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1
00:00:07,907 --> 00:00:09,309
We've lost engine number two.
2
00:00:09,376 --> 00:00:11,511
High above the
Mediterranean, two pilots
3
00:00:11,578 --> 00:00:13,146
struggle with a stalled engine.
4
00:00:11,578 --> 00:00:13,146
struggle with a stalled engine.
5
00:00:13,213 --> 00:00:14,347
Engine relight.
6
00:00:14,414 --> 00:00:15,415
- Negative.
- Stop.
7
00:00:15,482 --> 00:00:16,216
Stop.
8
00:00:16,282 --> 00:00:17,817
Engine one has flamed out.
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00:00:17,884 --> 00:00:20,487
45 miles
from land, the pilots
10
00:00:17,884 --> 00:00:20,487
45 miles
from land, the pilots
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00:00:20,553 --> 00:00:22,455
make a difficult decision.
12
00:00:22,522 --> 00:00:25,291
Prepare to ditch.
13
00:00:22,522 --> 00:00:25,291
Prepare to ditch.
14
00:00:25,358 --> 00:00:27,594
Oh my God, be merciful.
15
00:00:27,660 --> 00:00:29,829
Passengers are
forced to make life or death
16
00:00:29,896 --> 00:00:32,432
decisions on their own.
17
00:00:29,896 --> 00:00:32,432
decisions on their own.
18
00:00:32,499 --> 00:00:34,234
Do not inflate your vest!
19
00:00:39,572 --> 00:00:42,041
The accident
will tear families apart...
20
00:00:39,572 --> 00:00:42,041
The accident
will tear families apart...
21
00:00:43,309 --> 00:00:47,313
...set in motion a massive
rescue effort at sea,
22
00:00:47,380 --> 00:00:51,451
and trigger a
multinational investigation
23
00:00:47,380 --> 00:00:51,451
and trigger a
multinational investigation
24
00:00:51,518 --> 00:00:55,155
to discover why both engines on
one of the world's most popular
25
00:00:51,518 --> 00:00:55,155
to discover why both engines on
one of the world's most popular
26
00:00:55,221 --> 00:01:00,326
planes stopped in midflight.
27
00:00:55,221 --> 00:01:00,326
planes stopped in midflight.
28
00:01:00,393 --> 00:01:02,662
Ladies and gentlemen,
we are starting our approach.
29
00:01:02,729 --> 00:01:03,797
We lost both engines.
30
00:01:27,587 --> 00:01:30,223
August 6, 2005.
31
00:01:27,587 --> 00:01:30,223
August 6, 2005.
32
00:01:30,290 --> 00:01:34,427
Bari, Italy, an ancient port
town on the Adriatic sea
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00:01:34,494 --> 00:01:36,296
where the past
meets the present.
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00:01:34,494 --> 00:01:36,296
where the past
meets the present.
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00:01:38,965 --> 00:01:42,402
Just north of this historic
city, Bari International
36
00:01:38,965 --> 00:01:42,402
Just north of this historic
city, Bari International
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00:01:42,469 --> 00:01:45,605
Airport serves 10 major
Airlines and more than 1.5
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00:01:45,672 --> 00:01:47,407
million passengers each year.
39
00:01:50,009 --> 00:01:55,381
One of those carriers is
Tunisia's Tuninter Airlines.
40
00:01:50,009 --> 00:01:55,381
One of those carriers is
Tunisia's Tuninter Airlines.
41
00:01:55,448 --> 00:01:58,718
Captain Chafik Gharbi is
a pilot with Tuninter.
42
00:01:58,785 --> 00:02:03,223
Today, he's in command
of flight 1153.
43
00:01:58,785 --> 00:02:03,223
Today, he's in command
of flight 1153.
44
00:02:03,289 --> 00:02:06,626
The 45-year-old Tunisian
is a military-trained pilot
45
00:02:03,289 --> 00:02:06,626
The 45-year-old Tunisian
is a military-trained pilot
46
00:02:06,693 --> 00:02:09,596
with a flawless flight record.
47
00:02:09,662 --> 00:02:14,567
Gharbi's co-pilot is
28-year-old Ali Kebaier.
48
00:02:09,662 --> 00:02:14,567
Gharbi's co-pilot is
28-year-old Ali Kebaier.
49
00:02:14,634 --> 00:02:15,802
How much fuel are you adding?
50
00:02:15,869 --> 00:02:17,837
400 kilograms.
51
00:02:17,904 --> 00:02:19,105
2,700 total?
52
00:02:17,904 --> 00:02:19,105
2,700 total?
53
00:02:19,172 --> 00:02:19,973
Yes.
54
00:02:22,308 --> 00:02:24,143
Captain Gharbi and his co-pilot
55
00:02:22,308 --> 00:02:24,143
Captain Gharbi and his co-pilot
56
00:02:24,210 --> 00:02:26,880
flew from Tunis to Bari
this morning to collect
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00:02:26,946 --> 00:02:29,849
34 Italian passengers.
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00:02:29,916 --> 00:02:31,918
Now they're going to
fly them to Djerba,
59
00:02:29,916 --> 00:02:31,918
Now they're going to
fly them to Djerba,
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00:02:31,985 --> 00:02:35,321
a tunisian resort island.
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00:02:42,529 --> 00:02:44,931
Among the passengers
is 31-year-old police
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00:02:44,998 --> 00:02:47,200
officer, Luca Squicciarini.
63
00:02:47,267 --> 00:02:49,736
His girlfriend, Paola,
is traveling with him.
64
00:02:47,267 --> 00:02:49,736
His girlfriend, Paola,
is traveling with him.
65
00:02:54,707 --> 00:02:57,410
Our first choice wasn't
Djerba, it was Cape Verde.
66
00:03:00,046 --> 00:03:02,615
The thing with Cape Verde
is that it was a period
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00:03:02,682 --> 00:03:04,684
of terrorist activities.
68
00:03:04,751 --> 00:03:07,620
The flight would have left
from either Rome or Milan.
69
00:03:04,751 --> 00:03:07,620
The flight would have left
from either Rome or Milan.
70
00:03:12,058 --> 00:03:13,927
Since they are two
large airports,
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00:03:13,993 --> 00:03:16,195
Paola was afraid that
there would be an attack,
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00:03:16,262 --> 00:03:18,264
so we chose not to
go to Cape Verde.
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00:03:16,262 --> 00:03:18,264
so we chose not to
go to Cape Verde.
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00:03:22,602 --> 00:03:24,337
It was my first trip with Paola.
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00:03:22,602 --> 00:03:24,337
It was my first trip with Paola.
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00:03:24,404 --> 00:03:26,172
We met the previous winter.
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00:03:26,239 --> 00:03:28,474
We had plans to marry
the following year.
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00:03:30,743 --> 00:03:31,978
To tighten your belt,
79
00:03:32,045 --> 00:03:33,546
pull on the loose
end of the strap.
80
00:03:33,613 --> 00:03:35,982
To release your seatbelt,
lift the upper portion
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00:03:36,049 --> 00:03:37,183
of the buckle.
82
00:03:37,250 --> 00:03:38,418
Ladies and gentlemen,
your life vests
83
00:03:38,484 --> 00:03:40,153
are located beneath your seats.
84
00:03:40,219 --> 00:03:42,589
To inflate the vest, pull
firmly on the red cord
85
00:03:40,219 --> 00:03:42,589
To inflate the vest, pull
firmly on the red cord
86
00:03:42,655 --> 00:03:44,424
only when you're
leaving the aircraft.
87
00:03:44,490 --> 00:03:47,860
If you need to refill the
vest, blow into the mouthpiece.
88
00:03:53,266 --> 00:03:57,537
TSLBB flight 1153,
permission for takeoff granted.
89
00:03:53,266 --> 00:03:57,537
TSLBB flight 1153,
permission for takeoff granted.
90
00:03:57,604 --> 00:03:58,338
Roger that.
91
00:03:58,404 --> 00:03:59,772
Cleared for takeoff.
92
00:03:59,839 --> 00:04:02,575
Final prep for departure.
93
00:03:59,839 --> 00:04:02,575
Final prep for departure.
94
00:04:02,642 --> 00:04:07,080
The crew is
flying a French-made ATR 72.
95
00:04:02,642 --> 00:04:07,080
The crew is
flying a French-made ATR 72.
96
00:04:07,146 --> 00:04:11,517
The small turboprop is
perfect for short flights.
97
00:04:11,584 --> 00:04:13,086
It doesn't need a
lot of maintenance
98
00:04:11,584 --> 00:04:13,086
It doesn't need a
lot of maintenance
99
00:04:13,152 --> 00:04:16,856
or guzzle a lot of fuel.
100
00:04:16,923 --> 00:04:21,694
Just after 2:30 in the
afternoon, the plane takes off.
101
00:04:16,923 --> 00:04:21,694
Just after 2:30 in the
afternoon, the plane takes off.
102
00:04:21,761 --> 00:04:26,633
49 minutes after takeoff,
flight 1153 is 400 miles away
103
00:04:21,761 --> 00:04:26,633
49 minutes after takeoff,
flight 1153 is 400 miles away
104
00:04:26,699 --> 00:04:28,401
from its destination, Djerba.
105
00:04:37,844 --> 00:04:40,079
So we started chatting
with other passengers.
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00:04:40,146 --> 00:04:41,414
We were all excited.
107
00:04:41,481 --> 00:04:42,782
We talked about the vacation.
108
00:04:41,481 --> 00:04:42,782
We talked about the vacation.
109
00:04:47,186 --> 00:04:50,423
Then 75 miles
from the nearest land
110
00:04:47,186 --> 00:04:50,423
Then 75 miles
from the nearest land
111
00:04:50,490 --> 00:04:57,864
and 23,000 feet above the sea,
the plane's right engine stops
112
00:04:50,490 --> 00:04:57,864
and 23,000 feet above the sea,
the plane's right engine stops
113
00:04:57,930 --> 00:04:58,931
working.
114
00:04:58,998 --> 00:05:01,434
What?
115
00:04:58,998 --> 00:05:01,434
What?
116
00:05:01,501 --> 00:05:04,303
We've lost engine number two.
117
00:05:04,370 --> 00:05:06,239
Let's get to 17,000 feet.
118
00:05:04,370 --> 00:05:06,239
Let's get to 17,000 feet.
119
00:05:06,305 --> 00:05:09,609
TUI1153 request 170.
120
00:05:09,676 --> 00:05:10,910
TUI1153...
121
00:05:10,977 --> 00:05:14,213
Captain Gharbi
begins an emergency descent.
122
00:05:10,977 --> 00:05:14,213
Captain Gharbi
begins an emergency descent.
123
00:05:14,280 --> 00:05:15,615
Sending 170.
124
00:05:15,682 --> 00:05:18,384
When you have a single-engine
flameout, you would descend
125
00:05:15,682 --> 00:05:18,384
When you have a single-engine
flameout, you would descend
126
00:05:18,451 --> 00:05:19,619
down to a lower altitude.
127
00:05:19,686 --> 00:05:22,188
The air is thicker, the
propeller is more efficient.
128
00:05:22,255 --> 00:05:23,723
Under current conditions,
129
00:05:23,790 --> 00:05:27,026
the ATR 72 can best
fly on one engine
130
00:05:23,790 --> 00:05:27,026
the ATR 72 can best
fly on one engine
131
00:05:27,093 --> 00:05:30,363
at an altitude of 17,000 feet.
132
00:05:27,093 --> 00:05:30,363
at an altitude of 17,000 feet.
133
00:05:30,430 --> 00:05:34,400
Power lever flight
idle, start button.
134
00:05:34,467 --> 00:05:37,370
The crew struggles
to restart the right engine.
135
00:05:34,467 --> 00:05:37,370
The crew struggles
to restart the right engine.
136
00:05:37,437 --> 00:05:39,939
Negative.
137
00:05:40,006 --> 00:05:42,608
Fuel supply, check.
138
00:05:40,006 --> 00:05:42,608
Fuel supply, check.
139
00:05:42,675 --> 00:05:44,477
But then,
less than two minutes
140
00:05:44,544 --> 00:05:46,379
after the first engine quits...
141
00:05:49,615 --> 00:05:50,349
Stop.
142
00:05:50,416 --> 00:05:51,284
Stop.
143
00:05:51,350 --> 00:05:52,552
Engine number one,
it's flamed out.
144
00:05:52,618 --> 00:05:54,787
...both of the
plane's engines have stopped.
