Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated:
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Coffee and a tie rise to the occasion A
million tiny
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flashlights, I gotta turn it off Coffee
and a tie rise
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to the occasion A million tiny
flashlights, I gotta turn it off
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Too much information I gotta turn it off
Oh, sleep for a
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while Too much conversation Too much
information I gotta turn
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it off
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Just about every time we use the
internet, a communication link, or an
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agree to some very long terms and
conditions.
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But what exactly are we agreeing to?
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You guys!
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You gotta help me. These business casual
G -men are trying to kidnap me. What?
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It's crazy, dude. They're saying it's
because I agreed to the latest terms and
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conditions on iTunes.
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Why? What did the terms and conditions
for the last update say?
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I don't know. I didn't read them.
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You didn't read them? Who the hell reads
that entire thing every time it pops
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up?
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I do.
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Can you tell, can Apple tell how many
people actually read it?
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Well, they have to say that they agree.
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We can't know for sure if they've read.
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We try to make it in plain English and
very short. If I were trying to make a
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user agreement uninviting, I would
choose a small font, a thin serif font,
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would set it in all caps.
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What happens then is that you have type
that becomes a texture rather than words
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and spaces.
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No one has read the terms and
conditions. No one in the world.
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No one, even the lawyers who wrote it,
wrote it like this.
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You come to a website and they have a
set of rules, usually described in a
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of services, and then they have a
privacy policy.
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And as soon as you start using the
service, in essence, you have agreed to
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terms of service and the privacy policy.
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Do these terms and conditions that we
sign up for even apply?
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They do. I think if they didn't apply, I
think the web would topple over. And so
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to the extent there have been contract
decisions, they've held that these terms
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and conditions are valid.
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And this concept is pretty new.
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For instance, you never had to sign a
user agreement for an old -fashioned
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landline, or to watch TV, or to read a
book.
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But if you use a smartphone, a Kindle,
or you watch Hulu, then you do.
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Pilot, baby, don't you sign anything
there. What's this all about?
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In fact,
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if you were to read everything you
agreed to, it would take one full month
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work out of every year.
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That's 180 hours you would need to spend
every year.
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And according to the Wall Street
Journal, consumers lose $250 billion
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due to what's hidden in fine print.
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Here's an example from LinkedIn's term.
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So, LinkedIn takes pretty much
everything forever.
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You'll find this kind of language in
Google, Pinterest, Facebook, pretty much
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anything that people consider free.
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Instagram is finding that pictures are
worth much more than a thousand angry
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words after the company updated its user
agreement to say it would have the
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right to sell posted photos without
compensation for use in advertising.
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And even if you are paying, companies
have the ability to make you accept just
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about whatever they please.
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In 2009, GameStation, a company in the
UK, put some pretty sneaky stuff in
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terms. They didn't take money or your
firstborn child.
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But for one day, their terms stated, by
placing an order via this website, you
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agree to grant us a non -transferable
option to claim, now and forevermore,
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immortal soul.
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The contract was only live for a day,
but Game Station happened to rake in the
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lives of 7 ,000 immortal souls.
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This was, of course, a joke. However, it
makes you wonder, what if there were
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more serious consequences that might
result from not reading terms and
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conditions? What if your phone came with
these long terms of conditions that
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said, well, if you use the phone, the
government can wiretap you. That would
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insane. But that's the kind of world
we're living in. A world where the
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government can wiretap you because of
terms and conditions?
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So if you look at the iPhone user
agreement, wiretapping isn't mentioned.
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But in AT &T's privacy policy, they say
that they can use data to investigate,
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prevent, or take action regarding
illegal activities.
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Prevent?
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In 1994, Pizza Hut became the first
major chain to accept a delivery online.
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Suddenly, the internet needed a way to
remember who you were, where you lived,
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and how you were going to pay.
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My question is, what the hell?
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Like, how do they know who you are?
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Yeah. Okay, um, there are these things
called cookies.
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Where, like, if you go to a site and buy
something, it'll remember you and then
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create ads for other stuff you might
want to buy.
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So it learns information about me?
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Seems like an invasion of privacy.
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It wasn't until the late 90s that
companies began voluntarily adding
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policies to explain what was happening
with this data.
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Then, in 2000, an online company called
ToySmart went bankrupt.
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But they had an idea.
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They tried to sell their database of 195
,000 users to another company.
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This included names, billing
information, shopping preferences, and
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profiles. Even though their privacy
policy said they would never share
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information, people felt like they were
being duped.
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Lawmakers tell you time and time again
that every time they go back to the
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district, to their district, people are
telling them that they want some
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internet privacy laws. They want some
protection.
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In early 2001, over a dozen bills were
introduced in Congress to protect
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online.
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These acts of mass murder were intended
to frighten our nation into chaos and
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retreat, but they have failed.
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All of the privacy legislation was
killed or abandoned, and the Patriot Act
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of course, initiated.
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The bill before me takes account of the
new realities and dangers posed by
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modern terrorists.
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This new law that I signed today will
allow surveillance of all communications
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used by terrorists, including emails,
the internet, and cell phones.
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The Patriot Act expanded the ability of
the federal government to do
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surveillance in a lot of little ways.
You don't need a judge's approval, for
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instance, to find out what website
someone visited, what search terms they
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into Google.
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The question of your...
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if you will, information being retained
by Google is not really at this point a
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Google decision. It's really a political
or public policy decision enforced by
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different governments in different ways.
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What if privacy policies weren't about
protecting privacy at all, but rather
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taking it away?
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Let's take a look at Google's privacy
policy around this time to see if any
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changes were made.
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So here's Google's privacy policy from
December of 2000.
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Google may also choose to use cookies to
store user preferences.
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A cookie can tell us this is the same
computer that visited Google two days
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but it cannot tell us this person is Joe
Smith or even this person lives in the
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United States.
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And here's the privacy policy from one
year later, in December of 2001.
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Google does this by storing user
preferences in cookies and by tracking
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trends and patterns of how people
search.
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00:11:07,180 --> 00:11:09,660
Google will not disclose cookies to
third parties.
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except as required by a valid legal
process, such as a search warrant,
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statute, or court order.
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00:11:16,580 --> 00:11:19,560
Now, it's important to note the
fundamental difference between these two
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policies. One says that you're totally
anonymous.
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The other says, when necessary, you're
not.
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00:11:26,660 --> 00:11:27,960
But here's what's strange.
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So the first screenshot you saw of
Google's oldest policy was taken by a
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-profit internet archival service.
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It records what websites used to look
like by taking snapshots, and it's been
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doing it since the 90s.
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00:11:39,340 --> 00:11:43,300
Now, Google also lists the history of
its privacy policies on its own official
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archive page.
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In their archives, they state they've
got every privacy policy that goes back
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the beginning.
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00:11:49,080 --> 00:11:52,980
But what Google shows as their original
privacy policy doesn't match that of the
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archive service.
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Instead, they show the policy from
December of 2001, the one that says that
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users are not anonymous.
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Google claims this is their first
privacy policy, which it isn't. So why
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Google not include its original privacy
policy on its own archives page?
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the one that said you would remain
anonymous.
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What if the data collection that the
Patriot Act required became the
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of a whole new business model and the
foundation of the modern Internet as we
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know it?
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Would that be something worth covering
up?
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Even though we don't write checks to
Google, and that's one of the reasons we
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kind of like the company, it doesn't
mean that Google is really free or that
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are free in the liberty sense when we
use it.
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It might feel very different if Google
was effectively a $500 a year service
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because that's the value of the data
that you're providing.
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I mean, that was a really critical
finding in that advertising could be
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based on information that people were
somehow supplying about themselves.
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Suddenly, you didn't have to wonder, was
somebody watching my commercial?
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You knew someone clicked on my ad. That
meant that they...
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paid attention to it. In 2012, Google
was one of the most valuable stocks in
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world. And Mark Zuckerberg, the founder
of Facebook, had become one of the
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richest men in America.
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My job is to help investors figure out
for themselves what this thing's worth.
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look at what Facebook has as an asset,
which is 900 million people and a ton of
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data on those people.
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And I say, if they use 10 % of that
data, they're going to be the most
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company ever. When personal data is
worth this much.
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Why would Google or any free Internet
service be opposed to the data retention
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that the Patriot Act required?
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Anonymity wasn't profitable.
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The people who are willing to give up a
little bit of information in exchange
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for having access to something that's
free or something that's fun or a free
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taco.
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I don't think that ever changes, right?
You always want something free.
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And plenty of people are willing to
provide information to get that.
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And plenty of companies picked up on
this fact.
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Let me give you some very practical
tips.
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First of all, I want everybody here to
be careful about what you post on
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Facebook.
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What the default settings are on
Facebook. This is how most people use
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technology. When these companies are
building these systems, they know that.
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So why is it default for everything
staring, every photo?
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When I start Facebook, why isn't it just
for my friends?
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Why is the default for everybody?
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Because it's really confusing for my mom
to figure out how to just share to her
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friends. The way we've designed the site
is that it's a community thing.
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So people want to share with just their
friends, but a lot of people also want
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to share with the community around them.
So I want to share with everyone who
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works with me at Facebook. I want to
share with everyone who went to my
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everyone in the village around me.
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And those people aren't just my friends.
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Even Mark's explanation doesn't make any
sense.
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He says he wants to share with the
school, with the quaint village next to
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He doesn't say he wants to share with
the entire world.
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And yet, that's the default.
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The challenge with defaults is that you
get comfortable with whatever the
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default is.
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When the default is public, you actually
can adapt really beautifully and deal
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with it. When the default is private,
you can adapt comfortably and deal with
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it. When the defaults change, that's
when problems emerge.
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And in fact, that's what Facebook did.
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In 2009, Facebook made changes to their
privacy policy without telling anyone.
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Doing a privacy change for 350 million
users is really not the type of thing
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that a lot of companies would do.
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We decided that these would be the
social norms now, and we just went for
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You might remember the fan page with
over a million people who tried to get
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policy reversed.
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What was the big deal, you might ask?
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Well, over the course of a night,
Facebook turned what was once private
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information into totally public
information.
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These platforms have an incentive to
keep as much information about you and
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it as visible as possible.
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It's almost the question then becomes,
what's the less forgivable sin?
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Having this crazy one -night stand?
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or not knowing how to use Facebook
properly.
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Most relationships in your life, it's
very good that the other person doesn't
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know everything you've ever said or
scribbled or thought.
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When you share a photo album you go to
Facebook and you choose to put those
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photos there Opt -in on every single
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thing opt -in Opt -in opt -in
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I'm okay with Facebook behaving like a
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company
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But I think we need to treat it like a
company and not treat it like some
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public utility.
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These are the default settings on
Facebook in 2005, divided into 12
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As time passes, more and more
information is shared by default.
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In 2009, Facebook began automatically
sharing personal information with the
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entire Internet.
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By 2010, everything was shared by
default, except for your contact info
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birthday. We could, if you did a search
and a Gmail and a YouTube and so forth
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00:17:59,050 --> 00:18:03,470
yesterday, and you did it from your
home, I'll give you the worst case. You
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it from your home, and you only have one
computer in your home.
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In theory, we could cross -correlate
those and get all three together.
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00:18:10,710 --> 00:18:12,930
We don't do that, and we're not likely
to do that.
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00:18:13,210 --> 00:18:18,150
But in January of 2012, Google made
changes to their privacy policy, and
236
00:18:18,150 --> 00:18:19,150
did just that.
237
00:18:19,410 --> 00:18:23,430
Google combined all of the information
any of their services had collected
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00:18:23,430 --> 00:18:24,109
a person.
239
00:18:24,110 --> 00:18:26,550
and put them into one single profile.
240
00:18:27,050 --> 00:18:30,950
What Eric Schmidt had said was the worst
-case scenario, Google had actually
241
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done.
242
00:18:39,150 --> 00:18:44,850
How can you honestly sit here and tell
this committee this is not a growing
243
00:18:44,850 --> 00:18:45,850
problem?
244
00:18:46,280 --> 00:18:49,760
A good deal of what I was trying to say
is that I don't think there is evidence
245
00:18:49,760 --> 00:18:54,940
of a market failure or consumer harm
from the legal and legitimate use of
246
00:18:54,940 --> 00:18:59,500
personal information in commerce.
247
00:18:59,720 --> 00:19:04,060
I don't think there's evidence of it.
There are companies that you've never
248
00:19:04,060 --> 00:19:08,480
heard of, like Actium, that claim to
have about 1 ,500 points of data on the
249
00:19:08,480 --> 00:19:09,480
average American citizen.
