All language subtitles for bandicam 2025-12-23 04-08-24-878

A sound cuts through the cabin. The
passengers glance around, uneasy, but

nothing. So the noise is ignored, and
the countdown to disaster is triggered.

The North Sea is harsh, unpredictable,
and deadly.

In winter, waves can rise over 15
meters, about as tall as a five -story

building. Wind gusts have reached more
than 87 knots, the force of a Category 2

hurricane. Water temperatures stay just
above freezing, making the odds of

survival in any type of accident quite
low.

But beneath these dangerous waters lie
vast oil and gas deposits, which means

companies will send men to harness that
energy.

for a profit in the 1970s platforms like
brent delta and 40s alpha were built to

access those deposits each platform
holding hundreds of workers engineers

support crews each platform houses its
own small community about 54 nautical

miles from shore but getting people
there was hard ships were slow and at

mercy of rough seas sometimes taking
more than a day to travel a distance

would take less than an hour by road.
The expense of a ship to ferry the

workers, multiplied by the number of
workers in transit, adds up to a

significant amount of lost time and
money.

Helicopters changed everything.

They could carry people, cargo and
emergency teams crossing over 100

miles of open water in just over an
hour. They became essential for fast

changes that boats couldn't handle
efficiently.

By the 1980s and 1990s, helicopters were
the offshore industry's lifeline,

making tens of thousands of flights each
year from Stavanger and Bergen in

Norway and Aberdeen in Scotland.

A common helicopter in use was the
Eurocopter AS332 Super Puma.

It's a medium -sized utility model with
four blades and two engines.

built for two crew and 18 passengers in
the early 2000s many oil companies

banned the use of the middle rear seat
which cut capacity to 17 passengers they

found it was too difficult to evacuate
three passengers through the back window

in an emergency the as332 later evolved
into the ec225 model

with a five bladed rotor and more engine
power but kept the same main rotor

gearbox The EC225 Super Puma was a twin
-engine medium -sized helicopter,

longer and more modern than the original
AS332.

It carried two crew and 19 passengers
with four -point safety belts and high

back seats to support the head and neck
during a crash.

On the 1st of April 2009, Bond Offshore
Helicopter Flight 85N was set to make

several trips from Aberdeen to oil
platforms in the North Sea.

The original AS332 Super Puma had just
returned from the Bruce platform.

With its rotors still turning, the crew
changed over.

The new pilot received a brief, the
aircraft was refueled and passengers

boarding. At 10 .42 the helicopter took
off for the BP Miller oil field about

145 nautical miles northeast of
Aberdeen. The flight was uneventful.

But 10 minutes before landing, the
passengers heard a strange noise.

They didn't think it was serious, so no
one told the crew.

At 11 .49, the helicopter landed on the
BP platform.

With the rotor still spinning, the
passengers disembarked, the aircraft was

refueled, and 14 new passengers boarded
for the return flight to Aberdeen. The

weather was good, with light south -to
-southeasterly winds, clear skies, and a

few broken clouds between.

Flying conditions were smooth and the
sea was calm.

At 12 .03 the helicopter took off and
climbed to 610 meters on its return to

Aberdeen. At 12 .54 the co -pilot made a
routine call to report 14 passengers on

board, the helicopter in good condition
and an estimated arrival time at 13 .14.

12 seconds later, the pilot sent a
mayday call, followed by the co -pilot

repeating the mayday with details about
their location.

The helicopter briefly climbed to 670
meters, then turned right and began a

rapid descent.

A crew member on the vessel Norman
Aurora saw the helicopter drop sharply

hit the sea about two nautical miles
away from their location.

The four main rotor blades and hub
separated and fell into the water

An explosion followed, sending grey
smoke into the air that soon turned

The crew member raised the alarm and
Aurora turned toward the crash site

11 nautical miles northeast of
Peterhead, Scotland.

