All language subtitles for Air.Crash.Investigation.S24E02.Disaster.at.Dutch.Harbor.PROPER.1080p.HDTV.x264.STER.en

While landing at Dutch Harbor, Alaska,

Hang on, I'm sliding.

the pilots of PenAir flight 3296
run out of runway.

All I could see is water.

Everyone brace!

We're gonna go in.

Not everyone makes it out alive.

You never want to lose
a passenger, for any reason.

These are pretty beat up.

NTSB investigators must
piece together the evidence.

We've got a dark 170 foot long skid mark.

So the tire blew.

We needed to do a deeper dive.

They soon discover a critical oversight.

There's no numbering on these wires.

That was really the "aha" moment.

Mayday. Mayday.

PULL UP!

[indistinct radio chatter]

PenAir flight 3296 cruises
over Alaska's Aleutian Islands.

We should be getting
directions here to descend soon.

I'm gonna see if I can't get the weather.

Yeah, it's changed. Weather's
been updated. It's 310 at 11 knots.

56 year old Captain Paul
Wells is a new hire to PenAir,

but has 25 years of
experience with other airlines.

Mm 'kay.

Paul is, an amazing guy.
I flew with him several times.

He was, a true decision maker as a captain.

Peninsula 3296,
descend pilot's discretion.

Maintain flight level 290.

Pilot's discretion 290, Peninsula 3296.

39 year old First Officer Justin Lunn
has been with PenAir for five months.

I couldn't have been
with a better copilot.

He's a very thorough
individual, um, ex-military.

There are 39 passengers on today's flight,

including a high school swim
team and their chaperones.

Commercial pilot Steve Ranney
is escorting his son, Jacob.

We were on the flight,
um, to go to a swim meet.

We'd worked really hard raising the
money for the trip. It was a big deal.

It's a two hour flight from Anchorage to
Unalaska Airport, also known as Dutch Harbor.

The journey crosses some of the most
rugged and isolated terrain in the world.

The flight is over a
spectacular part of Alaska.

The entire, um, Alaska Peninsula is in view.

It's a great view. You can go
grab a window seat further back.

My son did move to a couple of rows
back so that he could get that view, too.

The pilots are flying a
Swedish made Saab 2000.

Saab 2000 is a twin-engine turbojet
aircraft. It seats approximately 50 people.

It's a good aircraft for reaching
remote communities in Alaska.

Dutch Ops 3296.

Thirty minutes before landing,
the first officer contacts the weather

observer at Unalaska Airport
for the latest conditions.

Hello, 3296. Right now, winds,

210 at 6 knots, gusting to 14.

Temperature 8, dew point 1.

Altimeter 29.50.

All right, copy the weather.

The airport at Dutch
Harbor has a short runway,

vulnerable to severe and
unpredictable weather.

Pilots need special training to land here.

The terrain around the area in
Dutch Harbor is mountainous.

The wind conditions can change in seconds.

Turbulence can be bad. Icing can be bad.
So we have dedicated weather observers.

That is, invaluable.

What did she say the wind was?

Wind was 210.

-Pretty much a direct crosswind.
-Hm.

I guess we can go ahead
and start heading down.

All right.

Peninsula 3296, are you
planning on RNAV runway 31?

Twenty minutes before landing,
Anchorage Air Traffic Control

asks the pilots about
their runway preference.

Affirmative. Uh, uh, negative.

We want the RNAV 13, Peninsula 3296.

Unalaska Airport is on an island,
tucked behind a 1,600 foot mountain.

Planes can land in either direction,

runway 13 from the west,
or runway 31 from the east.

Most pilots would prefer to use runway 13,
basically because they have more room to

maneuver, more room to escape if you've got
to punch out, or you've got to go around.

And just like the other day, if there's
any major changes in the wind,

-we'll just.
-We'll switch.

We always prepare for the
worst and hope for the best.

Minimize risk. That's what we do.

