Original subtitles

In 1861, most people believed that the war would be won in the Eastern Theater. However, Abraham

Lincoln was terrified it would be lost in the Western Theater. If Missouri or Kentucky joined

the Confederacy, the Union’s strategic position would be compromised and potentially indefensible.

Fortunately, the boldness of the Western theater’s Union officers and the overconfident ineptitude

of the secessionists prevented either state from seceding and set the Union on the path

to victory. Welcome to our latest video on the American Civil War, in which the battles

of the western theatre continue and the fates of Missouri and Kentucky hang in the balance.

The Border States Only the states of the Deep South, whose economies

were entirely dependent on the slavery-driven cotton trade, plus Texas, seceded from the

Union prior to Fort Sumter. While most Upper South states held votes on secession, their more mixed

economies, internal divisions, and stronger ties to free states diluted the slaveholders' fears

enough to defeat secession. These states seceded after President Lincoln called for volunteers,

either because public opinion shifted towards secession as happened in Tennessee,

or because secessionists manipulated the vote as in Virginia. The northernmost slaveholding states,

known as Border States, remained in the Union despite local secession efforts and Confederate

lobbying. Delaware was the second state to hold a secession vote, but it was rejected unanimously.

Its Governor Burton stated that as Delaware was the first state to enter the Union, it

would be the last to leave. Meanwhile, Lincoln’s post-Baltimore Riot crackdown destroyed Maryland’s

secessionists. Missouri and Kentucky were far more delicate. Both were among the most populated and

wealthy states with strongly mixed loyalties. They’d been initially settled as slave states,

but waves of immigration and changing economics caused slavery’s importance

to decline, especially in Missouri. Their loyalties were almost perfectly split.

The Missouri Crisis As the secession crisis began,

Missouri's outgoing governor Robert Stewart advocated neutrality, remaining in the Union

but refusing to materially aid either side and committing state troops to repel any invasion.

Incoming governor Claiborne Jackson claimed he’d reaffirm Stewart’s policy. However, his inaugural

address on January 3, 1861, made clear that his sympathies lay with the Confederacy. Shortly after

taking office, he and the pro-Southern legislature further revealed their secessionist inclinations

by calling for a Constitutional Convention to “reconsider” Missouri’s relationship with

the Federal government, a clear euphemism for secession. However, on March 19th, the

Convention voted 89-1 against secession. Despite Missouri furnishing most of the pro-slavery

Border Ruffians and Bushwackers during Bleeding Kansas, the public strongly favored neutrality

and had overwhelmingly elected Unionists to the convention. Shocked and frustrated,

Jackson and his allies were undeterred, opening covert diplomatic channels to Jefferson Davis.

Jackson’s public and forceful rejection of Lincoln’s call for troops signaled Missouri’s

secessionists to take action. On April 20th, a pro-secession mob seized 1000 small arms from the

Liberty Arsenal as Jackson prepared to coup the state into the Confederacy. The only obstacle was

the St. Louis Arsenal. Its thick walls and Federal garrison made it perilous to take it by storm or

subversion. Therefore, Jackson petitioned Davis for heavy artillery to breach the walls, which

Davis granted. While Jackson couldn’t simply take control of the state militia, he could call up

part of it for training. On May 1st, he assembled the most pro-secession units for “maneuvers” about

4.5 miles from the Arsenal at the imaginatively named Camp Jackson. They hoped to either

intimidate the Union garrison into evacuating or drive them out once the cannons arrived.

The Lyon of the West Opposing Jackson was

Captain Nathaniel Lyon. Lyon had developed a reputation for ruthless brutality fighting

Indians in California and a burning hatred of slavery while stationed in Kansas. Lyon’s friend,

Congressman Francis Blair, arranged his company’s transfer to St. Louis in March

so Lyon could protect the Arsenal not only from Jackson but from Department

of the West commander Brigadier General William Harney. Harney was a proven incompetent who was

only a general thanks to his friends in the Southern political elite. These friends had

also protected him during multiple court martials and civil trials. Blair and Lyon believed that if

Harney didn’t join the secessionists, he’d bungle Missouri into their hands.

