All language subtitles for Mayday.S01E06.Fire.on.Board.1080p.AMZN.WEB-DL.DD+2.0.H.264-playWEB_track3_[eng]

3000.

We're not getting any oxygen.

We have the terrain alarm.

We are in an emergency.

In 1998,
off Canada's east coast,

a modern passenger jet
run by one of the world's
best airlines,

catches fire at 33,000 feet.

Swiss Air 111.
We are dumping fuel now

and we must land immediately.

In its final six minutes,

communications from the cockpit cease.

It's burning already!

Then the plane plummets
into the ocean.

229 people are dead.

What caused the fire
is a mystery.

Many of the vessels
reported to the Canadian Navy

vessels standing by on scene,
that they were finding bodies

and making repeated requests
for more body bags...

Now, after one
of the largest investigations
in aviation history,

the complete story behind
the loss of Swiss Air Flight 111
can finally be told.

It's a wake up call for
the entire airline industry

to ensure that what happened
aboard Swiss Air 111 would
never happen again.

This accident investigation
was a unique opportunity

to assess the materials
in airplanes.

The problem is not only
just the stuff that can burn,

but the fact you can't see it.

When you really
have fire on board,

the clock is running
against you.

September the 2nd, 1998,

Swiss Air Flight 111 prepares
to depart New York's

JFK International Airport
en route to Geneva, Switzerland.

The aircraft was a MacDonald
Douglas 11 or MD11,

a model first developed in 1986

as a highly automated
modern replacement

for the antiquated DC10.

It was considered one of the
most reliable passenger jets

in the skies,
and Swiss Air pilots

were among the world's
best-trained.

Okay, I have
to start checklist.

- Uh, Engine Anti Ice.
- Not required.

Roger. Not required.

Auto brakes.

Swiss Air 111'S pilots were
Captain Urs Zimmerman,

and First Officer Stephan Loew.

Swiss Air 111 hold short,
3-1 left.

Zimmerman encouraged
an easy-going atmosphere
in the cockpit,

but he was also known for his
by-the-book precision.

When not flying, he was
an instructor of new pilots

for Switzerland's
national airline.

Flaps and slats.

Flaps set 15 degrees.

Set at 15.

On board were 215 passengers,
12 crew and two pilots.

Most were French,
American, or Swiss.

23-year-old Stephanie Shaw
was on her way home

to her parents in Geneva.

Stephanie, uh, was blessed
in many ways.

She was physically
very attractive.

She was an intelligent girl.

The reason she went to New York
was that she had been invited

to become a member
of the world economic forum

which is based in Geneva,

and she wanted to have this trip
before she joined.

She was a darling.
She was an absolute darling.

8:18 PM.

Swiss Air 111 heavy,
clear for take-off.

Cleared for take-off.

Roger, Swiss Air 111.

For safety, the Swiss Air
pilots push the throttles

forward together
ensuring no single pilot
can botch a takeoff.

VR.

V2.

Swiss Air Flight 111 lifted
off and made her way Northeast,

toward the open Atlantic.

For the first 15 minutes
after takeoff,

there was no communication
from Swiss Air 111.

It was an unusual small detail

that would later
baffle investigators.

Well, it does happen, occasionally.

They'd not yet reached what
we call the North Atlantic
Track System

where then you're not usually
in radio contact.

So, I thought it was
a little abnormal,

but it appears it was just
nothing more than a mistake
in radio frequency.

When the guy dialed it in
and swapped over the radio,

he had put in the incorrect
frequency, and evidently,

they didn't make another attempt
at contacting someone.

It was strange.

And I agree with you.
It was kind of like, well,
that's interesting.

Atlantic air traffic
is handled by a remote centre

in Moncton,
New Brunswick, Canada.

Almost half an hour
after takeoff,

Captain Zimmerman made his first
communication with Moncton.

Moncton Centre,
Swiss Air 111 heavy.

Good... evening,
level 3-3-0.

Swiss Air 111 heavy,
Moncton Centre. Good evening.

Reports of occasional light
turbulence at all levels.

Moncton Swiss Air.

It was a perfectly
normal transatlantic crossing.

