Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated:
1
00:00:03,379 --> 00:00:06,034
Helios 522,
do you read?
2
00:00:06,137 --> 00:00:07,551
High above Athens,
3
00:00:07,655 --> 00:00:11,275
fighter jets track a 737
as it circles the city.
4
00:00:13,379 --> 00:00:15,689
522,
do you read? Over.
5
00:00:15,793 --> 00:00:19,000
There's no answer
from the passenger plane,
6
00:00:19,103 --> 00:00:21,000
but there is
someone at the controls.
7
00:00:23,068 --> 00:00:25,517
More than a hundred
people are on board.
8
00:00:25,620 --> 00:00:29,103
Everybody's mind was
going to hijack or terrorist.
9
00:00:29,206 --> 00:00:32,310
There is one
person moving in the cockpit.
10
00:00:32,413 --> 00:00:33,827
Repeat there is one person...
11
00:00:33,931 --> 00:00:35,689
What happened
to the crew and passengers?
12
00:00:37,172 --> 00:00:39,724
522,
do you read? Over.
13
00:00:39,827 --> 00:00:42,586
And who is
flying the plane?
14
00:00:42,689 --> 00:00:45,068
Helios 522,
do you read? Over.
15
00:01:06,344 --> 00:01:13,448
Early morning,
August the 14th, 2005.
16
00:01:15,620 --> 00:01:19,551
The cabin crew of Helios Airways
flight 522 are preparing
17
00:01:19,655 --> 00:01:22,758
for their trip from the island
of Cyprus to Athens, Greece.
18
00:01:22,862 --> 00:01:26,448
Sure is
a beautiful day.
19
00:01:29,103 --> 00:01:30,206
Maybe I shouldn't have come in.
20
00:01:30,310 --> 00:01:34,793
Andreas Prodromou
is twenty-five.
21
00:01:34,896 --> 00:01:36,724
He isn't supposed to be
working today
22
00:01:36,827 --> 00:01:38,655
but he's taken
the flight to spend some time
23
00:01:38,758 --> 00:01:41,172
with his girlfriend,
who also works for Helios.
24
00:01:41,275 --> 00:01:44,827
It's the sort of day
I'd like to be out flying.
25
00:01:44,931 --> 00:01:46,827
You will Andreas.
26
00:01:46,931 --> 00:01:50,275
Prodromou is
a flight attendant now
27
00:01:50,379 --> 00:01:52,413
but he has bigger plans.
28
00:01:52,517 --> 00:01:54,689
One day he wants
to fly for Helios.
29
00:01:56,655 --> 00:02:02,275
His dream was
to become a professional pilot.
30
00:02:03,551 --> 00:02:07,551
Personally, I wanted him
to stay in the family business.
31
00:02:07,655 --> 00:02:10,379
We often talked about this.
We've got company.
32
00:02:10,482 --> 00:02:17,965
Stay warm in the back.
See you in Athens.
33
00:02:18,068 --> 00:02:28,896
In the cockpit,
the flight crew is occupied
34
00:02:29,000 --> 00:02:31,724
with the daily routine of
preparing their jet for takeoff.
35
00:02:31,827 --> 00:02:34,551
It's bright today.
36
00:02:34,655 --> 00:02:38,241
09 Captain Hans Merten
is an East German,
37
00:02:38,344 --> 00:02:41,586
a contract pilot hired by Helios
for the busy holiday season.
38
00:02:41,689 --> 00:02:44,896
Are you almost through?
Pardon?
39
00:02:45,000 --> 00:02:51,827
Are you almost done?
Nearly.
40
00:02:53,655 --> 00:02:57,413
His co-pilot
is from Cyprus.
41
00:02:57,517 --> 00:02:59,241
Pambos Charalambous
has been working
42
00:02:59,344 --> 00:03:01,862
exclusively for Helios
for the last five years.
43
00:03:03,517 --> 00:03:06,689
Before beginning any flight,
crews are required to perform
44
00:03:06,793 --> 00:03:09,413
dozens of checks on various
pieces of onboard equipment.
45
00:03:09,517 --> 00:03:12,793
It's a routine
but necessary procedure.
46
00:03:12,896 --> 00:03:15,103
Doors closed.
47
00:03:15,206 --> 00:03:21,724
Sorry. Could you store
trays and put your seat back.
48
00:03:21,827 --> 00:03:24,482
Helios is
a charter airline,
49
00:03:24,586 --> 00:03:26,965
with low cost fares to Greece.
50
00:03:27,068 --> 00:03:31,068
It's a summer weekend, and the
plane is filled with families.
51
00:03:31,172 --> 00:03:33,620
In all, there are 1-hundred
and fifteen passengers
52
00:03:33,724 --> 00:03:34,689
on the morning flight.
53
00:03:34,793 --> 00:03:37,827
If you need any
more help, let me know.
54
00:03:37,931 --> 00:03:40,896
We're just about to take off.
55
00:03:41,000 --> 00:03:42,379
They are low fare,
no thrills.
56
00:03:42,482 --> 00:03:46,000
Uh they don't even
serve you refreshments
57
00:03:46,103 --> 00:03:49,413
during small sorts of flights.
58
00:03:49,517 --> 00:03:53,896
But they often
another possibility
59
00:03:54,000 --> 00:03:55,931
for the budget minded traveler.
60
00:03:56,034 --> 00:03:59,931
Paros Demetriou
and Maria Rikkou
61
00:04:00,034 --> 00:04:02,551
are traveling to the
Greek island of Patros.
62
00:04:02,655 --> 00:04:03,827
They've just got engaged.
63
00:04:03,931 --> 00:04:11,310
They booked, they booked
this holiday a month,
64
00:04:11,413 --> 00:04:13,379
or more than a month ago.
65
00:04:13,482 --> 00:04:14,689
It was like
a honeymoon for them.
66
00:04:16,896 --> 00:04:18,655
Flight attendants,
please take your seats.
67
00:04:18,758 --> 00:04:20,827
Prepare for takeoff.
68
00:04:28,586 --> 00:04:31,068
Just a few minutes
after nine in the morning,
69
00:04:31,172 --> 00:04:35,241
Helios Airways flight 522 lifts
off into the bright sunshine.
70
00:04:35,344 --> 00:04:41,034
Nicosia area control,
this is Helios 522.
71
00:04:42,758 --> 00:04:46,965
Request cruising at 3-4-0.
72
00:04:48,241 --> 00:04:51,344
Helios 522, you
are cleared to climb to 3-4-0.
73
00:04:51,448 --> 00:04:53,551
Have a good day.
74
00:04:53,655 --> 00:04:56,172
Set 3-4-0.
3-4-0.
75
00:04:59,862 --> 00:05:02,758
Minutes
into the flight,
76
00:05:02,862 --> 00:05:05,758
the plane is still climbing
towards its cruising altitude.
77
00:05:07,896 --> 00:05:10,068
Suddenly, an alarm
blares in the cockpit.
78
00:05:12,310 --> 00:05:15,206
What is it?
79
00:05:15,310 --> 00:05:16,206
The takeoff
config warning?
80
00:05:16,310 --> 00:05:19,034
The flight
crew is confused.
81
00:05:19,137 --> 00:05:20,827
The takeoff configuration alarm
82
00:05:20,931 --> 00:05:23,172
normally only sounds
on the ground.
83
00:05:23,275 --> 00:05:25,793
It tells pilots their jet
isn't ready for takeoff.
84
00:05:27,413 --> 00:05:29,517
The crew doesn't know why
it's sounding now.
85
00:05:31,724 --> 00:05:34,620
Uncertain what the problem is,
the captain radios
86
00:05:34,724 --> 00:05:38,275
the Helios operations center at
Larnaka Airport back in Cyprus.
87
00:05:38,379 --> 00:05:43,413
Operations,
this is flight 522. Over.
88
00:05:43,517 --> 00:05:46,206
Flight 522,
what can I do for you?
89
00:05:46,310 --> 00:05:49,482
We have a takeoff config
warning on.
90
00:05:49,586 --> 00:05:51,034
Pardon?
91
00:05:51,137 --> 00:05:54,103
Our takeoff
config warning is on.
92
00:05:54,206 --> 00:06:00,275
I'm sure it's nothing.
93
00:06:00,379 --> 00:06:04,517
I'll let you know
when we level off.
94
00:06:04,620 --> 00:06:07,517
With the first alarm
still beeping in the cockpit,
95
00:06:07,620 --> 00:06:10,137
things become even more
confusing.
96
00:06:10,241 --> 00:06:13,172
Their master caution
alarm goes off.
97
00:06:13,275 --> 00:06:16,310
It could indicate that some
systems onboard are overheating.
98
00:06:16,413 --> 00:06:19,275
We now have
a master caution.
99
00:06:19,379 --> 00:06:21,931
I'll get you
an engineer, 522. Just a minute.
100
00:06:22,034 --> 00:06:28,896
I find him
very hard to understand.
101
00:06:29,000 --> 00:06:29,793
His accent is quite thick.
