42:40,891 is to design the FQIs so that they only fit 1093 00:42:40,958 --> 00:42:42,226 on the plane they're meant for. 1094 00:42:45,496 --> 00:42:48,499 I'll get to when you get back from Djerba. 1095 00:42:45,496 --> 00:42:48,499 I'll get to when you get back from Djerba. 1096 00:42:48,565 --> 00:42:49,667 Roger that. 1097 00:42:49,733 --> 00:42:52,202 There is no single cause of the accident. 1098 00:42:49,733 --> 00:42:52,202 There is no single cause of the accident. 1099 00:42:52,269 --> 00:42:56,307 This accident, like many other aircraft accidents, 1100 00:42:56,373 --> 00:43:00,044 was determined by a series of actions, a series of events 1101 00:42:56,373 --> 00:43:00,044 was determined by a series of actions, a series of events 1102 00:43:00,110 --> 00:43:04,048 linked one to each other. 1103 00:43:00,110 --> 00:43:04,048 linked one to each other. 1104 00:43:04,114 --> 00:43:07,418 This is unheard of. 1105 00:43:07,484 --> 00:43:10,487 I would have accepted the engine breaking, 1106 00:43:07,484 --> 00:43:10,487 I would have accepted the engine breaking, 1107 00:43:10,554 --> 00:43:12,222 or a window shattering. 1108 00:43:14,792 --> 00:43:19,730 But to have people die because of a lack of fuel? 1109 00:43:14,792 --> 00:43:19,730 But to have people die because of a lack of fuel? 1110 00:43:19,797 --> 00:43:22,032 The crash of Flight 1153 1111 00:43:19,797 --> 00:43:22,032 The crash of Flight 1153 1112 00:43:22,099 --> 00:43:26,603 was caused by a series of grave errors on the ground 1113 00:43:26,670 --> 00:43:28,072 and in the air. 1114 00:43:26,670 --> 00:43:28,072 and in the air. 1115 00:43:34,311 --> 00:43:38,716 In 2012, an Italian court sentenced Captain Gharbi 1116 00:43:38,782 --> 00:43:43,287 to 6.5 years in prison for his responsibility in the crash 1117 00:43:38,782 --> 00:43:43,287 to 6.5 years in prison for his responsibility in the crash 1118 00:43:43,354 --> 00:43:48,225 and subsequent deaths of 16 passengers and crew. 1119 00:43:43,354 --> 00:43:48,225 and subsequent deaths of 16 passengers and crew. 1120 00:43:48,292 --> 00:43:51,495 Co-captain Kebaier, three Tuninter executives, 1121 00:43:51,562 --> 00:43:53,731 and a mechanic received sentences 1122 00:43:51,562 --> 00:43:53,731 and a mechanic received sentences 1123 00:43:53,797 --> 00:43:57,067 between 5.5 and six years for their liability 1124 00:43:57,134 --> 00:44:01,138 in the fatal crash. 1125 00:43:57,134 --> 00:44:01,138 in the fatal crash. 88677

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