In First Class, Swiss Air
passengers were among the first

in the world to have
a personalised in-flight
entertainment network.

Though now common, the system
was an innovation in 1998.

Passengers could choose
their own movie,

browse the internet, and gamble.

They evaluated the market
and they thought

that introducing modern
in-flight entertainment system

combined with a gambling system

so that passengers actually
can use their credit card

and gamble during
long-range flights,

uh...

would make them more
attractive.

This luxury would be the
source of controversy to come.

Do you smell something?

Yeah. What is that?

Go have a look.
I'll take the controls.

Roger. You have control.

1st Officer Loew investigates

the area near
the air conditioner vent.

Harmless smoke traces
from air conditioning systems

are common on commercial jets.

I don't see anything, Urs.

And there's nothing
up there now.

You hailed for me, Captain?

Stephan and I were sure we
smelled smoke a few seconds ago.

Can you smell anything?

I smell it too, yeah.

Could you smell it in
the cabin before you came in?

No, definitely not.

They agree that
the air conditioner
was the likely culprit.

Can't see it
or smell it anymore.

Air conditioning, is it?
- Yes.

Please close it, thanks.

Behind the sealed panel,
the pilots could not see

that the problem
was getting worse.

Less than 45 seconds
after smoke disappeared

in the cockpit of Swiss Air 111,
it returned.

Zimmerman followed
Swiss Air procedure.

There it is again.- He made plans to divert

to the nearest place to land.

Find the closest place
to land, Stephan.

We'll need the Nav charts
from the library.

Also, weather data for the area.

Boston is close.

It's not doing well
at all up there.

Zimmerman radioed
air traffic control
in Moncton, New Brunswick.

Moncton Centre,
Swiss Air 111 heavy.
Good evening.

United 9-7-0 heavy,
Moncton Centre, good evening.

The controller
dealt with another aircraft

before responding
to Swiss Air.

Other aircraft calling
say again.

Swiss Air 111 heavy
is declaring Pan Pan Pan.

We have smoke in the cockpit,

uh, request... immediate return

to a convenient place,
I guess, Boston.

Pan Pan Pan
is an international term

used to notify air traffic
control of an urgent situation,

one step below declaring Mayday.

You say to Boston
you want to go?

I guess Boston...

We need first the weather there,

we are starting
a right turn here.

Swiss Air 111 heavy.

Swiss Air 111, roger.

And descend to flight
level 3-1-0.

3-1-0, 3-1-0.

Swiss Air 1-1-1 heavy.

This is the first interview
with one of the air traffic
controllers in Moncton.

My name is Bill Pickrell
and on September, 1998,

September 2nd, 1998,
I was one of two Halifax

terminal controllers working
the evening shift.

The "pan" in any kind
of a special condition

is usually dealt with
as an emergency

and this in fact was dealt
with that way.

The aircraft was immediately
given priority

and the high level supervisor
initiated a call

to the rescue
coordination centre.

Pickrell's colleague
determined that Swiss Air 111

was just 66 nautical miles from
Halifax, and 300 from Boston.

But Captain Zimmerman had
chosen an airport he knew.

And a lot of times,
when you're having a problem,

you'd rather be dealing
with an issue

where you're much more familiar
with the airport,

because that relieves
a little stress on you.

That was his initial problem.
He's looking up there

and he's trying to think,
"I've got smoke here,
what does it mean?

Let's see, where is the closest
place I can go to

that I can talk
to a Swiss Air mechanic?

Boston."

Swiss Air 111 Centre.

Swiss Air 111 heavy,
go ahead.

Would you prefer
to go into Halifax?

Urs, we better put
the masks on.

Uh, standby.

Realizing their location,

Zimmerman decided Halifax
was now the best option.

Affirmative,
Swiss Air 111 heavy.

We prefer Halifax
from our position.

Swiss Air 111, roger,
proceed direct to Halifax,

descend now to flight
level two-niner-zero.

Level two-niner-zero
to Halifax, Swiss Air 111 heavy.

A British Airways pilot
in the area offered the crew

what little help he could.

Swiss Air 111 heavy
from Speedbird two-one-four,

I can give you the Halifax
weather if you like?

