All language subtitles for Mayday.S01E03.Flying.Blind.1080p.AMZN.WEB-DL.DD+2.0.H.264-playWEB_track3_[eng]

3000.

We're not getting any oxygen.

We have the terrain alarm.

We are in an emergency.

We are observing you
crossing the 260 of Lima
at 31 miles west.

The level is 10 700.

October, 1996,

a state-of-the-art
passenger jet

careens out of control
for 30 horrific minutes

then crashes
into the Pacific Ocean.

I've got it! I've got it!

What could've brought down
AeroPeru Flight 603?

The answer to the mystery
may be found in the aircraft's
black box flight recorder.

A puzzle which
investigators must solve.

The story they uncover
is how a simple human error

set off a chain of events
that ended in tragedy.

Two cents of American money
brought down

a 75-million-dollar aircraft
and killed 70 people.

This kind of a problem
that they faced that night

was... probably one of ten

over the last 20 or 30 years.

You never lose hope
immediately.

It takes time for you to get
to that point

that you will accept
the fact that...

there are no people
that got out of there alive.

We're gonna turn over!

Lima, Peru.

Jorge Chavez
International Airport.

AeroPeru Flight 603 prepared
for takeoff to Santiago Chile.

The plane was
a 4-year-old Boeing 757,

a state-of-the-art passenger jet

known for its reliability
and safety.

AeroPeru 603 was flown by two
of the national airline's

best pilots:
Captain Eric Shreiber, 58,

and First Officer,
David Fernandez, 42.

61 passengers and nine
crew members were aboard.

Most were Chileans
on their way home.

Others were Peruvian,
British, Italian, Spanish,

one New Zealander
and other Latin Americans.

Among them,
the brother-in-law
and close friend

of Mexico businessman
Monus Albert.

Our companies do business
in South America.

We export, and every so often,
we go to see our clients.

On this trip,
Kenny and Abraham

went to see some clients
in Peru and Chile.

I had a very good relationship
with both of them,

with my brother-in-law,
of course.

We were like brothers.
I loved the guy.

He married my only sister.

So, we had a great relationship.

Checklists complete,

First Officer Fernandez
hailed the tower.

Lima Tower AeroPeru 603.
Runway 1-5 ready for takeoff.

AeroPeru 603.
Use noise abatement.

Wind calm.
Ready for takeoff on runway 1-5.

- 1-5-1-5 transponder.
- Flaps 1-5.

Takeoff briefing complete.

The captain makes a joke
about their precision.

See how accurate we are?
Not even Swiss.

Rolling.

The AeroPeru 757
was among a new generation

of computer-controlled aircraft

in which pilots are trained
to rely on a central data system

designed to reduce errors,
both mechanical and human.

On takeoff, the 757
performed perfectly.

80 knots.

Check.

V1, rotate.

V2.

Gear up.

Right.

Within moments,

the pilots received a highly
unusual reading.

The altimeters are stuck.

The altimeter indicates
the height of the aircraft

off the ground.

It reads zero, though they
were obviously flying.

The altimeters have stuck.

- Yeah.
- All of them.

This is really new.
Keep V2 plus 10.

The 757 is equipped
with three altimeters:

One for the pilot, one for
co-pilot, one back up.

All three were dead.

Then they lost another
crucial instrument.

The air speed indicator.

The speed.

- Eh?
- The speed.

What's going on?
We're not climbing.

- I am climbing, but the speed.
- Hold it.

Maintain speed.

AeroPeru 603 left
the lights of Lima,

out towards the Pacific Ocean.

With no air speed
or altitude instruments,

the pilots were now
flying blind.

The air traffic controller
in Lima maintained contact

with the plane, noting its
altitude and course.

He did not hear when the pilots
got a new minor warning,

that they must adjust
the rudder,

which steers the aircraft
left and right.

...603. We are descending.

- Rudder Ratio.
- That's strange.

Turn to the right.

Alan MacLeod is a veteran
Air Canada pilot.

They got a rudder ratio
warning which consists

of an amber light that would
come flashing on there

with a beeping horn
and a message on this engine

crew alerting system saying:
Rudder Ratio.

That's just a system
that reduces the amount
of rudder the airplane

has that can be used
as the airplane accelerates

to go faster and faster.

