All language subtitles for Mayday.S01E05.Cutting.Corners.1080p.AMZN.WEB-DL.DD+2.0.H.264-playWEB_track3_[eng]

3000.

We're not getting any oxygen.

We have the terrain alarm.

We are in an emergency.

This is a true story.

The reconstructions are based

on original cockpit
voice recordings

and eyewitness accounts.

No family wants to lose...
a loved one.

A daughter, a son.

None of us think it's going
to happen to our family.

We read about
these horrible crashes,

and we think, "Thank God."
You know...

Chances are it won't
happen to us.

The odds are in our favour.

- You got it?
- Yeah!

- Well, what are you doing?
- It just got worse, okay?

In January 2000,
an Air Alaska jet

with 88 passengers and crew
suffered a catastrophic failure

that tore it from the sky.

A shocking chain of negligence
and error that led to disaster.

When a whistleblower mechanic
from the airline

tried to sound the alarm about
faulty maintenance procedures,

he was suspended
from his job.

The investigation exposes
deeply worrying shortcomings

in maintenance and regulation

that afflict
the airline industry.

It shows how a series
of devastating errors

combined to produce
a tragic accident,

one that could happen again...

- We're stalled.
- I can't release It!

Puerto Vallarta
is a popular holiday resort

on the Mexican Pacific coast,

one of several
Mexican destinations

served by Alaskan Airlines.

Colleen Werley went there
to celebrate a family birthday.

The 34-year-old
was a keen traveller

who spoke Spanish well and had
visited Mexico many times.

Colleen and the other
holiday-makers returning

from Puerto Vallarta
settle in for the 4-hour flight
to San Francisco.

In the warm afterglow
of their holidays,

they are looking to the future.

Colleen and her fiancé
Monty were planning

to start a family
later that year.

The pilots on flight 261
are very experienced.

Both Captain Ted Thompson,
and First Officer Bill Tansky

have thousands of hours
flying MD-80s.

They know the plane well.

The MD-83 is one of a successful
group of rear engine,

low-wing planes.

Originally launched in 1980,

over 1 100 were delivered
worldwide.

- Flaps.
- Check. Confirmed.

- Spoilers.
- Check. Armed.

But on the 31st
of January 2000,

as they prepared Flight 261,

Thompson and Tansky had no idea

that deep in the plane's tail
lay a critical weakness.

Colleen Werley
and her fiancé Monty

were planning their
forthcoming wedding.

They had announced their
engagement at Christmas time.

So it was a time for everybody
to sort of congratulate them

so we decided we'd have
a party for the family.

Abby Miller Bush had visited
Mexico with her husband Ryan

and their friends to celebrate
her new job at Microsoft.

It's hard to describe...

...how joyful a girl she was.

She was well known for
that care that she had in her.

A trait that you can't
put a value on.

Dean and I had been there
a lot together

and it was the first time
that he went without me.

Dean taught me how to play.

He was always up.
He told jokes a lot.

People described him
kind of as a puppy dog.

Alaska Airlines
was a successful carrier

with routes up and down
the west coast of America

and into Mexico.

Flight 261 left Puerto Vallarta
as a routine flight

with no hint
of the danger to come.

The devastating failure
that would bring catastrophe

to Flight 261 did not
come out of the blue.

In fact, it was the culmination
of a chain of mistakes

that began years earlier.

Maintenance procedures
at the company had come
under scrutiny

two years earlier
when a whistleblower

set off an investigation by the
Federal Aviation Administration.

But the day Flight 261
left Puerta Vallarta,

the investigation
was still underway,

and the whistleblower
suspended from his work.

Shortly after takeoff,
Captain Thompson

and First Officer Tansky
get the first sign of trouble.

The horizontal stabiliser
on the tail plane won't move.

The pilots carry out a standard
checklist to try and free it.

Stabiliser trim switch.

Normal.

Circuit breakers,
reset if tripped.

D-9, D-10, D-11 okay.

The stabiliser on the MD-83
is the 40-foot wide

horizontal surface
of the front of the tail.

It's like another wing.