145
00:05:52,618 --> 00:05:54,787
...both of the
plane's engines have stopped.
146
00:06:01,828 --> 00:06:04,464
The engine shut off.
147
00:06:04,530 --> 00:06:06,699
Our first thought was
of a terrorist attack
148
00:06:04,530 --> 00:06:06,699
Our first thought was
of a terrorist attack
149
00:06:06,766 --> 00:06:09,302
since there were so
many at the time.
150
00:06:09,368 --> 00:06:11,571
We tried to figure out
what was happening,
151
00:06:11,637 --> 00:06:14,474
so we looked towards the
cockpit to see if someone was
152
00:06:11,637 --> 00:06:14,474
so we looked towards the
cockpit to see if someone was
153
00:06:14,540 --> 00:06:16,075
trying to sabotage the plane.
154
00:06:21,748 --> 00:06:24,183
The plane is
now falling to the sea
155
00:06:21,748 --> 00:06:24,183
The plane is
now falling to the sea
156
00:06:24,250 --> 00:06:26,052
at 800 feet per minute.
157
00:06:26,119 --> 00:06:26,853
Mayday.
158
00:06:26,919 --> 00:06:27,854
Mayday.
159
00:06:27,920 --> 00:06:29,355
Mayday.
160
00:06:29,422 --> 00:06:31,290
TUI1153.
161
00:06:29,422 --> 00:06:31,290
TUI1153.
162
00:06:31,357 --> 00:06:32,759
We have lost both engines.
163
00:06:32,825 --> 00:06:35,361
Request immediate
landing at Palermo.
164
00:06:35,428 --> 00:06:37,830
The crew still
hopes to reach an airport,
165
00:06:35,428 --> 00:06:37,830
The crew still
hopes to reach an airport,
166
00:06:37,897 --> 00:06:40,133
but they have 70 miles
of ocean to cross
167
00:06:40,199 --> 00:06:42,635
before they're over land.
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00:06:40,199 --> 00:06:42,635
before they're over land.
169
00:06:42,702 --> 00:06:45,805
Crews are trained
for almost anything.
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00:06:45,872 --> 00:06:47,507
There's a checklist
for them to follow
171
00:06:47,573 --> 00:06:50,009
to solve most problems,
including what
172
00:06:47,573 --> 00:06:50,009
to solve most problems,
including what
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00:06:50,076 --> 00:06:51,878
to do when both engines die.
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00:06:51,944 --> 00:06:52,845
...checklist.
175
00:06:52,912 --> 00:06:55,081
Fuel supply, check.
176
00:06:52,912 --> 00:06:55,081
Fuel supply, check.
177
00:06:55,148 --> 00:06:57,984
The pilots don't know
why their engines have stopped.
178
00:06:58,050 --> 00:07:02,255
The only clue they're getting
is a low fuel feed warning.
179
00:06:58,050 --> 00:07:02,255
The only clue they're getting
is a low fuel feed warning.
180
00:07:02,321 --> 00:07:04,323
A low pressure
warning light tells
181
00:07:04,390 --> 00:07:07,360
a pilot that there's low fuel
pressure going to the engine.
182
00:07:04,390 --> 00:07:07,360
a pilot that there's low fuel
pressure going to the engine.
183
00:07:07,426 --> 00:07:10,263
Now that could be a mechanical
problem or that could
184
00:07:10,329 --> 00:07:12,865
be a contamination problem.
185
00:07:10,329 --> 00:07:12,865
be a contamination problem.
186
00:07:12,932 --> 00:07:14,500
The crew
follows the steps
187
00:07:14,567 --> 00:07:18,337
laid out by the manufacturer
to relight their dead engines.
188
00:07:14,567 --> 00:07:18,337
laid out by the manufacturer
to relight their dead engines.
189
00:07:18,404 --> 00:07:19,972
Fuel supply, check.
190
00:07:20,039 --> 00:07:23,943
Power lever flight
idle, start button.
191
00:07:24,010 --> 00:07:26,712
Engine relight, negative.
192
00:07:30,783 --> 00:07:32,385
Get Choukri.
193
00:07:32,451 --> 00:07:34,320
The captain
asks the cabin crew
194
00:07:34,387 --> 00:07:37,190
to bring the onboard
engineer, Choukri Harbaoui,
195
00:07:34,387 --> 00:07:37,190
to bring the onboard
engineer, Choukri Harbaoui,
196
00:07:37,256 --> 00:07:38,791
to the cockpit.
197
00:07:38,858 --> 00:07:39,959
Palermo approach.
198
00:07:40,026 --> 00:07:43,462
This is TUI1153 We
have lost both engines.
199
00:07:40,026 --> 00:07:43,462
This is TUI1153 We
have lost both engines.
200
00:07:43,529 --> 00:07:45,031
Request immediate landing.
201
00:07:49,135 --> 00:07:51,470
The closest
airport is in Palermo on
202
00:07:51,537 --> 00:07:53,806
the Italian island of Sicily.
203
00:07:53,873 --> 00:07:56,609
TUI Palermo.
204
00:07:53,873 --> 00:07:56,609
TUI Palermo.
205
00:07:56,676 --> 00:07:59,111
Affirmative, you are
clear for landing.
206
00:07:59,178 --> 00:08:01,781
Palermo approach, what is
our distance to the airport?
207
00:07:59,178 --> 00:08:01,781
Palermo approach, what is
our distance to the airport?
208
00:08:01,848 --> 00:08:07,854
Your distance to Palermo
is now 48 nautical miles.
209
00:08:01,848 --> 00:08:07,854
Your distance to Palermo
is now 48 nautical miles.
210
00:08:07,920 --> 00:08:10,790
An ATR 72
will fall from the sky
211
00:08:10,857 --> 00:08:15,828
at a predictable rate, one foot
down for every 16 feet forward.
212
00:08:10,857 --> 00:08:15,828
at a predictable rate, one foot
down for every 16 feet forward.
213
00:08:20,566 --> 00:08:23,469
If they can't restart
their engines soon,
214
00:08:23,536 --> 00:08:25,738
they'll be forced
to ditch in the sea.
215
00:08:23,536 --> 00:08:25,738
they'll be forced
to ditch in the sea.
216
00:08:30,109 --> 00:08:31,611
Ditching at sea
is a very difficult
217
00:08:31,677 --> 00:08:34,480
decision to make because
it's the hardest thing to do.
218
00:08:34,547 --> 00:08:39,652
You have swells, waves, wind.
219
00:08:34,547 --> 00:08:39,652
You have swells, waves, wind.
220
00:08:39,719 --> 00:08:41,454
Is anybody going to see you?
221
00:08:41,520 --> 00:08:45,091
How long can the
plane float for?
222
00:08:41,520 --> 00:08:45,091
How long can the
plane float for?
223
00:08:45,157 --> 00:08:47,226
Landing a
passenger plane on water
224
00:08:47,293 --> 00:08:50,263
is extremely dangerous.
225
00:08:47,293 --> 00:08:50,263
is extremely dangerous.
226
00:08:50,329 --> 00:08:53,699
In 1996, an Ethiopian
Airlines pilot
227
00:08:53,766 --> 00:08:57,970
was forced to bring his 767
down on the Indian Ocean.
228
00:08:53,766 --> 00:08:57,970
was forced to bring his 767
down on the Indian Ocean.
229
00:08:58,037 --> 00:09:03,309
The ditching was recorded by
a tourist on a nearby beach.
230
00:08:58,037 --> 00:09:03,309
The ditching was recorded by
a tourist on a nearby beach.
231
00:09:03,376 --> 00:09:07,013
50 people survived,
but 125 people died.
232
00:09:03,376 --> 00:09:07,013
50 people survived,
but 125 people died.
233
00:09:10,449 --> 00:09:12,818
The crew of this small
plane doesn't usually
234
00:09:10,449 --> 00:09:12,818
The crew of this small
plane doesn't usually
235
00:09:12,885 --> 00:09:14,387
include an engineer.
236
00:09:14,453 --> 00:09:19,025
When there is one on board, he
usually travels in the cabin.
237
00:09:14,453 --> 00:09:19,025
When there is one on board, he
usually travels in the cabin.
238
00:09:19,091 --> 00:09:21,427
I remembered this person
looked at the stewardess
239
00:09:21,494 --> 00:09:24,764
and shook his head, as if saying
no after the second engine
240
00:09:21,494 --> 00:09:24,764
and shook his head, as if saying
no after the second engine
241
00:09:24,830 --> 00:09:25,631
had shut off.
242
00:09:40,947 --> 00:09:45,584
That gesture showed there
was nothing left to do.
243
00:09:40,947 --> 00:09:45,584
That gesture showed there
was nothing left to do.
244
00:09:45,651 --> 00:09:49,655
The crew of flight
1153 has tried all it can.
245
00:09:45,651 --> 00:09:49,655
The crew of flight
1153 has tried all it can.
246
00:09:49,722 --> 00:09:52,091
They're running out
of time and options.
247
00:09:54,460 --> 00:09:56,262
Flight engineer,
Choukri Harbaoui,
248
00:09:56,329 --> 00:09:58,097
has joined in the
struggle to get
249
00:09:58,164 --> 00:10:02,234
flight 1153's engine started.
250
00:09:58,164 --> 00:10:02,234
flight 1153's engine started.
251
00:10:02,301 --> 00:10:03,169
You've run the checklist?
252
00:10:03,235 --> 00:10:05,271
Yes.
253
00:10:03,235 --> 00:10:05,271
Yes.
254
00:10:05,338 --> 00:10:07,073
The captain
hopes the engineer
255
00:10:07,139 --> 00:10:10,476
will know something that isn't
covered by the checklist.
256
00:10:10,543 --> 00:10:11,844
Attempt to
restart the engines.
257
00:10:10,543 --> 00:10:11,844
Attempt to
restart the engines.
258
00:10:11,911 --> 00:10:13,245
Right engine first.
259
00:10:13,312 --> 00:10:14,814
Fuel supply, check.
260
00:10:14,880 --> 00:10:17,783
Engine two start
power button, on.
261
00:10:14,880 --> 00:10:17,783
Engine two start
power button, on.
262
00:10:17,850 --> 00:10:22,154
Engine relight, negative.
263
00:10:22,221 --> 00:10:25,891
Palermo approach, TUI1153.
264
00:10:22,221 --> 00:10:25,891
Palermo approach, TUI1153.
265
00:10:25,958 --> 00:10:29,295
Any closer airport
where we can land?
266
00:10:25,958 --> 00:10:29,295
Any closer airport
where we can land?
267
00:10:29,362 --> 00:10:32,331
Negative, 1153.
268
00:10:32,398 --> 00:10:35,634
Palermo airport is the closest
airport to your position.
269
00:10:32,398 --> 00:10:35,634
Palermo airport is the closest
airport to your position.
270
00:10:35,701 --> 00:10:39,171
We're not going to make it.
271
00:10:39,238 --> 00:10:40,373
Prepare to ditch.
272
00:10:43,209 --> 00:10:44,343
Oh my God, be merciful.
273
00:10:51,884 --> 00:10:53,285
No one said anything.
274
00:10:51,884 --> 00:10:53,285
No one said anything.
275
00:10:53,352 --> 00:10:55,621
I noticed something wasn't
right because the two
276
00:10:55,688 --> 00:10:57,123
engines shut off.
277
00:10:57,189 --> 00:11:00,292
More than once, I tried to get
the stewardess's attention,
278
00:10:57,189 --> 00:11:00,292
More than once, I tried to get
the stewardess's attention,
279
00:11:00,359 --> 00:11:02,428
asking what I should do.
280
00:11:02,495 --> 00:11:06,065
If I had to put on the life
jacket, if I had to stand,
281
00:11:02,495 --> 00:11:06,065
If I had to put on the life
jacket, if I had to stand,
282
00:11:06,132 --> 00:11:08,167
if I should take off my shoes.
283
00:11:08,234 --> 00:11:09,769
I got no answer.
284
00:11:09,835 --> 00:11:11,804
She was in shock
and started to cry.
285
00:11:09,835 --> 00:11:11,804
She was in shock
and started to cry.
286
00:11:14,940 --> 00:11:16,375
The senior
flight attendant
287
00:11:16,442 --> 00:11:18,644
does give passengers direction.
288
00:11:16,442 --> 00:11:18,644
does give passengers direction.
289
00:11:18,711 --> 00:11:23,783
The captain has decided
to land the plane at sea.
