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Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:01:28,280 --> 00:01:34,380 Coffee and a tie rise to the occasion A million tiny 2 00:01:34,380 --> 00:01:41,340 flashlights, I gotta turn it off Coffee and a tie rise 3 00:01:41,340 --> 00:01:47,980 to the occasion A million tiny flashlights, I gotta turn it off 4 00:02:14,730 --> 00:02:21,530 Too much information I gotta turn it off Oh, sleep for a 5 00:02:21,530 --> 00:02:28,250 while Too much conversation Too much information I gotta turn 6 00:02:28,250 --> 00:02:29,250 it off 7 00:03:36,750 --> 00:03:40,990 Just about every time we use the internet, a communication link, or an 8 00:03:40,990 --> 00:03:43,230 agree to some very long terms and conditions. 9 00:03:43,950 --> 00:03:45,790 But what exactly are we agreeing to? 10 00:03:46,770 --> 00:03:47,649 You guys! 11 00:03:47,650 --> 00:03:51,290 You gotta help me. These business casual G -men are trying to kidnap me. What? 12 00:03:51,430 --> 00:03:54,790 It's crazy, dude. They're saying it's because I agreed to the latest terms and 13 00:03:54,790 --> 00:03:55,790 conditions on iTunes. 14 00:03:56,090 --> 00:03:58,270 Why? What did the terms and conditions for the last update say? 15 00:03:58,670 --> 00:04:00,230 I don't know. I didn't read them. 16 00:04:00,890 --> 00:04:04,810 You didn't read them? Who the hell reads that entire thing every time it pops 17 00:04:04,810 --> 00:04:05,810 up? 18 00:04:05,900 --> 00:04:06,900 I do. 19 00:04:06,960 --> 00:04:11,960 Can you tell, can Apple tell how many people actually read it? 20 00:04:14,640 --> 00:04:17,440 Well, they have to say that they agree. 21 00:04:17,779 --> 00:04:20,820 We can't know for sure if they've read. 22 00:04:21,260 --> 00:04:26,160 We try to make it in plain English and very short. If I were trying to make a 23 00:04:26,160 --> 00:04:32,340 user agreement uninviting, I would choose a small font, a thin serif font, 24 00:04:32,340 --> 00:04:33,340 would set it in all caps. 25 00:04:34,510 --> 00:04:38,290 What happens then is that you have type that becomes a texture rather than words 26 00:04:38,290 --> 00:04:39,290 and spaces. 27 00:04:39,530 --> 00:04:43,350 No one has read the terms and conditions. No one in the world. 28 00:04:44,690 --> 00:04:46,990 No one, even the lawyers who wrote it, wrote it like this. 29 00:04:48,190 --> 00:04:51,810 You come to a website and they have a set of rules, usually described in a 30 00:04:51,810 --> 00:04:53,450 of services, and then they have a privacy policy. 31 00:04:53,790 --> 00:04:57,550 And as soon as you start using the service, in essence, you have agreed to 32 00:04:57,550 --> 00:04:59,250 terms of service and the privacy policy. 33 00:04:59,590 --> 00:05:02,470 Do these terms and conditions that we sign up for even apply? 34 00:05:03,780 --> 00:05:08,660 They do. I think if they didn't apply, I think the web would topple over. And so 35 00:05:08,660 --> 00:05:12,520 to the extent there have been contract decisions, they've held that these terms 36 00:05:12,520 --> 00:05:13,580 and conditions are valid. 37 00:05:14,040 --> 00:05:16,040 And this concept is pretty new. 38 00:05:16,400 --> 00:05:19,660 For instance, you never had to sign a user agreement for an old -fashioned 39 00:05:19,660 --> 00:05:22,680 landline, or to watch TV, or to read a book. 40 00:05:23,020 --> 00:05:27,500 But if you use a smartphone, a Kindle, or you watch Hulu, then you do. 41 00:05:28,720 --> 00:05:31,060 Pilot, baby, don't you sign anything there. What's this all about? 42 00:05:36,919 --> 00:05:37,919 In fact, 43 00:05:40,760 --> 00:05:44,500 if you were to read everything you agreed to, it would take one full month 44 00:05:44,500 --> 00:05:45,600 work out of every year. 45 00:05:46,100 --> 00:05:50,060 That's 180 hours you would need to spend every year. 46 00:05:51,120 --> 00:05:56,540 And according to the Wall Street Journal, consumers lose $250 billion 47 00:05:56,540 --> 00:05:58,400 due to what's hidden in fine print. 48 00:05:59,200 --> 00:06:00,960 Here's an example from LinkedIn's term. 49 00:06:21,630 --> 00:06:24,230 So, LinkedIn takes pretty much everything forever. 50 00:06:24,630 --> 00:06:28,610 You'll find this kind of language in Google, Pinterest, Facebook, pretty much 51 00:06:28,610 --> 00:06:30,130 anything that people consider free. 52 00:06:31,380 --> 00:06:35,140 Instagram is finding that pictures are worth much more than a thousand angry 53 00:06:35,140 --> 00:06:40,300 words after the company updated its user agreement to say it would have the 54 00:06:40,300 --> 00:06:45,000 right to sell posted photos without compensation for use in advertising. 55 00:06:45,520 --> 00:06:49,840 And even if you are paying, companies have the ability to make you accept just 56 00:06:49,840 --> 00:06:50,860 about whatever they please. 57 00:06:51,420 --> 00:06:57,280 In 2009, GameStation, a company in the UK, put some pretty sneaky stuff in 58 00:06:57,280 --> 00:07:00,180 terms. They didn't take money or your firstborn child. 59 00:07:00,730 --> 00:07:04,810 But for one day, their terms stated, by placing an order via this website, you 60 00:07:04,810 --> 00:07:09,410 agree to grant us a non -transferable option to claim, now and forevermore, 61 00:07:09,410 --> 00:07:10,470 immortal soul. 62 00:07:11,130 --> 00:07:15,010 The contract was only live for a day, but Game Station happened to rake in the 63 00:07:15,010 --> 00:07:17,070 lives of 7 ,000 immortal souls. 64 00:07:17,930 --> 00:07:22,150 This was, of course, a joke. However, it makes you wonder, what if there were 65 00:07:22,150 --> 00:07:25,470 more serious consequences that might result from not reading terms and 66 00:07:25,470 --> 00:07:28,610 conditions? What if your phone came with these long terms of conditions that 67 00:07:28,610 --> 00:07:31,150 said, well, if you use the phone, the government can wiretap you. That would 68 00:07:31,150 --> 00:07:35,130 insane. But that's the kind of world we're living in. A world where the 69 00:07:35,130 --> 00:07:38,070 government can wiretap you because of terms and conditions? 70 00:07:39,150 --> 00:07:43,330 So if you look at the iPhone user agreement, wiretapping isn't mentioned. 71 00:07:43,990 --> 00:07:48,250 But in AT &T's privacy policy, they say that they can use data to investigate, 72 00:07:48,470 --> 00:07:51,450 prevent, or take action regarding illegal activities. 73 00:07:53,390 --> 00:07:54,390 Prevent? 74 00:08:07,900 --> 00:08:12,380 In 1994, Pizza Hut became the first major chain to accept a delivery online. 75 00:08:13,220 --> 00:08:17,000 Suddenly, the internet needed a way to remember who you were, where you lived, 76 00:08:17,060 --> 00:08:18,540 and how you were going to pay. 77 00:08:19,900 --> 00:08:21,500 My question is, what the hell? 78 00:08:22,200 --> 00:08:23,540 Like, how do they know who you are? 79 00:08:24,020 --> 00:08:28,140 Yeah. Okay, um, there are these things called cookies. 80 00:08:28,890 --> 00:08:32,270 Where, like, if you go to a site and buy something, it'll remember you and then 81 00:08:32,270 --> 00:08:34,370 create ads for other stuff you might want to buy. 82 00:08:34,590 --> 00:08:37,289 So it learns information about me? 83 00:08:37,909 --> 00:08:39,530 Seems like an invasion of privacy. 84 00:08:40,210 --> 00:08:44,510 It wasn't until the late 90s that companies began voluntarily adding 85 00:08:44,510 --> 00:08:46,810 policies to explain what was happening with this data. 86 00:08:48,030 --> 00:08:51,950 Then, in 2000, an online company called ToySmart went bankrupt. 87 00:08:52,550 --> 00:08:53,730 But they had an idea. 88 00:08:54,330 --> 00:08:58,390 They tried to sell their database of 195 ,000 users to another company. 89 00:08:58,750 --> 00:09:02,730 This included names, billing information, shopping preferences, and 90 00:09:02,730 --> 00:09:05,910 profiles. Even though their privacy policy said they would never share 91 00:09:05,910 --> 00:09:08,730 information, people felt like they were being duped. 92 00:09:09,250 --> 00:09:12,130 Lawmakers tell you time and time again that every time they go back to the 93 00:09:12,130 --> 00:09:17,050 district, to their district, people are telling them that they want some 94 00:09:17,050 --> 00:09:19,550 internet privacy laws. They want some protection. 95 00:09:20,470 --> 00:09:25,250 In early 2001, over a dozen bills were introduced in Congress to protect 96 00:09:25,250 --> 00:09:26,250 online. 97 00:09:28,590 --> 00:09:32,870 These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and 98 00:09:32,870 --> 00:09:35,590 retreat, but they have failed. 99 00:09:36,310 --> 00:09:40,730 All of the privacy legislation was killed or abandoned, and the Patriot Act 100 00:09:40,830 --> 00:09:41,830 of course, initiated. 101 00:09:41,890 --> 00:09:45,610 The bill before me takes account of the new realities and dangers posed by 102 00:09:45,610 --> 00:09:46,610 modern terrorists. 103 00:09:47,600 --> 00:09:51,280 This new law that I signed today will allow surveillance of all communications 104 00:09:51,280 --> 00:09:57,000 used by terrorists, including emails, the internet, and cell phones. 105 00:09:57,380 --> 00:10:02,420 The Patriot Act expanded the ability of the federal government to do 106 00:10:02,420 --> 00:10:06,820 surveillance in a lot of little ways. You don't need a judge's approval, for 107 00:10:06,820 --> 00:10:12,640 instance, to find out what website someone visited, what search terms they 108 00:10:12,640 --> 00:10:13,599 into Google. 109 00:10:13,600 --> 00:10:15,460 The question of your... 110 00:10:15,840 --> 00:10:20,320 if you will, information being retained by Google is not really at this point a 111 00:10:20,320 --> 00:10:24,480 Google decision. It's really a political or public policy decision enforced by 112 00:10:24,480 --> 00:10:25,820 different governments in different ways. 113 00:10:26,160 --> 00:10:30,440 What if privacy policies weren't about protecting privacy at all, but rather 114 00:10:30,440 --> 00:10:31,440 taking it away? 115 00:10:33,340 --> 00:10:37,020 Let's take a look at Google's privacy policy around this time to see if any 116 00:10:37,020 --> 00:10:38,020 changes were made. 117 00:10:38,580 --> 00:10:41,580 So here's Google's privacy policy from December of 2000. 118 00:10:42,400 --> 00:10:45,460 Google may also choose to use cookies to store user preferences. 119 00:10:46,720 --> 00:10:50,460 A cookie can tell us this is the same computer that visited Google two days 120 00:10:50,640 --> 00:10:54,780 but it cannot tell us this person is Joe Smith or even this person lives in the 121 00:10:54,780 --> 00:10:55,780 United States. 122 00:10:56,340 --> 00:11:00,360 And here's the privacy policy from one year later, in December of 2001. 123 00:11:01,480 --> 00:11:05,080 Google does this by storing user preferences in cookies and by tracking 124 00:11:05,080 --> 00:11:06,900 trends and patterns of how people search. 125 00:11:07,180 --> 00:11:09,660 Google will not disclose cookies to third parties. 126 00:11:10,060 --> 00:11:14,480 except as required by a valid legal process, such as a search warrant, 127 00:11:14,620 --> 00:11:15,980 statute, or court order. 128 00:11:16,580 --> 00:11:19,560 Now, it's important to note the fundamental difference between these two 129 00:11:19,560 --> 00:11:22,380 policies. One says that you're totally anonymous. 130 00:11:22,780 --> 00:11:25,900 The other says, when necessary, you're not. 131 00:11:26,660 --> 00:11:27,960 But here's what's strange. 132 00:11:28,340 --> 00:11:32,100 So the first screenshot you saw of Google's oldest policy was taken by a 133 00:11:32,100 --> 00:11:33,560 -profit internet archival service. 134 00:11:33,880 --> 00:11:37,740 It records what websites used to look like by taking snapshots, and it's been 135 00:11:37,740 --> 00:11:38,880 doing it since the 90s. 136 00:11:39,340 --> 00:11:43,300 Now, Google also lists the history of its privacy policies on its own official 137 00:11:43,300 --> 00:11:44,300 archive page. 138 00:11:44,460 --> 00:11:48,180 In their archives, they state they've got every privacy policy that goes back 139 00:11:48,180 --> 00:11:49,079 the beginning. 140 00:11:49,080 --> 00:11:52,980 But what Google shows as their original privacy policy doesn't match that of the 141 00:11:52,980 --> 00:11:53,980 archive service. 142 00:11:54,180 --> 00:11:58,760 Instead, they show the policy from December of 2001, the one that says that 143 00:11:58,760 --> 00:11:59,800 users are not anonymous. 144 00:12:00,160 --> 00:12:04,780 Google claims this is their first privacy policy, which it isn't. So why 145 00:12:04,780 --> 00:12:08,800 Google not include its original privacy policy on its own archives page? 146 00:12:09,210 --> 00:12:10,530 the one that said you would remain anonymous. 