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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:47,259 --> 00:00:50,380 Laura, at this stage I can offer nothing more than my word. 2 00:00:51,340 --> 00:00:54,480 I am a senior government employee in the intelligence community. 3 00:00:55,240 --> 00:00:59,240 I hope you understand that contacting you is extremely high risk, and you are 4 00:00:59,240 --> 00:01:02,080 willing to agree to the following precautions before I share more. 5 00:01:03,100 --> 00:01:04,840 This will not be a waste of your time. 6 00:01:06,280 --> 00:01:09,920 The following sounds complex, but should only take minutes to complete for 7 00:01:09,920 --> 00:01:10,920 someone technical. 8 00:01:11,720 --> 00:01:15,320 I would like to confirm out of email that the keys we exchanged were not 9 00:01:15,320 --> 00:01:17,140 intercepted and replaced by your surveillance. 10 00:01:19,120 --> 00:01:22,980 Please confirm that no one has ever had a copy of your private key and that it 11 00:01:22,980 --> 00:01:27,080 uses a strong passphrase. Assume your adversary is capable of one trillion 12 00:01:27,080 --> 00:01:28,080 guesses per second. 13 00:01:29,200 --> 00:01:33,540 If the device you store the private key and enter your passphrase on has been 14 00:01:33,540 --> 00:01:36,000 hacked, it is trivial to decrypt our communications. 15 00:01:37,860 --> 00:01:41,620 Understand that the above steps are not bulletproof and are intended only to 16 00:01:41,620 --> 00:01:45,320 give us breathing room. In the end, if you publish the source material, I will 17 00:01:45,320 --> 00:01:46,620 likely be immediately implicated. 18 00:01:46,960 --> 00:01:50,260 This must not deter you from releasing the information I will provide. 19 00:01:52,120 --> 00:01:53,760 Thank you and be careful. 20 00:02:51,490 --> 00:02:52,490 Hey, 21 00:02:58,030 --> 00:02:59,030 can you hear me? 22 00:02:59,710 --> 00:03:01,050 I am here, David. How are you? 23 00:03:05,790 --> 00:03:09,870 Well, I would just start by pointing to what Barack Obama himself said about 24 00:03:09,870 --> 00:03:11,390 those questions when he was running. 25 00:03:12,110 --> 00:03:15,990 For the office that he now occupies, in December of 2007, he said, quote, the 26 00:03:15,990 --> 00:03:20,130 president does not have the power under the Constitution to unilaterally 27 00:03:20,130 --> 00:03:24,330 authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping 28 00:03:24,330 --> 00:03:28,130 actual or imminent threat to the nation. So by Obama's own words, the president 29 00:03:28,130 --> 00:03:31,150 does not have the power that he's now exercising under the Constitution. 30 00:03:31,850 --> 00:03:37,730 And as far as why it matters, on August 1, 2007, when he laid out his reasons 31 00:03:37,730 --> 00:03:41,050 why he was running for office and why he thought it was so important to change 32 00:03:41,050 --> 00:03:45,310 the way we were doing things, he said, quote, no more ignoring the law when 33 00:03:45,310 --> 00:03:49,930 inconvenient. That is not who we are. We will again set an example for the world 34 00:03:49,930 --> 00:03:52,950 that the law is not subject to the whims of stubborn rulers. 35 00:03:53,310 --> 00:03:56,430 So to allow presidents to simply start words on their own. 36 00:04:21,899 --> 00:04:23,380 You asked why I picked you. 37 00:04:24,400 --> 00:04:26,260 I didn't. You did. 38 00:04:27,020 --> 00:04:31,240 The surveillance you've experienced means you've been selected, a term which 39 00:04:31,240 --> 00:04:34,600 will mean more to you as you learn about how the modern SIGINT system works. 40 00:04:36,520 --> 00:04:41,480 For now, know that every border you cross, every purchase you make, every 41 00:04:41,480 --> 00:04:46,600 you dial, every cell phone tower you pass, friend you keep, article you 42 00:04:46,860 --> 00:04:51,850 site you visit, subject line you type, and packet you route, is in the hands of 43 00:04:51,850 --> 00:04:55,190 a system whose reach is unlimited, but whose safeguards are not. 44 00:04:56,790 --> 00:05:00,870 Your victimization by the NSA system means that you are well aware of the 45 00:05:00,870 --> 00:05:04,170 that unrestricted, secret police pose for democracies. 46 00:05:04,970 --> 00:05:07,190 This is a story you bet you can tell. 47 00:06:02,060 --> 00:06:07,620 Thank you for inviting me here to give me the opportunity to express my story. 48 00:06:07,920 --> 00:06:09,620 But let me give you some of my background. 49 00:06:10,200 --> 00:06:14,800 I spent about four years in the military and then I went into NSA directly. So I 50 00:06:14,800 --> 00:06:18,980 ended up with about 37 years of service combined. 51 00:06:19,720 --> 00:06:22,720 Most of it was a lot of fun, I tell you. It was really a lot of fun breaking 52 00:06:22,720 --> 00:06:27,020 these puzzles, solving problems and things like that. And that's really what 53 00:06:27,020 --> 00:06:30,440 did. I fundamentally started working out with data, looking at data and data 54 00:06:30,440 --> 00:06:35,760 systems and how you do that. I was developing this concept of analysis that 55 00:06:35,760 --> 00:06:38,960 could lay it out in such a way that it could be coded and executed 56 00:06:38,960 --> 00:06:41,400 electronically, meaning you could automate analysis. 57 00:06:42,360 --> 00:06:45,420 And it has to do with metadata and using metadata relationships. 58 00:06:46,300 --> 00:06:47,300 So that was my whole... 59 00:06:48,440 --> 00:06:51,340 Being there, I didn't say that. Eventually, that's what I ended up 60 00:06:51,340 --> 00:06:53,060 the only one there doing that, by the way. 61 00:06:53,920 --> 00:07:00,920 So, at any rate, 9 -11 happened, and it must have been right after a few days, 62 00:07:01,040 --> 00:07:07,220 no more than a week after 9 -11, that they had decided to begin actively 63 00:07:07,220 --> 00:07:08,340 on everyone in this country. 64 00:07:08,900 --> 00:07:13,580 And they wanted that back part of our program to run all the spying. 65 00:07:14,100 --> 00:07:14,959 All right? 66 00:07:14,960 --> 00:07:17,900 So that's exactly what they did. 67 00:07:18,430 --> 00:07:22,050 And then he started taking the telecom data, and it expanded after that. 68 00:07:22,270 --> 00:07:27,970 So, I mean, the one I knew was AT &T, and that one provided 320 million 69 00:07:27,970 --> 00:07:28,970 every day. 70 00:07:29,490 --> 00:07:34,810 That program was reauthorized every 45 days by what I called the YES Committee, 71 00:07:34,970 --> 00:07:38,970 which was Hayden and Tennant and the DOJ. 72 00:07:39,610 --> 00:07:41,470 The program was called Stellar Wind. 73 00:07:42,130 --> 00:07:46,290 So first I went to the House Intelligence Committee and the staff 74 00:07:46,290 --> 00:07:47,290 personally knew there. 75 00:07:48,140 --> 00:07:50,240 She then went to the chairman of that committee. 76 00:07:50,500 --> 00:07:52,440 Nancy Pelosi was the minority rep. 77 00:07:53,940 --> 00:07:58,180 They were all briefed into the program at the time, by the way, and all the 78 00:07:58,180 --> 00:08:01,260 other programs that were going on, including all these CIA programs. 79 00:08:01,920 --> 00:08:05,680 I wasn't alone in this. There were four others out of NSA, and we were all 80 00:08:05,680 --> 00:08:09,120 trying to work internally in the government over these years, trying to 81 00:08:09,120 --> 00:08:13,780 to come around to being constitutionally acceptable and take it into the courts 82 00:08:13,780 --> 00:08:15,500 and have the courts' oversight of it, too. 83 00:08:16,080 --> 00:08:22,400 So we naively kept thinking that that could happen, and it never did. 84 00:08:24,020 --> 00:08:28,460 But at any rate, after that and all the stuff we were doing, they decided to 85 00:08:28,460 --> 00:08:31,080 raid us to keep us quiet, threaten us, you know. 86 00:08:31,560 --> 00:08:36,419 So we were raided simultaneously, four of us. In my case, they came in with 87 00:08:36,419 --> 00:08:38,419 drawn. I don't know why they did that, but they did. 88 00:08:59,970 --> 00:09:04,450 Laura, I will answer what I remember of your questions as best I can. Forgive 89 00:09:04,450 --> 00:09:05,450 the lack of structure. 90 00:09:05,550 --> 00:09:08,610 I am not a writer, and I have to draft this in a great hurry. 91 00:09:10,450 --> 00:09:12,910 What you know as Stellar Wind has grown. 92 00:09:14,510 --> 00:09:19,070 SSO, the expanded special source operations that took over Stellar Wind's 93 00:09:19,070 --> 00:09:23,430 of the pie, has spread all over the world to practically include 94 00:09:23,430 --> 00:09:25,030 coverage of the United States. 95 00:09:26,790 --> 00:09:31,190 Disturbingly, The amount of U .S. communication ingested by NSA is still 96 00:09:31,190 --> 00:09:32,190 increasing. 97 00:09:33,030 --> 00:09:37,210 Publicly, we complain that things are going dark, but in fact, our accesses 98 00:09:37,210 --> 00:09:38,210 improving. 99 00:09:38,450 --> 00:09:43,030 The truth is that the NSA has never in its history collected more than it does 100 00:09:43,030 --> 00:09:44,030 now. 101 00:09:45,750 --> 00:09:50,230 I know the location of most domestic interception points and that the largest 102 00:09:50,230 --> 00:09:53,850 telecommunication companies in the U .S. are betraying the trust of their 103 00:09:53,850 --> 00:09:55,770 customers, which I can prove. 104 00:09:57,130 --> 00:10:01,370 We are building the greatest weapon for oppression in the history of man, yet 105 00:10:01,370 --> 00:10:03,590 its directors exempt themselves from accountability. 106 00:10:05,450 --> 00:10:10,030 NSA director Keith Alexander lied to Congress, which I can prove. 107 00:10:11,590 --> 00:10:14,590 Billions of U .S. communications are being intercepted. 108 00:10:16,240 --> 00:10:20,020 In gathering evidence of wrongdoing, I focus on the wronging of the American 109 00:10:20,020 --> 00:10:23,980 people. But believe me when I say that the surveillance we live under is the 110 00:10:23,980 --> 00:10:26,640 highest privilege compared to how we treat the rest of the world. 111 00:10:27,620 --> 00:10:28,900 This I can also prove. 112 00:10:30,700 --> 00:10:34,980 On cyber operations, the government's public citizen is that we still lack a 113 00:10:34,980 --> 00:10:35,980 policy framework. 114 00:10:36,140 --> 00:10:41,140 This too is a lie. There is a detailed policy framework, a kind of Markle law 115 00:10:41,140 --> 00:10:43,680 for cyber operations created by the White House. 116 00:10:44,090 --> 00:10:48,010 It's called Presidential Policy Directive 20 and was finalized at the 117 00:10:48,010 --> 00:10:49,010 last year. 118 00:10:49,250 --> 00:10:50,530 This I can also prove. 119 00:10:51,970 --> 00:10:56,310 I appreciate your concern for my safety, but I already know how this will end 120 00:10:56,310 --> 00:10:58,110 for me, and I accept the risk. 121 00:10:58,990 --> 00:11:03,170 If I have luck, and you are careful, you will have everything you need. 122 00:11:03,610 --> 00:11:07,410 I ask only that you ensure this information makes it home to the 123 00:11:07,410 --> 00:11:08,410 public. 124 00:11:09,420 --> 00:11:13,600 Does the NSA routinely intercept American citizens emails? 125 00:11:14,060 --> 00:11:15,060 No. 126 00:11:16,440 --> 00:11:22,680 Does the NSA intercept Americans cell phone conversations? 127 00:11:22,900 --> 00:11:25,020 No. Google searches? 128 00:11:25,440 --> 00:11:27,760 No. Text messages? 129 00:11:28,180 --> 00:11:31,000 No. Amazon .com orders? 130 00:11:31,340 --> 00:11:33,080 No. Bank records? 131 00:11:33,740 --> 00:11:39,520 No. What judicial consent is required for NSA to intercept communications 132 00:11:39,520 --> 00:11:43,660 and information involving American citizens? 133 00:11:44,120 --> 00:11:48,580 Within the United States, that would be the FBI lead. If it was a foreign actor 134 00:11:48,580 --> 00:11:52,040 in the United States, the FBI would still have to lead and could work that 135 00:11:52,040 --> 00:11:55,580 NSA or other intelligence agencies as authorized. 136 00:11:56,000 --> 00:12:01,040 But to conduct that kind of collection in the United States, it would have to 137 00:12:01,040 --> 00:12:02,040 through a court order. 138 00:12:02,730 --> 00:12:06,850 and the court would have to authorize it. We are not authorized to do it, nor 139 00:12:06,850 --> 00:12:07,850 we do it. 140 00:12:15,610 --> 00:12:16,610 All right. 141 00:12:17,730 --> 00:12:21,650 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is now in session. 142 00:12:22,790 --> 00:12:23,830 Please be seated. 143 00:12:33,390 --> 00:12:35,330 Good morning and welcome to the Ninth Circuit. 144 00:12:36,710 --> 00:12:41,470 The first case for argument is Jewell v. National Security Agency. 145 00:12:42,010 --> 00:12:43,070 You may proceed. 146 00:12:46,250 --> 00:12:50,330 May it please the Court, Kevin Bankston for Carolyn Jewell and her fellow 147 00:12:50,330 --> 00:12:52,190 plaintiff appellants in Jewell v. NSA. 148 00:12:52,810 --> 00:12:58,350 Your Honors, plaintiffs have specifically alleged that their own 149 00:12:58,350 --> 00:13:01,090 and communications records have been acquired by the government. 150 00:13:01,680 --> 00:13:06,200 But the district court found that we had failed to allege facts that 151 00:13:06,200 --> 00:13:10,000 differentiated the injury that our plaintiffs suffered from the injury 152 00:13:10,000 --> 00:13:14,820 by every other AT &T user whose communications and records have been 153 00:13:14,820 --> 00:13:18,600 the government, basically concluding that so long as everyone is being 154 00:13:18,600 --> 00:13:20,660 surveilled, no one has standing to sue. 155 00:13:21,140 --> 00:13:25,040 However, to deny standing to persons who are injured simply because many others 156 00:13:25,040 --> 00:13:28,720 are also injured would mean that the most injurious and widespread government 157 00:13:28,720 --> 00:13:30,480 actions could be questioned by nobody. 158 00:13:31,080 --> 00:13:36,380 Do you have anything concrete that, in fact, a specific communication of your 159 00:13:36,380 --> 00:13:41,760 client was intercepted? We have evidence that all the communications passing 160 00:13:41,760 --> 00:13:46,400 between AT &T's network and other networks in their Northern California 161 00:13:46,400 --> 00:13:50,280 have been intercepted, and so that would necessarily include the Internet 162 00:13:50,280 --> 00:13:53,520 communications of our Northern California plaintiffs. 