Harney quickly justified the paranoia. Harney thwarted Lyons' efforts to strengthen

the Arsenal's defenses, fearing it would provoke secessionist violence. Therefore,

Blair was intrigued first to get Lyon appointed commander of the Arsenal,

then get Harney recalled to Washington. Once command defaulted to Lyon, he swiftly moved to

covertly arm the Wide Awakes, a Republican youth organization. On April 23rd, the War Department

formally ordered Lyon to take command, raise volunteers, and evacuate the weapons stockpile

to Illinois. Lyon swiftly and covertly enlisted his paramilitaries and armed other militias.

The Camp Jackson Affair Jackson hadn’t fooled anyone about his plans,

and Lyon was determined to strike first. Learning of increased activity in Camp Jackson the night

of May 8th, Lyon disguised himself and snuck in the following morning. There, he discovered

the Confederate artillery that had arrived the night before, plus rifles stolen from Liberty.

Camp chatter indicated that Jackson intended to attack soon. Therefore, Lyon moved before dawn

on May 10th and surrounded Camp Jackson with 6000 regular soldiers and volunteers. The 669 militia

surrendered without a fight. After securing the weapons and cannons, Lyon decided to march

the prisoners back to the Arsenal through the streets of St. Louis as a show of force. However,

an angry mob gathered and started hurling insults and rocks at the column. What precisely happened

is disputed, but the soldiers opened fire, killing 28. Rioting ensued, and martial law was declared.

The War Begins In response, Jackson’s legislative

allies formed the Missouri State Guard, commanded by former governor Sterling Price. Officially,

the State Guard was supposed to oppose both Union and Confederate forces. However, Price was

already coordinating with Arkansas Confederates to occupy southern Missouri. Harney returned and,

on May 21st, negotiated a truce which amounted to restricting Federal authority to St. Louis. This

immediately led to Unionists being driven from their homes, who began forming their own Home

Guard militia. Blair convinced Lincoln to replace Harney with Lyon on May 30th in retaliation.

Price, Jackson, and now Brigadier General Lyon met on June 11th, ostensibly to discuss the truce.

Instead, Jackson made clear that he intended to ignore Federal authority and disarm the Home

Guard while allowing anti-Unionist activity to continue. Lyon berated Jackson before declaring,

“This means war!” Lyon gave Jackson and Price precisely one hour to depart by rail before

loading his troops onto steamships bound for the capital of Jefferson City. Jackson and the

legislature immediately fled southward while Price tried to concentrate the State Guard. Lyon seized

Jefferson City on June 15th before following Jackson. On the 17th, he attacked and scattered

State Guard units near Boonville, forcing Price to abandon northern and central Missouri.

Battle of Wilson’s Creek Lyon spent June and July securing

central Missouri and gathering reinforcements near Springfield, particularly German immigrants eager

to serve under Colonel Franz Sigel . A series of skirmishes pushed Price into southwest Missouri,

where Confederate troops under Benjamin McCulloch reinforced him. The two marched to attack Lyon

while bickering over who commanded whom, but again, Lyon struck first. The rebel

vanguard was repulsed near Dug Springs , but Lyon discovered he was outnumbered 12000 to

6000 and fell back on Springfield. Price wanted to immediately attack,

but McCulloch refused due to ammunition shortages and lack of faith in Price’s abilities. After

Price threatened to attack alone, McCulloch agreed to attack at dawn on August 10th, but heavy rain

on August 9th made him cancel. However, Lyon’s volunteers’ 90-day enlistments were nearly up,

and he hoped a surprise attack would do sufficient damage to prevent a rebel pursuit once he had to

retreat to St. Louis for reinforcements. Leaving a garrison in Springfield, Lyon would take the main

body and attack the rebel camp along Wilson’s Creek from the north while Sigel’s 1200 troops

flanked from the south after a night march. At dawn, Lyon overran the surprised rebel camp.