250
00:19:10,140 --> 00:19:13,480
Everything from, you know, whether
you're right -handed or left -handed,
251
00:19:13,480 --> 00:19:18,060
kind of dog you have, what your sort of
psychological outlook is, and all of
252
00:19:18,060 --> 00:19:22,600
that can be used to inform decisions
that businesses make about us as well.
253
00:19:22,820 --> 00:19:27,060
These are the types of companies that a
potential employer would go to to try
254
00:19:27,060 --> 00:19:29,460
and run a background check on somebody
before they hired them.
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00:19:30,010 --> 00:19:35,190
They're able to connect the fact that
you went to site A and then later to
256
00:19:35,190 --> 00:19:39,770
B and then eventually to site C and
create this detailed history of what
257
00:19:39,770 --> 00:19:40,770
you visit online.
258
00:19:40,930 --> 00:19:44,690
They don't put your name in the cookie.
They put a unique serial number in the
259
00:19:44,690 --> 00:19:47,590
cookie that could then be linked to your
name in their database.
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00:19:48,030 --> 00:19:53,190
I don't know if you've ever seen the
picture of the ad network ecosystem that
261
00:19:53,190 --> 00:19:58,290
shows all the parties in the ad network
ecosystem. It's a bit overwhelming.
262
00:19:58,970 --> 00:20:01,590
The information is valuable to different
people for different reasons.
263
00:20:02,130 --> 00:20:03,990
What if you buy a lot of alcohol?
264
00:20:04,670 --> 00:20:07,710
You know, they might want to raise your
premiums because they think you're at
265
00:20:07,710 --> 00:20:13,270
risk for alcoholism or something like
that. The company might use it in a way
266
00:20:13,270 --> 00:20:14,710
that actually harms you.
267
00:20:14,970 --> 00:20:19,210
For example, in 2008, thousands of
people suddenly had their credit limits
268
00:20:19,210 --> 00:20:20,810
reduced, seemingly for no reason.
269
00:20:21,390 --> 00:20:24,970
While on vacation, one wealthy business
owner from Atlanta thought his limit
270
00:20:24,970 --> 00:20:26,330
plummeted from 10 ,800.
271
00:20:27,000 --> 00:20:29,300
to just $3 ,800, ruining his vacation.
272
00:20:29,640 --> 00:20:31,160
The letter he received said this.
273
00:20:31,600 --> 00:20:34,820
Other customers who've used their card
at establishments where you recently
274
00:20:34,820 --> 00:20:37,440
shopped have a poor repayment history
for the American Express.
275
00:20:38,380 --> 00:20:39,900
This means companies like Walmart.
276
00:20:40,620 --> 00:20:45,060
And in Minneapolis, a father came into a
Target outraged that they were sending
277
00:20:45,060 --> 00:20:46,780
a teenage daughter pregnancy coupon.
278
00:20:47,360 --> 00:20:49,040
Coupons that were addressed to her.
279
00:20:49,420 --> 00:20:52,500
The man thought the Target was trying to
encourage his daughter to get pregnant.
280
00:20:52,960 --> 00:20:57,450
As it turned out, thanks to her shopping
habits, Target knew that this high
281
00:20:57,450 --> 00:20:59,690
schooler was pregnant before her own
father did.
282
00:21:00,190 --> 00:21:01,570
The father later apologized.
283
00:21:03,270 --> 00:21:06,790
And in the Netherlands, data was being
used to harm customers in a whole new
284
00:21:06,790 --> 00:21:11,510
way. Now, while you're driving and using
a GPS, that GPS is sending back signals
285
00:21:11,510 --> 00:21:12,630
to tell how fast you're moving.
286
00:21:13,270 --> 00:21:17,030
It's really useful for helping us avoid
traffic, but that got a little company
287
00:21:17,030 --> 00:21:20,310
called TomTom wondering who else might
be interested in knowing the speed of
288
00:21:20,310 --> 00:21:24,250
traffic. And so in the Netherlands, the
data that people were willingly trading
289
00:21:24,250 --> 00:21:27,550
to find a faster way home was being sold
to the authority to give those same
290
00:21:27,550 --> 00:21:28,550
drivers tickets.
291
00:21:36,210 --> 00:21:41,690
The reason we don't have any baseline
consumer privacy law because of the FBI?
292
00:21:41,770 --> 00:21:46,970
No. That is largely due to lobbying by
companies that have built extremely
293
00:21:46,970 --> 00:21:49,810
lucrative businesses around these
business activities.
294
00:21:50,840 --> 00:21:52,580
Don't want to do anything to disrupt
that.
295
00:21:53,820 --> 00:21:58,940
Under Facebook's terms and conditions, a
user must be 13 or older.
296
00:21:59,560 --> 00:22:04,920
Despite this, according to a recent
Consumer Reports study, an estimated 7
297
00:22:04,920 --> 00:22:07,100
million users were younger than 13.
298
00:22:07,980 --> 00:22:12,080
First of all, we don't allow people to
have accounts under the age of 13.
299
00:22:12,340 --> 00:22:16,240
And my reaction to that is that's just
absolutely indefensible. I mean, it's
300
00:22:16,240 --> 00:22:17,600
unbelievable that you would say that.
301
00:22:18,120 --> 00:22:21,920
Senator, I just want to say we really
emphatically agree with your points.
302
00:22:21,920 --> 00:22:26,060
say that Facebook sent an army of
lawyers with the final privacy
303
00:22:26,060 --> 00:22:31,200
that emerged in 2011 was watered down
significantly in a way that wouldn't
304
00:22:31,200 --> 00:22:32,800
affect Facebook's business model.
305
00:22:33,080 --> 00:22:37,320
My name is Alan Davidson, and I am the
Director of Public Policy for Google in
306
00:22:37,320 --> 00:22:38,320
North and South America.
307
00:22:38,520 --> 00:22:40,020
My message today is simple.
308
00:22:40,300 --> 00:22:44,540
As we've heard, mobile services create
enormous social and economic benefits.
309
00:22:48,040 --> 00:22:49,700
Protection is the enemy of innovation.
310
00:22:50,380 --> 00:22:53,360
It absolutely doesn't have to be and
isn't.
311
00:22:53,680 --> 00:22:56,540
It was an expensive year of lobbying for
these big companies.
312
00:22:56,780 --> 00:23:00,780
Google spent five times as much as the
year before, and Facebook spent four
313
00:23:00,780 --> 00:23:01,780
times as much.
314
00:23:01,980 --> 00:23:06,720
Senate Bill 242 will protect users of
social networking Internet sites.
315
00:23:07,120 --> 00:23:12,360
It will protect these users from
identity theft and from unwanted
316
00:23:12,700 --> 00:23:15,180
keeping their private information
private.
317
00:23:15,800 --> 00:23:19,900
Of course, unless they agree to share
it. I know that many members, including
318
00:23:19,900 --> 00:23:25,460
myself, do not want to negatively impact
a very important industry for the state
319
00:23:25,460 --> 00:23:26,460
of California.
320
00:23:26,520 --> 00:23:30,940
Individuals involved in this industry
don't want to see any regulation
321
00:23:30,940 --> 00:23:33,980
whatsoever. So I think that's really
key.
322
00:23:34,600 --> 00:23:38,400
And one of the most interesting things I
found in these conversations is that
323
00:23:38,400 --> 00:23:42,380
many members of the legislature don't
even have network.
324
00:23:43,420 --> 00:23:46,640
Social network sites because they're
concerned about their privacy.
325
00:23:46,880 --> 00:23:51,260
And at the time the bill was being
heard, although lobbyists were in the
326
00:23:51,260 --> 00:23:55,420
committee room for the entire hearing,
they did not come forward to speak.
327
00:23:55,960 --> 00:24:00,560
So it was sort of an interesting
process, sort of a self -killing of the
328
00:24:00,560 --> 00:24:04,720
without the opportunity for the public
to really see who was in opposition.
329
00:24:05,240 --> 00:24:09,780
So people like Google and Facebook were
in strong opposition, Facebook in
330
00:24:09,780 --> 00:24:10,780
particular.
331
00:24:11,240 --> 00:24:12,580
What did Facebook have to lose?
332
00:24:13,840 --> 00:24:20,680
You know, I really do not understand
their logic, and you'd have to ask
333
00:24:20,680 --> 00:24:25,700
them about that. But when I analyze an
issue like this... I'd love to ask them
334
00:24:25,700 --> 00:24:26,840
about that. They won't talk to me.
335
00:24:27,780 --> 00:24:28,780
I'm not surprised.
336
00:24:30,100 --> 00:24:36,500
I don't think the rules of law and
regulation necessarily apply when it
337
00:24:36,500 --> 00:24:40,440
interacting with a company that wants to
sell you something.
338
00:24:41,160 --> 00:24:43,410
Yeah. We should be worried.
339
00:24:44,990 --> 00:24:46,790
But worried about what?
340
00:24:47,710 --> 00:24:51,910
Sure, the data collection allowed by
privacy policies had fueled commerce.
341
00:24:51,910 --> 00:24:54,030
was there something more serious we were
agreeing to?
342
00:25:05,050 --> 00:25:07,750
Total Information Awareness.
343
00:25:08,010 --> 00:25:11,530
A program initiated by the government in
January of 2002.
344
00:25:12,520 --> 00:25:16,280
Its mission? To collect every digital
transmission imaginable.
345
00:25:16,900 --> 00:25:21,620
And yes, this was their real symbol, the
Eye of the Pyramid, scanning the Earth
346
00:25:21,620 --> 00:25:22,620
with a laser beam.
347
00:25:23,160 --> 00:25:26,340
It actually looks oddly similar to
what's inside of Mark Zuckerberg's
348
00:25:26,640 --> 00:25:28,140
Making the world more open and
connected.
349
00:25:28,460 --> 00:25:30,040
Oh my God, it's like a secret vault.
350
00:25:31,260 --> 00:25:36,020
Total Information Awareness was a
program designed to connect with dots,
351
00:25:36,020 --> 00:25:39,520
banking activities, to flight searches,
to...
352
00:25:39,870 --> 00:25:41,310
to online activities.
353
00:25:41,730 --> 00:25:47,350
But the Pentagon is clearly moving to
create the largest electronic eye ever
354
00:25:47,350 --> 00:25:49,570
look at any and all Americans.
355
00:25:49,990 --> 00:25:54,750
You're looking for trends and
transactions that are associated with
356
00:25:54,750 --> 00:25:56,190
potential terrorist act.
357
00:25:56,830 --> 00:26:01,810
They believe that with enough data that
they could predict who would be engaging
358
00:26:01,810 --> 00:26:03,350
in nefarious crimes.
359
00:26:03,650 --> 00:26:07,930
The public was outraged. Congress was
outraged. The program was shut down.
360
00:26:08,430 --> 00:26:13,070
The lesson that the government learned
after the failure of total information
361
00:26:13,070 --> 00:26:18,350
awareness was that if you're going to
create a gigantic spying program, don't
362
00:26:18,350 --> 00:26:19,350
give it a creepy name.
363
00:26:19,510 --> 00:26:24,070
There's nothing to prevent them from
developing the same capabilities, just
364
00:26:24,070 --> 00:26:25,510
smarter ways from their standpoint.
365
00:26:31,550 --> 00:26:33,850
A wiretap requires a court order.
366
00:26:35,150 --> 00:26:37,090
Nothing has changed, by the way.
367
00:26:37,740 --> 00:26:40,080
But in reality, lots had changed.
368
00:26:40,480 --> 00:26:46,980
We were told one day in late 2002 that
an NSA representative was coming to the
369
00:26:46,980 --> 00:26:50,760
office. Mark Klein came to us at the
Electronic Frontier Foundation.
370
00:26:51,600 --> 00:26:58,260
with data and documents that showed that
AT &T was engaged in a
371
00:26:58,260 --> 00:26:59,320
wiretapping program.
372
00:26:59,540 --> 00:27:04,540
The NSA is much different from the CIA.
First of all, it's about three times the
373
00:27:04,540 --> 00:27:10,620
size. It costs far more. It's
tremendously more secret than the...
374
00:27:11,140 --> 00:27:17,660
CIA, and what it does is very different.
It's focused on eavesdropping, on
375
00:27:17,660 --> 00:27:22,120
tapping into major communications links.
They actually had a secret room in
376
00:27:22,120 --> 00:27:26,460
their facilities, and they were creating
a copy of Internet traffic and sending
377
00:27:26,460 --> 00:27:27,460
it to the NSA.