102
00:06:31,896 --> 00:06:33,758
Flight 522,
what can I do for you?
103
00:06:33,862 --> 00:06:39,172
The ventilation cooling
fan lights are off.
104
00:06:39,275 --> 00:06:41,689
Sorry. Can you repeat?
105
00:06:41,793 --> 00:06:44,724
While the pilots
and ground engineers
106
00:06:44,827 --> 00:06:47,103
try to troubleshoot
the two alarms,
107
00:06:47,206 --> 00:06:50,586
most passengers have no
idea there's a problem until...
108
00:06:50,689 --> 00:06:57,862
Everyone stay calm.
Please remain seated.
109
00:06:57,965 --> 00:07:01,931
Everyone
please put the oxygen
110
00:07:02,034 --> 00:07:04,689
masks on completely
over your mouth and nose.
111
00:07:04,793 --> 00:07:11,586
The protocol was
immediately to secure yourself,
112
00:07:11,689 --> 00:07:13,793
grab an oxygen mask,
stay in your seat.
113
00:07:13,896 --> 00:07:16,620
If you can help passengers
without getting up,
114
00:07:16,724 --> 00:07:18,689
you could help them
and you should help them.
115
00:07:18,793 --> 00:07:22,172
But you would not risk the
safety of any cabin crew member
116
00:07:22,275 --> 00:07:24,965
to go and help a passenger which
is five or six rows further up.
117
00:07:25,068 --> 00:07:30,034
Their procedure would
be to grab their mask,
118
00:07:30,137 --> 00:07:37,000
don it, and wait
for the aircraft to level off or
119
00:07:37,103 --> 00:07:38,275
commence with a descent.
120
00:07:38,379 --> 00:07:42,103
No one in the cabin
knows what the problem is.
121
00:07:43,620 --> 00:07:45,379
They're waiting for information
from the cockpit.
122
00:07:48,379 --> 00:07:50,655
The pilots are unaware
that the oxygen masks
123
00:07:50,758 --> 00:07:52,241
in the cabin have dropped.
124
00:07:52,344 --> 00:07:55,206
And they still don't know
why their takeoff configuration
125
00:07:55,310 --> 00:07:58,068
warning is on or why
their systems are overhearing.
126
00:07:59,620 --> 00:08:02,862
Both of my equipment
cooling lights are off.
127
00:08:02,965 --> 00:08:08,137
This is normal. Can
you please confirm your problem?
128
00:08:08,241 --> 00:08:10,206
But the engineer
on the ground is struggling
129
00:08:10,310 --> 00:08:12,793
to get a clear picture of what's
happening in the air.
130
00:08:12,896 --> 00:08:15,241
They are not switched off!
131
00:08:15,344 --> 00:08:17,103
Can you confirm
132
00:08:17,206 --> 00:08:21,344
that the pressurization panel
is set to auto?
133
00:08:21,448 --> 00:08:24,448
Where are my equipment
cooling circuit breakers?
134
00:08:24,551 --> 00:08:30,275
Behind the captain's
seat. Can you see them?
135
00:08:30,379 --> 00:08:31,758
What's going on?
136
00:08:31,862 --> 00:08:36,517
There's something
wrong with the electrics on 522.
137
00:08:36,620 --> 00:08:38,137
I had something
to pick up
138
00:08:38,241 --> 00:08:40,482
from operations so
I was, I was there.
139
00:08:40,586 --> 00:08:46,310
I figured, oh not again.
One of our problems. So I left.
140
00:08:46,413 --> 00:08:48,758
Well good luck.
141
00:08:48,862 --> 00:08:52,000
The problem
doesn't seem serious,
142
00:08:52,103 --> 00:08:55,172
but as the plane continues
to climb, passengers still
143
00:08:55,275 --> 00:08:57,586
haven't received any
information from the cockpit.
144
00:08:57,689 --> 00:09:03,241
Helios 522, can you
see the circuit breakers?
145
00:09:03,344 --> 00:09:06,758
And now the engineer
on the ground
146
00:09:06,862 --> 00:09:09,000
loses contact with the aircraft.
147
00:09:09,103 --> 00:09:14,310
Helios 522,
can you hear me?
148
00:09:14,413 --> 00:09:18,896
It's less than
30 minutes after take-off.
149
00:09:19,000 --> 00:09:21,344
And flight 522 is
still on course.
150
00:09:24,551 --> 00:09:27,586
The plane is high
above the Mediterranean Sea -
151
00:09:27,689 --> 00:09:29,931
and headed
straight towards Athens.
152
00:09:35,931 --> 00:09:37,862
August the 14th, 2005.
153
00:09:37,965 --> 00:09:43,482
A Helios Airways 737 with
1-hundred and twenty-one people
154
00:09:43,586 --> 00:09:46,172
onboard is circling
in the sky near Athens.
155
00:09:46,275 --> 00:09:51,586
Helios 522,
can you hear me?
156
00:09:51,689 --> 00:09:55,000
Shortly after
leaving the island of Cyprus,
157
00:09:55,103 --> 00:09:58,344
two different alarms had been
triggered on the plane.
158
00:09:58,448 --> 00:10:00,000
The flight crew was
trying to solve
159
00:10:00,103 --> 00:10:02,137
the problem with the help
of ground engineers.
160
00:10:04,793 --> 00:10:08,413
But now radio contact
with the plane has been lost.
161
00:10:08,517 --> 00:10:10,689
Air traffic control
can't get any response
162
00:10:10,793 --> 00:10:12,413
from the captain or co-pilot.
163
00:10:15,034 --> 00:10:17,724
The flight to Greece normally
takes an hour and a half
164
00:10:19,206 --> 00:10:22,241
but the passenger jet has been
in the air for over two hours,
165
00:10:22,344 --> 00:10:23,896
circling in a holding pattern.
166
00:10:24,000 --> 00:10:29,655
We heard that there
was an airplane which was
167
00:10:29,758 --> 00:10:35,551
flying into Greek territory
and had no communication.
168
00:10:35,655 --> 00:10:39,931
Everybody's mind was
going to hijack or to terrorist.
169
00:10:40,034 --> 00:10:47,344
More than 3-million
people live in Athens.
170
00:10:47,448 --> 00:10:49,103
A plane slamming into the city
171
00:10:49,206 --> 00:10:51,482
could cause an incredible
loss of life.
172
00:10:51,586 --> 00:10:55,724
This is
a runaway aircraft.
173
00:10:55,827 --> 00:10:59,241
It's a possible hijacking or
it's a possible terrorist act
174
00:10:59,344 --> 00:11:01,172
so let's involve the military.
175
00:11:01,275 --> 00:11:06,000
The Greek air force
scrambles two of its most
176
00:11:06,103 --> 00:11:09,896
sophisticated fighter jets
to investigate the Helios plane.
177
00:11:10,000 --> 00:11:11,344
Helios 522,
do you read? Over.
178
00:11:11,448 --> 00:11:16,000
But the pilots
aren't getting any response.
179
00:11:17,206 --> 00:11:20,310
One of the jets flies
closer to the cockpit.
180
00:11:20,413 --> 00:11:24,793
Someone is in the co-pilot's
seat, slumped over the controls.
181
00:11:24,896 --> 00:11:29,448
But there's no
sign of the captain at all.
182
00:11:29,551 --> 00:11:33,206
The fighter pilot radios air
traffic control in Athens.
183
00:11:33,310 --> 00:11:34,655
Athinai ACC,
184
00:11:34,758 --> 00:11:39,275
there's one figure
in the cockpit of Helios 522.
185
00:11:39,379 --> 00:11:45,103
He appears non-responsive.
Athinai ACC, checking the cabin.
186
00:11:45,206 --> 00:11:49,551
He can see
passengers in their seats,
187
00:11:49,655 --> 00:11:51,931
but none of them react
to the presence of the jet.
188
00:12:00,793 --> 00:12:03,344
Then, the pilot sees someone
moving in the cockpit.
189
00:12:06,448 --> 00:12:07,620
Athinai Control.
190
00:12:07,724 --> 00:12:10,275
There is one person moving
in the cockpit of Helios 522.
191
00:12:10,379 --> 00:12:14,965
Repeat there is one
person inside the cockpit.
192
00:12:15,068 --> 00:12:20,206
Helios, 522 do you read?
Over. Helios 522. Over.
193
00:12:20,310 --> 00:12:26,103
Flight HCY 522,
this is Athinai radar control.
194
00:12:26,206 --> 00:12:28,965
The F-16s continue
shadowing the jet,
195
00:12:29,068 --> 00:12:31,241
but there's no response
at all from the cockpit.
196
00:12:31,344 --> 00:12:34,379
One of them
was actually
197
00:12:34,482 --> 00:12:37,931
in a shooting position
behind the 737.
198
00:12:38,034 --> 00:12:40,206
The other one was nearby
the cockpit and he was
199
00:12:40,310 --> 00:12:42,862
trying to communicate visually
with the person in the cockpit.
