All language subtitles for Mayday.S01E01.Racing.the.Storm.1080p.AMZN.WEB-DL.DD+2.0.H.264-playWEB_track3_[eng]

3000.

We're not getting any oxygen.

We have the terrain alarm.

We are in an emergency.

I can't see anything.

Damn, we're off-course.

- No, I can't see it.
- Way off.

On June 1st, 1999,

as an American Airlines jet
prepared to land

amidst severe thunderstorms,

passengers knew they were
flying into trouble.

I don't know
what made me aware,

so dog gone aware, that we were
going to have a problem.

Oh, no!

Within minutes, their worst
fears would be realized.

- Other one!
- Other one!

- Other one!
- Other one!

I'm yelling, "Get away
from the plane.

Run. Get away from the plane."

I don't know
where we're at,

but there's a road that goes
around the airport.

We've got a lot of people hurt.

This film tells the story of
a tragic and avoidable
disaster.

The investigation would reveal

a lethal combination
of pilot error,

the devastating effects
of severe weather,

and a dangerous race to keep
the plane on schedule.

It would also uncover
disturbing evidence

of an industry-wide failing,

one that could kill again
at any time.

Despite reliable aircraft
and extensive training,

modern airlines and their crews
face unprecedented pressures.

Intense industry competition
demands that the whole system

from the flight planers
to the pilots be efficient
and on time.

The stresses this can bring
would play a vital role
in the loss of Flight 1420.

For a large operator
like American Airlines,

the pressures start
with the complex task

of scheduling their vast fleet.

Dispatchers direct the planes
around the world

in a carefully
choreographed dance.

The strain of maintaining
this efficiency affects
the entire system.

Of course, competition
has become very intense...

A lot of pressure
on the dispatchers, pilots,

flight attendants and basically
the whole infrastructure

to accomplish the mission
and make a dollar.

Every effort is made to
ensure

that nothing disrupts
these fragile schedules.

But there is one variable
that no airline can control:

the weather.

The southern states of America

are especially prone
to severe weather.

Storms not only cause delays,

but pose extreme dangers
to commercial jets.

Delays, scheduling problems
and fierce thunderstorms

would all conspire to turn
a routine flight

into a terrifying race
against time.

On June 1, 1999,

American Airlines Flight 1420
is running late.

The movement of the storm...

Everything is sliding
to the southeast.

So, yes we do have a stormy
evening headed our way.

The delay of Flight 1420

put pressure on the pilots
even before takeoff.

The responsibility can fall
on flight crews

to keep a tight schedule
on track.

Dispatch, please.

Yeah, it's Michael Origel.

Crews have strict legal
limits on their duty time.

The first officer
warned the dispatcher

that they were in danger
of running out of time.

...around 11:16.

The flight had to take off in
the next hour or be cancelled.

The pilots also became aware
of another pressure

caused by deteriorating weather
near their destination.

The pilots had a weather
briefing that they got

before they departed Dallas,
Forth Worth,

which provided the forecast...
the weather alerts.

The dispatcher and the captain
preparing for the flight

looked at the weather
information and thought

that they could get
to Little Rock

before the thunderstorms
impacted.

The 139 passengers just
wanted to get home.

I was traveling with my son
and my daughter.

We were coming home
from our vacation.

It was my daughter's
first flight.

The plane was late and there
were a lot of delays of course.

It was tiring,
it was frustrating,

it was late at night...

They soon began to sense
that Flight 1420

was racing against the weather.

As they called for us
to board the plane,

they wanted us there just
to get on really quickly.

Just get on, sit down, put your
seatbelt on, we're going.

They did mention that
there was bad weather

between us and Little Rock.

They wanted to get ahead
of the bad weather coming
into Little Rock.

Finally, over two hours
behind schedule,

flight 1420 leaves Dallas.

Unknown to the crew,
the storms are already massing
around Little Rock.

40 minutes later, 1420 is
100 miles from its destination.

At this point,
the voice recorder transcript

reveals a calm and steady
cockpit routine.

American 1420, are you
going to still want lower?

So far, it's okay.

So far so good, ma'am.

American 1420,
we'll let you know.

The First Officer on American
1420 was a new hire.

He had just recently
completed training

and he had been paired
on one of his first trips

with this management captain.

So, now you had
a very experienced pilot

sitting in the left seat
with the company

paired with a relatively
new hire.

Bushman and Origel
are clearly relaxed,

as they plan their approach
and landing.

25 for 24, set and armed.

You think this stuff going
to work out pretty well?

Yeah, we're almost down
to max landing weight.

Oh, there's a moon out...
or a spaceship.

Oh, it's the mother ship.