163 00:13:53,860 --> 00:13:56,480 Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. 164 00:14:03,850 --> 00:14:07,130 May it please the court, I'm Thomas Byron from the Department of Justice 165 00:14:07,130 --> 00:14:11,810 behalf of the government defendants. We think this litigation need not be 166 00:14:11,810 --> 00:14:16,890 resolved in federal court in light of the oversight of the political branches, 167 00:14:16,990 --> 00:14:23,610 both legislative and executive, which provides a better opportunity for 168 00:14:23,610 --> 00:14:28,690 oversight and resolution of the concerns raised concerning nationwide policy of 169 00:14:28,690 --> 00:14:34,640 alleged surveillance in these... in these complaints. Even if it's revealed 170 00:14:34,640 --> 00:14:39,720 one or more of the plaintiffs had email or telephone conversations intercepted 171 00:14:39,720 --> 00:14:42,080 that had nothing to do with national security. 172 00:14:42,520 --> 00:14:46,580 Your Honor, I don't know that anyone necessarily would have standing to raise 173 00:14:46,580 --> 00:14:49,600 the particular claims at issue in these two cases. 174 00:14:49,840 --> 00:14:55,040 We think instead that the kinds of claims at issue here against these... 175 00:14:55,200 --> 00:14:59,460 defendants are those that are better suited to resolution before the 176 00:14:59,460 --> 00:15:04,460 representative branches of our government. So what rule would the 177 00:15:04,460 --> 00:15:07,680 if your approach is adopted? 178 00:15:08,720 --> 00:15:13,220 Judge Ferguson, I think that the... I mean, we just get out of the way, is 179 00:15:13,220 --> 00:15:17,580 it? Well, Judge Ferguson, I think that there is a narrow category, a subset of 180 00:15:17,580 --> 00:15:21,800 cases in which it may be appropriate to step aside. 181 00:15:22,380 --> 00:15:27,220 for that narrow category of cases. But the judiciary plays a role. 182 00:15:27,500 --> 00:15:28,500 To be sure, Judge Ferguson. 183 00:15:28,780 --> 00:15:29,699 In our system. 184 00:15:29,700 --> 00:15:30,700 Yes, Your Honor. 185 00:15:30,880 --> 00:15:33,100 And we don't mean to diminish that. 186 00:15:33,360 --> 00:15:35,820 You're asking us to abdicate that role. 187 00:15:36,300 --> 00:15:40,540 No, Your Honor, but it is a question of this court's discretion whether to reach 188 00:15:40,540 --> 00:15:41,469 that issue. 189 00:15:41,470 --> 00:15:45,770 We do think that there is simply no way for the litigation to proceed without 190 00:15:45,770 --> 00:15:50,730 risk of divulging those very questions of privileged information that would 191 00:15:50,730 --> 00:15:54,450 cause, as the Director of National Intelligence has explained, 192 00:15:54,450 --> 00:15:56,990 grave damage to national security if disclosed. 193 00:16:01,350 --> 00:16:02,530 Thanks for having me. 194 00:16:03,570 --> 00:16:07,250 If anybody has any questions, like I said, just basically just raise your 195 00:16:07,330 --> 00:16:09,690 and I'll try to call on you as soon as I possibly can. 196 00:16:11,200 --> 00:16:15,180 Who here actually feels like they are under surveillance pretty regularly? 197 00:16:16,840 --> 00:16:21,580 Everyone inside of Occupy. How many people here have been arrested and at 198 00:16:21,580 --> 00:16:24,220 court date they had their phone taken into the back room? 199 00:16:24,680 --> 00:16:26,400 How many people here had their retina scanned? 200 00:16:28,080 --> 00:16:29,080 Wow. 201 00:16:30,020 --> 00:16:33,780 So you guys are actually, in a sense, the canaries in the coal mine, right? 202 00:16:33,840 --> 00:16:36,060 Because the incentives are all lined up against you. 203 00:16:36,540 --> 00:16:39,880 Anybody see on the subway, link your MetroCard to your debit card? 204 00:16:40,650 --> 00:16:41,870 and auto -refill. 205 00:16:42,250 --> 00:16:45,550 This is a concept which is key to everything we'll talk about today. It's 206 00:16:45,550 --> 00:16:49,550 linkability. Take one piece of data and link it to another piece of data. 207 00:16:50,050 --> 00:16:53,770 For example, if you have your MetroCard and you have your debit card, you have 208 00:16:53,770 --> 00:16:55,350 those things and you can draw a line between them. 209 00:16:56,230 --> 00:16:57,830 That's not a scary thing. 210 00:16:58,370 --> 00:17:02,370 Except your bank card is tied to everything else that you do during the 211 00:17:02,370 --> 00:17:05,050 they know where you're going, when you make purchases. 212 00:17:05,650 --> 00:17:08,770 When they decide to target you, they can actually recreate your exact steps. 213 00:17:09,099 --> 00:17:13,079 with a MetroCard and with a credit card alone, like literally where you go and 214 00:17:13,079 --> 00:17:13,779 what you buy. 215 00:17:13,780 --> 00:17:18,000 And potentially, by linking that data with other people on similar travel 216 00:17:18,339 --> 00:17:20,780 they can figure out who you talked to and who you met with. 217 00:17:21,359 --> 00:17:25,599 When you then take cell phone data, which logs your location, and you link 218 00:17:25,599 --> 00:17:31,020 purchasing data, MetroCard data, and your debit card, you start to get what 219 00:17:31,020 --> 00:17:33,840 could call metadata in aggregate over a person's life. 220 00:17:34,140 --> 00:17:36,440 And metadata in aggregate is content. 221 00:17:37,240 --> 00:17:41,400 It tells a story about you, which is made up of facts, but it's not 222 00:17:41,400 --> 00:17:45,180 true. So, for example, just because you were on the corner and all those data 223 00:17:45,180 --> 00:17:47,580 points point to it, it doesn't mean you committed a crime. 224 00:17:48,000 --> 00:17:51,660 So it's important to note that if someone has a perception of you having 225 00:17:51,660 --> 00:17:54,580 thing, it will now follow you for the rest of your life. 226 00:17:54,780 --> 00:17:58,100 So just keep in mind that what happens to you guys, for example, with 227 00:17:58,100 --> 00:18:01,060 fingerprints and retinal scans and photographs... 228 00:18:01,680 --> 00:18:04,860 That is what is going to happen to people in the future when they resist 229 00:18:04,860 --> 00:18:08,160 changes and when they try to protest in a totally constitutionally protected 230 00:18:08,160 --> 00:18:09,160 way. 231 00:18:09,940 --> 00:18:13,280 This is for you, Director Clapper, again on the surveillance front. And I hope 232 00:18:13,280 --> 00:18:17,320 we can do this in just a yes or no answer because I know Senator Feinstein 233 00:18:17,320 --> 00:18:18,099 to move on. 234 00:18:18,100 --> 00:18:25,100 So does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of 235 00:18:25,100 --> 00:18:26,260 millions of Americans? 236 00:18:27,560 --> 00:18:28,560 No, sir. 237 00:18:29,380 --> 00:18:30,380 It does not? 238 00:18:31,850 --> 00:18:33,010 Not wittingly. 239 00:18:33,850 --> 00:18:40,130 There are cases where they could inadvertently, perhaps, collect, but not 240 00:18:40,130 --> 00:18:41,130 wittingly. 241 00:19:06,860 --> 00:19:10,180 The encrypted archive should be available to you within seven days. 242 00:19:10,540 --> 00:19:12,940 The key will follow when everything else is done. 243 00:19:15,160 --> 00:19:19,600 The material I provide and investigative effort required will be too much for 244 00:19:19,600 --> 00:19:20,600 any one person. 245 00:19:20,760 --> 00:19:24,160 I recommend, at a very minimum, you involve Glenn Greenwald. 246 00:19:24,380 --> 00:19:25,660 I believe you know him. 247 00:19:28,180 --> 00:19:32,300 The plain text of the payload will include my true name details for the 248 00:19:33,580 --> 00:19:37,520 though it will be your decision as to whether or how to declare my 249 00:19:38,800 --> 00:19:42,500 My personal desire is that you paint the target directly on my back. 250 00:19:43,600 --> 00:19:48,880 No one, not even my most trusted confidant, is aware of my intentions, 251 00:19:48,880 --> 00:19:51,800 would not be fair for them to fall under suspicion for my actions. 252 00:19:52,960 --> 00:19:57,080 You may be the only one who can prevent that, and that is by immediately nailing 253 00:19:57,080 --> 00:19:59,700 me to the cross, rather than trying to protect me as a source. 254 00:20:03,180 --> 00:20:05,860 On timing regarding meeting up in Hong Kong. 255 00:20:06,980 --> 00:20:11,020 The first rendezvous attempt will be at 10 a .m. local time on Monday. 256 00:20:12,140 --> 00:20:15,600 We will meet in the hallway outside of a restaurant in the Mira Hotel. 257 00:20:17,340 --> 00:20:20,360 I will be working on a Rubik's Cube so you can identify me. 258 00:20:22,120 --> 00:20:24,700 Approach me and ask if I know the hours of the restaurant. 259 00:20:25,700 --> 00:20:29,720 I'll respond by stating that I'm not sure and suggest you try the lounge 260 00:20:29,720 --> 00:20:30,720 instead. 261 00:20:30,930 --> 00:20:33,950 I'll offer to show you where it is, and at that point, we're good. 262 00:20:35,170 --> 00:20:36,830 You simply need to follow naturally. 263 00:21:14,879 --> 00:21:18,700 As far as positioning, I mean, if you want us to sit in any particular way. 264 00:21:19,040 --> 00:21:20,500 You know, I'm going to go there. 265 00:21:20,820 --> 00:21:21,820 Okay. 266 00:21:27,920 --> 00:21:34,360 There's so many different 267 00:21:34,360 --> 00:21:40,900 enormous stories just that are kind of stand -alone stories that 268 00:21:41,680 --> 00:21:45,520 even certain things about individual documents that can just be their own 269 00:21:45,900 --> 00:21:47,940 And I just want to start turning those stories out. 270 00:21:48,200 --> 00:21:50,640 I basically woke up this morning and already started writing stories. 271 00:21:51,740 --> 00:21:57,860 So I'm hoping to start publishing within a day or two days, as long as you're 272 00:21:57,860 --> 00:21:58,860 good with that. 273 00:21:59,080 --> 00:22:05,620 And so as far as the stuff we have to talk about, I'm kind of dichotomizing it 274 00:22:05,620 --> 00:22:06,620 between... 275 00:22:08,650 --> 00:22:11,070 You know, stuff that I'd like to talk to you about in terms of like the 276 00:22:11,070 --> 00:22:13,670 documents and the content. And Laura has a bunch of questions about that as 277 00:22:13,670 --> 00:22:17,090 well. Sort of working through the documents, getting your take on a lot of 278 00:22:17,090 --> 00:22:20,750 stuff that, you know, will help me understand it better. But then also the 279 00:22:20,750 --> 00:22:26,130 of you story, right? Like the who you are, what you've done, why you've done 280 00:22:26,130 --> 00:22:28,190 what you've done. And I'd love to do that first. 281 00:22:28,650 --> 00:22:33,510 Okay. In part because you're the only one who could do that. So I'd like to 282 00:22:33,510 --> 00:22:34,610 get it done so that it's done. 283 00:22:35,240 --> 00:22:39,920 And also because, you know, it might be that you want to do that early because 284 00:22:39,920 --> 00:22:43,920 it might be necessary or we might choose to have that done early. 285 00:22:44,180 --> 00:22:48,580 Tell me your thoughts on where you are with that. The primary one on that, I 286 00:22:48,580 --> 00:22:54,380 think I've expressed a couple times online, is I feel the modern media has a 287 00:22:54,380 --> 00:22:56,000 focus on personalities. 288 00:22:56,240 --> 00:23:02,160 Totally. And I'm a little concerned the more we focus on that, the more they're 289 00:23:02,160 --> 00:23:03,220 going to use that as a distraction. 290 00:23:04,680 --> 00:23:08,000 And I don't necessarily want that to happen, which is why I've consistently 291 00:23:08,000 --> 00:23:10,520 said, you know, I'm not the story here. 292 00:23:12,660 --> 00:23:15,220 Nervous, huh? No, it's a very, very cheap plan. 293 00:23:15,520 --> 00:23:17,200 Go ahead. 294 00:23:18,880 --> 00:23:25,580 But, yeah, anything I can do to help you guys get this out, I will do. 295 00:23:25,860 --> 00:23:31,720 I don't have any experience with media with how this works. 296 00:23:32,709 --> 00:23:35,330 So I'm kind of learning as I go. 297 00:23:36,090 --> 00:23:40,110 Right. So I just want to get a sense of why did you decide to do what you've 298 00:23:40,110 --> 00:23:45,830 done? So for me, it all comes down to state power against the people's ability 299 00:23:45,830 --> 00:23:47,930 to meaningfully oppose that power. 300 00:23:48,450 --> 00:23:55,070 And I'm sitting there every day getting paid to design methods to 301 00:23:55,070 --> 00:24:00,770 amplify that state power. And I'm realizing that if, you know, the policy 302 00:24:00,770 --> 00:24:07,240 switches, that are the only things that restrain these states were chained, you 303 00:24:07,240 --> 00:24:11,380 couldn't meaningfully oppose these. I mean, you would have to be the most 304 00:24:11,380 --> 00:24:14,520 incredibly sophisticated technical actor in existence. 305 00:24:14,920 --> 00:24:20,320 I mean, I'm not sure there's anybody, no matter how gifted you are, who could 306 00:24:20,320 --> 00:24:25,540 oppose all of the offices and all the bright people, even all the mediocre 307 00:24:25,540 --> 00:24:28,240 people out there with all of their tools and all their capabilities. 308 00:24:29,290 --> 00:24:35,210 And as I saw the promise of the Obama administration be betrayed and walked 309 00:24:35,210 --> 00:24:42,130 from, and in fact actually advance the things that had been promised to be sort 310 00:24:42,130 --> 00:24:46,910 of curtailed and reined in and dialed back, and actually at work, particularly 311 00:24:46,910 --> 00:24:52,030 drone strikes, which I also learned at NSA, we could watch drone videos from 312 00:24:52,030 --> 00:24:53,030 desktops. 313 00:24:55,939 --> 00:24:59,680 As I saw that, that really hardened me to action. In real time? 314 00:24:59,980 --> 00:25:01,040 In real time, yeah. 315 00:25:01,840 --> 00:25:05,660 It'll stream a lower quality of the video to your desktop. 316 00:25:06,140 --> 00:25:09,500 Typically, you'd be watching surveillance drones as opposed to 317 00:25:09,560 --> 00:25:12,220 you know, murder drones where they're going out there to bomb somebody. 318 00:25:12,520 --> 00:25:17,040 But you'll have a drone that's just following somebody's house for hours and 319 00:25:17,040 --> 00:25:20,200 hours. And you won't know who it is because, you know, you don't have the 320 00:25:20,200 --> 00:25:24,640 context for that. But it's just a page where it lists and lists. 