290
00:11:18,711 --> 00:11:23,783
The captain has decided
to land the plane at sea.
291
00:11:27,086 --> 00:11:29,121
I'll let you imagine
the panic on board.
292
00:11:27,086 --> 00:11:29,121
I'll let you imagine
the panic on board.
293
00:11:29,188 --> 00:11:32,024
People were
screaming and crying.
294
00:11:32,091 --> 00:11:35,528
Please, stay calm and follow
your crew's instructions.
295
00:11:32,091 --> 00:11:35,528
Please, stay calm and follow
your crew's instructions.
296
00:11:38,364 --> 00:11:40,132
There were
people in the front seats
297
00:11:40,199 --> 00:11:41,367
that had a baby girl.
298
00:11:40,199 --> 00:11:41,367
that had a baby girl.
299
00:11:41,434 --> 00:11:43,669
She had been playing
and was so excited.
300
00:11:43,736 --> 00:11:46,005
To now see the panic
in her mother's face
301
00:11:46,072 --> 00:11:49,442
made me feel so sad.
302
00:11:46,072 --> 00:11:49,442
made me feel so sad.
303
00:11:49,508 --> 00:11:55,681
TUI1153, what
is your fuel load?
304
00:11:49,508 --> 00:11:55,681
TUI1153, what
is your fuel load?
305
00:11:55,748 --> 00:11:59,885
Cockpit fuel quantity
1,800 kilograms.
306
00:11:55,748 --> 00:11:59,885
Cockpit fuel quantity
1,800 kilograms.
307
00:11:59,952 --> 00:12:02,621
Captain Gharbi's
fuel gauge shows that he has
308
00:12:02,688 --> 00:12:04,957
plenty of fuel, but
for some reason,
309
00:12:05,024 --> 00:12:06,859
neither engine will restart.
310
00:12:05,024 --> 00:12:06,859
neither engine will restart.
311
00:12:06,926 --> 00:12:09,395
Just 10 minutes after
the trouble began,
312
00:12:09,462 --> 00:12:13,999
the plane is 7,000 feet
above the ocean and falling.
313
00:12:09,462 --> 00:12:13,999
the plane is 7,000 feet
above the ocean and falling.
314
00:12:14,066 --> 00:12:16,802
Outside, it's completely silent.
315
00:12:16,869 --> 00:12:19,538
But in the cabin, there's panic.
316
00:12:16,869 --> 00:12:19,538
But in the cabin, there's panic.
317
00:12:19,605 --> 00:12:23,409
Please remain in your seats
with your seatbelts fastened.
318
00:12:19,605 --> 00:12:23,409
Please remain in your seats
with your seatbelts fastened.
319
00:12:23,476 --> 00:12:24,610
My first instinct
320
00:12:24,677 --> 00:12:26,979
was to undo my seatbelt
to prevent getting
321
00:12:27,046 --> 00:12:29,315
trapped when we hit the water.
322
00:12:27,046 --> 00:12:29,315
trapped when we hit the water.
323
00:12:29,381 --> 00:12:31,250
I didn't want to be
trapped in my seat
324
00:12:31,317 --> 00:12:32,751
and go down in a horrible way.
325
00:12:35,988 --> 00:12:37,523
Do not inflate your vests
326
00:12:37,590 --> 00:12:39,725
until you've left the plane.
327
00:12:39,792 --> 00:12:41,360
A plane
ditching at sea
328
00:12:39,792 --> 00:12:41,360
A plane
ditching at sea
329
00:12:41,427 --> 00:12:43,929
will more than likely
fill with water.
330
00:12:43,996 --> 00:12:46,632
That's why safety procedures
call for passengers
331
00:12:46,699 --> 00:12:51,637
to only inflate their life vests
once they've cleared the plane.
332
00:12:46,699 --> 00:12:51,637
to only inflate their life vests
once they've cleared the plane.
333
00:12:51,704 --> 00:12:54,373
Otherwise, they could
become trapped inside
334
00:12:51,704 --> 00:12:54,373
Otherwise, they could
become trapped inside
335
00:12:54,440 --> 00:12:58,244
the flooded fuselage and drown.
336
00:12:58,310 --> 00:13:02,448
The dead engines aren't the only
problem confronting the crew.
337
00:12:58,310 --> 00:13:02,448
The dead engines aren't the only
problem confronting the crew.
338
00:13:02,515 --> 00:13:06,418
Many of their instruments get
their power from the engines.
339
00:13:02,515 --> 00:13:06,418
Many of their instruments get
their power from the engines.
340
00:13:06,485 --> 00:13:09,989
Without the engines, some
vital gauges are dead.
341
00:13:10,055 --> 00:13:13,592
On a two-engine flameout, you
go on your standby instruments,
342
00:13:10,055 --> 00:13:13,592
On a two-engine flameout, you
go on your standby instruments,
343
00:13:13,659 --> 00:13:15,427
which is you have an
attitude indicator,
344
00:13:15,494 --> 00:13:17,296
you have an altimeter.
345
00:13:15,494 --> 00:13:17,296
you have an altimeter.
346
00:13:17,363 --> 00:13:18,797
Fuel supply, check.
347
00:13:18,864 --> 00:13:21,767
The crew continues to
try to restart their engines,
348
00:13:21,834 --> 00:13:25,838
but it's become clear that
they've run out of time.
349
00:13:21,834 --> 00:13:25,838
but it's become clear that
they've run out of time.
350
00:13:25,905 --> 00:13:27,306
They're not doing anything.
351
00:13:27,373 --> 00:13:28,908
Confirm distance, please.
352
00:13:28,974 --> 00:13:33,646
Your distance is now 20 miles.
353
00:13:28,974 --> 00:13:33,646
Your distance is now 20 miles.
354
00:13:33,712 --> 00:13:34,446
Boats.
355
00:13:34,513 --> 00:13:37,016
I see boats.
356
00:13:34,513 --> 00:13:37,016
I see boats.
357
00:13:37,082 --> 00:13:38,884
Palermo approach.
358
00:13:38,951 --> 00:13:40,920
TUI1153.
359
00:13:40,986 --> 00:13:44,023
We can't make it to the airport.
360
00:13:40,986 --> 00:13:44,023
We can't make it to the airport.
361
00:13:44,089 --> 00:13:46,692
We see two boats
on the left side.
362
00:13:46,759 --> 00:13:48,861
We're going there.
363
00:13:46,759 --> 00:13:48,861
We're going there.
364
00:13:48,928 --> 00:13:50,196
If you can, please call.
365
00:13:53,432 --> 00:13:56,268
Captain Gharbi turns
his plane toward the boats.
366
00:13:58,771 --> 00:14:00,673
Can you send
helicopters or something
367
00:13:58,771 --> 00:14:00,673
Can you send
helicopters or something
368
00:14:00,739 --> 00:14:02,908
similar, fast, fast, fast?
369
00:14:02,975 --> 00:14:03,943
Emergency.
370
00:14:04,009 --> 00:14:06,946
All marine units,
aircraft in distress
371
00:14:04,009 --> 00:14:06,946
All marine units,
aircraft in distress
372
00:14:07,012 --> 00:14:10,916
20 nautical miles off Palermo.
373
00:14:10,983 --> 00:14:13,452
Even before
the plane hits the water,
374
00:14:10,983 --> 00:14:13,452
Even before
the plane hits the water,
375
00:14:13,519 --> 00:14:15,087
rescuers are on their way.
376
00:14:18,457 --> 00:14:20,492
I had very little information.
377
00:14:20,559 --> 00:14:22,161
We didn't know the
nature of the crash
378
00:14:22,228 --> 00:14:25,764
or anything about the plane.
379
00:14:22,228 --> 00:14:25,764
or anything about the plane.
380
00:14:25,831 --> 00:14:27,333
Autopress, dump.
381
00:14:27,399 --> 00:14:28,934
Although it's a rare maneuver,
382
00:14:29,001 --> 00:14:32,304
there is also a checklist for
ditching a plane in the water.
383
00:14:29,001 --> 00:14:32,304
there is also a checklist for
ditching a plane in the water.
384
00:14:32,371 --> 00:14:33,472
Valve, full close.
385
00:14:33,539 --> 00:14:35,074
Before ditching, the crew
386
00:14:33,539 --> 00:14:35,074
Before ditching, the crew
387
00:14:35,140 --> 00:14:37,977
ensures all landing gear
is retracted to help
388
00:14:38,043 --> 00:14:39,511
the plane land more smoothly.
389
00:14:39,578 --> 00:14:42,214
Landing gear lever up.
390
00:14:39,578 --> 00:14:42,214
Landing gear lever up.
391
00:14:42,281 --> 00:14:44,917
When pilots ditch,
they want their airplane
392
00:14:44,984 --> 00:14:47,753
as streamlined as
possible so that it glides
393
00:14:44,984 --> 00:14:47,753
as streamlined as
possible so that it glides
394
00:14:47,820 --> 00:14:50,556
across the water when it hits.
395
00:14:50,623 --> 00:14:54,093
Pilots must not only monitor
the systems on the plane,
396
00:14:50,623 --> 00:14:54,093
Pilots must not only monitor
the systems on the plane,
397
00:14:54,159 --> 00:14:57,363
they also have to assess
conditions at sea.
398
00:14:57,429 --> 00:14:59,965
They don't want to
hit a wave head on.
399
00:14:57,429 --> 00:14:59,965
They don't want to
hit a wave head on.
400
00:15:00,032 --> 00:15:03,369
If you hit
perpendicular to the waves
401
00:15:03,435 --> 00:15:06,839
or swells with the aircraft,
it's like hitting concrete.
402
00:15:03,435 --> 00:15:06,839
or swells with the aircraft,
it's like hitting concrete.
403
00:15:06,905 --> 00:15:10,142
The plane will break up.
404
00:15:10,209 --> 00:15:13,912
Passengers can see what's coming.
405
00:15:10,209 --> 00:15:13,912
Passengers can see what's coming.
406
00:15:13,979 --> 00:15:16,982
I was hanging on tight
to the seat in front of me.
407
00:15:17,049 --> 00:15:19,918
And through the window, I could
see the impact was imminent.
408
00:15:17,049 --> 00:15:19,918
And through the window, I could
see the impact was imminent.
409
00:15:23,989 --> 00:15:27,293
The crew
is 700 feet above the sea.
410
00:15:27,359 --> 00:15:29,295
You're with me, Ali, huh?
411
00:15:27,359 --> 00:15:29,295
You're with me, Ali, huh?
412
00:15:29,361 --> 00:15:31,463
Careful.
413
00:15:31,530 --> 00:15:33,198
Choukri, ready?
414
00:15:33,265 --> 00:15:33,999
Ready.
415
00:15:34,066 --> 00:15:35,868
Here we go.
416
00:15:34,066 --> 00:15:35,868
Here we go.
417
00:15:35,934 --> 00:15:37,303
There is no other God but Allah.
418
00:15:37,369 --> 00:15:39,138
Muhammad is his messenger.
419
00:15:39,204 --> 00:15:41,440
In the name of God
merciful, merciful.
420
00:15:39,204 --> 00:15:41,440
In the name of God
merciful, merciful.
421
00:15:56,488 --> 00:15:59,191
At a speed
of 145 miles an hour,
422
00:15:56,488 --> 00:15:59,191
At a speed
of 145 miles an hour,
423
00:15:59,258 --> 00:16:01,560
the plane collides with the sea.
424
00:16:16,475 --> 00:16:18,777
I lost consciousness.
425
00:16:16,475 --> 00:16:18,777
I lost consciousness.
426
00:16:24,717 --> 00:16:26,618
I woke up in the water.
427
00:16:26,685 --> 00:16:29,221
I was two or three
meters underwater.
428
00:16:26,685 --> 00:16:29,221
I was two or three
meters underwater.
429
00:16:31,957 --> 00:16:34,626
I came up to the surface
wearing only my pants.
430
00:16:34,693 --> 00:16:38,464
I had lost my life jacket
and clothes on impact.
431
00:16:34,693 --> 00:16:38,464
I had lost my life jacket
and clothes on impact.
432
00:16:38,530 --> 00:16:41,934
I got to the surface
and grabbed on to a bag.
433
00:16:38,530 --> 00:16:41,934
I got to the surface
and grabbed on to a bag.
434
00:16:44,403 --> 00:16:45,604
I was in shock.
435
00:16:45,671 --> 00:16:48,273
I was surrounded by everything.
