All language subtitles for The.Ultimate.Civil.War.Series.S01E03.Days.of.Infamy.1080p.AMZN.WEB-DL.DD+2.0.H.264-playWEB_track3_[eng]

And now came
the moment of battle that

tried us severely, not that
there was a sign of hesitancy,

or show of poor behavior, but
it is terrible to march slowly

into danger, and see and feel
that each second your chance

for death is surer than it was
the second before.

The desire to break loose, to
run,

to fire, to do something, no
matter what,

rather than to walk, is almost
irresistible.

We were under fire and
advancing at a brisk walk,

closed in mass...
ten ranks deep.

We were almost as good a
target as a barn.

Union Lieutenant
John Mead Gould described his

regiment's experience as they
marched into battle at

Antietam on September 17,
1862,

which would become the
bloodiest single day of combat

in American history.

The battle marked the end of
Robert E. Lee's

Maryland Campaign.

Following his victory at the
Second Battle of Manassas,

General Lee brought his army
across the Potomac and into

Maryland, invading the north.

He wanted to move the conflict
out of his beloved Virginia,

and to draw fresh troops from
a Maryland that he expected

would greet his men as
liberators.

Though Maryland remained with
the Union,

it was a slave state.

Many in Maryland were
sympathetic

to the southern cause.

Lee believed that these were
the men who would join his

army if they were given the
chance.

Lee, and Confederate President
Jefferson Davis,

also hoped that a successful
northern campaign would

encourage the European powers
to lend political and military

support to the Confederacy, as
well as influence the upcoming

midterm elections in the
Union,

putting more Peace Democrats
in Congress.

The recent Confederate success
at the Second Battle of Bull

Run, or Second Manassas, had
some European leaders leaning

toward recognizing the
Confederacy as a legitimate

government, and treating with
both the CSA and the USA

as two separate nations.

And in the Union, the public
was frustrated with

Lincoln's failure to end the
war quickly.

A successful invasion, Lee and
Davis hoped,

could indeed hasten the end of
the war,

but not to the Union's
benefit.

Lee believed he would face
minimal resistance,

as the Union Army of the
Potomac was demoralized by its

loss at Manassas, and would
take weeks to reorganize.

Upon reaching Frederick,
Maryland,

Lee drew up a Proclamation to
the people of Maryland.

It declared that his army had
arrived to help them throw off

the "foreign yoke" of oppression
by the U.S. government.

But the people of Maryland did
not greet Lee with open arms.

Many, if not most,
secessionist-leaning

Marylanders had long since
gone south and already joined

the Confederate forces.

Those who remained were
appalled at the invasion.

Furthermore, Lee's bedraggled,
hungry, poorly-clothed army

did not inspire young men to
join their cause.

Lee then divided his forces,
sending Stonewall Jackson with

about half of the army to
capture Harpers Ferry,

seizing the weapons and
ammunition stored there and

securing his lines of supply
further south.

General Jackson and his thirty
thousand troops were able to

overwhelm the twelve thousand
Union troops

in place at Harpers Ferry.

The rest of Lee's army moved
northwest toward Hagerstown,

Maryland, across South
Mountain.

But another of the southern
commander's assumptions

proved incorrect.

Rather than taking weeks to
reorganize Union forces,

General George McClellan
accomplished it in days.

General John Pope was relieved
of his command following the

disaster at Second Manassas.

His Army of Virginia was
folded into McClellan's Army

of the Potomac.

McClellan's superior
organizational skills,

and the love his men had for
their "Little Mac",

reinvigorated the northern
forces as they marched into

Maryland to head off the
invasion.

The Union army moved into
Frederick just days after

Lee's army had departed.

Upon learning of the proximity
of the Union forces,

Lee sent word to all his
commanders to regroup outside

of Sharpsburg, Maryland, near
Antietam Creek.

Unfortunately for Lee,
McClellan received a copy of

Lee's orders on September 13.

With these in hand, McClellan
had an opportunity to take his

larger force and destroy Lee's
army in pieces.

But McClellan was ever
cautious,

always overestimating the size
of his enemies' forces.

He moved slowly, cautiously,
and by the time he committed

his troops to battle on
September 17,

most of Lee's troops had
joined him near Sharpsburg.

The armies fought across open
fields and cornfields,

along roads and next to a
bridge later named for

Union General Burnside.

Lieutenant Gould described his
regiment's experience.

The fire of
the enemy became more galling

every step we took, and one
man after another fell...

