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00:00:02,143 --> 00:00:02,977
A private
charter jet
2
00:00:02,977 --> 00:00:04,187
is flying 15 passengers
3
00:00:04,187 --> 00:00:06,981
to Aspen, Colorado for a party.
4
00:00:06,981 --> 00:00:10,610
This flight really captured
the public attention
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00:00:10,610 --> 00:00:13,196
because of the people
onboard.
6
00:00:13,196 --> 00:00:15,365
Poor weather makes
the landing a challenge
7
00:00:15,365 --> 00:00:17,533
for the experienced pilots.
8
00:00:17,533 --> 00:00:19,994
Can you see out there
at all yet?
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00:00:19,994 --> 00:00:21,371
No.
10
00:00:21,371 --> 00:00:23,873
Aspen is considered
one of the most dangerous
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00:00:23,873 --> 00:00:25,917
airports in the country.
12
00:00:26,417 --> 00:00:27,919
As the plane nears the runway,
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00:00:27,919 --> 00:00:31,047
the controller watches
as disaster unfolds.
14
00:00:33,424 --> 00:00:34,884
What are they doing?
15
00:00:37,345 --> 00:00:38,888
Investigators examine
16
00:00:38,888 --> 00:00:41,391
the Gulfstream's wreckage
for answers.
17
00:00:42,975 --> 00:00:44,268
I don't see any issues here.
18
00:00:44,936 --> 00:00:48,064
When they learn about
the passengers' behavior...
19
00:00:48,898 --> 00:00:52,777
We're running out of fuel here
for the birthday boy!
20
00:00:52,777 --> 00:00:55,947
...the moving parts of this
mystery fall into place.
21
00:00:55,947 --> 00:00:58,241
That clearly had to put some
pressure on the pilots to say,
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00:00:58,241 --> 00:01:00,076
alright, this is not
looking good.
23
00:01:02,203 --> 00:01:03,371
Mayday, mayday.
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00:01:06,541 --> 00:01:08,668
Pull up.
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{\an8}The sun has just
set over the Colorado mountains.
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00:01:28,146 --> 00:01:31,274
{\an8}Avjet November 3-0-3 Golf Alpha
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00:01:31,274 --> 00:01:33,943
{\an8}is nearing the end
of its journey to Aspen.
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00:01:34,610 --> 00:01:36,779
{\an8}Well, there's the edge
of the night there.
29
00:01:38,197 --> 00:01:39,365
Yeah.
30
00:01:40,074 --> 00:01:43,911
Captain Robert Frisbie
has almost 10,000 flying hours
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to his credit.
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00:01:46,372 --> 00:01:48,624
What time is official sunset?
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He and First Officer
Peter Kowalczyk
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00:01:51,836 --> 00:01:55,131
have been flying together
for close to five months.
35
00:01:56,257 --> 00:01:57,759
6:28.
36
00:01:59,135 --> 00:02:02,972
Both pilots have been with
Avjet for less than a year.
37
00:02:04,265 --> 00:02:05,725
{\an8}The small charter airline
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00:02:05,725 --> 00:02:08,561
{\an8}is based out of
Burbank, California.
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00:02:10,188 --> 00:02:13,066
Avjet catered to high rollers,
40
00:02:13,066 --> 00:02:16,277
business people, people who
could afford to charter a jet,
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00:02:16,277 --> 00:02:19,906
people who had to get there
in a hurry, but do it in style.
42
00:02:21,157 --> 00:02:25,119
We're running out of fuel here
for the birthday boy!
43
00:02:25,953 --> 00:02:28,956
A Miami financier
chartered this flight
44
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for 14 of his friends
45
00:02:30,333 --> 00:02:34,420
to attend a birthday party
at an exclusive venue in Aspen.
46
00:02:35,672 --> 00:02:39,467
This was a group of friends
who seemed to have had
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00:02:39,467 --> 00:02:42,387
tremendous early achievements
and accomplishments,
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00:02:42,387 --> 00:02:44,639
and they were really
going to go places.
49
00:02:47,058 --> 00:02:49,936
So, forty-eight hundred pounds
one-twenty-six?
50
00:02:49,936 --> 00:02:51,437
Wait. It was 50.
51
00:02:51,437 --> 00:02:55,024
You know what, I adjusted it,
because the fuel was way off.
52
00:02:56,067 --> 00:02:59,362
The pilots are flying
a Gulfstream III.
53
00:03:01,447 --> 00:03:05,284
The Gulfstream
is a luxurious plane
54
00:03:05,284 --> 00:03:07,078
that, you know people see
in the movies
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00:03:07,078 --> 00:03:10,123
and people think high rollers
and movie stars fly in,
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00:03:10,123 --> 00:03:11,457
but it's a workhorse plane.
57
00:03:11,457 --> 00:03:14,127
It actually has
a good reputation.
58
00:03:15,253 --> 00:03:18,881
It's a 90-minute flight
from Los Angeles to Aspen.
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00:03:22,427 --> 00:03:25,513
Gulfstream 3-0-3
Golf Alpha, Aspen,
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00:03:25,513 --> 00:03:28,725
reduce speed to
two one zero or slower.
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00:03:29,642 --> 00:03:31,769
The controller slows down
the Gulfstream
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00:03:31,769 --> 00:03:33,730
to maintain a safe distance
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00:03:33,730 --> 00:03:36,482
from the other planes
heading into Aspen.
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00:03:37,984 --> 00:03:41,237
Two one zero or slower
three Golf Alpha.
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00:03:44,824 --> 00:03:46,784
17 minutes from landing,
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00:03:46,784 --> 00:03:50,037
the pilots begin their descent.
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00:03:50,830 --> 00:03:53,249
Aspen Pitkin County Airport,
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00:03:53,249 --> 00:03:55,084
also known as Sardy Field,
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00:03:55,084 --> 00:03:58,129
is about three miles northwest
of Aspen.
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00:03:58,129 --> 00:04:01,549
Landing on its single
runway is a challenge.
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00:04:02,967 --> 00:04:06,095
{\an8}Aspen is considered
one of the most dangerous
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00:04:06,095 --> 00:04:08,347
{\an8}airports in the country.
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00:04:08,347 --> 00:04:11,309
The runway is not long
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00:04:11,309 --> 00:04:16,939
and it is in close proximity
to high terrain on all sides.
75
00:04:18,900 --> 00:04:21,694
Hey, do you remember
that crazy guy in the Lear
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00:04:21,694 --> 00:04:23,988
when we were in Aspen
last time?
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00:04:23,988 --> 00:04:27,325
He was, "I can see the airport,"
but he couldn't see it.
78
00:04:29,952 --> 00:04:31,371
Okay, set you up
on the approach?
79
00:04:31,371 --> 00:04:32,789
Okay.
80
00:04:32,789 --> 00:04:35,083
The landing
is made even more difficult
81
00:04:35,083 --> 00:04:38,628
with the final stage needing
to be carried out visually.
82
00:04:39,879 --> 00:04:41,839
As the plane nears Aspen,
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00:04:41,839 --> 00:04:44,717
a beacon guides it
to the airport,
84
00:04:44,717 --> 00:04:48,429
but it doesn't lead it
directly to the runway.
85
00:04:48,429 --> 00:04:50,223
Once the airport is in sight,
86
00:04:50,223 --> 00:04:53,476
the pilots must line up
with the runway visually.
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00:04:54,102 --> 00:04:56,479
Because of the high terrain
and close proximity
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00:04:56,479 --> 00:04:58,564
to the final approach course,
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00:04:58,564 --> 00:05:01,401
the minimum altitude
is a couple thousand feet
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00:05:01,401 --> 00:05:03,111
above the ground,
and we must be visual
91
00:05:03,111 --> 00:05:08,366
by that time to safely continue
our descent down to a landing.
92
00:05:09,325 --> 00:05:13,663
And tonight, the weather
isn't making landing any easier.
93
00:05:15,289 --> 00:05:17,667
If at any time it's snowing,
94
00:05:17,667 --> 00:05:21,671
it's very hard to acquire
that visual reference
95
00:05:21,671 --> 00:05:24,966
to safely descend further
to a landing.
96
00:05:27,802 --> 00:05:30,680
Residential noise restrictions
around the airport
97
00:05:30,680 --> 00:05:32,932
leave the pilots
only nine minutes
98
00:05:32,932 --> 00:05:36,519
until the landing curfew
at 6:58.
99
00:05:36,519 --> 00:05:38,813
The crew is cutting it close.
100
00:05:40,231 --> 00:05:43,109
Can you see
out there at all yet?
101
00:05:43,109 --> 00:05:44,777
Uh...
102
00:05:46,154 --> 00:05:47,363
No.