Together with the elevators
at the rear of the tail,

the stabiliser is used
to adjust the angle

of the plane in flight.

The stabiliser was jammed.

Thompson and Tansky assumed
there was a fault

in the electric motors
that move it up and down.

They believed they could
fix the problem.

They had no idea
they were in great danger.

What they dealt with
was something that really
snuck up on them.

It was not supposed
to be a big deal.

If it had been,
they would've turned around

and gone back in to the Mexican
airfield they came out of.

But they were led down this road

of accepting this problem
as a small problem,

so it's perfectly alright
to troubleshoot it.

The pilots repeatedly
try the two switches

that operate the stabiliser:

The primary motor activated by
the switch on the control stick

known as the pickle switch

and the sliding suitcase handles
on the central console.

Either system operative?

- No.
- Both systems inoperative.

Consider stab jam,
do not use autopilot.

Check.

The jam stabiliser

is pushing the aircraft down
towards the ground.

At 28 500 feet, the pilots
switch off the autopilot

and fly the plane manually.

They have to pull back hard
on the control column

to lift the nose
of the plane up.

This requires
considerable effort.

The plane climbs
for the next seven minutes

to its cruising altitude
of 32 000 feet.

As they fly up the coast,
the pilots contact

Alaska maintenance
department for assistance.

Maintenance,
we need to know if any fault

like this got reported recently
for this aircraft.

And whether there are
any switches

that we might not be aware of

that could get those motors
turning again.

Roger 261. I...

have verified no history
on your aircraft

from the past thirty days.

Yeah, we didn't see anything
in the logbook.

Why don't you move
your seat forward

and I'll check this
pedestal back there.

Beyond that, I don't think
there's anything

we haven't checked.

I use the example...
the average layman, I think,
can understand.

If you try to start your car

and it doesn't crank,
you try jiggling the key

in the socket
and then try it again.

And I think the crew,
was probably understandably,

going through a lot of these.

"Well, maybe it'll work now,

or let's try this,
let's try that."

The pilots want to divert
to Los Angeles,

but Alaska Airline's dispatch,

co-ordinating the movements
of the company's planes,

is worried this will upset
the busy schedule.

261, dispatch.
Uh, if you want to land at LA,

of course, for safety reasons,
we will do that.

I'll tell you though,
if we land in LA,

we'll be looking
at probably an hour,

an hour and a half.
We got a major flow problem
going right now.

Well, boy, you really put me
in a spot up here.

I don't want to hear
that the flow is the reason
you're calling

because I'm concerned about
overflying suitable airports.

Well, we wanna do what's safe,

so if that's what
you feel is safe,

just wanna make sure
you have all the info.

We might ask if they have

a ground school
instructor available,

we could discuss it with him.
And a simulator instructor.

Dispatch 261.

We're wondering
if we can get some support

out of the instructors up there.

Thompson and Tansky
now ask for a pilot instructor

who might know the solution
to their unusual problem.

Stand by.

As they wait for a reply,

their frustration begins
to show.

Just... drives me nuts,
you know?

Not that I want
to go on about it. But...

It just blows me away.
They think we're gonna land,

they're gonna fix it, now
they're worried about the flow.

Well, I'm sorry...

They're putting
pressure on you.

Well, no... Yeah.

The pilots need to think
about what will happen

when they descend for landing.

How will the plane behave?

Will they be able to control it?

But several minutes after
requesting help from the ground,

they are getting no advice.

As Flight 261 approached
Los Angeles off the coast,

the problems on board were
about to get far worse.

The pilots on the crippled
Air Alaska Flight 261

are flying manually
at 32 000 feet

in a plane that has
a jammed stabiliser

that is forcing
the plane's nose down.

The pilots have another go

at freeing up
the jammed stabiliser.

They switch on both the electric
motors that control it.

This'll click it off.

Holy...

You got it?
- Yeah! What are you doing?

It clicked off!

From 31 000 feet,
Flight 261 plunges down

for over a minute,
the crew battle for control.

It just got worse, okay.

We're stalled.

At first, they pull back
on the control columns

to fight the dive.