The battle had been terribly
severe to us,

engaged as we were at close
quarters,

and with troops that had seen so
much more fighting

than we had...

...the well aimed bullets
of the rebels as they went

zipping past us, killing and
wounding our comrades and

sometimes cutting spitefully
through our clothes,

made us most nervous, of
course...

The Battle at
Antietam saw twenty-three

thousand casualties, killed,
wounded,

captured, or missing.

A quarter of the Army of the
Potomac,

and over thirty-percent of the
Army of Northern Virginia.

Over six thousand American
soldiers - north and south -

lost their lives on that day
of battle.

As historian James M. McPherson
notes, American casualties at

Antietam were four times greater
than American losses at Normandy

on June 6, 1944.

Despite his losses on the
seventeenth,

General Lee and his army stood
their ground when dawn broke

on the eighteenth.

They stood facing McClellan's
larger army,

which included twenty thousand
fresh reserves who had not

fought the previous day, and
they prepared

themselves for attack.

But that attack never came.

Eventually, Lee withdrew his
forces across the Potomac.

From one perspective, neither
side won that bloody battle.

Despite being greatly
outnumbered, Robert E. Lee's

superior generalship had allowed
his smaller army to

inflict significant damage on
the Union forces.

At the same time, General
McClellan's hesitancy,

and his decision to hold a
third of his army in reserve,

prevented the Army of the
Potomac from smashing Lee's

army once and for all.

Although McClellan was able to
build a great army for

Lincoln, he was not able to
use it.

Lieutenant Charles Brewster,
of the Tenth Massachusetts,

was working at a recruiting
station in Cambridge when he

learned of the results at
Antietam.

He wrote in a letter home to
his mother:

I see the news
begins to grow less favorable

to our side in the late battles.

At first they were going to
"bag the whole Rebel Army",

now they are "driven back into
Virginia" which is not the

place to bag them by a long
shot.

But though McClellan
might have been able to

accomplish far more than he
did at Antietam,

it was nonetheless a strategic
Union victory.

Lee's army was stopped short.

The northern invasion had
failed.

The Army of Northern Virginia
returned to Virginia.

The loss at Antietam put a
halt to chances of European

recognition of the
Confederacy.

Karl Marx, living in London,
had been following the

American Civil War closely,

writing numerous articles
about it.

In October 1862, stating what
many

had already agreed, upon, he
wrote:

The short campaign in
Maryland has

decided the fate of the
American Civil War,

however much the fortune of
war may still vacillate

between the opposing parties
for a shorter or longer time.

In the elections in
November,

although the Peace Democrats
would capture more seats than

they had previously held,
Lincoln's Republican Party

would maintain control of the
House of Representatives.

Combined with the Unionist,
who were also committed to

preserving the Union through
military means,

they controlled the majority
vote.

The Maryland invasion had
failed in all of its goals.

But the suffering of Antietam
was felt by both sides.

Second Lieutenant B.F.
Blakeslee of the

Sixteenth Connecticut
Volunteers, wrote:

In a room about
twelve by twenty feet a

bloody table stood and around
it were five surgeons.

A wounded man was laid on the
table and it took but a few

seconds for them to decide
what to do,

and but a few minutes to do
it.

The amputated limbs were
thrown out of a window.

In forty-eight hours there
were as many as two carts of

loaded amputated legs, feet,
arms,

and hands in the pile.

Plenty of men, most of them
slightly wounded,

were hard at work carrying the
wounded to and fro,

making beds of straw, hauling
and cutting wood,

and assisting in a thousand
ways.

Antietam looms large
in American memory,

not simply because of the long
casualty lists,

but because it was the
first major battle to be

thoroughly documented by
photography.

Photographer Alexander
Gardner,

working for noted photographer
Matthew Brady,

brought the images of the true
horrors of war home to

Americans for the first time.

Brady exhibited these
photographs

in his New York gallery.

On October 20, 1862, The New
York Times described the

effect these images had on
civilians back home.

Mr. Brady has
done something to bring home

to us the terrible reality and
earnestness of war.

If he has not brought bodies
and laid them in our dooryards

and along the streets, he has
done something very like it.

At the door of his gallery
hangs a little placard,

"The Dead of Antietam."

Crowds of people are
constantly going

up the stairs...

You will see hushed, reverend
groups standing around these

weird copies of carnage,
bending down to look in the

pale faces of the dead.