200
00:12:42,965 --> 00:12:47,000
Suddenly,
the 737 turns left
201
00:12:47,103 --> 00:12:49,655
and begins to quickly descend.
202
00:12:49,758 --> 00:12:52,517
Athinai ACC.
Helios 522 turning sharply.
203
00:12:53,758 --> 00:12:54,724
Following down.
204
00:12:54,827 --> 00:12:58,724
From more
than 10-thousand meters,
205
00:12:58,827 --> 00:13:00,655
the plane drops
towards the ground.
206
00:13:00,758 --> 00:13:04,862
There is no structural
failure. There is no fire.
207
00:13:04,965 --> 00:13:07,724
There is no problem,
obvious problem,
208
00:13:07,827 --> 00:13:09,206
from the external
view with the plane.
209
00:13:10,931 --> 00:13:13,034
Helios 522. Over.
Do you read?
210
00:13:14,793 --> 00:13:17,103
Helios 522, do you read? Over.
211
00:13:20,551 --> 00:13:23,413
Then 21-hundred
meters above the ground,
212
00:13:23,517 --> 00:13:24,931
the person in the captain's seat
213
00:13:25,034 --> 00:13:27,655
acknowledges the fighter jet
for the very first time.
214
00:13:30,137 --> 00:13:31,689
But no words are exchanged.
215
00:13:34,965 --> 00:13:37,724
Neither the fighter pilot nor
local air traffic control
216
00:13:37,827 --> 00:13:39,655
can make radio
contact with the jet.
217
00:13:43,448 --> 00:13:46,068
Just after twelve o'clock,
almost three hours
218
00:13:46,172 --> 00:13:48,827
after it took off from the
island of Cyprus,
219
00:13:48,931 --> 00:13:51,827
Helios flight 522
slams into the ground.
220
00:14:03,827 --> 00:14:06,931
Athinai ACC.
Helios 522 is down.
221
00:14:08,241 --> 00:14:14,000
Repeat Helios 522 is
down on Grammatiko Hill. Over.
222
00:14:14,103 --> 00:14:21,206
Fire and rescue
workers rush to the crash site.
223
00:14:21,310 --> 00:14:22,482
There are no survivors.
224
00:14:27,275 --> 00:14:30,137
Flight attendant Lazaros
Temetzian is stunned by what
225
00:14:30,241 --> 00:14:32,241
he hears at the company's
operations center.
226
00:14:32,344 --> 00:14:39,137
It was the most
chaotic scene I've ever seen.
227
00:14:42,000 --> 00:14:47,758
When I went back, our operations
controller said that he
228
00:14:47,862 --> 00:14:52,586
lost the aircraft and his eyes,
he started to cry.
229
00:14:52,689 --> 00:14:59,379
Helios is a small
company, with just three jets.
230
00:14:59,482 --> 00:15:02,517
Members of the cabin crew have
been working together for years.
231
00:15:05,620 --> 00:15:07,275
For Paul Symeonides,
232
00:15:07,379 --> 00:15:10,448
news of the crash is
particularly terrifying.
233
00:15:10,551 --> 00:15:14,137
He's a flight attendant for the
airline, and so is his fiancée.
234
00:15:14,241 --> 00:15:18,068
I think that must have
been the worst thirty minutes
235
00:15:18,172 --> 00:15:19,931
of my life following
that first image
236
00:15:20,034 --> 00:15:23,275
because Victoria was flying
that morning to Glasgow.
237
00:15:23,379 --> 00:15:25,241
I had everyone and his brother,
238
00:15:25,344 --> 00:15:28,551
every person we knew was calling
me up to find out if I'm alive,
239
00:15:28,655 --> 00:15:31,379
if Victoria's alive,
what happened, why it happened.
240
00:15:31,482 --> 00:15:35,724
At first we said it
takes one hour and a half
241
00:15:35,827 --> 00:15:38,758
to go to Greece, so probably
it's not that plane
242
00:15:38,862 --> 00:15:45,482
and it took about two or three
hours later to know that
243
00:15:45,586 --> 00:15:48,379
Paros and Maria
was on the plane that crashed.
244
00:15:48,482 --> 00:15:54,379
Andreas Prodromou's
father didn't know his son
245
00:15:54,482 --> 00:15:56,275
had been called to fill
in on Flight 522.
246
00:16:00,793 --> 00:16:04,275
I was told that
a Helios aircraft was
247
00:16:04,379 --> 00:16:08,793
lost by radar and air
controllers couldn't contact it.
248
00:16:08,896 --> 00:16:13,896
I got worried.
I called Andreas' phone.
249
00:16:14,000 --> 00:16:17,241
He always had it
on and unfortunately
250
00:16:17,344 --> 00:16:17,931
he wouldn't answer.
251
00:16:20,137 --> 00:16:21,344
After that phone call,
252
00:16:21,448 --> 00:16:25,413
I felt as if the ground was
pulled out from under my feet.
253
00:16:25,517 --> 00:16:33,241
It's the worst air
crash in the history of Greece.
254
00:16:33,344 --> 00:16:35,413
Most of the 1-hundred
and twenty-one victims
255
00:16:35,517 --> 00:16:36,379
are from Cyprus.
256
00:16:37,655 --> 00:16:39,724
The small island
nation declares three
257
00:16:39,827 --> 00:16:41,689
days of mourning
following the crash.
258
00:16:46,034 --> 00:16:48,379
It's an eerie disaster.
259
00:16:48,482 --> 00:16:50,862
For over an hour,
air traffic controllers watched
260
00:16:50,965 --> 00:16:54,517
the passenger jet fly in radio
silence closer and closer
261
00:16:54,620 --> 00:16:58,137
to Athens with no idea what was
happening inside the jet.
262
00:17:01,793 --> 00:17:03,758
Now, piece by piece,
263
00:17:03,862 --> 00:17:05,793
investigators
are trying to find out.
264
00:17:05,896 --> 00:17:10,931
So we climbed
over the hill and there we were,
265
00:17:11,034 --> 00:17:13,827
you know, facing this situation
266
00:17:13,931 --> 00:17:16,862
which was beyond any,
any description.
267
00:17:16,965 --> 00:17:20,448
I saw a great area in front
of me which was burning,
268
00:17:20,551 --> 00:17:27,586
it was black, burning, people
spread, pieces of the airplane.
269
00:17:32,689 --> 00:17:35,896
It is a truly
nightmarish sight.
270
00:17:36,000 --> 00:17:38,413
I hope that I never
experience it again.
271
00:17:40,068 --> 00:17:42,482
It was terrible, just terrible.
272
00:17:42,586 --> 00:17:48,896
Investigators
immediately start
273
00:17:49,000 --> 00:17:50,655
looking for the cause
of the crash.
274
00:17:53,586 --> 00:17:56,379
In the early days, their efforts
take a frustrating turn.
275
00:18:00,517 --> 00:18:03,413
They recover the box containing
the cockpit voice recorder,
276
00:18:03,517 --> 00:18:07,103
but the recorder itself
has been thrown clear.
277
00:18:07,206 --> 00:18:12,137
It was difficult for us
because we first,
278
00:18:12,241 --> 00:18:17,379
first found the case of the CVR
very badly damaged
279
00:18:17,482 --> 00:18:21,896
and we could not find the,
you know, the machine itself.
280
00:18:22,000 --> 00:18:24,620
Investigators
need to know what
281
00:18:24,724 --> 00:18:26,482
happened to the pilots.
282
00:18:26,586 --> 00:18:28,172
Without the cockpit
voice recorder,
283
00:18:28,275 --> 00:18:29,310
they have little to go on.
284
00:18:29,413 --> 00:18:32,724
So keep looking.
Let's hope we can find it.
285
00:18:32,827 --> 00:18:42,482
Bodies recovered
from the wreckage are brought
286
00:18:42,586 --> 00:18:44,551
to the offices of Athens'
chief coroner.
287
00:18:45,896 --> 00:18:48,896
Autopsies add more
mystery to the case.
288
00:18:49,000 --> 00:18:52,689
Everyone on board the plane was
alive at the time of the crash.
289
00:18:54,034 --> 00:18:57,620
There were scenarios
at the time
290
00:18:57,724 --> 00:18:58,793
that they had all
died in midair.
291
00:18:58,896 --> 00:19:05,034
But the truth, they did not
die from inhaling a toxic
292
00:19:05,137 --> 00:19:07,344
substance in the airplane
or from an explosion.
293
00:19:07,448 --> 00:19:15,206
These people died on impact.
294
00:19:15,310 --> 00:19:21,827
But if the passengers
were alive the entire flight,
295
00:19:21,931 --> 00:19:23,689
why didn't the pilot
of the fighter jet
296
00:19:23,793 --> 00:19:26,793
see any activity
inside the cabin,
297
00:19:26,896 --> 00:19:35,137
and who was at the controls
as the jet circled over Athens?
298
00:19:35,241 --> 00:19:38,000
When investigators find tissue
samples in the remains
299
00:19:38,103 --> 00:19:40,862
of the cockpit,
they make a stunning discovery.