Swiss Air 111 heavy,

we have the oxygen masks on,
go ahead with the weather.

It's the 300
zulu weather...

- Swiss Air 111
commenced its descent
to below 30,000 feet,

the pilots calm
and in control.

It would take about 20 minutes
to reach Halifax.

...over.

Roger, Swiss Air 111 heavy.

We copy. Two-niner-eight-zero.

Swiss Air 111,
you're cleared to 10 000 feet

and the Halifax altimeter
is two-niner-eight-zero.

Swiss Air 111 heavy,
two-niner-eight-zero
at 10 000 feet.

And Swiss Air 111,
can you tell me what
your fuel on board is?

Stand by for this.

Speedbird one-five-zero-six

is at Tusky listening out.

Speedbird
one-five-zero-six, roger.

The controller
signed off with another
aircraft.

His jurisdiction was
high-altitude flights.

As Swiss Air was on descent
to Halifax,

he hands over responsibility
to Bill Pickrell.

At that point,
everything was normal.

I gave the pilot
an initial descent

and he requested to level off
at an intermediate altitude

to get the cabin in order
for the landing

which I took to mean
that they needed to pack away

dinner trays
and things like that.

It was an indication to me
that while his situation
was unusual,

that they weren't considering it
as an emergency at that time.

Watch your speed, Stephan,
don't descend too fast.

Roger.

Yes, Captain.

We have got smoke
in the cockpit here.

Have the cabin crew prepare
for landing,

we'll be setting down
in Halifax in about 20 minutes.

I'm about to start
the checklist here.

Yes, Captain Zimmerman.

Zimmerman had two checklists
for smoke in the cockpit.

To complete both will take
20 minutes.

This was Swiss Air
company policy.

In the meantime, Loew continued
the descent into Halifax.

Stephan, I'll need you
to handle the radio

while I go do this checklist.

One-one-niner, point-two for
the Swiss Air 1-1-1 heavy.

Swiss Air 111 was now
at about 25,000 feet.

Pickrell advises them
to descend to 3000.

But First Officer Loew says
he'd rather fly at 8000,

until the passenger cabin
was cleared.

Their attitude underscored the
sense of control in the cockpit.

From my point of view,
it gave all initial appearances

that it should be a fairly
straight forward operation,

assuming that
everything happened normally,

the aircraft would require
a minimum of handling

to lead them into Halifax.

Swiss Air 111,
you can descend to 3,

level off at
an intermediate altitude,
if you wish, just advise...

But Pickrell
was concerned the plane

was not coming down fast enough.

It appeared that the aircraft
might've been a little bit high

and I wanted to ensure
that the pilots were aware

of how far they were
from the airport,

how many miles they had to fly.

So that they could judge
their own descent

and make their decision
about what they wanted to do.

Roger. At the time we descend
to 8000 feet.

And we are clear anytime
to 3000 feet.

I keep you advised.

Okay. Can I vector you

to set up for runway zero-six
at Halifax?

Roger, vector for 6
will be fine.

Swiss Air 111 heavy.

Swiss Air 111 roger,
turn left heading 0-3-0.

Left heading 0-3-0
for Swiss Air 111 heavy.

Captain Zimmerman
needed information

for the unfamiliar airfield,

but his flight bag
was out of reach.

He summoned the flight
attendant to help.

- You hailed me, Captain?
- For two minutes now.

I need the flight bag there,

it's got the approach charts
for Halifax.

Get back to your crew.
- Yes, Captain.

This is your
Maitre de Cabin speaking.

The chief flight attendant
notified passengers that

the flight was being diverted.

There was no panic,
the plane was flying normally,

and there was no sign
of smoke in the cabin.

Swiss Air 111,
the localizer frequency

is one-zero-niner decimal niner.

You've got 30 miles
to fly to the threshold.

We're gonna need more
than 30 miles...

But still at more
than 20,000 feet,

Swiss Air 111 was too high
to make a landing

in just 30 miles.

The frequency
is one-zero-niner decimal niner
for the localizer.

Okay, roger. One-zero-niner
point niner,

and we are turning left
heading, uh... north.

Swiss Air 111 heavy.

We've got to dump fuel.

Agreed.