103
00:05:49,407 --> 00:05:53,870
Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,
heading zero five zero.
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00:05:53,870 --> 00:05:55,246
Heading zero five zero,
105
00:05:55,246 --> 00:05:57,123
three Golf Alpha.
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00:05:58,249 --> 00:06:00,043
As the pilots
prepare to line up
107
00:06:00,043 --> 00:06:03,546
with the runway, passengers
get ready for landing.
108
00:06:11,721 --> 00:06:13,890
Okay, synchronizers off.
109
00:06:13,890 --> 00:06:17,310
There is just enough fuel
for one landing attempt.
110
00:06:17,310 --> 00:06:21,189
After that, the pilots will have
to divert to another airport.
111
00:06:21,189 --> 00:06:22,982
Okay, it's off.
112
00:06:24,984 --> 00:06:26,986
Hydraulic pressure's good.
113
00:06:27,695 --> 00:06:29,822
Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,
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00:06:29,822 --> 00:06:31,449
turn heading one four zero,
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00:06:31,449 --> 00:06:32,909
intercept final
approach course,
116
00:06:32,909 --> 00:06:35,787
maintain one six thousand.
117
00:06:35,787 --> 00:06:37,538
Eight minutes
from the airport,
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00:06:37,538 --> 00:06:39,499
the Controller
gives the crew clearance
119
00:06:39,499 --> 00:06:41,584
to commence the approach.
120
00:06:41,584 --> 00:06:44,003
One four zero,
one six thousand...
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00:06:44,003 --> 00:06:45,672
...intercept final
approach course,
122
00:06:45,672 --> 00:06:47,423
three Golf Alpha.
123
00:06:50,635 --> 00:06:52,345
One six thousand.
124
00:06:56,224 --> 00:06:59,143
As the pilots get
their final intercept
125
00:06:59,143 --> 00:07:00,770
to the airport...
126
00:07:02,271 --> 00:07:05,733
Challenger seven Juliet alpha,
you have the airport in sight?
127
00:07:05,733 --> 00:07:08,653
...another aircraft
also on approach to Aspen,
128
00:07:08,653 --> 00:07:10,405
updates the controller.
129
00:07:10,405 --> 00:07:13,741
Ah, that's
a negative. Going around.
130
00:07:15,243 --> 00:07:17,495
Those pilots
abort their landing,
131
00:07:17,495 --> 00:07:20,373
because they can't
see the runway.
132
00:07:21,958 --> 00:07:25,461
Attention all aircraft,
last aircraft went missed.
133
00:07:26,587 --> 00:07:28,881
- What?
- He went missed.
134
00:07:28,881 --> 00:07:30,925
He went missed?
135
00:07:30,925 --> 00:07:32,677
Damn.
136
00:07:32,677 --> 00:07:34,303
That's not good.
137
00:07:35,221 --> 00:07:37,515
If you can't successfully
land the aircraft,
138
00:07:37,515 --> 00:07:40,393
then a missed approach
is a procedure
139
00:07:40,393 --> 00:07:44,939
that pilots will execute
to return to a safe altitude.
140
00:07:45,773 --> 00:07:48,693
As the Gulfstream gets closer
to the airport,
141
00:07:48,693 --> 00:07:50,820
the weather deteriorates.
142
00:07:59,287 --> 00:08:02,331
Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,
five miles from Red Table,
143
00:08:02,331 --> 00:08:05,626
cross Red Table at or above
one four thousand,
144
00:08:05,626 --> 00:08:08,087
clear V-O-R-D-M-E
Charlie approach.
145
00:08:09,922 --> 00:08:11,549
The Controller
clears the pilots
146
00:08:11,549 --> 00:08:15,470
to begin the final approach
11 miles from the airport.
147
00:08:18,306 --> 00:08:20,892
You have to be configured
properly at the right altitude,
148
00:08:20,892 --> 00:08:23,895
at the right speed,
otherwise you are expected
149
00:08:23,895 --> 00:08:26,147
to execute a missed approach.
150
00:08:27,148 --> 00:08:28,775
Red Table
at one four thousand,
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00:08:28,775 --> 00:08:30,526
cleared for V O R approach,
152
00:08:30,526 --> 00:08:33,363
Gulfstream 3-0-3 Golf Alpha.
153
00:08:34,864 --> 00:08:36,532
Here we go.
154
00:08:37,784 --> 00:08:40,369
As the pilots get
closer to the airport,
155
00:08:40,369 --> 00:08:44,165
they're counting on the weather
to improve for their landing.
156
00:08:44,957 --> 00:08:47,168
Descending to one
four thousand.
157
00:08:48,753 --> 00:08:50,797
Problems can escalate
very quickly
158
00:08:50,797 --> 00:08:52,590
when flying into Aspen.
159
00:08:52,590 --> 00:08:57,053
There's really no room
to recover without breaking off
160
00:08:57,053 --> 00:08:59,472
that approach
or trying it again.
161
00:09:00,848 --> 00:09:04,143
Landing flaps.
162
00:09:04,143 --> 00:09:06,187
Just over two minutes
from landing,
163
00:09:06,187 --> 00:09:08,981
instruments have successfully
guided the pilots
164
00:09:08,981 --> 00:09:11,109
to the airport.
Now it's up to them
165
00:09:11,109 --> 00:09:13,236
to identify the runway.
166
00:09:14,737 --> 00:09:17,031
You see the runway?
167
00:09:21,202 --> 00:09:24,163
Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,
you have the runway in sight?
168
00:09:26,999 --> 00:09:29,127
- Oh. Affirmative.
- Yeah, now we do.
169
00:09:29,127 --> 00:09:31,921
Yeah, runway in sight,
three Golf Alpha.
170
00:09:31,921 --> 00:09:35,299
Gulfstream
three Golf Alpha visual, roger.
171
00:09:35,800 --> 00:09:37,427
One thousand.
172
00:09:37,427 --> 00:09:38,845
One thousand to go.
173
00:09:39,804 --> 00:09:42,765
The pilots are now
less than a minute from landing.
174
00:09:52,191 --> 00:09:53,693
Two hundred.
175
00:09:53,693 --> 00:09:57,405
At the last moment,
they realise something is wrong.
176
00:09:57,405 --> 00:10:00,783
No, oh! No. No. No. No!
177
00:10:15,673 --> 00:10:17,967
Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha
178
00:10:17,967 --> 00:10:21,304
crashes just short
of the runway at Aspen.
179
00:10:22,930 --> 00:10:24,223
Aircraft identification
180
00:10:24,223 --> 00:10:26,893
Gulfstream 3-0-3
Golf Alpha,
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00:10:26,893 --> 00:10:29,312
aircraft location,
it was north of the runway
182
00:10:29,312 --> 00:10:31,898
approximately...
the Shale Bluffs area.
183
00:10:34,442 --> 00:10:37,028
Emergency vehicles
rush to the scene
184
00:10:37,028 --> 00:10:39,197
in the hope that there are
survivors of the crash
185
00:10:39,197 --> 00:10:42,450
of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha.
186
00:10:51,376 --> 00:10:54,337
But all 18 people onboard
are dead.
187
00:10:54,337 --> 00:10:57,548
All 15 passengers,
the two pilots,
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00:10:57,548 --> 00:10:59,926
and the flight attendant.
189
00:11:06,933 --> 00:11:10,061
This flight really captured
the media
190
00:11:10,061 --> 00:11:13,523
and the public attention
because of the people onboard.
191
00:11:14,232 --> 00:11:18,486
There were a lot of very young,
talented people.
192
00:11:23,366 --> 00:11:26,160
Put everything from
the tail section over there.
193
00:11:28,121 --> 00:11:31,624
By the following day,
investigators are on site.
194
00:11:33,668 --> 00:11:37,213
Thousands of passengers
fly charter airplanes
195
00:11:37,213 --> 00:11:41,676
every year, encompassing
2.5 million flight hours
196
00:11:41,676 --> 00:11:43,970
annually,
so trying to understand
197
00:11:43,970 --> 00:11:47,432
why this accident occurred
was significant.
198
00:11:52,103 --> 00:11:53,646
Let me see that.
199
00:11:53,646 --> 00:11:56,023
Within hours,
the plane's cockpit
200
00:11:56,023 --> 00:11:58,234
voice recorder, or CVR,
201
00:11:58,234 --> 00:12:00,945
is retrieved from the wreckage.
202
00:12:00,945 --> 00:12:03,740
Let's get the data pulled
from that ASAP.
203
00:12:03,740 --> 00:12:06,367
What about a flight
data recorder?
204
00:12:11,289 --> 00:12:13,458
Looks like there wasn't one.
205
00:12:14,000 --> 00:12:15,376
Okay.