436
00:16:45,671 --> 00:16:48,273
I was surrounded by everything.
437
00:16:52,044 --> 00:16:54,313
My thoughts were
constantly with Paola.
438
00:16:52,044 --> 00:16:54,313
My thoughts were
constantly with Paola.
439
00:16:54,380 --> 00:16:57,549
I thought I was going to die
because I was spitting blood.
440
00:16:57,616 --> 00:16:59,651
I felt my lungs
filling with blood.
441
00:16:57,616 --> 00:16:59,651
I felt my lungs
filling with blood.
442
00:17:08,694 --> 00:17:10,362
Captain Gharbi survives
443
00:17:10,429 --> 00:17:12,431
but has been seriously injured.
444
00:17:10,429 --> 00:17:12,431
but has been seriously injured.
445
00:17:12,498 --> 00:17:15,768
Copilot Ali Kebaier
has also survived.
446
00:17:15,834 --> 00:17:18,771
But flight engineer
Choukri Harbaoui is killed.
447
00:17:15,834 --> 00:17:18,771
But flight engineer
Choukri Harbaoui is killed.
448
00:17:21,840 --> 00:17:24,143
No one aboard the
nearby boats saw
449
00:17:21,840 --> 00:17:24,143
No one aboard the
nearby boats saw
450
00:17:24,209 --> 00:17:28,881
flight 1153 crash into the sea.
451
00:17:28,947 --> 00:17:31,250
The plane is broken
into three pieces.
452
00:17:28,947 --> 00:17:31,250
The plane is broken
into three pieces.
453
00:17:31,316 --> 00:17:33,619
The tail section and
much of the fuselage
454
00:17:33,685 --> 00:17:36,121
sink to the bottom of the sea.
455
00:17:33,685 --> 00:17:36,121
sink to the bottom of the sea.
456
00:17:36,188 --> 00:17:39,191
But the largest section
containing the two wings
457
00:17:39,258 --> 00:17:41,360
stays afloat.
458
00:17:39,258 --> 00:17:41,360
stays afloat.
459
00:17:41,427 --> 00:17:46,732
It becomes a makeshift
life raft for survivors.
460
00:17:46,799 --> 00:17:49,635
But not all of the
passengers have survived.
461
00:17:46,799 --> 00:17:49,635
But not all of the
passengers have survived.
462
00:17:49,701 --> 00:17:52,838
Many haven't it made it out of
the plane and to the surface.
463
00:17:57,009 --> 00:18:00,078
Helicopter pilot Stefano
Burigana is one of the first
464
00:17:57,009 --> 00:18:00,078
Helicopter pilot Stefano
Burigana is one of the first
465
00:18:00,145 --> 00:18:02,614
to arrive at the scene.
466
00:18:02,681 --> 00:18:04,516
When we
approached the airplane,
467
00:18:04,583 --> 00:18:07,252
we could see the wings floating.
468
00:18:04,583 --> 00:18:07,252
we could see the wings floating.
469
00:18:13,292 --> 00:18:15,494
There were several
people in the water
470
00:18:15,561 --> 00:18:19,031
around the aircraft,
all floating,
471
00:18:15,561 --> 00:18:19,031
around the aircraft,
all floating,
472
00:18:19,097 --> 00:18:24,870
and everybody with
their jacket inflated.
473
00:18:19,097 --> 00:18:24,870
and everybody with
their jacket inflated.
474
00:18:24,937 --> 00:18:27,606
Burigana spots
Luca Squicciarini floating
475
00:18:27,673 --> 00:18:30,242
away from the main wreckage.
476
00:18:27,673 --> 00:18:30,242
away from the main wreckage.
477
00:18:30,309 --> 00:18:33,946
There was one man
without his jacket
478
00:18:34,012 --> 00:18:37,182
and he was the farthest
from the airplane.
479
00:18:34,012 --> 00:18:37,182
and he was the farthest
from the airplane.
480
00:18:37,249 --> 00:18:43,288
I decided to go over him and
throw one of our life jackets
481
00:18:37,249 --> 00:18:43,288
I decided to go over him and
throw one of our life jackets
482
00:18:43,355 --> 00:18:44,122
to him.
483
00:18:47,826 --> 00:18:49,995
The Coast
Guard arrives and begins
484
00:18:50,062 --> 00:18:52,831
pulling survivors from the sea.
485
00:18:52,898 --> 00:18:56,335
Within the hour, the crash
site is teeming with rescuers.
486
00:18:52,898 --> 00:18:56,335
Within the hour, the crash
site is teeming with rescuers.
487
00:18:56,401 --> 00:18:59,671
They search for survivors from
the water and from the air.
488
00:18:56,401 --> 00:18:59,671
They search for survivors from
the water and from the air.
489
00:18:59,738 --> 00:19:02,975
23 people are pulled from
the Mediterranean sea,
490
00:19:03,041 --> 00:19:09,681
but 16 have died in the crash,
including Paola di Cialla.
491
00:19:03,041 --> 00:19:09,681
but 16 have died in the crash,
including Paola di Cialla.
492
00:19:09,748 --> 00:19:12,651
It's quite likely that
none of those who died ever
493
00:19:09,748 --> 00:19:12,651
It's quite likely that
none of those who died ever
494
00:19:12,718 --> 00:19:15,687
had a chance to swim to safety.
495
00:19:15,754 --> 00:19:17,256
Their serious
injuries would have
496
00:19:15,754 --> 00:19:17,256
Their serious
injuries would have
497
00:19:17,322 --> 00:19:19,925
prevented them from escaping
after the plane hit the water.
498
00:19:23,662 --> 00:19:26,131
In this accident,
most of the survivors
499
00:19:26,198 --> 00:19:30,335
were seated in the
rear of the plane, most
500
00:19:26,198 --> 00:19:30,335
were seated in the
rear of the plane, most
501
00:19:30,402 --> 00:19:32,204
of those who died, up front.
502
00:19:35,007 --> 00:19:37,876
Those sections, along
with some valuable clues,
503
00:19:35,007 --> 00:19:37,876
Those sections, along
with some valuable clues,
504
00:19:37,943 --> 00:19:39,645
are now at the
bottom of the sea.
505
00:19:43,749 --> 00:19:46,785
The one section that didn't sink
is towed to the port in Palermo
506
00:19:46,852 --> 00:19:49,054
and taken to a nearby hangar.
507
00:19:46,852 --> 00:19:49,054
and taken to a nearby hangar.
508
00:19:55,928 --> 00:19:59,364
A team of agents from Italy's
National Flight Safety Agency,
509
00:19:55,928 --> 00:19:59,364
A team of agents from Italy's
National Flight Safety Agency,
510
00:19:59,431 --> 00:20:03,435
the ANSV, began
looking for leads.
511
00:20:03,502 --> 00:20:04,770
Their job?
512
00:20:04,836 --> 00:20:09,341
Find out why Flight 1153's
engines stopped in midflight.
513
00:20:04,836 --> 00:20:09,341
Find out why Flight 1153's
engines stopped in midflight.
514
00:20:09,408 --> 00:20:12,911
We need to collect as
much as evidence as possible
515
00:20:09,408 --> 00:20:12,911
We need to collect as
much as evidence as possible
516
00:20:12,978 --> 00:20:18,383
in order to fulfill two
main answers, what happened
517
00:20:12,978 --> 00:20:18,383
in order to fulfill two
main answers, what happened
518
00:20:18,450 --> 00:20:21,453
and why had it happened?
519
00:20:21,520 --> 00:20:23,589
They are
led by chief ANSV
520
00:20:21,520 --> 00:20:23,589
They are
led by chief ANSV
521
00:20:23,655 --> 00:20:25,891
investigator Vincenzo Pennetta.
522
00:20:25,958 --> 00:20:29,061
I arrived in Palermo
the day after the accident
523
00:20:25,958 --> 00:20:29,061
I arrived in Palermo
the day after the accident
524
00:20:29,127 --> 00:20:33,599
on the seventh, very
early in the morning.
525
00:20:33,665 --> 00:20:36,034
A flight test
engineer by training, Pennetta
526
00:20:33,665 --> 00:20:36,034
A flight test
engineer by training, Pennetta
527
00:20:36,101 --> 00:20:40,339
has led several air
crash investigations.
528
00:20:40,405 --> 00:20:44,576
The engines and central
fuselage of Tuninter flight 1153
529
00:20:40,405 --> 00:20:44,576
The engines and central
fuselage of Tuninter flight 1153
530
00:20:44,643 --> 00:20:47,346
have been recovered.
531
00:20:44,643 --> 00:20:47,346
have been recovered.
532
00:20:47,412 --> 00:20:49,314
The rest of the
plane lies somewhere
533
00:20:49,381 --> 00:20:51,183
off the Sicilian coast.
534
00:20:51,249 --> 00:20:53,151
The main challenge
of the investigation
535
00:20:51,249 --> 00:20:53,151
The main challenge
of the investigation
536
00:20:53,218 --> 00:20:56,688
was the fact that the flight
recorder, and the cockpit voice
537
00:20:56,755 --> 00:20:59,191
recorder, and also
the front fuselage
538
00:20:56,755 --> 00:20:59,191
recorder, and also
the front fuselage
539
00:20:59,257 --> 00:21:03,495
were 1,500 meters under the sea.
540
00:21:03,562 --> 00:21:06,598
While the Italian Navy
conducts a deep water search
541
00:21:03,562 --> 00:21:06,598
While the Italian Navy
conducts a deep water search
542
00:21:06,665 --> 00:21:10,402
for the rest of the wreck
and the crucial black boxes,
543
00:21:10,469 --> 00:21:13,438
Italian investigators are given
some assistance by the plane's
544
00:21:10,469 --> 00:21:13,438
Italian investigators are given
some assistance by the plane's
545
00:21:13,505 --> 00:21:15,574
European manufacturer.
546
00:21:15,641 --> 00:21:18,143
ATR's Giuseppe
Caldarelli is here
547
00:21:15,641 --> 00:21:18,143
ATR's Giuseppe
Caldarelli is here
548
00:21:18,210 --> 00:21:22,180
to find out if there's a flaw
with the company's plane.
549
00:21:22,247 --> 00:21:25,751
Anytime there is an accident
and also when people die,
550
00:21:22,247 --> 00:21:25,751
Anytime there is an accident
and also when people die,
551
00:21:25,817 --> 00:21:27,319
for me, is a big accident.
552
00:21:30,589 --> 00:21:33,558
Worldwide, hundreds of ATR 72 seconds
553
00:21:33,625 --> 00:21:36,962
crossed the skies each day.
554
00:21:33,625 --> 00:21:36,962
crossed the skies each day.
555
00:21:37,029 --> 00:21:39,631
Those aircraft
have a very sound
556
00:21:39,698 --> 00:21:43,201
structure and robust systems,
and are very cost efficient.
557
00:21:39,698 --> 00:21:43,201
structure and robust systems,
and are very cost efficient.
558
00:21:45,771 --> 00:21:47,739
Together, Pennetta and Caldarelli
559
00:21:45,771 --> 00:21:47,739
Together, Pennetta and Caldarelli
560
00:21:47,806 --> 00:21:52,010
set to find out why both engines
on such an advanced airplane
561
00:21:52,077 --> 00:21:54,780
died in midflight.
562
00:21:52,077 --> 00:21:54,780
died in midflight.
563
00:21:54,846 --> 00:21:56,782
TUI1153.
564
00:21:58,583 --> 00:22:00,452
Before it happens again.
565
00:21:58,583 --> 00:22:00,452
Before it happens again.
566
00:22:04,790 --> 00:22:06,024
Captain Gharbi, how are you?
567
00:22:06,091 --> 00:22:06,925
I'm getting better.
568
00:22:06,992 --> 00:22:08,026
Thank you.
569
00:22:08,093 --> 00:22:09,961
Investigators want to know what
570
00:22:08,093 --> 00:22:09,961
Investigators want to know what
571
00:22:10,028 --> 00:22:13,465
happened in the cockpit
of Tuninter flight 1153
572
00:22:13,532 --> 00:22:15,434
when the engines died.
573
00:22:13,532 --> 00:22:15,434
when the engines died.
574
00:22:15,500 --> 00:22:17,469
Without the cockpit
voice recorder,
575
00:22:17,536 --> 00:22:20,005
they must rely on the
recollections of surviving
576
00:22:20,072 --> 00:22:22,274
passengers and crew members.
577
00:22:20,072 --> 00:22:22,274
passengers and crew members.