300
00:19:43,344 --> 00:19:46,379
The person at the controls
of the plane when it crashed
301
00:19:46,482 --> 00:19:48,103
was flight attendant
Andreas Prodromou,
302
00:19:49,517 --> 00:19:51,482
a last minute
addition to the cabin crew.
303
00:19:51,586 --> 00:19:56,931
But why was he in the cockpit?
304
00:19:57,034 --> 00:19:58,620
Was he trying to save the plane,
305
00:20:00,379 --> 00:20:02,482
or did he deliberately fly it
into the ground?
306
00:20:07,482 --> 00:20:10,379
Several days after finding
the outer case of the cockpit
307
00:20:10,482 --> 00:20:13,931
voice recorder, investigators
find the recording itself.
308
00:20:15,517 --> 00:20:18,448
When chief investigator
Tsolakis listens to the final
309
00:20:18,551 --> 00:20:21,620
moments of the flight,
it answers a vital question.
310
00:20:24,068 --> 00:20:25,586
Mayday, Mayday, Mayday.
311
00:20:25,689 --> 00:20:26,724
This was
no terrorist act.
312
00:20:26,827 --> 00:20:30,620
Helios Airways
flight 522.
313
00:20:30,724 --> 00:20:32,241
Prodromou was
calling for help.
314
00:20:32,344 --> 00:20:36,793
Mayday, Mayday.
315
00:20:36,896 --> 00:20:40,379
Tsolakis hears five
separate maydays on the tape,
316
00:20:40,482 --> 00:20:41,827
even though none of them
were heard
317
00:20:41,931 --> 00:20:43,275
by air traffic controllers.
318
00:20:45,310 --> 00:20:50,000
From the first
moment that they saw someone
319
00:20:50,103 --> 00:20:53,896
in the cockpit believe me,
I was certain it was Andreas.
320
00:20:54,000 --> 00:20:55,275
He wasn't a coward.
321
00:20:57,000 --> 00:20:58,517
He knew something about planes,
322
00:20:58,620 --> 00:21:05,344
and he had the capacity
to do something.
323
00:21:05,448 --> 00:21:17,344
In fact, Prodromou had
his commercial pilot's license.
324
00:21:17,448 --> 00:21:19,310
It was the first step
towards his goal
325
00:21:19,413 --> 00:21:21,137
of becoming a captain
for Helios.
326
00:21:21,241 --> 00:21:23,655
It's the sort of day
I'd like to be out flying.
327
00:21:23,758 --> 00:21:25,655
Oh you will Andreas.
328
00:21:25,758 --> 00:21:28,275
But all of
his training
329
00:21:28,379 --> 00:21:29,965
wouldn't have helped
save the jet.
330
00:21:32,241 --> 00:21:34,068
When he was
seen at the controls,
331
00:21:34,172 --> 00:21:37,413
flight 522 had been in the air
for almost three hours.
332
00:21:40,241 --> 00:21:43,241
And the reason the Helios plane
seemed to veer away from the
333
00:21:43,344 --> 00:21:47,482
F-16s following it was because
its left engine was out of fuel.
334
00:21:49,137 --> 00:21:51,689
No matter what caused
the alarms to sound,
335
00:21:51,793 --> 00:21:56,103
the ultimate reason
for the crash was simple.
336
00:21:56,206 --> 00:22:02,448
The DFDR and the CVR
gave us absolute proof that the
337
00:22:02,551 --> 00:22:06,724
plane ran out of fuel and this
was the cause of the crash.
338
00:22:06,827 --> 00:22:13,551
Scheduled as a
ninety-minute flight, the plane
339
00:22:13,655 --> 00:22:16,931
didn't have enough fuel to stay
in the air for over three hours.
340
00:22:18,241 --> 00:22:20,655
But why had the plane flown
so much longer
341
00:22:20,758 --> 00:22:21,793
than it was supposed to?
342
00:22:25,034 --> 00:22:28,034
Tsolakis now knows who
was in the cockpit of the plane
343
00:22:28,137 --> 00:22:30,275
and why it crashed.
344
00:22:30,379 --> 00:22:32,448
But to fully understand
the mystery,
345
00:22:32,551 --> 00:22:33,862
he needs more information.
346
00:22:39,551 --> 00:22:41,655
His investigators uncover
a suspicious
347
00:22:41,758 --> 00:22:44,655
history of maintenance
issues with the Helios jet,
348
00:22:44,758 --> 00:22:47,724
issues that could help explain
what happened on flight 522.
349
00:22:51,137 --> 00:22:52,965
Less than a year
before the crash,
350
00:22:53,068 --> 00:22:55,655
the same aircraft had suffered
a rapid decompression.
351
00:23:01,793 --> 00:23:04,827
Lazaros Temetzian
worked on that flight.
352
00:23:04,931 --> 00:23:07,068
I was in the back
of the aircraft at the time.
353
00:23:07,172 --> 00:23:10,862
There was a loud metallic bang,
a clanging sound
354
00:23:12,241 --> 00:23:15,413
and the oxygen masks
dropped in the cabin.
355
00:23:18,241 --> 00:23:21,379
Every step I was taking
was difficult.
356
00:23:21,482 --> 00:23:24,482
It was hard to move,
uh hard to breathe.
357
00:23:24,586 --> 00:23:28,172
In fact, I was, I was starting
to pant, I was panting for air.
358
00:23:28,275 --> 00:23:31,620
As the plane began an
immediate descent
359
00:23:31,724 --> 00:23:33,724
to 33-hundred meters,
360
00:23:33,827 --> 00:23:36,827
all Temetzian could do was
remain strapped in and wait.
361
00:23:40,413 --> 00:23:42,655
Once the plane reached a safe
altitude,
362
00:23:42,758 --> 00:23:44,655
Temetzian inspected
the rear door
363
00:23:44,758 --> 00:23:46,137
and was shocked
by what he found.
364
00:23:46,241 --> 00:23:50,689
I noticed that
the aft service door
365
00:23:50,793 --> 00:23:51,965
was not fully locked.
366
00:23:53,655 --> 00:23:56,551
The hinges on the top
and the bottom of the door
367
00:23:56,655 --> 00:23:58,827
were kind of displaced.
368
00:23:58,931 --> 00:24:02,034
I could pass my hand
right through.
369
00:24:02,137 --> 00:24:06,724
There were no injuries
and the plane made
370
00:24:06,827 --> 00:24:10,724
an emergency landing,
and the door was inspected.
371
00:24:10,827 --> 00:24:13,620
But this wasn't the only problem
crews had with this plane.
372
00:24:13,724 --> 00:24:18,172
We would record
faults in the cabin logbook
373
00:24:18,275 --> 00:24:22,000
constantly and nothing would be
done to rectify even these
374
00:24:22,103 --> 00:24:24,344
small little
problems in the cabin.
375
00:24:24,448 --> 00:24:26,793
Engineers would take
months to rectify
376
00:24:26,896 --> 00:24:29,517
even the slightest
problem in the cabin.
377
00:24:29,620 --> 00:24:34,275
There were more
recent problems as well.
378
00:24:34,379 --> 00:24:38,137
A Helios ground engineer tells
Tsolakis that on the very day of
379
00:24:38,241 --> 00:24:42,758
flight 522, the 737 had another
problem with its back door.
380
00:24:42,862 --> 00:24:45,068
When we checked
the flight log for the trip,
381
00:24:45,172 --> 00:24:47,137
we saw that we'd have to do some
unscheduled maintenance.
382
00:24:47,241 --> 00:24:50,034
The plane had
arrived in Cyprus just after
383
00:24:50,137 --> 00:24:51,310
midnight on August the 14th.
384
00:24:52,724 --> 00:24:55,344
The cabin crew had heard
loud banging noises
385
00:24:55,448 --> 00:24:59,413
and saw ice on the rear service
door during the flight.
386
00:24:59,517 --> 00:25:02,103
It was scheduled to take
off again just hours later.
387
00:25:05,896 --> 00:25:10,103
Soon after it landed, engineers
began checking the problem.
388
00:25:10,206 --> 00:25:12,103
To make sure there's nothing
wrong with the seal
389
00:25:12,206 --> 00:25:15,413
on the door, the engineers
run a pressurization test.
390
00:25:17,482 --> 00:25:18,758
During normal flight,
391
00:25:18,862 --> 00:25:21,310
a plane's engines force
air into the cabin.
392
00:25:23,172 --> 00:25:25,827
To ensure oxygen
circulates during the trip,
393
00:25:25,931 --> 00:25:29,241
small valves in the rear allow
some of it to leak out.
394
00:25:29,344 --> 00:25:35,896
A pressurized
airplane essentially is
395
00:25:36,000 --> 00:25:38,724
sort of like a pressurized can.
396
00:25:38,827 --> 00:25:41,758
We pressurize the airplane
so that the people inside can
397
00:25:41,862 --> 00:25:45,551
survive the environment that the
airplane likes to operate in.