206
00:12:17,128 --> 00:12:20,548
Because the airplane
was manufactured in 1980
207
00:12:20,548 --> 00:12:22,759
and registered in 1981,
208
00:12:22,759 --> 00:12:25,887
it was not required
to have an FDR.
209
00:12:26,304 --> 00:12:28,681
While the CVR is sent
for analysis,
210
00:12:28,681 --> 00:12:31,059
Investigators from
the National Transportation
211
00:12:31,059 --> 00:12:33,353
Safety Board wonder
why the pilots
212
00:12:33,353 --> 00:12:35,646
weren't able to land safely.
213
00:12:35,646 --> 00:12:39,734
The plane crashed 24-hundred
feet from the runway.
214
00:12:40,568 --> 00:12:42,487
When an aircraft crashes
short of a runway,
215
00:12:42,487 --> 00:12:45,490
especially a sophisticated
airplane like a Gulfstream Jet,
216
00:12:45,490 --> 00:12:47,367
a number of questions
arise here:
217
00:12:47,367 --> 00:12:49,577
How did they get there?
What possible factors
218
00:12:49,577 --> 00:12:52,538
could the crew have?
Was there some sort of a failure
219
00:12:52,538 --> 00:12:54,248
in the aircraft?
220
00:12:56,584 --> 00:12:58,711
Take a look at this.
221
00:12:58,711 --> 00:13:00,380
What do you think caused that?
222
00:13:00,380 --> 00:13:04,092
There's a deep ground scar
at the crash site.
223
00:13:06,886 --> 00:13:08,304
That would do it.
224
00:13:08,304 --> 00:13:10,556
Investigators conclude
that it was formed
225
00:13:10,556 --> 00:13:13,351
when the left wing
hit the ground.
226
00:13:14,435 --> 00:13:16,521
When an airplane
comes through trees
227
00:13:16,521 --> 00:13:20,525
or vegetation
as it approaches the ground,
228
00:13:20,525 --> 00:13:22,110
it cuts off branches.
229
00:13:22,110 --> 00:13:24,028
And we can look
at those branches
230
00:13:24,028 --> 00:13:25,446
and the angles that are made
231
00:13:25,446 --> 00:13:28,282
to understand
the airplane's attitude
232
00:13:28,282 --> 00:13:33,287
as it came into the ground
and its descent profile.
233
00:13:33,997 --> 00:13:37,291
Left wing struck the trees
at about...
234
00:13:39,627 --> 00:13:41,379
49 degrees.
235
00:13:43,089 --> 00:13:45,466
That's a hell of a bank.
236
00:13:49,303 --> 00:13:52,223
There is no operationally
relevant reason
237
00:13:52,223 --> 00:13:54,642
for an airplane to be
banked at 49 degrees
238
00:13:54,642 --> 00:13:58,688
that close to the airport
or that close to the ground.
239
00:13:59,439 --> 00:14:01,816
Maybe they lost control
of the plane?
240
00:14:03,818 --> 00:14:07,196
When we see an aircraft
in an abnormal attitude,
241
00:14:07,196 --> 00:14:09,198
uh, we've got to look at,
did something happen
242
00:14:09,198 --> 00:14:11,659
where the pilots
couldn't keep it level?
243
00:14:11,659 --> 00:14:16,247
The plane's position gives
investigators a promising lead.
244
00:14:16,706 --> 00:14:18,332
Engine failure?
245
00:14:19,876 --> 00:14:22,670
The loss of thrust
resulting from an engine failure
246
00:14:22,670 --> 00:14:24,255
on one side
247
00:14:24,255 --> 00:14:25,715
can yaw the airplane,
248
00:14:25,715 --> 00:14:27,467
and if not appropriately managed
249
00:14:27,467 --> 00:14:31,054
by the pilots
in a timely fashion,
250
00:14:31,054 --> 00:14:33,598
can lead to a loss of control.
251
00:14:34,349 --> 00:14:36,601
Aside from the impact damage,
252
00:14:36,601 --> 00:14:39,771
there's no sign of fire
to the exterior.
253
00:14:39,771 --> 00:14:42,648
The team studies
the engines' compressor blades
254
00:14:42,648 --> 00:14:45,193
to determine if the engines
were functioning
255
00:14:45,193 --> 00:14:47,445
when the plane hit the ground.
256
00:14:48,780 --> 00:14:51,574
When the Gulfstream III's
engines are working,
257
00:14:51,574 --> 00:14:55,036
the compressor blades spin
in a clockwise direction.
258
00:14:55,036 --> 00:14:57,038
If the engines
were still functioning
259
00:14:57,038 --> 00:14:58,456
when the plane crashed,
260
00:14:58,456 --> 00:15:01,042
these blades would be bent
counterclockwise,
261
00:15:01,042 --> 00:15:03,211
or in the opposite direction.
262
00:15:07,632 --> 00:15:10,718
No, these are all bent
counterclockwise, so...
263
00:15:10,718 --> 00:15:12,387
it wasn't engine failure.
264
00:15:13,846 --> 00:15:15,807
Our examination of the engines
265
00:15:15,807 --> 00:15:18,976
showed that there was no
pre-existing damage,
266
00:15:18,976 --> 00:15:21,729
no evidence
of an in-flight fire,
267
00:15:21,729 --> 00:15:24,315
and also showed that
they were operating normally
268
00:15:24,315 --> 00:15:27,527
and at high power
at the time of the impact.
269
00:15:28,486 --> 00:15:31,030
Let's take a look
at the rudder.
270
00:15:31,030 --> 00:15:33,408
An airplane operating
at a low airspeed
271
00:15:33,408 --> 00:15:37,537
while the rudder moves
to an extreme limit
272
00:15:37,537 --> 00:15:39,831
could introduce a rolling moment
273
00:15:39,831 --> 00:15:43,751
or also stall one of the wings,
274
00:15:43,751 --> 00:15:47,004
which would further exacerbate
the rolling moment.
275
00:15:47,672 --> 00:15:50,216
Investigators examine
the actuator
276
00:15:50,216 --> 00:15:53,010
that controls
the rudder's movement.
277
00:15:53,010 --> 00:15:55,263
The piston
is completely intact.
278
00:15:56,514 --> 00:15:58,516
No sign of any damage.
279
00:16:01,477 --> 00:16:05,023
There was no pre-existing
conditions or failures
280
00:16:05,023 --> 00:16:07,066
that would have explained
the accident.
281
00:16:07,066 --> 00:16:09,110
The airplane
was functioning normally.
282
00:16:09,694 --> 00:16:13,156
If mechanical failure
didn't cause the roll,
283
00:16:13,156 --> 00:16:15,491
what went wrong on approach?
284
00:16:16,492 --> 00:16:19,370
Determining the airplane's
flight path helps us understand
285
00:16:19,370 --> 00:16:22,665
how that airplane
got to the accident site.
286
00:16:22,665 --> 00:16:24,292
What was it doing?
287
00:16:24,292 --> 00:16:26,919
Where was it flying?
How fast was it going?
288
00:16:28,588 --> 00:16:30,590
Have a look
at this radar data.
289
00:16:32,925 --> 00:16:34,761
With no flight data recorder,
290
00:16:34,761 --> 00:16:38,181
investigators turn
to Aspen's radar information
291
00:16:38,181 --> 00:16:41,893
to reconstruct the Gulfstream's
descent profile.
292
00:16:44,062 --> 00:16:45,938
Using the radar position
and time,
293
00:16:45,938 --> 00:16:48,524
so the altitude
and position of the aircraft,
294
00:16:48,524 --> 00:16:51,611
the performance engineers
can extract the speed
295
00:16:51,611 --> 00:16:54,072
of the aircraft,
how fast is it descending,
296
00:16:54,072 --> 00:16:56,991
and is that appropriate
for the approach
297
00:16:56,991 --> 00:16:59,410
that they're trying to do?
298
00:17:00,411 --> 00:17:01,913
Here's what we've got.
299
00:17:03,498 --> 00:17:06,542
This is the approach
they should have flown.
300
00:17:06,542 --> 00:17:09,420
Investigators examine
the path the pilots
301
00:17:09,420 --> 00:17:12,090
were required to follow
into Aspen.
302
00:17:13,883 --> 00:17:17,303
{\an8}Due to the rising terrain
away from the airport,
303
00:17:17,303 --> 00:17:19,806
{\an8}Aspen at this time
had a step-down approach
304
00:17:19,806 --> 00:17:23,601
{\an8}which from a profile,
looks like stairs.
305
00:17:23,601 --> 00:17:26,396
The pilots will step down
to an altitude
306
00:17:26,396 --> 00:17:29,273
based on the terrain
availability.