147 00:12:11,330 --> 00:12:14,870 What if the data collection that the Patriot Act required became the 148 00:12:14,870 --> 00:12:19,070 of a whole new business model and the foundation of the modern Internet as we 149 00:12:19,070 --> 00:12:19,829 know it? 150 00:12:19,830 --> 00:12:21,690 Would that be something worth covering up? 151 00:12:21,950 --> 00:12:24,990 Even though we don't write checks to Google, and that's one of the reasons we 152 00:12:24,990 --> 00:12:29,790 kind of like the company, it doesn't mean that Google is really free or that 153 00:12:29,790 --> 00:12:33,210 are free in the liberty sense when we use it. 154 00:12:33,470 --> 00:12:39,330 It might feel very different if Google was effectively a $500 a year service 155 00:12:39,330 --> 00:12:43,250 because that's the value of the data that you're providing. 156 00:12:43,550 --> 00:12:48,850 I mean, that was a really critical finding in that advertising could be 157 00:12:48,850 --> 00:12:53,090 based on information that people were somehow supplying about themselves. 158 00:12:53,210 --> 00:12:57,390 Suddenly, you didn't have to wonder, was somebody watching my commercial? 159 00:12:58,110 --> 00:13:01,950 You knew someone clicked on my ad. That meant that they... 160 00:13:02,200 --> 00:13:06,800 paid attention to it. In 2012, Google was one of the most valuable stocks in 161 00:13:06,800 --> 00:13:10,400 world. And Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, had become one of the 162 00:13:10,400 --> 00:13:11,400 richest men in America. 163 00:13:12,000 --> 00:13:16,800 My job is to help investors figure out for themselves what this thing's worth. 164 00:13:16,800 --> 00:13:22,600 look at what Facebook has as an asset, which is 900 million people and a ton of 165 00:13:22,600 --> 00:13:23,740 data on those people. 166 00:13:23,960 --> 00:13:28,420 And I say, if they use 10 % of that data, they're going to be the most 167 00:13:28,420 --> 00:13:31,140 company ever. When personal data is worth this much. 168 00:13:31,640 --> 00:13:35,060 Why would Google or any free Internet service be opposed to the data retention 169 00:13:35,060 --> 00:13:36,440 that the Patriot Act required? 170 00:13:37,720 --> 00:13:38,820 Anonymity wasn't profitable. 171 00:13:39,560 --> 00:13:43,880 The people who are willing to give up a little bit of information in exchange 172 00:13:43,880 --> 00:13:48,980 for having access to something that's free or something that's fun or a free 173 00:13:48,980 --> 00:13:49,980 taco. 174 00:13:50,040 --> 00:13:52,900 I don't think that ever changes, right? You always want something free. 175 00:13:53,700 --> 00:13:57,360 And plenty of people are willing to provide information to get that. 176 00:13:57,780 --> 00:14:00,100 And plenty of companies picked up on this fact. 177 00:14:09,000 --> 00:14:11,640 Let me give you some very practical tips. 178 00:14:13,080 --> 00:14:18,860 First of all, I want everybody here to be careful about what you post on 179 00:14:18,860 --> 00:14:19,860 Facebook. 180 00:14:20,380 --> 00:14:24,820 What the default settings are on Facebook. This is how most people use 181 00:14:24,820 --> 00:14:30,060 technology. When these companies are building these systems, they know that. 182 00:14:30,360 --> 00:14:36,160 So why is it default for everything staring, every photo? 183 00:14:36,650 --> 00:14:39,170 When I start Facebook, why isn't it just for my friends? 184 00:14:39,510 --> 00:14:41,390 Why is the default for everybody? 185 00:14:41,590 --> 00:14:45,470 Because it's really confusing for my mom to figure out how to just share to her 186 00:14:45,470 --> 00:14:49,290 friends. The way we've designed the site is that it's a community thing. 187 00:14:49,490 --> 00:14:53,450 So people want to share with just their friends, but a lot of people also want 188 00:14:53,450 --> 00:14:56,930 to share with the community around them. So I want to share with everyone who 189 00:14:56,930 --> 00:15:00,210 works with me at Facebook. I want to share with everyone who went to my 190 00:15:00,290 --> 00:15:02,350 everyone in the village around me. 191 00:15:02,910 --> 00:15:04,690 And those people aren't just my friends. 192 00:15:05,280 --> 00:15:07,220 Even Mark's explanation doesn't make any sense. 193 00:15:07,460 --> 00:15:10,860 He says he wants to share with the school, with the quaint village next to 194 00:15:10,940 --> 00:15:13,640 He doesn't say he wants to share with the entire world. 195 00:15:13,860 --> 00:15:15,500 And yet, that's the default. 196 00:15:15,780 --> 00:15:19,120 The challenge with defaults is that you get comfortable with whatever the 197 00:15:19,120 --> 00:15:20,120 default is. 198 00:15:20,560 --> 00:15:25,600 When the default is public, you actually can adapt really beautifully and deal 199 00:15:25,600 --> 00:15:29,380 with it. When the default is private, you can adapt comfortably and deal with 200 00:15:29,380 --> 00:15:32,980 it. When the defaults change, that's when problems emerge. 201 00:15:33,630 --> 00:15:35,270 And in fact, that's what Facebook did. 202 00:15:35,610 --> 00:15:39,770 In 2009, Facebook made changes to their privacy policy without telling anyone. 203 00:15:40,350 --> 00:15:47,330 Doing a privacy change for 350 million users is really not the type of thing 204 00:15:47,330 --> 00:15:48,330 that a lot of companies would do. 205 00:15:48,850 --> 00:15:52,530 We decided that these would be the social norms now, and we just went for 206 00:15:52,930 --> 00:15:56,070 You might remember the fan page with over a million people who tried to get 207 00:15:56,070 --> 00:15:57,070 policy reversed. 208 00:15:57,150 --> 00:15:58,690 What was the big deal, you might ask? 209 00:15:59,030 --> 00:16:02,540 Well, over the course of a night, Facebook turned what was once private 210 00:16:02,540 --> 00:16:05,280 information into totally public information. 211 00:16:11,760 --> 00:16:17,120 These platforms have an incentive to keep as much information about you and 212 00:16:17,120 --> 00:16:18,380 it as visible as possible. 213 00:16:22,100 --> 00:16:26,260 It's almost the question then becomes, what's the less forgivable sin? 214 00:16:27,060 --> 00:16:28,780 Having this crazy one -night stand? 215 00:16:29,400 --> 00:16:31,160 or not knowing how to use Facebook properly. 216 00:16:42,400 --> 00:16:48,520 Most relationships in your life, it's very good that the other person doesn't 217 00:16:48,520 --> 00:16:54,600 know everything you've ever said or scribbled or thought. 218 00:17:02,480 --> 00:17:07,599 When you share a photo album you go to Facebook and you choose to put those 219 00:17:07,599 --> 00:17:14,420 photos there Opt -in on every single 220 00:17:14,420 --> 00:17:21,400 thing opt -in Opt -in opt -in 221 00:17:21,400 --> 00:17:28,220 I'm okay with Facebook behaving like a 222 00:17:28,220 --> 00:17:29,220 company 223 00:17:29,320 --> 00:17:34,300 But I think we need to treat it like a company and not treat it like some 224 00:17:34,300 --> 00:17:35,300 public utility. 225 00:17:36,060 --> 00:17:40,500 These are the default settings on Facebook in 2005, divided into 12 226 00:17:40,840 --> 00:17:44,180 As time passes, more and more information is shared by default. 227 00:17:44,420 --> 00:17:48,780 In 2009, Facebook began automatically sharing personal information with the 228 00:17:48,780 --> 00:17:49,719 entire Internet. 229 00:17:49,720 --> 00:17:54,160 By 2010, everything was shared by default, except for your contact info 230 00:17:54,160 --> 00:17:59,050 birthday. We could, if you did a search and a Gmail and a YouTube and so forth 231 00:17:59,050 --> 00:18:03,470 yesterday, and you did it from your home, I'll give you the worst case. You 232 00:18:03,470 --> 00:18:05,670 it from your home, and you only have one computer in your home. 233 00:18:05,970 --> 00:18:09,810 In theory, we could cross -correlate those and get all three together. 234 00:18:10,710 --> 00:18:12,930 We don't do that, and we're not likely to do that. 235 00:18:13,210 --> 00:18:18,150 But in January of 2012, Google made changes to their privacy policy, and 236 00:18:18,150 --> 00:18:19,150 did just that. 237 00:18:19,410 --> 00:18:23,430 Google combined all of the information any of their services had collected 238 00:18:23,430 --> 00:18:24,109 a person. 239 00:18:24,110 --> 00:18:26,550 and put them into one single profile. 240 00:18:27,050 --> 00:18:30,950 What Eric Schmidt had said was the worst -case scenario, Google had actually 241 00:18:30,950 --> 00:18:31,950 done. 242 00:18:39,150 --> 00:18:44,850 How can you honestly sit here and tell this committee this is not a growing 243 00:18:44,850 --> 00:18:45,850 problem? 244 00:18:46,280 --> 00:18:49,760 A good deal of what I was trying to say is that I don't think there is evidence 245 00:18:49,760 --> 00:18:54,940 of a market failure or consumer harm from the legal and legitimate use of 246 00:18:54,940 --> 00:18:59,500 personal information in commerce. 247 00:18:59,720 --> 00:19:04,060 I don't think there's evidence of it. There are companies that you've never 248 00:19:04,060 --> 00:19:08,480 heard of, like Actium, that claim to have about 1 ,500 points of data on the 249 00:19:08,480 --> 00:19:09,480 average American citizen. 250 00:19:10,140 --> 00:19:13,480 Everything from, you know, whether you're right -handed or left -handed, 251 00:19:13,480 --> 00:19:18,060 kind of dog you have, what your sort of psychological outlook is, and all of 252 00:19:18,060 --> 00:19:22,600 that can be used to inform decisions that businesses make about us as well. 253 00:19:22,820 --> 00:19:27,060 These are the types of companies that a potential employer would go to to try 254 00:19:27,060 --> 00:19:29,460 and run a background check on somebody before they hired them. 255 00:19:30,010 --> 00:19:35,190 They're able to connect the fact that you went to site A and then later to 256 00:19:35,190 --> 00:19:39,770 B and then eventually to site C and create this detailed history of what 257 00:19:39,770 --> 00:19:40,770 you visit online. 258 00:19:40,930 --> 00:19:44,690 They don't put your name in the cookie. They put a unique serial number in the 259 00:19:44,690 --> 00:19:47,590 cookie that could then be linked to your name in their database. 260 00:19:48,030 --> 00:19:53,190 I don't know if you've ever seen the picture of the ad network ecosystem that 261 00:19:53,190 --> 00:19:58,290 shows all the parties in the ad network ecosystem. It's a bit overwhelming. 262 00:19:58,970 --> 00:20:01,590 The information is valuable to different people for different reasons. 263 00:20:02,130 --> 00:20:03,990 What if you buy a lot of alcohol? 264 00:20:04,670 --> 00:20:07,710 You know, they might want to raise your premiums because they think you're at 265 00:20:07,710 --> 00:20:13,270 risk for alcoholism or something like that. The company might use it in a way 266 00:20:13,270 --> 00:20:14,710 that actually harms you. 267 00:20:14,970 --> 00:20:19,210 For example, in 2008, thousands of people suddenly had their credit limits 268 00:20:19,210 --> 00:20:20,810 reduced, seemingly for no reason. 269 00:20:21,390 --> 00:20:24,970 While on vacation, one wealthy business owner from Atlanta thought his limit 270 00:20:24,970 --> 00:20:26,330 plummeted from 10 ,800. 271 00:20:27,000 --> 00:20:29,300 to just $3 ,800, ruining his vacation. 272 00:20:29,640 --> 00:20:31,160 The letter he received said this. 273 00:20:31,600 --> 00:20:34,820 Other customers who've used their card at establishments where you recently 274 00:20:34,820 --> 00:20:37,440 shopped have a poor repayment history for the American Express. 275 00:20:38,380 --> 00:20:39,900 This means companies like Walmart. 276 00:20:40,620 --> 00:20:45,060 And in Minneapolis, a father came into a Target outraged that they were sending 277 00:20:45,060 --> 00:20:46,780 a teenage daughter pregnancy coupon. 278 00:20:47,360 --> 00:20:49,040 Coupons that were addressed to her. 279 00:20:49,420 --> 00:20:52,500 The man thought the Target was trying to encourage his daughter to get pregnant. 280 00:20:52,960 --> 00:20:57,450 As it turned out, thanks to her shopping habits, Target knew that this high 281 00:20:57,450 --> 00:20:59,690 schooler was pregnant before her own father did. 282 00:21:00,190 --> 00:21:01,570 The father later apologized. 283 00:21:03,270 --> 00:21:06,790 And in the Netherlands, data was being used to harm customers in a whole new 284 00:21:06,790 --> 00:21:11,510 way. Now, while you're driving and using a GPS, that GPS is sending back signals 285 00:21:11,510 --> 00:21:12,630 to tell how fast you're moving. 286 00:21:13,270 --> 00:21:17,030 It's really useful for helping us avoid traffic, but that got a little company 287 00:21:17,030 --> 00:21:20,310 called TomTom wondering who else might be interested in knowing the speed of 288 00:21:20,310 --> 00:21:24,250 traffic. And so in the Netherlands, the data that people were willingly trading 289 00:21:24,250 --> 00:21:27,550 to find a faster way home was being sold to the authority to give those same 290 00:21:27,550 --> 00:21:28,550 drivers tickets. 