321 00:25:25,050 --> 00:25:28,690 of drone feeds in all these different countries under all these different code 322 00:25:28,690 --> 00:25:30,970 names. And you can just click on which one you want to see. 323 00:25:33,730 --> 00:25:38,250 Right. So if your self -interest is to live in a world in which there's maximum 324 00:25:38,250 --> 00:25:43,690 privacy, doing something that could put you into prison in which your privacy is 325 00:25:43,690 --> 00:25:46,470 completely destroyed is sort of the antithesis of that. 326 00:25:46,690 --> 00:25:50,010 How did you reach the point where that was a worthwhile calculation for you? 327 00:25:50,820 --> 00:25:55,340 I remember what the Internet was like before it was being watched, and there's 328 00:25:55,340 --> 00:25:58,640 never been anything in the history of man that's like it. I mean, you could, 329 00:25:58,660 --> 00:26:04,540 again, have children from one part of the world having an equal discussion 330 00:26:04,540 --> 00:26:10,900 where, you know, they were sort of granted the same respect for their ideas 331 00:26:10,900 --> 00:26:15,740 conversation with experts in the field from another part of the world on any 332 00:26:15,740 --> 00:26:18,440 topic, anywhere, anytime, all the time. 333 00:26:19,300 --> 00:26:25,240 And it was free and unrestrained. And we've seen the chilling of that and the 334 00:26:25,240 --> 00:26:28,720 cooling of that and the changing of that model toward something in which people 335 00:26:28,720 --> 00:26:30,300 self -police their own views. 336 00:26:30,540 --> 00:26:35,660 And they literally make jokes about ending up on the list if they donate to 337 00:26:35,660 --> 00:26:38,420 political cause or if they say something in a discussion. 338 00:26:39,000 --> 00:26:43,120 And it's become an expectation that we're being watched. 339 00:26:43,900 --> 00:26:47,160 Many people I've talked to have mentioned that they're careful about 340 00:26:47,160 --> 00:26:50,900 type into search engines because they know that it's being recorded. And that 341 00:26:50,900 --> 00:26:54,680 limits the boundaries of their intellectual exploration. 342 00:26:56,020 --> 00:27:01,860 And I am more willing to 343 00:27:01,860 --> 00:27:08,700 risk imprisonment or any other negative outcome personally 344 00:27:08,700 --> 00:27:12,260 than I am willing to risk. 345 00:27:13,070 --> 00:27:19,730 the curtailment of my intellectual freedom and that of those around me whom 346 00:27:19,730 --> 00:27:22,930 care for equally as I do for myself. 347 00:27:23,190 --> 00:27:29,050 And again, that's not to say that I'm self -sacrificing because it gives me, I 348 00:27:29,050 --> 00:27:33,890 feel good in my human experience to know that I can contribute to the good of 349 00:27:33,890 --> 00:27:34,890 others. 350 00:27:51,120 --> 00:27:52,280 Could you elaborate on that? 351 00:27:52,680 --> 00:27:59,140 So I don't know how much of the programs and the actual technical capacity that 352 00:27:59,140 --> 00:28:02,720 everybody's talked to you about, but there's an infrastructure in place in 353 00:28:02,720 --> 00:28:09,160 United States and worldwide that NSA has built in cooperation 354 00:28:09,160 --> 00:28:15,200 with other governments as well that intercepts 355 00:28:15,200 --> 00:28:19,240 basically every digital communication. 356 00:28:20,240 --> 00:28:26,680 every radio communication, every analog communication that it has sensors in 357 00:28:26,680 --> 00:28:27,720 place to detect. 358 00:28:28,020 --> 00:28:34,840 And with these capabilities, basically the vast majority 359 00:28:34,840 --> 00:28:40,700 of human and computer -to -computer communications, device -based 360 00:28:40,700 --> 00:28:45,320 communications, which sort of inform the relationships between humans, are 361 00:28:45,320 --> 00:28:47,180 automatically ingested. 362 00:28:47,680 --> 00:28:48,680 without targeting. 363 00:28:48,860 --> 00:28:55,460 And that allows individuals to retroactively search your communications 364 00:28:55,460 --> 00:29:01,700 on self -certifications. So, for example, if I wanted to see the content 365 00:29:01,700 --> 00:29:08,540 email or your wife's phone calls or anything like that, all I have to do 366 00:29:08,540 --> 00:29:12,980 is use what's called a selector, any kind of... 367 00:29:14,210 --> 00:29:19,950 thing in the communications chain that might uniquely or almost uniquely 368 00:29:19,950 --> 00:29:21,570 identify you as an individual. 369 00:29:21,810 --> 00:29:25,650 And I'm talking about things like email addresses, IP addresses, phone numbers, 370 00:29:25,810 --> 00:29:32,090 credit cards, even passwords that are unique to you that aren't used by anyone 371 00:29:32,090 --> 00:29:33,090 else. 372 00:29:33,370 --> 00:29:37,910 I can input those into the system and it will not only go back through the 373 00:29:37,910 --> 00:29:41,370 database and go, have I seen this anywhere in the past? 374 00:29:42,150 --> 00:29:43,150 It will 375 00:29:43,889 --> 00:29:49,270 basically put an additional level of scrutiny on it, moving into the future 376 00:29:49,270 --> 00:29:53,850 says, if this is detected now or at any time in the future, I want this to go to 377 00:29:53,850 --> 00:29:58,650 me immediately and alert me in real time that you're communicating with someone, 378 00:29:58,730 --> 00:29:59,730 things like that. 379 00:30:03,810 --> 00:30:06,450 So I don't know who you are or anything about you. 380 00:30:06,650 --> 00:30:07,650 Okay. 381 00:30:08,110 --> 00:30:11,930 I work for Booz Allen Hamilton. 382 00:30:12,620 --> 00:30:14,240 a defense contractor. 383 00:30:14,800 --> 00:30:17,180 I'm sort of on loan to NSA. 384 00:30:17,600 --> 00:30:21,060 I don't talk to a Booz Allen boss. I don't get tasking from Booz Allen. It's 385 00:30:21,060 --> 00:30:21,919 from NSA. 386 00:30:21,920 --> 00:30:23,480 So I don't know your name. 387 00:30:23,720 --> 00:30:24,720 Oh, sorry. 388 00:30:24,800 --> 00:30:28,500 My name is Edward Snowden. I go by Ed. 389 00:30:30,000 --> 00:30:32,000 Edward Joseph Snowden is the full name. 390 00:30:32,340 --> 00:30:35,120 S -N -O -W -D -E -N. 391 00:30:35,580 --> 00:30:37,160 And where are you from? 392 00:30:37,760 --> 00:30:40,420 I'm originally, I was born in North Carolina. 393 00:30:40,940 --> 00:30:42,800 a small town, Elizabeth City. 394 00:30:43,000 --> 00:30:45,460 There's a Coast Guard station there. I'm from a military family. 395 00:30:45,840 --> 00:30:50,780 But I spent most of my time growing up around Fort Meade in Maryland. 396 00:30:53,000 --> 00:30:57,040 And your family, what's the consequences for them? 397 00:30:57,540 --> 00:31:01,660 This is actually what has made this hardest. 398 00:31:02,020 --> 00:31:06,600 My family doesn't know what's happening. They're unaware. 399 00:31:08,020 --> 00:31:09,420 I don't think... 400 00:31:09,870 --> 00:31:16,510 I'll be able to keep the family ties that I've had for my life 401 00:31:16,510 --> 00:31:22,970 because of the risk of associating them with this. And I'll 402 00:31:22,970 --> 00:31:28,410 leave what to publish on this and what not to publish to you guys. I trust you 403 00:31:28,410 --> 00:31:29,410 to be responsible on this. 404 00:31:31,270 --> 00:31:36,900 But basically, the closer I stay to my family, the more likely they are to be 405 00:31:36,900 --> 00:31:38,920 leaned on. So you don't want me to report this? 406 00:31:39,240 --> 00:31:44,780 Yeah, we definitely want to do whatever we can not to include them or bring them 407 00:31:44,780 --> 00:31:45,780 into the mix. 408 00:31:46,360 --> 00:31:47,219 That's fine. 409 00:31:47,220 --> 00:31:50,960 I'm sorry, let me interrupt you. Can we just stop for a second and do the 410 00:31:50,960 --> 00:31:52,220 document and then go back to that? 411 00:31:53,409 --> 00:31:56,790 What do I need? Do I need an email address that we're using? 412 00:31:57,170 --> 00:31:59,130 Well, so you can send them. 413 00:31:59,570 --> 00:32:02,230 Once you've encrypted it, you can send it from whatever you think is 414 00:32:02,230 --> 00:32:06,550 appropriate. The main thing is you've got to encapsulate all of this in a way 415 00:32:06,550 --> 00:32:13,130 that it can't be decrypted and read in transit across the network or on 416 00:32:13,130 --> 00:32:14,550 either of the endpoints. 417 00:32:14,790 --> 00:32:17,970 Okay. I mean, just so you know, these documents are basically all going to be. 418 00:32:18,330 --> 00:32:23,310 public within 48 hours, 72 hours, whatever. You want to get in the process 419 00:32:23,310 --> 00:32:26,710 doing this for everything because it seems hard, but it's not hard. It's 420 00:32:26,710 --> 00:32:28,830 easy. Just walk me through it. 421 00:32:29,150 --> 00:32:32,830 Show me the actual folder structure where these files are first. 422 00:32:36,490 --> 00:32:38,350 How many documents did you say there were? 423 00:32:39,050 --> 00:32:40,050 Seven. 424 00:32:40,710 --> 00:32:41,710 Okay, go ahead. 425 00:32:44,490 --> 00:32:47,490 How many documents are we talking about? Because when The Guardian did 426 00:32:47,490 --> 00:32:52,270 WikiLeaks, technical people set up a system so that they were available for 427 00:32:52,270 --> 00:32:53,270 anybody to see. 428 00:32:53,410 --> 00:32:59,470 And I just wonder if it's possible to do the same thing. That would be the ideal 429 00:32:59,470 --> 00:33:05,810 endgame. But because some of these documents are 430 00:33:05,810 --> 00:33:10,690 legitimately classified in ways that could cause harm to people and methods. 431 00:33:12,270 --> 00:33:16,250 I'm comfortable in my technical ability to protect them. I mean, you could 432 00:33:16,250 --> 00:33:19,850 literally shoot me or torture me, and I could not disclose the password if I 433 00:33:19,850 --> 00:33:20,850 wanted to. 434 00:33:22,530 --> 00:33:25,130 I have the sophistication to do that. 435 00:33:25,590 --> 00:33:29,950 There are some journalists that I think could do that, but there are a number of 436 00:33:29,950 --> 00:33:36,310 them that couldn't. But the question becomes, can an organization actually 437 00:33:36,310 --> 00:33:39,890 control that information in that manner? 438 00:33:40,510 --> 00:33:43,370 without risking basically an uncontrolled disclosure. 439 00:33:43,610 --> 00:33:48,430 But I do agree with that. Honestly, I don't want to be the person making 440 00:33:48,430 --> 00:33:52,730 decisions on what should be public and what shouldn't, which is why rather than 441 00:33:52,730 --> 00:33:57,930 publishing these on my own or putting them out openly, I'm running them 442 00:33:57,930 --> 00:34:02,950 journalists so that my bias... and my things, because clearly I have some 443 00:34:02,950 --> 00:34:08,030 strongly held views, are removed from that equation and the public interest is 444 00:34:08,030 --> 00:34:09,929 being represented in the most responsible manner. 445 00:34:11,350 --> 00:34:16,110 Actually, given your sort of geographic 446 00:34:16,110 --> 00:34:22,969 familiarity with the UK and whatnot, I'd like to point out that GCHQ 447 00:34:22,969 --> 00:34:28,230 has probably the most invasive 448 00:34:30,610 --> 00:34:33,190 Network intercept program anywhere in the world. 449 00:34:34,330 --> 00:34:37,449 It's called Tempora, T -E -M -P -O -R -A. 450 00:34:37,889 --> 00:34:42,770 And it's the world's first full take, they call it. And that means content in 451 00:34:42,770 --> 00:34:44,630 addition to metadata on everything. 452 00:34:47,710 --> 00:34:51,909 So this is what I like to do in terms of scheduling, if it's good with everybody 453 00:34:51,909 --> 00:34:53,270 else. Are you... 454 00:34:53,600 --> 00:34:59,660 Do you feel like you're done with what you... So, I'm anxious to go back, get 455 00:34:59,660 --> 00:35:03,820 those articles done, and then there's a bunch of documents that aren't about 456 00:35:03,820 --> 00:35:07,000 those first two or three stories that I'd like to spend time with you, you 457 00:35:07,000 --> 00:35:08,000 kind of going over. 458 00:35:09,040 --> 00:35:11,120 I'm not going anywhere. You're available? 459 00:35:11,460 --> 00:35:16,220 You want to check your book first? Yeah, let me check my schedule. Is that good 460 00:35:16,220 --> 00:35:17,220 for you, Oren? Okay. 461 00:35:35,930 --> 00:35:36,930 Hello? Yes. 462 00:35:37,790 --> 00:35:39,850 My meal was great. Thank you very much. 463 00:35:43,550 --> 00:35:47,090 No, I still have some left, and I think I'm going to be eating it later, so you 464 00:35:47,090 --> 00:35:48,090 can just leave me alone for now. 465 00:35:50,950 --> 00:35:52,470 Okay, great. Thank you so much. 466 00:35:52,910 --> 00:35:53,910 Have a good one. Bye. 467 00:36:02,680 --> 00:36:06,160 Another fun thing I was telling Laura about, all of these new VoIP phones, 468 00:36:06,160 --> 00:36:09,820 have little computers in them, and you can hot mic these over the network all 469 00:36:09,820 --> 00:36:11,340 the time, even when the receiver's down. 470 00:36:11,840 --> 00:36:16,240 As long as it's plugged in, it can be listening on and on. I hadn't even 471 00:36:16,240 --> 00:36:17,860 considered that earlier, but yeah. 472 00:36:18,280 --> 00:36:19,520 There are so many ways. 473 00:36:20,500 --> 00:36:24,000 Everything that's in here is pretty much going to be on the public record at 474 00:36:24,000 --> 00:36:27,900 some point. We should operate on that. Yeah, yeah, I think we are. 475 00:36:28,360 --> 00:36:30,360 Do you have your hair cap machine? I do, I do. 476 00:36:30,820 --> 00:36:31,820 Let me pop that out. 477 00:36:36,040 --> 00:36:39,000 Do you have an understanding or commitment on when you guys are going to 478 00:36:39,000 --> 00:36:40,000 with the first stories? 479 00:36:40,960 --> 00:36:43,120 It's about 7 or 8 in the morning in London. 480 00:36:43,520 --> 00:36:44,520 Okay. 481 00:36:46,980 --> 00:36:47,980 Let's see here. 482 00:36:56,280 --> 00:36:57,540 Okay, look, there's the other one. 483 00:36:59,120 --> 00:37:03,360 Pro tip, let's not leave the same SD cards in our laptops forever in the 484 00:37:10,440 --> 00:37:13,740 Did you know that this was still kicking around in your laptop? 485 00:37:14,880 --> 00:37:18,300 Yeah, I mean, that would be... Okay, just making sure. Okay, yeah. 486 00:37:20,940 --> 00:37:24,580 You will have a new one that looks exactly identical, but it's a different 487 00:37:24,580 --> 00:37:26,760 archive, so you might want to take a Sharpie to it or something. 488 00:37:28,620 --> 00:37:31,520 Could you pass me my magic mantle of power? 