398
00:25:45,655 --> 00:25:47,172
Switching digital
pressure control
399
00:25:47,275 --> 00:25:49,551
unit from auto to manual.
400
00:25:49,655 --> 00:25:52,551
Without the jet's
engines running,
401
00:25:52,655 --> 00:25:55,034
the engineer uses
the plane's auxiliary power
402
00:25:55,137 --> 00:25:57,413
unit to force air
into the aircraft,
403
00:25:57,517 --> 00:25:59,758
and the cabin is pressurized
for several minutes.
404
00:25:59,862 --> 00:26:05,206
It's like looking
for a leak in a tire.
405
00:26:05,310 --> 00:26:07,724
In this case, what you're
having to do is pressurize
406
00:26:07,827 --> 00:26:11,206
the aircraft, use a bar,
a barometer essentially
407
00:26:11,310 --> 00:26:14,344
to monitor the pressure inside
uh and look for leaks that way.
408
00:26:16,965 --> 00:26:19,206
But there's
no indication any air
409
00:26:19,310 --> 00:26:20,896
is escaping through
the back door.
410
00:26:21,000 --> 00:26:26,310
In this case,
they felt that it was all right
411
00:26:26,413 --> 00:26:28,586
and they completed the test.
412
00:26:28,689 --> 00:26:33,896
The entire jet seems
to be in good working order.
413
00:26:34,000 --> 00:26:36,862
After performing a series of
additional routine maintenance
414
00:26:36,965 --> 00:26:40,275
procedures, the engineers signed
off on their technical log.
415
00:26:41,862 --> 00:26:43,689
Investigators are faced
with a dead end.
416
00:26:46,517 --> 00:26:48,137
An explosive decompression
417
00:26:48,241 --> 00:26:52,275
could have explained
the tragic events of flight 522.
418
00:26:52,379 --> 00:26:55,758
If the oxygen had been suddenly
sucked out of the jet,
419
00:26:55,862 --> 00:26:57,793
everyone onboard could
have been overcome.
420
00:26:59,344 --> 00:27:03,103
But not only did engineers check
the problem, when the F-16s
421
00:27:03,206 --> 00:27:06,655
approached the plane
near Athens, no damage was seen.
422
00:27:06,758 --> 00:27:09,310
There was no indication that the
fuselage was punctured.
423
00:27:11,068 --> 00:27:13,931
Investigators are still
struggling to solve the mystery.
424
00:27:14,034 --> 00:27:17,724
What had overcome the passengers
and crew of Helios flight
425
00:27:17,827 --> 00:27:22,344
522, and why was one flight
attendant apparently unaffected?
426
00:27:24,275 --> 00:27:27,241
The discovery of one
small switch holds
427
00:27:27,344 --> 00:27:29,172
the key to the entire crash.
428
00:27:29,275 --> 00:27:36,034
The crash of
Helios flight 522
429
00:27:36,137 --> 00:27:39,413
is one of the most mysterious
air disasters ever.
430
00:27:44,275 --> 00:27:46,275
Helios 522,
do you read? Over.
431
00:27:46,379 --> 00:27:48,655
All investigators
know for sure is that shortly
432
00:27:48,758 --> 00:27:50,862
after takeoff the crew
stopped communicating
433
00:27:50,965 --> 00:27:52,413
with air traffic controllers.
434
00:27:52,517 --> 00:27:55,931
Helios 522. Over.
Mayday.
435
00:27:56,034 --> 00:27:58,758
Then, after two
and a half hours in the air,
436
00:27:58,862 --> 00:28:00,206
one of the plane's
flight attendants
437
00:28:00,310 --> 00:28:02,586
was seen at the controls.
438
00:28:02,689 --> 00:28:05,793
Eventually the plane ran
out of fuel and crashed,
439
00:28:05,896 --> 00:28:07,689
killing 1-hundred
and twenty-one people.
440
00:28:10,965 --> 00:28:13,241
But investigators are stumped.
441
00:28:13,344 --> 00:28:15,586
They still don't know what
had happened to the plane's
442
00:28:15,689 --> 00:28:18,517
captain or the rest of the crew.
443
00:28:18,620 --> 00:28:20,655
Tell me about what
happened the day of the flight.
444
00:28:20,758 --> 00:28:23,620
They concentrate
on the conversation
445
00:28:23,724 --> 00:28:27,000
between the pilot and the Helios
engineer shortly after takeoff.
446
00:28:29,034 --> 00:28:31,793
As the plane passed
through 37-hundred meters,
447
00:28:31,896 --> 00:28:33,448
an alarm sounded in the cockpit.
448
00:28:33,551 --> 00:28:36,724
Operations,
this is flight 522. Over.
449
00:28:36,827 --> 00:28:40,172
Flight 522,
what can I do for you?
450
00:28:40,275 --> 00:28:43,793
We have a takeoff
config warning on.
451
00:28:43,896 --> 00:28:45,000
Pardon?
452
00:28:45,103 --> 00:28:48,758
Our takeoff
config warning is on.
453
00:28:48,862 --> 00:28:51,827
Usually,
the takeoff config warning
454
00:28:51,931 --> 00:28:53,517
is only triggered
on the runway,
455
00:28:53,620 --> 00:28:56,034
but wreckage recovered
at the crash site
456
00:28:56,137 --> 00:28:58,724
reveals no problems
with the plane's flaps,
457
00:28:58,827 --> 00:29:01,931
landing gear or anything else
that could trigger the alarm.
458
00:29:04,620 --> 00:29:05,931
So why had it sounded?
459
00:29:09,862 --> 00:29:13,241
Chief investigator Akrivos
Tsolakis focuses on a small
460
00:29:13,344 --> 00:29:16,000
control panel found in the
wreckage of the ravaged jet.
461
00:29:16,103 --> 00:29:21,931
Are you sure this is
the way it was found?
462
00:29:22,034 --> 00:29:23,241
It hasn't been moved at all?
463
00:29:23,344 --> 00:29:25,655
We were lucky.
464
00:29:25,758 --> 00:29:28,206
Finding this panel which
had the switch
465
00:29:28,310 --> 00:29:31,172
on the manual
position was a major one.
466
00:29:31,275 --> 00:29:34,655
The P-5 pressurization
panel ensures that
467
00:29:34,758 --> 00:29:38,241
passengers have enough air to
breathe, even at high altitudes.
468
00:29:40,068 --> 00:29:43,448
Normally, pressurization
takes place automatically.
469
00:29:43,551 --> 00:29:45,896
As the jet climbs,
its engines force
470
00:29:46,000 --> 00:29:48,379
air into the plane as
they power it through the sky.
471
00:29:50,310 --> 00:29:53,517
But when the pressurization
switch is set to manual,
472
00:29:53,620 --> 00:29:56,034
both the captain
and co-pilot are responsible
473
00:29:56,137 --> 00:29:59,000
for maintaining the cabin
atmosphere using a controller.
474
00:29:59,103 --> 00:30:04,206
So explain again how
you tested the pressure.
475
00:30:04,310 --> 00:30:05,896
I went
into the cockpit.
476
00:30:06,000 --> 00:30:07,896
I turned the pressurization
switch to manual.
477
00:30:09,896 --> 00:30:11,965
Tsolakis learns
that during the early morning
478
00:30:12,068 --> 00:30:14,931
maintenance check on Helios 522,
479
00:30:15,034 --> 00:30:17,896
ground engineers had turned
the P-5 switch to manual.
480
00:30:19,068 --> 00:30:21,448
That allowed them to use
the onboard generators
481
00:30:21,551 --> 00:30:24,103
to test the pressure
seals on the plane's rear door
482
00:30:24,206 --> 00:30:25,689
without starting the engines.
483
00:30:27,000 --> 00:30:28,931
When the test was over,
484
00:30:29,034 --> 00:30:31,241
they didn't turn the switch
back to automatic.
485
00:30:31,344 --> 00:30:34,655
The procedure
of pressurizing the aircraft
486
00:30:34,758 --> 00:30:37,068
has to do with setting
the pressurization
487
00:30:37,172 --> 00:30:39,724
system from auto to manual.
488
00:30:39,827 --> 00:30:41,586
They were supposed to return
489
00:30:42,655 --> 00:30:45,482
the uh selector
to the auto position.
490
00:30:53,620 --> 00:30:57,103
Several hours later,
when the flight crew entered
491
00:30:57,206 --> 00:31:00,793
the cockpit, the pressurization
switch was still set to manual.
492
00:31:00,896 --> 00:31:06,172
It's bright today.
Are you almost through?
493
00:31:07,931 --> 00:31:09,241
Pardon?
494
00:31:09,344 --> 00:31:11,758
But neither the pilot
nor co-pilot saw it.
495
00:31:14,482 --> 00:31:17,551
As a result, after takeoff
the cabin would not pressurize
496
00:31:17,655 --> 00:31:22,793
automatically, and the higher
flight 522 climbed
497
00:31:22,896 --> 00:31:24,482
the thinner
the atmosphere became.