378
00:27:27,700 --> 00:27:31,520
So in a sense, they are vacuuming up,
scooping up everything. In a sense, they
379
00:27:31,520 --> 00:27:35,540
are blindly vacuuming up everything
going across those links.
380
00:27:35,780 --> 00:27:36,940
And you're certain of that?
381
00:27:37,160 --> 00:27:39,500
I'm certain of that. So President Bush
owned up to it.
382
00:27:40,810 --> 00:27:46,270
I authorized the National Security
Agency to intercept the international
383
00:27:46,270 --> 00:27:52,230
communications of people with known
links to al -Qaeda and related terrorist
384
00:27:52,230 --> 00:27:53,230
organizations.
385
00:27:53,790 --> 00:27:57,670
It's taken less than 24 hours after the
Bush presidency ended for former
386
00:27:57,670 --> 00:28:00,690
analysts at the National Security Agency
to come forward to reveal new
387
00:28:00,690 --> 00:28:04,050
allegations about how this nation was
spied on by its own government.
388
00:28:04,270 --> 00:28:08,610
The National Security Agency had access
to all Americans' communications, faxes,
389
00:28:08,790 --> 00:28:09,790
phone calls.
390
00:28:10,620 --> 00:28:16,120
And their computer communications. Is
there a recording somewhere of every
391
00:28:16,120 --> 00:28:20,160
conversation I had with my little nephew
in upstate New York? Is it like that?
392
00:28:20,240 --> 00:28:21,680
It would be everything, yes.
393
00:28:23,360 --> 00:28:24,480
It would be everything.
394
00:28:25,780 --> 00:28:28,520
But then a beacon of hope arrived in the
White House.
395
00:28:29,000 --> 00:28:32,780
Hi, Senator Obama. I appreciate your
giving us the opportunity to ask you
396
00:28:32,780 --> 00:28:33,780
questions.
397
00:28:33,880 --> 00:28:36,880
I'm an attorney who represents federal
whistleblowers.
398
00:28:37,530 --> 00:28:43,010
And I was very disappointed when I
learned that you supported the bill that
399
00:28:43,010 --> 00:28:47,950
phone companies off the hook when
they've helped the federal government
400
00:28:47,950 --> 00:28:53,910
without warrant wiretap phones.
401
00:28:55,110 --> 00:28:58,930
I recognize that some people feel like,
yeah, well, the phone companies still
402
00:28:58,930 --> 00:29:02,950
were complicit in this. They should be
held accountable still. I understand
403
00:29:02,950 --> 00:29:06,660
argument. But the problem was the
surveillance program is actually one
404
00:29:06,660 --> 00:29:08,560
believe is necessary for our national
security.
405
00:29:09,380 --> 00:29:12,880
So they were immune, but that means that
the programs are still shut down,
406
00:29:13,020 --> 00:29:14,020
right?
407
00:29:14,340 --> 00:29:16,300
The programs are shut down?
408
00:29:16,620 --> 00:29:17,900
Yeah, the wiretapping programs.
409
00:29:18,200 --> 00:29:21,880
I have no reason to believe that the
wiretapping programs have been shut
410
00:29:21,980 --> 00:29:27,260
No, if the wiretapping programs had been
shut down, then I don't believe that
411
00:29:27,260 --> 00:29:32,320
the government and AT &T would still be
fighting in court for the legality of
412
00:29:32,320 --> 00:29:33,320
it.
413
00:29:34,510 --> 00:29:38,990
Barack Obama hasn't changed anything.
No, Barack Obama did not shut those
414
00:29:38,990 --> 00:29:43,750
programs down after he took office, even
though he had threatened to before he
415
00:29:43,750 --> 00:29:44,750
became president.
416
00:29:50,790 --> 00:29:56,950
When we got started just in my dorm room
at Harvard, the question that a lot of
417
00:29:56,950 --> 00:30:00,430
people asked was, why would I want to
put any information on the Internet at
418
00:30:00,430 --> 00:30:01,830
all? Why would I want to have a website?
419
00:30:02,510 --> 00:30:05,930
And people have really gotten
comfortable not only sharing more
420
00:30:05,930 --> 00:30:09,650
different kinds, but more openly and
with more people. And that social norm
421
00:30:09,650 --> 00:30:10,990
just something that's evolved over time.
422
00:30:11,250 --> 00:30:17,470
You may have seen the onion take on
Facebook, which was the CIA has just
423
00:30:17,470 --> 00:30:21,030
announced its most recent handy
invention, Facebook.
424
00:30:21,890 --> 00:30:25,270
According to Department of Homeland
Security reports, Facebook has replaced
425
00:30:25,270 --> 00:30:29,110
almost every other CIA information
gathering program since it was launched
426
00:30:29,110 --> 00:30:30,110
2004.
427
00:30:30,540 --> 00:30:35,060
After years of secretly monitoring the
public, we were astounded. So many
428
00:30:35,060 --> 00:30:38,640
would willingly publicize where they
lived, their religious and political
429
00:30:38,940 --> 00:30:43,680
an alphabetized list of all their
friends, personal email addresses, phone
430
00:30:43,680 --> 00:30:48,420
numbers, hundreds of photos of
themselves, and even status updates
431
00:30:48,420 --> 00:30:51,860
they were doing moment to moment. It is
truly a dream come true for the CIA.
432
00:30:52,500 --> 00:30:57,560
You know, the FBI's and the NSA's of the
world are appreciative of the fact that
433
00:30:57,560 --> 00:31:01,860
Google and Facebook have built business
models around collecting user data
434
00:31:01,860 --> 00:31:03,580
because it makes their jobs much easier.
435
00:31:03,900 --> 00:31:06,440
That article in Time started with this
anecdote.
436
00:31:06,960 --> 00:31:11,520
They're sitting in their transparent
cubicle in their open space in Facebook.
437
00:31:11,780 --> 00:31:17,440
Robert Mueller was the one man in the
room with a tie on, and he was older, in
438
00:31:17,440 --> 00:31:20,820
suit. And he comes in and he says, I was
just in the building and I wanted to
439
00:31:20,820 --> 00:31:25,760
say hello to Mark Zuckerberg. So he says
hello to Mark Zuckerberg, a little chit
440
00:31:25,760 --> 00:31:27,640
-chat, and then he leaves. And
everybody's saying...
441
00:31:27,980 --> 00:31:28,980
What the hell was that?
442
00:31:29,220 --> 00:31:34,660
Now, nobody asks the question, why was
Mueller in the building?
443
00:31:35,720 --> 00:31:36,880
He's the head of the FBI.
444
00:31:38,940 --> 00:31:43,960
On the one hand, Mark Zuckerberg said he
wants to create a more open society,
445
00:31:44,200 --> 00:31:46,380
and Facebook is a way to do that.
446
00:31:46,900 --> 00:31:51,380
On the other hand, you know, there's a
lot about the way that Facebook uses
447
00:31:51,380 --> 00:31:53,280
information that people don't know.
448
00:31:53,980 --> 00:31:57,060
If only there was a way of knowing how
much information these companies were
449
00:31:57,060 --> 00:31:58,060
storing about us.
450
00:31:58,480 --> 00:32:02,440
Well, in the case of Facebook, we
learned some pretty interesting things
451
00:32:02,440 --> 00:32:03,660
to one student in Austria.
452
00:32:04,060 --> 00:32:07,980
And unlike the U .S., Europe has a law
that requires a company to tell a
453
00:32:07,980 --> 00:32:11,100
customer what data they have stored on
them if that customer wants to know.
454
00:32:11,500 --> 00:32:15,100
And Facebook, unlike most major Internet
companies, had actually built a
455
00:32:15,100 --> 00:32:16,100
headquarters in Europe.
456
00:32:17,160 --> 00:32:20,550
Apparently we were like the only three
people that were like... pushing hard
457
00:32:20,550 --> 00:32:24,290
enough and like asking again and again
and again and going through also the
458
00:32:24,290 --> 00:32:29,170
Irish authority to finally where you get
at least like a bigger part of our data
459
00:32:29,170 --> 00:32:30,810
set. We still didn't get everything
right now.
460
00:32:31,390 --> 00:32:34,670
Got it right there. Just to have like an
idea how much it actually is.
461
00:32:35,950 --> 00:32:39,490
That's like just to picture it and to
see how much it is.
462
00:32:40,350 --> 00:32:41,770
Wow, this is more than a baby.
463
00:32:42,110 --> 00:32:45,030
Yeah, that's 1 ,222 pages.
464
00:32:45,610 --> 00:32:49,770
I'm a member of Facebook for three
years, but I was using it more intense
465
00:32:49,810 --> 00:32:52,870
like, the last one and a half years or
so. What's interesting as well is that I
466
00:32:52,870 --> 00:32:55,830
didn't post too much, actually. Like,
I'm a person who posts something, like,
467
00:32:55,870 --> 00:32:56,870
once a week or so.
468
00:32:56,970 --> 00:33:00,710
With this giant ream of information in
front of me, is it hard to go through it
469
00:33:00,710 --> 00:33:03,150
and actually find specific details about
a person?
470
00:33:03,390 --> 00:33:07,330
No, that's super easy because it's PDF.
I mean, we just used the search function
471
00:33:07,330 --> 00:33:08,330
in the PDF file.
472
00:33:08,410 --> 00:33:12,570
So you just type in one word, let's say
demonstration or sex or political party
473
00:33:12,570 --> 00:33:15,190
or something, and within a second you
find the right information.
474
00:33:15,410 --> 00:33:19,770
So within a couple of minutes you can
figure out what people voted for, what,
475
00:33:19,770 --> 00:33:23,070
don't know, psychological problems they
have, what parties they've been to.
476
00:33:24,010 --> 00:33:27,730
All these information are really easy to
find, actually. While using that
477
00:33:27,730 --> 00:33:31,210
service for such a short time, you still
had a data file that's bigger than
478
00:33:31,210 --> 00:33:36,150
anything that any CIA, FBI, or, I don't
know, Stasi ever had about an average
479
00:33:36,150 --> 00:33:39,640
person. If you hit the remove button, it
just means that it's flagged as
480
00:33:39,640 --> 00:33:42,600
deleted. So you hide it actually from
yourself.
481
00:33:42,920 --> 00:33:47,380
But anyone like Facebook or any
government agency that wants to look at
482
00:33:47,380 --> 00:33:49,200
can still retrieve it and get it back.
483
00:33:49,780 --> 00:33:52,780
And that means that it's there for an
indefinite time.
484
00:33:53,540 --> 00:33:56,400
Even though you hit the delete button,
it asks you three times if you really,
485
00:33:56,460 --> 00:33:57,460
really want to delete it.
486
00:33:58,500 --> 00:33:59,560
It's not actually gone.
487
00:33:59,780 --> 00:34:01,240
It's not actually gone. It's still
there.
488
00:34:09,230 --> 00:34:12,230
So we've ultimately adopted roughly the
following rule.
489
00:34:12,690 --> 00:34:17,130
Think of it as we anonymize the
information within 18 months.
490
00:34:17,590 --> 00:34:22,010
It might be anonymized after 18 months,
but all the searches that we've ever
491
00:34:22,010 --> 00:34:26,270
done are still there. The underlying
data is still there to be de -anonymized
492
00:34:26,270 --> 00:34:27,270
some point.
493
00:34:27,409 --> 00:34:30,909
And de -anonymizing search records turns
out to be shockingly easy.
494
00:34:31,190 --> 00:34:34,710
That is, taking private searches and
finding out whose records they are.
495
00:34:35,360 --> 00:34:38,880
In 2006, AOL turned over a bunch of
these anonymized search records of their
496
00:34:38,880 --> 00:34:42,960
users to the public, and it only took a
few short hours for a reporter to decode
497
00:34:42,960 --> 00:34:45,920
who user number 4417749 was.
498
00:34:46,280 --> 00:34:50,380
Between searches for things like numb
fingers, 60 single men, and dog that
499
00:34:50,380 --> 00:34:53,719
urinates on everything, the reporter
uncovered a woman named Thelma Arnold.
500
00:34:53,920 --> 00:34:55,020
She was age 62.
501
00:34:55,860 --> 00:35:01,540
But then there's user 17556639, who
looked up how to kill your wife multiple
502
00:35:01,540 --> 00:35:05,890
times. along with decapitated photos,
and then in the middle, the user
503
00:35:05,890 --> 00:35:06,990
looks up steak and cheese.
504
00:35:07,950 --> 00:35:08,950
Steak and cheese.
505
00:35:09,610 --> 00:35:12,690
And there were plenty of users online
who were quick to judge what was going
506
00:35:12,690 --> 00:35:14,670
here. It was murder.
