All language subtitles for Mayday.S01E02.Unlocking.Disaster.1080p.AMZN.WEB-DL.DD+2.0.H.264-playWEB_track3_[eng]

3000.

We're not getting any oxygen.

We are in an emergency.

Modern airliners are among the most

complex and reliable machines
in common use.

But occasionally,
delays in fixing a known defect
have led to disaster.

This is a story of one
of the most terrifying

and avoidable accidents
in recent history.

When a 747 suffered
a devastating explosion
at high altitude,

the crew and passengers faced
an unprecedented crisis.

It is also a story of how
one family's grief

led to a relentless
investigation

to uncover the full,
disturbing truth.

Lee can't have died
for nothing.

You know, you've got
to find out why he died

and you've got to make sure
that it never happens again.

And it reveals how other known
problems in aircraft design

have continued
to go uncorrected

causing further
avoidable accidents.

So would I be surprised
if it happened again?

I would be surprised
if it didn't happen again.

It is a matter of time.

One of the most shocking cases
of a known design flaw

being ignored for years
would finally take its toll

on the United Airlines 747

bound from Honolulu
to Auckland, New Zealand.

As flight 811 prepared
for take-off,

the crew were concerned
with another kind of threat

that had recently
led to tragedy.

We were in the aftermath
of Lockarbee.

And I had instructed the crew
to be particularly aware

because it was a through flight
from Los Angeles

going through to New Zealand.

So in my pre-flight briefing,

I had asked them to make sure
that they checked any baggage

that looked suspicious
or anything because we wanted
to be extra cautious.

Flight 811 was heavily loaded.

337 passengers,
packed cargo holds,
and a full fuel load.

The doors closed on time
and the plane left the gate

just before 2 o'clock
in the morning

for a routine 8-hour flight.

Well, we were going
to New Zealand on vacation.

Someplace that we had really
thought was interesting.

And somebody had told us how
beautiful it was,

so this was kind of
a dream come true.

I was seated in what's
called the upper deck.

I hadn't had a vacation
in five years

and I took all my MileagePlus
points from United Airlines

and I purchased
a business-class ticket

to Auckland, New Zealand,
and Sydney, Australia.

I was going to finally
make that dream vacation

I'd always wanted,
to get to Australia

and lie on a beach somewhere,

and forget about airplanes,
forget about accidents

and get this out of my mind
for a while.

On the flight deck,
Captain Dave Cronin was
hugely experienced.

Just two months
short of retirement.

Rotate.

I flew almost
35 years with United.

I've got over 30 000 hours
of flight time

in just about everything.
Military as well as civilian.

My co-pilot or first officer
was Al Slaytor.

And I've known Al at that time
for probably 20 years.

And the second officer,
Mark Thomas,

it was the first time
I had flown with him,

but we got along real well.

Tell them we can handle 33,

if it's available.
- Okay.

The pilots wanted to climb
to 33 000 feet

above the Pacific Ocean to avoid
turbulence from bad weather.

We did notice that there
were thunderstorms

a hundred miles south
right on course,

which is rather unusual
for that time of night,

so I left the seat belt sign on.

Capt Cronin's decision to keep
people fastened in their seats

would save the lives of many.

We were still climbing out and
the seatbelt sign was still on.

And uh... just basically
getting ready

to serve beverages,
and then to tuck everyone in
for the evening

because it was going to be a
long flight down to New Zealand.

Okay, tell them we are going
to detour over to the left.

Centre?
United 811 heavy.

We're going to be detouring
over some weather here.

It will be to the left,
of course.

100 miles from Honolulu,

as flight 811 climbed
through 23 000 feet,

a critical malfunction
was about to occur.

There was now a huge
air pressure difference

between the inside and
outside of the aircraft.

Suddenly, passengers
sitting just above

and behind the cargo door
heard a noise.

There was kind of
a grinding noise.

I heard like a thud.

What the hell?

In the next nanosecond,

it was pure unadulterated
pandemonium.

- We lost number three.
- Going down.

It looks like we've lost
number three engine.

And we are descending rapidly.

Coming back.

The next thing I knew,
I found myself on the stairwell

hanging onto the rungs

and I immediately knew it was
an explosive decompression.

The cargo door had torn off

and ripped a huge section
of the plane with it.

The pressurized air inside
blasted out

with explosive force.