498
00:31:26,034 --> 00:31:28,172
Not turning the switch
back to automatic
499
00:31:28,275 --> 00:31:30,103
was a deadly hidden danger.
500
00:31:30,206 --> 00:31:34,310
Are you sure this
is the way it was found?
501
00:31:34,413 --> 00:31:35,689
It hasn't been moved at all?
502
00:31:35,793 --> 00:31:39,517
Tsolakis believes
this panel could be
503
00:31:39,620 --> 00:31:41,931
the key to the disaster.
504
00:31:42,034 --> 00:31:44,793
Leaving one switch on manual
could have led to all
505
00:31:44,896 --> 00:31:46,517
the other problems
the plane faced.
506
00:31:48,931 --> 00:31:52,655
To prove he's right,
he takes an unusual step.
507
00:31:52,758 --> 00:31:55,896
Four months after the disaster,
he takes an Olympic Airlines
508
00:31:56,000 --> 00:31:59,103
737 on the same route
flown by the Helios jet.
509
00:32:00,482 --> 00:32:03,000
If he's right about what
caused the crash,
510
00:32:03,103 --> 00:32:06,310
this plane should react exactly
like the doomed airliner did.
511
00:32:06,413 --> 00:32:09,344
Are we ready to go?
512
00:32:09,448 --> 00:32:13,827
When there is a
complicated accident like this,
513
00:32:13,931 --> 00:32:17,862
I think reenact, reenactments
should, should be performed.
514
00:32:17,965 --> 00:32:21,068
Of course it's expensive to
have a jetliner flying
515
00:32:21,172 --> 00:32:27,793
for three or four hours but it
is worth it if you have to come
516
00:32:27,896 --> 00:32:33,068
with some results which benefit
to the overall investigation.
517
00:32:36,965 --> 00:32:45,068
Make sure the P-5 is
set to manual. It's hard to see.
518
00:32:45,172 --> 00:32:46,448
In the cockpit,
519
00:32:46,551 --> 00:32:50,896
Tsolakis has the crew turn the
pressurization switch to manual.
520
00:32:51,000 --> 00:32:54,413
A green light indicates it's
no longer on automatic
521
00:32:54,517 --> 00:32:56,896
but in the bright glare
of an early morning departure
522
00:32:57,000 --> 00:32:58,413
the light is hard to see.
523
00:33:01,551 --> 00:33:03,689
As the reenactment
flight climbs,
524
00:33:03,793 --> 00:33:05,931
oxygen is thinning
quickly in the aircraft.
525
00:33:07,827 --> 00:33:10,172
The same thing
happened on the Helios flight,
526
00:33:10,275 --> 00:33:11,310
triggering an alarm.
527
00:33:15,482 --> 00:33:17,172
What is it?
528
00:33:17,275 --> 00:33:18,517
The takeoff
config warning?
529
00:33:18,620 --> 00:33:23,896
The alarm sounded and
that alarm was misinterpreted.
530
00:33:24,000 --> 00:33:29,689
Most of the flight crew
they will never face
531
00:33:29,793 --> 00:33:34,655
an alarm with non-pressurization
in all of their flight career
532
00:33:34,758 --> 00:33:35,931
because it's a rare event.
533
00:33:37,241 --> 00:33:39,068
Tsolakis
confirms that the alarm went off
534
00:33:39,172 --> 00:33:42,172
because of the dangerously low
air pressure in the aircraft.
535
00:33:42,275 --> 00:33:44,655
But he also discovers that
the sound itself is
536
00:33:44,758 --> 00:33:47,034
identical to the takeoff
config warning.
537
00:33:47,137 --> 00:33:49,413
We have a takeoff
config warning on.
538
00:33:49,517 --> 00:33:53,448
But even if the flight
crew did misinterpret
539
00:33:53,551 --> 00:33:56,413
the first alarm, they still had
another chance to determine
540
00:33:56,517 --> 00:33:59,000
what the real problem was.
541
00:33:59,103 --> 00:34:02,517
At almost 5-thousand meters,
the plane's master caution
542
00:34:02,620 --> 00:34:05,344
light flashed on and stayed
on for almost a minute.
543
00:34:05,448 --> 00:34:08,241
We now have a
master caution.
544
00:34:08,344 --> 00:34:11,517
But once again
the pilots misinterpreted
545
00:34:11,620 --> 00:34:12,689
the cause of the alarm.
546
00:34:14,482 --> 00:34:16,896
The master caution light can
indicate that the plane's
547
00:34:17,000 --> 00:34:19,206
systems are overheating.
548
00:34:19,310 --> 00:34:24,448
But it can also tell pilots
the oxygen masks are down.
549
00:34:24,551 --> 00:34:27,344
In this case, it
was doing both at the same time.
550
00:34:30,103 --> 00:34:31,379
But since the crew didn't think
551
00:34:31,482 --> 00:34:33,620
they were having
pressurization problems,
552
00:34:33,724 --> 00:34:35,862
they focused on
the plane's cooling systems.
553
00:34:35,965 --> 00:34:40,448
The alarm
about the non-cooling
554
00:34:40,551 --> 00:34:44,620
was a side effect
of non-pressurization.
555
00:34:44,724 --> 00:34:49,620
Actually it was not really that
there was a high temperature
556
00:34:49,724 --> 00:34:55,482
inside the avionics bay,
but it was the sensors
557
00:34:55,586 --> 00:34:58,310
that were supposed to measure
the temperature
558
00:34:58,413 --> 00:35:01,827
and the pressure in that area
sensed that something was wrong.
559
00:35:01,931 --> 00:35:05,724
On the recreation
flight,
560
00:35:05,827 --> 00:35:08,068
investigators monitor
instruments recording
561
00:35:08,172 --> 00:35:11,689
the same events occurring
onboard their aircraft.
562
00:35:11,793 --> 00:35:12,965
At the same time,
563
00:35:13,068 --> 00:35:15,655
they also begin to feel the
effects of the lack of oxygen.
564
00:35:15,758 --> 00:35:19,758
The first feelings
you'd start to have
565
00:35:19,862 --> 00:35:21,517
were your ears would pop
566
00:35:21,620 --> 00:35:23,551
and you'd start feeling
pressure in your sinuses.
567
00:35:23,655 --> 00:35:28,551
Uh as you climb higher,
you begin to feel almost giddy.
568
00:35:28,655 --> 00:35:30,862
It's almost like having
a couple of drinks of alcohol.
569
00:35:30,965 --> 00:35:34,241
The dwindling oxygen
levels could also help
570
00:35:34,344 --> 00:35:36,689
explain some of the crews'
bizarre behavior.
571
00:35:36,793 --> 00:35:41,586
Such as,
when the ground engineer
572
00:35:41,689 --> 00:35:43,620
asked about pressurization...
573
00:35:43,724 --> 00:35:44,379
Can you
confirm that
574
00:35:44,482 --> 00:35:47,689
the pressurization panel
is set to auto?
575
00:35:47,793 --> 00:35:50,724
Captain Merten
ignores the question
576
00:35:50,827 --> 00:35:52,793
and responds with one
of his own.
577
00:35:52,896 --> 00:35:57,827
Where are my equipment
cooling circuit breakers?
578
00:35:57,931 --> 00:35:59,931
You really don't
notice it at first.
579
00:36:00,034 --> 00:36:03,310
It's amazing how subtle it
can be in the early phases.
580
00:36:03,413 --> 00:36:05,724
They'd start feeling dizzy.
581
00:36:05,827 --> 00:36:09,379
They'd begin to lose
the ability to think coherently.
582
00:36:09,482 --> 00:36:13,448
In a way it
traps you in the situation.
583
00:36:13,551 --> 00:36:15,655
You can't react to anything.
584
00:36:15,758 --> 00:36:17,206
Eventually,
you're gonna lose consciousness.
585
00:36:20,517 --> 00:36:22,724
Tsolakis believes
that the captain may have been
586
00:36:22,827 --> 00:36:25,655
checking on the circuit
breakers behind his seat
587
00:36:25,758 --> 00:36:29,551
when he and the co-pilot
finally ran out of air.
588
00:36:29,655 --> 00:36:33,241
And, unlike in the cabin,
the oxygen masks in the cockpit
589
00:36:33,344 --> 00:36:36,793
do not automatically deploy if
the atmosphere begins to thin.
590
00:36:36,896 --> 00:36:44,482
Helios 522,
can you hear me?
591
00:36:44,586 --> 00:36:47,482
On the other
side of the locked cockpit door,
592
00:36:47,586 --> 00:36:49,000
no one in the cabin
would have known
593
00:36:49,103 --> 00:36:51,034
that the plane was now
flying itself.
594
00:36:52,482 --> 00:36:53,758
Nor would they have
realized that
595
00:36:53,862 --> 00:36:56,896
a limitation of the passenger
oxygen system had sealed
596
00:36:57,000 --> 00:36:58,655
the fate of everyone
in the cabin.