489 00:37:40,270 --> 00:37:43,190 Is that about the possibility of overhead? 490 00:37:43,470 --> 00:37:44,650 Yeah, visual collection. 491 00:37:51,870 --> 00:37:54,890 I don't think at this point there's anything in this regard that will shock 492 00:37:56,310 --> 00:38:01,070 We've become pretty... In fact, Ewan said before, he's like, I'm never 493 00:38:01,070 --> 00:38:03,970 my room. He's like, I'm never leaving anything in my room again, not a single 494 00:38:03,970 --> 00:38:07,490 machine. I was like, you've been infected with a paranoia bug. That was 495 00:38:07,490 --> 00:38:08,490 us. 496 00:38:09,100 --> 00:38:12,740 And the way he said it, he was like, I would never leave a single device in the 497 00:38:12,740 --> 00:38:13,740 room again alone. 498 00:38:14,420 --> 00:38:16,480 My bike is getting heavier and heavier. Are you sorry? 499 00:38:19,960 --> 00:38:24,400 That's your evil informant. All right, I'm going to need you to enter your root 500 00:38:24,400 --> 00:38:25,980 password for that. No idea. 501 00:38:28,180 --> 00:38:30,820 If you want to use this one, you're more than welcome to. 502 00:38:31,930 --> 00:38:34,590 It looks like your root password is about four characters long anyway. It's 503 00:38:34,590 --> 00:38:37,270 usually a lot longer, but that's just like the one -time -only thing, right? 504 00:38:37,850 --> 00:38:38,910 So it is. 505 00:38:39,170 --> 00:38:42,490 It had been a lot longer, but ever since I knew that it was just like a one 506 00:38:42,490 --> 00:38:44,290 -time -only session one, I've been making it shorter. 507 00:38:44,730 --> 00:38:45,730 Is that not good? 508 00:38:46,010 --> 00:38:50,770 It's actually not. I was expressing this with Laura either. The issue is because 509 00:38:50,770 --> 00:38:53,550 of the fact that it's got a hardware MAC address and things like that, if people 510 00:38:53,550 --> 00:38:58,630 are able to identify your machine and they're able to. The fact you're about 511 00:38:58,630 --> 00:38:59,468 break them. 512 00:38:59,470 --> 00:39:00,288 setting stories. 513 00:39:00,290 --> 00:39:04,850 Right, that's true. So they might kind of prioritize... It's 10 letters. I type 514 00:39:04,850 --> 00:39:09,050 very quickly. It actually is 10 letters. Okay, so 10 letters would be good if 515 00:39:09,050 --> 00:39:11,110 they had to brute force the entire key space. 516 00:39:11,330 --> 00:39:12,330 Right. 517 00:39:12,470 --> 00:39:15,250 That would still probably only take a couple days for NSA. 518 00:39:18,490 --> 00:39:19,610 That's a fire alarm. 519 00:39:20,930 --> 00:39:21,930 Okay. 520 00:39:23,550 --> 00:39:26,730 Hopefully it sounds like a two -second test. 521 00:39:28,520 --> 00:39:30,220 Do you want to call the desk and ask? 522 00:39:32,080 --> 00:39:33,080 I think it's fine. 523 00:39:33,540 --> 00:39:36,020 Yeah, I don't think it's an issue, but it's interesting to do this. Does that 524 00:39:36,020 --> 00:39:37,020 happen before? 525 00:39:37,540 --> 00:39:40,300 Maybe they got mad that they couldn't listen in to us via the phone anymore. 526 00:39:42,540 --> 00:39:45,200 Did the final alarm get off before? 527 00:39:45,520 --> 00:39:47,220 No, that's the first time that's happened. 528 00:39:48,320 --> 00:39:53,040 Yeah, I think they've got like an alert that goes to final. 529 00:39:53,340 --> 00:39:54,360 That's unusual. 530 00:39:57,640 --> 00:40:00,940 You probably might have to go back and ignore that. 531 00:40:01,460 --> 00:40:02,460 I don't know. 532 00:40:03,440 --> 00:40:04,940 If it goes... No, it's not continuous. 533 00:40:05,400 --> 00:40:06,400 It's not continuous. 534 00:40:07,240 --> 00:40:14,160 No, I'm just saying, if it continues... And then we go 535 00:40:14,160 --> 00:40:15,840 and we meet the guys down in the lobby. 536 00:40:16,100 --> 00:40:17,200 Yeah, right? Yeah. 537 00:40:18,840 --> 00:40:22,480 Yeah, let's leave for now. Let me finish this up. 538 00:40:36,470 --> 00:40:39,030 Not that they're going to answer because they probably got like 7 ,000 calls. 539 00:40:39,110 --> 00:40:40,110 Yeah. 540 00:40:42,770 --> 00:40:46,730 Hi, we hear a loud buzzing on the 10th floor. Can you tell us what that is? 541 00:40:49,710 --> 00:40:50,710 Oh, okay. 542 00:40:51,430 --> 00:40:52,930 Okay, great. Thank you. Bye. 543 00:40:55,070 --> 00:40:56,750 Fire alarm testing maintenance. 544 00:40:57,090 --> 00:40:57,848 That's good. 545 00:40:57,850 --> 00:40:58,870 That's what we want to do here. 546 00:40:59,090 --> 00:41:03,610 Nice of them to let us know about that in advance. 547 00:41:08,850 --> 00:41:10,690 I just wanted to give you kind of a quick tour. 548 00:41:10,950 --> 00:41:14,290 When Laura was looking at this, she was kind of salivating and couldn't stop, 549 00:41:14,330 --> 00:41:17,570 like, actually reading the document. Right, right, right. We'll try and 550 00:41:17,570 --> 00:41:20,730 ourselves without promising that we'll succeed. Yeah, I just wanted to kind of 551 00:41:20,730 --> 00:41:24,230 explain a brief overview of what these are and how they're organized. 552 00:41:24,910 --> 00:41:26,530 The beginning are just some documents of interest. 553 00:41:26,750 --> 00:41:31,190 The primary purpose of the second archive is to bring the focus over to 554 00:41:31,190 --> 00:41:34,170 opposed to PRISM. And this is in general. 555 00:41:35,030 --> 00:41:36,550 SSO are special source operations. 556 00:41:36,910 --> 00:41:42,590 Those are the worldwide passive collection on networks. They're both 557 00:41:42,590 --> 00:41:44,270 the U .S. and international. 558 00:41:45,240 --> 00:41:49,160 There's a lot of different ways they do it, but corporate partnerships are one 559 00:41:49,160 --> 00:41:52,160 of the primary things they do domestically. They also do this with 560 00:41:52,160 --> 00:41:55,000 multinationals that might be headquartered in the U .S. who they can 561 00:41:55,000 --> 00:41:57,200 coerce or just pay into giving them access. 562 00:41:57,760 --> 00:42:00,740 And they also do it bilaterally with the assistance of certain governments. 563 00:42:01,220 --> 00:42:04,520 And that's basically on the premise that they go, all right, we'll help you set 564 00:42:04,520 --> 00:42:06,560 the system up if you give us all the data from it. 565 00:42:11,170 --> 00:42:15,070 There's a lot more in here than any one person or probably one team could do. 566 00:42:16,650 --> 00:42:21,530 XKeyscore Deep Dive, XKeyscore in general, and there's a huge folder of 567 00:42:21,530 --> 00:42:25,790 documentation on XKeyscore and how it works, is the front -end system that 568 00:42:25,790 --> 00:42:29,790 analysts use for querying that sort of ocean of raw signals that I was telling 569 00:42:29,790 --> 00:42:33,570 you about. All of that stuff where you can sort of do the retroactive searches 570 00:42:33,570 --> 00:42:35,590 and live searches and get flagging and whatnot. 571 00:42:36,510 --> 00:42:37,990 XKeyscore is the front -end for that. 572 00:42:39,850 --> 00:42:44,410 I'm just going to show you one slide here because Laura thought it was 573 00:42:44,410 --> 00:42:50,170 and was talking about kind of how these capabilities ramp up in sophistication 574 00:42:50,170 --> 00:42:51,170 over time. 575 00:42:51,910 --> 00:42:57,170 This is kind of nice. As of fiscal year 2011, they could monitor one billion 576 00:42:57,170 --> 00:43:01,650 telephone or Internet sessions simultaneously per one of these devices. 577 00:43:02,570 --> 00:43:08,670 And they could collect at a rate of about 125 gigabytes a second, which is a 578 00:43:08,670 --> 00:43:12,010 terabit per second. That's for each one of these devices? That's for each one of 579 00:43:12,010 --> 00:43:12,689 these, yeah. 580 00:43:12,690 --> 00:43:15,130 How many tumult missions would that be then? 581 00:43:15,730 --> 00:43:21,090 Per this, back then, there were 20 sites. There's 10 at DoD installation. 582 00:43:21,690 --> 00:43:24,430 But these are all outdated. We've expanded pretty rapidly. 583 00:43:26,190 --> 00:43:29,030 But still 20 sites, that's at least 20 billion. 584 00:43:29,290 --> 00:43:31,330 This all needs to get out. You know what I mean? 585 00:43:32,690 --> 00:43:38,730 Just in terms of understanding the capabilities, it's so opaque. It's not 586 00:43:38,730 --> 00:43:42,410 science fiction. This stuff is happening right now. No, that's what I mean. It's 587 00:43:42,410 --> 00:43:48,290 like the magnitude of it. And this is a pretty inaccessible technical document. 588 00:43:48,650 --> 00:43:51,910 But even this is really chilling. 589 00:43:52,190 --> 00:43:56,170 Do you know what I mean? And yeah, I mean, we could be having debates about 590 00:43:56,170 --> 00:43:57,550 whether we want government. 591 00:43:58,960 --> 00:44:03,680 massive and extraordinary it's amazing even though you know it you know even 592 00:44:03,680 --> 00:44:09,040 though you know that to see it like the physical blueprints of it and sort of 593 00:44:09,040 --> 00:44:13,680 the technical expressions of it really hits home in like a super visceral way 594 00:44:13,680 --> 00:44:20,480 that is so needed this 595 00:44:20,480 --> 00:44:26,820 is dnn breaking news An explosive new report is reigniting the concern that 596 00:44:26,820 --> 00:44:30,040 privacy is being violated to protect America's security. 597 00:44:30,320 --> 00:44:35,720 It reveals a court order giving the National Security Agency blanket access 598 00:44:35,720 --> 00:44:39,100 millions of Verizon customers' records on a daily basis. 599 00:44:39,420 --> 00:44:42,560 Earlier, I had the chance to conduct the first TV interview with the reporter 600 00:44:42,560 --> 00:44:46,640 who broke this story wide open, Glenn Greenwald of The Guardian. 601 00:44:48,020 --> 00:44:51,180 Congratulations on the scoop. Explain for our viewers. 602 00:44:51,710 --> 00:44:52,730 Why this is important. 603 00:44:53,810 --> 00:44:57,550 It's important because people have understood that the law that this was 604 00:44:57,550 --> 00:45:00,210 under, which is the Patriot Act enacted in the wake of 9 -11. 605 00:45:00,910 --> 00:45:04,610 was a law that allowed the government very broad powers to get records about 606 00:45:04,610 --> 00:45:09,370 people with a lower level of suspicion than probable cause, the traditional 607 00:45:09,370 --> 00:45:12,610 standard. So it's always been assumed that under the Patriot Act, if the 608 00:45:12,610 --> 00:45:15,690 government had even any suspicion that you were involved in a crime or 609 00:45:15,690 --> 00:45:19,410 terrorism, they could get a lot of information about you. What this court 610 00:45:19,410 --> 00:45:24,010 does that makes it so striking is that it's not directed at any individuals who 611 00:45:24,010 --> 00:45:27,990 they believe or have suspicion of committing crimes or part of a terrorist 612 00:45:27,990 --> 00:45:32,530 organization. It's collecting the phone records. of every single customer of 613 00:45:32,530 --> 00:45:36,310 Verizon Business and finding out every single call that they've made 614 00:45:36,310 --> 00:45:37,670 internationally and locally. 615 00:45:37,910 --> 00:45:41,710 So it's indiscriminate and it's sweeping. It's a government program 616 00:45:41,710 --> 00:45:45,030 collect information about all Americans, not just people where they believe 617 00:45:45,030 --> 00:45:46,870 there's reason to think they've done anything wrong. 618 00:46:47,120 --> 00:46:52,380 Yeah, it's a tough situation, you know, hearing that the person that you love, 619 00:46:52,420 --> 00:46:56,000 that you've spent a decade with, may not be coming back. 620 00:47:01,400 --> 00:47:02,540 What did they ask her? 621 00:47:04,000 --> 00:47:07,680 When was the last time she saw me? Where am I? 622 00:47:08,620 --> 00:47:09,680 What am I doing? 623 00:47:10,240 --> 00:47:12,260 What does she know about my illness? 624 00:47:12,640 --> 00:47:13,640 Things like that. 625 00:47:17,740 --> 00:47:23,380 So, yeah, they're pretty solidly aware because 626 00:47:23,380 --> 00:47:27,440 I'm clearly not at home ill. 627 00:47:49,080 --> 00:47:50,320 Hello? Hello? 628 00:47:50,640 --> 00:47:53,640 Hello. I mean, disconnect from the internet. 629 00:47:57,100 --> 00:48:00,660 So, there's some news? 630 00:48:01,360 --> 00:48:07,080 Yes, there was indeed some news. I have config today, I think, maybe just a few 631 00:48:07,080 --> 00:48:07,819 hours ago. 632 00:48:07,820 --> 00:48:10,800 What kind of people visit? 633 00:48:12,689 --> 00:48:19,570 An HR lady, I'm assuming from NSA, as opposed to Booz Allen, because 634 00:48:19,570 --> 00:48:22,250 she was accompanied by a police officer, which means NSA police. 635 00:48:22,630 --> 00:48:25,670 And they were planning to break into my house, which regular police don't do. 636 00:48:26,790 --> 00:48:27,790 Does she live there? 637 00:48:28,070 --> 00:48:31,550 Yeah, she lives there, so I told her to cooperate fully. 638 00:48:32,370 --> 00:48:35,030 I can't find my phone, just one second. Don't worry about her, Phillip. 639 00:48:35,270 --> 00:48:37,990 You know what I'm going to do? I'll just take out the stuff I want to use. 640 00:48:38,410 --> 00:48:39,410 Okay. 641 00:48:40,310 --> 00:48:44,330 Okay, well, look, I mean, this is not a surprise at all. Not, yeah, I know, I 642 00:48:44,330 --> 00:48:46,890 plan for it, but it's just, you know, when it's impacting them and they're 643 00:48:46,890 --> 00:48:49,150 talking to you, it's a little bit different. Absolutely. 644 00:48:51,150 --> 00:48:55,470 But it's possible that they just noticed that you're missing. I guess it's not 645 00:48:55,470 --> 00:48:56,388 really impossible. 646 00:48:56,390 --> 00:48:58,410 It is, but yeah, they're, I mean... 647 00:48:58,410 --> 00:49:05,410 Let me just get 648 00:49:05,410 --> 00:49:06,410 rid of this. 649 00:49:08,330 --> 00:49:11,850 So I... I obviously was focused on other things than appearance this morning. 650 00:49:14,270 --> 00:49:18,970 How did she react? Was she relatively calm about it? She's relatively calm. 651 00:49:18,970 --> 00:49:22,530 she know anything about what you're doing in life? She has no idea. 652 00:49:23,670 --> 00:49:29,210 I mean, I feel badly about that, but that's the only way I could think of 653 00:49:29,210 --> 00:49:33,190 she can't be in trouble. Did you just basically do a I have to go somewhere 654 00:49:33,190 --> 00:49:36,390 reasons that I can't tell you about kind of thing? I just disappeared when she 655 00:49:36,390 --> 00:49:37,390 was on vacation. 