The Norman Aurora launched a fast rescue
boat as it headed toward the crash

site. At Aberdeen, the radar controller
confirmed the mayday and tried to reach

the flight crew.

He asked another helicopter on a similar
route to check the sea where flight H5N

had last appeared on radar.

Both the rescue boat and the helicopter
reached an area of disturbed water about

150 metres wide.

They found debris from the helicopter,
two life rafts and eight people wearing

survival gear.

No survivors.

Search and rescue teams reached the site
within 40 minutes and recovered

floating debris.

On the evening of the 2nd of April, a
survey vessel working for the Maritime

Coast Guard Agency scanned the seabed
with high -definition sonar. The next

it located the main wreckage at a depth
of 100 metres.

Fuselage, main rotor and tail boom.

Because of the depth, the Aircraft
Accidents Investigation Bureau hired a

saturation diving recovery vessel to
bring it up. On the 4th of April, a

support vessel arrived on site.

By the next day, all eight remaining
bodies were recovered from the fuselage.

The flight data recorder and cockpit
voice recorder were also retrieved and

to the Aircraft Accident Investigation
Bureau in Farnborough, along with the

wreckage for analysis.

Investigators from the UK Air Accident
Investigation Branch focused quickly on

the main rotor gearbox.

The rotor head had torn free from the
fuselage.

The engines were intact and the controls
hadn't failed.

Something inside the gearbox had broken
apart with force too great for the

structure to survive.

A helicopter's engines spin fast, but
the rotors must actually turn more

than the engine.

The Super Puma's twin engines run at 23
,000 revolutions per minute.

but the main rotor turns at about 265
revolutions per minute. The main rotor

gearbox reduces the engine speed by
about 87 times while transferring

of horsepower to the rotor mast.

It has two sections.

The lower section, called the main
module, cuts the input speed to about

revolutions per minute.

Above it sits the epicyclic reduction
gearbox which reduces it further to

265 revolutions per minute.

Inside the upper module is the second
stage planetary gear system.

A central sun gear drives several planet
gears that spin inside a ring gear.

As the sun gear turns, the planets orbit
and share the load evenly, spreading

out the enormous forces.

In the Super Puma, these planet gears
take some of the heaviest stress in the

aircraft, each handling power in tens of
thousands of horsepower.

They spin for hours under heavy loads,
and if one fails, the result can be

catastrophic. To detect problems early,
the gearbox has magnetic chip detectors

that collect metal debris in the oil.

If a gear or bearing begins to wear, the
detectors sense the metal filings and

trigger a warning.

In theory this allows engineers to find
and fix issues before a failure happens

in flight.

Inside the damaged epicyclic module
investigators found a second stage

gear with its rim split open.

Microscopic analysis showed curved lines
on the fracture surface proving a

fatigue crack had grown slowly through
the steel.

A tiny flaw formed deep inside the gear,
spreading slightly with each rotation

until it finally reached the rim, which
caused the whole system to fail.

When the rim broke, the gear shattered,
sending steel fragments into nearby

components and jamming the gearbox.

The engines kept turning, forcing power
into the jammed system until the weakest

link, the connection between the rotor
head and the fuselage, snapped.

tearing the rotor apart.

Investigators then found something more
concerning.

36 flight hours before the crash, a chip
detector had picked up microscopic

metal fragments just a few millimeters
wide.

Maintenance engineers examined them, but
because procedures for interpreting

chip debris were unclear, they simply
cleaned the detector and returned the

helicopter to service.

No one recognized that those metal
particles came from the planet gear rim.

An early warning of a hidden crack.

The Aircraft Accidents Investigation
Bureau concluded that the second stage

Planet Gear failure caused the crash.

The fatigue crack had developed slowly,
releasing fragments that hinted at a

serious fault.

But without clear guidance, the warning
went unnoticed.

In the months after the crash, the
Aircraft Accidents Investigation Bureau

issued urgent safety recommendations.