We should scarce choose to be
in the gallery,

when one of the women bending
over them should recognize a

husband, a son, or a brother
in the still,

lifeless lines of bodies, that
lie ready

for the gaping trenches.

Those lifeless lines
of bodies weighed

on President Lincoln.

But what frustrated him most
about the battle at Antietam

was the series of missed
opportunities.

Yes, General McClellan had
succeeded in stopping

Robert E. Lee's invasion of
Maryland.

But General Lee had succeeded
in preventing his own army's

destruction at the hands of
the Army of the Potomac.

While Lincoln was glad to have
the immediate threat removed,

he saw the failure to smash
Lee's army after Antietam as a

lost opportunity to end the
war.

Lincoln had expected McClellan
to follow after Lee,

striking hard while the
confederate forces were still

reeling from their losses at
Antietam,

and were still far from home.

Lincoln visited McClellan at
his headquarters near Antietam

in the first week of October.

At that point, the Army of the
Potomac had sat still

for over two weeks.

He urged McClellan then to
pursue the enemy quickly,

while the time was right.

But McClellan did not move.

Lincoln followed his visit
with telegrams that continued

to push McClellan to take
action.

He instructed his General in
Chief,

Henry Halleck, to order
McClellan to

"Cross the Potomac and give
battle."

But McClellan did not move.

Finally, on November 7,
Lincoln removed McClellan from

command, replacing him with
General Ambrose Burnside.

But though McClellan did not
achieve the level of

success that Lincoln believed
possible,

the end of the northern
invasion and Lee's retreat to

Virginia did give Lincoln the
opportunity he needed

for something else.

In the North, abolitionist
pressure was building for a

general emancipation of all
slaves.

Lincoln knew that he would
need a substantial Union

military victory first, or
else the move would seem like

an act of desperation, and
therefore might draw more

resistance than support in the
north.

Lincoln also feared what
emancipation efforts would do

to the support of the border
states.

On multiple occasions, he met
with delegates from these

states, in an attempt to get
them to accept some process of

gradual emancipation, whereby
the federal government would

financially reimburse
slave-owners for their

loss of "property."

But the offer was flatly
refused.

Months earlier, Congress was
able to force the issue in the

District of Columbia.

In April 1862, about a year
after the war began,

Congress abolished slavery in
the District,

and compensated former slave
owners with payments of three

hundred dollars per slave.

It was the beginning of
emancipation in America.

Even in the North, there was
resistance to the idea of

large numbers of free blacks
intermingling with whites.

White workers feared the
competition they might face,

competing against workers
whose experience was to labor

without pay.

Racist fears dovetailed with
economic ones,

as foes of emancipation warned
of black men taking up with

the daughters of white men.

Anti-slavery forces resisted
this backlash,

and stressed that emancipation
would help the war effort.

Lincoln, as ever, sought to
preserve the Union.

As he said:

My paramount object in
this struggle

is to save the Union, and is not
either to save

or to destroy slavery.

If I could save the Union
without freeing any slave

I would do it, and if I could
save it by freeing all the

slaves I would do it; and if I
could save it by freeing some

and leaving others alone I
would also do that.

What I do about slavery and
the colored race I do because

I believe it helps to save the
Union.

And what I forebear I forebear
because I do not believe it

would help to save the Union.

I shall do less whenever I
shall believe what I am doing

hurts the cause and I shall do
more whenever I shall believe

doing more will help the
cause.

But even as he said
this,

Lincoln had been making plans
to take action on emancipation

using the war powers granted
to the Commander-in-Chief.

He just needed that military
victory.

Antietam provided that
victory,

and on September 22, 1862,
Lincoln issued a proclamation

which declared that all slaves
living in states that were in

rebellion as of January 1,
1863, would be free.

Slaves living in the border
states of Delaware,

Maryland, Kentucky, and
Missouri were not included in

Lincoln's proclamation, nor
were those living in

Confederate States but within
areas controlled by the Union.

But this still meant that over
three million slaves had been

freed under the law, by the
stroke of a pen.

Lincoln said at the time:

I never, in my life,
felt more certain that I was

doing right, than I do in
signing this paper.

Lincoln's
Emancipation Proclamation

changed the political nature
of the war.

Before, Lincoln might have
accepted the peaceful return

of the confederate states and
allowed them to retain their

constitutions and their
slaves.

But now, no peace could be
made without the south

surrendering its slaves, or
the Union

surrendering its states.