507
00:35:21,710 --> 00:35:23,530
Hey, old friend.
508
00:35:24,610 --> 00:35:26,490
Let's take a seat, and I'm going to show
you something.
509
00:35:26,810 --> 00:35:29,990
What I'm showing you here...
510
00:35:30,300 --> 00:35:32,900
is a list of anonymized search records.
511
00:35:34,320 --> 00:35:36,540
These records were released by AOL.
512
00:35:37,220 --> 00:35:41,680
Are there actually things on this list
that you know you've searched for
513
00:35:42,900 --> 00:35:47,680
Sure, yeah. I have definitely looked up
car crash photos. I've definitely typed
514
00:35:47,680 --> 00:35:48,638
in decapitated.
515
00:35:48,640 --> 00:35:50,780
I've definitely looked up dead people
photos.
516
00:35:52,900 --> 00:35:56,020
I've definitely looked up white killer,
yeah. In fact, I've looked up every
517
00:35:56,020 --> 00:35:57,280
single search term I'm looking at here.
518
00:35:58,060 --> 00:36:02,540
You see, Jerome had been a writer on
Cold Kick, a TV show where each week
519
00:36:02,540 --> 00:36:03,640
have to solve a murder mystery.
520
00:36:04,720 --> 00:36:08,020
That's always what scared me when I was
entering those search terms, was if
521
00:36:08,020 --> 00:36:11,300
there's some sort of automated system
that just red flags you based on the
522
00:36:11,300 --> 00:36:14,220
search term, they're not going to look
and say, oh, yeah, he was probably
523
00:36:14,220 --> 00:36:18,300
working on a TV show, and that's why he
was just Googling how to murder my
524
00:36:18,300 --> 00:36:19,300
cheating wife.
525
00:36:19,500 --> 00:36:23,840
I just wanted to confirm that I had not
murdered you and that you were alive.
526
00:36:24,160 --> 00:36:26,320
No, I am allowed to come out of this
room.
527
00:36:26,920 --> 00:36:27,920
Okay,
528
00:36:29,740 --> 00:36:30,740
good.
529
00:36:31,140 --> 00:36:35,860
Oh, thank God. So we can rest assured
you are not a murderer.
530
00:36:36,160 --> 00:36:38,180
I am not a murderer.
531
00:36:38,560 --> 00:36:40,220
You're a writer. I'm a writer.
532
00:36:41,440 --> 00:36:42,440
Okay.
533
00:36:42,780 --> 00:36:44,880
Glad we can clear that up. Glad we could
clear that up.
534
00:36:45,580 --> 00:36:48,880
So what would happen if that red flag
system did exist?
535
00:36:49,640 --> 00:36:53,380
If a dad like Jerome might someday have
his door knocked on because his search
536
00:36:53,380 --> 00:36:54,380
records became public?
537
00:37:01,870 --> 00:37:05,790
The consensus seems to be that the
retention of this kind of information
538
00:37:05,790 --> 00:37:07,110
be greater than zero days.
539
00:37:07,690 --> 00:37:12,570
And the reason it has to do with police
action, terrorists, Patriot Act, all
540
00:37:12,570 --> 00:37:13,570
those sorts of things.
541
00:37:13,750 --> 00:37:17,550
It turns out that in this environment,
the digital environment, there's a
542
00:37:17,550 --> 00:37:21,530
loophole to the Fourth Amendment, which
is if a third party collects a lot of
543
00:37:21,530 --> 00:37:24,950
this information, the government doesn't
have to go through those same hoops.
544
00:37:25,030 --> 00:37:26,470
It's called the third party doctrine.
545
00:37:27,210 --> 00:37:30,230
The third party doctrine means that when
you...
546
00:37:30,640 --> 00:37:35,120
If consumers share your data with a
bank, with an email provider, with a
547
00:37:35,120 --> 00:37:41,820
engine, with any kind of technology
company, you have basically given up
548
00:37:41,820 --> 00:37:45,940
what would have been your fourth -rate
protections over that data. For the
549
00:37:45,940 --> 00:37:49,600
government to get information from a
Google or a Facebook is a lot easier
550
00:37:49,600 --> 00:37:52,940
the government doing it itself and
putting a wiretap on our phones.
551
00:37:53,160 --> 00:37:57,560
Large companies like Google and Facebook
receive thousands of requests a year.
552
00:37:58,170 --> 00:37:59,190
from government agencies.
553
00:37:59,410 --> 00:38:02,110
Facebook has 25 employees doing nothing
but surveillance.
554
00:38:02,410 --> 00:38:05,430
And these companies routinely receive
requests.
555
00:38:05,790 --> 00:38:06,990
They process the requests.
556
00:38:07,370 --> 00:38:10,990
You may be surprised to hear that secret
searches of email by the government
557
00:38:10,990 --> 00:38:12,190
seem to be commonplace.
558
00:38:12,490 --> 00:38:18,650
A law that governs when the government
can get electronic communications,
559
00:38:18,750 --> 00:38:23,670
like emails and things that are stored
remotely, was written in 1986.
560
00:38:24,650 --> 00:38:28,850
It can have effects that allow the
government to at least claim that they
561
00:38:28,850 --> 00:38:33,190
be able to get location data without a
warrant. Or at one point the government
562
00:38:33,190 --> 00:38:37,230
was claiming that it doesn't need a
warrant to get emails that you've
563
00:38:44,350 --> 00:38:49,430
Well, in the spring of 2011, the
Department of Justice, and in particular
564
00:38:49,430 --> 00:38:51,730
FBI, made several requests.
565
00:38:52,170 --> 00:38:55,870
to Internet companies as part of an
investigation relating to individuals
566
00:38:55,870 --> 00:38:57,130
associated with WikiLeaks.
567
00:38:57,490 --> 00:39:02,270
We released 400 ,000 classified
documents.
568
00:39:02,530 --> 00:39:05,990
For those of you who don't know who
Julian Assange is, he started WikiLeaks.
569
00:39:06,690 --> 00:39:10,190
Now, in the past, WikiLeaks has released
secret documents related to the Iraq
570
00:39:10,190 --> 00:39:12,510
War, Guantanamo Bay, and Afghanistan.
571
00:39:13,930 --> 00:39:19,390
And that's, you know, obviously a
positive development for those of us who
572
00:39:19,390 --> 00:39:20,390
that information...
573
00:39:21,050 --> 00:39:24,970
should be more accessible almost no
matter what, and obviously is a
574
00:39:24,970 --> 00:39:30,170
development to those institutions like
corporations, in many cases, that depend
575
00:39:30,170 --> 00:39:31,170
on secrecy.
576
00:39:31,350 --> 00:39:36,110
I condemn the action that WikiLeaks has
taken. It puts at risk...
577
00:39:36,560 --> 00:39:37,740
our national security.
578
00:39:38,060 --> 00:39:42,460
Twitter received an order that requested
data regarding certain Twitter users.
579
00:39:42,640 --> 00:39:47,680
These were all users that were related
to the whistleblower website WikiLeaks.
580
00:39:48,060 --> 00:39:52,000
However, it wasn't just an order. It was
actually a de -order, and it came with
581
00:39:52,000 --> 00:39:56,800
a gag order. It required that Twitter
never speak publicly about the fact that
582
00:39:56,800 --> 00:39:57,820
they had received this request.
583
00:39:58,530 --> 00:40:02,750
Denouncing the move, Assange said he
believes other American Internet
584
00:40:02,750 --> 00:40:06,870
such as Facebook and Google may also
have been ordered to disclose
585
00:40:07,290 --> 00:40:13,950
Companies like Amazon, Yahoo, Dropbox,
even Facebook will
586
00:40:13,950 --> 00:40:18,370
be capable of handing data to the
government without first informing
587
00:40:18,890 --> 00:40:23,890
Even if you think what the people are
doing is wrong, that's why the First
588
00:40:23,890 --> 00:40:26,210
Amendment exists, to protect.
589
00:40:27,029 --> 00:40:31,030
Unpopular people engaging in unpopular
speech.
590
00:40:31,530 --> 00:40:32,830
But Twitter fought back.
591
00:40:33,030 --> 00:40:36,730
They released the information to the
users and let them know ahead of time,
592
00:40:36,730 --> 00:40:38,990
they were successful in getting the gag
order overturned.
593
00:40:39,470 --> 00:40:43,490
Meanwhile, Amazon, PayPal, MasterCard,
and Visa, they all gave in to the
594
00:40:43,490 --> 00:40:44,710
pressure regarding their users.
595
00:40:45,010 --> 00:40:50,570
You know, a culture of loyalty to not
you, but a greater cause is important to
596
00:40:50,570 --> 00:40:54,310
be successful, it seems like to me, and
is disloyal, in this case, to the
597
00:40:54,310 --> 00:40:57,920
country. While President Bush might
think it's disloyal, thanks to Twitter
598
00:40:57,920 --> 00:41:01,840
standing up for the privacy of activists
like Julian Assange, you can now be
599
00:41:01,840 --> 00:41:02,558
shown this.
600
00:41:02,560 --> 00:41:09,220
Today, we released over 287 files
documenting
601
00:41:09,220 --> 00:41:13,740
the reality of the international mass
surveillance industry.
602
00:41:14,500 --> 00:41:21,380
An industry which now sells equipment to
dictators and democracies alike
603
00:41:21,380 --> 00:41:24,040
in order to intercept...
604
00:41:24,490 --> 00:41:25,830
entire populations.
605
00:41:26,850 --> 00:41:33,150
9 -11 has provided a license for
European countries, for
606
00:41:33,150 --> 00:41:40,030
United States, Australia, Canada, South
Africa, and others
607
00:41:40,030 --> 00:41:43,190
to develop spying systems that affect
all of us.
608
00:41:50,050 --> 00:41:53,850
The spy files show the massive industry
that's around selling to the U .S.
609
00:41:53,850 --> 00:41:55,750
government. and governments around the
world.
610
00:41:56,650 --> 00:42:00,410
Instead of having something called the
Total Information Awareness Act with
611
00:42:00,410 --> 00:42:03,430
big symbol with the eye of the pyramid
looking at everybody and scanning the
612
00:42:03,430 --> 00:42:07,350
world with its sinister laser beams,
instead they just have a bunch of
613
00:42:07,350 --> 00:42:11,710
that exist that are providing bits of
those capabilities that are provided
614
00:42:11,710 --> 00:42:14,750
different contracts that go up to the
same agency, the same people.
615
00:42:15,280 --> 00:42:20,600
One of the most popular is called
Massive Intercept, and basically what
616
00:42:20,600 --> 00:42:24,940
governments are trying to do with this
is get as much information as possible
617
00:42:24,940 --> 00:42:31,480
from our communications so they can
analyze that and detect patterns in
618
00:42:31,660 --> 00:42:34,880
It's interesting, you know, in your
article you really talk about the
619
00:42:34,880 --> 00:42:39,040
nature of the business, that they sell
through trade shows which are not open
620
00:42:39,040 --> 00:42:39,819
the media.
621
00:42:39,820 --> 00:42:41,520
But we actually went to one of these
conventions.
622
00:42:42,040 --> 00:42:43,140
It was pretty easy.
623
00:42:44,160 --> 00:42:45,580
called and asked for a pass.
624
00:42:46,420 --> 00:42:49,900
So we talked to the representative from
one of these companies, a firm called
625
00:42:49,900 --> 00:42:52,160
Celebrite. They were included in the spy
files.
626
00:42:52,500 --> 00:42:55,560
They're a company that sells cell phone
extraction tools to every major
627
00:42:55,560 --> 00:42:56,860
government sector in the U .S.
628
00:42:57,900 --> 00:43:01,340
So my name is Christopher Shin. I'm the
vice president of engineering for
629
00:43:01,340 --> 00:43:02,340
Celebrite USA.
630
00:43:02,600 --> 00:43:06,520
Today I'm presenting to you the
Celebrite UFED system. It's my right
631
00:43:07,080 --> 00:43:09,760
It is a device used to extract...
632
00:43:11,260 --> 00:43:15,180
Countless information from mobile
devices, so text messages, pictures,
633
00:43:15,260 --> 00:43:20,060
audio, call logs, that kind of thing.
It's used by agencies across the United
634
00:43:20,060 --> 00:43:21,060
States and the world.
635
00:43:21,120 --> 00:43:25,960
Yeah, the iPhone specifically stores a
lot of information, more than your
636
00:43:25,960 --> 00:43:30,320
handset. It really is a digital store of
your personal life, your business life,
637
00:43:30,440 --> 00:43:35,900
and this is why the field is actually,
it's been growing exponentially over the
638
00:43:35,900 --> 00:43:38,880
last couple of years. So as the devices
get more complex, they can hold more
639
00:43:38,880 --> 00:43:39,880
information.