I immediately thought
of Lockarbee.

We actually thought it was
a bomb that went off.

It was hell on earth.

Everything on the airplane
that wasn't fastened down,

tied down, or secured
became airborne.

The noise was incredible.

Everything in front
of us was gone.

Where we were sitting,
we were about six inches
from the hole.

So, there was nothing in front
of us or to the side of us.

The whole side
of the plane was gone.

Actually, our feet were dangling
on the hole.

And I first thought
we weren't going to make it.

I just didn't think
there was any hope.

With the pressurized air
blown out,

the lack of oxygen
at 23 000 feet

was now suffocating
the passengers and the crew.

It felt like someone
had kicked me in the stomach.

Knocked the wind out of me.

And I remember trying to catch
my breath...

and couldn't.

We were re supposed
to grab those oxygen masks
and put them on.

Except those oxygen masks
in that cabin,

they were ripped out of the
ceiling and they weren't there.

And... I remember
thinking to myself:

"This is what it feels like
to suffocate."

United 811 heavy.

We are doing
an emergency decent.

The pilots could tell
from their instruments

that the number 3 engine
was failing,

but they couldn't tell
the full extent of the damage.

Their priority was to get
the plane down to a level

where they could
breathe normally.

Put your mask on, Dave.

But the pilots didn't know
that the explosion

had destroyed the entire
oxygen supply.

Can't get any oxygen.

We're not getting any oxygen.

You getting any?
- I can't get any either.

With the plane heading
steeply down

and no word
from the cockpit,

the cabin crew feared the worst.

I remember thinking
that the cockpit,

which is in the upper deck,

had probably blown off
the airplane too.

Because as far up as we could
see, there was nothing there.

Now we're doing this...
nose dive,

my next thought was:

Oh my God, we're just
going straight down.

We're just going to crash
into the sea."

With its airframe ruptured,

severe damage to the right wing
and engines

and the crew forcing it down
in an emergency decent,

the problems on Flight 811
had only just begun.

Two minutes after suffering

a devastating
explosive decompression,

Flight 811 was still
in a steep emergency decent

passing rapidly
through 15 000 feet

to reach breathable air.

United 811 heavy.
State your altitude now.

Even 15.
United 811 heavy.

We're on a 15.5.

United 811. Roger.

I think we blew a door
or something.

Tell the flight attendant to
get prepared for an evacuation.

The crew finally began to
level out at a safer altitude.

But they now faced
a barrage of problems.

The most immediate was
the disintegration

of the number 3 engine
nearest to the explosion.

We don't have any
fire indications?

I... I don't have anything.

Okay, we lost number 3.

Let's shut it down.

Yeah, okay.

Ready for number 3.
Shut down checklist.

Number 3...
Before you shut down number 3,

the generator went off.

It looks alright to try it now.

Well, that stopped
the vibration anyway.

Fuel jettison procedure.

Main boost pumps. On.

Centre.
United 811.

We need the equipment
standing by,

company notified please.

We got a control problem.

Centre wing,
left right valves, on.

- Start dumping the fuel.
- I am dumping.

One stewardess
had been seriously injured
by falling debris.

As Laura Brentlinger helped her,

the full gravity of their
situation suddenly became clear.

As I am holding her
in my arms,

I looked up and as I looked up,

that was the first time
I saw this tremendous hole

on the side of the aircraft
that was just a void,

and seats were missing
and I immediately knew

that we had lost passengers.

Five rows of seats
had been blown out

in the decompression,
killing nine passengers.

On the flight deck,
the crew had turned

the stricken plane
back to Honolulu,

but with 80 miles still to go,

the crisis now got far worse.

We got a helluva
control problem here.

I got almost full rudder
on this thing.

Are you dumping
as fast as you can?

I'm dumping everything.

We got a problem
with number 4 engine?

Yeah.

Debris from the explosion

had also damaged
the number 4 engine.

If it fell completely,
the implications were severe.

If you're on two engines

and you weigh 700 pounds,
that is a big deal.

Simply because with
that kind of weight,

two engines are not going
to keep you in the air.

You are going to come down.

- Can you maintain 240?
- Just barely.

We're losing altitude.

I know it.

Centre.
United 811 heavy.

Do you have a fix on us?

Affirmative, sir,
I have you on radar.

Okay, we've lost engine
number 3

and we don't have full power
on engine number 4.