While the Army of the Potomac
was fighting off

Robert E. Lee's invasion of
Maryland in the East,

the Union's Army of the Ohio
was battling against a

confederate invasion of
Kentucky in the West.

Confederate General Braxton
Bragg had led his Army of the

Mississippi into Kentucky in
August 1862.

Like Lee, Bragg hoped to draw
support from confederate

sympathizers in this border
state.

He also sought to draw Union
Major General Don Carlos Buell

out of Tennessee.

Buell had reinforced General
Grant at Shiloh in April,

and later participated in the
month-long siege of Corinth,

Mississippi in May.

He then began a slow march
toward Chattanooga, Tennessee.

Bragg found in Kentucky what
Lee found in Maryland.

Whatever sympathies the border
states might have toward the

Confederacy, they were not
enough to deliver Bragg the

men he hoped to recruit.

But Bragg did succeed in
drawing Buell

out of Tennessee.

On October 7, Buell's Army of
the Ohio clashed with Bragg's

forces at Perryville, Kentucky.

After smaller skirmishes on
the seventh,

fighting began in earnest on
the eighth.

A Union division assaulted the
Confederate line

near Peters Hill.

A Confederate division struck
the Union's left flank,

forcing it back.

As more Confederate divisions
joined in the assault,

the Union line was forced
back.

Some of the Union units were
in full rout,

but the commanders were able
to stabilize the line,

forcing the confederates to a
halt.

John Beatty, who was
commissioned as a brigadier

general in the Third Ohio
Infantry for his performance

at Perryville, wrote in his
journal that day:

Nearly two hundred of my
five hundred men now lay dead

and wounded on the little strip
of ground over which we fought.

They have long sought for a
battle,

and often been disappointed
and sore because they failed

to find one; but now, for the
first time,

they really realize what a
battle is.

They see it is to men what an
arctic wind is to autumn

leaves, and are astonished to
find that any have outlived

the furious storm of deadly
missiles.

The enemy is in the woods
before us,

and as the sentinels
occasionally exchange shots,

we can see the flash of their
guns and hear the whistle of

bullets above our heads.

The two armies are too near to
sleep comfortably,

or even safely, so the boys
cling to their muskets and

keep ready for action.

It is a long night, but it
finally comes to an end.

Union forces took
forty-two hundred casualties

at Perryville, and the
Confederates took

thirty-two hundred.

As with Antietam, at
Perryville the Confederates

could point to their ability
to stand up to a larger force

and inflict more casualties
than they received.

In truth however, the Battle
of Perryville was a tactical

stalemate, and it was a
strategic victory for the Union.

As with Lee's Maryland
Invasion,

Bragg's Heartland Offensive
into Kentucky was shut down,

and his army retreated to
Tennessee.

Buell, like McClellan, failed
to follow his enemy and strike

quickly in East Tennessee, as
Lincoln had wished.

Lincoln removed Buell from
command.

The Union's western forces
were reorganized and Buell's

Army of the Ohio was folded
into the new Department of the

Cumberland, under Major
General William Rosecrans.

In the East, General Burnside
had replaced

McClellan as the commander of
the Army of the Potomac.

Although Burnside had
distinguished himself in a few

earlier operations, he did not
believe himself ready for

command of the full army.

But when told that the
commander would be either him

or his rival, Joe Hooker, he
reluctantly accepted the post.

Burnside immediately
demonstrated that he was

willing to seek the fights
that McClellan would not.

He planned a bold, fast march
to Fredericksburg, Virginia.

There he would cross the
Rappahannock River and then

advance along the railroad
line to Richmond.

He was positioned to get there
ahead of Lee,

cutting the rebel general off
from his main base

of operations.

The Army of the Potomac set
out on November 15,

and within two days Burnside's
advance elements reached the

north side of the Rappahannock.

The confederates had long
since destroyed the bridges

across the river.

Burnside's plan called for
pontoon bridges to be quickly

sent to the front and
assembled for the army,

now 120,000 strong, to cross.

This is where Burnside's plan
fell apart.

A series of administrative
failures delayed the bridges

for seventeen days.

More than enough time for Lee
to arrange his forces.

Lee's artillery and infantry
were dug in.

Crossing the Rappahannock
would be a bloody affair.

Burnside arranged his forces
into three "Grand Divisions".

Major General Edwin Sumner
commanded the Right Grand

Division, Major General Joseph
Hooker the Center,

and Major General William
Franklin the Left.

Each Division included two
corps of infantry plus cavalry.

Confederate Lieutenant General

James Longstreet later
recounted.