So far, communications from
Swiss Air have been calm.

Still, Moncton Center
initiated emergency efforts
at Halifax airport.

Preparing ground crews
for an emergency,

Pickrell sought information
from the pilots.

Swiss Air 111,
when you have time,

could I have the number
of souls on board

and your fuel on board please
for emergency services.

Roger, at this time, fuel
on board is two-three-zero tons.

We have to dump some fuel.

May we do that in this area
during descent?

Pickrell was
surprised to learn so late

that Swiss Air 111
needed to dump fuel.

At that point, it became more
of a complicated situation.

In fact, with every transmission
after that,

it became more and more
complicated.

Pickrell considered
his options for a safe place,

that wouldn't take the aircraft
too far from Halifax.

He decided to direct the plane
over St. Margaret's Bay,

about 30 miles
from the airport.

The other choice,
if he had said he needed
to stay close,

was to start the aircraft
in a right-hand turn

to set them up for any
of the other runways.

I had to keep them flying
in a circle or a constant track

so that he wouldn't fly back
into his own fuel

which would have been not good.

Dumping fuel
is standard procedure.

A fully fuelled passenger jet
is too heavy,

and could break up on landing.

But Co-Pilot Loew wondered if,
given their situation,

they might forgo
the regulations.

They want us to turn
to the south.

Should we just forget about
dumping and just land?

No, dump it.

Okay, we are able
for a left or right turn

to the south
in order to dump.

I initiated the vector back
toward St. Margaret's Bay

to start him in that direction.

It indicated to me that again

it wasn't a critical
situation on board

and in fact he did have time
to be able to go back

and dump his fuel
over the water.

Swiss Air 111, roger.

Turn left heading of
two-zero-zero degrees

and advise me when
you're ready to dump.

It will be about ten miles
before you are off the coast.

You will still be within
about 25 miles of the airport.

Roger,
we are turning left 2-0-0.

In that case,
we're going to descend

to only 10 000 feet
in order to dump the fuel.

Roger, maintain
one-zero-thousand.

I'll advise you when you
are over the water.

It will be very shortly.

Roger.

While Zimmerman continued
with his checklist,

Loew accidentally transmitted
to Bill Pickrell in Moncton.

Are you in the
emergency checklist

for air conditioning smoke?
- Yes.

Uh, Swiss Air 111,
say again please.

Sorry,
that was not for you.

Swiss Air 111
was asking internally.

Okay.

Airspeed is decreasing below
306, level off speed here?

Just fly the plane
as you see fit.

Swiss Air 111, continue left
heading 1-8-0,

you'll be off the coast
in about 15 miles.

Left heading
one-eight-zero, roger.

Swiss Air 111 and maintaining
at 10 000 feet.

Roger.

Cabin Bus off?

Cabin Bus off, roger.

The cabin bus switch
knocked out all the lighting
in the cabin.

It was an indication
for the passengers

that something was wrong,
but hardly alarming.

Ladies and gentlemen,
we have temporarily lost
the lights in the cabin.

Please, remain calm,
the crew will be coming around

with flashlights
to assist in landing.

Despite a cockpit
filled with smoke,

there was still no trace
in the passenger cabin.

You will be staying
within about 35, 40 miles
of the airport

if you have to get back
to the airport in a hurry.

Okay, that's fine with us.

Please tell us when we can
start to dump the fuel.

Suddenly, the aircraft
sent out a warning

that the smoke was a sign
of a more serious problem.

Autopilot disconnect.

Copy that,
autopilot disconnect.

Swiss Air 111...

The autopilot disconnected

because the plane's computers
sensed erratic readings.

In the next 90 seconds,
those readings went haywire.

11 000 and 9 000 feet!

Swiss Air 111, you can block

between 5 000 and 12 000
if you wish.

Once by one,
the instruments failed.

The calm in the cockpit
dissolved.

Copy that! We are between
12 and 5 000 feet.

We are declaring emergency now,

Swiss Air 111,
at time zero-one-two-four.

Then the two pilots spoke
simultaneously.

Combined with other distractions
in the control room,

Pickrell was unable to hear
a critical transmission:

Loew's declaration that they
must land immediately.