We can't hold altitude
right now.

We're dumping fuel so...
811 heavy, roger.

I see you're 60 miles south
of Honolulu at this time.

Roger.

I haven't talked
to anybody yet.

I can't get to them.

You want me to go downstairs
and take a look?

Yeah, let's see what's
happening down there.

I think we lost
a compressor, but--

Can't hold...
can't hold altitude.

- I told them that--
- Get some axe on there.

I got to take off power
on this thing.

Whatever you need, Captain.

Although their number 4 engine
was failing,

the pilots pushed it,
along with the remaining
engines to full power.

A setting they should
not be running for more
than four minutes.

But the nearest land
was 50 minutes away.

I look out the window
on the right-hand side

and I see flames, big flames.

And I know what flames
in an engine means.

It's not good.

The pilots were unaware

that the number 4 engine
was now on fire.

You've got 250 knots now,
that's good.

7000...

Yeah. We're getting
more rumble.

Watch your heading,
watch your heading,

you want to go direct
to Honolulu.

Okay. I'm gonna go downstairs

and see what the hell
is going on.

Go ahead and run down
and see what's happening.

I saw the flight engineer
descend down the stairwell.

And when I saw him,
my relief was:

"Oh my God,
they're alive."

And there was a huge sense
of relief for me.

He saw the hole and turned
as white as a sheet.

And I screamed to him:
"Dear God, please get us down."

We got a fire out there.

Oh yeah.
We got a fire on number 4.

Go through the procedure.

Shut down the engine.

We're not gonna be able
to hold this altitude on two.

We got a fire
on the right side.

We're on two engines now.

The whole right side
is just gone

from about the one right back
to uh... It's just open.

You're just looking outside.

- What do you mean?
- It looks like a bomb.

- Fuselage?
- Yeah, the fuselage.

It's just...
It's just open.

Okay, it looks like
we've got a bomb

that went off on the right side.

The whole right side is gone.

Yeah, from about the one
right back to uh...

Anybody...

Some people are probably gone,
I don't know.

I knew that we had
lost people.

I didn't know how many.

In fact, I didn't know
until the next day

how many were lost.

But...

You know, it's a terrible thing

when you're a captain
of an airplane

and you lose passengers.

Lee Campbell flying home
to New Zealand

was sitting in row 10
just in front of the cargo door.

I woke up with such a start

because I had seen Lee
standing by the bed.

Just with a gray jacket
over his arm

and a small smile
on his face.

Of course as I woke up,
it had faded. He was not there.

And when we woke up in
the morning, we discussed this.

I said, it was strange,
in the night.

It was such a vivid dream,
Lee was standing there.

And then, the radio came on

and the first item of news

was that there'd been a problem
with the United aircraft.

And I said, that was Lee.
That's Lee's.

And my blood just ran cold.

I knew he was dead
from that moment.

Centre, do you read?

We evidently had a bomb
or something.

A big section of the right side
of the airplane is missing.

United 811
heavy, roger.

I wouldn't go any faster
than I had to.

Because that pull... I mean,
I wouldn't get it over 250 knots

because that's a big--
- Okay. What's our stall speed?

- I wouldn't go below 240.
- Yeah.

I don't know if we're
going to make this.

We didn't know that we were
going to make it back.

So we were actually preparing
to ditch that plane at night

in the Pacific Ocean which has
never been done before.

In the cabin, the crew
prepared for the worst.

My training kicked in
and I got up from my jump seat

and started instructing the crew

that we have to prepare
the cabin.

We have to... prepare
for a ditching

which I thought was inevitable.

We were running around
getting life vests on

and I do remember thinking:

"I am not sure this is
going to matter

because when we hit the water,

you know, I just imagine the
plane is going to split apart."

I knew that if
we hit the water,

it would be tantamount
to hitting the ground

and there would be very few
if any survivors,

so my mind went to...

...the things that meant
something to me

and at that point
in my life, it was my son.

Believing they were
going to die,

one passenger took
these photographs,

in the hope they'd be found
in the wreckage

and give clues
to the cause of the crash.

For 15 minutes, the plane
steadily lost altitude.

Then, at 4000 feet,
the first glimmer of hope.

After an imponderable time,
I remember,

one of the passengers
began to point

out one of the windows
on the right side.