But then, the pilots push
the aircraft's nose down

into the dive to regain control.

It's a risky manoeuvre,
pushing the plane's speed

to 350 miles an hour.

You gotta release it,
ya gotta release it.

The pilots slowly bring
the plane out of its dive

and back under control.

Let's get speedbrakes.

Give me high pressure pumps.
- Okay.

Help me back, help me back.

Okay.

Centre Alaska, 261,

we are in a dive here.

I've lost control,
vertical pitch.

Alaska 261,
say again, sir.

Yeah, we're out of
26 000 feet.

We are in a vertical dive,
not a dive yet,

but we've lost vertical control
of our airplane.

Just help me.

Once we get the speed slowed,
maybe... we'll be okay.

Maintaining level flight
is difficult.

The jammed stabiliser
keeps pushing the nose
of the plane down.

We're at 23-7. Request...

Yeah, we got it
under control here.

No, we don't.

- Okay.
- Okay.

To counteract the downward
force of the stabiliser,

the pilots use the elevators,

movable panels at the back
of the tail

linked by cables
to the control column.

The pilots pull
with all their might.

The fate of the plane hangs
on the strength of their arms.

In the cabin, frightened
passengers try to recover

from the terrifying plunge.

They have no idea
what might happen next.

Holiday memories are replaced
by the fear of dying.

Dean was one of those people

who would talk to whoever
was around him.

I am absolutely certain
that he was talking

to the person that was sitting
next to him on the plane.

I am sure that they had
a connection.

Colleen was... very unique

from my other kids
and she loved to travel.

She was a beautiful girl.

Here was a 25-year-old who...

It was like she had her
own private rocketship.

She was really going places.

In the cockpit,
the pilots struggle to control

the plane's speed
so they can land.

They've got a handful
of airplane,

they get her stabilised
and they're now in a situation

where they make
the decision properly

to go in on an emergency landing
to Los Angeles International.

And they have to be able
to slow the airplane up,

so you gotta experiment
a little bit.

Let's take
the speed brakes off.

No, leave them there.
It seems to be helping.

Damn, okay, it really
wants to pitch down.

Okay.

- Don't mess with that.
- I agree with you.

With the plane under
temporary control,

the crew make
the fateful decision

to do more troubleshooting.

They need a block of clear
space around the aircraft

in case they lose control again.

They contact
air traffic control.

Alaska 261.
Say your conditions.

261, we are
at 24 000 feet,

kind of stabilised.

We're slowing down here

and we're gonna do
a little troubleshooting.

Can you give me
a blocked altitude

between 20 and 25?

Alaska 2-6-1,
maintain block altitude,

flight level 2-0-0 through
flight level 2-5-0.

The pilots know they now
have clear air space

above and below the plane.

They try to figure out
their next move.

You got the airplane.
Let me just try it.

Okay.

How hard is it?

I don't know,
my adrenaline's going.

It was really rough
back there for a while.

Yeah, it is.

Whatever we did is no good,
let's not do that again.

Yeah, it went to down,
to full-nose down.

It's worse than it was before?

Yeah, we're in much
worse shape now.

The crew know this is
no mere electrical problem.

From what they've experienced,

they assume the stabiliser
is now jammed.

I think it's at the stop,
full stop and I'm thinking...

can it get any worse?

But it probably can.

But let's slow it,
let's get down

to 200 knots
and see what happens.

The crisis is getting worse.

Uncertain how the plane
will react

if they try to slow it down,
the pilots must still pull

on the elevators
to maintain level flight.

Captain Thompson once again

tries to get help
from maintenance.

Maintenance, 2-6-1,
are you on?

Yeah, 2-6-1,
this is maintenance.

Okay, we did both
the pickle switch

and the suitcase handles
and it ran away...

it ran away full-nose trim down.

Oh, it ran away
trim down?

And now, we're in
a damn pinch,

and we're holding. We're worse
than we were before.

You're getting
full-nose trim down,

but you don't get no-nose
trim up, is that correct?

That's affirm.

We went to full-nose down
and I'm afraid to try it again

to see if it would go
in the other direction.

Okay, well, your discretion.