Helicopter operators were told to treat
every fragment from chip detectors as a

serious warning.

New procedures were created to improve
how metal debris was analyzed.

The message was clear.

Metallic debris in the gearbox isn't
routine.

It can signal a catastrophic failure
already in progress.

The industry acted quickly.

European regulators temporarily grounded
the Super Puma L2 fleet.

Flight operators Bond Offshore, CHC and
Bristow carried out detailed inspections

of their helicopters.

Airbus helicopters released new service
bulletins, redesigned components,

upgraded chip detection systems and
assured operators that the risk was

understood and reduced.

By 2010, in less than a year, the Super
Puma fleet was cleared to fly again.

The helicopters returned to service over
the North Sea.

carrying hundreds of workers daily, and
confidence in the fleet slowly returned.

Today, there are industries that support
the safety of the men and women who

work offshore.

Part of that safety training is SUIT, or
helicopter underwater escape training,

which all offshore workers must
complete.

A helicopter body is lowered into the
water and spun upside down to simulate a

water crash landing, and trainees must
escape.

The passengers and crew on board the
Super Puma didn't really have a chance

escape in the water, and the next story
is no different.

On the 29th of April 2016, seven years
after flight 85N, a CHC helicopter

service aircraft lifted off in the
Norwegian sector of the North Sea.

CHC operated flights for Stas Oil ASA,
now Equinor, including routes from

Airport, Sledlund, to the Gullfax
oilfield.

The helicopter, an Airbus EC225LP Super
Puma, a newer version of the

same family as Flight 85N, was operating
as Flight 241.

That morning, the crew had already
completed one round trip to the Gullfax

platform and returned to Sledlund. At 10
.05, they departed again for Gullfax B.

After landing on the platform, the road
was kept spinning as passengers

disembarked and 11 new ones boarded. The
turnaround lasted 12 minutes.

At 11 .16, flight 241 took off for its
return to Sledlands, climbing to 900

meters with the co -pilot in control.

The helicopter cruised at 900 meters
until reaching the coastline, then

descended to 610 meters after clearance
from air traffic control, flying at 140

knots. Moments later, engine speed
dropped sharply.

The main rotor tilted erratically. There
was metallic screeching, then a loud

bang. The rotor separated completely and
the helicopter began to fall in a

ballistic arc.

People on the ground over a mile away
heard the metallic noise and looked up

see the helicopter falling without its
rotor.

Some nearby witnesses saw paths breaking
away.

Eight divers preparing to dive at Turoi
Key heard the noise.

Two had helmet cameras that recorded the
event.

Without its rotor, the helicopter rolled
right almost a full turn, yawed to the

right, then rolled left as the nose
dropped vertically.

At about 11 .55, it struck the small
island of Sorokitilman near Turoi in

Oigarden municipality, killing all 13
people instantly.

The impact destroyed the helicopter and
most wreckage slid into the sea, resting

a few meters offshore at a depth of
about five meters.

A white cloud of fuel vapor rose and
ignited, starting a fire on the island.

Wreckage, fuel, and oil spread across
land and sea.

The detached main rotor flew separately,
landing at Toskora Island less than

half a mile north of the main crash
site.

At 11 .57, a surveillance aircraft
spotted smoke over the area and

crash. Air traffic services immediately
notified the Joint Rescue Coordination

Center for Southern Norway.

At 12 .01, six minutes after impact,
rescuers began to arrive.

A rigid inflatable boat reached the
crash site first, followed a minute

two smaller boats.

The Sotro Fire Department arrived with
three vehicles and six personnel.

Two firefighters were taken to the small
island, but found that life -saving

efforts were impossible.

Soon after, additional responders from
Oygaarden and Bergen fire department

arrived, joined by police, Norwegian
armed forces, air ambulance crews, and

civil defense units.

At 13 .05, the first diver entered the
water.

Recovery efforts began immediately after
the crash.