And everybody looked

and we looked through
this little window

from wherever we were,

and we could see
a point of light.

And another point of light,
and another point...

And pretty soon, you could
make out a coastline.

Okay, I got lights over here.

Okay.

Okay.

We're at 4, we're 21 miles out.

We're in good shape.

At Honolulu airport,
an emergency was declared.

All other aircraft
were diverted

and the rescue services
prepared for the crash landing

of a fully loaded airliner.

You want to give me
some speeds?

Yeah.

150 is going to be
your 2 engine.

Use 160.

I need souls on board
if you have it?

Okay, souls on board.

- 160 is the minimum.
- Standby, United 811 heavy.

I don't know how many
are on board.

200 and uh... I don't have the
paperwork in front of me here.

Uh, we're too busy right now.

200 and something.

Okay.

Six minutes from the airport.

The crew now had to slow the
overweight plane for landing.

But the effect of this
was unknown.

What's going to happen
when I start coming out

with flaps and landing gear,

we're either going to land
on the airport,

in the water
or downtown Honolulu.

Okay, we'll try ten.

Okay, inboards
are coming at ten.

How do the controls feel?

Alright, so far.

But the flaps were damaged
and could not fully extend.

This meant that flight 811

would have to land
dangerously fast.

United 811 heavy.

Do you have the airport
in sight?

It's over here
to the right, Captain.

- Okay.
- Okay, we have the airport.

United 811 heavy.

811 is cleared
to land 8 left.

Equipment standing by.

Wind is 0-5-0-1-2.

Clear to land.

8 left.
United 811 heavy.

As the unstable 747
lined up for landing,

the pilots knew they would
only have one attempt.

But even if they got it
on the runway,

the nagging question remained:

would the stress of impact
cause the damaged

and overweight aircraft
to disintegrate?

Severely damaged
with an unstable airframe

and losing altitude
on just two engines,

Flight 811 now began its final
approach to Honolulu airport.

Two engine approach.

Two engine approach.

We still had no idea
how far off the ground we were,

if we were going to make it
to Honolulu or not.

But that seemed like
an appropriate time

if we were somewhere
around land,

that we're probably going
to try and land somewhere,

to get the passengers
in their brace positions.

So that's when
we started yelling

for them to get down
in their brace positions.

Every molecule in my body
combined to express:

Get this damn airplane
on the ground.

How we doing
on the hydraulics?

Hydraulics are... good.

Have we got brakes?

Normal hydraulics.

So, we've got brakes, but
we're only going to have

reversing on one and two.

Though I thought
maybe there was a chance

that we were going to actually
be able to attempt to land,

the thought came to my mind:

"What happens now, on impact,
do we explode?

Do we fall off this huge hole?"

Despite dumping fuel,

the aircraft was still
critically overweight.

But without full flaps
to keep it in the air,

it had to approach fast.

1000 down.

The danger was that
the under carriage

could shear off
and the plane break up.

A dot and half high.

190...

185...

A little slow,
a little slow, Dave.

It's below what we want.

Coming up on the glide slope.

Okay.

Now, let's try the gear.

No one knew if the explosion
had damaged the landing gear.

I remember Laura saying to me

that she didn't hear
the landing gear go down.

And it was loud.
It was still loud.

And I didn't hear
the landing gear go down.

So that's another thought:

"Maybe they can't get their
landing gear down.

Maybe it's not down."

I've got...

Gear down
and we're clear to land

and everything is taken care of,
as far as we know.

200.

195.

Half a dot high.

Looking... Looking good.

192.

195.

I'm off on the power.

100 feet.

50 feet.

Set other trim.
Set other trim.

30...

10...

Zero.

We're on.

Gear's holding.

We landed. It felt fast.

And that was my next concern,

that we weren't going to stop
at the end of the runway,

that we were just going
to keep going.

And all of a sudden,
we were slowing down,

slowing down and I said,

"Oh my God, we've landed,
we're on the ground.

And the people
started applauding.

Probably the best landing
I've ever made.

When we finally stopped
on the runway,

we deployed all the ten shoots

and the flight attendants
evacuated all the passengers.

It's amazing how fast
everyone went.

My understanding is that
in less than 45 seconds,

330 people were
off the airplane.

We were probably
20 feet off the ground

and I would have stepped out of
that airplane without a slide.

I wanted to get off so bad.