656 00:49:38,720 --> 00:49:42,620 And I left a note saying, hey, I'm going to be gone for a while for work, which 657 00:49:42,620 --> 00:49:44,240 isn't unusual for me in my business. 658 00:49:45,340 --> 00:49:46,340 Okay, 659 00:49:47,060 --> 00:49:48,840 so let me ask you a couple of things just quickly. 660 00:49:49,060 --> 00:49:52,320 Are they going to be able to go into your stuff and figure out what you took? 661 00:49:55,700 --> 00:50:01,540 In some kind of, some sort of like peripheral senses, but not necessarily. 662 00:50:01,540 --> 00:50:04,480 with great specificity. Yes, because I cast. 663 00:50:04,860 --> 00:50:05,860 such a wide net. 664 00:50:06,000 --> 00:50:08,140 If they do that, the only thing they're going to do is they're going to have a 665 00:50:08,140 --> 00:50:10,340 heart attack because they're going to go, he had access to everything. 666 00:50:10,660 --> 00:50:14,380 And they're not going to know what specifically has been done. 667 00:50:14,680 --> 00:50:18,100 I think they're going to start to actually feel a little better, although 668 00:50:18,100 --> 00:50:21,620 they're not going to be wild about this in any case. 669 00:50:22,140 --> 00:50:26,000 When they see that the stories are kind of cleaving to a trend, it's not like 670 00:50:26,000 --> 00:50:28,280 here's the list of everybody who works everywhere. 671 00:50:28,600 --> 00:50:33,600 Right. I also think they're going to be paranoid in the extreme and assuming all 672 00:50:33,600 --> 00:50:39,580 kinds of worst -case scenarios, which is going to, I think, make them react in 673 00:50:39,580 --> 00:50:43,780 ways that probably aren't going to be particularly rational on their part. 674 00:50:44,300 --> 00:50:48,840 But at the same time, I do think they're limited for the moment. 675 00:50:49,260 --> 00:50:54,820 I agree. And, I mean, I had kind of time to set a stage where we all enjoy at 676 00:50:54,820 --> 00:50:57,660 least a minimum level of protection, you know, no matter who we are who's 677 00:50:57,660 --> 00:51:00,600 involved in this. You know, you're either a journalist or you're either out 678 00:51:00,600 --> 00:51:04,040 jurisdiction. So we have some time to play this before they can really get 679 00:51:04,040 --> 00:51:07,140 nasty. I think it's over, you know, the weeks when they have time to get lawyers 680 00:51:07,140 --> 00:51:09,900 really sort of go, this is a special situation. 681 00:51:10,600 --> 00:51:12,240 How can we interpret this to our advantage? 682 00:51:12,440 --> 00:51:15,740 Like, we see them do this all the time, you know, whether it's drones or 683 00:51:15,740 --> 00:51:20,340 wiretapping or whatever. They'll go, well, according to this law from the 684 00:51:20,340 --> 00:51:22,060 you know, we can apply X, Y, or Z authority. 685 00:51:22,720 --> 00:51:27,140 But that takes time, and that takes agreement. And also, you know, I mean, I 686 00:51:27,140 --> 00:51:31,240 think the more public we are out there to, like, as journalists, the more 687 00:51:31,240 --> 00:51:32,900 protection that's going to give as well. 688 00:51:34,000 --> 00:51:37,240 Have you started to give thought to when you're ready to come forward? 689 00:51:37,680 --> 00:51:39,180 I'm ready whenever. 690 00:51:40,779 --> 00:51:45,580 Honestly, I think there's sort of an agreement that it's not going to bias 691 00:51:45,580 --> 00:51:48,440 reporting process. That's my primary concern at this point. I don't want to 692 00:51:48,440 --> 00:51:52,900 myself into the issue before it's going to happen anyway and where it takes away 693 00:51:52,900 --> 00:51:54,420 from the stories that are getting out. 694 00:52:34,990 --> 00:52:39,390 of millions of Americans who weren't suspected of doing anything who were 695 00:52:39,390 --> 00:52:42,570 surveilled in this way. Your thoughts for a moment. I want to continue this 696 00:52:42,570 --> 00:52:45,890 conversation because these are really important, sensitive issues and the 697 00:52:45,890 --> 00:52:50,410 out there has a right to know what's going on. Stand by. This is CNN Breaking 698 00:52:50,410 --> 00:52:51,410 News. 699 00:52:51,880 --> 00:52:55,920 Another explosive article has just appeared, this time in The Washington 700 00:52:56,080 --> 00:53:00,540 It's breaking news that it reveals another broad and secret U .S. 701 00:53:00,540 --> 00:53:01,620 surveillance program. 702 00:53:02,000 --> 00:53:06,600 The Washington Post and The Guardian in London reporting that the NSA and the 703 00:53:06,600 --> 00:53:11,880 FBI are tapping directly into the central servers of nine leading Internet 704 00:53:11,880 --> 00:53:17,060 companies, including Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, AOL, Skype, YouTube, 705 00:53:17,200 --> 00:53:20,960 and Apple. The Post says they're extracting audio, video. 706 00:53:21,540 --> 00:53:26,100 photographs, e -mails, documents, and connection logs that enable analysts to 707 00:53:26,100 --> 00:53:29,160 track a person's movements and contacts over time. 708 00:53:29,560 --> 00:53:31,940 Let's discuss this latest revelation. 709 00:53:32,240 --> 00:53:33,260 They're coming out fast. 710 00:53:33,560 --> 00:53:38,040 Bill Binney, the former official of the NSA who quit back in 2001, you were 711 00:53:38,040 --> 00:53:41,940 angry over what was going on. You'd be known as a whistleblower right now. 712 00:53:42,060 --> 00:53:45,400 what do you think about this Washington Post story? Well, I assume it's just a 713 00:53:45,400 --> 00:53:47,420 continuation of what they've been doing all along. 714 00:53:47,700 --> 00:53:48,700 So you're not surprised? 715 00:53:48,960 --> 00:53:50,820 Do you have any idea who's leaking this information? 716 00:53:51,300 --> 00:53:55,780 I don't know who leaked this. I have no doubt that the administration will 717 00:53:55,780 --> 00:54:00,500 launch an investigation, not into who approved these programs, but into who 718 00:54:00,500 --> 00:54:01,520 leaked the information. 719 00:54:01,840 --> 00:54:07,200 I'm not shocked that the companies are denying it. I don't assume that there 720 00:54:07,200 --> 00:54:11,060 be some technical basis on which they can say that we are not actively 721 00:54:11,060 --> 00:54:12,680 collaborating or they don't have. 722 00:54:13,040 --> 00:54:17,040 what we consider in our own definition to be direct access to our servers. But 723 00:54:17,040 --> 00:54:21,700 what I do know is that I've talked to more than one person who has sat at a 724 00:54:21,700 --> 00:54:27,980 at a web portal and typed out commands and reached into those servers from a 725 00:54:27,980 --> 00:54:31,520 distance. So whatever they want to call that, that's what's happening. Well, 726 00:54:31,560 --> 00:54:34,980 what I would call it is the single biggest infringement on American civil 727 00:54:34,980 --> 00:54:37,260 liberties probably of all time, isn't it? 728 00:54:37,560 --> 00:54:39,940 It's interesting. I already have the New York Times now today saying that the 729 00:54:39,940 --> 00:54:41,380 administration has lost all credibility. 730 00:54:41,920 --> 00:54:44,980 Yeah, the New York Times slammed President Obama for this. And frankly, I 731 00:54:44,980 --> 00:54:48,120 used to that. The New York Times slammed George Bush for protecting the country 732 00:54:48,120 --> 00:54:51,360 and for the steps he took. I don't want us to drop our guard. I don't want us to 733 00:54:51,360 --> 00:54:56,080 be struck again. As we saw in Boston, Anderson, people are willing to 734 00:54:56,080 --> 00:54:58,340 their civil liberties. People are sheltered inside. 735 00:54:58,560 --> 00:55:01,480 How can you believe in freedom, do you think? I mean, try and play devil's 736 00:55:01,480 --> 00:55:06,000 advocate for me. When you have secret courts, secret operations like prison. 737 00:55:06,560 --> 00:55:10,960 Secret investigations which go into every bit and cough of every American's 738 00:55:10,960 --> 00:55:14,380 without any member of the American public knowing about it. That's not 739 00:55:14,440 --> 00:55:19,080 is it? In 2008, they eliminated the warrant requirement for all 740 00:55:19,080 --> 00:55:23,840 except ones that take place by and among Americans exclusively on American soil. 741 00:55:24,060 --> 00:55:28,400 So they don't need warrants now for people who are foreigners outside of the 742 00:55:28,400 --> 00:55:31,860 .S., but they also don't need warrants for Americans who are in the United 743 00:55:31,860 --> 00:55:35,780 States communicating with people reasonably believed to be outside of the 744 00:55:36,010 --> 00:55:39,570 So, again, the fact that there are no checks, no oversight about who's looking 745 00:55:39,570 --> 00:55:43,050 over the NSA's shoulder means that they can take whatever they want. And the 746 00:55:43,050 --> 00:55:46,570 fact that it's all behind a wall of secrecy and they threaten people who 747 00:55:46,570 --> 00:55:50,970 expose it means that whatever they're doing, even violating the law, is 748 00:55:50,970 --> 00:55:53,890 something that we're unlikely to know until we start having real 749 00:55:53,890 --> 00:55:58,210 and real transparency into what it is that the government is doing. Glenn 750 00:55:58,210 --> 00:56:01,910 Greenwald, congratulations again on exposing what is a true scandal. I 751 00:56:01,910 --> 00:56:02,910 appreciate you joining me. 752 00:56:49,480 --> 00:56:56,440 I just heard from Lindsay, and she's still alive, which is good, and free. 753 00:56:56,660 --> 00:57:00,800 My rent checks apparently are no longer getting through to my landlord. 754 00:57:01,440 --> 00:57:06,300 So they said if we don't pay them in five days, we'll be evicted, which is 755 00:57:06,300 --> 00:57:09,760 strange because I've got a system set up that automatically pays them. 756 00:57:12,640 --> 00:57:16,460 So there's that, and apparently there's construction trucks all over the street 757 00:57:16,460 --> 00:57:17,460 of my house. 758 00:57:18,700 --> 00:57:23,340 I wonder what they're looking for. 759 00:58:06,990 --> 00:58:13,330 It is an unusual feeling that's kind of hard to describe 760 00:58:13,330 --> 00:58:19,310 or convey in words, but not knowing what's going to happen the next day, the 761 00:58:19,310 --> 00:58:20,690 next hour, the next week. 762 00:58:21,510 --> 00:58:23,670 It's scary, but at the same time it's liberating. 763 00:58:23,990 --> 00:58:29,470 The planning comes a lot easier because you don't have that many variables to 764 00:58:29,470 --> 00:58:32,610 take into play. You can only act and then act again. 765 00:58:33,800 --> 00:58:37,700 Now, all these phone calls are being recorded digitally, not for content, but 766 00:58:37,700 --> 00:58:38,920 for origin and destination. 767 00:58:39,280 --> 00:58:42,680 Now, where the government is going right into the servers of these large 768 00:58:42,680 --> 00:58:46,840 Internet companies. How does the government, politically speaking, make 769 00:58:46,840 --> 00:58:50,660 argument that this is essential to national security and not a dramatic 770 00:58:50,660 --> 00:58:53,240 overreach in terms of personal privacy? 771 00:58:53,930 --> 00:58:57,890 It's difficult, Matt, because as Peter was pointing out overnight, we had an 772 00:58:57,890 --> 00:59:02,210 extraordinary late night, close to midnight announcement and a 773 00:59:02,210 --> 00:59:03,850 from the director of national intelligence. 774 00:59:04,050 --> 00:59:08,010 They are scrambling. The administration is already supported strongly by leaders 775 00:59:08,010 --> 00:59:09,890 in both parties from the intelligence committees. 776 00:59:10,710 --> 00:59:15,590 GCHQ has an internal Wikipedia at the top secret, you know, super classified 777 00:59:15,590 --> 00:59:19,250 level where anybody working in intelligence can work on anything they 778 00:59:20,109 --> 00:59:23,070 That's what this is. I'm giving it to you. You can make the decisions on that, 779 00:59:23,110 --> 00:59:24,230 what's appropriate, what's not. 780 00:59:24,730 --> 00:59:28,230 It's going to be documents with different types of pictures and 781 00:59:28,230 --> 00:59:29,730 Word documents, stuff like that. 782 00:59:30,710 --> 00:59:31,850 Sorry, can I take that seat? 783 00:59:35,390 --> 00:59:39,030 I'm sorry, I've got you to repeat. So in these documents, they will show... 784 00:59:39,030 --> 00:59:42,430 Yeah, there will be a couple more documents on that. That's only one part, 785 00:59:42,530 --> 00:59:45,790 though. Like it talks about Tempora and a little more thing. That's the wiki 786 00:59:45,790 --> 00:59:46,790 article itself. 787 00:59:47,320 --> 00:59:52,200 It was also talking about a self -developed tool called UDAQ, U -D -A -Q. 788 00:59:52,960 --> 00:59:56,500 It's their search tool for all the stuff they collect, was what it looked like. 789 00:59:57,320 --> 01:00:00,780 It's going to be projects. It's going to be troubleshooting pages for a 790 01:00:00,780 --> 01:00:01,780 particular tool. 791 01:00:02,120 --> 01:00:03,120 Thanks. 792 01:00:04,140 --> 01:00:05,140 What's the next step? 793 01:00:05,440 --> 01:00:07,060 When do you think you'll go public? 794 01:00:08,640 --> 01:00:12,000 I think it's pretty soon. I mean, with the reaction, this escalated more 795 01:00:12,000 --> 01:00:15,900 quickly. I think pretty much as soon as they start trying to make this about me, 796 01:00:16,000 --> 01:00:21,820 which should be any day now, I'll come out just to go, hey, you know, this is 797 01:00:21,820 --> 01:00:25,940 not a question of somebody skulking around in the shadows. 798 01:00:26,240 --> 01:00:27,440 These are public issues. 799 01:00:27,660 --> 01:00:28,760 These are not my issues. 800 01:00:29,020 --> 01:00:33,660 These are everybody's issues. And I'm not afraid of you. You're not going to 801 01:00:33,660 --> 01:00:36,300 bully me into silence like you've done to everybody else. 802 01:00:37,000 --> 01:00:39,120 And if nobody else is going to do it, I will. 803 01:00:39,540 --> 01:00:43,220 And hopefully when I'm gone, whatever you do to me, there will be somebody 804 01:00:43,220 --> 01:00:44,220 who will do the same thing. 805 01:00:44,320 --> 01:00:49,060 It will be the sort of Internet principle of the Hydra. You can stomp 806 01:00:49,060 --> 01:00:51,020 person, but there's going to be seven more of us. 807 01:00:51,780 --> 01:00:56,480 Are you getting more nervous? 