If you want to try it,
that's okay with me.

If not, that's fine.
See you at the gate.

As important as it is
to have that ground contact

with people,
with maintenance manuals,

and experience on the ground
and the ability to call up

the manufacturer,
it's not always going
to give you a magic answer.

The crew had already gone
through every logic tree

they possibly could think of.

Maintenance clearly
do not appreciate

the gravity of the situation.

This is the last the crew
will hear from them.

No one can help the pilots now,

as they struggle with
the plane's faulty stabiliser.

Ever professional, however,

they try to put
the passengers at ease.

Folks, we have had a flight
control problem up front here.

We're working it uh...

That's Los Angeles off
to the right, there,

that's where
we're intending to go.

We're pretty busy up here
working this situation.

I don't anticipate
any big problems

once we get a couple
of sub-systems on the line.

But we will be going into LAX

and I anticipate us
parking there

in about 20 to 30 minutes.

In fact, they will never
make it to Los Angeles.

A full-blown disaster
is about to unfold.

After the terrifying
8000-feet plunge downwards,

Alaska 261 has now levelled out.

LA? Alaska 261,
we're with you.

We're at 22-5,
we have a jammed stabiliser

and we're maintaining altitude
with difficulty.

But we can maintain altitude,
we think,

and our intention
is to land in Los Angeles.

The pilots request
to be routed out

over the Pacific Ocean.

Centre Alaska 261.

I need to get down about 10,
change my configurations,

to make sure
I can control the jet

and I'd like to do that
over the bay, here, if I may.

If the worst happens,
they don't want to kill people

on the ground
as well as in the plane.

There are a lot of lives saved

that people maybe don't realise

by the fact that
this air crew said,

"Let's stay out over the water

until we've got this thing
completely under control."

As they manoeuvre
over the ocean,

the crew again ask
air traffic control

for clear space
around the plane.

Alaska 2-61,
fly a heading of 2-8-0

and descend and maintain
1-7 thousand.

2-8-0 and 1-7, 17 000,

Alaska 261.

And we're generally needing
a block altitude.

Alaska 2-61, roger.

I need everything
picked up

and everybody strapped down

because I'm going
to unload the aircraft

and see if we can regain
control that way.

The pilots concentrate on
trying to fix the plane.

- I'm test-flying now.
- How does it feel?

It's wanting
to pitch over more.

- Really?
- Yeah.

Try flaps? 15-11.

Let's go to 11.

Okay. Get some power on.

- I'm at 250 knots.
- Real hard?

No, actually, it's pretty
stable right here.

But we got to get it
down to 180.

The crew try to slow
the aircraft down

to landing speed
without losing control.

But every move they make could
have fatal consequences.

Okay, bring the flaps
and the slats back up for me.

- Slats too?
- Yeah.

Treading a knife edge
of control,

the pilots are still trying
to free up the stabiliser.

What I wanna do
is get the nose up...

And then, let the nose
fall through and

see if we can stab it
when it's unloaded.

The only hope
for the passengers is that

the pilots' skill and experience

can get the plane
to Los Angeles airport.

It's on the stop now,
it's on the stop.

Not according to this,
it's not.

As one effort
after another fails,

the crew wonder if
the stabiliser is damaged.

The trim might be...

And then it might be, uh...

If something's
popped back there.

Yeah.

It might be
mechanical damage too.

I think if it's controllable,
we ought to just try to land it.

You think so? Okay.
Let's head for LA.

But just as they prepare
to land in Los Angeles,

something in the tail
suddenly breaks.

- Do you feel that?
- Yeah.

Okay, gimme slats.
This is a bitch.

- Is it?
- Yeah.

The plane dives straight down
from 18 000 feet.

To avoid collisions,
Los Angeles control has warned

the pilots of nearby planes
that Alaska Flight 261
is in difficulty.

These pilots now report back
to the tower.

That plane has just
started to do a big huge plunge.

Yeah!

Yes, sir,
he is definitely

in a nose-down position,
descending quite rapidly.

Definitely out of control.

The plane
is inverted, sir.

Okay.
Yeah, he's inverted.