Shortly thereafter, Sigel’s artillery scattered Confederate cavalry guarding the camp’s rear,

and he advanced across the Creek. However, McCulloch’s artillery halted Lyon’s advance long

enough for Price’s infantry to form up. Lyon’s position became known as Bloody Hill as Price

ordered first frontal, then flanking attacks, which failed due to lack of ammunition. Meanwhile,

Sigel had lost contact with Lyon and his men were exhausted, so he paused past Sharp’s farm

to reorient and rest. This gave McCulloch time to organize a counterattack, led by the 3rd

Louisiana, who wore the same grey uniforms as the 1st Iowa Volunteers, one of Lyon’s units. This

misidentification allowed them to march unmolested to Sigel’s line and fire point blank into the

flank, immediately routing Sigel’s brigade. Lyon had been wounded twice while personally

directing his troops. With Sigel routed, the full Confederate force turned on him. Heavily

outnumbered, the Federal forces continued to repel attacks until Lyon was shot through the

heart while preparing a counterattack. Major Sturgis took command, repelled another attack,

then ordered a retreat to Rolla before being overwhelmed. The Union suffered 1,317 casualties

to 1,232 Confederate. Price wanted to immediately pursue it, but it was impossible because of the

scattered cavalry and exhausted infantry. After days of arguing, McCulloch decided that his supply

situation and conflicts with Price were too severe to remain, and he returned to Arkansas while Price

lethargically marched northward, ironically fulfilling the late Lyon’s strategic goal.

Kentucky Gets Drafted Across the Mississippi in Kentucky,

the birthstate of both Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis held strong ties to both the

North and South. Consequently, Kentucky Governor Beriah Magoffin and the General Assembly declared

neutrality on May 20th and, unlike Jackson, actually meant it. Magoffin repeatedly refused

to send help to either side, offered to mediate the conflict, and interfered in both sides’

recruitment efforts. Initially, both Lincoln and Davis respected Kentucky’s neutrality. The former

was terrified that Kentucky’s secession would make the North’s strategic position untenable

and instantly lose them the war. The latter was influenced by Tennessee Governor Isham Harris,

whose northern border was indefensible. If federal gunboats entered the Tennessee or

Cumberland Rivers, all of northern Tennessee, including Nashville, would be too isolated to

defend. Kentucky was his only shield, but only as long as it stayed non-hostile.

Neutrality Falters However, neutrality couldn’t last.

Union recruiting camps were set up across the border in Ohio and Indiana. The Confederates built

Forts Henry and Donelson across the border on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers while stationing

troops yards from the border in the Cumberland Gap. Attempts to reorganize the state military

to enforce neutrality just led to a secessionist State Guard and unionist Home Guard forming.

Peace survived the summer, but the August 5th legislative election returned veto-proof Unionist

majorities in both houses. Public sentiment had shifted strongly against secession, though it

wasn’t pro-war. Immediately thereafter, a Union recruiting station opened in central Tennessee

and Confederate volunteers began massing near Guthrie. All that was missing was a final push.

Fremont’s Folly, Polk’s Stupidity That push came from Major General

John Frémont , who superseded Lyon as department commander on July 25th. Frémont was a military

explorer, vocal abolitionist, and failed presidential candidate who struggled to

control the chaos in Missouri. On August 30th, he declared martial law throughout the state to

enforce order. Tucked into the declaration was a clause emancipating rebel-held slaves. The uproar

in Kentucky was so great that Lincoln feared it would drive the state to secede and repudiated

the declaration. In response, Frémont ordered the Union commander in Cairo , Brigadier General

Ulysses S. Grant, to prepare to occupy Columbus . However, the Confederacy acted first.

Former Episcopalian bishop turned Major General Leonidas Polk had

convinced himself that Columbus needed to be occupied and fortified immediately,

a decision helped by Columbus being the center of Kentucky secessionism. Seeing

increased Union activity in Cairo and probably unaware of Frémont’s plans, Polk occupied

Columbus on September 4th and began building a fortress he called Gibraltar of the West on the

Mississippi river. Grant informed Frémont and occupied Paducah bloodlessly on September 6th.