640
00:43:40,620 --> 00:43:43,640
one of the most personal devices to you
today, even more than your laptop.
641
00:43:43,860 --> 00:43:49,000
We think of ourselves as basically a
tool manufacturer, just like Glock or
642
00:43:49,000 --> 00:43:50,860
Beretta is producing a firearm.
643
00:43:51,480 --> 00:43:56,100
We're producing a tool that does a
certain task, and we're marketing that
644
00:43:56,100 --> 00:43:59,700
only towards, just like you can't go out
and just buy a handgun without
645
00:43:59,700 --> 00:44:02,280
credentials, we're not just selling it
to everybody.
646
00:44:03,000 --> 00:44:05,460
But could you possibly sell it, or is it
a lockout?
647
00:44:05,870 --> 00:44:10,830
There are no laws against selling this
to someone that's not in law enforcement
648
00:44:10,830 --> 00:44:13,530
or government, something like that. If
someone was to dump my phone tomorrow,
649
00:44:13,650 --> 00:44:16,910
they might get a good laugh out of the
content in it, but I don't think I'd be
650
00:44:16,910 --> 00:44:17,868
put in jail.
651
00:44:17,870 --> 00:44:22,330
So I think that it really depends on how
you look at it. I mean, there are
652
00:44:22,330 --> 00:44:27,150
privacy concerns, but I'm a little bit
more on the, I guess, the liberal side
653
00:44:27,150 --> 00:44:31,490
my privacy being exposed. I mean, other
people, of course, that's a completely
654
00:44:31,490 --> 00:44:33,070
different, completely personal view.
655
00:44:34,540 --> 00:44:39,800
My phone itself, I mean, I actually take
that back. I have a lot of work
656
00:44:39,800 --> 00:44:43,880
-related information on my BlackBerry.
So if this information did get out, I
657
00:44:43,880 --> 00:44:45,860
probably would be pretty concerned.
658
00:44:47,440 --> 00:44:50,480
The surveillance vendors target two
types of customers.
659
00:44:50,700 --> 00:44:55,500
They target governments directly, and
then they also target Internet service
660
00:44:55,500 --> 00:45:00,540
providers and telecommunications
carriers who are tasked with the
661
00:45:00,540 --> 00:45:02,180
of spying on their own customers.
662
00:45:02,740 --> 00:45:03,740
For example.
663
00:45:04,160 --> 00:45:07,180
there was a little piece of software
that had been installed on every phone
664
00:45:07,180 --> 00:45:10,200
America. This software was called
Carrier IQ.
665
00:45:11,300 --> 00:45:14,320
And thanks to a little video that a
systems administrator from Connecticut
666
00:45:14,320 --> 00:45:18,480
posted on YouTube, the world now knows
that this software had been monitoring
667
00:45:18,480 --> 00:45:19,840
our every keystroke.
668
00:45:22,040 --> 00:45:24,400
553, and so on and so forth.
669
00:45:25,980 --> 00:45:29,520
According to Carrier IQ's chief
marketer, they're aware this information
670
00:45:29,520 --> 00:45:31,200
sensitive and call it a treasure trove.
671
00:45:31,880 --> 00:45:35,560
It became big enough of a deal that Al
Franken decided to take this issue to
672
00:45:35,560 --> 00:45:36,560
Congress.
673
00:45:36,900 --> 00:45:42,600
Mr. Director, millions of Americans have
smartphones with pre -installed
674
00:45:42,600 --> 00:45:45,280
software designed by a company called
Carrier IQ.
675
00:45:46,860 --> 00:45:50,800
Recent research has shown that it
captures a broad range of sensitive
676
00:45:50,800 --> 00:45:55,140
information. Let me start off by saying
we have neither sought nor obtained any
677
00:45:55,140 --> 00:45:57,760
information from Carrier IQ in any one
of our investigations.
678
00:45:58,600 --> 00:46:02,600
Not directly from Carrier, but what
about from the wireless carriers?
679
00:46:03,980 --> 00:46:10,200
No, I don't believe so. If you're
specifying the use of the Carrier IQ
680
00:46:10,200 --> 00:46:16,060
in a wireless carrier, have we?
681
00:46:16,620 --> 00:46:21,280
I sought that. I do not know any
information we seek from wireless
682
00:46:21,280 --> 00:46:22,280
what have you.
683
00:46:22,460 --> 00:46:27,560
And I'm not talking about carrier IQ.
I'm talking about wireless carriers that
684
00:46:27,560 --> 00:46:33,120
may obtain information that in some way
carrier IQ may have been involved with.
685
00:46:33,860 --> 00:46:37,340
Why would the FBI need carrier IQ to
send them all of this information?
686
00:46:37,880 --> 00:46:41,740
After all, they could be using any of
these services that were included in the
687
00:46:41,740 --> 00:46:42,519
spy files.
688
00:46:42,520 --> 00:46:45,120
Take this product, for instance, Scan
and Target.
689
00:46:45,450 --> 00:46:48,910
which claims that it can search through
the SMS, the IM, Twitter, emails,
690
00:46:49,210 --> 00:46:53,510
Facebook, blogs and forums, all while
analyzing huge volumes of information in
691
00:46:53,510 --> 00:46:54,448
real time.
692
00:46:54,450 --> 00:46:58,310
Or Finn Fisher, which demonstrates how
police can infiltrate anyone's system
693
00:46:58,310 --> 00:47:01,230
through a variety of videos that used to
be available on their website.
694
00:47:02,050 --> 00:47:05,170
They even show the agent hacking into
Google and Facebook in their demo.
695
00:47:09,650 --> 00:47:14,330
Massive interception equipment is sold
by surveillance vendors around the
696
00:47:14,730 --> 00:47:18,330
So it's really up for grabs for anyone
who wants it and can pay the price.
697
00:47:18,770 --> 00:47:22,410
The Thin Fisher system was sold to Egypt
to monitor people who oppose their
698
00:47:22,410 --> 00:47:24,530
leader. These are the actual documents.
699
00:47:25,090 --> 00:47:28,950
It even includes training for two to
four people for the low, low price of
700
00:47:28,950 --> 00:47:29,950
11 grand.
701
00:47:30,330 --> 00:47:34,050
Or the Hacking Teams project, which
advertises that it can track hundreds of
702
00:47:34,050 --> 00:47:36,170
thousands of cell phones all on one
system.
703
00:47:36,490 --> 00:47:41,390
Or software like Kapow that analyzes all
social networks with features like the
704
00:47:41,390 --> 00:47:43,190
ability to search out keywords and
phrases.
705
00:47:44,800 --> 00:47:48,400
Everything happens on Facebook, and it
shows the frequency of conversations
706
00:47:48,400 --> 00:47:53,140
between one person and another and that
kind of thing. That allows for a lot of
707
00:47:53,140 --> 00:47:57,660
profiling. It creates massive databases
for law enforcement to exploit and often
708
00:47:57,660 --> 00:48:02,200
misread. With hundreds of companies
offering these services, why would the
709
00:48:02,200 --> 00:48:03,220
need to use Carrier IQ?
710
00:48:03,820 --> 00:48:08,760
Everything coming from a cell phone,
everything coming from a computer,
711
00:48:08,760 --> 00:48:12,580
that's going over the Internet out of
the country or even internal within the
712
00:48:12,580 --> 00:48:14,760
country. and be monitored using this
kind of equipment.
713
00:48:15,020 --> 00:48:19,620
If you look at news stories now about
what they call big data, big data is
714
00:48:19,620 --> 00:48:26,020
really looking up the question of how
can government and corporations work
715
00:48:26,020 --> 00:48:31,580
that data in order to look for anomalies
and predict when you're going to do
716
00:48:31,580 --> 00:48:35,660
something so they can stop you from
doing it. And the government isn't even
717
00:48:35,660 --> 00:48:36,660
secretive about it.
718
00:48:37,020 --> 00:48:40,060
If you visit their business website,
there's an application there looking for
719
00:48:40,060 --> 00:48:43,100
developers to create better tools for
mass surveillance for online activity.
720
00:48:43,860 --> 00:48:49,640
Examples for surveillance include, but
are not limited to, Fox News, CNN,
721
00:48:49,900 --> 00:48:51,700
Twitter, Facebook, etc.
722
00:48:52,100 --> 00:48:54,820
Which brings us back to that word you'll
find in many user agreements.
723
00:48:55,240 --> 00:48:57,980
It's the word that sent us down this
whole path in the first place.
724
00:48:58,540 --> 00:49:03,160
Prevent. So this might make you wonder,
what potential threats would all of the
725
00:49:03,160 --> 00:49:05,340
surveillance we agreed to actually
prevent?
726
00:49:17,109 --> 00:49:22,150
Basically, January the 3rd, 20 days
before I go on holiday, I tweet, are you
727
00:49:22,150 --> 00:49:24,690
free this week for a gossip slash prep
before I go destroy America?
728
00:49:25,150 --> 00:49:26,290
Ended the tweet with a kiss.
729
00:49:26,950 --> 00:49:28,270
As threatening as that is.
730
00:49:29,710 --> 00:49:33,890
20 days later, I get on a flight, go to
LAX. We had a hotel in Hollywood
731
00:49:33,890 --> 00:49:37,090
Boulevard. We were just going to party
around for a week, just looking around,
732
00:49:37,150 --> 00:49:38,150
just being tourists.
733
00:49:38,450 --> 00:49:42,310
Got off the plane, went through the
passport control, fight my passport
734
00:49:42,430 --> 00:49:44,740
and they're like, can you come this way?
And I was like... Because I got an
735
00:49:44,740 --> 00:49:49,020
Irish passport, I thought maybe Irish
people would stereotype IRA bombers.
736
00:49:49,400 --> 00:49:52,180
They went through my suitcase and I was
like, what are you doing?
737
00:49:52,640 --> 00:49:55,200
And then when they pulled me into the
holding room, I was questioning me for
738
00:49:55,200 --> 00:49:57,220
five hours about whether I had a Twitter
account.
739
00:49:57,700 --> 00:49:58,820
And I was like, are you being serious?
740
00:49:59,200 --> 00:50:01,000
Are you actually holding me because of a
tweet?
741
00:50:01,240 --> 00:50:03,700
And they were like, what do you mean by
destroy America?
742
00:50:04,000 --> 00:50:07,800
And I was like, it's a party. It means
go wild, get drunk.
743
00:50:08,140 --> 00:50:13,060
Any moron that could read that tweet can
see what it's meant as. It ends with a
744
00:50:13,060 --> 00:50:17,600
kiss. I'm sure, like, Hitler doesn't end
his memoirs with a kiss or whatever he
745
00:50:17,600 --> 00:50:20,300
did. And then they moved us to a holding
room.
746
00:50:20,680 --> 00:50:24,280
But then at midnight, the staff changed
over, and they weren't aware of what we
747
00:50:24,280 --> 00:50:28,020
were there for, so they handcuffed us,
stuck us in the back of a police van,
748
00:50:28,020 --> 00:50:31,020
then took us to a downtown, like, prison
detention center.
749
00:50:33,100 --> 00:50:37,440
Innocent people shouldn't be treated
like absolute dirt. And they were
750
00:50:37,440 --> 00:50:39,040
us around, pushing us into walls.
751
00:50:39,520 --> 00:50:40,760
Sounds like a horrible vacation.
752
00:50:42,000 --> 00:50:43,600
Is the government refunding you at
least?
753
00:50:43,900 --> 00:50:47,480
No, they won't comment on what happened.
754
00:50:47,800 --> 00:50:50,900
Well, if I'd put I was going to paint
the town red, they'd have me done for
755
00:50:50,900 --> 00:50:51,980
graffiti as well, wouldn't they?
756
00:50:52,780 --> 00:50:56,740
When I go to other countries, this is
going to show up that I got refused from
757
00:50:56,740 --> 00:50:59,740
America, so more than likely I'm now
going to get dragged off at every
758
00:50:59,740 --> 00:51:03,740
and questioned about what happened, and
I have to explain to them that it was a
759
00:51:03,740 --> 00:51:04,740
tweet.
760
00:51:05,180 --> 00:51:07,640
I'm Italian, Irish, French.
761
00:51:08,650 --> 00:51:11,890
Portuguese, Native American, Black, I'm
leaving my 118th avatar.
762
00:51:13,850 --> 00:51:14,990
This is Joe Lopari.