On the morning of
the 11th of December,

1862, an hour or so before
daylight,

the slumbering Confederates
were awakened by a solitary

cannon thundering on the
heights of Marye's Hill...

the aroused Confederates
recognized the signal of the

Washington artillery and knew
that the Federal troops were

preparing to cross the
Rappahannock...

Until one o'clock this contest
lasted,

when the Federals, with angry
desperation,

turned their whole force of
artillery on the little city,

and sent down from the heights
a perfect storm of shot and

shell, crushing the houses
with a cyclone of fiery metal.

From our position on the
heights,

we saw the batteries hurling
an avalanche upon the town

whose only offense was
near its edge in a snug

retreat nestled three thousand
Confederate hornets that were

stinging the Army of the
Potomac into a frenzy...

But in the midst of all this
fury,

the little brigade of
Mississippians

clung to their work.

At last, when I had everything
in readiness,

I sent a peremptory order to
Barksdale to withdraw,

which he did, fighting as he
retired before the Federals,

who had by that time succeeded
in landing a number

of their troops.

Sumner's division
secured the town of

Fredericksburg, and then
looted it,

smashing whatever they could
find in the abandoned homes.

On the thirteenth, Union
troops began their attack on

the Confederate line.

On the left, south of the
town,

Franklin's Division was
stopped short

by Stonewall Jackson's
artillery.

On the right, Hooker's
Divisions had to cross a

sunken road and a mile of open
ground to capture

Marye's Heights.

Longstreet commanded the
defense there.

This was just
where we had expected attack,

and I was prepared to meet it.

As the troops massed before
us,

they were very much annoyed by
the fire of our batteries.

The field was literally packed
with Federals from the vast

number of troops that had been
massed in the town.

From the moment of their
appearance began

the most fearful carnage.

With our artillery from the
front,

right, and left tearing
through their ranks,

the Federals pressed forward
with almost invincible

determination, maintaining
their steady step and closing

up their broken ranks.

Thus resolutely they marched
upon the stone fence behind

which they quietly waited the
Confederate brigade

of General Cobb.

As they came within reach of
this brigade,

a storm of lead was poured
into their advancing ranks and

they were swept away from the
field like chaff

before the wind.

Union troops made
seven charges at the Marye's

Heights, all resulting in the
same terrible result.

When night came to
end the dreadful carnage,

and the Federals withdrew,
leaving the battle-field

literally heaped with the
bodies of their dead.

Before the well-directed fire
of Cobb's brigade,

the Federals had fallen like
the steady dripping of rain

from the eaves of a house.

Our musketry alone killed and
wounded at least 5000;

and these, with the slaughter
by the artillery,

left over 7000 killed and
wounded before the foot

of Marye's Hill.

The dead were piled sometimes
three deep,

and when morning broke, the
spectacle that we saw upon the

battle-field was one of the
most distressing

I ever witnesses.

Union casualties
were staggering.

Almost twelve thousand seven
hundred men,

including thirteen hundred
killed

and ninety-six hundred wounded.

Lee's Army of Virginia
suffered less than

half those losses.

Burnside withdrew his forces
across the river,

his advance toward Richmond
thwarted.

In the West, General Rosecrans,
the new commander of the

Army of the Cumberland,
was settled in Nashville.

Despite repeated urging by the
War Department,

Rosecrans had refused to move
against

Confederate General Bragg.

He took his time reorganizing,
resupplying,

and training his men in
Nashville.

Finally, the day after
Christmas,

1862, Rosecrans marched from
the city,

in three columns, seeking the
enemy.

Bragg meanwhile was in
Murfreesboro, Tennessee.

He was struggling against
subordinate generals who had

sent a request to Jefferson
Davis to have Bragg removed,

and replaced by General Joseph
E. Johnston.

Davis determined not to remove
Bragg,

but neither did he remove the
fractious generals under him.

Rosecrans marched his over
eighty-thousand men toward

Murfreesboro, harassed along
the way by Confederate

Brigadier General Joseph
Wheeler's cavalry.

Rosecrans was forced to leave
about half his force along the

way to guard his rear and
supply lines

from Wheeler's attacks.

On December 30, Rosecrans
found Bragg's army in a strong

position astride Stones River,

blocking the way to Chattanooga.

Rosecrans and Bragg developed
identical battle plans,

each planning to envelop the
enemy's right flank.

The Confederates seized the
initiative,

striking at dawn on December
31.