Because it was sensing wrong
or improper information,

it sensed a fault, so it gave
a warning to the crew.

The erratic warnings
were being generated

by the plane's central computer.

But the pilots could not
understand why.

Then, the dead altimeters
sprung to life.

Climb, climb, climb!

Climb!
- I am!

Climb!
You're going down, David!

I am up, but the speed.

Yeah, but it's stuck.
The trim rudder ratio.

Climb, climb, climb!

Climb, climb!

Set heading 100.

So now you're...

It's okay on this heading.

Set the climb thrust.

Centre auto pilot in command.

Just as suddenly, the altitude
readings return to normal.

The moment of calm
would be brief.

Just one minute after takeoff,

Captain Shreiber attempted
to engage the autopilot

to give them time to think.

The autopilot requires
identical data

from two of the aircraft's three
flight control computers.

But Shreiber's instrument
readings were so different
from those of Fernandez

the autopilot disengaged.

Then another alert.

Mach trim. Mach trim.

Mach trim indicates
that the plane is not flying

in a level position.

Yet the 757 seemed to be
flying normally.

Let's go to basic instruments.
Everything's going to hell.

Mach speed trim is a system
that trims the airplane.

It changes the angle
of the horizontal stabilizer

in the back end of the airplane

and that has to be changed
as the airplane accelerates

to a higher speed.

It was giving false indications,

so they got a warning
that they had an over-speed,

which, of course, they didn't.

That warning would consist of,
again, a master caution

and a master warning
which is a red light

associated with...
an aural warning as well.

Despite confusing warnings

and no autopilot,
the aircraft was controllable.

If necessary,
Shreiber could've kept
the plane aloft for hours,

but he decided to land.

He instructed his first officer
to declare an emergency.

We are in an emergency.

AeroPeru 603, Lima.

We are declaring
an emergency.

We have no basic instruments,

no altimeter,
no air speed indicator.

Declaring an emergency.

Received. Altitude?

We don't have.

We're up to 1000 feet.

Approximately 1700.

603, confirm if possible
if you can change your frequency

to 119.7 to make sure you can
receive radar instructions.

Just 40 miles from Lima,

the pilots of AeroPeru
flight 603 now made their
first attempt

at an emergency landing.

Puzzled by their problems,

they began to suspect that
the AeroPero ground crew

had tampered with the aircraft.

We change to 1-1-9
point seven.

Auto-throttle,
it disconnected by itself.

maintenance
moves everything.

What have they done?

I'll take the controls now.

Okay, you have control.

The pilots did not know
that their suspicions

were close to the truth.

But there was not time
to speculate further.

- Lima, 603.
- AeroPero 603, Lima.

We request vectors for ILS,
runway 1-5.

They sought the runway
with the help of the
guidance transmitter

called the Instrument
Landing System, or ILS.

The ILS provides information
on their course

while altitude information comes
from the aircraft's transponder.

Affirmative.
Maintain present altitude.

What level do we have?

We have 4000 feet.
Can you confirm for us?

Correct. Maintain 4000.

Shreiber and Fernandez
had ever experienced

nor been trained
for this emergency.

Auto-throttle disconnect.

Really, we don't
have any control.

We don't have... any control,
not even the basics.

Let's see. Check everything.

The airplane was controllable,

but you first have
to diagnose what is wrong.

It's very easy
with 20/20 hindsight,

sitting here in a chair
on a nice sunny day to say,

"This is what
he should've done."

But in the cold dark night,

with bells and whistles
going off, it's very difficult

to analyze conflicting
information that you're getting.

This kind of a problem that
they faced that night was...

...probably one of 10
over the last 20 or 30 years

that has been similar to this.

Over the dark Pacific Ocean,

the pilots could not determine
altitude nor speed by sight.

They requested that the tower
help guide them in.

- Responding.
- Air speed is zero.

All speeds. Right.

Can you give us
the air speed please,

if you have us on the radar?

Yes. Affirmative.
As of 10 seconds,

it seems that you're climbing
at level 6000

at 22 miles south
on heading 1-9-5.

The air traffic controller's
computers calculated

a correct air speed
by measuring the plane's

movement over the ground.

Okay. We have that.

We're on heading 190

and we have 7000 feet
on the altimeter.

Yes, correct.
You are now reaching 7000.