Magoffin immediately protested to both governments, while Harris and Department commander

General Albert Johnston protested to Richmond. Davis had promised Magoffin and Harris only days

before that the Confederacy would never violate Kentucky’s neutrality. However, Davis accepted

Polk’s claims that “the necessity justified the action”, to Johnston’s horror. Instead of

defending a narrow line along Tennessee's western border, he now had to hold a line from Columbus,

through Bowling Green to the Cumberland Gap. If the Federals found any gap in that line, Kentucky

and, with it Nashville, were indefensible. Polk’s impetuousness was a strategic disaster,

especially once the pro-Union Assembly overrode Magoffin’s vetoes and welcomed Union intervention.

The Confederate States That Weren’t Meanwhile, Price had failed to retake

Missouri. Despite being unopposed thanks to chaos and inefficiency in Frémont’s headquarters,

Price’s northern march was lethargic at best. His only real success was capturing Lexington after a

weeklong siege. In July, the Constitutional Convention reconvened in Jefferson City and

declared itself Missouri’s government, as Jackson’s government had effectively vacated

their posts. While the legislature had reconvened in Neosho, it was powerless, and many legislators

were abandoning Jackson. Worse, Frémont finally advanced out of St. Louis on September

26 with overwhelming numbers, and Price rapidly retreated south, abandoning all his summer gains.

Shortly before fleeing Missouri, Jackson’s government voted for secession on October 28th

despite not having that power and likely lacking a quorum, which was necessary for legal legitimacy.

However, Davis ignored the legal questions and added Missouri’s star to the Confederate flag.

Meanwhile, pro-secession Kentucky politicians met in Bowling Green and declared Kentucky’s secession

and themselves as its government on November 18th. The move was so clearly illegitimate

that Johnston didn’t acknowledge them until Davis ordered him to so the Confederate flag could add a

thirteenth star. Both Border States’ populations largely ignored the secession declarations,

but in truth, their fate would be decided by military force in their southern neighbors.

Capture of Fort Henry Johnston was increasingly convinced that

Kentucky was already lost, as Don Carlos Buell’s growing army in Lexington alone outnumbered

his department. Worse, his subordinates were liabilities. Polk only reluctantly followed orders

and quarrelled about everything but couldn’t be removed due to his political connections.

Several of Davis’ other political generals lost battles to Colonel James Garfield and Brigadier

George Thomas in eastern Kentucky. Confederate Kentucky was already crumbling. In the Union camp,

Lincoln removed Frémont from department command and replaced him with Henry Halleck in October.

Officially, Frémont was removed for severe financial mismanagement indistinguishable

from rampant corruption. Unofficially, Frémont needed punishing to placate pro-slavery Unionists.

Halleck was an able administrator and scholar who quickly fixed Frémont’s mess. However,

per orders from General-in-Chief George McClellan, he held off on offensive action

until all commands were ready. However, Grant and Flag Officer Andrew Foote of the Western

Gunboat Flotilla convinced him that Fort Henry was vulnerable and were allowed to attack in February.

The plan was for Grant’s two divisions to surround Fort Henry while Foote covered them. However,

it had been constructed in the Tennessee River’s floodplain and was half underwater when Foote

arrived with four City-class ironclads and three timberclad gunboats on February 6th.

Most of the garrison retreated to nearby Fort Donelson, leaving a token force to man the guns

who surrendered after a 75-minute bombardment. Grant occupied the fort a few hours later. When

word reached Johnston, he knew Kentucky was lost. With Federals behind and in front of him, he’d be

trapped in Bowling Green if either advanced. Therefore, he ordered a retreat to Nashville

before the trap closed. Fort Donelson was heavily reinforced. If it fell, Nashville was also lost.

Battle of Fort Donelson Grant intended to move against

Donelson immediately in case Halleck recalled him, but heavy rains submerged Henry and made

the roads impassable. Instead, Foote launched a raid down the Tennessee while Grant waited

for reinforcements and better weather. Fort Donelson sat above the Cumberland on cliffs

and was protected by about 16,000 infantry and 700 cavalry. However, the senior officer was Brigadier

General John Floyd, whose only military experience was as James Buchanan’s Secretary of War. Having

no idea what he was doing, Floyd largely deferred to Brigadier General Gideon Pillow,

who had demonstrated military mediocrity in Mexico. The only competent officers were

the junior Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Buckner and cavalry Colonel Nathan Forest.