307
00:17:29,857 --> 00:17:32,610
Pilots cannot descend
below that altitude
308
00:17:32,610 --> 00:17:36,364
until they reach another
fix or another distance.
309
00:17:37,573 --> 00:17:39,117
And...
310
00:17:40,910 --> 00:17:43,788
here's the descent
the pilots actually flew.
311
00:17:43,788 --> 00:17:46,666
The radar data shows
the Avjet flight
312
00:17:46,666 --> 00:17:50,420
deviated from the published
descent profile.
313
00:17:51,546 --> 00:17:55,216
Four miles out, they dropped
300 feet below the minimum,
314
00:17:55,216 --> 00:17:56,968
and a mile later,
315
00:17:56,968 --> 00:18:00,138
they dropped 900 hundred feet
below the minimum altitude.
316
00:18:00,138 --> 00:18:02,390
And they stayed that way.
317
00:18:02,390 --> 00:18:04,809
They flew in very low.
318
00:18:06,394 --> 00:18:08,938
If you go below
a minimum altitude
319
00:18:08,938 --> 00:18:13,609
before you are allowed to,
then you no longer can guarantee
320
00:18:13,609 --> 00:18:16,029
the safety of that aircraft.
321
00:18:22,160 --> 00:18:24,245
Why would they do that?
322
00:18:25,204 --> 00:18:28,082
Because the pilots did not fly
this approach to standards,
323
00:18:28,082 --> 00:18:31,794
we wanted to look into
their backgrounds and training
324
00:18:31,794 --> 00:18:34,339
to better understand
why the accident
325
00:18:34,339 --> 00:18:36,382
may have occurred.
326
00:18:40,261 --> 00:18:44,557
Why did the pilots
of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha
327
00:18:44,557 --> 00:18:48,436
not follow the prescribed
approach procedure into Aspen?
328
00:18:50,646 --> 00:18:53,066
The captain passed
his last proficiency check.
329
00:18:53,066 --> 00:18:56,402
So did the first officer.
Just a couple months ago.
330
00:18:57,987 --> 00:19:01,032
Investigators learn
that all Avjet pilots
331
00:19:01,032 --> 00:19:02,408
are trained to land
332
00:19:02,408 --> 00:19:05,078
in mountainous terrain
like Aspen.
333
00:19:05,745 --> 00:19:09,082
And they both flew into Aspen
together twice before
334
00:19:09,082 --> 00:19:10,583
without incident.
335
00:19:11,334 --> 00:19:13,461
No accidents,
336
00:19:13,461 --> 00:19:15,421
no reprimands...
337
00:19:16,547 --> 00:19:19,133
Even the Captain's
driving record is spotless.
338
00:19:21,177 --> 00:19:22,845
So looking into the background
of this flight crew,
339
00:19:22,845 --> 00:19:24,680
we really didn't see anything
that stood out.
340
00:19:24,680 --> 00:19:26,891
They were both well qualified,
well trained
341
00:19:26,891 --> 00:19:29,185
and experienced
to fly this airplane
342
00:19:29,185 --> 00:19:31,187
and make this trip.
343
00:19:31,187 --> 00:19:32,605
And they both got
plenty of sleep
344
00:19:32,605 --> 00:19:35,733
before the flight,
so fatigue isn't an issue.
345
00:19:36,484 --> 00:19:38,528
In fact, I don't
see any issues here.
346
00:19:41,322 --> 00:19:43,199
This doesn't make any sense.
347
00:19:45,952 --> 00:19:48,955
Why would two well-trained
pilots fly so recklessly
348
00:19:48,955 --> 00:19:50,623
below the limits?
349
00:19:53,126 --> 00:19:55,169
No matter whether
you're a charter pilot,
350
00:19:55,169 --> 00:19:57,213
or an airline pilot,
or even just
351
00:19:57,213 --> 00:19:59,382
a personal general
aviation pilot,
352
00:19:59,382 --> 00:20:00,883
you know, our number one job
is safety.
353
00:20:00,883 --> 00:20:03,636
Uh, regulations are there
for a reason.
354
00:20:03,636 --> 00:20:06,305
What is it that could lead
a good flight crew
355
00:20:06,305 --> 00:20:09,809
to go beyond
those safety limits?
356
00:20:11,686 --> 00:20:15,732
Okay. So we know the pilots
landed at Aspen twice before
357
00:20:15,732 --> 00:20:18,860
without incident.
What was different this time?
358
00:20:20,903 --> 00:20:23,865
Maybe they were trying
to get eyes on the runway?
359
00:20:25,158 --> 00:20:26,743
Pull up the weather.
360
00:20:35,793 --> 00:20:39,630
It was important to understand
exactly what was going on
361
00:20:39,630 --> 00:20:42,884
with the weather, in terms
of the layers of clouds,
362
00:20:42,884 --> 00:20:45,386
whether they were
solid or broken,
363
00:20:45,386 --> 00:20:47,347
to understand
364
00:20:47,347 --> 00:20:49,807
what capability these pilots
may have had
365
00:20:49,807 --> 00:20:53,061
to see objects on the ground.
366
00:20:53,686 --> 00:20:57,857
The crash was at 7:02 PM.
Back it up to about 6:30 PM.
367
00:21:00,068 --> 00:21:02,361
They would've been flying
in and out of some pretty heavy
368
00:21:02,361 --> 00:21:04,739
cloud here. So...
369
00:21:04,739 --> 00:21:07,617
maybe they didn't have
a clear line on the runway.
370
00:21:07,617 --> 00:21:09,869
Okay, but these
are seasoned pilots.
371
00:21:09,869 --> 00:21:11,662
They should know
if you don't see the runway...
372
00:21:11,662 --> 00:21:13,790
- You don't try to land on it.
- And yet, they did
373
00:21:13,790 --> 00:21:15,667
try to land on it.
- And they missed by almost
374
00:21:15,667 --> 00:21:19,796
half a mile. So,
did they see the runway or not?
375
00:21:21,798 --> 00:21:23,883
We should talk
to the controller.
376
00:21:26,636 --> 00:21:29,347
An air traffic controller
can tell you
377
00:21:29,347 --> 00:21:31,349
what the visibility is,
378
00:21:31,349 --> 00:21:32,684
what the weather
conditions were,
379
00:21:32,684 --> 00:21:34,394
what other airplanes were doing
380
00:21:34,394 --> 00:21:37,480
in terms of coming
into the airport
381
00:21:37,480 --> 00:21:39,482
and provide eyewitness testimony
382
00:21:39,482 --> 00:21:41,317
about the time of the accident.
383
00:21:41,317 --> 00:21:43,319
But they also can help us
understand
384
00:21:43,319 --> 00:21:46,155
communications that they had
with the airplane.
385
00:21:49,200 --> 00:21:51,577
So did they give you
any indication at all
386
00:21:51,577 --> 00:21:53,621
that they were having trouble
seeing the runway?
387
00:21:53,621 --> 00:21:56,082
No. Quite the opposite.
388
00:21:56,082 --> 00:21:57,792
I asked them
if they could see the runway,
389
00:21:57,792 --> 00:21:59,752
and they confirmed
that they did.
390
00:22:00,336 --> 00:22:03,297
Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,
you have the runway in sight?
391
00:22:03,923 --> 00:22:06,759
Yeah. Runway
in sight, three Golf Alpha.
392
00:22:06,759 --> 00:22:09,679
Gulfstream three Golf Alpha
visual, roger.
393
00:22:11,180 --> 00:22:12,974
Hm.
394
00:22:13,599 --> 00:22:16,269
I made extra sure to confirm
395
00:22:16,269 --> 00:22:18,479
because I couldn't see them.
396
00:22:18,479 --> 00:22:20,690
The weather was so bad.
397
00:22:20,690 --> 00:22:23,317
Did you have any reason
to doubt the pilots?
398
00:22:24,193 --> 00:22:27,739
Not at the time, but...
399
00:22:27,739 --> 00:22:29,699
here's what's so odd.
400
00:22:29,699 --> 00:22:31,826
They confirmed they had visual,
but when they came out
401
00:22:31,826 --> 00:22:35,872
of the clouds, they were headed
to the right of the airport.
402
00:22:45,340 --> 00:22:46,966
What are they doing?
403
00:22:54,849 --> 00:22:55,892
I don't think they realized
404
00:22:55,892 --> 00:22:57,435
they weren't headed
for the runway
405
00:22:57,435 --> 00:22:59,228
until the last second.
406
00:23:01,773 --> 00:23:03,649
When we put
those pieces together, you know,
407
00:23:03,649 --> 00:23:05,401
that the pilots did report
on the radio
408
00:23:05,401 --> 00:23:06,736
they had the runway
in sight,
409
00:23:06,736 --> 00:23:08,654
we had to ask ourselves:
Did they really?