The pilots
can barely reach the controls.

The plane is now upside down,

but they believe
they might be able

to roll it out of the dive.

Mayday.

Push and roll.
Push and roll.

Push, dammit.
Push, push, push.

Push the blue side up!

They tried to fly the
airplane, even upside down.

They never for a moment believed

that they could not find a way
to control this airplane.

- Push!
- I'm pushing!

Okay. Let's get rudder.

Left rudder! Left rudder!

Can't reach it!

Okay. Right rudder,
right rudder!

The plane was being knocked
from side to side.

It turned upside down.
It was spinning.

Persons were being thrown
against the walls of the plane,

falling out of their seats

and the cockpit
voice recorder screaming.

Um...

Unbelievable...

horrible last few minutes
of their lives.

- Are we flying?
- We're flying. We're flying.

Tell them what we're doing.

- Let me just...
- God damn!

We're upside down
and we're flying.

And it was so violently
upside down

that the pilots were hanging
from their shoulder straps.

Passengers don't have
shoulder straps.

Here we go.

Yeah, he just hit
the water.

Yes, sir. He...
He hit the water. He's down.

After a terrifying
60-second dive,

Flight 261 hit the Pacific
Ocean at over 250 miles an hour.

Rescue helicopters were soon
at the crash site,

but there were no survivors.

The plane had broken up
on impact.

88 passengers and crew

including three young children
died instantly.

Fred Miller lost his daughter
Abbey and her husband Ryan.

These people suffered
on the way down.

This was not
a pretty way to die.

One witness who I met,

a jogger on the beach down
at Port Wynamie,

he said, "You look like
you lost somebody."

I said, "I did, my daughter."

He said, "You know, I saw
the plane go down."

He said the plane was inverted
and twisting and flipping

and then, he said it spun
at times, almost like a top.

He said, "To think people...

Somebody who has a life to live

is in there dying..."

He said, "It's one of the most
horrifying memories

I'll ever have."

Susan Da Silva
lost her husband Dean.

I know that they went through
a horrible horrible experience.

This was a violent end
these people suffered.

There were no bodies that were
intact or even close to intact.

And they were conscious
for a long time

before it all came apart.

Colleen Werley died along
with her fiancé Monty.

As a mother, you keep waiting
for your... child to come home.

And Colleen had travelled
so much in her life,

that it was... it was unusual

not to have her just walk
in the door.

All this time, you're thinking,

something caused this,
something made this happen.

And I want to find out
who's responsible for this.

The investigation
into Flight 261

immediately got underway.

But the wreckage
lay 700 feet down.

So National Transportation
Safety Board officials

called on Navy submersibles
to retrieve the debris

from the sea bed.

We set up a base of operations

and we had a remote
operating vehicle

with the side-scanning sonar
which they used

to map the debris field an get
an idea of how widely spread
the wreckage was.

At the National Transportation
Safety Board headquarters

in Washington,
the investigators'

immediate concern
was to find out

what had brought the plane down.

The first clues came from
the cockpit voice recordings.

LA? Alaska 261,
we're with you.

We're at 22-5, we have
a jammed stabiliser

and we're maintaining altitude
with difficulty.

We immediately suspected
some problem

in the tail of the airplane
which is where the controls are.

Something was wrong back there

and that was the key piece
of wreckage to look for.

The MD-83 that crashed
was a revised version

of the Douglas Corporation's
popular DC-9.

Over 2000 of which were
delivered to airlines worldwide.

The engines were at the rear
and the distinctive

T-shaped tail was an essential
element of the design.

In a big turbo jet aircraft,

one of the brilliant elements
of the design

is that since you're going to be
loading passengers and cargo,

you want to be able to have that
aircraft a little nose-heavy

or a little tail-heavy.
Well, in order to do that,

you actually had to have
that entire stabiliser moving.

But the ones that are the most
difficult to engineer

are the T-tailed airplanes where
you have the vertical stabiliser

and the horizontal
sitting on top.

And we call that
stabiliser "trim"

and that is an essential element

of what makes
these aircrafts so usable.