We are dumping fuel now.
We must land immediately!

Swiss Air 111,
just a couple more miles.
I'll be right with you.

Roger that.

We are declaring emergency now,
Swiss Air 111.

Missing this transmission
is a moment Bill Pickrell
relives today.

I'm not sure
that it's a feeling

that you can
adequately describe.

I recall reviewing the events
of that night

a thousand times to determine

if there was
something additionally

that I could have done or if
there was some mistake

that I might have made
or was there any way that
I contributed to this.

And eventually, I was able to
come to the point of realization

that there wasn't anything
that I could have done.

That... everything
that could have was done.

Now, there was nothing
to do but wait.

30 seconds after declaring
an emergency,

the pilots of Swiss Air 111
faced an inferno.

All my screens are down!

I'm flying on standby
instruments, maintaining 300.

Swiss Air 111, you are cleared
to commence your fuel dump

on that track and advise me
when your dump is complete.

Soon after I gave him
authorization

to commence the fuel dump,
there was no acknowledgement.

Initially, I wasn't concerned
by that because I considered

that he was probably
doing the fuel dump.

He was reviewing a checklist.

He was busy doing things,
and as per our training,

we're told not to bother
the pilots

in those kinds of situations.

Swiss Air 111, check.
You're cleared to start
the fuel dump.

There was no further
communication from the aircraft.

Six minutes later,
residents of Peggy's Cove

heard a devastating explosion.

No one knew what had happened
to 229 people

after six minutes of silence.

It was probably one
of the most helpless feelings

that any individual can have,

not being able to do anything,

but just sit and watch
the target

and hope that it would turn back
toward the airport.

And of course,
it didn't.

The following morning,
would-be rescuers

glimpsed the terrible remains
of Swiss Air 111.

Only one body
was discovered intact.

In Geneva, Ian Shaw
had a premonition

about his 23-year-old
daughter Stephanie.

That night, the night
on which she was due to return,

for reasons I can't explain
even now,

I was restless
and I was disturbed

and I slept early and woke

while my wife was still awake

and asked her if she had
had news of Stephanie.

No, she had not,
but she didn't expect
to have news of Stephanie,

we knew she was coming
on that flight

and that she would certainly
expect me to be at the airport

to fetch her in the morning.

I awoke around 6:00,
Geneva time,

and on television,
there was a report

of the crash of Swiss Air 111.

And I knew instantaneously that
we had lost our daughter.

Air traffic controller
Bill Pickrell was in shock.

It's a strange experience.

I'm not sure that
I can adequately express
the feelings. But it's...

You work to provide a service

and you read about aircraft
flying into a mountain

or ending up in a swamp
in some distant country,

but you never expect
that it's going to happen
in your backyard.

And when it does, it's...

...it's kind of
a lonely experience,
I guess, in one sense.

The Transportation
Safety Board of Canada

launched what would become the
largest disaster investigation

in the nation's history.

They only knew Swiss Air 111
experienced a cockpit fire,

but what caused it
remained a mystery.

Well, this accident
was a challenging one

to investigate
in that initially, of course,

we had to recover the aircraft
from about 55 metres of water,

around 185 feet.

Of course, it was also
in many pieces,

as it turns out,
it was in a couple
of million pieces.

So that was
the initial challenge.

And then after that, of course,

when you have so many pieces,
you need to determine

which are the relevant ones

and what are these pieces
telling you,

about what happened and why.

The TSB embarked
on a five-stage plan.

First, divers were deployed
to survey the wreckage.

They discover that the plane

was smashed into
millions of pieces.

But as the autumn
weather worsened,

the risks to divers increased.

At this rate, the salvage would
take years to complete.

Stage two.

With help from
the United States Navy,

Remote Operated Vehicles began
a more detailed search.

The ROV's helped investigators
survey the site.

But the question remained:

how to recover tiny pieces
of twisted metal

from the bottom of the sea.

We have to go through little
bits of airplane, pieces.

In Swiss Air, we had about
two million pieces of airplane

and we pretty much almost had
to look at them all,

because we had to discredit
certain things:

terrorists, bombs,
various other types of faults.