410
00:23:08,654 --> 00:23:10,073
Did they really see the runway?
411
00:23:10,073 --> 00:23:14,660
Um, might they have engaged
in a little wishful thinking?
412
00:23:16,496 --> 00:23:20,208
This leaves investigators
with a troubling question.
413
00:23:22,877 --> 00:23:24,754
They couldn't see the runway,
414
00:23:24,754 --> 00:23:27,298
why did they go ahead
with the landing?
415
00:23:27,298 --> 00:23:29,926
Maybe they were under
some kind of pressure?
416
00:23:31,344 --> 00:23:34,097
We needed to know
the purpose of this flight,
417
00:23:34,097 --> 00:23:36,849
its schedule
and the pilots' activities
418
00:23:36,849 --> 00:23:39,018
before they departed for Aspen.
419
00:23:39,018 --> 00:23:42,772
Looking into what happened
before the flight took off
420
00:23:42,772 --> 00:23:45,358
from L.A. can help us
gain insight
421
00:23:45,358 --> 00:23:49,779
into what might have been
going on during the flight.
422
00:23:54,701 --> 00:23:56,202
So sorry to keep you waiting.
423
00:23:56,202 --> 00:23:57,578
No problem at all.
424
00:23:58,246 --> 00:24:00,164
To understand
why the pilots
425
00:24:00,164 --> 00:24:03,209
were so intent upon
landing in Aspen,
426
00:24:03,209 --> 00:24:06,838
NTSB investigators
speak to the Avjet coordinator
427
00:24:06,838 --> 00:24:10,425
who managed flight 3-0-3
Golf Alpha.
428
00:24:10,925 --> 00:24:13,720
The charter coordinators
communicated with the pilots
429
00:24:13,720 --> 00:24:17,890
moments before the flight
departed Los Angeles.
430
00:24:17,890 --> 00:24:19,851
They would have insights into
431
00:24:19,851 --> 00:24:22,729
what was concerning the pilots,
432
00:24:22,729 --> 00:24:24,981
what they were trying
to accomplish,
433
00:24:24,981 --> 00:24:28,151
and some of the decisions
being made.
434
00:24:28,860 --> 00:24:31,863
Did you talk to the captain
on the day of the flight?
435
00:24:31,863 --> 00:24:34,574
Oh, yes. And there were some
problems right from the start.
436
00:24:34,574 --> 00:24:36,534
Really? How so?
437
00:24:36,534 --> 00:24:38,995
Well, the flight was supposed
to leave at 4:30.
438
00:24:38,995 --> 00:24:41,372
At 4:15, he called to say
the passengers
439
00:24:41,372 --> 00:24:43,207
still hadn't shown up.
440
00:24:45,501 --> 00:24:47,837
Well if the passengers
don't show up soon,
441
00:24:47,837 --> 00:24:50,298
with the long taxi
out to the runway,
442
00:24:50,298 --> 00:24:52,425
we won't make it
to Aspen in time.
443
00:24:52,425 --> 00:24:54,260
So what are you suggesting?
444
00:24:54,260 --> 00:24:56,137
Well, we may need to divert.
445
00:24:57,972 --> 00:25:01,059
The captain was worried
that because of the 7 PM
446
00:25:01,059 --> 00:25:02,518
noise curfew at Aspen,
447
00:25:02,518 --> 00:25:04,437
he might have to go
to Rifle instead,
448
00:25:04,437 --> 00:25:06,731
which is about 60 miles away.
449
00:25:06,731 --> 00:25:08,566
So he knew about
the noise curfew
450
00:25:08,566 --> 00:25:10,401
and he had a plan to divert
if he needed.
451
00:25:10,401 --> 00:25:12,070
Absolutely.
452
00:25:14,030 --> 00:25:16,991
They knew that Rifle Colorado
Airport was nearby.
453
00:25:16,991 --> 00:25:18,785
They had planned
for alternatives even before
454
00:25:18,785 --> 00:25:21,996
they left, which is exactly
what a crew should be doing.
455
00:25:23,456 --> 00:25:25,583
When did the passengers board?
456
00:25:25,583 --> 00:25:28,419
They didn't start boarding
till around 4:30.
457
00:25:29,670 --> 00:25:31,255
Then what happened?
458
00:25:31,255 --> 00:25:33,633
About 10 minutes later,
I got a phone call
459
00:25:33,633 --> 00:25:35,676
from the client's
personal assistant.
460
00:25:35,676 --> 00:25:38,763
And he told me
the client was very upset.
461
00:25:40,223 --> 00:25:41,432
Hm.
462
00:25:41,432 --> 00:25:43,559
What's this
about diverting to Rifle?
463
00:25:43,559 --> 00:25:45,144
What do you mean?
464
00:25:46,312 --> 00:25:47,939
Once the passengers boarded,
465
00:25:47,939 --> 00:25:53,111
there was a call by
the charter customer's assistant
466
00:25:53,111 --> 00:25:56,864
expressing concern
467
00:25:56,864 --> 00:25:59,909
that the crew
had told the passengers
468
00:25:59,909 --> 00:26:02,745
that they might have to go
to another airport.
469
00:26:02,745 --> 00:26:04,914
Welcome. Welcome.
Given the delay in boarding,
470
00:26:04,914 --> 00:26:07,375
it looks like we may have
to divert to Rifle.
471
00:26:12,839 --> 00:26:15,383
So the client had
his assistant call me.
472
00:26:16,551 --> 00:26:19,345
So my boss
wants you to tell the pilot
473
00:26:19,345 --> 00:26:22,974
to, well, keep his mouth shut
around the passengers.
474
00:26:22,974 --> 00:26:26,936
And if he has anything to say,
save it until he gets there,
475
00:26:26,936 --> 00:26:28,938
and then they can talk it over.
476
00:26:28,938 --> 00:26:31,399
Understood. There is nothing
to worry about.
477
00:26:31,399 --> 00:26:32,734
I'll take care of it.
478
00:26:32,734 --> 00:26:35,069
Thank you very much
for letting me know.
479
00:26:38,114 --> 00:26:40,575
So, of course,
safety comes first,
480
00:26:40,575 --> 00:26:43,661
but we wanted to keep
the client happy.
481
00:26:43,661 --> 00:26:45,621
And did this make it back
to the captain?
482
00:26:45,621 --> 00:26:47,498
Yes, I called him right away.
483
00:26:49,042 --> 00:26:50,334
The client's very upset.
484
00:26:50,334 --> 00:26:52,795
He doesn't want you speaking
to the passengers anymore,
485
00:26:52,795 --> 00:26:54,172
only to him.
486
00:26:54,172 --> 00:26:57,633
Understood, okay.
Don't mention diverting.
487
00:26:57,633 --> 00:26:59,260
Thank you so much.
488
00:26:59,260 --> 00:27:00,428
Yup.
489
00:27:04,057 --> 00:27:07,518
He was worried that he was
going to disappoint our boss,
490
00:27:07,518 --> 00:27:10,772
maybe even get into trouble
for upsetting the client.
491
00:27:10,772 --> 00:27:13,316
But he wouldn't
get into trouble.
492
00:27:14,150 --> 00:27:16,903
In a charter operation,
the needs of your passengers
493
00:27:16,903 --> 00:27:19,781
are front and center.
You're fully aware of them.
494
00:27:19,781 --> 00:27:23,284
And in a situation
where a group of people
495
00:27:23,284 --> 00:27:24,786
are going to a dinner
496
00:27:24,786 --> 00:27:27,914
and that's the only reason
they're taking this trip,
497
00:27:27,914 --> 00:27:30,124
if they can't satisfy
that timeline,
498
00:27:30,124 --> 00:27:33,628
then there was no point
of being on that aircraft.
499
00:27:34,045 --> 00:27:37,882
The Captain was told
not to upset the passengers.
500
00:27:37,882 --> 00:27:40,218
Did that instruction
affect his decision
501
00:27:40,218 --> 00:27:42,845
about diverting
his plane to Rifle?
502
00:27:42,845 --> 00:27:45,515
And so this was all
before they took off?
503
00:27:45,515 --> 00:27:47,558
- Yes.
- And was that the last time
504
00:27:47,558 --> 00:27:49,352
you spoke to the captain?
- No.
505
00:27:49,352 --> 00:27:51,562
He called me again
en route to Aspen.
506
00:27:51,562 --> 00:27:53,314
And what time was that?
507
00:27:54,649 --> 00:27:56,109
6:30.
508
00:27:57,860 --> 00:28:01,239
We'll be landing at Aspen
in about 20, 25 minutes,
509
00:28:01,239 --> 00:28:03,032
but we'll have to spend
the night there.