808 01:00:57,700 --> 01:01:01,360 I mean, no. 809 01:01:01,900 --> 01:01:08,360 I think the way I look at stress, particularly because I sort of knew this 810 01:01:08,360 --> 01:01:12,760 coming, you know, because I sort of volunteered to walk into it, 811 01:01:12,800 --> 01:01:19,520 I'm already sort of familiar 812 01:01:19,520 --> 01:01:23,380 with the idea. I'm not worried about it. When somebody, like, busts in the door, 813 01:01:23,540 --> 01:01:28,200 suddenly I'll get nervous and it'll affect me. But until they do, you know. 814 01:01:28,970 --> 01:01:32,070 I'm eating a little less. That's the only difference I take. 815 01:01:38,810 --> 01:01:42,910 Let's talk about the issue with when we're going to say who you are. 816 01:01:43,710 --> 01:01:49,850 You have to talk me through this because I have a big worry about this. Okay, 817 01:01:49,870 --> 01:01:56,650 tell me. Which is that if we come out and I know that you believe that 818 01:01:56,650 --> 01:01:57,650 you're 819 01:01:57,920 --> 01:02:01,460 detection is inevitable and that it's inevitable imminently. 820 01:02:02,080 --> 01:02:05,020 There's, you know, in the New York Times today, Charlie Savage, the fascinating 821 01:02:05,020 --> 01:02:09,860 Sherlock Holmes of political reporting, deduced that the fact that there's been 822 01:02:09,860 --> 01:02:13,100 these leaks in succession probably means that there's some one person who's 823 01:02:13,100 --> 01:02:15,520 decided to leak a bunch of stuff. Somebody else quoted you as saying it 824 01:02:15,520 --> 01:02:16,459 of your readers. 825 01:02:16,460 --> 01:02:19,720 Yeah. Somebody else who put in all the things. Yeah. So, you know, I mean, it's 826 01:02:19,720 --> 01:02:24,880 fine. I want people to, I want it to be, you know, like this is a person. I want 827 01:02:24,880 --> 01:02:28,020 to start introducing the concept that this is a person who has a particular. 828 01:02:28,780 --> 01:02:32,320 set of political objectives about informing the world about what's taking 829 01:02:32,660 --> 01:02:38,580 So I'm keeping it all anonymous, totally, but I want to start introducing 830 01:02:38,580 --> 01:02:39,760 that kind of incremental way. 831 01:02:40,160 --> 01:02:41,640 But here's the thing. 832 01:02:42,080 --> 01:02:46,260 What I'm concerned about is that if we come out and say, here's who this is, 833 01:02:46,420 --> 01:02:49,300 here's what he did, the whole thing that we talked about, that we're going to 834 01:02:49,300 --> 01:02:51,780 basically be doing the government's work for them, and we're going to basically 835 01:02:51,780 --> 01:02:54,600 be handing them a confession. 836 01:02:56,120 --> 01:02:59,860 and helping them identify who found it. I mean, maybe you're right. Maybe 837 01:02:59,860 --> 01:03:03,800 they'll find out quickly, and maybe they'll know, but is there any 838 01:03:03,800 --> 01:03:08,980 that they won't? Are we kind of giving them stuff that we don't, or... 839 01:03:08,980 --> 01:03:12,180 Possibility that they know, but they don't want to reveal it because they 840 01:03:12,180 --> 01:03:15,360 know. Or that they don't know, and we're going to be telling them. Like, is it a 841 01:03:15,360 --> 01:03:17,700 possibility that they're going to need, like, two, three months of uncertainty, 842 01:03:17,840 --> 01:03:22,260 and we're going to be solving that problem for them? Or, let me just say, 843 01:03:22,260 --> 01:03:27,040 part... Maybe it doesn't matter to you. Like, maybe you want it. Maybe, I mean, 844 01:03:27,060 --> 01:03:31,400 you're not coming out because you think inevitably they're going to catch you 845 01:03:31,400 --> 01:03:32,660 and you want to do it first. 846 01:03:33,160 --> 01:03:37,000 You're coming out because you want to fucking come out. Well, there is that. I 847 01:03:37,000 --> 01:03:40,320 mean, that's the thing. I don't want to hide on this and skulk around. I don't 848 01:03:40,320 --> 01:03:41,320 think I should have to. 849 01:03:42,320 --> 01:03:45,080 Obviously, there's circumstances that are saying that. And I think it is 850 01:03:45,080 --> 01:03:47,240 powerful to come out and be like, look. 851 01:03:47,610 --> 01:03:51,110 I'm not afraid, you know, and I don't think other people should either. You 852 01:03:51,110 --> 01:03:54,570 know, I was sitting in the office right next to you last week. You know, we all 853 01:03:54,570 --> 01:03:56,370 have a stake in this. This is our country. 854 01:03:56,670 --> 01:04:01,370 And the balance of power between the citizenry and the government is becoming 855 01:04:01,370 --> 01:04:06,530 that of the ruling and the ruled as opposed to actually, you know, the 856 01:04:06,530 --> 01:04:10,790 and the electorate. Okay, so that's what I need to hear, that this is not 857 01:04:10,790 --> 01:04:13,450 about... But I do want to say... 858 01:04:13,840 --> 01:04:17,980 I don't think there's a case that I'm not going to be discovered in the 859 01:04:17,980 --> 01:04:21,220 of time. It's a question of time frame. You're right. It could take them a long 860 01:04:21,220 --> 01:04:24,960 time. I don't think it will. But I didn't try to hide the footprint 861 01:04:25,000 --> 01:04:28,820 again, I intended to come forward. Okay. I'm going to post this morning just a 862 01:04:28,820 --> 01:04:33,300 general defense of whistleblowers. That's fine. And you in particular 863 01:04:33,840 --> 01:04:36,540 saying anything about you i'm gonna go post that right when i get back and i'm 864 01:04:36,540 --> 01:04:39,680 also doing like a big fuck you to all the people who keep like talking about 865 01:04:39,680 --> 01:04:44,680 investigations like that i want that to be like the fearlessness and the fuck 866 01:04:44,680 --> 01:04:49,420 you to like the bullying tactics has got to be completely pervading everything 867 01:04:49,420 --> 01:04:53,320 we do and i think that's brilliant i i mean your principles on this i love i 868 01:04:53,320 --> 01:04:54,320 can't support them enough 869 01:04:55,580 --> 01:05:00,020 because it's inverting the model that the government has laid out where people 870 01:05:00,020 --> 01:05:03,420 who are trying to say the truth skulk around and they hide in the dark and 871 01:05:03,420 --> 01:05:08,200 quote anonymously and whatnot. I say, yes, fuck that. Okay, so here's the plan 872 01:05:08,200 --> 01:05:12,320 then. I mean, and this is the thing. It's like once you, I think we all just 873 01:05:12,320 --> 01:05:14,420 felt the fact that this is the right way to do it. 874 01:05:14,860 --> 01:05:18,560 It's the, you feel the power of your choice. You know what I mean? It's like, 875 01:05:18,560 --> 01:05:23,120 and I want that power to be felt in the world. Okay. And it is the, I mean, it's 876 01:05:23,120 --> 01:05:27,560 the ultimate standing up to them, right? Like I'm not going to fucking hide even 877 01:05:27,560 --> 01:05:28,560 for like one second. 878 01:05:28,720 --> 01:05:30,640 I'm going to get right in your face. 879 01:05:30,840 --> 01:05:31,860 You don't have to investigate. 880 01:05:32,380 --> 01:05:34,440 There's nothing to investigate. Here I am. 881 01:05:35,260 --> 01:05:38,460 You know, and I think that it's just incredibly powerful. 882 01:05:38,680 --> 01:05:42,840 And then the question just becomes, how do we do this in the right, you know, 883 01:05:42,880 --> 01:05:47,220 the perfect way? And that's my burden and that's what I'm going to... So today 884 01:05:47,220 --> 01:05:50,580 is going to be the story in the morning, assuming that it doesn't change on the 885 01:05:50,580 --> 01:05:52,860 Guardian. It's going to be the story in the morning just to keep the momentum 886 01:05:52,860 --> 01:05:55,140 going, just to keep, like, the disclosures coming. 887 01:05:55,740 --> 01:05:56,860 A big one at night. 888 01:05:57,100 --> 01:06:02,550 Now it's becoming like, okay, this is... a major leak and after today i only 889 01:06:02,550 --> 01:06:07,290 post the two stuff things that we're going to post it's going to be what the 890 01:06:07,290 --> 01:06:09,830 fuck is this leak and who did it i guarantee you 891 01:06:09,830 --> 01:06:20,310 i 892 01:06:20,310 --> 01:06:23,730 just want to make sure move over slightly and you want me to move a 893 01:06:23,730 --> 01:06:24,730 over okay 894 01:06:28,750 --> 01:06:29,750 All right, we're rolling. 895 01:06:30,470 --> 01:06:34,650 So let's just begin with some basic background information, like just state 896 01:06:34,650 --> 01:06:38,690 name, what position you held in the intelligence community, and how long you 897 01:06:38,690 --> 01:06:39,690 worked within that community. 898 01:06:40,810 --> 01:06:41,810 Okay. 899 01:06:42,360 --> 01:06:45,120 Just so I'm aware of where we're going. How in depth are we going? Just in 900 01:06:45,120 --> 01:06:48,480 general, like I'm currently an infrastructure analyst, you know, Booz 901 01:06:48,480 --> 01:06:50,840 Hamilton, not going through my whole backstory. 902 01:06:51,260 --> 01:06:54,140 Yeah. Okay. Just like, yeah, summary kind of. Okay. 903 01:06:54,440 --> 01:07:00,880 My name is Ed Snowden. I'm 29 years old. I work for Booz Allen Hamilton as an 904 01:07:00,880 --> 01:07:03,720 infrastructure analyst for NSA in Hawaii. 905 01:07:05,070 --> 01:07:08,710 And what are some of the positions that you held previously within the 906 01:07:08,710 --> 01:07:09,609 intelligence community? 907 01:07:09,610 --> 01:07:15,950 I've been a systems engineer, systems administrator, senior advisor 908 01:07:15,950 --> 01:07:22,010 for the Central Intelligence Agency, solutions consultant, and a 909 01:07:22,010 --> 01:07:24,890 telecommunications information systems officer. 910 01:07:25,310 --> 01:07:29,750 And what kind of clearances have you held? What kind of classification? 911 01:07:30,490 --> 01:07:31,630 Top secret. 912 01:07:36,560 --> 01:07:40,880 So people in my levels of access for systems administration or as an 913 01:07:40,880 --> 01:07:47,480 infrastructure analyst typically have higher accesses than an NSA employee 914 01:07:47,480 --> 01:07:48,259 normally have. 915 01:07:48,260 --> 01:07:54,960 Normal NSA employees have a combination of clearances called TS, SI, TK, and 916 01:07:54,960 --> 01:07:55,960 Gamma. 917 01:07:56,720 --> 01:08:02,660 That's top secret signals intelligence, talent keyhole, and Gamma. And they all 918 01:08:02,660 --> 01:08:05,720 relate to certain things that are sort of core to the NSA mission. 919 01:08:06,440 --> 01:08:11,460 As a systems administrator, you get a special clearance called Prisac for 920 01:08:11,460 --> 01:08:16,100 privileged access, which allows you to be exposed to information of any 921 01:08:16,100 --> 01:08:19,220 classification, regardless of what your position actually needs. 922 01:08:54,540 --> 01:08:58,100 So just before we go, a reminder of our top story, and that's that the former 923 01:08:58,100 --> 01:09:02,819 CIA technical worker, Edward Snowden, says he's responsible for leaking 924 01:09:02,819 --> 01:09:08,200 information that U .S. authorities have been monitoring phone and Internet data. 925 01:09:08,439 --> 01:09:13,140 The U .S. Justice Department confirmed it in the first stages of a criminal 926 01:09:13,140 --> 01:09:15,819 investigation. Leave it longer? I've got to shorten it. What do you think? 927 01:09:16,100 --> 01:09:17,880 As far as the video that people saw. 928 01:09:18,380 --> 01:09:20,260 Am I laughing at Apple now? Was it? 929 01:09:21,200 --> 01:09:24,260 Because I can't go all the way down. It's still going to be double. I don't 930 01:09:24,260 --> 01:09:25,260 the blade for closer. 931 01:09:28,460 --> 01:09:31,600 Are you going to be talking to any other media about the story today? 932 01:09:31,979 --> 01:09:32,979 I am. 933 01:09:34,060 --> 01:09:36,260 Will you be coming to our office if you have any questions? 934 01:09:36,560 --> 01:09:39,660 Of course, about where is Snowden now, what his plans are. Well, I'm obviously 935 01:09:39,660 --> 01:09:42,140 not going to talk about that. Unless you have any other questions, it's going to 936 01:09:42,140 --> 01:09:44,120 be a pretty brief interview. What are your plans, please? 937 01:09:44,340 --> 01:09:46,840 Are you staying in Hong Kong for the time being? For a little while. 938 01:09:47,420 --> 01:09:52,060 And do you have any hopes to write more about this story? Are you stopping new 939 01:09:52,060 --> 01:09:54,900 writing about this story? No, I'm going to continue to write about it. Have you 940 01:09:54,900 --> 01:09:58,380 had any pressure from the U .S. authorities about continuing to report 941 01:09:58,480 --> 01:09:59,358 No. 942 01:09:59,360 --> 01:10:03,820 And have you heard anything about what could be the attitude of Hong Kong 943 01:10:03,820 --> 01:10:07,000 authorities towards this case, whether they've contacted you or asked you 944 01:10:07,000 --> 01:10:11,420 anything about the whereabouts of Snowden and whether that is another... I 945 01:10:11,420 --> 01:10:13,480 haven't heard from the authorities of any of them. 946 01:10:15,160 --> 01:10:19,960 And where do you think the story is going for you and, of course, for 947 01:10:19,960 --> 01:10:23,580 and, of course, for the U .S. media and the U .S. administration in general? 948 01:10:23,780 --> 01:10:27,380 Well, for me, I'm going to continue to report on, do my reporting on what the 949 01:10:27,380 --> 01:10:30,500 government has been doing and what I think my readers should know about. 950 01:10:31,100 --> 01:10:35,320 As for him, I don't think anyone knows. I can have people come after me or any 951 01:10:35,320 --> 01:10:36,900 of their third -party partners. 952 01:10:37,120 --> 01:10:39,680 You know, they work closely with a number of other nations. 953 01:10:40,400 --> 01:10:44,180 Or, you know, they make a payout to ProHeads or, you know, any of their 954 01:10:44,180 --> 01:10:45,180 or assets. 955 01:11:34,340 --> 01:11:38,440 Now it's time for our newspaper review and looking at what's making headlines 956 01:11:38,440 --> 01:11:40,740 around the world. Let's start with The Guardian. 957 01:11:41,340 --> 01:11:45,400 This is revealing the identity of the former CAA employee. 958 01:11:45,820 --> 01:11:50,280 So the paper has leaked information exposing the scale of American 959 01:11:50,280 --> 01:11:51,300 of the internet. 960 01:11:52,540 --> 01:11:54,620 Edward Snowden. What a great story. 