578
00:22:22,340 --> 00:22:24,042
The main cause of the
double engine failure
579
00:22:24,109 --> 00:22:25,944
could be a lack of fuel.
580
00:22:26,011 --> 00:22:28,480
But according
to Captain Chafik Gharbi,
581
00:22:26,011 --> 00:22:28,480
But according
to Captain Chafik Gharbi,
582
00:22:28,547 --> 00:22:32,084
lack of fuel was
not the problem.
583
00:22:32,150 --> 00:22:34,820
What were your fuel readings?
584
00:22:32,150 --> 00:22:34,820
What were your fuel readings?
585
00:22:34,886 --> 00:22:41,026
The fuel quantity indicator
said 1,800 kilograms of fuel.
586
00:22:34,886 --> 00:22:41,026
The fuel quantity indicator
said 1,800 kilograms of fuel.
587
00:22:41,093 --> 00:22:42,494
What is your fuel load?
588
00:22:42,561 --> 00:22:46,031
Cockpit fuel quantity
1,800 kilograms.
589
00:22:42,561 --> 00:22:46,031
Cockpit fuel quantity
1,800 kilograms.
590
00:22:46,098 --> 00:22:47,966
Fuel supply, check.
591
00:22:48,033 --> 00:22:52,404
Was there any warning
that you were low on fuel?
592
00:22:48,033 --> 00:22:52,404
Was there any warning
that you were low on fuel?
593
00:22:52,471 --> 00:22:55,273
There was definitely
no low-fuel warning,
594
00:22:55,340 --> 00:22:59,311
just a low feed pressure light.
595
00:22:55,340 --> 00:22:59,311
just a low feed pressure light.
596
00:22:59,377 --> 00:23:01,279
The absence
of a low-fuel warning
597
00:23:01,346 --> 00:23:04,015
and the presence of a
low feed pressure warning
598
00:23:01,346 --> 00:23:04,015
and the presence of a
low feed pressure warning
599
00:23:04,082 --> 00:23:06,785
is a major clue.
600
00:23:06,852 --> 00:23:09,387
This set of alarms
usually indicates
601
00:23:06,852 --> 00:23:09,387
This set of alarms
usually indicates
602
00:23:09,454 --> 00:23:14,726
that there is a problem in
feeding the engine with fuel.
603
00:23:09,454 --> 00:23:14,726
that there is a problem in
feeding the engine with fuel.
604
00:23:14,793 --> 00:23:17,696
Since the plane's
gauges indicated that there was
605
00:23:17,763 --> 00:23:20,599
fuel on board that did
not get to the engines,
606
00:23:20,665 --> 00:23:24,703
ATR's Giuseppe Caldarelli looks
for flaws in the fallen plane's
607
00:23:20,665 --> 00:23:24,703
ATR's Giuseppe Caldarelli looks
for flaws in the fallen plane's
608
00:23:24,770 --> 00:23:26,204
fuel delivery system.
609
00:23:31,109 --> 00:23:34,813
Four years earlier, an Airbus
operated by Air Transat,
610
00:23:31,109 --> 00:23:34,813
Four years earlier, an Airbus
operated by Air Transat,
611
00:23:34,880 --> 00:23:36,782
developed a leak in
the fuel line that
612
00:23:36,848 --> 00:23:38,483
feeds the plane's right engine.
613
00:23:40,318 --> 00:23:42,921
Over time, the plane
leaked all of its fuel
614
00:23:42,988 --> 00:23:44,823
and both engines failed.
615
00:23:42,988 --> 00:23:44,823
and both engines failed.
616
00:23:44,890 --> 00:23:47,092
The pilots were forced
to glide their plane
617
00:23:47,159 --> 00:23:50,328
to an emergency landing.
618
00:23:50,395 --> 00:23:52,631
That incident has a
lot of similarities
619
00:23:50,395 --> 00:23:52,631
That incident has a
lot of similarities
620
00:23:52,697 --> 00:23:54,800
to the Tuninter crash.
621
00:23:54,866 --> 00:23:58,436
His team looks for breaks or
blockages in the fuel lines
622
00:23:54,866 --> 00:23:58,436
His team looks for breaks or
blockages in the fuel lines
623
00:23:58,503 --> 00:24:01,473
and evidence that the fuel
pumps malfunctioned and stopped
624
00:24:01,540 --> 00:24:02,874
fuel flow to the engines.
625
00:24:01,540 --> 00:24:02,874
fuel flow to the engines.
626
00:24:07,112 --> 00:24:10,315
While Caldarelli waits for
technicians to complete tests
627
00:24:07,112 --> 00:24:10,315
While Caldarelli waits for
technicians to complete tests
628
00:24:10,382 --> 00:24:13,151
on pumps and lines,
Pennetta decides
629
00:24:13,218 --> 00:24:15,020
to start a new line of inquiry.
630
00:24:13,218 --> 00:24:15,020
to start a new line of inquiry.
631
00:24:19,424 --> 00:24:22,561
He explores the possibility
that the fuel that was on board
632
00:24:19,424 --> 00:24:22,561
He explores the possibility
that the fuel that was on board
633
00:24:22,627 --> 00:24:25,030
was somehow contaminated.
634
00:24:25,096 --> 00:24:28,533
Fuel contamination
can derive from four
635
00:24:25,096 --> 00:24:28,533
Fuel contamination
can derive from four
636
00:24:28,600 --> 00:24:30,235
or five different sources.
637
00:24:34,840 --> 00:24:37,843
Kerosene-based
jet fuel is very delicate.
638
00:24:37,909 --> 00:24:40,345
If stored or
transferred improperly,
639
00:24:37,909 --> 00:24:40,345
If stored or
transferred improperly,
640
00:24:40,412 --> 00:24:42,948
it can be polluted
with water, sand,
641
00:24:43,014 --> 00:24:45,884
or fungus, even sticky
residue from the hoses
642
00:24:43,014 --> 00:24:45,884
or fungus, even sticky
residue from the hoses
643
00:24:45,951 --> 00:24:47,786
of refueling tankers.
644
00:24:47,853 --> 00:24:51,256
Any of these could prevent the
fuel from properly igniting
645
00:24:47,853 --> 00:24:51,256
Any of these could prevent the
fuel from properly igniting
646
00:24:51,323 --> 00:24:53,792
and could have caused
the engines to shut down.
647
00:24:56,728 --> 00:24:57,896
How much fuel are you adding?
648
00:24:57,963 --> 00:24:59,764
400 kilograms.
649
00:24:59,831 --> 00:25:03,902
The plane last
took on fuel in Bari.
650
00:24:59,831 --> 00:25:03,902
The plane last
took on fuel in Bari.
651
00:25:03,969 --> 00:25:06,137
Samples from the
tanker that supplied it
652
00:25:06,204 --> 00:25:08,707
are taken for testing.
653
00:25:08,773 --> 00:25:11,743
Pennetta needs to prove that
one of these contaminants
654
00:25:11,810 --> 00:25:15,947
got into flight 1153's fuel,
prevented combustion, and
655
00:25:11,810 --> 00:25:15,947
got into flight 1153's fuel,
prevented combustion, and
656
00:25:16,014 --> 00:25:19,351
caused both engines to fail.
657
00:25:19,417 --> 00:25:22,387
Sediments can be transferred
from the tanker truck
658
00:25:19,417 --> 00:25:22,387
Sediments can be transferred
from the tanker truck
659
00:25:22,454 --> 00:25:24,322
to the aircraft.
660
00:25:24,389 --> 00:25:26,925
So the fuel filter
can be clogged
661
00:25:24,389 --> 00:25:26,925
So the fuel filter
can be clogged
662
00:25:26,992 --> 00:25:31,096
and so the engine can
have some problems.
663
00:25:31,162 --> 00:25:34,032
Technicians remove
the truck's fuel filters to look
664
00:25:31,162 --> 00:25:34,032
Technicians remove
the truck's fuel filters to look
665
00:25:34,099 --> 00:25:35,967
for evidence of contamination.
666
00:25:39,137 --> 00:25:43,008
Hoses and couplings are swabbed
for sticky residue or colonies
667
00:25:43,074 --> 00:25:46,678
of microorganisms and submitted
for testing at an Italian Air
668
00:25:43,074 --> 00:25:46,678
of microorganisms and submitted
for testing at an Italian Air
669
00:25:46,745 --> 00:25:47,812
Force laboratory.
670
00:25:52,284 --> 00:25:54,452
The fuel is filtered
for minute particles
671
00:25:54,519 --> 00:25:55,954
suspended in the fluid.
672
00:26:01,993 --> 00:26:04,262
And carefully examined
for impurities.
673
00:26:01,993 --> 00:26:04,262
And carefully examined
for impurities.
674
00:26:12,270 --> 00:26:15,040
The truck's filters are
also inspected for residue
675
00:26:12,270 --> 00:26:15,040
The truck's filters are
also inspected for residue
676
00:26:15,106 --> 00:26:16,408
or sediment from the tanks.
677
00:26:19,844 --> 00:26:23,248
Meanwhile, in Palermo,
Caldarelli and his technicians
678
00:26:19,844 --> 00:26:23,248
Meanwhile, in Palermo,
Caldarelli and his technicians
679
00:26:23,315 --> 00:26:28,653
have completed tests on flight
1153's fuel lines and pumps.
680
00:26:23,315 --> 00:26:28,653
have completed tests on flight
1153's fuel lines and pumps.
681
00:26:28,720 --> 00:26:31,556
The tests are thorough,
the results conclusive.
682
00:26:35,126 --> 00:26:40,932
But the fuel feed lines
were OK, were no leak.
683
00:26:35,126 --> 00:26:40,932
But the fuel feed lines
were OK, were no leak.
684
00:26:40,999 --> 00:26:44,135
If the fuel
delivery system was working
685
00:26:44,202 --> 00:26:46,671
and the two pilots remember
having ample fuel...
686
00:26:44,202 --> 00:26:46,671
and the two pilots remember
having ample fuel...
687
00:26:46,738 --> 00:26:52,277
The fuel quantity indicator
said 1,800 kilograms of fuel.
688
00:26:46,738 --> 00:26:52,277
The fuel quantity indicator
said 1,800 kilograms of fuel.
689
00:26:52,344 --> 00:26:54,279
...then why
had the engines failed?
690
00:26:56,915 --> 00:27:00,151
When test results from the
Bari fuel tanker come in,
691
00:27:00,218 --> 00:27:02,053
they, too, are conclusive.
692
00:27:02,120 --> 00:27:04,823
The fuel filters, hose
couplings, and tanker
693
00:27:02,120 --> 00:27:04,823
The fuel filters, hose
couplings, and tanker
694
00:27:04,889 --> 00:27:07,926
fuel at Bari airport are clean.
695
00:27:07,993 --> 00:27:12,097
So fuel contamination as
a source of double engine
696
00:27:07,993 --> 00:27:12,097
So fuel contamination as
a source of double engine
697
00:27:12,163 --> 00:27:14,532
flameout was then excluded.
698
00:27:14,599 --> 00:27:16,501
At this
point, the investigators
699
00:27:14,599 --> 00:27:16,501
At this
point, the investigators
700
00:27:16,568 --> 00:27:18,737
still don't know what
caused the downing
701
00:27:18,803 --> 00:27:22,207
of Tuninter flight 1153.
702
00:27:18,803 --> 00:27:22,207
of Tuninter flight 1153.
703
00:27:22,273 --> 00:27:24,309
But something has been
eating at Pennetta.
704
00:27:28,780 --> 00:27:31,116
If the plane was
filled with fuel,
705
00:27:31,182 --> 00:27:34,519
and since the fuel is
stored in the plane's wings,
706
00:27:31,182 --> 00:27:34,519
and since the fuel is
stored in the plane's wings,
707
00:27:34,586 --> 00:27:36,821
why did the wing section float?
708
00:27:36,888 --> 00:27:40,258
Floating on the wing indicates
that the weight of the wing
709
00:27:36,888 --> 00:27:40,258
Floating on the wing indicates
that the weight of the wing
710
00:27:40,325 --> 00:27:41,659
was not so high.
711
00:27:41,726 --> 00:27:46,197
We have been told by ATR that
if the amount of fuel that was
712
00:27:41,726 --> 00:27:46,197
We have been told by ATR that
if the amount of fuel that was
713
00:27:46,264 --> 00:27:50,335
supposed to be into the
wing, around 2,000 kilograms,
714
00:27:50,402 --> 00:27:55,373
were on the fuel tanks,
the wings maybe would
715
00:27:50,402 --> 00:27:55,373
were on the fuel tanks,
the wings maybe would
716
00:27:55,440 --> 00:27:57,909
not have been able to float.