But neither the pilots
nor the air traffic controller

knew that the altitude indicated
on the scope was incorrect.

It was coming from the plane's
erratic computer.

The traffic controller
would try to help the pilot,

but he was receiving the wrong
information on altitude.

He was receiving the
wrong indication from
the captain's altimeter.

The reason the air traffic
control system

was transmitting improper
altitude readout information
to the airplane

was because
the airplane's altimeter,

through the air data computer,

would send
the indicated altitude

that the airplane
was experiencing

down to the radar unit,
and of course, it was incorrect

and they would read it off
their readout down in

the air traffic control center
and transmit it back

to the pilots, and of course,
it was incorrect

because they were
getting incorrect information
to begin with.

Investigators would later
discover the AeroPeru 603

was drifting downward,

while the altimeter showed them
at a near constant 10000 feet.

The passengers were as yet
unaware of the drama

unfolding in the cockpit.

Avoid large or abrupt
radar inputs.

If normal left hydraulic
systems pressure available...

Now, Captain Shreiber
ordered Fernandez to scan
the flight manual

for some explanation
of the warnings.

Yes, crosswinds.
Do not attempt an auto-land.

In Lima, the air traffic
controller continued to guide

AerpPeru 603
back to the ground.

AeroPeru 603, we are observing
you now at level 9200.

What is your heading now?
- We're heading level 2-0-5.

Affirmative. You are turning
slowly to the right, correct?

No, we are maintaining course
to stay away from the coast.

With incorrect altitude
information being transmitted

from the aircraft
to the tower,

they did not realize
that the plane was descending.

Your distance is 30 miles.

Do you want a heading to proceed

to the localizer, correct?- Correct.

We're going to suggest
course north 3-6-0.

3-6-0. We have problems here
reading the instruments.

You're going to have to help me
with altitudes

and air speeds
if it is possible.

Okay. Received.

Let's go.

The approach is set.

The 757's computers
send critical warnings.

Information that the pilots
were trained to obey,

but could not trust.

Let's try to make
a descent on this heading.

It's climbing.

The air speed plummeted
to below stall speed,

and then raced up again.

Let's go down to 10 000 feet.

Why does the speed
go away so fast?

Could it be the real speed?

That's what worries me.

No. I don't think so.

Can you verify our speed please?

320 is indicated.

We have 350.

The engines are on idle,

but we keep accelerating
and accelerating.

Okay. Received.

Nerves were now
stretched tight.

You can imagine the pilots,
they're flying there.

They don't have a true
indication of the speed.

They're obviously trying
to fly the airplane

and changing the attitude
up and down,

that in itself will change
an indication of air speed,

although it was incorrect.

Both pilots were
really confused.

They didn't know what to do.

They didn't know how to act

and they did unhuman efforts
to save the aircraft.

But, I mean, they were really...

...tired of all the work
and all the confusion
and all the alarms.

Fernandez suggested that
they try the speed brakes

used to rapidly slow
the aircraft.

Extend the speed brakes.

For a moment,
it appeared to be working.

Then, another warning.

All three indicators
are fine on speed.

Fine on...

Over speed.

Overspeed means the plane

is flying too fast.

The pilots didn't believe it.

But if it was right,

the 757 could be torn apart.

They were forced to make
a decision,

to speed up or slow down.

If they got it wrong,
70 people would die.

15 minutes had passed
since takeoff,

then the computerized brain
of AeroPeru 603

sent another burst
of contradictory warnings.

Rudder ratio.

It can't be.
Nothing's disconnecting.

All engine instruments
are okay.

What can our real speed be?

Lima tower provided their
only chance of survival.

We are observing you crossing
the 260 of Lima

at 31 miles west,
level is 10 700,

velocity is approximately
280 over the ground.

Perfect.

The controller's
altitude reading was incorrect.

Junk information being
generated by the 757's computers

and radioed to the tower.

Over speed.

The brakes were on, but now,
another over-speed warning.

Then, the stall warning sounded.

Let's descend.

We can't be over speed.

We're still flying.

They get a stall warning
that the airplane

is falling out of the sky

at the same time
they got an over-speed warning.

It's impossible to have
two contradictory alarms.

Either you're stalling or either
you're having over-speed.

So, that created more confusion.