961 01:11:54,940 --> 01:11:57,760 Peter, do you want to know what this is? Well, I think it's a fantastic story, 962 01:11:57,800 --> 01:12:00,940 first off. It could be straight out of a John le Carré novel. I mean, when you 963 01:12:00,940 --> 01:12:04,440 read what he did, you actually got the material. He then decided to go to the 964 01:12:04,440 --> 01:12:08,060 place he identified as being very difficult for America to get at him. 965 01:12:08,430 --> 01:12:12,590 Which is Hong Kong, because, of course, technically inside China, the one 966 01:12:12,590 --> 01:12:16,070 country, two systems policy there, meaning that you can even get 967 01:12:16,070 --> 01:12:20,570 some protection, you thought, all very well planned. It could be just out of a 968 01:12:20,570 --> 01:12:22,370 spy mode. But what about the details? 969 01:12:25,610 --> 01:12:27,630 That could make it worse. 970 01:12:33,170 --> 01:12:35,010 It's just the lower half of my face. 971 01:13:20,250 --> 01:13:23,950 How do you feel? 972 01:13:29,520 --> 01:13:30,540 What happens, happens. 973 01:13:30,900 --> 01:13:33,660 We've talked about this. I knew what the risks were. 974 01:13:34,880 --> 01:13:36,820 If I get arrested, I get arrested. 975 01:13:39,000 --> 01:13:43,080 We were able to get the information that needed to get out, out. 976 01:13:45,020 --> 01:13:50,240 And you and Glenn are able to keep reporting regardless what happens to me. 977 01:14:03,290 --> 01:14:04,290 Yes. 978 01:14:07,090 --> 01:14:08,270 I'm sorry, who's asking? 979 01:14:11,670 --> 01:14:13,510 I'm afraid you have the wrong room. Thank you. 980 01:14:15,230 --> 01:14:16,230 Wall Street Journal. 981 01:14:32,000 --> 01:14:33,380 Yes. I'm sorry, say again? 982 01:14:36,560 --> 01:14:38,020 No, no, thank you. No calls. 983 01:14:38,400 --> 01:14:39,720 I think they have the wrong number. 984 01:14:41,340 --> 01:14:42,620 Yeah, no calls. Thank you. 985 01:14:43,380 --> 01:14:44,380 Wait, I'm sorry. 986 01:14:44,740 --> 01:14:49,900 If it's two men from the front desk, they can call, but no outside calls. 987 01:14:50,120 --> 01:14:51,640 Wait, actually, just let them through. 988 01:14:54,060 --> 01:14:55,060 Wait, wait, ma 'am? 989 01:15:05,350 --> 01:15:06,350 Yes. Wait, 990 01:15:08,930 --> 01:15:10,230 is it a lawyer? 991 01:15:12,510 --> 01:15:16,230 Yeah, no, no, no. I mean the people who are asking. Ask them if they are 992 01:15:16,230 --> 01:15:17,230 lawyers. 993 01:15:19,490 --> 01:15:26,150 No, tell her that she has the wrong 994 01:15:26,150 --> 01:15:28,030 number and there's no Mr. Snowden here. 995 01:15:37,580 --> 01:15:38,580 Can you talk right now? 996 01:15:39,520 --> 01:15:41,280 I'm safely going into the room. 997 01:15:42,180 --> 01:15:48,740 I'm not saving the client, okay? So can we talk together about the plan? 998 01:15:48,980 --> 01:15:52,340 Is the application started already or not, technically? 999 01:15:55,500 --> 01:15:58,820 Yeah, so technically it hasn't started yet. 1000 01:16:09,160 --> 01:16:11,320 Would you mind to talk to him in speakerphone? 1001 01:16:12,860 --> 01:16:14,520 Sorry. Hi, Robert. 1002 01:16:15,600 --> 01:16:16,600 Hi, 1003 01:16:17,420 --> 01:16:18,420 I'm the client. 1004 01:16:21,400 --> 01:16:23,420 Pretty good. I'm doing well. 1005 01:16:39,250 --> 01:16:40,250 Okay. 1006 01:16:43,890 --> 01:16:44,890 Okay. 1007 01:16:55,210 --> 01:17:01,970 Okay, that's great. Is it okay if I bring equipment? Because I'm just kind 1008 01:17:01,970 --> 01:17:05,530 going so I can leave in any direction at any time and not come back, if 1009 01:17:05,530 --> 01:17:06,530 necessary. 1010 01:17:09,520 --> 01:17:12,340 Okay. Take whatever you want with you. Just go with Mr. Matt. 1011 01:17:12,720 --> 01:17:15,960 I will pick you. He knows where I'm going to pick you guys up, and then I'll 1012 01:17:15,960 --> 01:17:18,000 bring you to the UNHCR. Okay, that sounds good. 1013 01:17:18,460 --> 01:17:21,400 All right. Thank you so much for helping me. 1014 01:17:21,700 --> 01:17:25,880 He's quite worried about the big thing. It's about the accommodation, or he's 1015 01:17:25,880 --> 01:17:30,040 going to say whether there's something pirate and they cannot be discovered by 1016 01:17:30,040 --> 01:17:31,040 the police. 1017 01:17:34,700 --> 01:17:38,560 Okay, I see. Okay, I will give you a call, hit up before I restart, okay? 1018 01:17:39,080 --> 01:17:40,660 Okay, bye. Okay, thank you. Bye -bye. 1019 01:17:42,120 --> 01:17:46,420 Sorry, not yet, but we don't have a car. 1020 01:17:47,040 --> 01:17:53,900 Okay. What I'm thinking, we may ask the concierge to arrange 1021 01:17:53,900 --> 01:17:56,180 a car or we just go down and catch a taxi. 1022 01:17:56,680 --> 01:18:02,020 But it's quite, the traffic here in Tsim Sha Tsui is quite difficult to catch a 1023 01:18:02,020 --> 01:18:03,480 taxi. Yeah, sorry. 1024 01:18:04,080 --> 01:18:09,080 And so is there precedent for this, where Hong Kong would extradite someone 1025 01:18:09,080 --> 01:18:10,080 political speech? 1026 01:18:10,440 --> 01:18:15,600 No, I'm not aware of. If we have a torture claim or asylum seeking claim on 1027 01:18:15,600 --> 01:18:20,480 death, then they ought, under the law, they ought to give you a reconnaissance 1028 01:18:20,480 --> 01:18:26,180 for you to stay in Hong Kong because they don't know where to come you back 1029 01:19:17,480 --> 01:19:20,540 The President certainly does not welcome the way that this debate has earned 1030 01:19:20,540 --> 01:19:24,080 greater attention than last week, that the leaked classified information about 1031 01:19:24,080 --> 01:19:27,760 sensitive programs that are important in our fight against terrorists who would 1032 01:19:27,760 --> 01:19:30,260 do harm to Americans is a problem. 1033 01:19:30,520 --> 01:19:33,740 But the debate itself is legitimate and should be engaged. 1034 01:21:16,639 --> 01:21:19,040 But tomorrow it will be on the internet, right? 1035 01:21:19,460 --> 01:21:20,460 Yes. 1036 01:21:24,000 --> 01:21:30,460 I want to show you the new document now. 1037 01:21:30,800 --> 01:21:33,900 You will see this much clearer than this one. 1038 01:21:34,460 --> 01:21:40,840 This is the map of the cables where they are collecting the data for the prison. 1039 01:21:41,080 --> 01:21:44,260 Here it shows how many they are collecting. 1040 01:21:44,890 --> 01:21:48,370 The bigger the line, the more they are collecting. 1041 01:21:48,830 --> 01:21:53,010 You can see here the line, the cable, is very thick. 1042 01:21:53,450 --> 01:21:59,330 For Brazil in the south and the north, the cable in the sea of Brazil. It shows 1043 01:21:59,330 --> 01:22:02,910 that they are collecting a lot of things in the Prism program, which I think is 1044 01:22:02,910 --> 01:22:08,970 very important because Prism is Facebook, Skype, YouTube, Yahoo, 1045 01:22:08,970 --> 01:22:11,390 shows a lot of transactions being stolen from Brazil. 1046 01:22:12,050 --> 01:22:13,690 But we don't know... 1047 01:22:14,300 --> 01:22:19,800 how much the Brazilian government was and how much collaboration they have 1048 01:22:19,800 --> 01:22:21,200 Brazilian companies as well. 1049 01:22:21,420 --> 01:22:22,600 We don't know, but we will know. 1050 01:23:25,590 --> 01:23:27,610 Right, so which ones do we want here then? 1051 01:23:27,850 --> 01:23:31,430 This is operational stuff, so we mustn't pay any less. So redact that. 1052 01:23:31,730 --> 01:23:36,390 What about the Alexander quote? Yeah, that's in tarmac. 1053 01:23:36,930 --> 01:23:41,290 Why can't we collect all the signals all the time? Sounds like a good summer 1054 01:23:41,290 --> 01:23:45,530 homework project for Menwick. Peter Alexander, the head of the NSA, on a 1055 01:23:45,530 --> 01:23:46,289 to the UK. 1056 01:23:46,290 --> 01:23:47,049 This one. 1057 01:23:47,050 --> 01:23:48,050 Yeah. 1058 01:23:48,130 --> 01:23:50,690 Secret documents in there, secret documents. 1059 01:23:51,190 --> 01:23:53,870 We've got a stick here that should just have three single... 1060 01:23:54,800 --> 01:23:57,840 slides on them. If it's got more than three single slides on them, we're an 1061 01:23:57,840 --> 01:23:58,960 extreme example. 1062 01:24:02,040 --> 01:24:03,340 Yeah, that's it. 1063 01:24:04,160 --> 01:24:08,800 This is really dangerous stuff for us. Guardian is going to make mistakes at 1064 01:24:08,800 --> 01:24:11,600 very end where we kept it all under lock and key and no one knows. 1065 01:24:11,860 --> 01:24:12,860 I'm not saying that. 1066 01:24:13,960 --> 01:24:18,020 They will come in and smack the front door down if we elaborate on that. 1067 01:24:18,700 --> 01:24:22,440 And he said the Prime Minister is extremely concerned about this. 1068 01:24:22,750 --> 01:24:25,190 And they were kept saying, this is from the very top. 1069 01:25:44,280 --> 01:25:50,720 As you may have heard, there is a CIA agent who has 1070 01:25:50,720 --> 01:25:57,300 revealed a lot of information and he is now trapped in the airport in Moscow. 1071 01:25:57,740 --> 01:26:01,400 We managed to get him out of Hong Kong, but when he landed in the Moscow 1072 01:26:01,400 --> 01:26:06,020 airport... the American government had cancelled his passport. 1073 01:26:06,340 --> 01:26:11,840 So formally, he hasn't entered into Russian territory. He's in the transit 1074 01:26:11,840 --> 01:26:16,660 of the airport, and one of our people is accompanying him. We are trying to 1075 01:26:16,660 --> 01:26:23,620 arrange a private jet to take him from 1076 01:26:23,620 --> 01:26:29,020 Moscow to Ecuador or perhaps maybe Venezuela. 1077 01:26:30,700 --> 01:26:34,420 Or maybe I planned the country's wages would be saved. 1078 01:26:57,500 --> 01:27:03,120 for Americans, for everything, since the September 11th attack, is terrorism. 1079 01:27:03,520 --> 01:27:07,220 Everything for national security, to protect our population. 1080 01:27:07,800 --> 01:27:09,900 In reality, it's the opposite. 1081 01:27:10,400 --> 01:27:17,180 There are many, many documents that have no reasoning with anything about 1082 01:27:17,180 --> 01:27:18,180 terrorism. 1083 01:27:28,099 --> 01:27:30,760 The second thing about the X -Keys score. 1084 01:27:31,420 --> 01:27:37,340 When we publish the first, second, third articles, the defense of the American 1085 01:27:37,340 --> 01:27:42,780 government is that we are not invading the content or communication, only the 1086 01:27:42,780 --> 01:27:49,680 metadata, the facts about, or identity, about what you are talking about, what 1087 01:27:49,680 --> 01:27:52,720 you are talking about, calling you, the duration of the communication. 1088 01:27:53,600 --> 01:27:58,660 In reality, if I can know all the people with whom you are communicating, and 1089 01:27:58,660 --> 01:28:03,800 all the people with whom they are communicating, and where you are when 1090 01:28:03,800 --> 01:28:09,260 communicating, and the address, and the location, I can know a lot about your 1091 01:28:09,260 --> 01:28:12,340 personality, your activity, your life. 1092 01:28:12,840 --> 01:28:14,880 It's a big advantage in privacy. 1093 01:28:15,540 --> 01:28:19,180 But in reality, this defense is totally false. 1094 01:28:19,540 --> 01:28:22,440 The American government has the capacity to... 1095 01:28:22,830 --> 01:28:24,250 Thank you very 1096 01:28:24,250 --> 01:28:34,210 much. 1097 01:28:50,700 --> 01:28:53,980 Thank you very 1098 01:28:53,980 --> 01:29:08,980 much. 1099 01:29:16,830 --> 01:29:21,010 If you are American, living in the United States, you need to be the first 1100 01:29:21,010 --> 01:29:24,690 to court and ask for permission to always receive. 1101 01:29:25,090 --> 01:29:31,870 But if you are not American, you don't need anything, no approval from the 1102 01:29:31,870 --> 01:29:33,150 to do that. 1103 01:29:33,390 --> 01:29:38,850 I think the consequences of the elimination of privacy are sometimes 1104 01:29:38,850 --> 01:29:42,690 for Anandazar, but it is very important to understand that... 1105 01:30:03,849 --> 01:30:06,590 May I collect all the phones, please? 1106 01:30:19,310 --> 01:30:20,310 Put them in the refrigerator. 1107 01:30:31,790 --> 01:30:38,710 So, as you know, in June, Snowden was in charge with three 1108 01:30:38,710 --> 01:30:45,490 legal violations, felonies, principally under a World War I era criminal 1109 01:30:45,490 --> 01:30:47,110 law called the Espionage Act. 1110 01:30:48,119 --> 01:30:54,580 The Espionage Act is an extremely broad criminal prohibition against the sharing 1111 01:30:54,580 --> 01:30:57,740 or dissemination of what's called national defense information. 1112 01:30:58,220 --> 01:31:04,320 It was only used to prosecute people who had been accused of acting with a 1113 01:31:04,320 --> 01:31:08,760 foreign power, spies, not whistleblowers. And it's a very unusual 1114 01:31:08,760 --> 01:31:12,640 representation, I think, not just for all of you, but for me as well. 1115 01:31:13,240 --> 01:31:15,440 The Espionage Act does not distinguish. 1116 01:31:16,270 --> 01:31:20,870 between leaks to the press and the public interest and selling secrets to 1117 01:31:20,870 --> 01:31:23,130 foreign enemies for personal profit. 1118 01:31:23,490 --> 01:31:28,430 So under the Espionage Act, it's not a defense if the information that was 1119 01:31:28,430 --> 01:31:31,970 disclosed should not have been withheld in the first place, that it was 1120 01:31:31,970 --> 01:31:32,970 improperly classified. 1121 01:31:33,350 --> 01:31:37,490 It's not a defense if the dissemination was in the public interest, that it led 1122 01:31:37,490 --> 01:31:38,490 to reform. 1123 01:31:38,550 --> 01:31:43,230 Even if a court determines that the programs that were revealed were illegal 1124 01:31:43,230 --> 01:31:45,390 unconstitutional, that's still not a defense. 1125 01:31:45,770 --> 01:31:49,710 under the espionage act the government doesn't have to defend the 1126 01:31:49,710 --> 01:31:54,950 it doesn't have to demonstrate harm from the release all of this is irrelevant 1127 01:31:54,950 --> 01:32:00,990 so when we say that the trial wouldn't be fair we're not talking about what 1128 01:32:00,990 --> 01:32:04,370 human rights lawyers think of as fair trial practices we're saying the law the 1129 01:32:04,370 --> 01:32:11,010 statute itself eliminates any kind of defense that snowden might be able to 1130 01:32:11,010 --> 01:32:15,130 and essentially would equate him with a spy and of course those three count 1131 01:32:15,660 --> 01:32:20,260 could be increased to 100 or 200 or 300, they could charge them separately for 1132 01:32:20,260 --> 01:32:23,900 each document that has been published by a journalist. 