Ladies and gentlemen, in order to…

Twelve miles from the airport,
passengers prepare for landing.

…items are stowed completely beneath the
seat in front of you.

All right. Flaps 20.
Flight attendant is secure.

Flaps set 20. Indicating 20.

Gear down.

Four minutes from the airport,
the crew begins the landing procedure.

Down three green.

At less than 1,000 feet,

the plane is rocked by turbulence.

Ah, bump.

There's a bit of a bump there too.

-Yeah.
-Yeah, there you go.

It's gonna be ugly in here, isn't it?

Hmm.

Paul was fighting the winds
as we were coming in.

Seconds from touchdown, Captain Wells
notices he's too high for a safe landing.

An updraft may cause you to balloon,
so that causes you to go high.

-What do you think?
-Go around.

At Dutch Harbor, I don't take chances.
If we're high, we're going around.

Max power.

I would not have been able to safely,

get back down, without,
putting people at, horrible risk.

The pilot pulled up and went around.

I was assuming it was
because of, uh, visibility issues.

Dutch Harbor traffic,
Peninsula 3296, going around.

We're gonna come back around for a visual.

We were contending with the terrain,

a lower layer of clouds, and
maintaining a safe airspeed.

You're very busy scanning
inside and outside of the airplane.

It only takes three minutes before
the pilots of PenAir flight 3296

are ready to attempt another landing.

If we couldn't land on this attempt,
then we would go to our alternate airport.

200.

-Plus 10, you got it?
-Got it.

The pilots are seconds from touching down.

-Sink rate.
-Yeah, I know.

Seemed like we floated down the runway
quite a bit, which didn't alarm me too much.

-Down.
-Okay, you got the yoke.

I got it yeah, we're down there, 80 knots.

As the captain begins slowing the plane,

something isn't right.

I was pushing on the brakes harder,

and noticing that I'm not getting
any more effect from the brakes.

When I saw the wind suck,
the wind was definitely strong.

And at that point,
all alarm bells went off in me.

-Brakes.
-I got 'em all the way down.

The pilots cannot
reduce their plane's speed.

I had to make a decision on whether
to continue the landing or abort.

In an instant, I realized that,

no, there's not enough room
to get the aircraft airborne again.

In the cabin, Steve Ranney notices, too.

Brace!

Everyone brace!

I actually went in the brace position and
I told the passengers around me to brace.

Hang on, I'm sliding.

The plane is swerving back and forth.

I thought I was going to be able
to turn off into the taxi area,

but I was going too fast.

The pilots are running out of runway.

All I could see is water.

The pilots of PenAir flight 3296
are unable to stop their airplane.

I saw the perimeter road
and I told Paul, go right, go right!

The only option was the road.

The plane crashes through a fence,

strikes a boulder and is
propelled towards the water.

That destroyed our exit plan.

They have only a few seconds to stop.

Now all I kept thinking was
"We're going to go in."

The left engine strikes a
signal post and road sign,

shattering the propellers
into deadly fragments.

Holy crap.

We need to evacuate.

Evacuate right-hand side.
Get out and get away.

In the cabin, it's eerily quiet.

I could feel blood running down my face
and my shoulder was sore and my head hurt.

It was very, very surreal.

a propeller blade has pierced
the cabin and struck Steve Ranney.

There was a propeller blade stuck,
up in the ceiling right up against me.

Jacob, get off the plane!
Don't wait for me!

Steve's son, Jacob, is lucky to
walk away from the accident unharmed.

He would not have survived, in the seat

next to me because the blade
was literally right there.

But a passenger near
him is severely injured.

I had had a fair amount
of training because of my job,

and so it was more or less an automatic
reflex to go over and, you know,

check for his pulse
see if he's still breathing.

Within minutes emergency
responders arrive and transport

ten injured passengers to hospital.

38 year old passenger David
Altman later succumbs to his injuries.

In ten years, he's one of only two people

to be killed on a domestic
flight in the United States.