Center pump's coming
off, all right?

The pilots are keeping a
close eye on the storms ahead.

On-board weather radar
scans a cone-shaped area

of sky in front of the plane.

Potentially severe storms
show up in red.

There's your big "wha diddly".

Yeah, we've gotta get
over there real quick.

I don't like that.

That's lightning.

It sure is.

The American Airlines'
dispatcher issued an update

on the shape and formation of
the thunderstorms.

Right now on radar there's a
large slot to Little Rock.

Thunderstorms are
on the left and right

and Little Rock
is in the clear...

sort of like a bowling
alley approach.

Thunderstorms are moving
East North Eastward

towards Little Rock and they may
be a factor for our arrival.

I suggest expediting
our arrival.

The dispatcher
gave this flight crew
the weather information.

It appeared to him that there
was going to be a gap,

or what he called
the bowling alley,

where you had two types
of thunderstorms

or two thunderstorms
with an alley between it.

And that the flight crew,
if they had expedited

their travel to Little Rock,

could probably make it
up that alley

before the two storms
closed together.

But as Flight 1420 descends,

the plan to beat the storms
is about to go seriously wrong.

The pilots do not realize

that the walls of the bowling
alley are closing in.

The route flown
by American Airlines Flight
1420

is flanked by treacherous
thunderstorms,

a corridor the pilots call
The Bowling Alley.

With 80 miles to go,
the path to Little Rock

still appears to be clear.

This is the bowling
alley right here.

Yeah, I know.

In fact, there are city
lights straight there.

- Do you want to go down?
- Not yet, but pretty soon.

We're about 80 miles

from the airport and we've
started our descent toward it.

Quite a light show on the side
of the aircraft

and we're going to be passing
that on our way to Little Rock.

It's been a pleasure having
you on board our short flight.

And I'd like to take
this opportunity

to thank you for flying
American Airlines.

The lightning seemed to be
on both sides of the plane.

It lit up the inside
of the plane.

Very quick, you know, just...

"kaboom" type lightning

which was a little scary.

There was quick a light show
off to the left,

normally that doesn't get
pointed out.

If you go past
the Grand Canyon,

that gets pointed out,
but not a lightning show.

As the plane descends,
transcripts of the cockpit

voice recordings
show that the pilots

are aware of rough
weather ahead.

Descent checks complete.

We've got to get there quick.

Yup.
Sit them down early?

Hello.

I think it's going to get
a little bumpy here again,

if you don't mind.

Do we need to sit down?

Uh, well, how far
through are you?

Um... We're almost done,
but not quite.

Well, finish it up real quick.

Okay.

I thought it was more
turbulent than normal.

I remember especially
watching the flight attendant

and I was looking at her
with amazement.

I was wondering how could
she hold those trays

and pour the drinks
and not spill everything.

From that point,
it just got worse.

With flaps 40,
130 000 pounds,

200 feet...

As they prepare for landing,

the pressure on the pilots
will now steadily rack up.

Manual brakes?

Manual's fine.

At first, as the crew pick
their way around the storms,

everything seems steady.

Yeah, actually there's
the city right there.

Yeah.

Breaking through this crud.
Good, doin' good.

Even when the first
indication comes that the
storms

are advancing, the pilots
take it in their stride.

Whoa.

Looks like it's movin'
this way though.

Yeah.

Just some lightning
straight ahead.

I think we're going
to be okay though.

Right there.

Yeah.
Right down the bowling alley.

As my friends would say,
California Cool.

Cool.

Peachy.
- Exactly.

1420 at 11-3 for 10 000.

But when pilots contact
the controller at Little Rock,

he gives the first of a series
of alarming weather alerts.

We've got a thunderstorm
just northwest of the airport

moving through the area now.

Wind is 2-8-0 at 2-8,
gusts 4-4,

and I'll have new weather for
you in just a moment, I'm sure.

Gale force winds are gusting
to 50 miles per hour,

enough to blow tiles
off a rooftop.

High winds pose a severe
hazard for Flight 1420.

Crosswinds could make it
difficult to control
the plane on landing.

The pilots must
quickly determine if they're
within safe limits.

They calculate the strength
of the cross wind from its
angle

to their final approach.

All right, so,
that's 2-8-0 at 4-4.

- Gusts at 44.
- Right.

Near the limit.

Well, it's 40 degrees off.

I mean, you're not
out of the limit

because of the angle,
but that's pretty close.

The crosswind limit
for landing is 30 knots

on a dry runway.

But Bushman and Origel
now become confused

about what happens if it rains.

Well, 30 knots
is the crosswind limitation,

but see 30 knots...
that's not wet.