291 00:21:36,210 --> 00:21:41,690 The reason we don't have any baseline consumer privacy law because of the FBI? 292 00:21:41,770 --> 00:21:46,970 No. That is largely due to lobbying by companies that have built extremely 293 00:21:46,970 --> 00:21:49,810 lucrative businesses around these business activities. 294 00:21:50,840 --> 00:21:52,580 Don't want to do anything to disrupt that. 295 00:21:53,820 --> 00:21:58,940 Under Facebook's terms and conditions, a user must be 13 or older. 296 00:21:59,560 --> 00:22:04,920 Despite this, according to a recent Consumer Reports study, an estimated 7 297 00:22:04,920 --> 00:22:07,100 million users were younger than 13. 298 00:22:07,980 --> 00:22:12,080 First of all, we don't allow people to have accounts under the age of 13. 299 00:22:12,340 --> 00:22:16,240 And my reaction to that is that's just absolutely indefensible. I mean, it's 300 00:22:16,240 --> 00:22:17,600 unbelievable that you would say that. 301 00:22:18,120 --> 00:22:21,920 Senator, I just want to say we really emphatically agree with your points. 302 00:22:21,920 --> 00:22:26,060 say that Facebook sent an army of lawyers with the final privacy 303 00:22:26,060 --> 00:22:31,200 that emerged in 2011 was watered down significantly in a way that wouldn't 304 00:22:31,200 --> 00:22:32,800 affect Facebook's business model. 305 00:22:33,080 --> 00:22:37,320 My name is Alan Davidson, and I am the Director of Public Policy for Google in 306 00:22:37,320 --> 00:22:38,320 North and South America. 307 00:22:38,520 --> 00:22:40,020 My message today is simple. 308 00:22:40,300 --> 00:22:44,540 As we've heard, mobile services create enormous social and economic benefits. 309 00:22:48,040 --> 00:22:49,700 Protection is the enemy of innovation. 310 00:22:50,380 --> 00:22:53,360 It absolutely doesn't have to be and isn't. 311 00:22:53,680 --> 00:22:56,540 It was an expensive year of lobbying for these big companies. 312 00:22:56,780 --> 00:23:00,780 Google spent five times as much as the year before, and Facebook spent four 313 00:23:00,780 --> 00:23:01,780 times as much. 314 00:23:01,980 --> 00:23:06,720 Senate Bill 242 will protect users of social networking Internet sites. 315 00:23:07,120 --> 00:23:12,360 It will protect these users from identity theft and from unwanted 316 00:23:12,700 --> 00:23:15,180 keeping their private information private. 317 00:23:15,800 --> 00:23:19,900 Of course, unless they agree to share it. I know that many members, including 318 00:23:19,900 --> 00:23:25,460 myself, do not want to negatively impact a very important industry for the state 319 00:23:25,460 --> 00:23:26,460 of California. 320 00:23:26,520 --> 00:23:30,940 Individuals involved in this industry don't want to see any regulation 321 00:23:30,940 --> 00:23:33,980 whatsoever. So I think that's really key. 322 00:23:34,600 --> 00:23:38,400 And one of the most interesting things I found in these conversations is that 323 00:23:38,400 --> 00:23:42,380 many members of the legislature don't even have network. 324 00:23:43,420 --> 00:23:46,640 Social network sites because they're concerned about their privacy. 325 00:23:46,880 --> 00:23:51,260 And at the time the bill was being heard, although lobbyists were in the 326 00:23:51,260 --> 00:23:55,420 committee room for the entire hearing, they did not come forward to speak. 327 00:23:55,960 --> 00:24:00,560 So it was sort of an interesting process, sort of a self -killing of the 328 00:24:00,560 --> 00:24:04,720 without the opportunity for the public to really see who was in opposition. 329 00:24:05,240 --> 00:24:09,780 So people like Google and Facebook were in strong opposition, Facebook in 330 00:24:09,780 --> 00:24:10,780 particular. 331 00:24:11,240 --> 00:24:12,580 What did Facebook have to lose? 332 00:24:13,840 --> 00:24:20,680 You know, I really do not understand their logic, and you'd have to ask 333 00:24:20,680 --> 00:24:25,700 them about that. But when I analyze an issue like this... I'd love to ask them 334 00:24:25,700 --> 00:24:26,840 about that. They won't talk to me. 335 00:24:27,780 --> 00:24:28,780 I'm not surprised. 336 00:24:30,100 --> 00:24:36,500 I don't think the rules of law and regulation necessarily apply when it 337 00:24:36,500 --> 00:24:40,440 interacting with a company that wants to sell you something. 338 00:24:41,160 --> 00:24:43,410 Yeah. We should be worried. 339 00:24:44,990 --> 00:24:46,790 But worried about what? 340 00:24:47,710 --> 00:24:51,910 Sure, the data collection allowed by privacy policies had fueled commerce. 341 00:24:51,910 --> 00:24:54,030 was there something more serious we were agreeing to? 342 00:25:05,050 --> 00:25:07,750 Total Information Awareness. 343 00:25:08,010 --> 00:25:11,530 A program initiated by the government in January of 2002. 344 00:25:12,520 --> 00:25:16,280 Its mission? To collect every digital transmission imaginable. 345 00:25:16,900 --> 00:25:21,620 And yes, this was their real symbol, the Eye of the Pyramid, scanning the Earth 346 00:25:21,620 --> 00:25:22,620 with a laser beam. 347 00:25:23,160 --> 00:25:26,340 It actually looks oddly similar to what's inside of Mark Zuckerberg's 348 00:25:26,640 --> 00:25:28,140 Making the world more open and connected. 349 00:25:28,460 --> 00:25:30,040 Oh my God, it's like a secret vault. 350 00:25:31,260 --> 00:25:36,020 Total Information Awareness was a program designed to connect with dots, 351 00:25:36,020 --> 00:25:39,520 banking activities, to flight searches, to... 352 00:25:39,870 --> 00:25:41,310 to online activities. 353 00:25:41,730 --> 00:25:47,350 But the Pentagon is clearly moving to create the largest electronic eye ever 354 00:25:47,350 --> 00:25:49,570 look at any and all Americans. 355 00:25:49,990 --> 00:25:54,750 You're looking for trends and transactions that are associated with 356 00:25:54,750 --> 00:25:56,190 potential terrorist act. 357 00:25:56,830 --> 00:26:01,810 They believe that with enough data that they could predict who would be engaging 358 00:26:01,810 --> 00:26:03,350 in nefarious crimes. 359 00:26:03,650 --> 00:26:07,930 The public was outraged. Congress was outraged. The program was shut down. 360 00:26:08,430 --> 00:26:13,070 The lesson that the government learned after the failure of total information 361 00:26:13,070 --> 00:26:18,350 awareness was that if you're going to create a gigantic spying program, don't 362 00:26:18,350 --> 00:26:19,350 give it a creepy name. 363 00:26:19,510 --> 00:26:24,070 There's nothing to prevent them from developing the same capabilities, just 364 00:26:24,070 --> 00:26:25,510 smarter ways from their standpoint. 365 00:26:31,550 --> 00:26:33,850 A wiretap requires a court order. 366 00:26:35,150 --> 00:26:37,090 Nothing has changed, by the way. 367 00:26:37,740 --> 00:26:40,080 But in reality, lots had changed. 368 00:26:40,480 --> 00:26:46,980 We were told one day in late 2002 that an NSA representative was coming to the 369 00:26:46,980 --> 00:26:50,760 office. Mark Klein came to us at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. 370 00:26:51,600 --> 00:26:58,260 with data and documents that showed that AT &T was engaged in a 371 00:26:58,260 --> 00:26:59,320 wiretapping program. 372 00:26:59,540 --> 00:27:04,540 The NSA is much different from the CIA. First of all, it's about three times the 373 00:27:04,540 --> 00:27:10,620 size. It costs far more. It's tremendously more secret than the... 374 00:27:11,140 --> 00:27:17,660 CIA, and what it does is very different. It's focused on eavesdropping, on 375 00:27:17,660 --> 00:27:22,120 tapping into major communications links. They actually had a secret room in 376 00:27:22,120 --> 00:27:26,460 their facilities, and they were creating a copy of Internet traffic and sending 377 00:27:26,460 --> 00:27:27,460 it to the NSA. 378 00:27:27,700 --> 00:27:31,520 So in a sense, they are vacuuming up, scooping up everything. In a sense, they 379 00:27:31,520 --> 00:27:35,540 are blindly vacuuming up everything going across those links. 380 00:27:35,780 --> 00:27:36,940 And you're certain of that? 381 00:27:37,160 --> 00:27:39,500 I'm certain of that. So President Bush owned up to it. 382 00:27:40,810 --> 00:27:46,270 I authorized the National Security Agency to intercept the international 383 00:27:46,270 --> 00:27:52,230 communications of people with known links to al -Qaeda and related terrorist 384 00:27:52,230 --> 00:27:53,230 organizations. 385 00:27:53,790 --> 00:27:57,670 It's taken less than 24 hours after the Bush presidency ended for former 386 00:27:57,670 --> 00:28:00,690 analysts at the National Security Agency to come forward to reveal new 387 00:28:00,690 --> 00:28:04,050 allegations about how this nation was spied on by its own government. 388 00:28:04,270 --> 00:28:08,610 The National Security Agency had access to all Americans' communications, faxes, 389 00:28:08,790 --> 00:28:09,790 phone calls. 390 00:28:10,620 --> 00:28:16,120 And their computer communications. Is there a recording somewhere of every 391 00:28:16,120 --> 00:28:20,160 conversation I had with my little nephew in upstate New York? Is it like that? 392 00:28:20,240 --> 00:28:21,680 It would be everything, yes. 393 00:28:23,360 --> 00:28:24,480 It would be everything. 394 00:28:25,780 --> 00:28:28,520 But then a beacon of hope arrived in the White House. 395 00:28:29,000 --> 00:28:32,780 Hi, Senator Obama. I appreciate your giving us the opportunity to ask you 396 00:28:32,780 --> 00:28:33,780 questions. 397 00:28:33,880 --> 00:28:36,880 I'm an attorney who represents federal whistleblowers. 398 00:28:37,530 --> 00:28:43,010 And I was very disappointed when I learned that you supported the bill that 399 00:28:43,010 --> 00:28:47,950 phone companies off the hook when they've helped the federal government 400 00:28:47,950 --> 00:28:53,910 without warrant wiretap phones. 401 00:28:55,110 --> 00:28:58,930 I recognize that some people feel like, yeah, well, the phone companies still 402 00:28:58,930 --> 00:29:02,950 were complicit in this. They should be held accountable still. I understand 403 00:29:02,950 --> 00:29:06,660 argument. But the problem was the surveillance program is actually one 404 00:29:06,660 --> 00:29:08,560 believe is necessary for our national security. 405 00:29:09,380 --> 00:29:12,880 So they were immune, but that means that the programs are still shut down, 406 00:29:13,020 --> 00:29:14,020 right? 407 00:29:14,340 --> 00:29:16,300 The programs are shut down? 408 00:29:16,620 --> 00:29:17,900 Yeah, the wiretapping programs. 409 00:29:18,200 --> 00:29:21,880 I have no reason to believe that the wiretapping programs have been shut 410 00:29:21,980 --> 00:29:27,260 No, if the wiretapping programs had been shut down, then I don't believe that 411 00:29:27,260 --> 00:29:32,320 the government and AT &T would still be fighting in court for the legality of 412 00:29:32,320 --> 00:29:33,320 it. 413 00:29:34,510 --> 00:29:38,990 Barack Obama hasn't changed anything. No, Barack Obama did not shut those 414 00:29:38,990 --> 00:29:43,750 programs down after he took office, even though he had threatened to before he 415 00:29:43,750 --> 00:29:44,750 became president. 416 00:29:50,790 --> 00:29:56,950 When we got started just in my dorm room at Harvard, the question that a lot of 417 00:29:56,950 --> 00:30:00,430 people asked was, why would I want to put any information on the Internet at 418 00:30:00,430 --> 00:30:01,830 all? Why would I want to have a website? 419 00:30:02,510 --> 00:30:05,930 And people have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more 420 00:30:05,930 --> 00:30:09,650 different kinds, but more openly and with more people. And that social norm 421 00:30:09,650 --> 00:30:10,990 just something that's evolved over time. 422 00:30:11,250 --> 00:30:17,470 You may have seen the onion take on Facebook, which was the CIA has just 423 00:30:17,470 --> 00:30:21,030 announced its most recent handy invention, Facebook. 424 00:30:21,890 --> 00:30:25,270 According to Department of Homeland Security reports, Facebook has replaced 425 00:30:25,270 --> 00:30:29,110 almost every other CIA information gathering program since it was launched 426 00:30:29,110 --> 00:30:30,110 2004. 427 00:30:30,540 --> 00:30:35,060 After years of secretly monitoring the public, we were astounded. So many 428 00:30:35,060 --> 00:30:38,640 would willingly publicize where they lived, their religious and political 429 00:30:38,940 --> 00:30:43,680 an alphabetized list of all their friends, personal email addresses, phone 430 00:30:43,680 --> 00:30:48,420 numbers, hundreds of photos of themselves, and even status updates 431 00:30:48,420 --> 00:30:51,860 they were doing moment to moment. It is truly a dream come true for the CIA. 432 00:30:52,500 --> 00:30:57,560 You know, the FBI's and the NSA's of the world are appreciative of the fact that 433 00:30:57,560 --> 00:31:01,860 Google and Facebook have built business models around collecting user data 434 00:31:01,860 --> 00:31:03,580 because it makes their jobs much easier. 