Really, this problem has
never happened before.

It was a new emergency.

In aviation,
you always figure:

What's going to kill me?

What is the critical thing?

Let's take care of that first,
and then...

...we'll take care of
the lesser issues later on.

When you get a stall warning

or when you get
an over-speed indication,

you need to pay attention
to those immediately.

In this case, they were getting
both a stall warning

and an over-speed.
Well, which is right?

First Officer David Fernandez

finally realized that the odds
were against a safe landing.

We request, is there any plane
that can take off and rescue us?

Acknowledged.
Rescue has been alerted.

Any plane
in the area to guide us?

An AeroPeru that may be
in the area.

Anybody.
- Don't say anything like that.

Yes, because right now
we are in a stall.

The stick shaker
vibrated violently,

indicating that the 757
was going too slow

and could fall from the sky.

AeroPeru 603, we have a 707
that is leaving for...

We will advise him.

We are not in a stall.

It's a false alarm.

Shreiber's air speed indicator
read 350 knots,

well above stall speed.

No, we have stick shaker,
it has to be.

But even with speed
brakes and everything,

we're maintaining 9500 feet.

Why aren't we getting
the same reading?

When the airplane is slowed up
to a point in the air

that it can no longer sustain
itself in flight, it stalls.

The wings stall or stop flying.

There's a warning system built
into the airplane

that tells the pilots
when that's happening,

that's known as a stick shaker
along with a voice warning,

which we just heard.

When the stick shaker
goes off because the airplane
has slowed down too much,

you get a warning like this
where the control column

is shaking and vibrating
along with the voice warning

saying the airplane is stalling.

And of course, the pilots
would go into the aircraft

stall recovery procedure
at that point.

In the battle between
man and machine,

the deranged 757 was winning.

The pilots now had no sense
of where they were or how high.

They had gradually
been descending,

and were now just 1000 feet
over the sea.

Lima tower, misguided
by AeroPeru 603's

incorrect transponder,
reassured the pilots

that they were at 10 000 feet.

AeroPeru 603, you are now
flying on course 1-2-0.

We observe you to be
at level 10 000.

Your speed is
approximately 2-2-0,

and at a distance from Lima
of 33 miles to the north-west.

The 707 will be ready
in 15 minutes to fly west
to help you.

The pilots had to abandon
their attempt at landing.

The best hope now
is that another aircraft

could get airborne and guide
the 757 back to the airport.

To have another aircraft
come alongside and formate

or you formate on it
would have been one way

of recovering from
this abnormal situation.

However, we must remember
that the flight

was at night in darkness.
The pilots may or may not

have had any formation
flying training.

But that would have been one way

to resolve the problem
quite well, actually.

Too low, terrain.

- What's happening?
- Too low, terrain?

Now the pilots receive the
most terrifying warning of all.

It is called the ground
proximity alarm,

meaning a collision
with the earth is imminent.

Still, the tower told them
they were at 10 000 feet.

We have the terrain
alarm and we're supposed
to be at 10 000 feet?

According to the
monitor, you have 105.

Too low, terrain.

Too low, terrain.

There is not checklist for
if you have these

seven or eight warnings
going off,

which they did
and they couldn't shut them off.

It's a very rattling experience.

I could play that tape for you
and you'd hear those things:

"Whoop, whoop, pull up,
terrain, terrain."

And all of these things
going off

and the stick shaker.

It...

It's a very unnerving
environment.

All the computers
are going crazy here.

Shreiber turned the aircraft
towards the sea,

away from a possible collision
with a mountain or skyscraper.

Too low,
terrain.

Too low, terrain.

Despite the erroneous
warnings, the terrain alarm
was correct.

There's a system on board
the aircraft called

the ground proximity
warning system

and it senses the rate of
descent of the airplane.

The irony of the situation was
that they were getting warnings

from that, saying, "Too low,
terrain, terrain, too low."

That probably, in all
probability, was a true warning.

But because they had been
subjected to so many warnings,

and on-going false warnings
and horns, bells and whistles,

they didn't really,
I don't think,

react to that too seriously.

The air traffic controller
noted AeroPeru's new course

away from Lima.

AeroPeru 603.

I don't understand you!

We observe you
turning to the left,
circling to the west.

Affirmative.
We are heading 2-5-0.