- That's dry.
- Yeah, dry.

- What's the wet?
- 20.

It's 25.

The discussion
is never resolved

and the crosswinds
will soon be gusting
well over the limit.

Flight attendants,
prepare for landing please.

The pilot's attention
now returns

to the bad weather ahead.

He said the storm was to the
northwest of the field.

- He said northwest.
- Yeah.

Lightning strikes...
He said storm.

But the task
of tracking the storms

is made more difficult
by the lack of sophisticated
radar at Little Rock.

American 1420, um...

your equipment's a lot better
than what I have.

How's that final
for 2-2 looking?

What's that?

Uh... we can see the airport,

but we can just barely
make it out.

Uh... we should be able
to make 2-2.

That storm is moving closer
like your radar says,

but it's a little farther off
than you thought.

The controller is going,
"Well, your radar is better
than mine," and so forth.

The controller in this accident
had a monochromatic

or basically, almost a black
and white set of a radar

and could not determine
the intensities of the storm.

Just eight miles
from the airport,

the pilots now face another
key decision:

How to approach the runway
through bad weather?

Controllers routinely
ask pilots

if they want to land visually

instead of relying
on the airport's

electronic instrument
landing system, or ILS.

But a visual approach
means they must be able

to see the runway
and this is proving difficult.

Uh... No, we can't really
make it out right now.

We're going to have to stay
with you as long as possible.

Now, as the wind suddenly
changes direction,

the pilots' problems
quickly mount up.

The wind's kind of
kicked around a little bit
right now.

It's 3-3-0 at 1-1.

Whoa.

It's a little better
than it was.

Yeah, but 330
is a tail wind though.

The crew now face the problem
of having the wind

behind them when they land,

greatly increasing the dangers
of overshooting the runway.

Then, the controller calls in
with more bad news.

Right now, I have
a wind shear alert.

Wind shear is a sudden change
of wind direction

over a short distance.

It is one of the most
feared elements

of a severe thunderstorm.

To combat constantly
shifting winds,

the pilots are forced
to throw away

their previous approach plans
and start again.

They have to reverse the
direction of their approach,

so they will be landing
into the wind.

Yeah, we're going
to need, uh...

We would rather go
into the headwinds, sir.

The pilots' decision to land
in the opposite direction

is a prudent move, but it will
create serious problems.

Okay... a right turn 2-5-0
the long way around?

Yes, sir. You're a little
close to the airport.

Yeah, right.
2-5-0, that'll work.

As the pilots turn
to their new approach,

the aircraft's weather radar,

which scans in front
of the plane,

loses track
of the thunderstorms.

Worse still,
the turn delays landing

by more than 10 minutes...

and with every passing moment,

the storms are growing
in intensity.

Runway 4 right,
1-1-1 point 3, 0-4-2.

I think... I think that was
the airport below us.

Yeah, right...

Switching runways,
keeping track of the storms,

all added greatly to
the pilots' heavy workload.

2-2-17 glide slope
intercept all the way down.

Missed approach right turn
to 4 000.

Let's see, you've got
the airport right...

Yeah. I don't have
the airport.

Well, I'm saying
you've got the ILS.

Yeah, I've got the ILS.

Airline pilots,
they make their money

when they're flying
into bad weather.

When the weather goes down,

now all of a sudden
the workload starts to increase

because you have to factor
in low clouds, rain,

lightning, thunderstorms,
wind... all of these elements

start to bombard you
the closer you get into
the airport environment.

American 1420, it appears
we have the second part

of this storm moving through.

The wind now is 3-4-0
at 1-6, gusts 3-4.

With the storms worsening,

the pilots need to make it
to the airport

as quickly as possible.

You want to accept the
short approach, keep it tight?

Yeah.
But if you can see the runway,

because I don't quite see it.
- Yeah, it's right there.

- All right.
- See it?

You just point me
in the right direction

and I'll start slowing down.
Give me flaps eleven.

Damn, it's heading
right over the field.

American 1420,
did you call me?

Yeah. We got the airport,

but we're going right
in between clouds.

I think it's to my right, uh...

off my 3 o'clock low
about 4 miles.

American 1420, that's it.

Do you want to shoot
the visual approach

or do you want to go off
of the ILS?

A visual approach
will allow 1420

to reach the airport faster
than one that depends on
instruments.

Uh, well, yeah.

I can start the visual
if we can do it.

American 1420's cleared,
visual approach runway 4 right.

If you lose it and need some
help, let me know please.

But a visual approach means
the pilots must keep the runway

in sight at all times.

The transcripts now
reveal rising confusion

on the flight deck
as the captain struggles

to fix the position
of the airport.