1133 01:32:24,120 --> 01:32:28,540 And I think that we all recognize, even though we sit here as lawyers in a 1134 01:32:28,540 --> 01:32:35,400 lawyers' meeting, that it's probably 95 % politics and 5 % law how 1135 01:32:35,400 --> 01:32:36,760 this will be resolved. 1136 01:33:08,740 --> 01:33:13,800 Mr. Snowden has been charged with very serious crimes, and he should be 1137 01:33:13,800 --> 01:33:17,900 to the United States where he will be granted full due process and every right 1138 01:33:17,900 --> 01:33:22,940 available to him as a United States citizen facing our justice system under 1139 01:33:22,940 --> 01:33:23,940 Constitution. 1140 01:34:14,800 --> 01:34:16,560 I don't think Mr. Snowden was a patriot. 1141 01:34:16,820 --> 01:34:23,600 I called for a thorough review of our surveillance operations before 1142 01:34:23,600 --> 01:34:24,940 Mr. Snowden made these leaks. 1143 01:34:26,060 --> 01:34:32,780 My preference, and I think the American people's preference, would have been for 1144 01:34:32,780 --> 01:34:37,800 a lawful, orderly examination of these laws, a 1145 01:34:37,800 --> 01:34:41,920 thoughtful, fact -based debate. 1146 01:34:43,160 --> 01:34:46,440 that would then lead us to a better place. 1147 01:35:24,540 --> 01:35:25,540 Oh, my God. 1148 01:35:26,720 --> 01:35:27,720 David. 1149 01:35:29,360 --> 01:35:32,440 You okay? 1150 01:35:38,980 --> 01:35:39,980 Okay, 1151 01:35:40,180 --> 01:35:40,978 okay, okay. 1152 01:35:40,980 --> 01:35:42,220 You just have to walk in. 1153 01:35:50,980 --> 01:35:53,780 Good, good. I'm totally fine. I didn't sleep at all. I couldn't sleep. 1154 01:35:54,040 --> 01:35:55,040 I know. 1155 01:36:17,160 --> 01:36:22,040 Recent reports have revealed that the NSA have access to encryption keys and 1156 01:36:22,040 --> 01:36:25,500 they paid tech companies to introduce backdoors in encryption protocols. 1157 01:36:25,840 --> 01:36:30,600 So we are going to talk about ways in which we can defend ourselves against 1158 01:36:30,600 --> 01:36:33,480 governments spying on us. So Mr. 1159 01:36:33,720 --> 01:36:37,840 Jacob Appelbaum is an encryption and security software developer and 1160 01:36:38,140 --> 01:36:44,000 Ladar Levinson, the founder of the encrypted email service Lavabit, used by 1161 01:36:44,000 --> 01:36:45,560 Edward Snowden. You have the floor. 1162 01:36:46,140 --> 01:36:47,140 Thank you. 1163 01:36:47,200 --> 01:36:53,020 LavaBit is an email service that hopefully one day will be able to stand 1164 01:36:53,020 --> 01:36:59,260 own without any references. My service was designed to remove me from the 1165 01:36:59,260 --> 01:37:03,720 possibility of being forced to violate a person's privacy. 1166 01:37:04,440 --> 01:37:08,740 Quite simply, LavaBit was designed to remove the service provider from the 1167 01:37:08,740 --> 01:37:14,160 equation. By not having logs on my server and not having access to a 1168 01:37:14,160 --> 01:37:15,160 emails on disk, 1169 01:37:15,820 --> 01:37:19,880 I wasn't eliminating the possibility of surveillance. I was simply removing 1170 01:37:19,880 --> 01:37:25,300 myself from that equation in that surveillance would have to be conducted 1171 01:37:25,300 --> 01:37:29,240 target, either the sender or the receiver of the messages. 1172 01:37:29,920 --> 01:37:36,820 But I was approached by the FBI quite recently and told that because I 1173 01:37:36,820 --> 01:37:39,460 turn over the information from that one particular user. 1174 01:37:39,930 --> 01:37:43,750 I would be forced to give up those SSL keys and let the FBI collect every 1175 01:37:43,750 --> 01:37:46,610 communication on my network without any kind of transparency. 1176 01:37:48,330 --> 01:37:53,550 And, of course, I wasn't comfortable with that, to say the least. 1177 01:37:54,330 --> 01:37:57,930 More disturbing was the fact that I couldn't even tell anybody that it was 1178 01:37:57,930 --> 01:37:58,930 on. 1179 01:37:59,130 --> 01:38:05,110 So I decided if I didn't win the fight to unseal my case, if I didn't win the 1180 01:38:05,110 --> 01:38:07,810 battle to be able to tell people what was going on, 1181 01:38:08,620 --> 01:38:11,680 then my only ethical choice left was to shut down. 1182 01:38:14,400 --> 01:38:15,440 Think about that. 1183 01:38:17,160 --> 01:38:21,300 I believe in the rule of law. I believe in the need to conduct investigations. 1184 01:38:22,540 --> 01:38:26,960 But those investigations are supposed to be difficult for a reason. It's 1185 01:38:26,960 --> 01:38:32,180 supposed to be difficult to invade somebody's privacy because of how 1186 01:38:32,180 --> 01:38:35,080 it is, because of how disruptive it is. 1187 01:38:36,200 --> 01:38:40,480 If we don't have our right to privacy, how do we have a free and open 1188 01:38:40,480 --> 01:38:41,480 discussion? 1189 01:38:41,900 --> 01:38:48,320 What good is the right to free speech if it's not protected 1190 01:38:48,320 --> 01:38:53,320 in the sense that you can't have a private discussion with somebody else 1191 01:38:53,320 --> 01:38:54,560 something you disagree with? 1192 01:38:55,400 --> 01:38:59,320 Think about the chilling effect that that has. Think about the chilling 1193 01:38:59,320 --> 01:39:02,360 it does have on countries that don't have a right to privacy. 1194 01:39:03,470 --> 01:39:06,770 I've noticed a really interesting discussion point, which is that what 1195 01:39:06,770 --> 01:39:09,530 used to call liberty and freedom, we now call privacy. 1196 01:39:10,870 --> 01:39:14,130 And we say in the same breath that privacy is dead. 1197 01:39:15,170 --> 01:39:19,230 This is something that really concerns me about my generation, especially when 1198 01:39:19,230 --> 01:39:20,970 we talk about how we're not surprised by anything. 1199 01:39:21,230 --> 01:39:25,690 I think that we should consider that when we lose privacy, we lose agency. We 1200 01:39:25,690 --> 01:39:29,350 lose liberty itself because we no longer feel free to express what we think. 1201 01:39:29,760 --> 01:39:31,920 There's this myth of the passive surveillance machine. 1202 01:39:32,140 --> 01:39:34,560 But actually, what is surveillance except control? 1203 01:39:34,980 --> 01:39:38,180 This notion that the NSA are passive, this is nonsense. 1204 01:39:38,400 --> 01:39:42,080 What we see is that they actively attack European citizens, American citizens, 1205 01:39:42,300 --> 01:39:45,480 and, in fact, anyone that they can if they perceive an advantage. 1206 01:40:01,000 --> 01:40:05,820 And then comes the decisive part, which speaks a lot for the fact that it was 1207 01:40:05,820 --> 01:40:10,480 the SDS that took the cell phone from Chancellor Merkel into the museum. 1208 01:40:11,360 --> 01:40:12,960 So we have the map. 1209 01:40:13,200 --> 01:40:14,200 Yes. 1210 01:41:21,760 --> 01:41:22,760 Okay. 1211 01:41:23,920 --> 01:41:24,920 All right. 1212 01:41:29,320 --> 01:41:30,920 I'll have to give that in testimony. 1213 01:41:33,220 --> 01:41:35,480 Everything I can truthfully. 1214 01:41:40,000 --> 01:41:41,740 Whatever the questions they ask me. 1215 01:41:43,600 --> 01:41:44,680 Okay. All right. 1216 01:41:45,600 --> 01:41:46,600 Thank you. 1217 01:41:51,530 --> 01:41:54,350 Hello, good day. How are you? 1218 01:41:54,610 --> 01:41:56,950 Good to see you again. Nice to meet you. 1219 01:41:59,910 --> 01:42:00,350 It 1220 01:42:00,350 --> 01:42:08,610 is 1221 01:42:08,610 --> 01:42:12,770 my pleasure to be here. I feel that it's important to testify about what's 1222 01:42:12,770 --> 01:42:17,010 really going on behind the scenes and the intelligence community around the 1223 01:42:17,010 --> 01:42:18,730 world, not just in a day. 1224 01:42:19,370 --> 01:42:23,910 All these programs that Edward Snowden exposed fundamentally are ways of 1225 01:42:23,910 --> 01:42:24,910 acquiring information. 1226 01:42:25,790 --> 01:42:29,850 Every dictatorship down through history has always done it. One of the first 1227 01:42:29,850 --> 01:42:34,250 things they need to do is to try to acquire knowledge of their population, 1228 01:42:34,250 --> 01:42:35,870 that's exactly what these programs do. 1229 01:42:36,630 --> 01:42:40,430 I see this as the most major threat to our democracy all around the world. 1230 01:43:29,580 --> 01:43:33,040 What do you think they're doing to reporters, those of us that are working 1231 01:43:33,040 --> 01:43:35,420 directly with Snowden documents? 1232 01:43:35,840 --> 01:43:38,200 How do you think they would approach dealing with people like us? 1233 01:43:38,460 --> 01:43:45,320 You're on the cast iron cover list, which means any electronic device you 1234 01:43:45,320 --> 01:43:49,260 use that they can attach to you, they'll record and capture all that data. 1235 01:43:49,520 --> 01:43:51,880 And what do they do with that data? They're just trying to figure out what 1236 01:43:51,880 --> 01:43:52,880 doing? 1237 01:43:53,220 --> 01:43:54,220 Well, they're trying to... 1238 01:43:54,510 --> 01:43:58,130 That's part of it, but the other part, primarily part, for them, I think, is to 1239 01:43:58,130 --> 01:43:59,770 find the sources of information you're getting. 1240 01:43:59,990 --> 01:44:03,090 So if I have a confidential source who's giving me information as a 1241 01:44:03,090 --> 01:44:06,890 whistleblower, and he works within the U .S. government, and he's concerned 1242 01:44:06,890 --> 01:44:12,130 about what he perceives as violations of the Constitution, and he gets in touch 1243 01:44:12,130 --> 01:44:14,350 with me, they... Go ahead. 1244 01:44:14,710 --> 01:44:19,130 From there on, they would nail him and start watching everything he did, and if 1245 01:44:19,130 --> 01:44:21,370 he started passing data, I'm sure they'd take him off the street. 1246 01:44:22,410 --> 01:44:27,010 I mean, the way you have to do it is like Deep Throat did, right, in the 1247 01:44:27,010 --> 01:44:31,150 years. Meet in the basement of a parking garage, physically. 1248 01:45:12,370 --> 01:45:16,290 Let's disassociate our metadata one last time, so we don't have a clear record 1249 01:45:16,290 --> 01:45:18,790 of your true name and our final communication chain. 1250 01:45:19,470 --> 01:45:23,210 This is obviously not to say you can't claim your involvement, but as every 1251 01:45:23,210 --> 01:45:27,210 trick in the book is likely to be used in looking into this, I believe it's 1252 01:45:27,210 --> 01:45:30,090 better that that particular disclosure come on your own terms. 1253 01:45:31,730 --> 01:45:33,590 Thank you again for all you've done. 1254 01:45:33,930 --> 01:45:37,810 So sorry again for the multiple delays, but we've been in uncharted territory 1255 01:45:37,810 --> 01:45:39,510 with no model to benefit from. 1256 01:45:41,200 --> 01:45:46,080 If all ends well, perhaps the demonstration that our methods work will 1257 01:45:46,080 --> 01:45:47,140 more to come forward. 1258 01:45:47,920 --> 01:45:49,500 So the 1259 01:45:49,500 --> 01:45:56,360 update that I want to give you 1260 01:45:56,360 --> 01:46:03,260 is about the new source that we... 1261 01:46:03,260 --> 01:46:04,260 Okay. 1262 01:46:05,420 --> 01:46:07,880 That... You picked what? 1263 01:46:10,060 --> 01:46:15,740 This is the, you know, this is the person who's doing the most of the work 1264 01:46:15,740 --> 01:46:16,740 it. 1265 01:46:18,400 --> 01:46:21,640 And now, and then, like, basically what's happened is, 1266 01:46:21,780 --> 01:46:28,740 and... That's actually, that's really dangerous 1267 01:46:28,740 --> 01:46:32,280 on the sources side. 1268 01:46:32,500 --> 01:46:35,900 Do they know how to take care of themselves? Well, he knows. I mean, it's 1269 01:46:35,900 --> 01:46:37,980 being done. 1270 01:46:40,580 --> 01:46:41,580 Through this. 1271 01:46:42,100 --> 01:46:46,420 Okay. And they're all talking this way. 1272 01:46:46,840 --> 01:46:47,840 Okay. 1273 01:46:48,100 --> 01:46:51,820 And... I was going to say, one of the big questions there is, can they handle 1274 01:46:51,820 --> 01:46:55,880 it? You know, do they have the... No, they're very careful, even though 1275 01:46:55,880 --> 01:46:56,880 that. Okay. Yeah. 1276 01:47:02,640 --> 01:47:03,640 And... 1277 01:47:10,670 --> 01:47:11,670 That's where that is. 1278 01:47:14,290 --> 01:47:15,710 Wow, that's really something. 1279 01:47:28,410 --> 01:47:29,650 You know that? 1280 01:47:36,430 --> 01:47:39,170 It's not the actual plane. Right, right. 1281 01:47:39,770 --> 01:47:40,770 You mean the control. 1282 01:47:41,010 --> 01:47:42,110 It's the process. 1283 01:47:44,550 --> 01:47:45,910 There's a chart. 1284 01:47:46,570 --> 01:47:49,410 There's a whole layout for everyone. 1285 01:47:49,630 --> 01:47:51,550 That is really bold. It's really risky. 1286 01:47:52,050 --> 01:47:55,670 But that's the thing. If they understand what they're doing. There's this chart. 1287 01:47:55,810 --> 01:47:58,790 It shows the decision -making chart. 1288 01:47:59,010 --> 01:48:01,550 It's shaped like this. 1289 01:48:07,730 --> 01:48:08,890 So up here it says, 1290 01:48:09,870 --> 01:48:13,730 That's the decision -making chart for each one. 1291 01:48:18,790 --> 01:48:21,930 It's so political. This part's amazing. 1292 01:48:28,930 --> 01:48:31,130 That's fucking ridiculous. 1293 01:48:32,310 --> 01:48:33,850 It's so shocking. 1294 01:48:40,009 --> 01:48:43,730 That's the population of an entire country. I know. 1295 01:48:47,530 --> 01:48:49,570 That's what we're working on. 1296 01:49:03,470 --> 01:49:05,390 That person is incredibly bold. 1297 01:49:07,370 --> 01:49:08,930 But also very well aware. 1298 01:49:09,190 --> 01:49:11,330 Right. You know, I just hope, I mean. 1299 01:49:11,810 --> 01:49:15,230 No, I mean, the boldness of it is shocking, but I mean, it was obviously 1300 01:49:15,230 --> 01:49:22,090 motivated by what you did. This is going to, this is going to, that could raise 1301 01:49:22,090 --> 01:49:28,050 the profile of this whole political situation with whistleblowing to a whole 1302 01:49:28,050 --> 01:49:29,050 level. Exactly. 1303 01:49:29,350 --> 01:49:30,350 It's going to. 1304 01:49:30,490 --> 01:49:32,750 Yeah, I actually think that's a great thing. 1305 01:49:33,290 --> 01:49:37,930 And I think people are going to see what's being hidden again, again, by a 1306 01:49:37,930 --> 01:49:40,010 totally different part of the government. 1307 01:51:35,780 --> 01:51:36,780 Thank you. 117698

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