But we are going out
towards sea because of
the low-terrain alarm.

The tower confirmed
that the 757

had turned away
from the airport,

out toward the open Pacific.

Yes, affirmative.
We observe you at 42 miles

flying to the west.
Course 2-5-0.

We are over water, aren't we?

Affirmative.
Over the water.

You are 42 miles to the west.

Now in darkness
and heavy haze,

the pilots had another problem
with their speed.

Are we going down now?

We have 370 knots.

Are we descending now?

We're showing the same speed.

You have 200 knots speed
approximately.

Speed 200 knots?

220 ground speed
reducing speed slightly.

The pilots
were stunned.

200 knots was precariously
close to a stall speed.

Damn, we're going
to stall right now!

Let's go up.
Let's see.

Let's go up here.

The two men struggle
with the deadly situation.

A computer that warns them
of flying too fast,

too slow and too low,
all at once.

Shreiber now decided to risk
a second attempt at landing,

seeking the signal
known as the ILS

to guide the aircraft
to the runway.

I want to try
to intercept the ILS.

I'm trying to descend.

Lima AeroPeru 603,

we will try to intercept
the ILS,

let us know if we are in.

Received, AeroPeru 603,

you show now level 9700.

The instruments
seemed to be working.

For a moment,
there was a glimmer of hope.

- This one's right.
- This one's okay too.

The air traffic controller
attempted to raise

the pilots' spirits
with good news.

Stand by to verify speed.

The 707 is about to take off.
It is on taxi.

Confirm our speed.

It is very important.

We do not have any speed
indications onboard.

Understood.
You're starting to turn

and we observe your ground
speed at 270.

Stay there, Eric.
270 is okay.

They now knew their speed,

but altitude remained
fatally wrong.

Altitude is 9700.

Your speed is 240 knots.
Ground speed on the monitor.

How can we be flying
at this speed

if we're descending
with engines on idle?

Give me the altitude, please.

Yes,
you are maintaining 9700

according to the scope, sir.

9700?(tower): Yes, correct.

What is your indicated altitude?

Do you have any visual
reference?

9700, but it's indicating
"too low, terrain".

Are you sure you have us
on the radar at 50 miles?

Hey, look! With 370,
we have--

370 of what?
We lowered gear.

AeroPeru 603, Lima.

What do we do with the gear?

Suddenly,
they realized the awful truth.

We're hitting water.

Pull it up!

Climb, climb, AeroPeru 603.

If you need to, pull up.

For 20 seconds, the pilots
struggled for altitude.

I've got it.
I've got it.

We're going to turn over.

AeroPeru 603, Lima.

AeroPeru 603, Lima.

The next morning, Mexico
businessman Monus Albert

learned that an AeroPeru
flight had crashed.

Five minutes after takeoff,
the crew informed the tower

that they were having
an emergency

and they were requested
to return to Lima.

During the process, contact
with the aircraft was lost

at 01:10, with the latest
position of the aircraft

being 50 miles north
of the city of Lima.

About 6 o'clock
in the morning I got up

and turned on the news channel

and I heard there was a crash,
an airplane crash

of AeroPeru, but the news
mentioned New York to Lima.

Rescue operations are underway
by authorities.

The aircraft was carrying 61
passengers and 9 crew members.

His brother-in-law
and his business partner
were on AeroPeru 603.

So I went to the shower and
didn't pay a lot of attention,

but when I came out,
they corrected the news

and they said,
"From Lima to Santiago."

And I knew on that plane
Kenny and Abraham were flying.

The news was very vague,
so they mentioned there might be

some survivors and
they mentioned that the plane

crashed into the Pacific Ocean

and they didn't have a lot of
news and the crash was at night.

In my mind, I thought the plane
sort of landed on water

and most of the people got out.

Guido Fernandez
had just been appointed

Peru's accident investigator.

AeroPeru was his first case.

The co-pilot, David Fernandez,
was his nephew.

I was in bed. It was
about 4:30 in the morning

and... they called me.

"Your... nephew is lost
in an airplane."

They asked me, "How do you feel

that your nephew
was the co-pilot?"

"My gosh, I feel very bad,

but I'm a professional
and I have to do a job.

I have to comply
and complete my duty."

So, that's what I did.