The TSB's investigators
finally got the breakthrough

they'd been seeking,
the black boxes.

Recordings of cockpit
and computer data

told investigators
that everything on the plane

was working perfectly
until the last few minutes.

When the crew declared
the Pan Pan Pan,

that they had smoke
in the cockpit,

after going through
all of these parameters,

we found no anomalies,
no problems in any
of the flight data

that suggested there was
a problem with the aircraft.

So this led us to believe

that the crew had a relatively
operational aircraft.

Aside from the smoke
in the cockpit that they noted,

everything else appeared
to be working fine.

And as they were making their
plan to descend the aircraft,

they experienced a series
of systems failures

that were in rapid succession
and exponential.

Copy that.
Autopilot disconnect.

Swiss Air 111,
we must fly manually now.

Mike Poole's CVR team
then faced a serious setback.

The last six minutes on both
flight recorders were missing.

You're losing systems rapidly
on the airplane

in that 90-second period when
things are happening very fast.

And one of the last things
we knew about

was the two recorders
went off-line.

So the fire has presumably
breached the lines,

breached the sources to these
recorders and has stopped them.

With the failure
of the black boxes,

investigators were no closer
to learning how, or where,

the fire started
on Swiss Air 111.

Stage Three.

Barges were deployed to scour
the seabed for evidence.

One by one, sad remnants of the
airplane reach the surface.

Her engines were recovered.

Then the landing gear.

These were among
the largest pieces

of Swiss Air 111
to be recovered.

The rest were mere fragments,

dredged up in a painfully
slow process.

Stage Four.

A nearby military hangar
provided a makeshift lab

for the growing team
of forensic investigators.

Representatives from
the American NTSB, Boeing,

Swiss Air, and the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police

joined in the search
for answers.

Pieces of Swiss Air 111
arrive by the truckload,

organised into various
categories for analysis.

Soon, the hangar was stacked
to capacity

with the biggest jigsaw
puzzle in aviation history.

All the investigators
knew for sure

was that an initially
small cockpit fire

suddenly turned to catastrophe.

The team sorted through
nearly 155 miles of wiring

retrieved from the wreckage
of Swiss Air 111.

Here, the first real clue.

Evidence of electrical arcing.

Scorch marks on metal reveal
that the source of the fire

was in the back
of the cockpit directly
behind the first officer.

By examining the aircraft's
wiring plans,

investigators found
a likely suspect:

the entertainment system
in first-class.

The system had some
major deficiencies.

It was getting very hot,

it drew a lot of power.

And thereby, for example,
raising the cabin temperature

considerably, because it was
always running.

They did not install
a simple off switch.

Nor did they install appropriate
cooling systems

to cool the system down.

The TSB's investigators
finally thought

they had the breakthrough
they'd been seeking.

Our report indicates
that there was a design flaw

in the way the in-flight
entertainment network installed

in the first-class and
business-class sections

of the aircraft were installed,

integrated into the electrical
system of the airplane.

When Captain Zimmerman
threw the cabin bus switch,

all power to the cabin should
have been switched off.

But the entertainment system
remained on, over-heating.

If you'd ask most pilots,
they would say,

"Well, if I pushed
the cabin bus switch,

it's going to turn off
the things behind the cockpit.

It's going to isolate
that electrically for me,

so that I don't have to worry
about that,

and then I can just concentrate
on those things

that might affect me
flying the airplane."

Well, it turns out
that this switch

was kind of bypassed,
in this case,

for this IFE
or entertainment system.

Swiss Air immediately disabled
the entertainment systems

on the rest of its fleet.

And the US National
Transportation Safety Board

ordered an inspection of
cockpit wiring on all MD-11s.

Unfortunately, this simple
solution proved insufficient.

By the time that cabin switch
was turned off,

the fire was well under way,

so that had no real bearing
on the initiation

or propagation of the fire
on the Swiss Air 111 aircraft.

But investigators determined
that the problem

with the entertainment
system alone

could not have brought down
Swiss Air 111.

The search for answers
continued.

Stage Five.

Undaunted, the TSB reconstructed
the MD-11 from the wreckage.

A wire-frame mock-up they call
"the jig" provided a spine

for placing tiny pieces
back where they once belonged.