435 00:31:03,900 --> 00:31:06,440 That article in Time started with this anecdote. 436 00:31:06,960 --> 00:31:11,520 They're sitting in their transparent cubicle in their open space in Facebook. 437 00:31:11,780 --> 00:31:17,440 Robert Mueller was the one man in the room with a tie on, and he was older, in 438 00:31:17,440 --> 00:31:20,820 suit. And he comes in and he says, I was just in the building and I wanted to 439 00:31:20,820 --> 00:31:25,760 say hello to Mark Zuckerberg. So he says hello to Mark Zuckerberg, a little chit 440 00:31:25,760 --> 00:31:27,640 -chat, and then he leaves. And everybody's saying... 441 00:31:27,980 --> 00:31:28,980 What the hell was that? 442 00:31:29,220 --> 00:31:34,660 Now, nobody asks the question, why was Mueller in the building? 443 00:31:35,720 --> 00:31:36,880 He's the head of the FBI. 444 00:31:38,940 --> 00:31:43,960 On the one hand, Mark Zuckerberg said he wants to create a more open society, 445 00:31:44,200 --> 00:31:46,380 and Facebook is a way to do that. 446 00:31:46,900 --> 00:31:51,380 On the other hand, you know, there's a lot about the way that Facebook uses 447 00:31:51,380 --> 00:31:53,280 information that people don't know. 448 00:31:53,980 --> 00:31:57,060 If only there was a way of knowing how much information these companies were 449 00:31:57,060 --> 00:31:58,060 storing about us. 450 00:31:58,480 --> 00:32:02,440 Well, in the case of Facebook, we learned some pretty interesting things 451 00:32:02,440 --> 00:32:03,660 to one student in Austria. 452 00:32:04,060 --> 00:32:07,980 And unlike the U .S., Europe has a law that requires a company to tell a 453 00:32:07,980 --> 00:32:11,100 customer what data they have stored on them if that customer wants to know. 454 00:32:11,500 --> 00:32:15,100 And Facebook, unlike most major Internet companies, had actually built a 455 00:32:15,100 --> 00:32:16,100 headquarters in Europe. 456 00:32:17,160 --> 00:32:20,550 Apparently we were like the only three people that were like... pushing hard 457 00:32:20,550 --> 00:32:24,290 enough and like asking again and again and again and going through also the 458 00:32:24,290 --> 00:32:29,170 Irish authority to finally where you get at least like a bigger part of our data 459 00:32:29,170 --> 00:32:30,810 set. We still didn't get everything right now. 460 00:32:31,390 --> 00:32:34,670 Got it right there. Just to have like an idea how much it actually is. 461 00:32:35,950 --> 00:32:39,490 That's like just to picture it and to see how much it is. 462 00:32:40,350 --> 00:32:41,770 Wow, this is more than a baby. 463 00:32:42,110 --> 00:32:45,030 Yeah, that's 1 ,222 pages. 464 00:32:45,610 --> 00:32:49,770 I'm a member of Facebook for three years, but I was using it more intense 465 00:32:49,810 --> 00:32:52,870 like, the last one and a half years or so. What's interesting as well is that I 466 00:32:52,870 --> 00:32:55,830 didn't post too much, actually. Like, I'm a person who posts something, like, 467 00:32:55,870 --> 00:32:56,870 once a week or so. 468 00:32:56,970 --> 00:33:00,710 With this giant ream of information in front of me, is it hard to go through it 469 00:33:00,710 --> 00:33:03,150 and actually find specific details about a person? 470 00:33:03,390 --> 00:33:07,330 No, that's super easy because it's PDF. I mean, we just used the search function 471 00:33:07,330 --> 00:33:08,330 in the PDF file. 472 00:33:08,410 --> 00:33:12,570 So you just type in one word, let's say demonstration or sex or political party 473 00:33:12,570 --> 00:33:15,190 or something, and within a second you find the right information. 474 00:33:15,410 --> 00:33:19,770 So within a couple of minutes you can figure out what people voted for, what, 475 00:33:19,770 --> 00:33:23,070 don't know, psychological problems they have, what parties they've been to. 476 00:33:24,010 --> 00:33:27,730 All these information are really easy to find, actually. While using that 477 00:33:27,730 --> 00:33:31,210 service for such a short time, you still had a data file that's bigger than 478 00:33:31,210 --> 00:33:36,150 anything that any CIA, FBI, or, I don't know, Stasi ever had about an average 479 00:33:36,150 --> 00:33:39,640 person. If you hit the remove button, it just means that it's flagged as 480 00:33:39,640 --> 00:33:42,600 deleted. So you hide it actually from yourself. 481 00:33:42,920 --> 00:33:47,380 But anyone like Facebook or any government agency that wants to look at 482 00:33:47,380 --> 00:33:49,200 can still retrieve it and get it back. 483 00:33:49,780 --> 00:33:52,780 And that means that it's there for an indefinite time. 484 00:33:53,540 --> 00:33:56,400 Even though you hit the delete button, it asks you three times if you really, 485 00:33:56,460 --> 00:33:57,460 really want to delete it. 486 00:33:58,500 --> 00:33:59,560 It's not actually gone. 487 00:33:59,780 --> 00:34:01,240 It's not actually gone. It's still there. 488 00:34:09,230 --> 00:34:12,230 So we've ultimately adopted roughly the following rule. 489 00:34:12,690 --> 00:34:17,130 Think of it as we anonymize the information within 18 months. 490 00:34:17,590 --> 00:34:22,010 It might be anonymized after 18 months, but all the searches that we've ever 491 00:34:22,010 --> 00:34:26,270 done are still there. The underlying data is still there to be de -anonymized 492 00:34:26,270 --> 00:34:27,270 some point. 493 00:34:27,409 --> 00:34:30,909 And de -anonymizing search records turns out to be shockingly easy. 494 00:34:31,190 --> 00:34:34,710 That is, taking private searches and finding out whose records they are. 495 00:34:35,360 --> 00:34:38,880 In 2006, AOL turned over a bunch of these anonymized search records of their 496 00:34:38,880 --> 00:34:42,960 users to the public, and it only took a few short hours for a reporter to decode 497 00:34:42,960 --> 00:34:45,920 who user number 4417749 was. 498 00:34:46,280 --> 00:34:50,380 Between searches for things like numb fingers, 60 single men, and dog that 499 00:34:50,380 --> 00:34:53,719 urinates on everything, the reporter uncovered a woman named Thelma Arnold. 500 00:34:53,920 --> 00:34:55,020 She was age 62. 501 00:34:55,860 --> 00:35:01,540 But then there's user 17556639, who looked up how to kill your wife multiple 502 00:35:01,540 --> 00:35:05,890 times. along with decapitated photos, and then in the middle, the user 503 00:35:05,890 --> 00:35:06,990 looks up steak and cheese. 504 00:35:07,950 --> 00:35:08,950 Steak and cheese. 505 00:35:09,610 --> 00:35:12,690 And there were plenty of users online who were quick to judge what was going 506 00:35:12,690 --> 00:35:14,670 here. It was murder. 507 00:35:21,710 --> 00:35:23,530 Hey, old friend. 508 00:35:24,610 --> 00:35:26,490 Let's take a seat, and I'm going to show you something. 509 00:35:26,810 --> 00:35:29,990 What I'm showing you here... 510 00:35:30,300 --> 00:35:32,900 is a list of anonymized search records. 511 00:35:34,320 --> 00:35:36,540 These records were released by AOL. 512 00:35:37,220 --> 00:35:41,680 Are there actually things on this list that you know you've searched for 513 00:35:42,900 --> 00:35:47,680 Sure, yeah. I have definitely looked up car crash photos. I've definitely typed 514 00:35:47,680 --> 00:35:48,638 in decapitated. 515 00:35:48,640 --> 00:35:50,780 I've definitely looked up dead people photos. 516 00:35:52,900 --> 00:35:56,020 I've definitely looked up white killer, yeah. In fact, I've looked up every 517 00:35:56,020 --> 00:35:57,280 single search term I'm looking at here. 518 00:35:58,060 --> 00:36:02,540 You see, Jerome had been a writer on Cold Kick, a TV show where each week 519 00:36:02,540 --> 00:36:03,640 have to solve a murder mystery. 520 00:36:04,720 --> 00:36:08,020 That's always what scared me when I was entering those search terms, was if 521 00:36:08,020 --> 00:36:11,300 there's some sort of automated system that just red flags you based on the 522 00:36:11,300 --> 00:36:14,220 search term, they're not going to look and say, oh, yeah, he was probably 523 00:36:14,220 --> 00:36:18,300 working on a TV show, and that's why he was just Googling how to murder my 524 00:36:18,300 --> 00:36:19,300 cheating wife. 525 00:36:19,500 --> 00:36:23,840 I just wanted to confirm that I had not murdered you and that you were alive. 526 00:36:24,160 --> 00:36:26,320 No, I am allowed to come out of this room. 527 00:36:26,920 --> 00:36:27,920 Okay, 528 00:36:29,740 --> 00:36:30,740 good. 529 00:36:31,140 --> 00:36:35,860 Oh, thank God. So we can rest assured you are not a murderer. 530 00:36:36,160 --> 00:36:38,180 I am not a murderer. 531 00:36:38,560 --> 00:36:40,220 You're a writer. I'm a writer. 532 00:36:41,440 --> 00:36:42,440 Okay. 533 00:36:42,780 --> 00:36:44,880 Glad we can clear that up. Glad we could clear that up. 534 00:36:45,580 --> 00:36:48,880 So what would happen if that red flag system did exist? 535 00:36:49,640 --> 00:36:53,380 If a dad like Jerome might someday have his door knocked on because his search 536 00:36:53,380 --> 00:36:54,380 records became public? 537 00:37:01,870 --> 00:37:05,790 The consensus seems to be that the retention of this kind of information 538 00:37:05,790 --> 00:37:07,110 be greater than zero days. 539 00:37:07,690 --> 00:37:12,570 And the reason it has to do with police action, terrorists, Patriot Act, all 540 00:37:12,570 --> 00:37:13,570 those sorts of things. 541 00:37:13,750 --> 00:37:17,550 It turns out that in this environment, the digital environment, there's a 542 00:37:17,550 --> 00:37:21,530 loophole to the Fourth Amendment, which is if a third party collects a lot of 543 00:37:21,530 --> 00:37:24,950 this information, the government doesn't have to go through those same hoops. 544 00:37:25,030 --> 00:37:26,470 It's called the third party doctrine. 545 00:37:27,210 --> 00:37:30,230 The third party doctrine means that when you... 546 00:37:30,640 --> 00:37:35,120 If consumers share your data with a bank, with an email provider, with a 547 00:37:35,120 --> 00:37:41,820 engine, with any kind of technology company, you have basically given up 548 00:37:41,820 --> 00:37:45,940 what would have been your fourth -rate protections over that data. For the 549 00:37:45,940 --> 00:37:49,600 government to get information from a Google or a Facebook is a lot easier 550 00:37:49,600 --> 00:37:52,940 the government doing it itself and putting a wiretap on our phones. 551 00:37:53,160 --> 00:37:57,560 Large companies like Google and Facebook receive thousands of requests a year. 552 00:37:58,170 --> 00:37:59,190 from government agencies. 553 00:37:59,410 --> 00:38:02,110 Facebook has 25 employees doing nothing but surveillance. 554 00:38:02,410 --> 00:38:05,430 And these companies routinely receive requests. 555 00:38:05,790 --> 00:38:06,990 They process the requests. 556 00:38:07,370 --> 00:38:10,990 You may be surprised to hear that secret searches of email by the government 557 00:38:10,990 --> 00:38:12,190 seem to be commonplace. 558 00:38:12,490 --> 00:38:18,650 A law that governs when the government can get electronic communications, 559 00:38:18,750 --> 00:38:23,670 like emails and things that are stored remotely, was written in 1986. 560 00:38:24,650 --> 00:38:28,850 It can have effects that allow the government to at least claim that they 561 00:38:28,850 --> 00:38:33,190 be able to get location data without a warrant. Or at one point the government 562 00:38:33,190 --> 00:38:37,230 was claiming that it doesn't need a warrant to get emails that you've 563 00:38:44,350 --> 00:38:49,430 Well, in the spring of 2011, the Department of Justice, and in particular 564 00:38:49,430 --> 00:38:51,730 FBI, made several requests. 565 00:38:52,170 --> 00:38:55,870 to Internet companies as part of an investigation relating to individuals 566 00:38:55,870 --> 00:38:57,130 associated with WikiLeaks. 567 00:38:57,490 --> 00:39:02,270 We released 400 ,000 classified documents. 568 00:39:02,530 --> 00:39:05,990 For those of you who don't know who Julian Assange is, he started WikiLeaks. 569 00:39:06,690 --> 00:39:10,190 Now, in the past, WikiLeaks has released secret documents related to the Iraq 570 00:39:10,190 --> 00:39:12,510 War, Guantanamo Bay, and Afghanistan. 571 00:39:13,930 --> 00:39:19,390 And that's, you know, obviously a positive development for those of us who 572 00:39:19,390 --> 00:39:20,390 that information... 573 00:39:21,050 --> 00:39:24,970 should be more accessible almost no matter what, and obviously is a 574 00:39:24,970 --> 00:39:30,170 development to those institutions like corporations, in many cases, that depend 575 00:39:30,170 --> 00:39:31,170 on secrecy. 