Fortunately, there was a slide,
I stepped into the abyss,

fell into the slide, whooshed
down to the bottom of the thing.

And then, you hit, feet running.

The slide kind of kicked me up

and flew me up into the air
and my thought was:

"Oh my God, I am going
to survive this whole thing

and I am going to get
wiped out here

on the evacuation,"
because it just really threw me.

And I landed and scraped up
my legs pretty badly

and landed on my feet
and it wasn't until that moment

that I had the sense of,

"I am here. I'm okay.
I'm on the ground."

When we got
all our switches off,

I ran through the airplane
to make sure there was

no one else on the airplane,
came up to the door one left,

I went down the slide
and came around the front

and I saw that humungous hole

on the side and I just
couldn't believe it.

By the grace of God, we made it.

And it was
an awesome experience.

I would never want to go
through that again.

It was crazy, it was wild,

it was scary
all at the same time.

Um...

I just thought
that that was the end

and we were going to die.

I mean, that was my first
thought, that this is the end.

But for the families
of the nine people

who were killed,

the ordeal was only beginning.

Kevin and Susan Campbell's son,
Lee, had been flying home.

About 3 o'clock
in the afternoon,

I think they said that there was
no New Zealanders involved,

but we just knew
that it was Lee.

And then, about, I suppose,
a quarter of an hour later,

we got a phone call from Chicago

and they just said that
they regret to inform us

that our son was missing,
presumed dead.

And I guess about
another hour after that,

a policeman arrived at the door

and he took one look at us
and he says:

"I can see that
you've had the news."

So um... it was just
an awful, awful day.

And it certainly
didn't get much better
for a long, long time.

Although Lee's body
had not been recovered,

the Campbells' flew straight

to the wrecked aircraft
in Honolulu.

Your initial feeling is that
you want to be as close

to the spot
where your relative died.

And that was the aircraft.

So we had to immediately go
and see the aircraft.

The damage inside
was horrific.

Just... a total mess.

And the hole in the side
of the aircraft

was much bigger than
I had thought it would be,

even though we had seen
television newsreel reports.

And it was so sad to get in

and actually see where Lee's
seat had been.

The legs of the seat
were still there.

There was a good bit
of fuselage beside him.

And still a window.

But the Campbell's desire
to find the cause of Lee's death

inevitably brought them face
to face with dreadful details.

They took us to the medical
examiner's office as well...

because they had found body
parts and that sort of thing.

So...

They didn't actually show us
the body parts,

but they showed us
bits and pieces

they had recovered
from the engines.

And we got
the medical examiner's report

on what they had recovered.

So, we really would have
preferred that it was Lee

that went through the engine

because it would have been
an immediate death,

whereas it was a four-minute
fall down to the ocean

and we know that the people
could have been alive

as they were falling,

and when you think about that,
that is just horrific.

As it became clear
that their son's body
would never be found,

the Campbells' need to find
the cause of the accident

that killed him grew stronger.

Lee can't have died
for nothing.

You've got to find out
why he died.

And you just gotta make sure
that it never happens again.

The Campbells embarked
on a relentless

personal investigation that
would last nearly two years.

The loss of their son
meant they would stop at nothing
to uncover the truth.

The engines number
three and four...

Two months after the accident
on Flight 811,

when the National Transportation
Safety Board

held preliminary hearings,

the Campbells made sure
they were there.

But they soon grew frustrated.

The NTSB would not complete
its report for months.

So the Campbells took matters
into their own hands.

We certainly weren't going
to leave it to the NTSB

to come up with the findings,
we were going to follow through.

And when the hearings ended,
they had said that we could take

whatever we wanted
off the press table

and Susan walked up
to the top table and said:

"Oh, there's a really good
set up here."

So, grabbed a box

and loaded all of the documents
we could find up there.

Kevin's the most honest
of people, I know,

but here he was taking something

that we hadn't specifically
been told we could take.

And we were heading out
the door, just as the NTSB

were arriving back in
with a trolley to pick up
all the documents.

So we were out the door
and into a taxi and gone.

So we quickly realized

we had got a really good
set of papers.

With a lot of things
that hadn't been released
to the public.

We were able to really start
our investigation

in earnest at that stage.

The unpublished documents

revealed a disturbing
catalogue of problems

with the forward cargo door,

going right back
to its original design.