Okay.
Did you notice something?

Did you see the airport there?

Where?

There, okay...

You're on a base for it.

Okay. It's right there.

I'm on a base now?

It's like a dogleg...

and we're coming in
and there it is right there.

I... I lost it.

You're downwind of it.
It's right... it's right there.

Well, I still don't see it.

Just vector me.
I don't know.

American 1420, monitor
1-1-8 point 7, runway 4 right,
clear to land.

The wind now is 3-3-0 at 2-1.

18-7, we'll monitor,
American 1420, thanks.

Uh, clear to land runway 4.

See... Those red lights there,

what are they in relation to?

There's the runway, uh...
there's two runways.

Yeah, I know.

See, we're losin' it.

I don't see how we can
maintain visual.

The pilots now have to
abandon their direct visual
approach

and request help
from Little Rock's

instrument landing system.

But this delays landing
even further.

Approach American 1420.

American 1420, yes sir.

Yeah, there's a cloud
between us and the airport

and we've lost the field.

Um... we're on a vector...

Well, basically we're on
the last vector you gave us,

which is like a dogleg,
it looks like.

American 1420,
can you fly heading 2-2-0?

I'll take you out
to the ILS.

This news footage shows the
storm on the night of the
crash.

As heavy rain cuts visibility
even further,

Captain Bushman
becomes frustrated.

See, I hate droning around
visual at night in weather

without having
any clue where we are.

The thing that was really
getting to me was...

I knew we were getting very low.

I knew that the rain
was not letting up

and that we were being jolted
around quite heavily.

See how we're going right
in the middle of this crap.

Right.
Approach American 1420,

I know you're doing
your best, sir,

but we're getting really close
to this storm

and uh, we'll keep it really
tight if we have to.

The plane was rocking
and rolling at that point.

It was pretty
dog gone unstable.

I don't know what made me
aware... so dog gone aware,

that we were going to have
a problem.

I don't know what did that.

As flight 1420 lines up
for final approach,

they're heading straight into
the heart of the thunderstorm.

The crisis for the flight crew
is about to get even worse.

With flight 1420 four minutes
from touch down,

severe thunderstorms give the
pilots another major problem.

Blinding rain and thick clouds
are obscuring the airfield.

The visibility on the runway,
known as RVR,

is getting dangerously low.

We're goin' right into this.

American 1420, right now,

we have heavy rain
on the airport.

I don't have new weather
for you,

but visibility
is less than a mile

and the runway 4 right
RVR is 3 000.

Visibility is down
to 3 000 feet,

the pilots are unsure
if it's safe to land.

3 000?

Roger that, 3 000,
American 1420.

This is 4 right, correct?

American 1420,
that's correct, sir,

on runway 4 right,
clear to land.

The winds now 3-5-0
at 3-0, gusts 4-5.

Can we land?

0-3-0 at 4-5, American 1420.

3 000 RVR...
we can't land on that!

- 3 000 at...
- What do we need?

No... it's 2400 RVR.

- Okay. Right.
- Yeah. We're fine.

Alright. 15.

Landing gear down.

And lights please.

As we descended, we descended
through a very dark black cloud.

The rain seemed to be
going horizontal.

It was windy enough,
apparently,

outdoors, that the plane
was moving around a lot.

I'd never done this before...

I buckled up really tight,
almost uncomfortably tight,

and I was concerned
enough I put my shoes back on
and got ready to go.

There was something going on
that made me very nervous.

The crosswinds are way
over the limit.

The pilots could divert
to another airport,

but they don't, even as
the weather gets worse.

Wind shear alert!

Center field wind 3-5-0 at 3-2,

gusts 4-5, north boundary wind
3-1-0 at 2-9,

north east boundary wind
3-2-0 at 3-2.

The jolts seemed to be much
stronger than I'd ever felt.

You could tell that the
thunderheads were extremely
close to the plane.

I said words to the effect
that if he tries to land in
this weather we'll crash.

- Flaps 28.
- Add 20.

Then visibility falls
drastically below the limit.

American 1420, the runway
4 right RVR is now 1600.

Damn.

The crew are rattled.

Under pressure,
they begin to make mistakes.

Can't see anything.

Looking for 4-60.

- It's there.
- Couldn't see anything.

The wind was throwing the plane
around so violently...

I think there was enough
of a crosswind that I was afraid

we were going to land on a wing.

It felt like we were going
to tip over, I mean,

it just felt that bad.

- You want 40 flaps.
- Yeah, I thought I called it.

I knew the way
he was jockeying the plane

and the sounds of the engines
that he was trying to get
lined up for the runway,

and I couldn't see it
and I couldn't see it,

but I could tell we were close.