576 00:39:31,350 --> 00:39:36,110 I condemn the action that WikiLeaks has taken. It puts at risk... 577 00:39:36,560 --> 00:39:37,740 our national security. 578 00:39:38,060 --> 00:39:42,460 Twitter received an order that requested data regarding certain Twitter users. 579 00:39:42,640 --> 00:39:47,680 These were all users that were related to the whistleblower website WikiLeaks. 580 00:39:48,060 --> 00:39:52,000 However, it wasn't just an order. It was actually a de -order, and it came with 581 00:39:52,000 --> 00:39:56,800 a gag order. It required that Twitter never speak publicly about the fact that 582 00:39:56,800 --> 00:39:57,820 they had received this request. 583 00:39:58,530 --> 00:40:02,750 Denouncing the move, Assange said he believes other American Internet 584 00:40:02,750 --> 00:40:06,870 such as Facebook and Google may also have been ordered to disclose 585 00:40:07,290 --> 00:40:13,950 Companies like Amazon, Yahoo, Dropbox, even Facebook will 586 00:40:13,950 --> 00:40:18,370 be capable of handing data to the government without first informing 587 00:40:18,890 --> 00:40:23,890 Even if you think what the people are doing is wrong, that's why the First 588 00:40:23,890 --> 00:40:26,210 Amendment exists, to protect. 589 00:40:27,029 --> 00:40:31,030 Unpopular people engaging in unpopular speech. 590 00:40:31,530 --> 00:40:32,830 But Twitter fought back. 591 00:40:33,030 --> 00:40:36,730 They released the information to the users and let them know ahead of time, 592 00:40:36,730 --> 00:40:38,990 they were successful in getting the gag order overturned. 593 00:40:39,470 --> 00:40:43,490 Meanwhile, Amazon, PayPal, MasterCard, and Visa, they all gave in to the 594 00:40:43,490 --> 00:40:44,710 pressure regarding their users. 595 00:40:45,010 --> 00:40:50,570 You know, a culture of loyalty to not you, but a greater cause is important to 596 00:40:50,570 --> 00:40:54,310 be successful, it seems like to me, and is disloyal, in this case, to the 597 00:40:54,310 --> 00:40:57,920 country. While President Bush might think it's disloyal, thanks to Twitter 598 00:40:57,920 --> 00:41:01,840 standing up for the privacy of activists like Julian Assange, you can now be 599 00:41:01,840 --> 00:41:02,558 shown this. 600 00:41:02,560 --> 00:41:09,220 Today, we released over 287 files documenting 601 00:41:09,220 --> 00:41:13,740 the reality of the international mass surveillance industry. 602 00:41:14,500 --> 00:41:21,380 An industry which now sells equipment to dictators and democracies alike 603 00:41:21,380 --> 00:41:24,040 in order to intercept... 604 00:41:24,490 --> 00:41:25,830 entire populations. 605 00:41:26,850 --> 00:41:33,150 9 -11 has provided a license for European countries, for 606 00:41:33,150 --> 00:41:40,030 United States, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and others 607 00:41:40,030 --> 00:41:43,190 to develop spying systems that affect all of us. 608 00:41:50,050 --> 00:41:53,850 The spy files show the massive industry that's around selling to the U .S. 609 00:41:53,850 --> 00:41:55,750 government. and governments around the world. 610 00:41:56,650 --> 00:42:00,410 Instead of having something called the Total Information Awareness Act with 611 00:42:00,410 --> 00:42:03,430 big symbol with the eye of the pyramid looking at everybody and scanning the 612 00:42:03,430 --> 00:42:07,350 world with its sinister laser beams, instead they just have a bunch of 613 00:42:07,350 --> 00:42:11,710 that exist that are providing bits of those capabilities that are provided 614 00:42:11,710 --> 00:42:14,750 different contracts that go up to the same agency, the same people. 615 00:42:15,280 --> 00:42:20,600 One of the most popular is called Massive Intercept, and basically what 616 00:42:20,600 --> 00:42:24,940 governments are trying to do with this is get as much information as possible 617 00:42:24,940 --> 00:42:31,480 from our communications so they can analyze that and detect patterns in 618 00:42:31,660 --> 00:42:34,880 It's interesting, you know, in your article you really talk about the 619 00:42:34,880 --> 00:42:39,040 nature of the business, that they sell through trade shows which are not open 620 00:42:39,040 --> 00:42:39,819 the media. 621 00:42:39,820 --> 00:42:41,520 But we actually went to one of these conventions. 622 00:42:42,040 --> 00:42:43,140 It was pretty easy. 623 00:42:44,160 --> 00:42:45,580 called and asked for a pass. 624 00:42:46,420 --> 00:42:49,900 So we talked to the representative from one of these companies, a firm called 625 00:42:49,900 --> 00:42:52,160 Celebrite. They were included in the spy files. 626 00:42:52,500 --> 00:42:55,560 They're a company that sells cell phone extraction tools to every major 627 00:42:55,560 --> 00:42:56,860 government sector in the U .S. 628 00:42:57,900 --> 00:43:01,340 So my name is Christopher Shin. I'm the vice president of engineering for 629 00:43:01,340 --> 00:43:02,340 Celebrite USA. 630 00:43:02,600 --> 00:43:06,520 Today I'm presenting to you the Celebrite UFED system. It's my right 631 00:43:07,080 --> 00:43:09,760 It is a device used to extract... 632 00:43:11,260 --> 00:43:15,180 Countless information from mobile devices, so text messages, pictures, 633 00:43:15,260 --> 00:43:20,060 audio, call logs, that kind of thing. It's used by agencies across the United 634 00:43:20,060 --> 00:43:21,060 States and the world. 635 00:43:21,120 --> 00:43:25,960 Yeah, the iPhone specifically stores a lot of information, more than your 636 00:43:25,960 --> 00:43:30,320 handset. It really is a digital store of your personal life, your business life, 637 00:43:30,440 --> 00:43:35,900 and this is why the field is actually, it's been growing exponentially over the 638 00:43:35,900 --> 00:43:38,880 last couple of years. So as the devices get more complex, they can hold more 639 00:43:38,880 --> 00:43:39,880 information. 640 00:43:40,620 --> 00:43:43,640 one of the most personal devices to you today, even more than your laptop. 641 00:43:43,860 --> 00:43:49,000 We think of ourselves as basically a tool manufacturer, just like Glock or 642 00:43:49,000 --> 00:43:50,860 Beretta is producing a firearm. 643 00:43:51,480 --> 00:43:56,100 We're producing a tool that does a certain task, and we're marketing that 644 00:43:56,100 --> 00:43:59,700 only towards, just like you can't go out and just buy a handgun without 645 00:43:59,700 --> 00:44:02,280 credentials, we're not just selling it to everybody. 646 00:44:03,000 --> 00:44:05,460 But could you possibly sell it, or is it a lockout? 647 00:44:05,870 --> 00:44:10,830 There are no laws against selling this to someone that's not in law enforcement 648 00:44:10,830 --> 00:44:13,530 or government, something like that. If someone was to dump my phone tomorrow, 649 00:44:13,650 --> 00:44:16,910 they might get a good laugh out of the content in it, but I don't think I'd be 650 00:44:16,910 --> 00:44:17,868 put in jail. 651 00:44:17,870 --> 00:44:22,330 So I think that it really depends on how you look at it. I mean, there are 652 00:44:22,330 --> 00:44:27,150 privacy concerns, but I'm a little bit more on the, I guess, the liberal side 653 00:44:27,150 --> 00:44:31,490 my privacy being exposed. I mean, other people, of course, that's a completely 654 00:44:31,490 --> 00:44:33,070 different, completely personal view. 655 00:44:34,540 --> 00:44:39,800 My phone itself, I mean, I actually take that back. I have a lot of work 656 00:44:39,800 --> 00:44:43,880 -related information on my BlackBerry. So if this information did get out, I 657 00:44:43,880 --> 00:44:45,860 probably would be pretty concerned. 658 00:44:47,440 --> 00:44:50,480 The surveillance vendors target two types of customers. 659 00:44:50,700 --> 00:44:55,500 They target governments directly, and then they also target Internet service 660 00:44:55,500 --> 00:45:00,540 providers and telecommunications carriers who are tasked with the 661 00:45:00,540 --> 00:45:02,180 of spying on their own customers. 662 00:45:02,740 --> 00:45:03,740 For example. 663 00:45:04,160 --> 00:45:07,180 there was a little piece of software that had been installed on every phone 664 00:45:07,180 --> 00:45:10,200 America. This software was called Carrier IQ. 665 00:45:11,300 --> 00:45:14,320 And thanks to a little video that a systems administrator from Connecticut 666 00:45:14,320 --> 00:45:18,480 posted on YouTube, the world now knows that this software had been monitoring 667 00:45:18,480 --> 00:45:19,840 our every keystroke. 668 00:45:22,040 --> 00:45:24,400 553, and so on and so forth. 669 00:45:25,980 --> 00:45:29,520 According to Carrier IQ's chief marketer, they're aware this information 670 00:45:29,520 --> 00:45:31,200 sensitive and call it a treasure trove. 671 00:45:31,880 --> 00:45:35,560 It became big enough of a deal that Al Franken decided to take this issue to 672 00:45:35,560 --> 00:45:36,560 Congress. 673 00:45:36,900 --> 00:45:42,600 Mr. Director, millions of Americans have smartphones with pre -installed 674 00:45:42,600 --> 00:45:45,280 software designed by a company called Carrier IQ. 675 00:45:46,860 --> 00:45:50,800 Recent research has shown that it captures a broad range of sensitive 676 00:45:50,800 --> 00:45:55,140 information. Let me start off by saying we have neither sought nor obtained any 677 00:45:55,140 --> 00:45:57,760 information from Carrier IQ in any one of our investigations. 678 00:45:58,600 --> 00:46:02,600 Not directly from Carrier, but what about from the wireless carriers? 679 00:46:03,980 --> 00:46:10,200 No, I don't believe so. If you're specifying the use of the Carrier IQ 680 00:46:10,200 --> 00:46:16,060 in a wireless carrier, have we? 681 00:46:16,620 --> 00:46:21,280 I sought that. I do not know any information we seek from wireless 682 00:46:21,280 --> 00:46:22,280 what have you. 683 00:46:22,460 --> 00:46:27,560 And I'm not talking about carrier IQ. I'm talking about wireless carriers that 684 00:46:27,560 --> 00:46:33,120 may obtain information that in some way carrier IQ may have been involved with. 685 00:46:33,860 --> 00:46:37,340 Why would the FBI need carrier IQ to send them all of this information? 686 00:46:37,880 --> 00:46:41,740 After all, they could be using any of these services that were included in the 687 00:46:41,740 --> 00:46:42,519 spy files. 688 00:46:42,520 --> 00:46:45,120 Take this product, for instance, Scan and Target. 689 00:46:45,450 --> 00:46:48,910 which claims that it can search through the SMS, the IM, Twitter, emails, 690 00:46:49,210 --> 00:46:53,510 Facebook, blogs and forums, all while analyzing huge volumes of information in 691 00:46:53,510 --> 00:46:54,448 real time. 692 00:46:54,450 --> 00:46:58,310 Or Finn Fisher, which demonstrates how police can infiltrate anyone's system 693 00:46:58,310 --> 00:47:01,230 through a variety of videos that used to be available on their website. 694 00:47:02,050 --> 00:47:05,170 They even show the agent hacking into Google and Facebook in their demo. 695 00:47:09,650 --> 00:47:14,330 Massive interception equipment is sold by surveillance vendors around the 696 00:47:14,730 --> 00:47:18,330 So it's really up for grabs for anyone who wants it and can pay the price. 697 00:47:18,770 --> 00:47:22,410 The Thin Fisher system was sold to Egypt to monitor people who oppose their 698 00:47:22,410 --> 00:47:24,530 leader. These are the actual documents. 699 00:47:25,090 --> 00:47:28,950 It even includes training for two to four people for the low, low price of 700 00:47:28,950 --> 00:47:29,950 11 grand. 701 00:47:30,330 --> 00:47:34,050 Or the Hacking Teams project, which advertises that it can track hundreds of 702 00:47:34,050 --> 00:47:36,170 thousands of cell phones all on one system. 703 00:47:36,490 --> 00:47:41,390 Or software like Kapow that analyzes all social networks with features like the 704 00:47:41,390 --> 00:47:43,190 ability to search out keywords and phrases. 705 00:47:44,800 --> 00:47:48,400 Everything happens on Facebook, and it shows the frequency of conversations 706 00:47:48,400 --> 00:47:53,140 between one person and another and that kind of thing. That allows for a lot of 707 00:47:53,140 --> 00:47:57,660 profiling. It creates massive databases for law enforcement to exploit and often 708 00:47:57,660 --> 00:48:02,200 misread. With hundreds of companies offering these services, why would the 709 00:48:02,200 --> 00:48:03,220 need to use Carrier IQ? 710 00:48:03,820 --> 00:48:08,760 Everything coming from a cell phone, everything coming from a computer, 711 00:48:08,760 --> 00:48:12,580 that's going over the Internet out of the country or even internal within the 712 00:48:12,580 --> 00:48:14,760 country. and be monitored using this kind of equipment. 