510
00:28:03,032 --> 00:28:05,326
No problem,
I can book you rooms.
511
00:28:05,326 --> 00:28:09,163
Hey, how are the passengers?
Are they still upset?
512
00:28:09,914 --> 00:28:10,998
I don't think so.
513
00:28:10,998 --> 00:28:13,418
What about the client?
514
00:28:13,418 --> 00:28:14,961
I had a talk with the client.
515
00:28:14,961 --> 00:28:17,422
It's just really important
to him that we make it to Aspen.
516
00:28:17,422 --> 00:28:20,133
Apparently, he's dropping
a substantial amount of money
517
00:28:20,133 --> 00:28:21,843
on dinner.
518
00:28:23,094 --> 00:28:24,929
The client didn't want
to go to Rifle.
519
00:28:24,929 --> 00:28:26,889
Rifle was more than
60 miles away;
520
00:28:26,889 --> 00:28:29,183
it would have taken them
too long to get there.
521
00:28:29,183 --> 00:28:30,852
I see.
522
00:28:32,437 --> 00:28:34,731
Okay, well,
523
00:28:34,731 --> 00:28:36,691
thank you very much
for your time.
524
00:28:36,691 --> 00:28:38,192
Happy to help.
525
00:28:39,694 --> 00:28:41,696
Although the pilots
would be aware
526
00:28:41,696 --> 00:28:44,490
of the needs
of their passengers,
527
00:28:44,490 --> 00:28:46,951
at no point can that supersede
528
00:28:46,951 --> 00:28:49,495
the professionalism
of that crew.
529
00:28:49,495 --> 00:28:51,831
Your primary and only real job
530
00:28:51,831 --> 00:28:54,208
is the safety
of that aircraft.
531
00:28:55,209 --> 00:28:58,087
You know, it seems they were
under a lot of pressure
532
00:28:58,087 --> 00:29:00,757
to land not only
before the flight began,
533
00:29:00,757 --> 00:29:03,342
but even during the flight.
534
00:29:04,510 --> 00:29:06,679
The crash happened
more than half an hour
535
00:29:06,679 --> 00:29:08,723
after that last call
from the plane.
536
00:29:09,724 --> 00:29:12,727
Did commercial
pressure influence the pilots
537
00:29:12,727 --> 00:29:17,148
to make a risky decision that
cost the lives of 18 people?
538
00:29:17,148 --> 00:29:19,150
You know, this comes up
all the time.
539
00:29:19,150 --> 00:29:23,863
Charter pilots
often voice on chat rooms
540
00:29:23,863 --> 00:29:25,323
and complaint lines
541
00:29:25,323 --> 00:29:27,950
that they are pressured
to keep people happy
542
00:29:27,950 --> 00:29:29,744
and do really difficult things
543
00:29:29,744 --> 00:29:32,455
just to satisfy
a demanding customer.
544
00:29:32,455 --> 00:29:34,165
And it's dangerous.
545
00:29:36,084 --> 00:29:38,753
They still had time
to correct the situation.
546
00:29:38,753 --> 00:29:42,423
So what happened
in these final 30 minutes?
547
00:29:47,970 --> 00:29:49,806
It's here.
548
00:29:49,806 --> 00:29:51,516
NTSB investigators
549
00:29:51,516 --> 00:29:54,310
turn to the cockpit
voice recorder of Avjet
550
00:29:54,310 --> 00:29:56,312
3-0-3 Golf Alpha
551
00:29:56,312 --> 00:29:57,897
to understand why the pilots
552
00:29:57,897 --> 00:30:00,566
chose to land instead
of diverting.
553
00:30:01,943 --> 00:30:03,569
We could learn
about the crew's decision making
554
00:30:03,569 --> 00:30:06,155
and what they were doing
from their conversations
555
00:30:06,155 --> 00:30:09,158
with each other, um, you know,
how they were planning
556
00:30:09,158 --> 00:30:11,953
and using the information
that was coming in
557
00:30:11,953 --> 00:30:13,579
as they approached Aspen.
558
00:30:14,664 --> 00:30:15,998
You know what,
let's pick it up
559
00:30:15,998 --> 00:30:18,251
before they begin
their final descent.
560
00:30:28,219 --> 00:30:30,013
Hey, do you
remember that crazy guy
561
00:30:30,013 --> 00:30:33,266
in the Lear when we were
in Aspen last time?
562
00:30:33,266 --> 00:30:35,977
He was, "I can see the airport"
but he couldn't see it?
563
00:30:38,438 --> 00:30:40,106
Pause that.
564
00:30:41,858 --> 00:30:45,695
So 14 minutes
before the crash,
565
00:30:45,695 --> 00:30:48,031
they're ridiculing another pilot
who tried to land
566
00:30:48,031 --> 00:30:50,867
without the runway in sight.
567
00:30:50,867 --> 00:30:53,536
Why did they do the same thing?
568
00:30:53,536 --> 00:30:57,290
At that point,
they were still in the mode of,
569
00:30:57,290 --> 00:30:58,708
we're gonna do this right,
570
00:30:58,708 --> 00:31:00,585
and even sort of made a joke
571
00:31:00,585 --> 00:31:03,338
about this one guy
that didn't do it right.
572
00:31:06,966 --> 00:31:08,342
Okay.
573
00:31:11,095 --> 00:31:13,097
Okay, we'll shoot it
from here.
574
00:31:13,097 --> 00:31:15,391
I mean, we're here,
but we only get to do it once.
575
00:31:15,391 --> 00:31:18,728
Alright. Once,
and then we go to Rifle, right?
576
00:31:18,728 --> 00:31:21,731
Yeah, it's too late
in the evening to come around.
577
00:31:26,194 --> 00:31:28,488
So right there,
they're talking about
578
00:31:28,488 --> 00:31:30,031
doing a missed approach.
579
00:31:30,615 --> 00:31:34,035
That was at 6:50,
so two minutes later.
580
00:31:35,161 --> 00:31:36,746
12 minutes
from the airport,
581
00:31:36,746 --> 00:31:38,790
the pilots confirmed
their plan
582
00:31:38,790 --> 00:31:41,209
to divert if they needed to.
583
00:31:42,126 --> 00:31:44,253
As the crew
was approaching Aspen,
584
00:31:44,253 --> 00:31:47,006
they were getting the idea
that the weather was getting
585
00:31:47,006 --> 00:31:49,092
more difficult to get in,
and they were having
586
00:31:49,092 --> 00:31:50,593
a conversation about this.
587
00:31:50,593 --> 00:31:53,012
They mentioned again,
"Well we might only have
588
00:31:53,012 --> 00:31:54,889
one shot at this,
and we have to go to Rifle".
589
00:31:54,889 --> 00:31:57,767
They were really saying
the right things.
590
00:32:00,728 --> 00:32:02,271
Attention
all aircraft.
591
00:32:02,271 --> 00:32:04,107
Last aircraft went missed.
592
00:32:05,858 --> 00:32:08,111
- What?
- He went missed.
593
00:32:08,111 --> 00:32:09,904
He went missed?
594
00:32:09,904 --> 00:32:13,282
Damn. That's not good.
595
00:32:16,077 --> 00:32:17,787
Nine minutes from crashing.
596
00:32:18,830 --> 00:32:22,166
They know the plane
in front of them couldn't land.
597
00:32:22,166 --> 00:32:24,627
And they know
it's a bad sign for them.
598
00:32:26,170 --> 00:32:28,297
That clearly had to put
some pressure on them
599
00:32:28,297 --> 00:32:31,592
{\an8}to say, alright, this is uh,
this is not looking good.
600
00:32:32,635 --> 00:32:35,596
{\an8}It should have those pilots
starting to get into
601
00:32:35,596 --> 00:32:37,974
{\an8}the mindset of executing
the missed approach
602
00:32:37,974 --> 00:32:39,517
{\an8}rather than landing
the aircraft.
603
00:32:39,892 --> 00:32:43,146
So they know they shouldn't
attempt the landing either.
604
00:32:43,146 --> 00:32:45,023
Up until now,
they've been doing everything
605
00:32:45,023 --> 00:32:47,316
right by the book.
- Yeah.
606
00:32:47,316 --> 00:32:49,736
I wonder what changed.
607
00:32:50,570 --> 00:32:53,614
Investigators discover
something unusual
608
00:32:53,614 --> 00:32:55,908
in the CVR transcripts.
609
00:32:55,908 --> 00:32:57,326
Huh.
610
00:32:59,579 --> 00:33:00,830
It looks like
the flight attendant
611
00:33:00,830 --> 00:33:02,749
brought someone
into the cockpit.
612
00:33:05,168 --> 00:33:07,253
About eight minutes
before the accident,
613
00:33:07,253 --> 00:33:11,257
somebody came into the cockpit,
one of the passengers.