597
00:37:00,379 --> 00:37:02,586
Passenger masks
are supplied by a chemical
598
00:37:02,689 --> 00:37:06,758
generator above their seats,
but the generators only produce
599
00:37:06,862 --> 00:37:09,310
enough oxygen to last
about twelve minutes.
600
00:37:09,413 --> 00:37:15,103
Well the problem
with the passenger masks
601
00:37:15,206 --> 00:37:18,862
is for one thing they're not
designed to keep you
602
00:37:18,965 --> 00:37:21,172
oxygenated at a high altitude.
603
00:37:21,275 --> 00:37:24,275
What they're designed to do is
give you enough oxygen
604
00:37:24,379 --> 00:37:25,758
so that you can survive
605
00:37:25,862 --> 00:37:28,793
until the pilots get the
airplane down to a low altitude.
606
00:37:28,896 --> 00:37:31,103
In almost every event where
we've had a decompression,
607
00:37:31,206 --> 00:37:32,344
that's been perfectly adequate.
608
00:37:32,448 --> 00:37:36,137
For those who
did put their masks on,
609
00:37:36,241 --> 00:37:38,655
they would have remained
conscious for several minutes
610
00:37:38,758 --> 00:37:40,068
until their oxygen ran out.
611
00:37:41,275 --> 00:37:42,965
Then they too would
have passed out.
612
00:37:43,068 --> 00:37:47,172
Once you get
up to 34-thousand feet,
613
00:37:47,275 --> 00:37:48,793
you're talking useful
consciousness
614
00:37:48,896 --> 00:37:50,172
of thirty to sixty seconds.
615
00:37:51,862 --> 00:37:55,241
Most of the people, once
the hypoxia begins to cause them
616
00:37:55,344 --> 00:37:57,482
to lose consciousness,
they're just gonna go to sleep.
617
00:37:57,586 --> 00:38:03,379
Without a flight crew,
618
00:38:03,482 --> 00:38:07,206
Helios 522 would have continued
to Athens on autopilot.
619
00:38:08,379 --> 00:38:10,448
When the crew didn't
take control,
620
00:38:10,551 --> 00:38:12,793
the autopilot would have
put the jet in a holding
621
00:38:12,896 --> 00:38:14,310
pattern as it
flew over the airport.
622
00:38:20,655 --> 00:38:23,172
Exactly the same thing will
happen on the reconstruction
623
00:38:23,275 --> 00:38:25,241
flight if cabin pressure
isn't restored.
624
00:38:25,344 --> 00:38:29,241
Tsolakis asks
the co-pilot to reset
625
00:38:29,344 --> 00:38:32,689
the P-5 panel to auto before
the jet continues to climb
626
00:38:32,793 --> 00:38:35,793
to its cruising altitude of just
over 10-thousand metres.
627
00:38:38,137 --> 00:38:41,551
Then, as it approaches
Athens, Tsolakis also has
628
00:38:41,655 --> 00:38:45,724
an F-16 shadow the jet
performing the recreation.
629
00:38:45,827 --> 00:38:48,068
He wants to confirm that it
was Andreas Prodromou
630
00:38:48,172 --> 00:38:51,379
at the controls of flight 522
when it went down.
631
00:38:51,482 --> 00:38:57,241
We dressed
one of our guys
632
00:38:57,344 --> 00:38:59,758
with the uniform of the steward.
633
00:38:59,862 --> 00:39:02,965
He came in,
he sat on the captain's chair,
634
00:39:03,068 --> 00:39:05,793
and the F-16 was looking at him.
635
00:39:05,896 --> 00:39:08,310
He was confirming that it
was exactly what
636
00:39:08,413 --> 00:39:10,068
he saw on the accident plane.
637
00:39:10,172 --> 00:39:15,068
The reconstruction
also answers another
638
00:39:15,172 --> 00:39:18,103
question about the tragic
fate of Helios Flight 522.
639
00:39:20,896 --> 00:39:22,275
The cockpit voice recorder
640
00:39:22,379 --> 00:39:24,896
picked up several
strange noises.
641
00:39:25,000 --> 00:39:27,517
They're heard just before
Prodromou enters the cockpit.
642
00:39:31,620 --> 00:39:34,896
Tsolakis confirms that these
sounds were made by Prodromou
643
00:39:35,000 --> 00:39:37,931
using the electronic keypad
to unlock the cockpit door.
644
00:39:38,034 --> 00:39:43,655
We confirmed all
those items and during the
645
00:39:43,758 --> 00:39:48,137
reenactment flight and it
was very, very useful.
646
00:39:48,241 --> 00:39:52,344
It filled a lot of gaps we had.
647
00:39:52,448 --> 00:39:53,482
Okay, take it down.
648
00:39:53,586 --> 00:39:59,896
For chief
investigator Tsolakis,
649
00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:03,000
the reenactment flight
has been convincing.
650
00:40:03,103 --> 00:40:05,862
There was no dramatic
cabin failure.
651
00:40:05,965 --> 00:40:09,379
Instead, a series of small
mistakes and misunderstandings
652
00:40:09,482 --> 00:40:12,379
had led to the worst air
disaster in Greek history.
653
00:40:18,068 --> 00:40:20,275
Fifteen months after the crash,
654
00:40:20,379 --> 00:40:22,172
Greek authorities
release the official
655
00:40:22,275 --> 00:40:27,379
report on Helios Airways Flight
522, but mysteries remain.
656
00:40:29,551 --> 00:40:31,068
What was happening in the cabin
657
00:40:31,172 --> 00:40:33,793
while the doomed airplane
flew towards Athens.
658
00:40:35,034 --> 00:40:37,862
And why was Andreas Prodromou
the only one
659
00:40:37,965 --> 00:40:39,655
conscious at the very end.
660
00:40:39,758 --> 00:40:50,689
The crash of
Helios Flight 522 was the worst
661
00:40:50,793 --> 00:40:53,034
disaster in the history
of Greek aviation.
662
00:40:54,517 --> 00:40:57,172
Like many crashes,
it was a fatal combination
663
00:40:57,275 --> 00:40:59,931
of mechanical problems,
and human error.
664
00:41:01,655 --> 00:41:04,689
The final accident report
details a tragic series of
665
00:41:04,793 --> 00:41:07,758
oversights and false assumptions
made by the flight crew.
666
00:41:09,000 --> 00:41:11,827
Problems that could have been
easily prevented turned
667
00:41:11,931 --> 00:41:15,413
deadly for all 1-hundred
and twenty-one people onboard.
668
00:41:15,517 --> 00:41:18,793
Where are my equipment
cooling circuit breakers?
669
00:41:22,517 --> 00:41:25,586
Behind the captain's
seat. Can you see them?
670
00:41:25,689 --> 00:41:33,413
But what the final
report does not do is
671
00:41:33,517 --> 00:41:35,896
explain what happened
in the cabin of the plane.
672
00:41:37,103 --> 00:41:40,137
What actions did the flight
attendants take?
673
00:41:40,241 --> 00:41:43,103
And why was Andreas Prodromou
still conscious
674
00:41:43,206 --> 00:41:44,758
after almost three hours?
675
00:41:47,827 --> 00:41:51,413
Interviews with Helios safety
instructors and crew members
676
00:41:51,517 --> 00:41:53,931
paint a tragic picture of what
may have occurred.
677
00:41:54,034 --> 00:41:58,275
Everyone,
please your masks on.
678
00:41:58,379 --> 00:42:01,344
We're not sure what the trouble
is but remain calm
679
00:42:01,448 --> 00:42:02,689
and please remain seated.
680
00:42:04,413 --> 00:42:07,344
Prodromou was sitting
at the back of the cabin.
681
00:42:07,448 --> 00:42:09,034
When the oxygen masks fell,
682
00:42:09,137 --> 00:42:12,413
he would have waited for
instructions from the cockpit.
683
00:42:12,517 --> 00:42:14,896
The flight attendants sitting
at the front of the plane would
684
00:42:15,000 --> 00:42:18,103
have done the same, but none of
them would have waited forever.
685
00:42:18,206 --> 00:42:22,448
We made it
an issue at Helios
686
00:42:22,551 --> 00:42:25,517
to uh
to emphasize that cabin crew
687
00:42:25,620 --> 00:42:29,413
should not entirely depend
on their procedures,
688
00:42:29,517 --> 00:42:30,965
but to think on their feet
689
00:42:31,068 --> 00:42:34,000
and to adapt to any
impending situation.
690
00:42:34,103 --> 00:42:36,862
In most
depressurizations,
691
00:42:36,965 --> 00:42:39,344
the plane descends quickly.
692
00:42:39,448 --> 00:42:42,000
But as minutes
passed on the Helios flight,
693
00:42:42,103 --> 00:42:43,689
the plane continued to climb.
694
00:42:45,068 --> 00:42:46,862
Unsure of what was going on,
695
00:42:46,965 --> 00:42:49,517
Prodromou would have tried
to contact the flight crew.
696
00:42:49,620 --> 00:42:52,241
Captain?
Captain Merten?
697
00:42:52,344 --> 00:42:54,241
But he gets
no response.