Grant finally started moving on February 12th with 15,000 men. Forest detected the march and

warned Floyd. The Confederates were spread in a wide ring of trenches outside the fort as Grant

arrived. Grant placed his largest division to block Pillow’s troops in Dover while his other

division faced the fort. Some light skirmishing broke out on the 13th, and Foote tested the

defenses with one ship. Grant was waiting for Foote and additional reinforcements to arrive,

while Floyd didn’t know what to do and didn’t know what advice to listen to.

On February 14th, Foote arrived with 10,000 reinforcements, bringing Grants’ strength to

25,000. Floyd finally called a war council at 11:00 and concluded that Fort Donelson

wasn’t defensible. Pillow was ordered to prepare a breakout before evacuating to Nashville. However,

the attack faltered when Pillow lost his nerve once Grant counterattacked. Sensing the rebels’

fear, Grant asked Foote to attack, hoping to repeat Fort Henry. Foote engaged at 15:00,

but his gunboats' decks were unarmored and helpless against plunging fire from the fort,

and a wounded Foote retreated at 16:30. That night, Grant decided to prepare a proper

siege while Buckner advised another breakout attempt. Freezing rain kept Grant’s troops awake,

so the dawn attack didn’t surprise them. However, Grant had left to confer with Foote,

thinking another breakout was impossible and hadn’t designated a second-in-command.

A flank attack by Forest’s troopers combined with a frontal attack by Pillow’s infantry pushed back

the Union flank along Lick Creek. However, confusion reigned in the Confederate camp,

and the attacks were uncoordinated as the generals argued amongst themselves. Still,

by 12:30, the escape route was open. Grant learned of the situation around 12:00 after asking Foote

to launch a long-range bombardment to confuse the Confederates and encourage his men. He arrived

on the scene shortly after Confederate attacks petered out. Correctly surmising that they were

preparing to retreat, he reorganized his troops to counterattack, only for Pillow to withdraw

back to his starting positions. He believed that his men needed rest and resupply before

attempting the escape, to Floyd and Buckner’s horror. This enabled Grant’s counterattack to

regain all the lost ground and pin them more tightly into the fort, preventing escape.

During the night, the Confederates concluded that their position was hopeless. Fearing Federal

retribution, Floyd passed command to Pillow, who passed command to Buckner. Pillow escaped

during the night on a rowboat while Floyd loaded his staff and Virginia regiments onto the last

steamer and fled to Nashville while Buckner agreed to surrender the remaining 13,000 troops. However,

Forest and his cavalry escaped through a gap in the Union lines. Buckner and Grant

were West Point friends, and Buckner hoped that would yield generous surrender terms. However,

Grant would only offer unconditional surrender, which Buckner begrudgingly accepted. Fort Donelson

was the first major Union land victory, and the nation was euphoric. Grant was hailed as a hero

for demanding unconditional surrender, just like his first initials. Lincoln took notice

and promoted him to Major General. Johnston evacuated Nashville for Corinth, Mississippi.

Missouri Falls to the Union Meanwhile, overwhelming Federal

numbers in Missouri forced Price to withdraw towards Arkansas continually. In December,

Halleck tasked Brigadier Samuel Curtis’ Army of the Southwest with finishing him off. Price

retreated into Arkansas to avoid being trapped in Springfield in February , leaving a handful of

scattered State Guard and Bushwacker companies as the only Confederate presence in Missouri.