713 00:48:15,020 --> 00:48:19,620 If you look at news stories now about what they call big data, big data is 714 00:48:19,620 --> 00:48:26,020 really looking up the question of how can government and corporations work 715 00:48:26,020 --> 00:48:31,580 that data in order to look for anomalies and predict when you're going to do 716 00:48:31,580 --> 00:48:35,660 something so they can stop you from doing it. And the government isn't even 717 00:48:35,660 --> 00:48:36,660 secretive about it. 718 00:48:37,020 --> 00:48:40,060 If you visit their business website, there's an application there looking for 719 00:48:40,060 --> 00:48:43,100 developers to create better tools for mass surveillance for online activity. 720 00:48:43,860 --> 00:48:49,640 Examples for surveillance include, but are not limited to, Fox News, CNN, 721 00:48:49,900 --> 00:48:51,700 Twitter, Facebook, etc. 722 00:48:52,100 --> 00:48:54,820 Which brings us back to that word you'll find in many user agreements. 723 00:48:55,240 --> 00:48:57,980 It's the word that sent us down this whole path in the first place. 724 00:48:58,540 --> 00:49:03,160 Prevent. So this might make you wonder, what potential threats would all of the 725 00:49:03,160 --> 00:49:05,340 surveillance we agreed to actually prevent? 726 00:49:17,109 --> 00:49:22,150 Basically, January the 3rd, 20 days before I go on holiday, I tweet, are you 727 00:49:22,150 --> 00:49:24,690 free this week for a gossip slash prep before I go destroy America? 728 00:49:25,150 --> 00:49:26,290 Ended the tweet with a kiss. 729 00:49:26,950 --> 00:49:28,270 As threatening as that is. 730 00:49:29,710 --> 00:49:33,890 20 days later, I get on a flight, go to LAX. We had a hotel in Hollywood 731 00:49:33,890 --> 00:49:37,090 Boulevard. We were just going to party around for a week, just looking around, 732 00:49:37,150 --> 00:49:38,150 just being tourists. 733 00:49:38,450 --> 00:49:42,310 Got off the plane, went through the passport control, fight my passport 734 00:49:42,430 --> 00:49:44,740 and they're like, can you come this way? And I was like... Because I got an 735 00:49:44,740 --> 00:49:49,020 Irish passport, I thought maybe Irish people would stereotype IRA bombers. 736 00:49:49,400 --> 00:49:52,180 They went through my suitcase and I was like, what are you doing? 737 00:49:52,640 --> 00:49:55,200 And then when they pulled me into the holding room, I was questioning me for 738 00:49:55,200 --> 00:49:57,220 five hours about whether I had a Twitter account. 739 00:49:57,700 --> 00:49:58,820 And I was like, are you being serious? 740 00:49:59,200 --> 00:50:01,000 Are you actually holding me because of a tweet? 741 00:50:01,240 --> 00:50:03,700 And they were like, what do you mean by destroy America? 742 00:50:04,000 --> 00:50:07,800 And I was like, it's a party. It means go wild, get drunk. 743 00:50:08,140 --> 00:50:13,060 Any moron that could read that tweet can see what it's meant as. It ends with a 744 00:50:13,060 --> 00:50:17,600 kiss. I'm sure, like, Hitler doesn't end his memoirs with a kiss or whatever he 745 00:50:17,600 --> 00:50:20,300 did. And then they moved us to a holding room. 746 00:50:20,680 --> 00:50:24,280 But then at midnight, the staff changed over, and they weren't aware of what we 747 00:50:24,280 --> 00:50:28,020 were there for, so they handcuffed us, stuck us in the back of a police van, 748 00:50:28,020 --> 00:50:31,020 then took us to a downtown, like, prison detention center. 749 00:50:33,100 --> 00:50:37,440 Innocent people shouldn't be treated like absolute dirt. And they were 750 00:50:37,440 --> 00:50:39,040 us around, pushing us into walls. 751 00:50:39,520 --> 00:50:40,760 Sounds like a horrible vacation. 752 00:50:42,000 --> 00:50:43,600 Is the government refunding you at least? 753 00:50:43,900 --> 00:50:47,480 No, they won't comment on what happened. 754 00:50:47,800 --> 00:50:50,900 Well, if I'd put I was going to paint the town red, they'd have me done for 755 00:50:50,900 --> 00:50:51,980 graffiti as well, wouldn't they? 756 00:50:52,780 --> 00:50:56,740 When I go to other countries, this is going to show up that I got refused from 757 00:50:56,740 --> 00:50:59,740 America, so more than likely I'm now going to get dragged off at every 758 00:50:59,740 --> 00:51:03,740 and questioned about what happened, and I have to explain to them that it was a 759 00:51:03,740 --> 00:51:04,740 tweet. 760 00:51:05,180 --> 00:51:07,640 I'm Italian, Irish, French. 761 00:51:08,650 --> 00:51:11,890 Portuguese, Native American, Black, I'm leaving my 118th avatar. 762 00:51:13,850 --> 00:51:14,990 This is Joe Lopari. 763 00:51:15,430 --> 00:51:17,870 Joe Lopari had had a rough day at the Apple Store. 764 00:51:18,070 --> 00:51:21,530 He had been forced to wait in line for four hours before finally leaving. 765 00:51:23,050 --> 00:51:28,750 So I get home from the Apple Store, feel a little irritated, smoke a little 766 00:51:28,750 --> 00:51:32,530 dope, turn on Fight Club, just trying to relax, go on Facebook. 767 00:51:33,310 --> 00:51:37,810 And this button down, Oxford Clock, I go, Mike, Joe, now. 768 00:51:38,190 --> 00:51:45,190 and then saw from office to office with an arm of light, AR -10, and I said the 769 00:51:45,190 --> 00:51:49,110 same thing, but except the apple. Pumping round after round. And, you 770 00:51:49,110 --> 00:51:52,970 basically word for word except for where. 771 00:51:53,470 --> 00:51:56,830 Hanging out on Facebook, getting ready to go to yoga class, and there's a shave 772 00:51:56,830 --> 00:51:57,549 and a haircut. 773 00:51:57,550 --> 00:51:59,350 Two -bit knock on my door. 774 00:52:00,070 --> 00:52:03,370 So I was like, hey, maybe somebody's here to watch Fight Club with me. 775 00:52:04,530 --> 00:52:05,530 Open it up. 776 00:52:05,610 --> 00:52:06,610 Boom. 777 00:52:06,730 --> 00:52:07,730 NYPD slot. 778 00:52:08,090 --> 00:52:12,870 their bulletproof vests on, their guns drawn, and they tear the place apart. 779 00:52:13,190 --> 00:52:14,550 You know, they really go through everything. 780 00:52:14,930 --> 00:52:18,970 When the one cop, you know, finds the box that has all my, like, military 781 00:52:18,970 --> 00:52:21,570 awards, he comes bringing it down. He's like, oh, you were in the military? 782 00:52:21,910 --> 00:52:25,070 And we start talking, like, you know, Army talk. He sees that I speak the 783 00:52:25,070 --> 00:52:28,550 language. And that's when he asked me, he's like, so do you know what an 784 00:52:28,550 --> 00:52:29,550 AR -10? 785 00:52:29,610 --> 00:52:34,410 And I was like, that's why you're here, guys. You're here because I made a bad 786 00:52:34,410 --> 00:52:35,410 joke on Facebook. 787 00:52:35,450 --> 00:52:36,450 Like, I, you know. 788 00:52:37,230 --> 00:52:38,350 It blew my mind. 789 00:52:39,030 --> 00:52:43,810 It's the ultimate buzzkill, really. Your Facebook page has brought SWAT to your 790 00:52:43,810 --> 00:52:48,030 house. They told me not to go far from New York because I'm going to be needed 791 00:52:48,030 --> 00:52:52,850 for all these court cases for a year. They claim one of my Facebook friends 792 00:52:52,850 --> 00:52:59,610 called 911, which is another thing I think is bogus. 793 00:52:59,610 --> 00:53:04,210 So I asked for the 911 tape, which they keep on file. They have to. 794 00:53:04,650 --> 00:53:08,490 And it's my right, it's my stuff. They have to give me my mug shots if I want 795 00:53:08,490 --> 00:53:13,390 it. So they come back and say, oh, it turns out it wasn't someone that called 796 00:53:13,390 --> 00:53:16,350 911. It was someone that just walked into the police station, and that's 797 00:53:16,350 --> 00:53:17,510 something we don't keep a record of. 798 00:53:18,170 --> 00:53:20,790 And how did you get my address? I lived there for like 10 days. 799 00:53:21,630 --> 00:53:26,390 I didn't update my mailing address yet. All my banking stuff was still going to 800 00:53:26,390 --> 00:53:27,129 my old apartment. 801 00:53:27,130 --> 00:53:31,810 There was nothing saying I lived there except for a verbal agreement. 802 00:53:33,540 --> 00:53:37,640 Three minutes after being done with my lunch, I was told to go up to the 803 00:53:38,380 --> 00:53:45,280 And then I would sit down inside the vice principal's office, and I wasn't 804 00:53:45,280 --> 00:53:49,200 told what was going on until maybe ten minutes later. My phone rings, I look at 805 00:53:49,200 --> 00:53:52,940 it, and it was the number to his school, and I answer it, and it's the school 806 00:53:52,940 --> 00:53:56,180 security guard just giving me a FYI. 807 00:53:56,780 --> 00:53:59,760 You know, for your information, just to give you a heads up, the Secret Service 808 00:53:59,760 --> 00:54:03,140 is here with the Tacoma Police Department, and they have veto, and 809 00:54:03,140 --> 00:54:10,100 talking to him. A man walked in in a suit and left, and he said 810 00:54:10,100 --> 00:54:15,920 that he was part of the Secret Service, and he told me it was because of a post 811 00:54:15,920 --> 00:54:19,460 that I made, and it indicated as a threat towards the president. 812 00:54:20,320 --> 00:54:25,700 Yes, a 7th grade boy was visited by our FBI because of a red flag that came up. 813 00:54:25,820 --> 00:54:26,779 in their spy system. 814 00:54:26,780 --> 00:54:33,000 I was saying how Osama's dead and for Obama to be careful because there might 815 00:54:33,000 --> 00:54:34,000 suicide bombers. 816 00:54:34,300 --> 00:54:38,700 It didn't consider his age or that his comments about Obama needing to watch 817 00:54:38,700 --> 00:54:39,760 was one of concern. 818 00:54:40,160 --> 00:54:44,280 The machine simply determined that based on a series of words, veto was a 819 00:54:44,280 --> 00:54:45,280 potential threat. 820 00:54:53,610 --> 00:55:00,450 Pre -crime, their belief, this potential breach of the peace, their 821 00:55:00,450 --> 00:55:03,930 belief that you might cause a crime. 822 00:55:04,990 --> 00:55:07,410 There's pre -crime arrests in minority reports. 823 00:55:08,670 --> 00:55:12,270 Mr. Marks, I mandated the District of Columbia Pre -Crime Division. 824 00:55:13,080 --> 00:55:15,880 I'm placing you under arrest for future murder of Sarah Mark and Donald Dubin. 825 00:55:15,880 --> 00:55:20,660 It must take place today, April 22nd, 0800 hours, 4 minutes. I didn't do 826 00:55:20,660 --> 00:55:23,640 anything. The arrest that happened on the royal wedding day when I attended a 827 00:55:23,640 --> 00:55:26,100 zombie flash mob wedding picnic. 828 00:55:26,540 --> 00:55:31,960 Right. And myself and four other zombies were arrested preemptively for 829 00:55:31,960 --> 00:55:33,200 potential breach of the peace. 830 00:55:33,460 --> 00:55:37,200 Even if you dressed up as a zombie, it seems to me that the crime isn't really 831 00:55:37,200 --> 00:55:38,640 committed until you eat some brain. 832 00:55:38,860 --> 00:55:40,920 Yep. To be fair, we did have some brain cake. 833 00:55:41,380 --> 00:55:42,560 Oh. So there's that. 834 00:55:42,800 --> 00:55:46,180 How did they know that you were going to be dressing up as a zombie this day? 835 00:55:46,320 --> 00:55:48,920 There couldn't have been emails or anything, really? There could have been. 836 00:55:48,920 --> 00:55:49,920 hard to know. Yeah. 837 00:55:50,160 --> 00:55:52,840 I think that's the tough thing, right? That's the scary thing, yeah. Yeah. 838 00:55:53,080 --> 00:55:58,060 The indication that they were monitoring private social networks came in the way 839 00:55:58,060 --> 00:56:01,400 they were reacting to certain things and asking about certain things. So they 840 00:56:01,400 --> 00:56:04,660 were asking about maggots and asking about climbing gear, which they must 841 00:56:04,660 --> 00:56:07,780 heard about through some exchanges on the internet, neither of which was true. 842 00:56:07,820 --> 00:56:09,420 Nobody had maggots or climbing gear. 843 00:56:10,010 --> 00:56:13,190 And not something that was itself posing a hazard to the royal wedding 844 00:56:13,190 --> 00:56:17,010 celebrations. We were nowhere near the royal wedding celebrations, and we had 845 00:56:17,010 --> 00:56:18,810 plan of going near the royal wedding celebrations. 846 00:56:19,730 --> 00:56:24,530 Anything that wasn't part of the official, ostentatious, joyous, 847 00:56:24,530 --> 00:56:30,610 celebrations of this wedding of two strangers was prevented from happening. 848 00:56:30,910 --> 00:56:33,410 And that seems deeply disturbing. 849 00:56:33,790 --> 00:56:37,690 You can see that surveillance measures are being used to silence protests 850 00:56:37,690 --> 00:56:38,690 they even happen. 851 00:56:39,620 --> 00:56:41,200 This was, of course, the royal wedding. 852 00:56:43,100 --> 00:56:47,600 We'd all help pay for the royal wedding. It wasn't just a private wedding. 853 00:56:48,220 --> 00:56:51,760 You're arresting a professor of anthropology that runs a street theatre 854 00:56:52,180 --> 00:56:57,740 We couldn't believe this was happening. 855 00:56:58,000 --> 00:57:00,440 We were so obviously a street theatre troupe. 