717
00:27:55,440 --> 00:27:57,909
not have been able to float.
718
00:27:57,976 --> 00:28:00,779
Pennetta suspects the
plane didn't have as much fuel
719
00:28:00,845 --> 00:28:06,184
as the pilots thought, but he
doesn't know how that could be.
720
00:28:00,845 --> 00:28:06,184
as the pilots thought, but he
doesn't know how that could be.
721
00:28:06,251 --> 00:28:08,887
Two weeks into the
investigation, Pennetta
722
00:28:06,251 --> 00:28:08,887
Two weeks into the
investigation, Pennetta
723
00:28:08,953 --> 00:28:11,523
gets an important
lead in the case.
724
00:28:11,589 --> 00:28:13,458
After two weeks
of the event, we
725
00:28:13,525 --> 00:28:16,094
received some
technical documentation
726
00:28:13,525 --> 00:28:16,094
received some
technical documentation
727
00:28:16,161 --> 00:28:18,963
from the aircraft operator.
728
00:28:19,030 --> 00:28:21,299
According to
the logs, Captain Gharbi
729
00:28:19,030 --> 00:28:21,299
According to
the logs, Captain Gharbi
730
00:28:21,366 --> 00:28:26,504
flew the same aircraft the
day before the accident.
731
00:28:26,571 --> 00:28:31,476
After that flight, he reported
a problem with his fuel gauge.
732
00:28:26,571 --> 00:28:31,476
After that flight, he reported
a problem with his fuel gauge.
733
00:28:31,543 --> 00:28:34,279
When he left the
aircraft the day before,
734
00:28:31,543 --> 00:28:34,279
When he left the
aircraft the day before,
735
00:28:34,345 --> 00:28:37,515
he reported that the
right display fuel
736
00:28:37,582 --> 00:28:39,417
indicator was out of service.
737
00:28:37,582 --> 00:28:39,417
indicator was out of service.
738
00:28:39,484 --> 00:28:41,553
So it needed to be replaced.
739
00:28:41,619 --> 00:28:44,489
The fuel
quantity indicator, or FQI,
740
00:28:44,556 --> 00:28:48,593
is a gas gauge that tells pilots
how much fuel is left on board.
741
00:28:44,556 --> 00:28:48,593
is a gas gauge that tells pilots
how much fuel is left on board.
742
00:28:52,130 --> 00:28:54,999
The lights on the FQI
were malfunctioning
743
00:28:55,066 --> 00:28:59,804
and Captain Gharbi made a note
of this in the maintenance log.
744
00:28:55,066 --> 00:28:59,804
and Captain Gharbi made a note
of this in the maintenance log.
745
00:28:59,871 --> 00:29:01,739
We were able to
see that the fuel
746
00:29:01,806 --> 00:29:06,644
quantity indicator was changed
the day before the event.
747
00:29:01,806 --> 00:29:06,644
quantity indicator was changed
the day before the event.
748
00:29:06,711 --> 00:29:09,280
The maintenance
log raises the possibility
749
00:29:06,711 --> 00:29:09,280
The maintenance
log raises the possibility
750
00:29:09,347 --> 00:29:12,283
that the FQI that the
mechanic installed
751
00:29:12,350 --> 00:29:14,819
was not the right
one for the plane.
752
00:29:12,350 --> 00:29:14,819
was not the right
one for the plane.
753
00:29:14,886 --> 00:29:18,490
It doesn't seem to have
the right model number.
754
00:29:18,556 --> 00:29:22,527
Tuninter flies two models
of ATR aircraft, the ATR
755
00:29:18,556 --> 00:29:22,527
Tuninter flies two models
of ATR aircraft, the ATR
756
00:29:22,594 --> 00:29:26,631
42 and the larger ATR 72.
757
00:29:30,935 --> 00:29:33,371
The fuel quantity
indicators for each plane
758
00:29:30,935 --> 00:29:33,371
The fuel quantity
indicators for each plane
759
00:29:33,438 --> 00:29:36,474
look identical except for
a different model number
760
00:29:36,541 --> 00:29:39,344
at the top of each unit.
761
00:29:36,541 --> 00:29:39,344
at the top of each unit.
762
00:29:39,410 --> 00:29:45,016
The ATR 72 should have
model number 2500.
763
00:29:39,410 --> 00:29:45,016
The ATR 72 should have
model number 2500.
764
00:29:45,083 --> 00:29:47,352
But according to
the logs, mechanics
765
00:29:47,418 --> 00:29:53,791
installed a unit with the
model number 2250 instead.
766
00:29:47,418 --> 00:29:53,791
installed a unit with the
model number 2250 instead.
767
00:29:53,858 --> 00:29:57,996
Tuninter's maintenance
logs offer a valuable clue.
768
00:29:53,858 --> 00:29:57,996
Tuninter's maintenance
logs offer a valuable clue.
769
00:29:58,062 --> 00:30:00,932
But for Pennetta, there's
no definitive proof
770
00:30:00,999 --> 00:30:02,934
that the wrong fuel
quantity indicator
771
00:30:00,999 --> 00:30:02,934
that the wrong fuel
quantity indicator
772
00:30:03,001 --> 00:30:05,503
was installed on the plane.
773
00:30:05,570 --> 00:30:09,474
It could have been a mismatch
in that aircraft documentation,
774
00:30:05,570 --> 00:30:09,474
It could have been a mismatch
in that aircraft documentation,
775
00:30:09,541 --> 00:30:11,409
so we need to prove that.
776
00:30:14,979 --> 00:30:16,681
There is only
one way to know for certain
777
00:30:16,748 --> 00:30:19,384
whether flight 1153
had the right fuel
778
00:30:19,450 --> 00:30:25,523
quantity indicator, go find
it at the bottom of the sea.
779
00:30:19,450 --> 00:30:25,523
quantity indicator, go find
it at the bottom of the sea.
780
00:30:30,061 --> 00:30:33,865
Not until three weeks after
the crash of Flight 1153 do
781
00:30:33,932 --> 00:30:37,535
investigators recover
wreckage from the sea.
782
00:30:33,932 --> 00:30:37,535
investigators recover
wreckage from the sea.
783
00:30:37,602 --> 00:30:39,571
The data from the
plane's black boxes
784
00:30:39,637 --> 00:30:43,107
confirms what the
pilots had been saying.
785
00:30:39,637 --> 00:30:43,107
confirms what the
pilots had been saying.
786
00:30:43,174 --> 00:30:45,243
There was no
warning of low fuel,
787
00:30:45,310 --> 00:30:49,447
so there appeared to be enough
fuel to make the flight.
788
00:30:45,310 --> 00:30:49,447
so there appeared to be enough
fuel to make the flight.
789
00:30:49,514 --> 00:30:54,285
The black boxes can't
solve this mystery.
790
00:30:49,514 --> 00:30:54,285
The black boxes can't
solve this mystery.
791
00:30:54,352 --> 00:30:59,290
Investigators hope that the
tail and front section can.
792
00:30:54,352 --> 00:30:59,290
Investigators hope that the
tail and front section can.
793
00:30:59,357 --> 00:31:02,160
They are hauled aboard a
Naval vessel from the sea.
794
00:31:09,567 --> 00:31:14,272
The moment the cockpit is
hauled in, Pennetta is there.
795
00:31:09,567 --> 00:31:14,272
The moment the cockpit is
hauled in, Pennetta is there.
796
00:31:14,339 --> 00:31:19,444
There's only one thing
he wants to see inside.
797
00:31:14,339 --> 00:31:19,444
There's only one thing
he wants to see inside.
798
00:31:22,880 --> 00:31:26,117
So when the wreckage was
recovered from under the sea
799
00:31:26,184 --> 00:31:28,253
and put on a ship
deck, I realized
800
00:31:28,319 --> 00:31:31,256
that as a matter of fact,
a fuel quantity indicator
801
00:31:28,319 --> 00:31:31,256
that as a matter of fact,
a fuel quantity indicator
802
00:31:31,322 --> 00:31:34,192
for an ATR 42 was installed.
803
00:31:34,259 --> 00:31:38,196
It was like we found
the smoking gun.
804
00:31:34,259 --> 00:31:38,196
It was like we found
the smoking gun.
805
00:31:38,263 --> 00:31:43,835
The wrong FQI was
installed on flight 1153.
806
00:31:38,263 --> 00:31:43,835
The wrong FQI was
installed on flight 1153.
807
00:31:43,901 --> 00:31:46,371
Pennetta finally has the
break he's been looking for.
808
00:31:48,973 --> 00:31:51,409
The ATR's fuel
quantity indicator
809
00:31:51,476 --> 00:31:54,312
collects data from the
sensors in the fuel tanks
810
00:31:51,476 --> 00:31:54,312
collects data from the
sensors in the fuel tanks
811
00:31:54,379 --> 00:31:57,882
and calculates how much
fuel is in the tanks.
812
00:31:57,949 --> 00:32:01,286
But since the fuel tanks
on the 42 and the 72
813
00:31:57,949 --> 00:32:01,286
But since the fuel tanks
on the 42 and the 72
814
00:32:01,352 --> 00:32:04,622
are different sizes,
fuel quantity indicators
815
00:32:01,352 --> 00:32:04,622
are different sizes,
fuel quantity indicators
816
00:32:04,689 --> 00:32:06,991
can't be swapped between them.
817
00:32:09,994 --> 00:32:12,297
Technicians conduct
refueling tests
818
00:32:09,994 --> 00:32:12,297
Technicians conduct
refueling tests
819
00:32:12,363 --> 00:32:20,004
with the wrong FQI
installed on an ATR 72
820
00:32:12,363 --> 00:32:20,004
with the wrong FQI
installed on an ATR 72
821
00:32:20,071 --> 00:32:22,974
and the results are chilling.
822
00:32:20,071 --> 00:32:22,974
and the results are chilling.
823
00:32:23,041 --> 00:32:29,080
The results show that if you
install an FQI type, we'll say
824
00:32:23,041 --> 00:32:29,080
The results show that if you
install an FQI type, we'll say
825
00:32:29,147 --> 00:32:35,820
42, on an ATR 72 aircraft, if I
have no fuel into the aircraft
826
00:32:29,147 --> 00:32:35,820
42, on an ATR 72 aircraft, if I
have no fuel into the aircraft
827
00:32:35,887 --> 00:32:38,122
in the fuel tanks
with zero fuel,
828
00:32:38,189 --> 00:32:43,361
the fuel quantity indicator
showed me 1,800 kilograms.
829
00:32:38,189 --> 00:32:43,361
the fuel quantity indicator
showed me 1,800 kilograms.
830
00:32:43,428 --> 00:32:45,263
Precisely the amount of fuel
831
00:32:45,330 --> 00:32:48,666
that the captain reported having
when his engines flamed out.
832
00:32:45,330 --> 00:32:48,666
that the captain reported having
when his engines flamed out.
833
00:32:48,733 --> 00:32:53,104
Cockpit fuel quantity
eight, 1,800 kilograms.
834
00:32:48,733 --> 00:32:53,104
Cockpit fuel quantity
eight, 1,800 kilograms.
835
00:32:53,171 --> 00:32:58,109
Investigators conclude at 23,000
feet above the Mediterranean,
836
00:32:58,176 --> 00:33:00,578
the wrong fuel
indicator led the crew
837
00:32:58,176 --> 00:33:00,578
the wrong fuel
indicator led the crew
838
00:33:00,645 --> 00:33:04,048
to believe that they had ample
fuel when their tanks were
839
00:33:04,115 --> 00:33:05,550
actually empty.
840
00:33:04,115 --> 00:33:05,550
actually empty.
841
00:33:05,616 --> 00:33:08,653
Engine relight, negative.
842
00:33:08,720 --> 00:33:10,188
They're not doing anything.
843
00:33:10,254 --> 00:33:13,491
The engines could not
possibly have been restarted.
844
00:33:10,254 --> 00:33:13,491
The engines could not
possibly have been restarted.
845
00:33:13,558 --> 00:33:18,596
With hundreds of ATR 42s
and ATR 72s still flying,
846
00:33:13,558 --> 00:33:18,596
With hundreds of ATR 42s
and ATR 72s still flying,
847
00:33:18,663 --> 00:33:21,065
the implications are stark,
848
00:33:21,132 --> 00:33:22,533
Could there
be other planes
849
00:33:21,132 --> 00:33:22,533
Could there
be other planes
850
00:33:22,600 --> 00:33:25,036
flying with the wrong gauge?