763
00:51:15,430 --> 00:51:17,870
Joe Lopari had had a rough day at the
Apple Store.
764
00:51:18,070 --> 00:51:21,530
He had been forced to wait in line for
four hours before finally leaving.
765
00:51:23,050 --> 00:51:28,750
So I get home from the Apple Store, feel
a little irritated, smoke a little
766
00:51:28,750 --> 00:51:32,530
dope, turn on Fight Club, just trying to
relax, go on Facebook.
767
00:51:33,310 --> 00:51:37,810
And this button down, Oxford Clock, I
go, Mike, Joe, now.
768
00:51:38,190 --> 00:51:45,190
and then saw from office to office with
an arm of light, AR -10, and I said the
769
00:51:45,190 --> 00:51:49,110
same thing, but except the apple.
Pumping round after round. And, you
770
00:51:49,110 --> 00:51:52,970
basically word for word except for
where.
771
00:51:53,470 --> 00:51:56,830
Hanging out on Facebook, getting ready
to go to yoga class, and there's a shave
772
00:51:56,830 --> 00:51:57,549
and a haircut.
773
00:51:57,550 --> 00:51:59,350
Two -bit knock on my door.
774
00:52:00,070 --> 00:52:03,370
So I was like, hey, maybe somebody's
here to watch Fight Club with me.
775
00:52:04,530 --> 00:52:05,530
Open it up.
776
00:52:05,610 --> 00:52:06,610
Boom.
777
00:52:06,730 --> 00:52:07,730
NYPD slot.
778
00:52:08,090 --> 00:52:12,870
their bulletproof vests on, their guns
drawn, and they tear the place apart.
779
00:52:13,190 --> 00:52:14,550
You know, they really go through
everything.
780
00:52:14,930 --> 00:52:18,970
When the one cop, you know, finds the
box that has all my, like, military
781
00:52:18,970 --> 00:52:21,570
awards, he comes bringing it down. He's
like, oh, you were in the military?
782
00:52:21,910 --> 00:52:25,070
And we start talking, like, you know,
Army talk. He sees that I speak the
783
00:52:25,070 --> 00:52:28,550
language. And that's when he asked me,
he's like, so do you know what an
784
00:52:28,550 --> 00:52:29,550
AR -10?
785
00:52:29,610 --> 00:52:34,410
And I was like, that's why you're here,
guys. You're here because I made a bad
786
00:52:34,410 --> 00:52:35,410
joke on Facebook.
787
00:52:35,450 --> 00:52:36,450
Like, I, you know.
788
00:52:37,230 --> 00:52:38,350
It blew my mind.
789
00:52:39,030 --> 00:52:43,810
It's the ultimate buzzkill, really. Your
Facebook page has brought SWAT to your
790
00:52:43,810 --> 00:52:48,030
house. They told me not to go far from
New York because I'm going to be needed
791
00:52:48,030 --> 00:52:52,850
for all these court cases for a year.
They claim one of my Facebook friends
792
00:52:52,850 --> 00:52:59,610
called 911, which is another thing I
think is bogus.
793
00:52:59,610 --> 00:53:04,210
So I asked for the 911 tape, which they
keep on file. They have to.
794
00:53:04,650 --> 00:53:08,490
And it's my right, it's my stuff. They
have to give me my mug shots if I want
795
00:53:08,490 --> 00:53:13,390
it. So they come back and say, oh, it
turns out it wasn't someone that called
796
00:53:13,390 --> 00:53:16,350
911. It was someone that just walked
into the police station, and that's
797
00:53:16,350 --> 00:53:17,510
something we don't keep a record of.
798
00:53:18,170 --> 00:53:20,790
And how did you get my address? I lived
there for like 10 days.
799
00:53:21,630 --> 00:53:26,390
I didn't update my mailing address yet.
All my banking stuff was still going to
800
00:53:26,390 --> 00:53:27,129
my old apartment.
801
00:53:27,130 --> 00:53:31,810
There was nothing saying I lived there
except for a verbal agreement.
802
00:53:33,540 --> 00:53:37,640
Three minutes after being done with my
lunch, I was told to go up to the
803
00:53:38,380 --> 00:53:45,280
And then I would sit down inside the
vice principal's office, and I wasn't
804
00:53:45,280 --> 00:53:49,200
told what was going on until maybe ten
minutes later. My phone rings, I look at
805
00:53:49,200 --> 00:53:52,940
it, and it was the number to his school,
and I answer it, and it's the school
806
00:53:52,940 --> 00:53:56,180
security guard just giving me a FYI.
807
00:53:56,780 --> 00:53:59,760
You know, for your information, just to
give you a heads up, the Secret Service
808
00:53:59,760 --> 00:54:03,140
is here with the Tacoma Police
Department, and they have veto, and
809
00:54:03,140 --> 00:54:10,100
talking to him. A man walked in in a
suit and left, and he said
810
00:54:10,100 --> 00:54:15,920
that he was part of the Secret Service,
and he told me it was because of a post
811
00:54:15,920 --> 00:54:19,460
that I made, and it indicated as a
threat towards the president.
812
00:54:20,320 --> 00:54:25,700
Yes, a 7th grade boy was visited by our
FBI because of a red flag that came up.
813
00:54:25,820 --> 00:54:26,779
in their spy system.
814
00:54:26,780 --> 00:54:33,000
I was saying how Osama's dead and for
Obama to be careful because there might
815
00:54:33,000 --> 00:54:34,000
suicide bombers.
816
00:54:34,300 --> 00:54:38,700
It didn't consider his age or that his
comments about Obama needing to watch
817
00:54:38,700 --> 00:54:39,760
was one of concern.
818
00:54:40,160 --> 00:54:44,280
The machine simply determined that based
on a series of words, veto was a
819
00:54:44,280 --> 00:54:45,280
potential threat.
820
00:54:53,610 --> 00:55:00,450
Pre -crime, their belief, this potential
breach of the peace, their
821
00:55:00,450 --> 00:55:03,930
belief that you might cause a crime.
822
00:55:04,990 --> 00:55:07,410
There's pre -crime arrests in minority
reports.
823
00:55:08,670 --> 00:55:12,270
Mr. Marks, I mandated the District of
Columbia Pre -Crime Division.
824
00:55:13,080 --> 00:55:15,880
I'm placing you under arrest for future
murder of Sarah Mark and Donald Dubin.
825
00:55:15,880 --> 00:55:20,660
It must take place today, April 22nd,
0800 hours, 4 minutes. I didn't do
826
00:55:20,660 --> 00:55:23,640
anything. The arrest that happened on
the royal wedding day when I attended a
827
00:55:23,640 --> 00:55:26,100
zombie flash mob wedding picnic.
828
00:55:26,540 --> 00:55:31,960
Right. And myself and four other zombies
were arrested preemptively for
829
00:55:31,960 --> 00:55:33,200
potential breach of the peace.
830
00:55:33,460 --> 00:55:37,200
Even if you dressed up as a zombie, it
seems to me that the crime isn't really
831
00:55:37,200 --> 00:55:38,640
committed until you eat some brain.
832
00:55:38,860 --> 00:55:40,920
Yep. To be fair, we did have some brain
cake.
833
00:55:41,380 --> 00:55:42,560
Oh. So there's that.
834
00:55:42,800 --> 00:55:46,180
How did they know that you were going to
be dressing up as a zombie this day?
835
00:55:46,320 --> 00:55:48,920
There couldn't have been emails or
anything, really? There could have been.
836
00:55:48,920 --> 00:55:49,920
hard to know. Yeah.
837
00:55:50,160 --> 00:55:52,840
I think that's the tough thing, right?
That's the scary thing, yeah. Yeah.
838
00:55:53,080 --> 00:55:58,060
The indication that they were monitoring
private social networks came in the way
839
00:55:58,060 --> 00:56:01,400
they were reacting to certain things and
asking about certain things. So they
840
00:56:01,400 --> 00:56:04,660
were asking about maggots and asking
about climbing gear, which they must
841
00:56:04,660 --> 00:56:07,780
heard about through some exchanges on
the internet, neither of which was true.
842
00:56:07,820 --> 00:56:09,420
Nobody had maggots or climbing gear.
843
00:56:10,010 --> 00:56:13,190
And not something that was itself posing
a hazard to the royal wedding
844
00:56:13,190 --> 00:56:17,010
celebrations. We were nowhere near the
royal wedding celebrations, and we had
845
00:56:17,010 --> 00:56:18,810
plan of going near the royal wedding
celebrations.
846
00:56:19,730 --> 00:56:24,530
Anything that wasn't part of the
official, ostentatious, joyous,
847
00:56:24,530 --> 00:56:30,610
celebrations of this wedding of two
strangers was prevented from happening.
848
00:56:30,910 --> 00:56:33,410
And that seems deeply disturbing.
849
00:56:33,790 --> 00:56:37,690
You can see that surveillance measures
are being used to silence protests
850
00:56:37,690 --> 00:56:38,690
they even happen.
851
00:56:39,620 --> 00:56:41,200
This was, of course, the royal wedding.
852
00:56:43,100 --> 00:56:47,600
We'd all help pay for the royal wedding.
It wasn't just a private wedding.
853
00:56:48,220 --> 00:56:51,760
You're arresting a professor of
anthropology that runs a street theatre
854
00:56:52,180 --> 00:56:57,740
We couldn't believe this was happening.
855
00:56:58,000 --> 00:57:00,440
We were so obviously a street theatre
troupe.
856
00:57:01,080 --> 00:57:03,220
Some of us had actually got the costume
on, you know.
857
00:57:03,460 --> 00:57:07,120
So we were locked away in Lewisham
Police Station for 25 hours.
858
00:57:07,760 --> 00:57:10,060
Once the whole wedding was safely over,
we were let out.
859
00:57:11,020 --> 00:57:15,120
For the first time, as far as I'm aware
in this country, a number of us,
860
00:57:15,160 --> 00:57:21,520
something like 50 of us, were arrested
and in most cases incarcerated for
861
00:57:21,520 --> 00:57:26,840
thinking about protest, for thinking
about, in this case, some streets yet.
862
00:57:31,630 --> 00:57:34,210
A lot of life is based upon trust.
863
00:57:34,510 --> 00:57:40,730
I mean, if you have a conversation with
your inner circle on a key strategic
864
00:57:40,730 --> 00:57:46,010
decision that is vital to your company,
and you read about it in the newspaper
865
00:57:46,010 --> 00:57:49,210
before the decision is implemented, in
other words, you get preempted from
866
00:57:49,210 --> 00:57:53,150
acting because somebody inside your
company has talked, you're not going to
867
00:57:53,150 --> 00:57:54,610
it, and it'll hurt.
868
00:57:55,210 --> 00:57:57,270
The activist didn't need to commit any
crime.
869
00:57:57,740 --> 00:58:01,600
They just needed to text, to email, and
to call each other about potentially
870
00:58:01,600 --> 00:58:02,600
protesting.
871
00:58:03,520 --> 00:58:08,260
But I think that the answer is not to
take away the capacity of looking at the
872
00:58:08,260 --> 00:58:10,480
public actions of citizens and keeping a
record of them.
873
00:58:10,760 --> 00:58:13,500
The solution is to make sure that we
elect better governments.
874
00:58:14,800 --> 00:58:19,480
So one of the things I hear a lot is,
who cares if they're collecting all of
875
00:58:19,480 --> 00:58:23,580
this information about me? I don't have
anything to hide, so why does it matter?
876
00:58:25,630 --> 00:58:30,950
I know this argument, and it is not very
new.
877
00:58:31,330 --> 00:58:35,610
It's old -fashioned, saying we are a...
878
00:58:37,200 --> 00:58:40,240
complying with rules, and so what
happens?
879
00:58:40,640 --> 00:58:45,640
Between leading the sinful life I would
like to lead and hoping that governments
880
00:58:45,640 --> 00:58:49,240
will protect my privacy, or assuming
that no one's going to protect my
881
00:58:49,240 --> 00:58:54,080
and leading a less sinful life, I'll go
with the latter. It's simply just the
882
00:58:54,080 --> 00:58:55,800
odds of success seem higher to me.
883
00:58:56,520 --> 00:59:00,380
I congratulate the people who say they
have nothing to hide. I don't believe
884
00:59:00,380 --> 00:59:04,280
them. And I also say that they're
probably hiding something from someone.
885
00:59:04,280 --> 00:59:06,600
do. You have nothing to hide till you
do.
886
00:59:07,020 --> 00:59:10,840
And you are not necessarily going to
know what you have to hide or not.