I was met in the hospital by a doctor.

They told me he hadn't made it,
and that was a, a crushing blow.

Investigators from the NTSB,
the National Transportation Safety Board

are dispatched to the area
as the plane is hoisted

onto a barge and taken
to a secure location.

We weren't able to offload it
the next day because of the weather,

so it took a day,
to get the airplane secured.

We're on record at 5:46 p.m.

Investigators are eager
to interview the pilot.

Memories tend to fade
and they tend to change,

so we want to get to the
information as soon as possible.

I didn't even have any sleep before I
showed up for that interview.

And so you're not, you know,
you're not 100% clear.

Okay.

Take us through the events
leading up to the accident.

Um…

Everything was, normal.
Just a, nice flight.

"Everything was going fine until it wasn't."

And this is pretty common
when we talk to pilots after accidents.

When I went to turn off the anti-ice
I, got out of position on final.

Captain Wells explains
that the plane was hit by

an updraft just as he took
his eyes off the gauges.

-What do you think?
-Go around.

Max power.

We were too high.

And instead of doing
the stabilized approach,

and continue to the runway,
we elected to go around.

So you're now set up for a second landing.

Do you remember your speed at touchdown?

126.

And where did you touch down?

I planted it pretty much on the 1,000,
right on the touchdown zone.

Put it in reverse, and then I
noticed it had stopped decelerating.

I, pushed down as hard as I could.

But there was no response from the brakes.

Brakes!

I got 'em all the way down.

-No response?
-Exactly.

Zero braking. But like on ice.

That was puzzling. We knew we had to
look at the braking system to understand

what was occurring there.

Did you get an update
from the weather observer?

Yes they said,
anywhere from 10 to 20 knots.

The winds were changing.

Any concerns at all
on the second approach?

The winds were dying down on the water.
It looked like a direct crosswind.

I, had no doubt that this was
going to be a fine approach.

The captain said that he
believed that they were flying

into a crosswind and was
confident in that approach.

Your FO did the
pre-flight on the aircraft?

He did.

Did he bring anything to your attention
at all that was out of the ordinary?

He did, actually.

He noticed something
with one of the tires.

-Pre-flight inspection complete.
-Any issues?

Bald spot on the left outboard.

Investigators learn that a
pre-flight inspection of flight 3296,

revealed a worn tire on
the left outboard wheel.

It's not showing any cord.
I'm not worried about it.

It was not down past
the red line on the tire

and didn't, to me, appear
to be of any concern.

I've had maintenance
come to look at tires,

that are in very similar
conditions to this tire.

They've basically said
"It's within serviceable limits,

and you can continue your flight."

Have you reached any
conclusion, just in your own head,

about what you think went
wrong or may have happened?

If I had to make my best guess,
I don't think it was brake failure.

I think more than likely, it was one of
those showers that put down some sleet or

hail on the runway and,
I just couldn't see it.

That's the, only thing I can think of.

Anything else you'd like to add?

I can't be more proud…

I'm sorry.

Take your time.

I couldn't be more proud of my crew.

The captain did get rather emotional,
given his involvement in the accident.

So, they came in on runway
13 and the pilot said his airspeed

was 126 knots and they touched
down at the 1,000 foot mark.

Why did flight 3296 come off the runway?

At that speed, they should have been able
to stop well before the end of the runway.

Specifically for runway overruns,
we're looking at how the airplane was

configured, what those runway lengths were,

as well as what it takes operationally,
to fly that airplane into the airport.

What were the runway conditions?

Was there rain, ice, snow, anything on
that runway that would have prevented the

airplane from stopping on its surface?

No rain. Seven degrees.

-So, hydroplaning is out of the question.
-Too warm for ice to form.

Investigators eliminate
the captain's theory.

Weather conditions did not
make the runway slippery.

In this case, the
runway wasn't contaminated.

But there was plenty of information
that the runway can tell us.