A Confederate corps, supported
by cavalry,

struck the Union right.

They quickly pushed the
defending Union troops back.

Meanwhile, Wheeler's cavalry
was wreaking havoc.

Transports of wounded soldiers
back to Nashville required

heavy escorts, pulling men
from the Union line.

The Union's right flank was
bent back,

though by afternoon the
Confederate assault

had bogged down.

The following day, New Years,
both sides sat warily

facing each other.

Bragg believed that Rosecrans
was planning a retreat,

which indeed, many of
Rosecrans' officers

were advising.

But the Union forces were
digging in.

When Bragg attacked the Union
left wing on January second,

massed Union artillery stopped
them cold,

and Union counterattacks
pushed the Confederate

right flank back.

Rosecrans received resupplies
and reinforcements

on January third.

Bragg could see now that the
Army of the Cumberland wasn't

going to retreat, and would
instead continue

to receive fresh troops.

Bragg had only twenty-thousand
effectives at this point,

and Rosecrans could soon have
more than three times as many.

Bragg withdrew to the south,

and Rosecrans occupied
Murfreesboro.

Though the battle had achieved
little tactically,

it was a powerful morale boost
for the Union.

Lincoln wrote to Rosecrans,
"You gave us a hard-earned

victory, which had there been
a defeat instead,

the nation could scarcely have
lived over."

The Confederate threat to
Kentucky and Middle Tennessee

had been halted.

Rosecrans dug massive
earthenworks at Murfreesboro,

which served as a Union supply
depot until the end

of the war.

Back in the East, Burnside made
another,

disastrous attempt on
Fredericksburg.

This time his plan was to take
advantage of the unusually dry

weather to move his troops a
few miles up the Rappahannock

where they could cross at
fords.

They set out on January 19th,
and continued their progress

over dry, frozen ground on the
20th.

Finally, his army completely
mired,

Burnside called a halt to the
"mud march."

Not surprisingly, perhaps,
Burnside's subordinate

generals, were unhappy with
their commander.

As had happened with the
Confederate commander Bragg,

Burnside's subordinates took
their complaints

to the President.

Furious, Burnside demanded
that either he or his

subordinates be removed.

Unlike Jefferson Davis,
Lincoln removed the commander.

Burnside was transferred to
command

the Department of the Ohio.

Major General Joseph Hooker
was given command

of the Army of the Potomac.

Nicknamed "Fighting Joe" by
journalists,

he had a reputation for bold
action

as a division and
corps commander.

John Mead Gould described the
change.

Hooker put
life into everything -

a very much-needed life it was
too -

and his most important act,
in a soldier's estimation,

was the providing of
good rations...

...from our first arrival at
Stafford Court House,

we began to improve in every
way.

We had drills and dress
parades as often as the

weather would permit.

Inspections by general and
staff officers were made more

frequently than ever before;
and when they saw anything

worth complimenting, they did
it in writing...

Much praise was due McClellan
for his success with raw

troops after Bull Run, but
Hooker taught old soldiers,

and made a hundred
improvements upon an army

which had come to believe it
knew everything.

Hooker abolished
Burnside's "grand divisions",

returning the army to its
former organization of seven

corps, each with about fifteen
thousand men.

Hooker also introduced corps
badges.

These provided a sense of
identity to the men,

and greatly improved the
esprit de corps.

Each division within a corps
had a variation of that corps'

badge, in a different color.

The badges were worn over
their left breast,

or on the left side of their
caps.

The Sixth Corps would soon
distinguish itself under Major

General John Sedgwick, when
they would finally capture the

Marye's Heights
at Fredericksburg.

The Ninth Corps was formed by
General Burnside,

and it followed him when he
was transferred

to the Western Theatre.

Hooker also greatly improved
the army's cavalry.

Although the Confederacy had
been making excellent use of

cavalry under leaders such as
J.E.B. Stuart,

Joseph Wheeler, and Nathan
Bedford Forrest,

the Union's cavalry units were
usually simply attached to the

infantry corps, and given
little role in campaigns.

Hooker created a unified
cavalry command,

under General George Stoneman.

As an indication of how this
change improved the

Union cavalry, Leonard Jordan,
a private with the

Tenth Maine Battalion, later
wrote:

...the cavalry
of the army of the Potomac had

lately shown much pluck,

and hereafter we were no more
to hear the taunt,

"Who ever saw a dead
cavalry-man?"