Within 24 hours, the cockpit voice
recorder and flight data recorder were

retrieved from the sea. On the 30th of
April 2016 the main wreckage was lifted

from the water and the detached main
rotor was recovered from Suscora Island.

Parts of the main gearbox including two
pieces of a fractured second stage

planet gear were found.

Debris from the helicopter was spread
across 180 ,000 square meters.

Some key gearbox components and
attachments were missing, prompting an

land and sea search.

Norwegian civil defense teams scanned
the shore with metal detectors while

divers from the Bergen fire department
and the Navy searched grid sections of

the seabed. A remotely operated vehicle
and a one meter wide fledge fitted with

14 magnetic arms were used to sweep the
seabed. By September 2016 the organized

search ended.

Most gearbox parts had been recovered.

but the second stage planet gear carrier
and forward suspension bar were still

missing. With the agreement of the
Norwegian Accidents Investigation Board,

accident site became a training site for
the Naval Diving School.

In February 2017, during one of these
training dives, the missing second stage

planet carrier was finally found.

Investigators from the Norwegian
Accidents Investigation Board, supported

UK Aircraft Accidents Investigation
Bureau and Airbus Helicopters, examined

wreckage. Inside the gearbox, they found
the second stage planet gear shattered

in almost exactly the same way as the
2009 accident.

Microscopic analysis showed the same
failure pattern. A fatigue crack started

from a tiny flaw inside the rim, and
slowly expanded until the rim split

When it failed, fragments destroyed
nearby gears, causing the rotor to

from the helicopter.

After flight 241's crash, engineers and
investigators were left asking how a

gearbox could fail so completely without
warning.

To find out, they studied how fatigue
fractures form and why they're so hard

detect inside a helicopter gearbox.

The second stage planet gear in a Super
Puma is roughly the size of a dinner

plate made from ultra -hard steel and
weighing several kilograms.

Every time the rope returns, its feet
mesh correctly with others, transmitting

thousands of horsepower 265 times a
minute, millions of times over its

Inside the steel, stress is enormous.

Though the gear looks solid, it's made
of microscopic crystals with tiny flaws.

Over time, these flaws concentrate
stress, forming cracks hidden beneath

surface. The cracks grow invisibly and
don't release fragments until they reach

the surface, often just before total
failure.

This means the problem isn't missing a
warning. It's a failure with no warning

at all.

Chip detectors, the main safety system,
only work when fragments circulate in

the gearbox oil. If the crack stays
internal there's nothing to detect until

it's too late.

Even then chip detectors have limits.
They're small magnetic plugs just a few

centimeters long that only attract
particles passing close by.

Oil moves unpredictably through the
gearbox so not all debris reaches the

detector and tiny cracks might not
release fragments at all.

For flight 241, investigators determined
the gear failed internally without

releasing debris, completely bypassing
the only available warning system.

Helicopter gearboxes are both vital and
fragile.

They take on extreme forces with no
backup.

When they fail, the aircraft simply
falls out of the sky.

In 2009 the warning was missed.

In 2016 there was no warning.

Both ended the same way.

The rotors were free and lives were lost
within seconds.

In the months after the crash, European
regulators grounded all EC225 and

AS332 Super Puma helicopters.

Offshore workers refused to fly in them,
even staging protests and calling the

aircraft coffins with rotors.

Airbus helicopters worked to regain
confidence by redesigning gears,

monitoring systems, and introducing
stricter inspection procedures.

They put the failure down to a rare
manufacturing flaw that had been fixed.

Oil workers weren't convinced.

In the UK and Norway, the unions
demanded that Super Pumas were taken out

service. By 2017, major operators like
Bristow and CHP confirmed they would

discontinue the EC225 for the North Sea
service.

That decision ended the Super Puma's
role in the region.

They still fly in other parts of the
world, but in the UK and Norway, the

Super Puma is linked with tragedy and
loss.