614
00:33:12,008 --> 00:33:13,760
Thank you very much.
615
00:33:20,850 --> 00:33:22,810
Do you think it's the client?
616
00:33:25,646 --> 00:33:26,939
It's possible.
617
00:33:28,483 --> 00:33:30,735
Having somebody else
up on the flight deck
618
00:33:30,735 --> 00:33:32,862
as you're conducting an approach
619
00:33:32,862 --> 00:33:36,908
into a mountainous area at night
620
00:33:36,908 --> 00:33:40,495
in poor weather
is not a good idea.
621
00:33:43,581 --> 00:33:46,376
Did the presence
of a passenger in the cockpit
622
00:33:46,376 --> 00:33:48,669
play a role in the crash?
623
00:33:56,427 --> 00:33:58,471
The weather's
gone down.
624
00:33:59,847 --> 00:34:01,099
They're not making it in.
625
00:34:01,099 --> 00:34:03,267
As the crew
got closer to Aspen,
626
00:34:03,267 --> 00:34:04,644
the weather worsened,
627
00:34:04,644 --> 00:34:08,356
making it more dangerous
for planes to try to land.
628
00:34:09,023 --> 00:34:10,316
Oh, really.
629
00:34:10,942 --> 00:34:12,652
"Oh, really"?
630
00:34:14,904 --> 00:34:16,739
The only conversation
that should be going on
631
00:34:16,739 --> 00:34:20,410
is between the crew
about aspects of the flight.
632
00:34:20,410 --> 00:34:22,161
If you're having someone
up there questioning
633
00:34:22,161 --> 00:34:24,247
their decision making,
questioning, you know,
634
00:34:24,247 --> 00:34:25,665
the weather and the operation,
635
00:34:25,665 --> 00:34:28,835
um, it's just such a distraction
and a pressure to them.
636
00:34:30,503 --> 00:34:32,505
As the pilots approach
the airport,
637
00:34:32,505 --> 00:34:34,882
the situation intensified.
638
00:34:36,426 --> 00:34:39,011
Challenger nine eight Romeo,
you're number one.
639
00:34:39,595 --> 00:34:41,097
Nine eight Romeo,
640
00:34:41,097 --> 00:34:43,433
negative visual on the missed.
641
00:34:43,433 --> 00:34:45,935
They learn that
the plane ahead of Avjet
642
00:34:45,935 --> 00:34:47,437
3-0-3 Golf Alpha
643
00:34:47,437 --> 00:34:49,439
also missed their approach
644
00:34:49,439 --> 00:34:51,607
because they couldn't see
the runway.
645
00:34:52,483 --> 00:34:54,485
{\an8}It's too dangerous to land
on that runway
646
00:34:54,485 --> 00:34:57,113
{\an8}under these conditions.
647
00:34:57,113 --> 00:34:58,698
So, what happened?
648
00:35:04,287 --> 00:35:05,830
Are we cleared to land?
649
00:35:05,830 --> 00:35:07,707
No, not yet.
650
00:35:07,707 --> 00:35:08,708
He just missed,
651
00:35:08,708 --> 00:35:11,252
the guy in front of us
didn't make it either.
652
00:35:11,252 --> 00:35:12,795
Oh, really.
653
00:35:16,424 --> 00:35:17,967
Okay, so it sounds like
this guy
654
00:35:17,967 --> 00:35:19,969
is sending the pilots a message.
655
00:35:19,969 --> 00:35:21,721
Exactly.
656
00:35:23,431 --> 00:35:25,350
"Oh, really," may not
sound like much,
657
00:35:25,350 --> 00:35:28,394
but after all those other
things that had occurred,
658
00:35:28,394 --> 00:35:31,481
I think, "Oh, really"
was a warning shot.
659
00:35:31,481 --> 00:35:33,566
Get this thing in Aspen.
660
00:35:34,609 --> 00:35:37,320
But the pilots still had
one more chance
661
00:35:37,320 --> 00:35:39,072
to implement their back-up plan
662
00:35:39,072 --> 00:35:41,407
to divert to another airport.
663
00:35:44,660 --> 00:35:45,912
Where's it at?
664
00:35:47,747 --> 00:35:50,625
So obviously, they still
can't see the runway.
665
00:35:53,544 --> 00:35:55,922
- To the right.
- To the right.
666
00:36:01,719 --> 00:36:04,389
So, instead of executing
a missed approach,
667
00:36:04,389 --> 00:36:05,681
they're still looking
for the runway,
668
00:36:05,681 --> 00:36:07,850
which is actually to their left.
669
00:36:08,810 --> 00:36:10,853
There was a river valley
and some roads nearby.
670
00:36:10,853 --> 00:36:13,272
Might they have seen something
they thought was the runway,
671
00:36:13,272 --> 00:36:15,650
you know, some lights
of the village or whatnot.
672
00:36:15,650 --> 00:36:17,193
Then they believed
they saw the runway,
673
00:36:17,193 --> 00:36:18,861
but that wasn't correct.
674
00:36:19,696 --> 00:36:21,364
They just keep flying
lower and lower
675
00:36:21,364 --> 00:36:23,366
looking for the airport.
676
00:36:24,742 --> 00:36:26,953
They were just under
way too much pressure
677
00:36:26,953 --> 00:36:28,788
to make good decisions.
678
00:36:31,457 --> 00:36:33,209
They had the night curfew.
679
00:36:33,209 --> 00:36:34,544
They had a, the time pressure,
680
00:36:34,544 --> 00:36:36,546
uh, pressure from
the client as well,
681
00:36:36,546 --> 00:36:39,298
um, and then with the weather
coming in and out
682
00:36:39,298 --> 00:36:41,634
as they stepped down,
683
00:36:41,634 --> 00:36:44,470
they'd catch glimpses
now and then of the ground.
684
00:36:45,346 --> 00:36:47,223
Five hundred.
685
00:36:47,223 --> 00:36:48,558
Ref plus five.
686
00:36:48,558 --> 00:36:50,727
Sink rate.
Sink rate.
687
00:36:52,854 --> 00:36:54,981
22 seconds
after crossing
688
00:36:54,981 --> 00:36:56,607
the missed approach point,
689
00:36:56,607 --> 00:37:00,903
Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha
hits the ground.
690
00:37:25,011 --> 00:37:27,388
So...
691
00:37:27,388 --> 00:37:30,183
in Los Angeles,
they were ready to divert.
692
00:37:32,060 --> 00:37:35,104
Then they get chewed out
for talking about diverting,
693
00:37:35,104 --> 00:37:38,274
and the client tells them
how important the dinner is.
694
00:37:38,274 --> 00:37:39,609
Topping it all off,
695
00:37:39,609 --> 00:37:41,319
the passenger enters
the cockpit.
696
00:37:41,319 --> 00:37:42,945
So, by the time
they get to Aspen...
697
00:37:42,945 --> 00:37:45,698
They were bound and determined
to land.
698
00:37:48,659 --> 00:37:52,622
Sadly, they turned into
the pilots they were ridiculing.
699
00:37:53,623 --> 00:37:56,626
All indications
700
00:37:56,626 --> 00:37:58,878
from our investigation
701
00:37:58,878 --> 00:38:01,714
show that these two pilots
were good pilots.
702
00:38:01,714 --> 00:38:06,052
Once the crew descended
without the runway in sight...
703
00:38:07,595 --> 00:38:09,639
the accident was inevitable.
704
00:38:11,683 --> 00:38:15,061
They just kept pushing,
and step by step,
705
00:38:15,061 --> 00:38:17,438
it got worse and worse until
706
00:38:17,438 --> 00:38:19,315
they descended too low.
707
00:38:19,315 --> 00:38:21,150
Despite
the pressures
708
00:38:21,150 --> 00:38:23,027
the pilots were under to land,
709
00:38:23,027 --> 00:38:24,821
there was one more safeguard
710
00:38:24,821 --> 00:38:27,156
that could have prevented
this tragedy.
711
00:38:27,156 --> 00:38:28,991
You're not gonna believe this.
712
00:38:38,876 --> 00:38:42,463
Investigators
of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha
713
00:38:42,463 --> 00:38:44,048
examine a safety notice
714
00:38:44,048 --> 00:38:47,719
for Aspen Airport that might
have prevented the crash.
715
00:38:48,136 --> 00:38:50,138
A NOTAM.
716
00:38:50,722 --> 00:38:54,142
NOTAM is an official
Notice to Airmen.
717
00:38:55,393 --> 00:38:57,687
That's a notice put out
by the FAA
718
00:38:57,687 --> 00:38:59,981
to tell pilots about
some abnormality
719
00:38:59,981 --> 00:39:01,649
in the airspace system.