In the MD-83,
a motorised jackscrew

in the tail moves the horizontal
stabiliser up and down.

As the stabiliser moves up,

the nose of the plane
moves down.

As the stabiliser moves down,
the nose moves up.

But what role had
the two-foot jackscrew

played in the loss
of Flight 261?

The investigators were anxious
to inspect it

as soon as it was recovered
from the sea bed.

The jackscrew wasn't mated

with the nut
that it screws into.

It was just by itself.

And the nut was found
in another piece of structure

a few feet away from where
the jackscrew was.

To have a screw separate itself
from a nut

with very thick threads
surprised us.

Secondly, we noticed that there
was a curled piece of brass

around the jackscrew.
And all of the threads...

that you can see here,
these ridges were gone,

they had been stripped out.

And the remnants of those were
found coiled on the jackscrew.

Once the thread had been
stripped off the nut,

the jackscrew could
no longer turn.

The pilots could not have known
the real nature of the problem.

The crew was confronted
with a situation

that had never occurred before.

There is no failed
jackscrew procedure

in the quick reference handbooks
that they have available.

There's no training for it.

When the jackscrew jammed,

the crew were unable
to adjust the stabiliser.

We felt that it was due
to the fact

that these nut threads
had worn away

and it was just too hard
for that jackscrew

under the power
of the electric motor to turn.

That gave the flight crew
an indication

that there was a problem.

The crew knew they had
a problem in the tail plane.

But they had no idea what.

Two motors controlled
the jackscrew.

They tried each in turn.

But the pilots attempts
to free the jammed stabiliser

inadvertently made
their situation worse.

We're at 23-7... request...

Yeah, we've got it
under control here.

No, we don't.

Where they went wrong was that

they wanted to try both
the alternate

and the primary trim motors
at the same time.

When the pilots switched both
the electric motors on,

the jackscrew moved,
but the threads had given way

and the jackscrew was now held
only by a single retaining nut.

From here on,
the plane was doomed.

That end nut
was never designed

to hold the loads generated
aerodynamically by the airplane.

Let's get speed brakes.

Give me high-pressure pumps.
- Okay.

Now we know, in the glaring
light of hindsight,

now when we turn the situation
around in time

and look back, we can see
that this air crew,

and no air crew should have ever
been fooling with the trim

and trying to run it
back and forth.

The retaining nut grew
weaker and weaker.

Then, finally,
through the loads

beating down on that nut,
the nut finally failed.

- Feel that?
- Yeah.

Okay, give me slats.

The jackscrew slipped

completely out
of the acme nut

allowing the horizontal
stabiliser

to move well beyond
its aerodynamic limits.

This is a bitch.

- Is it?
- Yeah.

The stabiliser forced
the plane down.

And now, completely
out of control,

it rolled over
into its final dive.

Okay, let's get rudder.

Left rudder, left rudder!

I can't reach it.

This crew was working
to recover the aircraft

right down to the water.

I mean, they did not give up

the whole way down
through the descent.

Here we go.

It was clear
to the investigators

that the failure
of the jackscrew

was the only explanation

for the plane's erratic
flight path and final dive.

But why had this happened?

Why had the jackscrew failed?

The investigators began looking
deeper and deeper

into the condition
of the faulty jackscrew

on Flight 261.

What had caused it to fail?

There was no lubrication
or visible grease

on the working area
of the screw.

That was surprising and strange.

The discovery of no grease
on the jackscrew

alarmed the investigators.

They alerted the Federal
Aviation Administration

who ordered an immediate check
on all the MD-80s in the USA.

This led to
a shocking discovery.

At Alaska Airlines, in six
of its fleet of 34 planes,

the jackscrew assembly
needed to be replaced

after failing new inspections.

No grease is the culprit.

No grease or inadequate grease

is the only thing that can
give you that wear rate.

A simple lack of grease led
to the failure of the jackscrew

and the loss of 88 lives.

But why did this happen
at Alaska Airlines?

The investigators' attention
now switched to the company's
maintenance program.

What emerged was
deeply worrying.

We interviewed
all the mechanics

who had worked
on these airplanes.