Instead of a plugged door
that gets jammed into its frame
as the aircraft pressurizes,

Boeing opted for
an outward opening door.

This allowed
for more cargo space,

but was not fail-safe
like the plug design.

So Boeing built
what they believed

was a fool-proof
locking mechanism.

What they do is they built in
multiple redundancies

to make sure the door
is properly latched

and does not open.

And you build it in to a point

that is extremely improbable
that the door would ever open.

So what went wrong
on Flight 811?

The Campbells soon discovered
that the problem

lay in the design
of the locking mechanism.

To lock the cargo door
on the 747,

electric motors rotate
C-shaped latches

around pins in the door frame.

A handle then moves arms
known as locking sectors

over top of the C-latches to
prevent them from re-opening.

But as early as 1975,

problems were found with
the locking sectors.

Kevin Campbell,
an engineer by training,

built a model to show the
weakness in the Boeing design.

Initially, the locking sectors
were made in aluminum,

and in 1975, Boeing realized
that they weren't strong enough.

And they actually doubled up
the aluminum

to make it double thickness.

But it still wasn't
strong enough

and a lot of the airlines

didn't even put
the doublers on anyway.

The weakness of the aluminum

drastically increased the risk

of the door
accidentally opening.

With the aluminum
locking sectors,

if the C-locks tried
to back wind,

open electrically,

it would just push the locking
sector out of the way.

It simply wasn't up to the job
it was designed for.

For 20 years,
747s have been flying

with this crucial weakness.

The Campbells wondered what else
remained to be revealed.

They redoubled their efforts
to uncover the full truth

behind the accident
that had killed their son.

We bought a car and set off
in the United States

to see as many people
who were involved with the
accident as possible.

We started at Seattle,
down to Denver,

across to Chicago,
through to Washington DC,

down to Kentucky, on to Miami,

and back across to San Diego,

back up through San Francisco
and back to Seattle.

And that was just one trip.

The Campbells soon found that
a shockingly similar incident

to Flight 811 had given
clear warnings

of the dangers
in the cargo door.

In 1987, two years
before flight 811,

a PAN AM 747 had been
climbing out of Heathrow

when it failed to pressurize
at 20 000 feet.

The pilots had to turn back.

When they got back
to Heathrow,

they found out the door was
hanging open an inch and a half

at the bottom
and all of the locks were open.

When they got to
the maintenance base,

they found that
all of the locking sectors

were either bent or broken.

Why had the C-latches turned

and bent back
the locking sectors?

Boeing claimed that
the ground crew

must have mishandled
the mechanism.

The door had been
closed manually

and what they said happened
was that the guy wound

the C-latch closed,
98 turns of a speed wrench.

He closed the... outer handle

and then wound it open again.

And to be in the position
that they were found in

when the aircraft got back,

he would have had
to wind them open 98 turns.

And this is just
absolutely ridiculous.

But the Campbells'
investigation uncovered

another vital clue to why
the C-latches are turned.

A report by PAN AM engineers

highlighted problems with
the doors' electrical system.

It had a fault
in the S2 master lock switch,

that should have turned off
the power to the door

when the outer handle
was closed.

This was an alarming finding.

When the outer handle
was closed,

the S2 master lock switch
was meant to disconnect

the power supply and stop the
C-latch motors from turning.

So could this have failed,

allowing the motors
to open the door?

To find out, Boeing asked the
airlines to do a simple test.

Close the outer handle,
then press the switch

to open the door
and see what happens.

When they hit the switch,
it actually worked

and Boeing thought
this is not going to work.

But it actually worked.

There was power
to the door locks

with the outer handle closed,

and the lock started to move

and it started to force

the locking sectors
out of the way.

And a few days later,

the airline started ringing in

and saying it was damaging
their planes.

So Boeing stopped the test.

But it meant that
on those aircraft,

the S2 switch had failed
which is a silent failure.

And all of those aircraft

were likely to have
the same problem as 811.

They were just waiting for a
short circuit to open the doors.

The Campbells now became
convinced that the accident

on Flight 811 began with
a failure of the S2 switch.

Power remained on
to the C-latch motors.

All it took was a short circuit
in the 20-year-old wiring

which had been found
to be frayed on other aircraft
to start the motors up.

The aluminum locking sectors
were too weak

to stop the latches turning
and the cargo door burst open.