856 00:57:01,080 --> 00:57:03,220 Some of us had actually got the costume on, you know. 857 00:57:03,460 --> 00:57:07,120 So we were locked away in Lewisham Police Station for 25 hours. 858 00:57:07,760 --> 00:57:10,060 Once the whole wedding was safely over, we were let out. 859 00:57:11,020 --> 00:57:15,120 For the first time, as far as I'm aware in this country, a number of us, 860 00:57:15,160 --> 00:57:21,520 something like 50 of us, were arrested and in most cases incarcerated for 861 00:57:21,520 --> 00:57:26,840 thinking about protest, for thinking about, in this case, some streets yet. 862 00:57:31,630 --> 00:57:34,210 A lot of life is based upon trust. 863 00:57:34,510 --> 00:57:40,730 I mean, if you have a conversation with your inner circle on a key strategic 864 00:57:40,730 --> 00:57:46,010 decision that is vital to your company, and you read about it in the newspaper 865 00:57:46,010 --> 00:57:49,210 before the decision is implemented, in other words, you get preempted from 866 00:57:49,210 --> 00:57:53,150 acting because somebody inside your company has talked, you're not going to 867 00:57:53,150 --> 00:57:54,610 it, and it'll hurt. 868 00:57:55,210 --> 00:57:57,270 The activist didn't need to commit any crime. 869 00:57:57,740 --> 00:58:01,600 They just needed to text, to email, and to call each other about potentially 870 00:58:01,600 --> 00:58:02,600 protesting. 871 00:58:03,520 --> 00:58:08,260 But I think that the answer is not to take away the capacity of looking at the 872 00:58:08,260 --> 00:58:10,480 public actions of citizens and keeping a record of them. 873 00:58:10,760 --> 00:58:13,500 The solution is to make sure that we elect better governments. 874 00:58:14,800 --> 00:58:19,480 So one of the things I hear a lot is, who cares if they're collecting all of 875 00:58:19,480 --> 00:58:23,580 this information about me? I don't have anything to hide, so why does it matter? 876 00:58:25,630 --> 00:58:30,950 I know this argument, and it is not very new. 877 00:58:31,330 --> 00:58:35,610 It's old -fashioned, saying we are a... 878 00:58:37,200 --> 00:58:40,240 complying with rules, and so what happens? 879 00:58:40,640 --> 00:58:45,640 Between leading the sinful life I would like to lead and hoping that governments 880 00:58:45,640 --> 00:58:49,240 will protect my privacy, or assuming that no one's going to protect my 881 00:58:49,240 --> 00:58:54,080 and leading a less sinful life, I'll go with the latter. It's simply just the 882 00:58:54,080 --> 00:58:55,800 odds of success seem higher to me. 883 00:58:56,520 --> 00:59:00,380 I congratulate the people who say they have nothing to hide. I don't believe 884 00:59:00,380 --> 00:59:04,280 them. And I also say that they're probably hiding something from someone. 885 00:59:04,280 --> 00:59:06,600 do. You have nothing to hide till you do. 886 00:59:07,020 --> 00:59:10,840 And you are not necessarily going to know what you have to hide or not. 887 00:59:18,120 --> 00:59:22,460 You might remember the case of Millie, a teenage girl in Britain who disappeared 888 00:59:22,460 --> 00:59:23,480 in 2002. 889 00:59:24,300 --> 00:59:28,580 Police in Surrey say they're growing increasingly concerned about the safety 890 00:59:28,580 --> 00:59:32,240 a 13 year old girl who hasn't been seen since Thursday afternoon. 891 00:59:33,140 --> 00:59:36,740 Before the police found her body, her parents were holding on to hopes that 892 00:59:36,740 --> 00:59:37,740 might still be alive. 893 00:59:43,560 --> 00:59:48,800 Why is that, you might ask? 894 00:59:49,220 --> 00:59:53,840 Well, because according to phone records, Millie had checked and deleted 895 00:59:53,840 --> 00:59:54,840 voicemail. 896 01:00:10,620 --> 01:00:15,240 As it turned out, members of Rupert Murdoch's corporation had been hacking 897 01:00:15,240 --> 01:00:19,080 Millie's phone, trying to be the first to reveal details of this national news 898 01:00:19,080 --> 01:00:20,080 story. 899 01:00:20,140 --> 01:00:26,460 I think this is the watershed moment when finally the public start to see and 900 01:00:26,460 --> 01:00:32,460 feel, above all, just how low and how disgusting this particular... 901 01:00:32,720 --> 01:00:39,680 newspapers methods were this was a murdered school girl and the thought 902 01:00:39,680 --> 01:00:45,980 very tight -knit circle of very senior politicians linked up very closely 903 01:00:45,980 --> 01:00:52,320 intimately with the police and with the media mogul rupert murdoch 904 01:00:52,320 --> 01:00:58,820 for 30 years as british prime ministers came and most certainly went a constant 905 01:00:58,820 --> 01:01:01,400 character in their worlds was rupert murdoch 906 01:01:02,510 --> 01:01:07,570 The billionaire media mogul who's... For years, celebrities and individuals like 907 01:01:07,570 --> 01:01:11,170 Millie had the voicemails they thought were hidden and private, accessed by 908 01:01:11,170 --> 01:01:14,470 Rupert Murdoch's corporation, at the expense of people like Millie's parents. 909 01:01:14,850 --> 01:01:18,810 And it took nearly a decade to expose the misuse of this highly personal data. 910 01:01:27,160 --> 01:01:30,880 Transparency, which bonds us together and gives us all so many friends that we 911 01:01:30,880 --> 01:01:37,780 didn't know before, but all these friends that are connected, gives the 912 01:01:37,780 --> 01:01:44,480 absolutely unparalleled in the history of humanity ability to know what's going 913 01:01:44,480 --> 01:01:47,120 on in the citizens, to find out who the dissenters are. 914 01:01:47,340 --> 01:01:50,660 The government is making whistleblowing a crime. 915 01:01:52,260 --> 01:01:55,060 They are making dissent a crime. 916 01:01:56,060 --> 01:01:59,580 especially when it embarrasses the government and calls the government to 917 01:01:59,580 --> 01:02:05,040 account. If sources are going to get discovered, and if whistleblowers cannot 918 01:02:05,040 --> 01:02:09,100 securely and anonymously provide that information to journalists, we as a 919 01:02:09,100 --> 01:02:12,660 society won't know when our rights are being silently violated. 920 01:02:25,740 --> 01:02:27,340 Of course, the president has defended his administration. 921 01:02:28,660 --> 01:02:29,840 The only way he knows how. 922 01:02:30,520 --> 01:02:35,540 If we can root out folks who have leaked, they will suffer consequences. 923 01:02:40,320 --> 01:02:41,160 If you 924 01:02:41,160 --> 01:02:47,760 look at a 925 01:02:47,760 --> 01:02:51,920 technical perspective, the technologies of maintaining privacy are actually 926 01:02:51,920 --> 01:02:52,920 running ahead. 927 01:02:53,200 --> 01:02:57,400 of the technologies that break it. For example, encryption, which can maintain 928 01:02:57,400 --> 01:02:59,740 your privacy, is running ahead of decryption. 929 01:03:00,000 --> 01:03:03,560 But what if there was a way to store information until it could be decrypted? 930 01:03:04,020 --> 01:03:07,600 US intelligence officials will soon be allowed to keep information on US 931 01:03:07,600 --> 01:03:12,300 citizens much longer than they used to, even if those citizens have no known 932 01:03:12,300 --> 01:03:13,560 ties to terrorism. 933 01:03:13,920 --> 01:03:18,100 Under new rules, the government can store data it gathers for five years. 934 01:03:18,100 --> 01:03:19,900 up from the current limit of six months. 935 01:03:23,200 --> 01:03:29,440 If Dick Cheney were elected president and wanted to detain and incessantly 936 01:03:29,440 --> 01:03:34,780 waterboard every American who sent an email making fun of his well -known 937 01:03:34,780 --> 01:03:41,780 hunting mishaps, what I'd like to know is does the NSA have the technological 938 01:03:41,780 --> 01:03:48,540 capacity to identify those Cheney bashers based upon the 939 01:03:48,540 --> 01:03:50,240 content of their emails? 940 01:03:52,110 --> 01:03:58,450 In the United States, we would have to go through an FBI process, a warrant, to 941 01:03:58,450 --> 01:04:01,110 get that and serve it to somebody to actually get it. 942 01:04:01,410 --> 01:04:04,710 But you do have the capability of doing it. But not in the United States. 943 01:04:05,200 --> 01:04:09,140 There are new questions about the National Security Agency's massive spy 944 01:04:09,140 --> 01:04:11,420 under construction in the desert of Utah. 945 01:04:11,820 --> 01:04:16,440 Once finished, it'll be five times the size of the U .S. Capitol building. The 946 01:04:16,440 --> 01:04:20,320 NSA is not allowed to spy on Americans, but now a whistleblower has come forward 947 01:04:20,320 --> 01:04:22,060 saying that the agency is doing it anyway. 948 01:04:22,360 --> 01:04:26,840 This massive agency that's collecting a tremendous amount of information every 949 01:04:26,840 --> 01:04:32,500 day by satellites and tapping the cell phones and data links and your computer 950 01:04:32,500 --> 01:04:33,960 email links and so forth. 951 01:04:34,670 --> 01:04:39,630 Then it has to store it someplace, and that's why they built Bluffdale. It's 952 01:04:39,630 --> 01:04:41,450 going to cost $2 billion. 953 01:04:41,790 --> 01:04:48,630 It's being built in this area on a military base outside of Salt Lake City 954 01:04:48,630 --> 01:04:54,850 Bluffdale. As I said, they had to actually extend the boundary of the town 955 01:04:54,850 --> 01:04:55,850 would fit into it. 956 01:04:56,250 --> 01:05:02,010 And the whole purpose of this is the centerpiece of this massive 957 01:05:02,680 --> 01:05:06,020 this network that was created after 9 -11. 958 01:05:07,900 --> 01:05:12,600 The reality of information technology is it progresses exponentially, only 959 01:05:12,600 --> 01:05:13,620 information technology. 960 01:05:14,320 --> 01:05:18,680 Exponential growth starts out very slow, looks like nothing's happening, you're 961 01:05:18,680 --> 01:05:23,100 doubling tiny little numbers, and suddenly it takes off. And we've seen 962 01:05:23,100 --> 01:05:27,040 with paradigm after paradigm, like social networks in recent times. 963 01:05:27,460 --> 01:05:32,330 In 1984, to store one gigabyte of data, cost $85 ,000. 964 01:05:32,910 --> 01:05:35,590 By 2012, it cost about $0 .05. 965 01:05:36,630 --> 01:05:40,030 In the city of Chongqing, there are about 500 ,000 cameras. 966 01:05:40,330 --> 01:05:44,590 In 2012, the cost of permanently recording a high -resolution feed was 967 01:05:44,590 --> 01:05:48,690 million. By the year 2020, the projected cost is less than $3 million. 968 01:05:49,050 --> 01:05:54,150 The UK, being one of the cultures that introduced cameras most ubiquitously and 969 01:05:54,150 --> 01:05:57,730 most quickly, so far the population seems fine with it. 970 01:05:58,070 --> 01:05:59,570 If they weren't, I... 971 01:05:59,790 --> 01:06:00,790 They know who to call. 972 01:06:01,830 --> 01:06:08,510 There are 2 ,000 cameras, and soon there will be 3 ,000, all of which feed into 973 01:06:08,510 --> 01:06:11,650 this control center housed in a secret location. 974 01:06:12,610 --> 01:06:18,770 And I can call up in real time all instances where a camera caught someone 975 01:06:18,770 --> 01:06:23,850 wearing a red shirt. This is the shape and the size of a potentially suspicious 976 01:06:23,850 --> 01:06:25,270 unattended package. 977 01:06:26,080 --> 01:06:30,440 Many police departments set to use controversial new devices capable of 978 01:06:30,440 --> 01:06:34,680 people's faces, then checking that information against a criminal database. 979 01:06:35,060 --> 01:06:39,280 When we're at war, when you're protecting your society against people 980 01:06:39,280 --> 01:06:43,940 to come in and kill civilians, you have to be able to defend what we're doing. 981 01:06:44,180 --> 01:06:49,520 You have to be able to defend our way of life, and you have to put these powers 982 01:06:49,520 --> 01:06:53,480 into somebody's hand. According to the Brookings Institution, This kind of 983 01:06:53,480 --> 01:06:56,800 pervasive monitoring will provide what amounts to a time machine, allowing 984 01:06:56,800 --> 01:06:59,580 authoritarian governments to perform retrospective surveillance. 985 01:07:00,060 --> 01:07:04,540 For example, if an anti -regime demonstrator previously unknown to 986 01:07:04,540 --> 01:07:08,780 services is arrested, it will be possible to go back in time to 987 01:07:08,780 --> 01:07:12,420 demonstrator's phone conversations, automobile travels, and the people he or 988 01:07:12,420 --> 01:07:15,120 met in the months and even years leading up to the arrest. 989 01:07:18,100 --> 01:07:21,520 The government is using the existence of terms of service. 990 01:07:22,040 --> 01:07:24,500 to justify the surveillance state that we now live in. 991 01:07:24,760 --> 01:07:28,940 The messages are free to use, and most importantly, they're encrypted, so the 992 01:07:28,940 --> 01:07:32,620 police can't actually get in there to encrypt what's happened. So that's 993 01:07:32,620 --> 01:07:35,400 prompted calls to shut down the entire network. 