The reconstruction revealed
that the fire spread

with alarming speed,
from the cockpit,

back into
the first-class galleys.

Some metal showed heat damage
from temperatures

as high as 600 degrees
centigrade.

As the investigation continued,

some argued that the actions
of the pilots

may have contributed
to the disaster.

Some experts charged
that Zimmerman and Loew's
by-the-book approach,

may have cost them their lives.

...Swiss Air 111
was asking internally.

Some operators emphasize,
in the very early stage,

land as soon as possible,

and then if you have time,
go into the checklist.

Others say: use the checklist,

and at the end
of the checklist,

if that doesn't help,
then land as soon as possible.

Pretty contradictory
to basic flying instructions

where student pilots

learn at a very early stage
that whenever you have smoke,

you have a fire and fire
means land as soon as possible.

Emergency light switch on.

Emergency light switch on.

Unfortunately, in this case,

the way the checklist
was written,

it didn't identify that,
"Now, start towards a divert."

It started more on,
"Let's try to see if we can
solve the problem."

And...

So now all of a sudden,

you're taking on a problem that
just kind of crept up on you.

You weren't expecting it.

We're gonna need more
than 30 miles...

But the TSB considered
the timeline.

Investigators determine
that Swiss Air 111

would not have made Halifax
airport under any circumstances.

There just wasn't enough time.

In our calculation...

we showed that starting
at the ideal decent point,

from 33,000 feet, which was

at about 10:14 PM that night,

it would take some 13 minutes

to get the airplane
onto the ground.

Which would take us to 10:27 PM.

By 10:24, the systems
in the aircraft

were starting to deteriorate.

So we believe that under
these circumstances,

the crew would not have been
able to successfully

land the airplane
under those conditions

with the amount of time
that they had.

Whatever caused the fire
on Swiss Air,

it happened at a lethal speed.

The mystery remained.

A year passed, then another
ambitious operation began.

The TSB hired a sophisticated
Dutch salvage ship,

Queen of the Netherlands.

The vessel has
a gigantic vacuum system,

capable of dredging
even the tiniest pieces

of Swiss Air 111
from the ocean floor.

A mixture of sea water,
silt and aircraft

were pumped into
the ship's hold.

This cargo was then pumped
into a specially-constructed
reservoir on shore.

When the water drained away,

investigators found another
million pieces of the aircraft.

Any one of them may have held
the clue to what caused
the catastrophic fire.

The pain-staking sorting
once again resumed.

Finally, after 15 months,

they found what
they'd been seeking:

A single faulty wire.

We looked at all of the
possible sources of heat

that might start a fire
in that area.

And in this instance,
we did discover a wire

that arced in that way
and right next to it

was some very flammable material

called Metalized Polyethylene
Terrathalate,

covering material, that covers
the insulation blankets.

This polyethylene insulate
which lined the MD-11

is common on commercial
airlines worldwide.

It has passed the industry's
flammability tests

that require materials
to self-extinguish

after a reasonable
period of time.

The investigation now took
an abrupt turn.

Instead of seeking
the cause of the fire,

the TSB now focussed
on the flammable materials
that fuelled it.

The thermo-acoustical
material that was

in this aircraft
was very flammable.

Even though it passed a test,

it does sustain and it does
propagate flame.

So this investigation did focus
on the flammability of materials

and the requirement
to reassess the criteria

that is used
to certify materials.

Not just thermal acoustical
insulation blanket materials,

but also other materials
that goes into aircraft,

much of it in hidden areas.

Investigators now
had their answer.

A wire arced in a closed
space behind the cockpit.

The arc ignited the insulation

which in turn
lit other materials,

such as foams and plastics.

The pilots could not sense how
quickly the fire intensified.

But 14 minutes after
they declared "pan pan pan",

the fire disabled
all electronics in the cockpit.

The black boxes went dead.

A forensic examination
also shed light

on the desperate
final minutes in the cockpit.

Loew was in his seat.
Captain Zimmerman was not.

Likely fighting the fire and
probably dead before impact.

The first officer was probably
trying to find a place

where he could put
this big airplane.

He just didn't have
a lot going for him.