Curtis almost caught Price in a series of skirmishes along the Wire Road before Price

reached the Boston Mountains , but stretched supply lines compelled Curtis to rest his

10,500 soldiers along Little Sugar Creek. Price linked back up with McCulloch near

Fayetteville, and they immediately resumed their bickering. To stop them, Davis created

the Trans-Mississippi Department, placing Earl van Dorn in charge. Van Dorn arrived in late February,

taking command of 15,000 Confederate and State Guard troops, plus 800 mostly Cherokee

Indian Cavalry. The tribes of the Indian Territory had little love for the Federals,

and many were slaveholders, making them allies of the Confederacy. Van Dorn decided to attack

and trap the outnumbered Curtis. Audaciously, he planned to swing around Curtis and cut his supply

and communication lines before attacking his rear. Speed was key to the operation, so Van Dorn

separated from his supply train and ordered his soldiers to carry only 40 rounds of ammunition,

three days' rations, and a blanket. The forced march began in freezing rain on March 4th.

Battle of Pea Ridge Curtis learned of Van

Dorn’s advance on March 5th. His divisions were out foraging when orders came to reconcentrate.

About 400 men were too far west to return, and Sigel returned from Bentonville so slowly that

he and his rearguard should have been captured March 6th, but the Confederate cavalry took the

wrong road and missed their chance . Curtis placed his four divisions on the bluffs north of Little

Sugar Creek, expecting Van Dorn to attack from the south. Additionally, trees were felled along

the Bentonville Detour as a precaution. This was fortunate, as the Detour along Pea’s Ridge

plateau was Van Dorn’s route to Curtis’ rear at Elkhorn Tavern. The obstructions plus exhaustion

prevented him from reaching Elkhorn by daylight on March 7th. To speed up the march, he split the

army. He and Price would continue on the Detour while McCulloch used Ford Road to reach Elkhorn.

Federal patrols noticed Confederates on the Detour but didn’t know if it was the main body.

Curtis dispatched Dodge’s brigade to Elkhorn and Osterhaus’ brigade to Leetown to reconnoiter.

First contact came at 09:30, when Price’s vanguard encountered Union scouts north of

Elkhorn. The rest of Carr’s division hurried to support Dodge, but rather than use his numerical

advantage, Van Dorn waited to deploy in a line fully. Carr sent his advance brigade forward,

and the counterattack temporarily halted Price’s advance. However, Price’s superior numbers let

him outflank Carr, who blocked the effort with his remaining brigades but was steadily pushed back.

At 11:30, Osterhaus discovered McCulloch’s troops nearing his position. His cavalry

company immediately attacked to stall McCulloch, and Osterhaus warned Curtis, who dispatched

Colonel Jefferson C. Davis’s division. The Federal cavalry was scattered by 3000 Confederate cavalry,

and the Cherokee overran several infantry companies before being routed by artillery

fire. McCulloch was killed by a Union sharpshooter as he led the infantry attack. His replacement was

killed shortly thereafter, and his replacement was captured as the attack faltered amid the

command confusion. Davis arrived and halted the attack, which caused the confused Confederates

to collapse at 15:30. Some units retreated east to link up with Van Dorn and Price,

others retreated the way they came, and a few were left behind and kept fighting until nightfall.

Van Dorn learned about the fighting in Leetown around 14:00. Realizing that the rendezvous

wouldn’t happen, he ordered more aggressive attacks on Carr’s division. Curtis and his second

division arrived and helped Carr halt Price in Ruddick’s Field at 18:30. During the night, parts

of McCulloch’s division linked up with Van Dorn. The supply train was supposed to arrive, too,

having traveled by another road, but it went to the wrong location. Nearly out of ammunition and

food, Van Dorn hoped that Curtis would retreat in the morning, letting him claim victory. Instead,

Curtis concentrated his forces south of Elkhorn and attacked with Sigel’s unengaged division

leading. The Confederates were in headlong retreat by 11:00. Curtis reported 1,384 casualties,

while Van Dorn suffered around 2,000, while claiming he wasn’t defeated but “failed in

his intentions.” Regardless, he was ordered to abandon both Missouri and northern Arkansas and

cross the Mississippi to help defend Corinth. Many of Price’s State Guard deserted, and no serious

effort was made to retake Missouri until 1864. The Border States had been secured for the Union.

In our next video in this series, the Confederacy will try to retake the initiative in the Western

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