And I kept thinking,
"Where's the runway?"

1000 feet...

20...

40-40 land...

This... this is a can
of worms.

Wind is 3-3-0 at 2-8.

I'm going to stay
above it a little.

There's a runway off
to your right.

You got it?
- No.

I've got the runway in sight.
You're right on course--

Stay where you are--
- I got it. I got it.

Most of the people
at that point in the plane

were just holding on
really tight.

Just looking forward,
I mean, like rigid.

I suspected the worst.
I really did.

We might not get down.

In the midst
of fierce thunderstorms,

Flight 1420 is about to land
at Little Rock.

Low visibility and high winds

make the final approach
treacherous.

Wind 3-3-0 at 2-5.

- 500 feet.
- Plus 20.

Wind 3-3-0 at 2-3.

Damn, we're off course.

- I can't see it.
- Way off!

I can't see anything.

- Got it?
- Got it!

100 feet.

50 feet.

40...

30...

20...

10...

We hit the runway real hard
and we didn't slow down.

We're down!
We're sliding!

Oh, no!

We were still going very,
very, very fast,

and at that point I thought,
we're dead.

On the brakes!

It was just chaos.

It was terrifying.

It was quite literally
terrifying.

Other one!

Other one... other one!

When the plane
actually stopped,

there was a moment
of absolute total silence.

There was fire
in front of me...

and I could see debris
and it was silent.

And I thought, "Oh my gosh.
I'm dead!"

Well, I knew we were
in deep trouble.

You know, it's a process
that started,

and in some way,
it's got to end,

it's gonna end and when it ends
how do I get out of here?

Within those minutes,
I heard a small scream.

And I heard it get louder
and louder and louder,

like it was on a megaphone and
it hit me: That's my daughter.

And I was like, "Oh, okay.
We've got to get out of here.

You know, we've got
to do something."

The passengers struggled
to get out before fire
engulfed the cabin.

I had a broken scapula,
a dislocated shoulder,

and cracked ribs and
all sorts of stuff going on,

but I didn't feel a thing.

I just wanted to get out.

I was not going to die
in that thing.

I got out of that plane
probably in ten seconds.

It was like being
in a war, go, go, go.

I was yelling, "Get away
from the plane, run,

get away from the plane, go!
Go. Go."

Some folks looked like
they'd been in an explosion.

Their clothes were tattered.

I saw a man using his cell
phone to call for help.

Okay, I don't know
where we're at,

but there is a road that
goes around the airport...

We've got a lot of people hurt.

Traveling at over
100 miles an hour,

the aircraft ran off
the end of the runway,

ploughed down
a 25-foot embankment

and slammed into
a steel walkway.

The plane was ripped
into several pieces.

The wreckage finally came
to rest on the muddy banks
of the Arkansas River.

10 passengers died in the
crash.

Captain Bushman
was killed instantly

when the cockpit was split open
by the steel walkway.

It was a shame I hadn't...
literally a shame,

that I had not done more
to save people.

That's the worst
nightmare I have.

The US National
Transportation Safety Board

was immediately notified.

Greg Feith was the NTSB's
chief investigator.

The night
American 1420 happened,

I received a phone call
about one o'clock in the morning

from our communication center
at the NTSB,

advising that there had been
an aircraft accident

at Little Rock and there may be
some fatalities involved.

Fellow investigator Don Eick
was quickly on the scene.

There's a sense of adrenalin
as an accident occurs like this

where you're being launched
to the accident scene.

And there's a strong urge
to get there,

to try to find out
what happened,

to document the facts, so we can
prevent it from happening.

The NTSB set up a command
center close to the site.

They would spend
the next 18 months

piecing together the events
that led to the crash.

We did have a basic idea

when we got on scene
of what happened.

We just didn't know why.

We knew the airplane went off
the end of the runway.

We knew the pilots
couldn't stop it.

We knew that the aircraft
was destroyed

going through this catwalk.

We knew that the subsequent
post-crash fire killed people.

We just didn't know
why at that point.

The NTSB worked backwards
from the impact,

piecing together
the sequence of events

from the final approach all the
way back to Dallas, Fort Worth.

The first question
for investigators

was why the pilots had been
unable to stop the plane.

Analysis of the tire tracks
left by the skidding plane

showed a complete loss
of control after touch down.

When you look at the width
of those tire tracks,

you then see that the airplane
wasn't going straight,

but in fact was
sliding sideways.

Here you have this machine

that weighs 130, 140 000 pounds.

It has a hundred
or so people on it

and it is sliding uncontrolled
off this runway.