851
00:33:25,103 --> 00:33:26,604
The first safety
recommendation
852
00:33:26,671 --> 00:33:35,046
was to mandate all operators
that use ATR 42 and 72 aircraft
853
00:33:26,671 --> 00:33:35,046
was to mandate all operators
that use ATR 42 and 72 aircraft
854
00:33:26,671 --> 00:33:35,046
was to mandate all operators
that use ATR 42 and 72 aircraft
855
00:33:35,113 --> 00:33:38,750
in their fleet to check
whether the right fuel
856
00:33:38,816 --> 00:33:43,588
quantity indicator was
installed on the aircraft.
857
00:33:38,816 --> 00:33:43,588
quantity indicator was
installed on the aircraft.
858
00:33:43,654 --> 00:33:45,623
Pennetta and
Caldarelli have uncovered
859
00:33:45,690 --> 00:33:48,359
the error that caused
both of flight 1153's
860
00:33:45,690 --> 00:33:48,359
the error that caused
both of flight 1153's
861
00:33:48,426 --> 00:33:50,228
engines to quit in midair.
862
00:33:58,703 --> 00:34:01,139
But the case isn't closed.
863
00:34:01,205 --> 00:34:03,141
Standard flight
procedures should
864
00:34:03,207 --> 00:34:05,376
have uncovered the
error before takeoff
865
00:34:03,207 --> 00:34:05,376
have uncovered the
error before takeoff
866
00:34:05,443 --> 00:34:06,778
and prevented the disaster.
867
00:34:10,448 --> 00:34:14,051
Captain Gharbi's aircraft
went in for repairs in Tunisia
868
00:34:10,448 --> 00:34:14,051
Captain Gharbi's aircraft
went in for repairs in Tunisia
869
00:34:14,118 --> 00:34:17,221
the night before the crash.
870
00:34:14,118 --> 00:34:17,221
the night before the crash.
871
00:34:17,288 --> 00:34:21,225
The plane's FQI indicated the
two tanks together held 790
872
00:34:21,292 --> 00:34:24,996
kilograms of fuel in the tank.
873
00:34:21,292 --> 00:34:24,996
kilograms of fuel in the tank.
874
00:34:25,062 --> 00:34:28,533
After the new fuel quantity
indicator was installed,
875
00:34:25,062 --> 00:34:28,533
After the new fuel quantity
indicator was installed,
876
00:34:28,599 --> 00:34:31,335
it showed that there was
almost four times as much
877
00:34:31,402 --> 00:34:37,141
fuel on board, 3,100 kilograms.
878
00:34:31,402 --> 00:34:37,141
fuel on board, 3,100 kilograms.
879
00:34:37,208 --> 00:34:40,411
The following morning, Captain
Gharbi noticed that the fuel
880
00:34:40,478 --> 00:34:41,946
levels had gone up.
881
00:34:40,478 --> 00:34:41,946
levels had gone up.
882
00:34:42,013 --> 00:34:45,349
He assumed that
fuel had been added.
883
00:34:45,416 --> 00:34:47,985
But when fuel is
added to an aircraft,
884
00:34:45,416 --> 00:34:47,985
But when fuel is
added to an aircraft,
885
00:34:48,052 --> 00:34:51,289
a refueling slip must
be left in the cockpit.
886
00:34:51,355 --> 00:34:53,825
Where is the refueling slip?
887
00:34:51,355 --> 00:34:53,825
Where is the refueling slip?
888
00:34:53,891 --> 00:34:56,794
The pilot asked to
the flight dispatcher,
889
00:34:56,861 --> 00:34:58,563
where was this refueling slip?
890
00:34:56,861 --> 00:34:58,563
where was this refueling slip?
891
00:34:58,629 --> 00:35:01,766
But the flight dispatcher
was not able to find
892
00:35:01,833 --> 00:35:03,901
this refueling slip.
893
00:35:03,968 --> 00:35:06,671
I'll get it to you when
you get back from Djerba.
894
00:35:03,968 --> 00:35:06,671
I'll get it to you when
you get back from Djerba.
895
00:35:06,737 --> 00:35:09,106
Roger that.
896
00:35:09,173 --> 00:35:12,076
There was no
refueling slip because the plane
897
00:35:09,173 --> 00:35:12,076
There was no
refueling slip because the plane
898
00:35:12,143 --> 00:35:14,145
hadn't been refueled.
899
00:35:17,515 --> 00:35:19,750
In spite of
regulations, the captain
900
00:35:19,817 --> 00:35:24,255
left without that
vital piece of paper.
901
00:35:19,817 --> 00:35:24,255
left without that
vital piece of paper.
902
00:35:24,322 --> 00:35:26,891
There are some standard
regulations requiring
903
00:35:26,958 --> 00:35:31,629
the pilot to take off only when
he is sure about the quantity
904
00:35:26,958 --> 00:35:31,629
the pilot to take off only when
he is sure about the quantity
905
00:35:31,696 --> 00:35:34,131
of fuel.
906
00:35:34,198 --> 00:35:36,434
With the wrong
fuel indicator on board
907
00:35:34,198 --> 00:35:36,434
With the wrong
fuel indicator on board
908
00:35:36,501 --> 00:35:40,004
and less fuel than he
believed, Captain Gharbi
909
00:35:40,071 --> 00:35:44,408
makes it to Bari,
Italy, and tops off
910
00:35:40,071 --> 00:35:44,408
makes it to Bari,
Italy, and tops off
911
00:35:44,475 --> 00:35:47,078
his plane for the next
leg of the trip to Djerba.
912
00:35:44,475 --> 00:35:47,078
his plane for the next
leg of the trip to Djerba.
913
00:35:52,116 --> 00:35:53,117
How much fuel are you adding?
914
00:35:52,116 --> 00:35:53,117
How much fuel are you adding?
915
00:35:53,184 --> 00:35:55,286
400 kilograms.
916
00:35:55,353 --> 00:35:56,554
2,700 total?
917
00:35:56,621 --> 00:35:57,922
Yes.
918
00:35:57,989 --> 00:36:02,093
Believing he has 2,700
kilograms of fuel on board,
919
00:35:57,989 --> 00:36:02,093
Believing he has 2,700
kilograms of fuel on board,
920
00:36:02,159 --> 00:36:06,097
Captain Gharbi begins
his flight to Djerba.
921
00:36:02,159 --> 00:36:06,097
Captain Gharbi begins
his flight to Djerba.
922
00:36:06,163 --> 00:36:09,634
If the correct fuel quantity
indicator had been installed,
923
00:36:09,700 --> 00:36:11,168
the captain would
have known that he
924
00:36:09,700 --> 00:36:11,168
the captain would
have known that he
925
00:36:11,235 --> 00:36:15,373
had only 540
kilograms, not nearly
926
00:36:15,439 --> 00:36:17,608
enough to make the crossing.
927
00:36:15,439 --> 00:36:17,608
enough to make the crossing.
928
00:36:17,675 --> 00:36:18,409
Mayday.
929
00:36:18,476 --> 00:36:19,210
Mayday.
930
00:36:19,277 --> 00:36:20,545
Mayday.
931
00:36:20,611 --> 00:36:23,915
TUI1153 request immediate
landing in Palermo.
932
00:36:20,611 --> 00:36:23,915
TUI1153 request immediate
landing in Palermo.
933
00:36:23,981 --> 00:36:25,650
We've lost both engines.
934
00:36:35,660 --> 00:36:38,462
Pennetta's
investigation comes to a close.
935
00:36:38,529 --> 00:36:41,399
He draws up his final report.
936
00:36:38,529 --> 00:36:41,399
He draws up his final report.
937
00:36:41,465 --> 00:36:46,437
His colleague, Giuseppe
Caldarelli, voices a bold view.
938
00:36:46,504 --> 00:36:49,473
Even with no fuel
and dead engines,
939
00:36:49,540 --> 00:36:53,578
Flight 1153 could
have made it to land.
940
00:36:49,540 --> 00:36:53,578
Flight 1153 could
have made it to land.
941
00:36:53,644 --> 00:36:57,181
The aircraft was
in a position that
942
00:36:57,248 --> 00:36:59,016
allowed it to reach Palermo.
943
00:36:57,248 --> 00:36:59,016
allowed it to reach Palermo.
944
00:36:59,083 --> 00:37:00,952
TUI1153.
945
00:37:01,018 --> 00:37:03,187
Caldarelli wonders if the pilots
946
00:37:03,254 --> 00:37:05,423
did everything they
could have to get
947
00:37:03,254 --> 00:37:05,423
did everything they
could have to get
948
00:37:05,489 --> 00:37:07,391
the plane safely to Palermo.
949
00:37:07,458 --> 00:37:10,227
Investigators get some
unexpected answers
950
00:37:10,294 --> 00:37:13,598
by having seasoned pilots
fly the exact same plane
951
00:37:10,294 --> 00:37:13,598
by having seasoned pilots
fly the exact same plane
952
00:37:13,664 --> 00:37:15,533
with the exact same problems.
953
00:37:15,600 --> 00:37:18,636
OK, we are now in big trouble
because this second engine
954
00:37:15,600 --> 00:37:18,636
OK, we are now in big trouble
because this second engine
955
00:37:18,703 --> 00:37:19,637
has gone off.
956
00:37:23,441 --> 00:37:26,344
Vincenzo Pennetta's
investigation into the crash
957
00:37:26,410 --> 00:37:29,981
of Tuninter Flight 1153
has uncovered the events
958
00:37:26,410 --> 00:37:29,981
of Tuninter Flight 1153
has uncovered the events
959
00:37:30,047 --> 00:37:32,216
that led up to the accident.
960
00:37:32,283 --> 00:37:36,621
Now he and Giuseppe Caldarelli
need to resolve one question.
961
00:37:32,283 --> 00:37:36,621
Now he and Giuseppe Caldarelli
need to resolve one question.
962
00:37:36,687 --> 00:37:38,055
We're not going to make it.
963
00:37:38,122 --> 00:37:40,391
Did mistakes
made by the pilots
964
00:37:38,122 --> 00:37:40,391
Did mistakes
made by the pilots
965
00:37:40,458 --> 00:37:42,259
cost people their lives?
966
00:37:44,128 --> 00:37:48,532
Caldarelli and his team study
the plane's specifications
967
00:37:44,128 --> 00:37:48,532
Caldarelli and his team study
the plane's specifications
968
00:37:48,599 --> 00:37:52,336
and draw a surprising
conclusion.
969
00:37:48,599 --> 00:37:52,336
and draw a surprising
conclusion.
970
00:37:52,403 --> 00:37:55,439
According to
manufacturer data, an ATR
971
00:37:55,506 --> 00:38:02,747
is able to glide three miles
for every 1,000 feet of descent.
972
00:37:55,506 --> 00:38:02,747
is able to glide three miles
for every 1,000 feet of descent.
973
00:38:02,813 --> 00:38:04,949
With the help of a
tailwind that day,
974
00:38:02,813 --> 00:38:04,949
With the help of a
tailwind that day,
975
00:38:05,016 --> 00:38:11,022
Flight 1153 could have been able
to glide 70 miles to Palermo.
976
00:38:05,016 --> 00:38:11,022
Flight 1153 could have been able
to glide 70 miles to Palermo.
977
00:38:11,088 --> 00:38:15,026
The crew might have
been able to make it.
978
00:38:15,092 --> 00:38:17,161
Landing gear lever up.
979
00:38:15,092 --> 00:38:17,161
Landing gear lever up.
980
00:38:17,228 --> 00:38:19,430
So what had
the pilots done wrong?
981
00:38:24,368 --> 00:38:27,405
To answer that question,
Pennetta and Caldarelli
982
00:38:27,471 --> 00:38:30,908
recreate flight 1153
in the flight simulator
983
00:38:27,471 --> 00:38:30,908
recreate flight 1153
in the flight simulator
984
00:38:30,975 --> 00:38:33,811
at the ATR facility in France.
985
00:38:38,582 --> 00:38:42,720
Test pilots try to glide
an ATR 72 for 70 miles
986
00:38:38,582 --> 00:38:42,720
Test pilots try to glide
an ATR 72 for 70 miles
987
00:38:42,787 --> 00:38:44,588
from the altitude
at which flight
988
00:38:44,655 --> 00:38:46,924
1153 lost its second engine.