We knew that they had been
falsifying records

or not doing the work
they had indicated.

The mechanics at Alaska
complained that they were

pressured to keep the planes
in the air

or that their recommendations
were overruled by supervisors.

Some alleged that records
were altered

to show work done
that was not done.

Alaska has long been one
of America's most successful

airlines,
but in the early 1990s,

the economic downturn
hit the company hard.

Its response was to slash costs
to revive its fortunes.

Pilots, maintenance workers,

management and others
had to make sacrifices.

Jobs were lost, pay was cut

and every hour aircraft spent
on the ground was seen as waste.

Two years of aggressive
axe wielding

saw costs come down
by 80 million dollars.

Profits leaped.
It was a corporate triumph.

In Alaska's case,
in the early nineties,

this airline had to do
an incredible job

of reforming itself
from a fairly high-cost carrier

to a lower-cost carrier
that could compete head on

with South West Airlines
and with others.

And they did it.
They did it brilliantly.

Nobody really believed
that it could happen.

Alaska Airlines began flying
the planes more intensively.

It doubled the average
daily use of its fleet.

But keeping the planes
in the air earning money

put maintenance schedules
under pressure.

John Leyatine was former
lead mechanic

at Alaska Airline's Oakland
maintenance facility

where he worked
for over eight years.

Leyatine felt that
the new pressures on maintenance

put passengers' lives at risk.

He was to pay dearly for
expressing those concerns.

We have used an actor
to portray his experiences

based on his sworn evidence
to the NTSB.

Leyatine claimed that planes

were pushed back into service
too quickly.

Sometimes, rather than wait for
a replacement part or repair,

supervisors passed planes
fit for service...

free to carry passengers
up into the air.

In October 1998, over 15 months
before the crash,

John Leyatine became so worried
that he did something

that would change
his life forever.

He reported Alaska Airlines
to the US Department

of Transportation,
alleging violations in
maintenance procedures.

There were very few voices
at Alaska who had concerns

about the maintenance
and there should have been more

and there should have been
people listening.

John Leyatine is a hero
in my book.

In December 1999,
over a year before the crash,

the FAA and Department
of Transportation officials

moved on Alaska Airlines.

The case was referred
to Federal prosecutors

and the FBI raided
Alaska's maintenance facilities

and seized thousands of records.

The raid was the opening shot

in a Federal
Grand Jury investigation,

that would last three years.

No criminal charges were
brought against the airline.

Alaska officials denied
that any unsafe planes

were put into service
or that passengers' lives
were ever at risk.

But the investigation
revealed hundreds of violations
of Federal regulations.

Alaska Airlines was fined.

The FAA insisted on changes
to the company's maintenance

and safety procedures.

The FAA also suspended
two supervisors

for falsifying records.

Like other whistleblowers,
John Leyatine would pay heavily

for his efforts to save lives.

Alaska put him on paid leave
from his job,

losing him thousands of dollars
in regular overtime earnings.

Then in January 2000,

John Leyatine saw his worst
nightmare come true.

The kind of accident
he had tried to prevent

now took place just off
the California Coast.

After the loss of Flight 261,

Leyatine went back
to his private work records.

Incredibly, he found
he had a direct link

to the crashed airliner.

Two years before at the plane's
last overhaul,

he had ordered
that the jackscrew

on this particular
very aircraft be replaced.

He then went off-shift.

When investigators examined
the record,

they found that
Leyatine's recommendation

had been overruled
by the next shift

and the plane put back
into service.

It would be two years
before the next overhaul,

but time ran out.

Four months before the overhaul
was due, Flight 261 crashed.

Alaska Airlines labelled
Leyatine a disruptive influence.

He sued the company for libel.

Alaska settled, but Leyatine
could no longer work

in the industry he loved.

I get calls almost every week,

somebody saying, "Should I blow
the whistle?"

And I always tell them,
"You need to know...

you need to be prepared
to find another line of work

because you will not work
in the industry

and you will not work
in the government."

In most cases,
it's almost impossible

to be a whistleblower
and survive your career.