The National Transportation
Safety Board determines

that the probable cause
of this accident...

After waiting a year
for the NTSB report,

Kevin and Susan Campbell
expected it to match

their theory of what had led
to the accident on Flight 811.

I assumed that we would have
a report come out

that this was
an electrical malfunction.

And we were staggerd
when they came out

and said that the door
had been mishandled.

The report focussed
entirely on the fact

that the door lock
must've been mishandled
by the ramp attendant.

That was disappointing
and we felt

that they must've been
at a different hearing

from the one we were at.

So how had the NTSB
come to their conclusion?

There was other evidence
that we had found

during our investigation
of improper procedures

by the United mechanics
and ramp people.

So we were convinced
that there was,

we could use the word "abuse",
being done on the doors.

The doors were sort of abused

and weren't maintained
very well.

We concluded that the probable
cause was mechanical.

For the Campbells,
the NTSB's failure to mention

the electrical problems
just wasn't good enough.

What they said happened was,

the door was closed,

the locks didn't fully close,

they just partially closed,
just hanging on... the pins.

And then they closed
the outer handle,

but that simply can't happen

because that part of the locking
sector is still intact.

It just simply cannot happen.

You can't close
the outer handle

unless these are
in the fully locked position.

It's the only way that
the outer handle will close.

And just closing this manually,

you can't exert enough force
to actually damage

this part of the locking sector.

All it does is just
butts up against there.

If the locks aren't
fully closed,

it just simply butts up
against them

and goes no further.

They went back
to investigating the accident
on Flight 811.

And soon found
disturbing evidence

of how it could and should
have been prevented.

After the PAN AM incident
in 1987,

it turned out that Boeing
had issued a directive

to the airlines
on how to correct

the weak aluminum
locking sectors.

The airworthiness directive
that came out

was to replace the aluminum
sectors with steel sectors

that could not be bent.

And there was some additionally
interim requirements

for inspections to be performed
until what they call

the terminating action, the
steal sectors were installed.

The fix was cheap and simple,
but getting it done was not.

The actual cost
of the modification,

changing these locking
sectors to steel

was 2 000 US dollars
per aircraft,

but it took
ten hours to do it.

And that's where
the money was...

Taking these aircrafts
out of service for ten hours.

That's millions of dollars.

The Campbells found
that back in 1987,

the Federal Aviation Admin,
who were meant

to enforce improvements,

had given the airlines 18 months

to comply with the modification.

Within a year, Lee Campbell
and eight others would die

in an avoidable accident.

So why weren't the airlines

forced to fix
the problem sooner?

If these airplanes, these
large commercial airplanes,

are grounded,

it's an economic disaster.

So what they do is they lobby

with the regulatory agency,

in the United States,
it's the FAA,

to allow them to do
the fixes over time,

when the airplanes are in
for normal maintenance.

And that way, they are not
taken out of service.

But when they do that,
when they allow the airlines,

the air carriers
and the manufacturers
to fix these over time,

in essence what the FAA is doing

is gambling with the lives
of the passengers and the crew

that are flying the airplanes

during the time
they are not fixed.

After the deaths
on flight 811,

the FAA instantly
shortened the deadline

for fixing the cargo door
from 18 months to just 30 days.

It was only when United had
gone from one of the airlines

of first resort to one
of the airlines of last resort

in New Zealand that they...
just totally out of the blue,

we got a letter inviting us
over to see them.

And when we got there,
they were just going to do
a PR exercise on us.

But we just laid into them,

pointed out where they had
got it wrong.

And you could see them
changing during it

to realizing that we did know
what we were talking about.

That we had put a lot
of serious effort into it.

One of them actually
broke down.

Because they'd never had
to meet next of kin before.

And it ended up with
the Vice President of United

taking us around
the maintenance facility.

And he had people running off
in all directions,

just to get the information
that we wanted,

getting questions answered.

We could go anywhere
that we wanted.

And we just...
Everything was laid on for us

because at that stage
they realised

that we really did know
what we were talking about.

The pressure
of the Campbells' campaign

eventually began to pay off.

The vital piece of evidence
that could prove them right,

the cargo door, still lay two
miles down in the Pacific Ocean.

But as articles appeared
in the American press,

the NTSB commissioned the
US Navy to search for it.

A hundred miles south
of Honolulu,

a deep submersible
began to trawl the sea bed.