994 01:07:35,940 --> 01:07:39,220 It's easy to justify using these technologies to stop a riot. 995 01:07:39,660 --> 01:07:42,740 But shouldn't we be concerned when the government is able to read our emails, 996 01:07:43,020 --> 01:07:47,040 text messages, phone calls, search history, to track our movements and 997 01:07:47,040 --> 01:07:47,999 free speech? 998 01:07:48,000 --> 01:07:50,060 What crime did that 7th grade boy really commit? 999 01:07:50,590 --> 01:07:53,130 Is having zombies at a row wedding really so bad? 1000 01:07:53,870 --> 01:07:55,070 What about Millie's parents? 1001 01:07:55,670 --> 01:07:58,850 And what happens when these technologies are used to watch peaceful protesters, 1002 01:07:59,150 --> 01:08:02,350 like all of the people that occupy Wall Street or the Tea Party folks? 1003 01:08:03,110 --> 01:08:06,490 What happens if the government doesn't like tents being set up? 1004 01:08:09,710 --> 01:08:16,310 Despite all of this, 1005 01:08:16,410 --> 01:08:18,590 it was starting to seem like, so what? 1006 01:08:19,260 --> 01:08:21,479 So what if the government can acquire all of this information? 1007 01:08:22,140 --> 01:08:24,439 Maybe it's good they can keep the peace when riots are happening. 1008 01:08:25,200 --> 01:08:27,800 And besides, maybe it was already too late. 1009 01:08:35,840 --> 01:08:37,439 Do you think privacy is dead? 1010 01:08:43,660 --> 01:08:44,939 I mean, it's certainly dying. 1011 01:08:46,600 --> 01:08:47,960 Whether or not it... 1012 01:08:51,689 --> 01:08:57,569 Privacy is going to remain dead unless there's a really fundamental shift in 1013 01:08:57,569 --> 01:09:02,510 the dynamics by which that's decided, by which I mean the only real effective 1014 01:09:02,510 --> 01:09:07,990 response is to monitor and to change the behavior, the tendencies of the 1015 01:09:07,990 --> 01:09:12,390 intelligence industry and law enforcement and all that, and even 1016 01:09:13,250 --> 01:09:15,310 And that's very, very unlikely. 1017 01:09:15,670 --> 01:09:19,010 I don't know exactly who the us is, but I'm very critical of us. 1018 01:09:20,270 --> 01:09:24,930 I think that this is an area in which we have allowed ourselves to be smitten. 1019 01:09:25,569 --> 01:09:32,350 We want this technology to grow and grow, and we don't want anything to rain 1020 01:09:32,350 --> 01:09:33,350 our parade. 1021 01:09:34,010 --> 01:09:40,790 And we have woken up to the privacy concerns, in 1022 01:09:40,790 --> 01:09:43,590 my view, at least four years too late. 1023 01:09:44,649 --> 01:09:45,649 Yeah, 1024 01:09:47,050 --> 01:09:48,050 without question. 1025 01:09:48,830 --> 01:09:50,050 Without question private, yeah. 1026 01:09:51,330 --> 01:09:53,569 It's safe to work under the assumption that nothing's private. 1027 01:09:53,990 --> 01:09:56,970 You know, anything that's been digitized is not private. 1028 01:09:57,670 --> 01:09:59,990 And that is terrifying. 1029 01:10:01,030 --> 01:10:05,650 When this becomes a sign of a blood cell, and I can just send them into my 1030 01:10:05,650 --> 01:10:09,910 and my body through the bloodstream, this will become quite ubiquitous, and 1031 01:10:09,910 --> 01:10:13,510 really will be part of who we are. And people say, well, okay, that's going to 1032 01:10:13,510 --> 01:10:15,030 be a real threshold. 1033 01:10:15,580 --> 01:10:20,480 to move beyond, but I don't think so. It's a very smooth continuum from, you 1034 01:10:20,480 --> 01:10:24,420 know, when I was a student and had to take my bicycle to get to the computer 1035 01:10:24,420 --> 01:10:27,860 having it in my pocket to having it in my body. 1036 01:10:28,640 --> 01:10:31,660 It's a convenient place to put it. I won't lose it that way. 1037 01:10:34,460 --> 01:10:37,900 But they say if you put a frog in a pot of water and slowly turn up the heat, 1038 01:10:38,040 --> 01:10:41,980 the frog will just die because it doesn't realize it's boiling. 1039 01:10:42,760 --> 01:10:43,780 And I think that... 1040 01:10:45,480 --> 01:10:49,780 Like anything else, I think we're opting in a centimeter at a time. 1041 01:10:50,760 --> 01:10:54,040 And, you know, pretty soon you're pretty far down the road. You look behind you 1042 01:10:54,040 --> 01:10:56,440 and you sort of wonder how you got where you were. 1043 01:10:57,960 --> 01:10:59,060 I think that's true. 1044 01:11:01,800 --> 01:11:08,340 It's just completely out of control. I mean, it's just sky's the limit, you 1045 01:11:08,340 --> 01:11:10,920 know. They know everything about us now. 1046 01:11:12,030 --> 01:11:16,570 It takes someone who's in charge of laws having what is being done to American 1047 01:11:16,570 --> 01:11:20,210 citizens done to their email account, done to their Facebook profile. 1048 01:11:20,750 --> 01:11:27,570 All these powerful institutions, they're not subject to the same evasions of 1049 01:11:27,570 --> 01:11:29,850 privacy as the rest of us are. 1050 01:11:30,350 --> 01:11:33,810 Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Google, once said, If you have something that you 1051 01:11:33,810 --> 01:11:36,690 want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place. 1052 01:11:37,770 --> 01:11:39,250 Then he got very angry. 1053 01:11:39,980 --> 01:11:43,420 when CNET, which is owned by CBS, published a picture of his house? 1054 01:11:51,520 --> 01:11:56,860 Well, when you ask Google about Do Not Track, they claim we have to understand 1055 01:11:56,860 --> 01:11:59,740 how to define that before we can implement any technology. 1056 01:12:00,860 --> 01:12:04,200 Do Not Track is pretty simple. It means we don't want to be tracked. 1057 01:12:05,320 --> 01:12:09,400 The only reason Google doesn't understand it... is because Google 1058 01:12:09,400 --> 01:12:10,400 to implement it. 1059 01:12:37,170 --> 01:12:43,830 Someone comes and makes it no longer practical for them to engage in that 1060 01:12:43,830 --> 01:12:44,830 of activity. 1061 01:12:45,270 --> 01:12:47,570 Pressure is put upon CEOs of the companies. 1062 01:12:47,810 --> 01:12:48,930 They're going to engage in it. 1063 01:13:03,470 --> 01:13:04,470 Dawn. 1064 01:13:05,900 --> 01:13:07,840 We're going by the Facebook campus right now. 1065 01:13:08,340 --> 01:13:09,980 Really have no idea what to expect. 1066 01:13:13,240 --> 01:13:14,240 We've not had breakfast. 1067 01:13:22,120 --> 01:13:27,560 He'll know that I checked in here, too. That's good. He'll know that I'm right 1068 01:13:27,560 --> 01:13:28,560 next to his house. 1069 01:13:30,640 --> 01:13:32,680 Here's the exact quote from Mark. 1070 01:13:33,370 --> 01:13:37,270 So, having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity. 1071 01:13:39,490 --> 01:13:40,490 Lack of integrity. 1072 01:13:42,450 --> 01:13:47,110 They just did a knockup on his door, so it seems very likely that we might get a 1073 01:13:47,110 --> 01:13:48,690 Mark Zuckerberg sighting today. 1074 01:13:54,510 --> 01:13:58,650 I mean, you might not be wrong, Vince. You might actually have... Ben might 1075 01:13:58,650 --> 01:13:59,650 actually have a tunnel. 1076 01:14:08,870 --> 01:14:09,870 Mr. 1077 01:14:18,910 --> 01:14:19,910 Zuckerberg? 1078 01:14:20,290 --> 01:14:21,510 Hey, I'm working on a documentary. 1079 01:14:22,430 --> 01:14:25,950 I have a little blog here, but I'm wondering if I could just ask you a 1080 01:14:25,950 --> 01:14:26,950 questions. 1081 01:14:27,170 --> 01:14:28,170 Sorry. 1082 01:14:28,850 --> 01:14:29,850 Really? 1083 01:14:48,070 --> 01:14:52,590 Mark Zuckerberg had asked me to please not record him, so we shut off the main 1084 01:14:52,590 --> 01:14:53,590 camera. 1085 01:14:53,710 --> 01:14:57,150 But since Mark doesn't seem to mind storing our data after we think it's 1086 01:14:57,150 --> 01:15:00,220 deleted, this... only seemed fair. 1087 01:15:12,300 --> 01:15:16,700 There's a major difference here. 1088 01:15:17,380 --> 01:15:19,720 Mark loosens up after he thinks we've stopped recording. 1089 01:15:20,240 --> 01:15:22,320 And do you see that? That right there. 1090 01:15:23,080 --> 01:15:24,080 That's a smile. 1091 01:15:24,900 --> 01:15:26,500 Mark Zuckerberg smiled at me. 1092 01:15:27,180 --> 01:15:28,180 And you know why? 1093 01:15:28,670 --> 01:15:31,450 because he thought I had stopped recording, and he was relieved. 1094 01:15:33,030 --> 01:15:37,070 Imagine what a relief it would be if all of these companies and the government 1095 01:15:37,070 --> 01:15:41,490 stopped recording everything we do, if we could just make a simple request to 1096 01:15:41,490 --> 01:15:44,130 them, something that Mark Zuckerberg knows how to ask for. 1097 01:15:45,030 --> 01:15:46,110 Can you please not? 1098 01:15:46,850 --> 01:15:50,970 Can you please not record us, monitor us, and share our information, unless we 1099 01:15:50,970 --> 01:15:51,970 ask first? 1100 01:15:52,270 --> 01:15:54,230 We need terms and conditions that are reasonable. 1101 01:15:54,920 --> 01:15:58,300 And we need privacy policies to promote the most basic principles of our 1102 01:15:58,300 --> 01:16:00,380 democracy, rather than taking them away. 1103 01:16:01,640 --> 01:16:06,360 Or, as a young senator once said, back before he became president, We need to 1104 01:16:06,360 --> 01:16:10,000 find a way forward to make sure that we can stop terrorists while protecting 1105 01:16:10,000 --> 01:16:13,560 privacy and liberty of innocent Americans. 1106 01:16:14,040 --> 01:16:17,700 We have to find a way to give the president the power he needs to protect 1107 01:16:17,700 --> 01:16:21,080 while making sure that he doesn't abuse that power. 1108 01:16:21,340 --> 01:16:23,840 And that simple principle that... 1109 01:16:25,150 --> 01:16:32,050 There's somebody watching the watcher, whether that's on an issue of freedom 1110 01:16:32,050 --> 01:16:36,590 of the press or it's an issue of warrantless wiretaps. That simple 1111 01:16:36,590 --> 01:16:39,070 one that we can't give up, and we don't have to give up. 1112 01:16:39,970 --> 01:16:43,190 Well, Mr. President, we are watching. 1113 01:16:43,890 --> 01:16:48,210 And I guess we have to ask ourselves one simple question. 1114 01:16:50,130 --> 01:16:51,130 Do we agree? 1115 01:17:08,300 --> 01:17:14,560 Cold feet and a tie rise to the occasion A million tiny 1116 01:17:14,560 --> 01:17:21,520 flashlights, I gotta turn it off Cold feet and a tie rise 1117 01:17:21,520 --> 01:17:28,140 to the occasion A million tiny flashlights, I gotta turn it off 1118 01:17:28,140 --> 01:17:29,220 For a while 1119 01:17:45,000 --> 01:17:50,080 Washington is caught in its very own episode of spy versus spy. The tactics 1120 01:17:50,080 --> 01:17:53,640 employed by top intelligence gathering teams at the CIA, sifting through IP 1121 01:17:53,640 --> 01:17:57,360 addresses, emails, and fake drop boxes, have now been turned against the 1122 01:17:57,360 --> 01:17:59,040 intelligence community's top officials. 1123 01:18:00,140 --> 01:18:06,880 The FBI uncovered evidence 1124 01:18:06,880 --> 01:18:11,220 of an affair between Petraeus and his biographer Paula Broadwood. That's 1125 01:18:11,900 --> 01:18:15,720 Petraeus had an affair with the author of his fawning biography, All In. 1126 01:18:21,980 --> 01:18:24,280 These did not implicate criminal activity. 1127 01:18:24,600 --> 01:18:26,580 These did not implicate national security. 1128 01:18:26,960 --> 01:18:31,140 These were not a threat to David Petraeus, the person, or to General 1129 01:18:31,180 --> 01:18:34,440 the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 1130 01:18:35,160 --> 01:18:37,700 Those are not my words. Those are the FBI's words. 1131 01:18:46,120 --> 01:18:49,660 But instead of actually sending those emails, in many cases, they wrote them 1132 01:18:49,660 --> 01:18:53,640 drafts in a Gmail account they both had access to. And that way they could both 1133 01:18:53,640 --> 01:18:57,660 log on and check the draft folder, never having to actually hit send. 1134 01:18:57,900 --> 01:19:00,940 It's very embarrassing for the Obama administration and for its national 1135 01:19:00,940 --> 01:19:01,940 security command. 1136 01:19:09,640 --> 01:19:14,200 It's troubling because there are laws that the FBI has to follow and he has 1137 01:19:14,200 --> 01:19:19,520 right to be protected from an unwarranted, unjustified investigation 1138 01:19:19,520 --> 01:19:22,120 or anyone. People don't really know how they're being monitored and they think, 1139 01:19:22,200 --> 01:19:25,900 well, hey, if it's working, if we keep stopping another 9 -11, then it's, 1140 01:19:26,260 --> 01:19:27,260 worth it. 1141 01:19:50,120 --> 01:19:56,420 The greatest fear that I have regarding the outcome for 1142 01:19:56,420 --> 01:19:59,600 America of these disclosures is that nothing will change. 104694

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