What about debris, skid marks?
Where are we at with the runway survey?

Got it here.

The team looks for any
evidence left behind on the runway.

The runway evidence was critical.
We walked the runway numerous times.

We, documented the heck out of the runway.

Starting at 1,835 feet past the threshold,
we've got a dark 170 foot long skid mark.

Then there's further
skidding down the runway.

Skid marks on the tarmac
are made when the wheels lock.

Then the plane crosses the center line to
the right and then straightens out.

Which tire skidded?

Based on the position of the skid mark,
it's outboard tire, left side.

The Saab 2000 has four
main wheels that brake.

Why would only one of them skid?

Wasn't that the one with the bald spot?

Yup.

The tire mark was a continuous black mark.
It didn't have any tread marks on it.

So we knew, right off
the bat that the tire was

skidding on the bald
spot and not on the tread.

We also found tire fragments, here.

-So the tire blew?
-Yeah.

Hold on. That's one heck of a long skid.

Even a brand new tire would have blown.

The fact that the airplane
was skidding on the bald spot,

may have caused it to burst
a fraction of a second earlier,

but in the end, it
wasn't a contributing factor.

This shouldn't happen.
The plane has an anti-skid system.

The anti-skid system is
activated when one of the

sensors on the four main
wheels detects a skid.

The brake pressure is released, either on
both inboard wheels or both outboard

wheels, ensuring the plane remains stable

while allowing the other two
wheels to slow the plane.

After we first noticed that there was a
flat spot and a hole in the tire,

we were immediately drawn
to the anti-skid system because

that's the purpose of the
anti-skid system, to stop skids.

Did the system fail, causing
flight 3296 to run off the runway?

Any news?

It's going to take some
time for the technicians

to break down and test those brakes.

Like you said, that is a long skid.

Why would they need
to brake so hard for so long?

In the meantime, investigators consider
other theories about the long skid marks.

Overweight?

Could the plane have exceeded its
maximum allowable landing weight,

requiring the pilot to
brake harder than usual?

A heavier airplane
essentially has, more inertia.

So, when a heavier airplane comes in to
land, it would take longer to stop.

According to the manifest, the captain
calculated their landing weight at,

45,213 pounds.

And the maximum allowable?

46,114.

900 pounds under.
Close, but, within the limits.

The airplane was not
overloaded, and we could rule out,

an overweight airplane as a
contributing factor for this event.

What else might cause
a pilot to brake so hard?

The captain said that
they had a crosswind,

but, maybe the direction
changed to a tailwind.

A tailwind during landing
essentially means that you are

moving faster over the ground
than you normally would.

So you would take up more space
on the runway to safely stop.

The automated weather system
only gives hourly reports.

Real-time updates come from a
weather observer at the airport.

I'll deal with that.

I'll go help with the anti-skid system.

Could flight 3296 have been hit
by an unexpected gust of wind,

causing it to land too fast,
and overshoot the runway?

-Thanks for coming in.
-You bet.

Investigators question the on-site
weather observer at Unalaska Airport,

about the wind conditions
when PenAir flight 3296 landed.

So first, um, how early do you start
providing crews with weather data?

About 20 to 30 minutes out.

-And up until when?
-Two to three miles out.

Dutch Harbor is a very unique airport.

The topography around
the runway actually lends

to very rapidly changing
weather conditions.

And so a weather observer on
the ground provides the ability

to get updated information
to pilots as it's happening.

And what was the weather like at the
airport when PenAir was on approach?

There was a storm coming in,
but at the time it was clear.

And what about the wind
on the first attempt?

270 degrees at 10 knots.

Looks like a crosswind.
And second attempt?

About three minutes out
the wind shifted around to,

290 at 16 knots, gusting to 30 knots.

-30 knot tailwind?
-Mm-hmm.

That would be an excessive tailwind.

If a pilot decides to
land with that tailwind,

they essentially become a test pilot.