We went to Honolulu.

And waited there while
they had their attempts.

And they finally
recovered the door

from 14 000 feet of water

which was the deepest recovery
ever at that time.

And we were phoned within
an hour of it coming out
of the water.

But before the Campbells
could see it,

the door was swiftly removed
to Boeing's plant in Seattle.

The Campbells
went in hot pursuit.

We went over to Boeing
and they wouldn't show it to us.

So, they reckoned
that the crucial pieces

had gone to the NTSB.

So again, we got in the car

and drove across
to Washington DC.

We arrived
at Ron Leesh's office.

And Ron looks at his watch
and he says,

"I can give you 5 minutes."

So, about three hours later,

we had the pieces that
were recovered in our hand.

And they acknowledged that
we were definitely correct,

it was an electrical
malfunction.

And they said
they would fix the planes,

they would make sure
it never happened again,

but just don't hold your breath

that the report
would ever be changed.

Even with the evidence
of an electrical malfunction

in their hands, the NTSB refused
to change their report.

Then, in June 1991,
fate intervened.

A four-year-old United 747

was sitting on the apron
in New York,

when the C-latch motor started
up and the door opened itself.

There was no way that they
could hide it any longer.

They simply couldn't deny

that it was
an electrical malfunction

that was covering it.

Finally, the NTSB publicly
issued a revised report

that concurred with
the Campbells' version.

There was an inadvertent
failure of either the switch

or the wiring that caused an
uncommanded opening of the door.

It's nice that other people
know that you are right

and had been all along

and the support that they were
giving you was vindicated.

The Campbells spent thousands
of dollars of their own money

on their campaign.

They were never interested
in a financial settlement

for Lee's death,
but they did persuade

United and Boeing to set up

a university scholarship
in his name.

I couldn't have lived
with myself

if we had done
no investigating ourselves.

It was just something we both
felt we needed to do.

We didn't even discuss it.

We just knew
that's what we would do.

Yeah.

But despite long
and public campaigns

like that of the Campbells',

critics fear that
the airline industry

has not learned the lessons
from Flight 811.

The regulatory agencies,
they have a dual charge.

One is to encourage aviation

and the other
is aviation safety.

And when you get
into a position

where you have economics
up against air safety,

they tend to err on the side of
economics rather than safety.

Serious accidents
caused by known defects
have continued to occur.

In the 1990s, known problems
with icing on aircraft wings

caused a series of crashes.

At least three planes
have had fatal fails

due to known dangers from
flammable insulation material.

And in 1996, a fully laden 747
blew itself up

when known faults in the wiring

are thought to have ignited
flammable vapours

in the fuel tanks.

Inevitably,
experts are skeptical

about the aviation
industry's record

of balancing profit
against prevention.

We've seen the wiring problem
in both United 811

which eventually turned out to
be the cause of that accident,

and also in TWA 800 where we had
an explosion in the fuel tank.

The industry's answer
to 20 and 30-year-old wiring...

And when the wiring can fray,
break, crack, cause a short,

which can either ignite fuel
like in TWA 800,

or open a cargo door
like in United 811.

What the industry says:

"Don't touch it.

Don't go in there.
Don't inspect it.

Don't try to fix it.
Don't try to remove it.

Because it is so brittle

that if you go in there
to try to fix it,

you're gonna do more damage
than you can do good."

And that's what I call
the ostrich approach

to maintenance and safety.

You know, we've decided
that you can have

a spark of ignition in a fuel
tank of a large air carrier.

But so far, we've been lucky,

we've only had
one every ten years.

We've only blown up
three or four airplanes.

You know, to go in and replace
this wiring,

to ground all these airplanes,

would be astronomically
expensive.

You know, one airplane
every ten years,

one airplane every five years,

200 or 300 people...
Cost of doing business.

Cost of doing business.

And that's a great
economic analysis

and unless your mother
or your child

is on board
one of these airplanes

that happens to pay the price
for their economic satisfaction.

For some of the survivors
of Flight 811

the cost has been heavy.

Each crew member
handled it differently.

I know that there are still
two crew members

that have never set foot
on an aircraft again.

It was very difficult for me.

I was diagnosed with severe
post-traumatic stress disorder.

You can't reason,
you can't think,

making the slightest decision
is... very difficult.

You are just at a total loss.

So it was very difficult
to cope with.

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