887
00:59:18,120 --> 00:59:22,460
You might remember the case of Millie, a
teenage girl in Britain who disappeared
888
00:59:22,460 --> 00:59:23,480
in 2002.
889
00:59:24,300 --> 00:59:28,580
Police in Surrey say they're growing
increasingly concerned about the safety
890
00:59:28,580 --> 00:59:32,240
a 13 year old girl who hasn't been seen
since Thursday afternoon.
891
00:59:33,140 --> 00:59:36,740
Before the police found her body, her
parents were holding on to hopes that
892
00:59:36,740 --> 00:59:37,740
might still be alive.
893
00:59:43,560 --> 00:59:48,800
Why is that, you might ask?
894
00:59:49,220 --> 00:59:53,840
Well, because according to phone
records, Millie had checked and deleted
895
00:59:53,840 --> 00:59:54,840
voicemail.
896
01:00:10,620 --> 01:00:15,240
As it turned out, members of Rupert
Murdoch's corporation had been hacking
897
01:00:15,240 --> 01:00:19,080
Millie's phone, trying to be the first
to reveal details of this national news
898
01:00:19,080 --> 01:00:20,080
story.
899
01:00:20,140 --> 01:00:26,460
I think this is the watershed moment
when finally the public start to see and
900
01:00:26,460 --> 01:00:32,460
feel, above all, just how low and how
disgusting this particular...
901
01:00:32,720 --> 01:00:39,680
newspapers methods were this was a
murdered school girl and the thought
902
01:00:39,680 --> 01:00:45,980
very tight -knit circle of very senior
politicians linked up very closely
903
01:00:45,980 --> 01:00:52,320
intimately with the police and with the
media mogul rupert murdoch
904
01:00:52,320 --> 01:00:58,820
for 30 years as british prime ministers
came and most certainly went a constant
905
01:00:58,820 --> 01:01:01,400
character in their worlds was rupert
murdoch
906
01:01:02,510 --> 01:01:07,570
The billionaire media mogul who's... For
years, celebrities and individuals like
907
01:01:07,570 --> 01:01:11,170
Millie had the voicemails they thought
were hidden and private, accessed by
908
01:01:11,170 --> 01:01:14,470
Rupert Murdoch's corporation, at the
expense of people like Millie's parents.
909
01:01:14,850 --> 01:01:18,810
And it took nearly a decade to expose
the misuse of this highly personal data.
910
01:01:27,160 --> 01:01:30,880
Transparency, which bonds us together
and gives us all so many friends that we
911
01:01:30,880 --> 01:01:37,780
didn't know before, but all these
friends that are connected, gives the
912
01:01:37,780 --> 01:01:44,480
absolutely unparalleled in the history
of humanity ability to know what's going
913
01:01:44,480 --> 01:01:47,120
on in the citizens, to find out who the
dissenters are.
914
01:01:47,340 --> 01:01:50,660
The government is making whistleblowing
a crime.
915
01:01:52,260 --> 01:01:55,060
They are making dissent a crime.
916
01:01:56,060 --> 01:01:59,580
especially when it embarrasses the
government and calls the government to
917
01:01:59,580 --> 01:02:05,040
account. If sources are going to get
discovered, and if whistleblowers cannot
918
01:02:05,040 --> 01:02:09,100
securely and anonymously provide that
information to journalists, we as a
919
01:02:09,100 --> 01:02:12,660
society won't know when our rights are
being silently violated.
920
01:02:25,740 --> 01:02:27,340
Of course, the president has defended
his administration.
921
01:02:28,660 --> 01:02:29,840
The only way he knows how.
922
01:02:30,520 --> 01:02:35,540
If we can root out folks who have
leaked, they will suffer consequences.
923
01:02:40,320 --> 01:02:41,160
If you
924
01:02:41,160 --> 01:02:47,760
look at a
925
01:02:47,760 --> 01:02:51,920
technical perspective, the technologies
of maintaining privacy are actually
926
01:02:51,920 --> 01:02:52,920
running ahead.
927
01:02:53,200 --> 01:02:57,400
of the technologies that break it. For
example, encryption, which can maintain
928
01:02:57,400 --> 01:02:59,740
your privacy, is running ahead of
decryption.
929
01:03:00,000 --> 01:03:03,560
But what if there was a way to store
information until it could be decrypted?
930
01:03:04,020 --> 01:03:07,600
US intelligence officials will soon be
allowed to keep information on US
931
01:03:07,600 --> 01:03:12,300
citizens much longer than they used to,
even if those citizens have no known
932
01:03:12,300 --> 01:03:13,560
ties to terrorism.
933
01:03:13,920 --> 01:03:18,100
Under new rules, the government can
store data it gathers for five years.
934
01:03:18,100 --> 01:03:19,900
up from the current limit of six months.
935
01:03:23,200 --> 01:03:29,440
If Dick Cheney were elected president
and wanted to detain and incessantly
936
01:03:29,440 --> 01:03:34,780
waterboard every American who sent an
email making fun of his well -known
937
01:03:34,780 --> 01:03:41,780
hunting mishaps, what I'd like to know
is does the NSA have the technological
938
01:03:41,780 --> 01:03:48,540
capacity to identify those Cheney
bashers based upon the
939
01:03:48,540 --> 01:03:50,240
content of their emails?
940
01:03:52,110 --> 01:03:58,450
In the United States, we would have to
go through an FBI process, a warrant, to
941
01:03:58,450 --> 01:04:01,110
get that and serve it to somebody to
actually get it.
942
01:04:01,410 --> 01:04:04,710
But you do have the capability of doing
it. But not in the United States.
943
01:04:05,200 --> 01:04:09,140
There are new questions about the
National Security Agency's massive spy
944
01:04:09,140 --> 01:04:11,420
under construction in the desert of
Utah.
945
01:04:11,820 --> 01:04:16,440
Once finished, it'll be five times the
size of the U .S. Capitol building. The
946
01:04:16,440 --> 01:04:20,320
NSA is not allowed to spy on Americans,
but now a whistleblower has come forward
947
01:04:20,320 --> 01:04:22,060
saying that the agency is doing it
anyway.
948
01:04:22,360 --> 01:04:26,840
This massive agency that's collecting a
tremendous amount of information every
949
01:04:26,840 --> 01:04:32,500
day by satellites and tapping the cell
phones and data links and your computer
950
01:04:32,500 --> 01:04:33,960
email links and so forth.
951
01:04:34,670 --> 01:04:39,630
Then it has to store it someplace, and
that's why they built Bluffdale. It's
952
01:04:39,630 --> 01:04:41,450
going to cost $2 billion.
953
01:04:41,790 --> 01:04:48,630
It's being built in this area on a
military base outside of Salt Lake City
954
01:04:48,630 --> 01:04:54,850
Bluffdale. As I said, they had to
actually extend the boundary of the town
955
01:04:54,850 --> 01:04:55,850
would fit into it.
956
01:04:56,250 --> 01:05:02,010
And the whole purpose of this is the
centerpiece of this massive
957
01:05:02,680 --> 01:05:06,020
this network that was created after 9
-11.
958
01:05:07,900 --> 01:05:12,600
The reality of information technology is
it progresses exponentially, only
959
01:05:12,600 --> 01:05:13,620
information technology.
960
01:05:14,320 --> 01:05:18,680
Exponential growth starts out very slow,
looks like nothing's happening, you're
961
01:05:18,680 --> 01:05:23,100
doubling tiny little numbers, and
suddenly it takes off. And we've seen
962
01:05:23,100 --> 01:05:27,040
with paradigm after paradigm, like
social networks in recent times.
963
01:05:27,460 --> 01:05:32,330
In 1984, to store one gigabyte of data,
cost $85 ,000.
964
01:05:32,910 --> 01:05:35,590
By 2012, it cost about $0 .05.
965
01:05:36,630 --> 01:05:40,030
In the city of Chongqing, there are
about 500 ,000 cameras.
966
01:05:40,330 --> 01:05:44,590
In 2012, the cost of permanently
recording a high -resolution feed was
967
01:05:44,590 --> 01:05:48,690
million. By the year 2020, the projected
cost is less than $3 million.
968
01:05:49,050 --> 01:05:54,150
The UK, being one of the cultures that
introduced cameras most ubiquitously and
969
01:05:54,150 --> 01:05:57,730
most quickly, so far the population
seems fine with it.
970
01:05:58,070 --> 01:05:59,570
If they weren't, I...
971
01:05:59,790 --> 01:06:00,790
They know who to call.
972
01:06:01,830 --> 01:06:08,510
There are 2 ,000 cameras, and soon there
will be 3 ,000, all of which feed into
973
01:06:08,510 --> 01:06:11,650
this control center housed in a secret
location.
974
01:06:12,610 --> 01:06:18,770
And I can call up in real time all
instances where a camera caught someone
975
01:06:18,770 --> 01:06:23,850
wearing a red shirt. This is the shape
and the size of a potentially suspicious
976
01:06:23,850 --> 01:06:25,270
unattended package.
977
01:06:26,080 --> 01:06:30,440
Many police departments set to use
controversial new devices capable of
978
01:06:30,440 --> 01:06:34,680
people's faces, then checking that
information against a criminal database.
979
01:06:35,060 --> 01:06:39,280
When we're at war, when you're
protecting your society against people
980
01:06:39,280 --> 01:06:43,940
to come in and kill civilians, you have
to be able to defend what we're doing.
981
01:06:44,180 --> 01:06:49,520
You have to be able to defend our way of
life, and you have to put these powers
982
01:06:49,520 --> 01:06:53,480
into somebody's hand. According to the
Brookings Institution, This kind of
983
01:06:53,480 --> 01:06:56,800
pervasive monitoring will provide what
amounts to a time machine, allowing
984
01:06:56,800 --> 01:06:59,580
authoritarian governments to perform
retrospective surveillance.
985
01:07:00,060 --> 01:07:04,540
For example, if an anti -regime
demonstrator previously unknown to
986
01:07:04,540 --> 01:07:08,780
services is arrested, it will be
possible to go back in time to
987
01:07:08,780 --> 01:07:12,420
demonstrator's phone conversations,
automobile travels, and the people he or
988
01:07:12,420 --> 01:07:15,120
met in the months and even years leading
up to the arrest.
989
01:07:18,100 --> 01:07:21,520
The government is using the existence of
terms of service.
990
01:07:22,040 --> 01:07:24,500
to justify the surveillance state that
we now live in.
991
01:07:24,760 --> 01:07:28,940
The messages are free to use, and most
importantly, they're encrypted, so the
992
01:07:28,940 --> 01:07:32,620
police can't actually get in there to
encrypt what's happened. So that's
993
01:07:32,620 --> 01:07:35,400
prompted calls to shut down the entire
network.
994
01:07:35,940 --> 01:07:39,220
It's easy to justify using these
technologies to stop a riot.
995
01:07:39,660 --> 01:07:42,740
But shouldn't we be concerned when the
government is able to read our emails,
996
01:07:43,020 --> 01:07:47,040
text messages, phone calls, search
history, to track our movements and
997
01:07:47,040 --> 01:07:47,999
free speech?
998
01:07:48,000 --> 01:07:50,060
What crime did that 7th grade boy really
commit?
999
01:07:50,590 --> 01:07:53,130
Is having zombies at a row wedding
really so bad?
1000
01:07:53,870 --> 01:07:55,070
What about Millie's parents?
1001
01:07:55,670 --> 01:07:58,850
And what happens when these technologies
are used to watch peaceful protesters,
1002
01:07:59,150 --> 01:08:02,350
like all of the people that occupy Wall
Street or the Tea Party folks?
1003
01:08:03,110 --> 01:08:06,490
What happens if the government doesn't
like tents being set up?
1004
01:08:09,710 --> 01:08:16,310
Despite all of this,
1005
01:08:16,410 --> 01:08:18,590
it was starting to seem like, so what?
1006
01:08:19,260 --> 01:08:21,479
So what if the government can acquire
all of this information?
1007
01:08:22,140 --> 01:08:24,439
Maybe it's good they can keep the peace
when riots are happening.
1008
01:08:25,200 --> 01:08:27,800
And besides, maybe it was already too
late.
1009
01:08:35,840 --> 01:08:37,439
Do you think privacy is dead?
1010
01:08:43,660 --> 01:08:44,939
I mean, it's certainly dying.
1011
01:08:46,600 --> 01:08:47,960
Whether or not it...