Fernandez rushed to the crash
site in a Navy helicopter.

It was clear there
were no survivors.

Nine bodies were floating
in the debris.

The rest sank with the 757.

Fernandez met with
the air traffic controller
at Lima tower.

His account was baffling.

Well, the controller
really didn't know,

he was just trying to help.

So, he did all he could
to help them,

but unfortunately for him,
it was a new emergency too.

Fernandez put thoughts
of his nephew out of his mind.

His job was to retrieve
the aircraft's flight data

and voice recorders
to determine what happened.

He needed help.

Fernandez contacted the National
Transportation Safety Board

in Washington DC,

the world's leading agency
for air accident investigation.

They had found the aircraft.

It was pretty well
documented by radar.

The Navy,
the Peruvian Navy had...

gotten a fix on the flotsam
and the wreckage in the ocean

and the only thing left to do

was find it on the bottom
of the ocean,

which they did not have
the facilities for.

Rodriguez flew to Lima
to join Guido Fernandez

in his effort
to find answers.

I found out that his nephew
was the first officer.

I suggested that perhaps
they should consider removing

Captain Fernandez
from the investigation

because of emotional involvement
and what have you.

The American investigator's
concerns soon vanished.

He was very objective.

I would say,
an excellent investigator

considering that it was
not a distant nephew,

I mean, it was
his very close relative.

He... He did an outstanding job.

The black box
in the Boeing 757

can emit a locator beacon
for 30 days before batteries
run dead.

The US Navy provided underwater
remote-operated vehicles

to survey the debris field,

seeking the black boxes.

The wreckage confirmed
that the plane went down
in one piece.

I've done in-flight break ups
that were spread

over 15, 16 miles and maybe
a mile and a half wide,

which tells you instantly that,

what you know of looking
at the wreckage,

that this thing
didn't hit in one piece.

It clearly was disintegrating
as it was crashing.

But in this case, it was
a fairly tight debris field.

So, obviously,
it hit at high speed

and was a fairly closely-knit
wreckage pattern.

The data recorders
were retrieved from the 757.

Brought to the surface,
the boxes were placed in coolers

full of fresh water
to keep them from oxidizing.

They were taken back
to Washington

for analysis at the NTSB.

The cockpit recorder
could offer the evidence
investigators sought.

Every word spoken by pilots
Shreiber and Fernandez,

and every unnerving alarm
was recorded on audiotape.

The recorded voices were faint,
sometimes hard to make out,

but the chaos in the cockpit

rang through
with chilling clarity.

Too low, terrain.

The tape was digitized into a
computer, filtered and enhanced.

Now, investigators had the
clue they'd been looking for.

It was clear to us that
they were really

experiencing a problem
with air speed and altitude.

And... the air speed and
altitude indications

in the aircraft are strictly
a function of what we call

the piedostatic system.

The piedostatic system
if found on all aircraft,
large or small.

External ports measure
outside air pressure

to provide data on altitude
and speed.

If these ports are blocked,

the plane's computers
receive false data

and generate false warnings.

But why these ports
would be blocked was a mystery.

Robot vehicles searched for
the missing piece of the puzzle.

What they found stunned
investigators.

Captain Shreiber's static port

was completely blocked
with tape.

Investigators now learned
what happened.

Just before AeroPeru 603
lifted off from Lima,

maintenance workers
cleaned the aircraft.

A worker covered the static
ports with tape to protect them.

This is standard procedure.

But he forgot
to remove the tape.

It was a small oversight,
with catastrophic results.

The taping was never removed,

and when the airplane departed
and started to fly,

nothing but trapped static
sea level air pressure

was sensed by those instruments.

As a matter of fact,
the airplane was climbing up
to thinner air

and the information presented
on the instruments

and to the air data computer
was false,

which generated just
totally non-normal readings.

The inspector who was supposed
to quality check his work

did not do it,
and the supervisor

out on the line that night
was not there,

he was sick and there was a...

a regular mechanic
who was filling that role

and he did not see it.

And the captain or the pilot...

In this case, the captain
did the pre-flight.

They do a walk-around looking
for just that kind of thing,

the captain did
the pre-flight that night

and he did not detect it either.

A little piece of paper
with glue caused an accident.

But the paper and the glue
are not to blame.