698
00:42:54,344 --> 00:42:55,758
Can you give us
an update please
699
00:42:55,862 --> 00:43:01,965
With no word from the
cockpit, he would have soon
700
00:43:02,068 --> 00:43:04,862
realized that this was not
a typical depressurization.
701
00:43:04,965 --> 00:43:07,793
When there was no
call out from the cockpit
702
00:43:07,896 --> 00:43:10,206
and the aircraft didn't
start an emergency descent,
703
00:43:10,310 --> 00:43:11,793
there was absolutely no
protocol.
704
00:43:11,896 --> 00:43:13,379
It would be,
they would be winging it.
705
00:43:13,482 --> 00:43:16,413
By now,
Prodromou must have felt
706
00:43:16,517 --> 00:43:19,068
that something
was terribly wrong.
707
00:43:19,172 --> 00:43:22,724
But to find out what the problem
was he had to leave his seat.
708
00:43:22,827 --> 00:43:26,275
The oxygen available
on a 737 is of course
709
00:43:26,379 --> 00:43:27,379
the drop-down oxygen.
710
00:43:27,482 --> 00:43:29,655
Ten percent of those
masks are available
711
00:43:29,758 --> 00:43:33,068
for the crew in case
of a de-pressurization incident.
712
00:43:33,172 --> 00:43:35,206
There are extra
masks per every seat row.
713
00:43:35,310 --> 00:43:39,862
Taking advantage
of the extra passenger masks,
714
00:43:39,965 --> 00:43:42,655
he could have made his way
to the front of the plane,
715
00:43:42,758 --> 00:43:45,068
a process cabin crew called
monkey swinging.
716
00:43:47,965 --> 00:43:51,241
But if more than twelve minutes
had passed, his girlfriend
717
00:43:51,344 --> 00:43:53,379
and the other flight attendant
may have still been
718
00:43:53,482 --> 00:43:57,448
in their seats and, like the
passengers, overcome by hypoxia.
719
00:44:00,896 --> 00:44:02,862
But Prodromou was a scuba diver
720
00:44:02,965 --> 00:44:06,517
and a former soldier
in the Cypriot special forces.
721
00:44:06,620 --> 00:44:09,724
His training may have helped him
to stay alert a little longer.
722
00:44:11,517 --> 00:44:14,275
Andreas
was not a coward.
723
00:44:14,379 --> 00:44:19,241
He was a brave person,
fearless, brave and very calm.
724
00:44:19,344 --> 00:44:25,896
But to survive after
the passenger oxygen system
725
00:44:26,000 --> 00:44:28,448
stopped working,
he needed another solution.
726
00:44:29,586 --> 00:44:33,931
The 737 had four
portable oxygen bottles.
727
00:44:34,034 --> 00:44:35,931
Each one could last
more than an hour.
728
00:44:37,413 --> 00:44:40,724
All four bottles were
found at the crash site.
729
00:44:40,827 --> 00:44:42,689
Three of them
appeared to have been used.
730
00:44:43,965 --> 00:44:46,758
While the F-16 pilot saw
Prodromou in the cockpit
731
00:44:46,862 --> 00:44:48,551
just before the crash,
732
00:44:48,655 --> 00:44:50,655
it may not have been
the first time he had gone in.
733
00:44:51,931 --> 00:44:53,344
As he did at the end
of the flight,
734
00:44:53,448 --> 00:44:56,517
he could have used the security
code to unlock the door earlier.
735
00:44:56,620 --> 00:45:04,827
The procedure would
be to enter the flight deck
736
00:45:04,931 --> 00:45:07,965
via the cockpit door,
737
00:45:08,068 --> 00:45:15,137
initially to bang on the door
and then if no response is
738
00:45:15,241 --> 00:45:19,586
forthcoming to enter the code
and enter the flight deck.
739
00:45:19,689 --> 00:45:23,551
During the accident
investigation,
740
00:45:23,655 --> 00:45:26,655
DNA was discovered on an oxygen
mask in the cockpit
741
00:45:26,758 --> 00:45:28,896
that matched the co-pilot's.
742
00:45:29,000 --> 00:45:31,862
It's possible Prodromou used it
to try and revive him.
743
00:45:33,517 --> 00:45:37,379
You can still
revitalize somebody
744
00:45:37,482 --> 00:45:39,689
for quite an extended
period of time if you
745
00:45:39,793 --> 00:45:42,862
get to them before major brain
damage has set in, and that's
746
00:45:42,965 --> 00:45:47,620
somewhat a variable situation
depending on the person,
747
00:45:47,724 --> 00:45:51,137
depending on how long they're
exposed to high altitude.
748
00:45:51,241 --> 00:45:54,827
But if he was
in the cockpit earlier,
749
00:45:54,931 --> 00:45:55,862
why did he leave?
750
00:45:57,206 --> 00:45:58,310
No one will ever know.
751
00:45:58,413 --> 00:46:02,931
He probably was
a little bit disoriented,
752
00:46:03,034 --> 00:46:04,379
a little bit confused.
753
00:46:04,482 --> 00:46:06,793
He's reacting a lot
slower than he normally would.
754
00:46:06,896 --> 00:46:10,655
What was
his state of mind?
755
00:46:10,758 --> 00:46:12,413
What was his physical condition?
756
00:46:12,517 --> 00:46:15,620
We think that he knew what
was really the problem
757
00:46:15,724 --> 00:46:18,965
but is that the real situation?
758
00:46:19,068 --> 00:46:20,344
It's a real question.
759
00:46:20,448 --> 00:46:24,448
After three
hours in the air,
760
00:46:24,551 --> 00:46:26,655
everyone who
didn't have bottled oxygen
761
00:46:26,758 --> 00:46:28,896
would have been unconscious.
762
00:46:29,000 --> 00:46:33,379
As it approached Athens, flight
522 was now a ghost plane.
763
00:46:37,827 --> 00:46:41,241
Most of the victims,
764
00:46:41,344 --> 00:46:44,344
uh they probably still had
heartbeats when the airplane
765
00:46:44,448 --> 00:46:47,758
crashed but almost certainly
were in an irreversible coma.
766
00:46:47,862 --> 00:46:52,172
Hypoxia is no more
painful than falling asleep,
767
00:46:54,241 --> 00:46:55,655
but for Andreas Prodromou
768
00:46:55,758 --> 00:46:57,482
the flight must have been
a nightmare.
769
00:47:01,620 --> 00:47:04,241
As the F-16s
roared to meet the jet,
770
00:47:04,344 --> 00:47:06,172
and with his oxygen running out,
771
00:47:06,275 --> 00:47:09,000
he must have known that
he too was almost out of time.
772
00:47:10,413 --> 00:47:16,689
Yet, to the very end
he didn't give up.
773
00:47:16,793 --> 00:47:23,206
Prodromou made one last
attempt to save the plane.
774
00:47:23,310 --> 00:47:26,448
When he returns to the cockpit,
the young flight attendant
775
00:47:26,551 --> 00:47:29,000
who dreamed of becoming
a pilot calls for help.
776
00:47:30,206 --> 00:47:32,068
But no one can hear him,
777
00:47:32,172 --> 00:47:35,103
probably because the radio
was still tuned to Larnaka,
778
00:47:35,206 --> 00:47:38,620
the airport on Cyprus where
the flight had taken off.
779
00:47:38,724 --> 00:47:41,931
Fighting hypoxia and struggling
to control an airplane
780
00:47:42,034 --> 00:47:44,275
larger than any
he had ever flown,
781
00:47:44,379 --> 00:47:47,965
Prodromou was in
an impossible situation.
782
00:47:48,068 --> 00:47:52,000
Even if he could have landed
the plane, it was now too late.
783
00:47:52,103 --> 00:47:55,000
Flight 522 was out
of time and fuel.
784
00:48:36,896 --> 00:48:40,241
There are pictures of Andreas
in Cyprus, in the cemetery
785
00:48:40,344 --> 00:48:43,448
where he and his girlfriend
Charis are buried side by side.
786
00:48:44,931 --> 00:48:50,896
As his father,
my son is in front of me.
787
00:48:52,620 --> 00:49:03,586
Wherever I go he is always
there. He left a very big gap.
788
00:49:07,965 --> 00:49:13,103
We will never get over it.
789
00:49:13,206 --> 00:49:15,827
There are pictures
in Greece too.
790
00:49:15,931 --> 00:49:19,965
On the hill north of Athens
where Helios flight 522 crashed,
791
00:49:20,068 --> 00:49:22,724
there are faded photographs
of many of those who died.
792
00:49:24,000 --> 00:49:26,862
Bleached by the brilliant
Mediterranean sun,
793
00:49:26,965 --> 00:49:29,827
they gaze over the rugged,
ancient terrain,
794
00:49:29,931 --> 00:49:33,068
silent witnesses to
one of the world's most bizarre
795
00:49:33,172 --> 00:49:35,000
and tragic airline disasters.
65177
Can't find what you're looking for?
Get subtitles in any language from opensubtitles.com, and translate them here.