What about when they landed?
What was the tailwind then?

The winds were, 15 knots.

Investigators confirm their
suspicions about a tailwind on landing.

-Thank you for your time.
-My pleasure.

One danger associated with landing in a
tailwind is, excessive ground speed,

which potentially puts
you in a situation where

you run out of runway to
safely stop the airplane.

What's the Saab 2000
max tailwind for landing?

Was a 15 knot tailwind
too much for the Saab to manage?

15 knots.

Right at the limit.
Why would they risk it?

-Down.
-Okay, you got the yoke.

I got it yeah, we're down there.

Investigators now know the pilots of PenAir
3296 approached a difficult airport in

tricky conditions, touching down with
a tailwind nearing the plane's limits.

-Brakes.
-I got 'em all the way down.

Okay. Weight roughly 45,000 pounds.
Speed at touchdown 126 knots.

Investigators calculate how a 15 knot
tailwind affects the pilot's ability to stop.

Our aircraft performance group developed
several scenarios, to understand whether

an aircraft would be able to
stop given those circumstances.

Tailwind 15 knots, flaps 20.

And let's do a loss of half of the
braking power because of the skid.

When the left outboard tire began to skid,
the Saab's anti-skid system would have

released brake pressure to both outboard
wheels, drastically reducing braking power.

They had room to spare.

With a tailwind of 15 knots
and two working brakes,

the plane could have stopped.

What are we missing?

Let's look at the FDR data.

Hold on a sec.

Just after touchdown,
there's an anti-skid fault caution.

This supports investigators' earlier
suspicions that an anti-skid failure

played a part in the accident.

Hang on, I'm sliding.

We gotta get to the
bottom of that warning.

In this case we did have a fault,
on the flight data recorder,

related to this system
that we couldn't explain.

And so, with that information, uh,
we needed to do a deeper dive, in a lab.

No issues with the control unit.
Wheel sensors.

Same with the control valves.

We tested all the components,
of the anti-skid system.

There were no significant faults.
So, it was a mystery.

There's still the cables
that connect the components.

Investigators focus on the wires that
carry signals from the wheels.

Right here.
Let's take a look at the wiring.

They request that the cables
be removed from the left landing gear,

as that was the side that locked.

Hey there. Can we get those
wire harnesses sent up to the lab?

When the airplane departed the runway,
it hit a ditch and some larger boulders.

And, it collapsed the left main gear,
which caused the wiring to fracture.

These are pretty beat up.

Investigators examine where the
cables were connected to the wheels.

These are identical.
Can't tell the left one from the right.

The team discovers a potential design
flaw within the anti-skid system.

The connectors at the wheels
didn't have any distinguishing features.

So this created potential for miswiring.

Could the brake cables have
been connected to the wrong wheels?

Investigators examine the
wires inside the cables.

Normally, we're able to open up a wiring
bundle and look at the wire numbers on the

wires and compare it
to an electrical diagram

and determine if it's connected properly.

There's no numbering on these wires.

We found the wires were so small, the
manufacturer didn't put wire numbers on them.

So we were concerned
about not being able to

determine if they're correctly connected.

There should be three wires
inside the anti-skid cables.

So we got three here.

Then investigators notice
something out of the ordinary.

There's four wires here.

There's an extra wire on
the top half of this cable.

The wiring inside the top and bottom half
of the outboard cable, doesn't match.

There's four in each of these.

The top outboard cable and the bottom
inboard cable each had an extra wire,

which means only one thing.

They're crossed.
No wonder the anti-skid system failed.

When the left outboard
wheel began to skid,

the anti-skid system mistakenly
released pressure to the inboard brakes.

As a result, the skid continued
and the left outboard tire burst.

That was really the "aha" moment.

When you have crossed wires, the airplane
is then dumping the brake pressure to the

two, perfectly good wheels,
and allowing the other tire to skid.

-Brakes.
-I got 'em all the way down.