Humans are to blame,

because humans used that tape
in the wrong place

for the wrong purpose.

Another accident, shockingly
similar to AeroPeru 603,

had happened just eight months
earlier to another 757.

In February 1996,
189 people died

when a German charter
called Bergen Air

crashed five miles
after takeoff,

from Puerto Plata,
Dominican Republic.

The NTSB assisted
in the investigation.

A survey of the wreckage
revealed that one piedotube,

the other critical part of the
piedostatic system, was blocked.

As with AeroPeru 603,

night was the pilot's
worst enemy.

The Bergen Air pilot
flipped the plane upside down

before crashing into the sea.

The Bergen accident nearly
pointed out already

that a crew will get confused

by these cryptic advisories...

Rudder ratio, mach trim...

And not getting
a clear indication

what the underlying problem is,

which is a problem
with the air data computer

or anything which
comes behind it.

The piedotupe or
the static port.

These were effects which were
well-known by the manufacturer,

and so, it happened again.

Three months after
the Bergen Air crash,

bulletins were issued
to all airline carriers

about the piedostatic problems,

but AeroPeru had not yet
implemented the changes.

The bulletins and the,
let's call it, the fruits

of the Dominican Republic
investigation of Bergen Air

had not yet reached AeroPeru at
the time this accident occurred.

The Peruvian government
very correctly

made a point of that
in their report on the accident

saying that they should
have given more impetus

to those recommendations

to get them out
to the industry quicker.

Well, it's very unfortunate,
but it comes back to the...

fact that communication
in aviation, uh...

is sometimes deficient.

There is not that
high level of exchange

of information between
different operators,

as they're all competitors.

They do not exchange
certain information

and specifically not
the one which is safety-related.

And that's definitely the case
in the AeroPeru accident.

9700! But it's indicating
"too low terrain".

Even if Shreiber and Fernandez
had known about Bergen Air,

it may not have
helped them survive,

given the high pressure
of their situation.

It's easy to sit here
in the 757 cockpit

and play the Monday morning
quarterback,

having heard the bells
and the over-speed warnings

the ground proximity warning,
the stall warning...

It's very easy to do that
and sit here

and say what I would have done
being an experienced pilot.

But to put yourself into
the position of those two pilots

that night, they were in an
extremely difficult situation

to fly that airplane and
recover from that experience.

Two weeks after the crash,
Monus Albert joins dozens

of grieving families,
seeking the remains

of his brother-in-law
and friend.

He finally identified them
in a Lima morgue.

I wanted to find them.
I really wanted to find them.

And one part of me didn't want
to find them

because there was this fantasy
that if I don't find them

maybe they're in an island
with a drink

and looking at some
girls dancing.

I can close the chapter,
I can go and have them buried

and there will be a place
for the family to go and...

put some flowers
once in a while and say,

"Okay, my brother-in-law
is here or my dad is here
or my husband is here."

Now that investigators
had the answer

to the mysterious loss
of AeroPeru 603,

the lawsuits began.

In November 1996,
a Miami lawyer

took on the case on behalf
of 41 passengers and crew,

arguing that
the manufacturer, Boeing,

was liable for the accident.

Boeing has to foresee
the misuse of their product.

In other words,
a manufacturer of a product

is legally liable
for the foreseeable misuse
of their product,

if it can be corrected.

In other words,
Boeing builds the airplane

with a potential hazard in it.

That hazard is that in order
to clean the airplane

you have to cover
the static port,

and if you don't take it off,
the airplane can crash.

I wanted them back.

Since I couldn't get them back,

at least I wanted the wives of
the victims to be compensated.

How much is that worth?
I don't know, I didn't know.

Abraham had three daughters,
and now...

they don't have a father.

So, what is the compensation?

The best compensation is if it
can be done is get them back.

Give them life back again,

but because
that is not possible...

...then the other possibility is
to get a monetary compensation,

and then you fight for the best
compensation you can get.

Boeing argued that AeroPeru
was at fault, not its 757.

An AeroPeru worker taped
the static port,

which is marked
with clear warnings.

Boeing also blamed
Captain Eric Shreiber.

It was his job to visually
inspect the aircraft

before taking off.

But investigator Richard
Rodriguez can understand

how Shreiber overlooked
the tape on the static port.

One of the reasons is
it's very high.