720
00:39:01,649 --> 00:39:03,776
An approach procedure
has been changed,
721
00:39:03,776 --> 00:39:06,863
a navigation aide is out,
um, all sorts of things.
722
00:39:08,573 --> 00:39:11,993
Two days before the crash,
a NOTAM was issued
723
00:39:11,993 --> 00:39:14,537
with a warning about
landing at Aspen.
724
00:39:15,455 --> 00:39:17,498
As far as I can tell, it says,
725
00:39:17,498 --> 00:39:20,585
"Circling NA,
not authorized, at night."
726
00:39:20,585 --> 00:39:22,086
So, in other words,
727
00:39:22,086 --> 00:39:24,255
they should never have been
flying into Aspen at night
728
00:39:24,255 --> 00:39:25,923
in the first place.
729
00:39:25,923 --> 00:39:31,012
It said that circling
not authorized at night.
730
00:39:31,012 --> 00:39:33,264
This approach is only
a circling approach,
731
00:39:33,264 --> 00:39:36,100
even if you elect to land
straight in.
732
00:39:36,100 --> 00:39:37,560
It actually had the effect
733
00:39:37,560 --> 00:39:41,189
of making that approach
not authorized at night.
734
00:39:42,774 --> 00:39:45,777
The crash was at 7:02 PM.
What time was nightfall?
735
00:39:45,777 --> 00:39:50,198
Nightfall was officially
at 6:55.
736
00:39:51,157 --> 00:39:53,618
Well, that's seven minutes
before the crash.
737
00:39:53,618 --> 00:39:55,870
Why didn't they follow
the NOTAM?
738
00:39:58,414 --> 00:40:00,708
Investigators examine
the Gulfstream's
739
00:40:00,708 --> 00:40:02,543
briefing records to see
740
00:40:02,543 --> 00:40:05,213
if it included
the most recent notice.
741
00:40:06,756 --> 00:40:09,467
It looks the first officer
did receive the NOTAM
742
00:40:09,467 --> 00:40:11,469
over the phone
before the flight.
743
00:40:12,220 --> 00:40:15,098
So who knows if
he passed it on to the Captain.
744
00:40:16,641 --> 00:40:18,226
NOTAM's are hard to read,
745
00:40:18,226 --> 00:40:20,978
there's a lot of um,
extraneous information in them.
746
00:40:20,978 --> 00:40:24,273
They tell you about everything
from a burned-out lightbulb
747
00:40:24,273 --> 00:40:26,234
on a tower fifteen miles away,
748
00:40:26,234 --> 00:40:29,320
to the runway is closed,
and everything in between.
749
00:40:29,320 --> 00:40:32,115
And what about the controller?
750
00:40:35,576 --> 00:40:38,538
NOTAM's are also distributed
to ATC facilities.
751
00:40:38,538 --> 00:40:39,706
They need to know about
752
00:40:39,706 --> 00:40:42,125
things that affect
the airspace as well.
753
00:40:45,420 --> 00:40:48,673
It never got passed on
to Aspen ATC.
754
00:40:54,011 --> 00:40:55,847
The reason the tower
didn't get the NOTAM
755
00:40:55,847 --> 00:40:59,100
is it was supposed to get
sent by, believe it or not, fax,
756
00:40:59,100 --> 00:41:00,935
and for whatever reason,
757
00:41:00,935 --> 00:41:03,396
it didn't get sent
to the ATC facilities
758
00:41:03,396 --> 00:41:05,815
that needed to know.
759
00:41:05,815 --> 00:41:08,693
Had the Controller received
the NOTAM,
760
00:41:08,693 --> 00:41:11,612
it might have
prevented the crash.
761
00:41:11,612 --> 00:41:14,657
In the final analysis,
investigators conclude
762
00:41:14,657 --> 00:41:16,659
the probable cause
of the accident
763
00:41:16,659 --> 00:41:19,579
was the flight crew's
operation of the airplane
764
00:41:19,579 --> 00:41:21,914
below the minimum
descent altitude
765
00:41:21,914 --> 00:41:25,793
without an appropriate visual
reference to the runway.
766
00:41:26,794 --> 00:41:28,379
This accident happened
767
00:41:28,379 --> 00:41:30,715
because the captain
did not go around,
768
00:41:30,715 --> 00:41:33,134
did not conduct
a missed approach.
769
00:41:34,218 --> 00:41:35,928
Had he done that,
770
00:41:35,928 --> 00:41:38,056
they would have gone
to Rifle.
771
00:41:38,056 --> 00:41:40,308
And the passengers may have
been frustrated,
772
00:41:40,308 --> 00:41:42,018
may have been angry.
There might have been a big
773
00:41:42,018 --> 00:41:45,146
conversation, but they
would have been alive.
774
00:41:48,733 --> 00:41:51,694
Investigators also believe
external pressures
775
00:41:51,694 --> 00:41:54,822
played a role in the pilots'
decision-making.
776
00:41:56,783 --> 00:41:58,368
We call it "get there-itus".
777
00:41:58,368 --> 00:41:59,869
We were close
to the destination,
778
00:41:59,869 --> 00:42:03,706
almost there and the pressure
on people to make the decision.
779
00:42:03,706 --> 00:42:05,958
Nothing broke,
nothing really failed,
780
00:42:05,958 --> 00:42:07,710
other than just
the decision-making,
781
00:42:07,710 --> 00:42:11,089
under pressures of
"get there-itus".
782
00:42:13,841 --> 00:42:16,052
As a result of this accident,
783
00:42:16,052 --> 00:42:18,429
Avjet restricts flying
into Aspen
784
00:42:18,429 --> 00:42:20,681
between sunset and sunrise.
785
00:42:20,681 --> 00:42:23,685
The FAA also revises
its specifications
786
00:42:23,685 --> 00:42:25,061
for flying into Aspen,
787
00:42:25,061 --> 00:42:27,980
with a minimum visibility
of five miles
788
00:42:27,980 --> 00:42:31,067
and a cloud ceiling of at least
44-hundred feet
789
00:42:31,067 --> 00:42:34,112
above ground now required
for landing.
790
00:42:36,864 --> 00:42:38,783
You see the runway?
791
00:42:38,783 --> 00:42:42,286
This is to ensure pilots
always have a clear view
792
00:42:42,286 --> 00:42:44,706
of the runway before landing.
793
00:42:45,206 --> 00:42:46,499
Thank you very much.
794
00:42:46,499 --> 00:42:48,084
Avjet also takes steps
795
00:42:48,084 --> 00:42:50,753
to prevent unnecessary
distractions in the cockpit
796
00:42:50,753 --> 00:42:52,588
during the flight.
797
00:42:53,256 --> 00:42:56,175
After the accident,
the company issued a bulletin
798
00:42:56,175 --> 00:42:59,429
changing their rules
that no passengers
799
00:42:59,429 --> 00:43:01,889
were allowed in the cockpit.
800
00:43:02,265 --> 00:43:05,893
Okay, guys.
Let's finish up tomorrow.
801
00:43:07,228 --> 00:43:10,273
Well, the NTSB has also made
a number of recommendations
802
00:43:10,273 --> 00:43:12,525
on improving the NOTAM system,
803
00:43:12,525 --> 00:43:15,445
making things a little bit more
graphical and easy to use
804
00:43:15,445 --> 00:43:16,738
so that people can sort them out
805
00:43:16,738 --> 00:43:19,157
rather than just
reading a list.
806
00:43:20,032 --> 00:43:21,993
The lessons serve as a warning
807
00:43:21,993 --> 00:43:25,788
to all other pilots
who interact with passengers.
808
00:43:26,748 --> 00:43:29,000
I think the message
of this flight
809
00:43:29,000 --> 00:43:32,712
is there is no
dinner date engagement,
810
00:43:32,712 --> 00:43:35,339
or birthday party
that is more important
811
00:43:35,339 --> 00:43:38,676
than the lives
of your passengers on the plane.
812
00:43:38,676 --> 00:43:41,137
And the pilot has to be
tough enough
813
00:43:41,137 --> 00:43:42,847
to stand up to that,
814
00:43:42,847 --> 00:43:45,266
because the passengers
just don't know.
815
00:43:45,266 --> 00:43:47,226
They're not pilots,
and they do not know
816
00:43:47,226 --> 00:43:51,689
that their behavior
is endangering their very lives.
817
00:43:51,689 --> 00:43:53,858
But it did help change the law
818
00:43:53,858 --> 00:43:56,152
and change how the FAA operates
819
00:43:56,152 --> 00:43:59,781
in many aspects.
And for that, we're thankful.
820
00:44:27,642 --> 00:44:30,019
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