Without braking power to the two inboard
wheels, and a blown left outboard tire,

the pilots had a massively
reduced ability to brake.

You're reducing the effective
braking capacity by 75%

and now only the right outboard
tire is providing braking.

The cables have to go through
the entire landing gear.

How did maintenance workers mistakenly
cross the wires of the braking system,

leaving the pilots of PenAir
flight 3296 with only one

of four main landing gear
brakes to stop their plane?

See? It's not a straight line.

And the wheel attachments are identical.

So imagine trying to
feed two wires through

a small hole at the
base of the landing gear.

How do you know which one went to
the left and which one went to the right?

It would just be so easy
to confuse the two.

How long could these have been crossed?

According to the records, there was a full
overhaul of the left main landing gear.

-When?
-January, 2017.

The wires were crossed two and
a half years prior to the accident.

We found out that the
aircraft had been sitting,

uh, for a couple of years, in overhaul.

And there wasn't any sort of procedure, to
check to see if there was any cross wiring.

So how many flights did it make
once it was back in service?

About 500.

They learned that the misrouted anti-skid
wiring went undetected for nearly four months.

So why did 500 flights manage
to stop but not these guys?

Maybe the malfunction was
happening just, on a smaller scale.

The balding tire?

Was the worn left outboard tire,

an indication of the
malfunctioning anti-skid system?

We suspected that there
were events of skidding.

But the difficult thing is, it would have
to skid more than a second and a half,

for the airplane, to display a fault,
that the s-system was malfunctioning.

So this could have been
happening gradually,

with repeated small skids
creating the bald spot on the tire.

Yeah. But when they landed at
that speed with that tailwind,

they braked longer and
harder than in previous flights.

-Brakes!
-I got 'em all the way down.

That's really the
insidious nature of this fault.

You're not going to find out
about this cross wiring until

you really need it when
you're slamming on the brakes.

Ah! Hang on. I'm sliding.

With the hidden anti-skid fault,

investigators conclude
the pilots of PenAir flight 3296

could not have stopped
their plane on runway 13.

There's one thing I'm curious about.

Could they have stopped if they landed
into the wind on runway 31 instead?

It's possible.

Their landing speeds would
have been slower and the drag

caused by the extra wind,
would have stopped it in time.

Then why did they choose
runway 13 and the tailwind?

Did the pilots of PenAir flight 3296,
ignore crucial information about the wind

and execute a risky landing?

The decision to land on runway 13 with the
reported tailwind was an inappropriate decision.

This was an experienced crew and, we
weren't sure what exactly had happened.

Investigators turn to the
cockpit voice recorder for answers.

Pull up from the go around onward.

-What do you think?
-Go around.

Max power.

Dutch Harbor traffic,
Peninsula 3296, going around.

We're going to come
back around for a visual.

Yeah, we're just going to get out of here,
do a 180, and come back in.

Roger, all right. You're at 1,000 feet.

Pause for a second.

So the captain says that he's doing a 180,
which would line him up with 31.

But that's not what he does.

He takes a sweeping 360 degree
turn around the mountain to 13.

Why?

We're at 1,200, coming back around
for a one, uh, for a visual 13.

31. 31.

31? I thought we were doing 13.

Uh, okay. Sure. I'll try it again.

Stop the tape.

So the captain wants to go to 31,
but the first officer questions it.

There was a back and forth between the
captain and first officer in terms of

which runway to use.

I would categorize the
captain's leadership, as poor.

Okay. Get a wind check from her again.

As the crew finalizes the second approach,
the captain stays on top of the wind reports.

Dutch weather 3296, another wind check.

Right now, midfield winds
at 300 at 24 knots.

-Oh, God.
-Oh, crap.

Stop the tape.

Sounds like they're not
happy with that tailwind.

And yet, they kept going.

The CVR raises questions about
the captain's report of a crosswind.