1012
01:08:51,689 --> 01:08:57,569
Privacy is going to remain dead unless
there's a really fundamental shift in
1013
01:08:57,569 --> 01:09:02,510
the dynamics by which that's decided, by
which I mean the only real effective
1014
01:09:02,510 --> 01:09:07,990
response is to monitor and to change the
behavior, the tendencies of the
1015
01:09:07,990 --> 01:09:12,390
intelligence industry and law
enforcement and all that, and even
1016
01:09:13,250 --> 01:09:15,310
And that's very, very unlikely.
1017
01:09:15,670 --> 01:09:19,010
I don't know exactly who the us is, but
I'm very critical of us.
1018
01:09:20,270 --> 01:09:24,930
I think that this is an area in which we
have allowed ourselves to be smitten.
1019
01:09:25,569 --> 01:09:32,350
We want this technology to grow and
grow, and we don't want anything to rain
1020
01:09:32,350 --> 01:09:33,350
our parade.
1021
01:09:34,010 --> 01:09:40,790
And we have woken up to the privacy
concerns, in
1022
01:09:40,790 --> 01:09:43,590
my view, at least four years too late.
1023
01:09:44,649 --> 01:09:45,649
Yeah,
1024
01:09:47,050 --> 01:09:48,050
without question.
1025
01:09:48,830 --> 01:09:50,050
Without question private, yeah.
1026
01:09:51,330 --> 01:09:53,569
It's safe to work under the assumption
that nothing's private.
1027
01:09:53,990 --> 01:09:56,970
You know, anything that's been digitized
is not private.
1028
01:09:57,670 --> 01:09:59,990
And that is terrifying.
1029
01:10:01,030 --> 01:10:05,650
When this becomes a sign of a blood
cell, and I can just send them into my
1030
01:10:05,650 --> 01:10:09,910
and my body through the bloodstream,
this will become quite ubiquitous, and
1031
01:10:09,910 --> 01:10:13,510
really will be part of who we are. And
people say, well, okay, that's going to
1032
01:10:13,510 --> 01:10:15,030
be a real threshold.
1033
01:10:15,580 --> 01:10:20,480
to move beyond, but I don't think so.
It's a very smooth continuum from, you
1034
01:10:20,480 --> 01:10:24,420
know, when I was a student and had to
take my bicycle to get to the computer
1035
01:10:24,420 --> 01:10:27,860
having it in my pocket to having it in
my body.
1036
01:10:28,640 --> 01:10:31,660
It's a convenient place to put it. I
won't lose it that way.
1037
01:10:34,460 --> 01:10:37,900
But they say if you put a frog in a pot
of water and slowly turn up the heat,
1038
01:10:38,040 --> 01:10:41,980
the frog will just die because it
doesn't realize it's boiling.
1039
01:10:42,760 --> 01:10:43,780
And I think that...
1040
01:10:45,480 --> 01:10:49,780
Like anything else, I think we're opting
in a centimeter at a time.
1041
01:10:50,760 --> 01:10:54,040
And, you know, pretty soon you're pretty
far down the road. You look behind you
1042
01:10:54,040 --> 01:10:56,440
and you sort of wonder how you got where
you were.
1043
01:10:57,960 --> 01:10:59,060
I think that's true.
1044
01:11:01,800 --> 01:11:08,340
It's just completely out of control. I
mean, it's just sky's the limit, you
1045
01:11:08,340 --> 01:11:10,920
know. They know everything about us now.
1046
01:11:12,030 --> 01:11:16,570
It takes someone who's in charge of laws
having what is being done to American
1047
01:11:16,570 --> 01:11:20,210
citizens done to their email account,
done to their Facebook profile.
1048
01:11:20,750 --> 01:11:27,570
All these powerful institutions, they're
not subject to the same evasions of
1049
01:11:27,570 --> 01:11:29,850
privacy as the rest of us are.
1050
01:11:30,350 --> 01:11:33,810
Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Google, once
said, If you have something that you
1051
01:11:33,810 --> 01:11:36,690
want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't
be doing it in the first place.
1052
01:11:37,770 --> 01:11:39,250
Then he got very angry.
1053
01:11:39,980 --> 01:11:43,420
when CNET, which is owned by CBS,
published a picture of his house?
1054
01:11:51,520 --> 01:11:56,860
Well, when you ask Google about Do Not
Track, they claim we have to understand
1055
01:11:56,860 --> 01:11:59,740
how to define that before we can
implement any technology.
1056
01:12:00,860 --> 01:12:04,200
Do Not Track is pretty simple. It means
we don't want to be tracked.
1057
01:12:05,320 --> 01:12:09,400
The only reason Google doesn't
understand it... is because Google
1058
01:12:09,400 --> 01:12:10,400
to implement it.
1059
01:12:37,170 --> 01:12:43,830
Someone comes and makes it no longer
practical for them to engage in that
1060
01:12:43,830 --> 01:12:44,830
of activity.
1061
01:12:45,270 --> 01:12:47,570
Pressure is put upon CEOs of the
companies.
1062
01:12:47,810 --> 01:12:48,930
They're going to engage in it.
1063
01:13:03,470 --> 01:13:04,470
Dawn.
1064
01:13:05,900 --> 01:13:07,840
We're going by the Facebook campus right
now.
1065
01:13:08,340 --> 01:13:09,980
Really have no idea what to expect.
1066
01:13:13,240 --> 01:13:14,240
We've not had breakfast.
1067
01:13:22,120 --> 01:13:27,560
He'll know that I checked in here, too.
That's good. He'll know that I'm right
1068
01:13:27,560 --> 01:13:28,560
next to his house.
1069
01:13:30,640 --> 01:13:32,680
Here's the exact quote from Mark.
1070
01:13:33,370 --> 01:13:37,270
So, having two identities for yourself
is an example of a lack of integrity.
1071
01:13:39,490 --> 01:13:40,490
Lack of integrity.
1072
01:13:42,450 --> 01:13:47,110
They just did a knockup on his door, so
it seems very likely that we might get a
1073
01:13:47,110 --> 01:13:48,690
Mark Zuckerberg sighting today.
1074
01:13:54,510 --> 01:13:58,650
I mean, you might not be wrong, Vince.
You might actually have... Ben might
1075
01:13:58,650 --> 01:13:59,650
actually have a tunnel.
1076
01:14:08,870 --> 01:14:09,870
Mr.
1077
01:14:18,910 --> 01:14:19,910
Zuckerberg?
1078
01:14:20,290 --> 01:14:21,510
Hey, I'm working on a documentary.
1079
01:14:22,430 --> 01:14:25,950
I have a little blog here, but I'm
wondering if I could just ask you a
1080
01:14:25,950 --> 01:14:26,950
questions.
1081
01:14:27,170 --> 01:14:28,170
Sorry.
1082
01:14:28,850 --> 01:14:29,850
Really?
1083
01:14:48,070 --> 01:14:52,590
Mark Zuckerberg had asked me to please
not record him, so we shut off the main
1084
01:14:52,590 --> 01:14:53,590
camera.
1085
01:14:53,710 --> 01:14:57,150
But since Mark doesn't seem to mind
storing our data after we think it's
1086
01:14:57,150 --> 01:15:00,220
deleted, this... only seemed fair.
1087
01:15:12,300 --> 01:15:16,700
There's a major difference here.
1088
01:15:17,380 --> 01:15:19,720
Mark loosens up after he thinks we've
stopped recording.
1089
01:15:20,240 --> 01:15:22,320
And do you see that? That right there.
1090
01:15:23,080 --> 01:15:24,080
That's a smile.
1091
01:15:24,900 --> 01:15:26,500
Mark Zuckerberg smiled at me.
1092
01:15:27,180 --> 01:15:28,180
And you know why?
1093
01:15:28,670 --> 01:15:31,450
because he thought I had stopped
recording, and he was relieved.
1094
01:15:33,030 --> 01:15:37,070
Imagine what a relief it would be if all
of these companies and the government
1095
01:15:37,070 --> 01:15:41,490
stopped recording everything we do, if
we could just make a simple request to
1096
01:15:41,490 --> 01:15:44,130
them, something that Mark Zuckerberg
knows how to ask for.
1097
01:15:45,030 --> 01:15:46,110
Can you please not?
1098
01:15:46,850 --> 01:15:50,970
Can you please not record us, monitor
us, and share our information, unless we
1099
01:15:50,970 --> 01:15:51,970
ask first?
1100
01:15:52,270 --> 01:15:54,230
We need terms and conditions that are
reasonable.
1101
01:15:54,920 --> 01:15:58,300
And we need privacy policies to promote
the most basic principles of our
1102
01:15:58,300 --> 01:16:00,380
democracy, rather than taking them away.
1103
01:16:01,640 --> 01:16:06,360
Or, as a young senator once said, back
before he became president, We need to
1104
01:16:06,360 --> 01:16:10,000
find a way forward to make sure that we
can stop terrorists while protecting
1105
01:16:10,000 --> 01:16:13,560
privacy and liberty of innocent
Americans.
1106
01:16:14,040 --> 01:16:17,700
We have to find a way to give the
president the power he needs to protect
1107
01:16:17,700 --> 01:16:21,080
while making sure that he doesn't abuse
that power.
1108
01:16:21,340 --> 01:16:23,840
And that simple principle that...
1109
01:16:25,150 --> 01:16:32,050
There's somebody watching the watcher,
whether that's on an issue of freedom
1110
01:16:32,050 --> 01:16:36,590
of the press or it's an issue of
warrantless wiretaps. That simple
1111
01:16:36,590 --> 01:16:39,070
one that we can't give up, and we don't
have to give up.
1112
01:16:39,970 --> 01:16:43,190
Well, Mr. President, we are watching.
1113
01:16:43,890 --> 01:16:48,210
And I guess we have to ask ourselves one
simple question.
1114
01:16:50,130 --> 01:16:51,130
Do we agree?
1115
01:17:08,300 --> 01:17:14,560
Cold feet and a tie rise to the occasion
A million tiny
1116
01:17:14,560 --> 01:17:21,520
flashlights, I gotta turn it off Cold
feet and a tie rise
1117
01:17:21,520 --> 01:17:28,140
to the occasion A million tiny
flashlights, I gotta turn it off
1118
01:17:28,140 --> 01:17:29,220
For a while
1119
01:17:45,000 --> 01:17:50,080
Washington is caught in its very own
episode of spy versus spy. The tactics
1120
01:17:50,080 --> 01:17:53,640
employed by top intelligence gathering
teams at the CIA, sifting through IP
1121
01:17:53,640 --> 01:17:57,360
addresses, emails, and fake drop boxes,
have now been turned against the
1122
01:17:57,360 --> 01:17:59,040
intelligence community's top officials.
1123
01:18:00,140 --> 01:18:06,880
The FBI uncovered evidence
1124
01:18:06,880 --> 01:18:11,220
of an affair between Petraeus and his
biographer Paula Broadwood. That's
1125
01:18:11,900 --> 01:18:15,720
Petraeus had an affair with the author
of his fawning biography, All In.
1126
01:18:21,980 --> 01:18:24,280
These did not implicate criminal
activity.
1127
01:18:24,600 --> 01:18:26,580
These did not implicate national
security.
1128
01:18:26,960 --> 01:18:31,140
These were not a threat to David
Petraeus, the person, or to General
1129
01:18:31,180 --> 01:18:34,440
the director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
1130
01:18:35,160 --> 01:18:37,700
Those are not my words. Those are the
FBI's words.
1131
01:18:46,120 --> 01:18:49,660
But instead of actually sending those
emails, in many cases, they wrote them
1132
01:18:49,660 --> 01:18:53,640
drafts in a Gmail account they both had
access to. And that way they could both
1133
01:18:53,640 --> 01:18:57,660
log on and check the draft folder, never
having to actually hit send.
1134
01:18:57,900 --> 01:19:00,940
It's very embarrassing for the Obama
administration and for its national
1135
01:19:00,940 --> 01:19:01,940
security command.
1136
01:19:09,640 --> 01:19:14,200
It's troubling because there are laws
that the FBI has to follow and he has
1137
01:19:14,200 --> 01:19:19,520
right to be protected from an
unwarranted, unjustified investigation
1138
01:19:19,520 --> 01:19:22,120
or anyone. People don't really know how
they're being monitored and they think,
1139
01:19:22,200 --> 01:19:25,900
well, hey, if it's working, if we keep
stopping another 9 -11, then it's,
1140
01:19:26,260 --> 01:19:27,260
worth it.
1141
01:19:50,120 --> 01:19:56,420
The greatest fear that I have regarding
the outcome for
1142
01:19:56,420 --> 01:19:59,600
America of these disclosures is that
nothing will change.
104694
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