Something had gone
terribly wrong on landing

and investigators
had to find out why.

They questioned the survivors
of flight 1420

who would provide
an extremely important clue.

The NTSB investigators
needed to find out

why flight 1420 had slid
uncontrolled off the runway.

They set out to interview
surviving passengers,

many of whom were local
to Little Rock.

Their eyewitness testimony
would point the inquiry

towards the most important
mechanical system

used to slow a plane down
after landing.

What we were really
interested in

were those passengers
that were sitting in a position

right near the wings
who could look out the windows

and tell us whether they saw
the ground spoilers deploy.

Spoilers are large flaps
that flip up on landing,

literally spoiling the airflow
over the wings.

This prevents them
from giving lift

and allows braking
to take effect.

Crucially,
none of the passengers

saw the spoilers deploy.

To check their testimony,
the NTSB examined information

from the airplane's
black boxes.

The flight data recorder,
which monitors the systems

on board during flight,
confirmed that the spoilers
had failed to deploy.

The implications were
catastrophic.

Flight 1420 had no hope
of stopping in time.

On the brakes!

We're sliding!
- Oh no!

So, was the failure
of the spoilers to deploy

a mechanical problem

or in the confusion of final
approach, was it pilot error?

To find out, the NTSB
would make clever use

of the cockpit voice recorder
or CVR.

- You want 40 flaps?
- Yeah! I thought I called it!

One of the key elements
that the CVR team

was listening for was the
setting of the spoiler handle.

Was saw on the flight data
recorder that the ground
spoilers didn't deploy.

We wanted to know if the handle
had been actually armed or not.

And we were looking
for a specific click sound.

We couldn't find that sound
on the accident CVR,

which led us to believe
that the handle was never

in the armed position
at touch down.

Intensely busy in the
cockpit,

the pilot simply forgot
to arm the spoilers.

Had they deployed,
the MD80 aircraft

might have over shot the
runway,

but it would have stopped
before hitting the catwalk.

The pilots had made serious
and ultimately fatal errors,

but investigators
wanted to know why.

They suspected that
pressures earlier in the flight

led to these mistakes.

They turned their attention
to the weather.

It was clear to us
that severe weather

had been in the area around
the time of the accident.

How it played a part
was one of the things

we had to try discover,

and putting the radar images in,
the observations,

trying to put it all together
would take weeks, of course,

to get this information done.

The NTSB wanted to know
what role the weather

had played in the crash

and had the pilots been fully
aware of the dangers?

See, we're going right
in the middle of this crap.

One of the concerns
that all pilots have

when they're trying to land
an aircraft is, of course,

making sure that the crosswinds
that they may experience

don't exceed the capabilities

of either themselves
or the aircraft.

The winds now 3-5-0
at 3-0, gusts 4-5.

Can we land?

This particular flight crew
had a limitation

not imposed by themselves,
but imposed by the company

and that was that they were
not allowed to exceed

a 10-knot crosswind
on a wet runway.

Crosswind limits are clearly
stated in the operating manual.

The crew of 1420 were flying
beyond regulation limits.

This...
This is a can of worms.

There's a runway off
to your right.

You got it?
- No.

The effect of the winds can
be seen in this NTSB animation

showing the captain's
desperate last maneuvers.

Winds definitely impacted
the flight.

If you look at the animation,

you'll see him fighting
the winds...

Definitely not good.

We're down!

On the brakes!

Other one! Other one!
Other one!

When you start talking
about wet runway,

thunderstorms... not good.

But were the crew of 1420

aware of the hazards posed by
the severe weather?

For the NTSB, previous
accidents had made the dangers

of thunderstorms all too clear.

In 1994, a US Air DC 9

fell victim to wind shear
in North Carolina.

The plane stalled at 250 feet
and fell from the sky.

A Delta Tristar crashed after
flying into the most severe
kind of wind shear

that created an intense
downdraft of air.

So should the crew of 1420
have aborted the approach?

There's the runway... uh...
there's two runways.

Yeah, I know.
See we're losing it.

I don't see how
we can maintain visual.

This NTSB weather animation
overlays the path

of the aircraft with ground
radar images of the storm.

Bushman and Origel
landed in lightning,
torrential rain and hail

and the crosswinds gusting
well over the limit.

Based on the information
we had from ground base
weather radar,

the flight crew of 1420
should have been seeing
the majority of that storm.

They would have been seeing
the leading edge going green,

rapidly changing to yellow
to a bright red.

Can't see anything.
Looking for a 4-60.

As they progress towards
Little Rock,

they started to paint
the bad weather

not only on their
on-board radar,

but they could see
out the window... lightning.