He didn't have a lot
of instrumentation left.

And I'm sure he was
looking for something,

some indication that would
give him an idea

where he could put
the airplane down,

maybe even ditch the airplane.

What is known is that the
first officer was in his seat.

Whether he was unconscious,

conscious, maybe had severe
degree burns on his skin.

It's not known.

We know the captain
was not in his seat,

so very likely,
he was trying to fight the fire.

The checklists were found, uh...

...molten together, the pages.

It indicates they were used
to fight a fire.

At 10:30, Halifax time,
Loew shut down engine 2.

Investigators determined that
he probably received a warning

the engine was on fire.

Chillingly, it proved that Loew

was alive a minute
before impact.

They could not determine
whether the passengers

were aware of the fire, at least
until the very final moments.

There were traces found
of soot and smoke,

extending as far as the business
class, overhead area.

Whether... the passengers

had smelled the smoke,
it is not known.

DNA analysis showed that they
had no residue in their body.

The aircraft hit the water
with a force of 350 Gs.

The TSB spent
four and a half years

and 40 million US dollars

analyzing the wreckage
of Swiss Air 111,

the largest
air disaster investigation
in Canada's history.

Their conclusion:
Flammable materials

do not belong
on commercial aircraft.

The rate of progression
in this airplane, I think,

surprised us
and surprised others

and that's why
we emphasize again

the importance
of raising the bar

on the flammability standards

for materials used in airplanes.

Ian Shaw waited four years
for the report to reveal

the fatal flaw that took
the life of his daughter.

The truth has not diminished
his anger at Swiss Air.

There has to be
accountability.

If you are involved
in wrongdoing,

you must be held accountable.

And you must declare your
sense of responsibility.

Otherwise, you are hiding.

And you are hiding,
in this case,

behind the flag of Switzerland.
I think it's unbelievable.

In the aftermath,
Swiss Air decided to remove

the flammable insulate
from its entire fleet.

They also made changes
to checklist procedure,

reducing response time
in a cockpit smoke emergency.

Swiss Air did something
very interesting,

they modified their entire
Swiss Air 11 fleet

according to all these findings.

They built in cameras
and smoke detectors

even into hidden areas...

where pilots have
a little TV monitor

and they can see whenever
there is a smoke warning,

which makes them all
help gain time,

and that's most important
when you have a case of...

when you have a fire.

Plagued with
financial problems,

the mighty Swiss Air
shocked the industry

when it declared bankruptcy
in October, 2001.

The flammable insulation
that set Swiss Air ablaze

remains in two-thirds
of commercial airplanes today.

But not for very much longer.

The Metalized Polyethylene
Terrethalate material

has been essentially banned
from aircraft

and the criteria to certify
that kind of material

for use in airplanes
has been worked on.

It has not been
put into law as yet,

but we look forward
to that being done.

So the criteria
is more stringent.

The US Federal Aviation
Administration

has given a deadline of 2005

to remove the material
from all commercial aircraft.

This major overhaul
is designed to ensure

that what took place on Swiss
Air 111 will never happen again.

The industry is trying
to remove it,

but I don't think they're
removing it as quickly,

necessarily, as they could.

There's always that battle.

How expensive is it to do
something that's a replacement,

or are you going to replace it
in an airplane

that you're going to throw away
in another couple years.

We have to live within certain
economic realities.

For Ian Shaw,
losing his daughter

so suddenly and violently has
left a permanent emotional scar.

He left his wife and his wealth
behind in Geneva,

and now runs a modest
restaurant in Nova Scotia,

in view of the sea,
where his daughter died.

Why would I come here to this
particular point in Nova Scotia?

A lot of people have said,
"Oh yes, we fully understand,

you want to be close...

to your daughter and the point
where the plane crashed."

That is no part
of my being here.

Swiss Air ripped out of me

any possibility
of proximity to my daughter.

I found a comfort
in the awareness

of the presence
of the eternal ocean,

the ocean which has been going
backwards and forwards

for many, many, many thousands
and millions of years.

I came here because I had to.

Um, I...

I can't give a fully
rational declaration

to you of why I came here.

I can only say to you

I am in the right place
for the wrong reasons.

difuze