989
00:38:44,655 --> 00:38:46,924
1153 lost its second engine.
990
00:38:54,365 --> 00:38:56,534
The simulation
was requested to see
991
00:38:56,600 --> 00:38:59,904
the range of the aircraft
starting from the second engine
992
00:38:56,600 --> 00:38:59,904
the range of the aircraft
starting from the second engine
993
00:38:59,970 --> 00:39:01,105
out.
994
00:39:01,172 --> 00:39:05,176
Double-engine flameouts,
you have to be very aware
995
00:39:01,172 --> 00:39:05,176
Double-engine flameouts,
you have to be very aware
996
00:39:05,242 --> 00:39:09,346
of the configuration of the
aircraft in order to keep
997
00:39:09,413 --> 00:39:12,850
as much as possible the
altitude and distance
998
00:39:09,413 --> 00:39:12,850
as much as possible the
altitude and distance
999
00:39:12,917 --> 00:39:14,385
to fly before the crash.
1000
00:39:15,953 --> 00:39:17,321
Stop!
Stop!
1001
00:39:15,953 --> 00:39:17,321
Stop!
Stop!
1002
00:39:17,388 --> 00:39:18,489
Engine number one
has flamed out.
1003
00:39:18,556 --> 00:39:21,158
With both
engines out, the priority
1004
00:39:21,225 --> 00:39:24,895
is to keep the plane
gliding as far as necessary.
1005
00:39:21,225 --> 00:39:24,895
is to keep the plane
gliding as far as necessary.
1006
00:39:24,962 --> 00:39:29,133
To do that, pilots can change
the angle of their windmilling
1007
00:39:24,962 --> 00:39:29,133
To do that, pilots can change
the angle of their windmilling
1008
00:39:29,200 --> 00:39:30,267
propellers.
1009
00:39:30,334 --> 00:39:32,436
You have the maximum
glide performance
1010
00:39:32,503 --> 00:39:34,505
when you minimize the drag.
1011
00:39:32,503 --> 00:39:34,505
when you minimize the drag.
1012
00:39:34,572 --> 00:39:37,742
It's very important to think
to feather the propeller
1013
00:39:37,808 --> 00:39:40,344
in order to reduce the drag.
1014
00:39:37,808 --> 00:39:40,344
in order to reduce the drag.
1015
00:39:40,411 --> 00:39:42,613
Feathering the
props involves changing
1016
00:39:42,680 --> 00:39:46,150
their angle against the wind.
1017
00:39:42,680 --> 00:39:46,150
their angle against the wind.
1018
00:39:46,217 --> 00:39:47,885
The maneuver reduces drag.
1019
00:39:50,554 --> 00:39:53,424
When you want to feather
the propeller in flight,
1020
00:39:50,554 --> 00:39:53,424
When you want to feather
the propeller in flight,
1021
00:39:53,491 --> 00:39:55,526
you first have to
reduce the power
1022
00:39:55,593 --> 00:39:57,762
lever to idle and
put the condition
1023
00:39:57,828 --> 00:40:00,564
lever back to feather position.
1024
00:39:57,828 --> 00:40:00,564
lever back to feather position.
1025
00:40:00,631 --> 00:40:02,900
The crew did
not feather their props
1026
00:40:02,967 --> 00:40:05,669
when their engines quit.
1027
00:40:02,967 --> 00:40:05,669
when their engines quit.
1028
00:40:05,736 --> 00:40:08,706
The windmilling propellers
created enormous drag.
1029
00:40:11,976 --> 00:40:15,946
If the crew of flight 1153
had feathered their props,
1030
00:40:16,013 --> 00:40:20,284
they may have been able to
glide further than they did.
1031
00:40:20,351 --> 00:40:23,888
By the time Captain Gharbi's
second engine flamed out,
1032
00:40:20,351 --> 00:40:23,888
By the time Captain Gharbi's
second engine flamed out,
1033
00:40:23,954 --> 00:40:27,424
he was just below 22,000 feet.
1034
00:40:27,491 --> 00:40:29,960
To further reduce
drag at that altitude,
1035
00:40:27,491 --> 00:40:29,960
To further reduce
drag at that altitude,
1036
00:40:30,027 --> 00:40:34,799
the plane should be slowed to
158 miles per hour, the ATR
1037
00:40:30,027 --> 00:40:34,799
the plane should be slowed to
158 miles per hour, the ATR
1038
00:40:34,865 --> 00:40:38,102
72's ideal gliding speed.
1039
00:40:38,169 --> 00:40:41,238
Surprisingly, to glide
as far as possible,
1040
00:40:38,169 --> 00:40:41,238
Surprisingly, to glide
as far as possible,
1041
00:40:41,305 --> 00:40:44,675
a pilot doesn't want to
fly as fast as possible.
1042
00:40:44,742 --> 00:40:47,044
The faster a plane
flies, the more
1043
00:40:44,742 --> 00:40:47,044
The faster a plane
flies, the more
1044
00:40:47,111 --> 00:40:51,382
the airflow pushes against
it, creating resistance.
1045
00:40:51,448 --> 00:40:57,655
Every plane has an optimal speed
to achieve the furthest glide.
1046
00:40:51,448 --> 00:40:57,655
Every plane has an optimal speed
to achieve the furthest glide.
1047
00:40:57,721 --> 00:41:02,359
The crew of flight 1153
continued flying up to 55 miles
1048
00:40:57,721 --> 00:41:02,359
The crew of flight 1153
continued flying up to 55 miles
1049
00:41:02,426 --> 00:41:05,396
an hour faster than their
optimal gliding speed.
1050
00:41:02,426 --> 00:41:05,396
an hour faster than their
optimal gliding speed.
1051
00:41:05,462 --> 00:41:07,965
That added to the
drag on the plane
1052
00:41:08,032 --> 00:41:11,435
and reduced the distance
they could glide.
1053
00:41:08,032 --> 00:41:11,435
and reduced the distance
they could glide.
1054
00:41:11,502 --> 00:41:14,605
By feathering his props
and reducing his speed,
1055
00:41:14,672 --> 00:41:17,408
a simulator pilot in
France was able to get
1056
00:41:14,672 --> 00:41:17,408
a simulator pilot in
France was able to get
1057
00:41:17,474 --> 00:41:21,078
the plane as far as Palermo.
1058
00:41:21,145 --> 00:41:23,013
You're with me, Ali, huh?
1059
00:41:21,145 --> 00:41:23,013
You're with me, Ali, huh?
1060
00:41:23,080 --> 00:41:25,216
Careful.
1061
00:41:25,282 --> 00:41:27,318
Choukri, ready?
1062
00:41:27,384 --> 00:41:29,587
Flight 1153 hit the water
1063
00:41:27,384 --> 00:41:29,587
Flight 1153 hit the water
1064
00:41:29,653 --> 00:41:33,257
26 miles from shore, well
short of what the plane
1065
00:41:33,324 --> 00:41:34,425
was capable of achieving.
1066
00:41:33,324 --> 00:41:34,425
was capable of achieving.
1067
00:41:48,973 --> 00:41:52,076
The simulation confirmed
that the crew might have been
1068
00:41:48,973 --> 00:41:52,076
The simulation confirmed
that the crew might have been
1069
00:41:52,142 --> 00:41:55,679
able to make it to land and
highlights the importance
1070
00:41:55,746 --> 00:41:59,016
of proper training to deal
with unlikely situations
1071
00:41:55,746 --> 00:41:59,016
of proper training to deal
with unlikely situations
1072
00:41:59,083 --> 00:42:02,219
such as a twin-engine flameout.
1073
00:42:02,286 --> 00:42:05,256
In aviation, it's
a very rare event.
1074
00:42:02,286 --> 00:42:05,256
In aviation, it's
a very rare event.
1075
00:42:05,322 --> 00:42:07,224
Vincenzo Pennetta's report
1076
00:42:07,291 --> 00:42:09,627
urges airlines to
train their pilots how
1077
00:42:09,693 --> 00:42:11,795
to ditch without engine power.
1078
00:42:09,693 --> 00:42:11,795
to ditch without engine power.
1079
00:42:11,862 --> 00:42:13,864
Better pilot
training is just one
1080
00:42:13,931 --> 00:42:18,302
of 17 safety recommendations
in the accident report.
1081
00:42:13,931 --> 00:42:18,302
of 17 safety recommendations
in the accident report.
1082
00:42:18,369 --> 00:42:22,106
Perhaps the most important,
that ATR redesigned
1083
00:42:18,369 --> 00:42:22,106
Perhaps the most important,
that ATR redesigned
1084
00:42:22,172 --> 00:42:24,275
the fuel quantity indicator.
1085
00:42:24,341 --> 00:42:26,844
In order to prevent
a fuel quantity
1086
00:42:26,911 --> 00:42:31,582
indicator type 42 on a 72
aircraft and vice versa.
1087
00:42:26,911 --> 00:42:31,582
indicator type 42 on a 72
aircraft and vice versa.
1088
00:42:31,649 --> 00:42:33,651
To prevent
mechanics from installing
1089
00:42:33,717 --> 00:42:37,554
the incorrect part, Pennetta
believes that the only answer
1090
00:42:33,717 --> 00:42:37,554
the incorrect part, Pennetta
believes that the only answer
1091
00:42:37,621 --> 00:42:40,891
is to design the FQIs
so that they only fit
1092
00:42:37,621 --> 00:42:40,891
is to design the FQIs
so that they only fit
1093
00:42:40,958 --> 00:42:42,226
on the plane they're meant for.
1094
00:42:45,496 --> 00:42:48,499
I'll get to when
you get back from Djerba.
1095
00:42:45,496 --> 00:42:48,499
I'll get to when
you get back from Djerba.
1096
00:42:48,565 --> 00:42:49,667
Roger that.
1097
00:42:49,733 --> 00:42:52,202
There is no single
cause of the accident.
1098
00:42:49,733 --> 00:42:52,202
There is no single
cause of the accident.
1099
00:42:52,269 --> 00:42:56,307
This accident, like many
other aircraft accidents,
1100
00:42:56,373 --> 00:43:00,044
was determined by a series of
actions, a series of events
1101
00:42:56,373 --> 00:43:00,044
was determined by a series of
actions, a series of events
1102
00:43:00,110 --> 00:43:04,048
linked one to each other.
1103
00:43:00,110 --> 00:43:04,048
linked one to each other.
1104
00:43:04,114 --> 00:43:07,418
This is unheard of.
1105
00:43:07,484 --> 00:43:10,487
I would have accepted
the engine breaking,
1106
00:43:07,484 --> 00:43:10,487
I would have accepted
the engine breaking,
1107
00:43:10,554 --> 00:43:12,222
or a window shattering.
1108
00:43:14,792 --> 00:43:19,730
But to have people die
because of a lack of fuel?
1109
00:43:14,792 --> 00:43:19,730
But to have people die
because of a lack of fuel?
1110
00:43:19,797 --> 00:43:22,032
The crash
of Flight 1153
1111
00:43:19,797 --> 00:43:22,032
The crash
of Flight 1153
1112
00:43:22,099 --> 00:43:26,603
was caused by a series of
grave errors on the ground
1113
00:43:26,670 --> 00:43:28,072
and in the air.
1114
00:43:26,670 --> 00:43:28,072
and in the air.
1115
00:43:34,311 --> 00:43:38,716
In 2012, an Italian court
sentenced Captain Gharbi
1116
00:43:38,782 --> 00:43:43,287
to 6.5 years in prison for his
responsibility in the crash
1117
00:43:38,782 --> 00:43:43,287
to 6.5 years in prison for his
responsibility in the crash
1118
00:43:43,354 --> 00:43:48,225
and subsequent deaths of
16 passengers and crew.
1119
00:43:43,354 --> 00:43:48,225
and subsequent deaths of
16 passengers and crew.
1120
00:43:48,292 --> 00:43:51,495
Co-captain Kebaier, three
Tuninter executives,
1121
00:43:51,562 --> 00:43:53,731
and a mechanic
received sentences
1122
00:43:51,562 --> 00:43:53,731
and a mechanic
received sentences
1123
00:43:53,797 --> 00:43:57,067
between 5.5 and six
years for their liability
1124
00:43:57,134 --> 00:44:01,138
in the fatal crash.
1125
00:43:57,134 --> 00:44:01,138
in the fatal crash.
88677
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