And one of the key statements
that this captain made,

which basically summarized
the entire flight,

was the captain saying...

I hate droning around
visual at night in weather

without having any clue
where we are.

"I hate droning around
at night

when I don't know where I am."

That was such a key statement.

It was at that point,

by an experienced
10,000-hour captain,

that he should have
abandoned the approach

going into Little Rock
and either gone to his alternate

or made his way back to Dallas.

But to make a statement
like that and then continue
an approach to an airport

where you have a thunderstorm
in progress over the airport...

is a recipe for disaster.

But the pilots
were not the only ones
to be heavily criticized.

As the investigation continued,

American Airlines' flight
policy would come under fire

and an industry-wide scandal
was about to be exposed.

For months after the crash
of flight 1420,

the NTSB dug deeper
into the circumstances
surrounding the accident.

The question was: Who would
take responsibility?

American Airlines
were reluctant to admit

that their pilots
had knowingly flown

into a severe thunderstorm.

Initially, they tried
to pin the blame

on the controller
at Little Rock.

American started legal action

against the authorities
responsible for airport
controllers.

American's lawyers claimed
that the crew of flight 1420

had not been given all
the current weather
information.

American 1420,
your equipment's a lot better
than what I have.

How's that final
for 2-2 left looking?

But after interviewing
the controller at Little Rock,

investigators were unconvinced.

It's highly unlikely
that the flight crew

wasn't sufficiently informed

about the nature
of the weather,

and the severity of the weather,

not only en route
but, of course,

during the course
of landing at Little Rock.

The focus turned back
on the pilots.

Lawyers representing
the passengers were determined

to get American Airlines to
accept liability for the crash.

I mean, it is about money,
in a way,

because you want
to make them pay,

because I saw the letters
that they would write back
to my lawyer,

minimizing what
we had been through.

Minimizing my daughter's burns,

cuts, the psychological effects
it had on my son at age 15

and my daughter and me...
and just minimizing everything.

So you want to find
a way to hurt them.

Renee Salmans
and many other survivors

attended the NTSB
public hearings

held in Little Rock eight
months after the disaster.

With the captain dead,
the co-pilot was the first
to testify.

As we went off
the end of the runway,

I could see the runway lights
coming up

and I knew we were going off
the end of the runway...

I couldn't see anything
in front of us.

All I thought was that the gear
would collapse

and we would continue to slide,
it's got to be okay.

And all of a sudden,
I felt the impact.

I followed it as close
as I could.

You bet.
I wanted to know what happened.

I went to all of the
NTSB hearings.

I was outraged.

I was mad.

For me, they didn't ask him
the right questions.

You know, I wanted to ask him:
What were you thinking?

Why did you all play chicken
with our lives?

The co-pilot's testimony
was highly controversial.

In his account of the final
moments of the flight,

he claims to have told the
captain to abort the approach,

otherwise known as a go-around.

Who can call for abandoning
the approach?

Either pilot.

Did you call for
a go-around at any time?

Yes, sir, I did.

Sounds like after
reviewing the tape,

you can definitely hear
the "go" and the "around".

It seems like he talked
at the same time I did

and I looked over at him

and he brought the airplane
back on course.

However, when NTSB
specialists studied the cockpit
voice tapes,

they couldn't hear
this statement.

Damn, we're off
course. No, I can't see it.

Way off!

Even though he stood by
that statement,

we could never validate it.

That led to a controversial
finding because we weren't

really sure if that
took place or not.

The NTSB asked tough
questions to the co-pilot,

but was American Airlines'
training also at fault?

Greg Feith put an American
Airlines' manager on the stand.

What were the company rules

for pilots flying
near thunderstorms?

When asked the question,
he basically responded

that he just didn't want
his pilots flying into
that type of weather.

Our pilots are forbidden
to enter or depart

a terminal area
blanketed by thunderstorms.

To the NTSB, this policy
simply wasn't clear cut enough.

Well, that's a very subjective
call for a pilot.

Pilots need boundaries.

You have to set limits.

If there's convective activity,
that is thunderstorm activity,

that's within five nautical
miles of the airport,

there's lightning, there's wind
shear... don't go there.

The deeper they looked,
the more the NTSB found

that flying into thunderstorms
was disturbingly widespread.

Extraordinary evidence
given at the hearings

revealed that the problem
spread through the whole
industry.

Expert analysts from MIT
spent weeks recording

the flight paths of planes
landing at Dallas, Fort Worth.

They waited for thunderstorms
and watched how pilots reacted.

Their animation plots
the planes coming in to land

overlaid with radar images
of the storms.