It's about maybe 15, 17 feet
up in the air,

and at night with a flashlight,

and this happened
to be duct tape,

which you're not
supposed to use,

they specified the tape
and it was duct tape,

which is silver, so it would not
distinguish itself

against the background of
the fuselage of the aircraft.

So basically,
three or four people

failed to detect the tape
on the aircraft,

prior to departure.

As the search
for blame continued,

the worker who taped the port
was jailed for his negligence.

Lawyers, they...

Lawyers, you know, sometimes,

they confuse
the matters and they...

...send a guy
and ask people questions.

And these questions...
The one that stuck the tape
was a painter,

the lowest-cultured

and the one that knew less

about what could happen,

and the judge resolved

that he was the one responsible
and he was in jail.

You don't lose the airplane
because a maintenance man

making two dollars an hour
down in Peru makes a mistake.

It's foreseeable that
that kind of a person

is going to make a mistake.

That's human nature, that
they're going to make a mistake

and you build your system
so you don't lose

your 50-million-dollar airplane

because a maintenance guy
makes a simple mistake.

Schreiber and Fernandez
were also scrutinized.

Veteran pilot Alan McLeod

believes that
in their situation,

he would not
have attempted to land.

He would have continued to fly
for as long as he could,

with the plane angled
upwards slightly

and the speed set
just above cruise.

Experience has shown that if
you don't fly the airplane

when you are experiencing
an abnormal situation,

and they certainly were,
you must fly the airplane,

just concentrate
on flying the airplane

and get the airplane under
control, first and foremost.

Are we going down now?

We have 370 knots.

If you don't do that,
the airplane's going to bite you

and you're going to end up
in more serious situations.

So, I would fly the airplane,
make sure I was able

to fly it safely,
if only by using the attitude
direction indicator

and normal power settings
that I was familiar with,

and eventually work my way back
and get it on the ground.

Pilots called it
"flying by numbers",

relying not on computers,
but on basic aviation

and human instinct.

It always becomes a problem
when pilots are reduced

to be push-buttonists.

The man-machine interface
has to work, and has to work

as humans are to operate
these airplanes.

They have to be designed

appropriately for the use
of a human being.

Of course, you can put in
all digits and numbers,

and computer gimmicks,
and you can...

But still, it's man who has
to operate and survey it.

And I believe, a human being
should be in charge.

In 1999, Boeing and AeroPeru

decided to settle
the lawsuits out of court.

Families and loved ones received
an exceptional settlement

averaging a million dollars US
per victim.

The damages were high
because of the terrible way

the passengers and crew
on AeroPeru died.

We were able to show that
a lot of the people were alive.

In a crash like this,
a lot of the people

would survive the crash,
and then died of drowning.

There was no question
in our minds that the people

suffered terrible terror and
pain when this happened to them.

They were horrified, they were
awake, they knew what happened.

The disaster helped
sink AeroPeru.

Combined with increased
competition and rising debt,

the national airline
went bankrupt in 1999.

Boeing increased training
on piedostatic problems

and issued new regulations about
unapproved static port covers.

Since 1996, there has not been
another piedostatic failure

like the one on AeroPeru 603.

The designers of
these products,

the manufacturers
of the products,

I know that they have take
safety into account.

They have to, of course,
they do that

because they know
it's the right thing to do,

but they also know
that if they don't do it,

there's going to be somebody
watching them that's going
to investigate it,

that's going to find out
why it happened,

and that they're going
to be accountable

for what they do wrong,

and if they don't take
into consideration safety,

they're going to have
to pay for it.

Well, it... The accidents made
the aviation industry aware

that something simple
like a piedotube

or a static port,
can cause a major incident

or even an accident.

And even...

airline pilots were
reminded that...

this is a vital basic thing
and it may happen

and this is way to prevent it
from turning into a catastrophe.

The case was settled.

The industry repented
and moved on.

Such is the world of
commercial aviation.

But it was little consolation
for those whose lives

were scarred forever by
an insignificant piece of tape.

Suddenly, saying that guy
doesn't exist anymore,

it's very hard... to swallow.

It's very hard to understand

and it took me
a long time...

to accept.

So, the memory's still there.

It'll be there for a long time.

I'm not going to let go.
I don't want to let go.

difuze