They were surprised of the,
wind direction and speed,

but the interesting thing is is that,
they were aware of the tailwind limitation,

for that particular aircraft.

But they continued on
with the decision to land.

-Try it again?
-Keep talking to weather.

Why would the pilots of PenAir flight 3296

decide to land with a tailwind on a
short runway in Dutch Harbor, Alaska?

…at 24 knots.

-All right, we'll try it again.
-All right.

-Last try.
-Rog.

It's like the captain's just going along
with what his first officer's saying.

He needs to take on more leadership.

The captain suspected 31 was the better
option, but he never stated his preference.

The captain's capitulation to land
on 13 does show ineffective leadership,

and, that he did not fully, evaluate the
circumstances at hand in order to make,

a-an objective decision.

Maybe he was fixated on landing.

Instead of communicating their options,
they continue their approach.

-Give me speed.
-Plus 15.

Investigators conclude the pilot's
decision to land on runway 13,

was intentional, and inappropriate.

By making that decision,
they put themselves at risk,

but they also put the passengers at risk.

Crossed wires, tailwind,
some poor leadership, it all added up.

And very little margin for
error at such a tricky airport.

The pilots of PenAir flight 3296 defend
their decision to land on runway 13.

We're at 1,200, coming back
around for a one, uh, the visual 13.

31. 31.

31? I thought we were doing 13.

Uh, okay, sure. We'll try again.

After the first landing attempt,
the captain claims his first officer saw

no change in wind
conditions on the runway.

He called my attention to it, so I looked
again to evaluate the situation.

He was correct, it was a crosswind.

If the conditions hadn't changed,
I didn't see a reason to change the plan.

Dutch weather 3296 another wind check.

Right now, midfield winds
at 300 at 24 knots.

-Oh God.
-Oh crap.

What we were seeing, was not what she
was, uh, reporting at that point in time.

Those winds were clearly a crosswind.

We could see the white caps, and then the
windsock itself was showing a crosswind.

Commercial pilot and passenger
Steve Ranney saw something different.

I saw a direct tailwind, 20 to 30 knots.

As a commercial pilot, that is something
that I would not have attempted.

When you get conflicting
information from what

you're seeing, that is
a tough call for a pilot.

Down.

-Okay, you got the yoke.
-I got it yeah, we're down there, 80 knots.

When the brakes malfunction,
the captain is unable to slow the plane.

-Brakes.
-I got 'em all the way down.

We had no braking power at all.

If we had one operational brake still,
it would have locked up and blown as well.

This particular aircraft didn't
have an emergency brake.

So in the event that the
main system failed,

there's no way to bring
this aircraft to a brake stop.

Hang on. I'm sliding.

Quick thinking and turning
the plane towards a road,

avoids a full plunge into Dutch Harbor.

Go right. Go right.

The key to not go into the water
was our decision to land on 13.

We had the perimeter road.
There was a lot more room on the 13 side.

Tragically, fragments of the left
propeller ripped through the fuselage,

killing a passenger.

You never want to lose
a passenger, for any reason.

Um…

That's, that's been very hard for me.

Investigators conclude the
probable cause of the accident,

is incorrect wiring
of the anti-skid system.

Contributing to the accident is the
pilot's inappropriate decision to land on

a runway with a
powerful reported tailwind.

That, troubles me because,

are we supposed to just blindly
rely on our weather observers?

Or are we supposed to
make a decision as the

pilots on what the best course of
action is, based on what we see?

Saab released a service bulletin,
advising operators to inspect

the anti-skid system for crossed wiring.

You know you can't afford for human
error, to be, allowed in connecting wires.

That's a very basic thing, especially on a
critical safety system such as the brakes.

For Steve Ranney, the ordeal
changed his attitude about flying.

It took quite a while for
myself to be comfortable

again, but we live in a
place where we have to fly.

There's no choices about it.

I would hope that there are lessons here
as far as, uh, weather and maintenance

that can keep accidents
like this from happening, again.

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