Anything yellow or orange is a
potentially severe
thunderstorm.

Of the 2000 encounters
with thunderstorms,

two out of three pilots
flew into the storm

and landed their aircraft.

I was very surprised by the
testimony at the public hearing.

Given the fact that they are
flying the best equipment,

typically have
the best training,

have the best information
available to them,

for those decisions to be made
to continue into harm's way,

it was very surprising to me
that they tried to do that.

Pilots know that if we go
into that thunderstorm,

we may not come out
of that thunderstorm,

and if we do it may not be
basically in one piece.

Why did so many pilots
fly into danger?

The MIT researchers found
pilots were more reckless

if they were behind schedule,
if it was night,

and if aircraft
in front of them were also
flying into bad weather.

In the Little Rock case,
two of those three elements

were present: it was night and
they were running late.

The MIT investigation
was chilling evidence

that the crash at Little Rock

was part of a much
wider problem.

We're not seeing
a major improvement,

to put it bluntly.

There's a limited time
for training,

weather was a significant part
that set up the stage

of this accident.

We do not condone any operation

to be conducted in such weather.

It is a known severe
weather hazard

and it should have been
suspended... no operation.

Ironically, it also emerged
that new technology

may be partly to blame
for bad decision-making.

Might it be that we're
desensitizing pilots?

We're putting weather radar
on-board aircraft,

we're putting wind shear
detection systems on airplanes.

Most of these systems only
react when you're in the hazard,

at that time,
it may be too late.

The root causes behind the
crash of 1420 went even deeper.

Why were the pilots
so determined to land?

Gregory Feith found the answer
back at Dallas, Fort Worth

before the flight
even left the ground.

There he found signs
of a deadly condition

in aviation known as
"get-there-itis".

There may have been a sense
of "Get-there-itis".

The flight crew knew
that they were pushing
their 14-hour duty day.

It had been a long duty day,
the airport's right there,

let's try it, let's see if we
can accomplish the mission.

Pilots are goal-oriented,
we're mission oriented.

We will stick our nose in there

to try and see if we can
accomplish the mission.

Sometimes, we will accomplish
that mission,

but sometimes, we get too far
into it that we can't bail out,

we don't have any more options
and bad things happen.

For flight 1420, the
pressures of "Get-there-itis"

sparked a fatal series
of mistakes and misjudgments.

At the end of a long day,
rushing to beat the storms

and get the passengers
to their destination,

the crew of 1420
made a basic mistake

that cost eleven people
their lives.

They forgot to arm
the spoilers.

They were so busy trying
to get the plane on the ground

that they forgot to do what
they needed to do.

They didn't have time to do it.

After the accident,
American Airlines

revised their
checklist procedures.

Both pilots must now confirm
that the spoilers are armed,

ready for landing.

In October, 2001, the NTSB
published their report.

They concluded that the two
main causes of the crash

were first the decision
to land in a thunderstorm,

and second, the pilots' failure
to arm the spoilers.

American Airlines declined
to take part in this film

or comment on the findings.

As an investigator,
I had over two years

to basically criticize
and determine

what the captain was trying
to accomplish.

That particular captain
had seconds to make decisions

based on the information
he was getting.

And while it's unfair
for an accident investigator
like myself

to start pointing the finger,
I wasn't there.

I blame them,

but I'm not
angry per se at them.

I don't waste my time
with anger on them.

They got nothing but flack.

You can understand it,

but I can't understand
a person, you know,

wanting to kill himself either.

We've been out and visited
his grave

at the Air Force Academy
a couple times

and the guy just got caught up
in a bad, bad situation.

I mean, uh... been
there, done that.

One year after the crash,

the survivors of flight 1420

gathered at the site
to remember those who died.

For surviving passengers,

the effects of the crash are
long lasting and profound.

We as a family worked long
and hard to work through it.

We had many talks.

It blew apart a lot
of relationships.

You find out who
your real friends are.

I cannot do enough to mitigate
what happened

to the individuals
on the airplane.

Life is a precious thing
and you're definitely here

for a very short time.

All of a sudden,
your life looks like about
a second and a half long.

The impact of the crash
is something that I try

to block out of my mind, because
I still feel uh...

...a reaction.

People ask me if I'm okay.

Well, no, I'm not okay!

No! We'll never be okay.

And what is this okay stuff?

You're different.

Deal with it.

I mean, that's the way
we're going to be.

The day after...

...it happened when Adam
and I were in the hospital,
and Samantha...

...Adam and I got up
and we looked out the window

and we just couldn't believe
that life went on.

We just couldn't believe
cars were driving

and it was sunny
and life went on,

because for us, life stopped.

difuze