Nor was a squad of cavalry
galloping to the rear past

infantry on the march to be
assailed by the cry,

"Look out for fun ahead boys,
cavalry to the rear!"

Hooker had, as John
Mead Gould said,

improved the army in a hundred
ways.

Better officer training,
better inspections,

better food, better ambulance
corps,

better cavalry, and more.

His men were rested, and his
army was large.

With almost one hundred
thirty-four thousand men,

his army dwarfed whatever
forces the Confederacy could

put in front of him.

Lee's sixty-thousand troops
occupied the heights south of

the Rappahannock, below
Fredericksburg.

They had fortified a fifteen
mile line.

To move past Lee's
fortifications would require

strategy as well as force.

At the end of April, Hooker
made his move.

Three infantry corps,
numbering about seventy

thousand men, moved secretly
northwest up the Rappahannock,

where they could ford the
streams to Lee's north.

Two other corps, with forty
thousand men,

were to feign an attack on
Fredericksburg,

striking across at the same
spot where the Union had met

defeat in December.

These corps were intended to
tie down Lee's forces

in Fredericksburg.

At the same time, ten thousand
cavalry were sent to raid

behind Lee's rear, cutting his
supply lines to Richmond

and diverting his attention.

The campaign began well for
Hooker.

By April 30, Hooker had led
his seventy thousand infantry

across the Rappahannock and
Rapidan Rivers.

They advanced to
Chancellorsville,

a major crossroads nine miles
west of Fredericksburg.

They were now in a low, flat,
wooded area,

locally known as the
Wilderness.

Narrow roads and thick woods
limited movement

and visibility.

Meanwhile, another forty
thousand Union infantry

demonstrated against
Fredericksburg,

holding Confederate attention
there.

For once the Union army seemed
to have out maneuvered Lee.

The question that remained
was,

what would they do now?

Having sent most of his
cavalry on that failed mission

to harass Lee's rear, Hooker
now had no cavalry to warn him

of General Lee's movements.

And Lee was moving.

While one brigade of cavalry
kept Stoneman's cavalry under

surveillance, the rest of the
Confederate horseman

under J.E.B. Stuart, had been
shadowing Hooker,

and sending information back
to Lee.

Lee knew exactly where the
bulk of Hooker's forces were,

and their strength.

Confederate Major General
Richard Anderson,

whose infantry division were
supporting J.E.B. Stuart's

cavalry, fell back to a spot
midway between

Chancellorsville and
Fredericksburg,

called Tabernacle Church, and
began fortifying a line there.

Hooker, having convinced
himself that Lee would

retreat, failed to strike
early while his forces were in

a superior position.

Abner Doubleday, a
Major-General serving under

Hooker later described the
events of that campaign:

In the present
instance it was simply

suicidal for Hooker to delay
action until Anderson had

fortified his lines and Lee
had come forward with the main

body to join him.

Hooker should have pressed on
immediately

to seize the objective...

but he delayed action all that
long night and until eleven

o'clock of the next morning.

When he did make the effort
the line he was about to

occupy was well fortified and
held by all but one division

and one brigade of Lee's army.

On May 1st, at 11 A.M., Hooker
moved out from

Chancellorsville to attack Lee
in four columns...

Sickles' corps... were posted in
rear of the

Chancellorsville House as a
reserve... Stonewall Jackson...

according to his invariable
custom to find and fight his

enemy as soon as possible, had
moved forward from Tabernacle

Church; so that the two armies
encountered each other about

two and half miles from
Chancellorsville.

Altogether the general line
was a good one;

for there were large open
spaces where the artillery

could move and maneuver, and
the army were almost out

of the thickets.

But Hooker, perhaps
shocked by Lee's failure to

retreat, ordered his troops
back to Chancellorsville,

to take defensive positions.

His subordinate officers
protested.

They would be surrendering the
relatively high ground,

with its superior position for
both artillery and infantry,

and withdrawing to the
Wilderness where their larger

numbers would be of much less
importance.

Despite their protests, the
generals obeyed their orders

and fell back
to Chancellorsville,

where they assumed a strong
defensive position.

Hooker still had about a two
to one advantage over Lee in

numbers, and he still expected
Lee to retreat toward Richmond.

But Lee had no intention of
retreating.

On the night of May first, Lee
met with Jackson to plan an

assault on the Union forces.

While they were meeting, the
received word from J.E.B.

Stuart regarding the enemy's
position.

Jackson at once
asked permission to take his

own corps - about 26,000
muskets - make a detour

through the woods to conceal
his march from observation,

and fall unexpectedly upon the
weak point

referred to by Stuart.