As the investigators continued
their work into Flight 261,

they made another disturbing
discovery about the drive

to cut costs at Alaska Airlines.

To keep planes flying
more intensively,

Alaska had dramatically extended
the intervals between service.

This was significant because
when a plane is designed,

every part has a schedule
listing when it is serviced

and when it must be replaced.

You're supposed to go in
and inspect every so many hours

and that's different
on parts all over the plane.

Some things you have to look at
after every flight,

other things
have to be inspected

every two or three days.

In 1996, Alaska Airlines
extended the intervals

between MD-80 jackscrew
inspections by 400%.

Before 1996,
jackscrews were inspected

every 600 flight hours.

Now, there was over
two and a half thousand hours

between each service.

If you had 600 hours
between inspection points

and greasing points,
we have no chance

of ever having a metal to metal
contact situation,

but if you put that up to
2 000 hours or 2 500 hours,

now what you do is eat into
some of these protective stages,

these barriers that we have
towards catastrophic failure.

In its final report into
the crash of Flight 261,

the NTSB concluded that
the extended service intervals

for the jackscrews on its MD-80s

was a significant contributor
to the crash.

With carriers doing anything
to save a dime,

maintenance, safety
took a back seat.

And one of the shocking things
about Alaska

is that they were allowed to
increase inspection intervals.

And it's very shocking

because that is the only way
we have safety.

The extended maintenance
intervals meant that

the lack of grease on
the jackscrew went undiscovered.

But now, investigators wondered
if the failure of the jackscrew

assembly revealed a basic flaw
in the plane's design.

They found that the MD-80
broke one of the fundamental
rules of aircraft design:

It was not fail-safe.

The design philosophy
that has made aviation so safe

is that we should never ever
have a situation

in which one catastrophic
failure of some component

in the airplane causes us
to lose the airplane.

These backups to the backup,
backing up the backups,

is why we can get on an airplane
with almost 100% assurance

that we're gonna get
where we want to go safely.

There was no backup
to the jackscrew and its nut.

Engineers never envisioned
a situation on the MD-80

where the jackscrew might fail.

With inspections every
600 flight hours

and replacements every
2 000 hours,

the designers did not add
an additional redundant
backup system.

It was utterly laughable
that they said

it was a redundant system.
There is one screw and one nut.

That's all there is.
It's not redundant.

The MD-80 continues
to fly worldwide.

Despite the revelation of this
dangerous design flaw,

the jackscrew assembly
has not been redesigned.

Inspection intervals
have been shortened,

but airlines still rely
on proper maintenance

to prevent the same accident
happening again.

In its final report,
the National Transportation
Safety Board concluded

that the crash of Flight 261
was due to the lack of adequate

greasing and the stretched
service intervals.

When coupled with the design
of the jackscrew,

these failures led to a
completely avoidable accident

and the loss of 88 lives.

Three years after the crash
of Flight 261,

the relatives and friends
of the dead

dedicated a permanent memorial

at Port Wynamie,
close to the crash site.

I think the best thing
and the only thing

in our infinite inadequacy
of making up for the loss

from this life is to say
something that we've been able

to say in a lot
of other accidents

to other grieving families,
and that is,

"Those deaths will not
be in vain.

We will not let them
be in vain."

Every one of those lives
will be made to count

in terms of making sure
that three, four, five

or ten other people do not die.

Colleen was different,

she was adventurous and there's
nobody like that in our family.

And I don't know...

what we can do
except to remember Colleen

and to live our lives now
a little bit better for her.

You know,
when I was growing up,

we didn't wear seatbelts.

There weren't even
seatbelts in cars.

And now, we know that we need
to wear our seatbelts.

We didn't know that much
about smoking cigarettes,

and now, we know that
we can't smoke cigarettes.

Well, there's a lot to learn
about airline safety too.

None of us are
the same anymore.

It's like walking into
a giant storm...

wave after wave, forming up
coming in,

because it never stops.

Grief over the loss of a child

is not something
I wish on anybody.

This plane went down
because of neglect.

It seems like such
an unholy type of loss.

What a hard way to die,

so an airline can, you know,
make more money.

difuze