If the Eleventh Corps had
prepared for Jackson's

approach by a line properly
fortified,

with redoubts on the flanks,
the men protected in front by

felled timber and sheltered by
breastworks,

with the artillery at the
angles,

crossing its fire in front,
Jackson's corps would have

been powerless to advance.

Just after five
p.m.,

Jackson's forces attacked,
screaming their rebel yell and

driving all the animals of the
forest before them.

Jackson quickly rolled up the
various brigades

of Howard's corps.

Some Union units made a
valiant effort,

but they were forced to
retreat in a rout.

Jackson pushed the Union right
flank back two miles before

sunset, when fresh Union
troops

put a halt to the advance.

But Stonewall Jackson's
tremendously

impressive military success
would be his last.

That night, Jackson and a few
other officers rode out ahead

of the Confederate line,
looking for weaknesses in the

Union defenses so that the
rebels

could press their advantage.

When they rode back to their
own lines,

they were mistaken for Union
cavalry.

Confederate infantry fired
upon them in the confusion,

and Jackson took two bullets
in his left arm.

The arm had to be amputated.

While he lay recuperating,

Stonewall Jackson contracted
pneumonia.

Eight days later he died.

May 3rd, the day after
Jackson's successful attack,

saw fierce fighting both at
Chancellorsville

and Fredericksburg.

In the night, Hooker had sent
word to Major General John

Sedgwick that his Sixth Corps
should push through

Fredericksburg toward Lee's
rear.

This meant attacking the
trenches and stone wall that

had thrown back Burnside's
forces the previous December.

This time, the result was a
happier one for the Union.

After being knocked back twice
by Jubal Early's division

defending Marye's Heights,
Sedgwick's force was

successful on its third
attempt.

Back at Chancellorsville,
Hooker was presented with

opportunities for his units to
strike at Confederate forces,

but for some reason he let those
opportunities pass.

Lee's forces consolidated, and
set up their artillery to

pound Hooker's men.

Hooker himself was knocked
unconscious when a cannonball

struck his tent.

He quickly recovered and
ordered a withdrawal,

disappointing officers who
wished to counterattack.

In the face of Hooker's
inactivity,

Lee took a division the next
day to put a stop

to Sedgwick's advance.

Without Sedgwick's force to
distract Lee,

Hooker felt his offensive
could not go forward.

He called council of war,
asking his officers whether

they felt they should
withdraw.

A majority of the officers
preferred to stay and fight,

but Hooker determined to
withdraw nonetheless.

Throughout the night of May 5
and in the early hours of May 6,

Hooker's forces withdrew
across the river at U.S. Ford.

Their withdraw frustrated Lee,
who had planned another

assault on the Union forces
for the morning of the sixth.

Lee had won the day despite
being outnumbered

almost two to one.

But victory had come at a high
cost.

Of his sixty thousand men
involved in the campaign,

over thirteen thousand -
twenty-two percent -

were casualties.

And in Jackson, the south lost
one of its most able generals.

Union losses were somewhat
higher in numbers -

about seventeen thousand -

but were only thirteen percent
of their forces.

Given the Confederacy's
limited manpower,

it could ill afford those
losses.

It was of course a stunning
victory for the Confederacy,

and a shocking loss for the
Union.

For years afterward, Hooker
and his generals would point

fingers at each other,
declaring that the battle was

lost because of either
Hooker's timidity or his

subordinates' incompetence.

Almost a century and a half
later, the U.S.

Army Center of Military
History summarized the cause

of Confederate victory at

"AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY":
Actually, Lee's brilliant

and daring maneuvers had
defeated only one man -

Hooker - and in no other action
of the war did moral superiority

of one general over the other

stand out so clearly as a
decisive factor in battle...

Lee was so successful in part
because Hooker

made so many mistakes...

Here again was a general who
could effectively lead a body

of troops under his own eyes
but could not use maps,

reports, and messages to
evaluate and control

situations that were beyond
his range of vision.

Hooker, not the Army of the
Potomac,

lost the battle of
Chancellorsville.

The loss hurt morale
in the North,

and boosted morale in the
South.

In particular, General Robert
E. Lee's confidence in his army

had grown so large that
Virginia could not contain it.

Believing his men were
practically invincible,

he determined to once again
take the battle to the North.

And so the Army of Virginia
moved from its greatest

triumph, to its greatest
defeat. Gettysburg.