Original subtitles

While landing at Dutch Harbor, Alaska,

Hang on, I'm sliding.

the pilots of PenAir flight 3296 run out of runway.

All I could see is water.

Everyone brace!

We're gonna go in.

Not everyone makes it out alive.

You never want to lose a passenger, for any reason.

These are pretty beat up.

NTSB investigators must piece together the evidence.

We've got a dark 170 foot long skid mark.

So the tire blew.

We needed to do a deeper dive.

They soon discover a critical oversight.

There's no numbering on these wires.

That was really the "aha" moment.

Mayday. Mayday.

PULL UP!

[indistinct radio chatter]

PenAir flight 3296 cruises over Alaska's Aleutian Islands.

We should be getting directions here to descend soon.

I'm gonna see if I can't get the weather.

Yeah, it's changed. Weather's been updated. It's 310 at 11 knots.

56 year old Captain Paul Wells is a new hire to PenAir,

but has 25 years of experience with other airlines.

Mm 'kay.

Paul is, an amazing guy. I flew with him several times.

He was, a true decision maker as a captain.

Peninsula 3296, descend pilot's discretion.

Maintain flight level 290.

Pilot's discretion 290, Peninsula 3296.

39 year old First Officer Justin Lunn has been with PenAir for five months.

I couldn't have been with a better copilot.

He's a very thorough individual, um, ex-military.

There are 39 passengers on today's flight,

including a high school swim team and their chaperones.

Commercial pilot Steve Ranney is escorting his son, Jacob.

We were on the flight, um, to go to a swim meet.

We'd worked really hard raising the money for the trip. It was a big deal.

It's a two hour flight from Anchorage to Unalaska Airport, also known as Dutch Harbor.

The journey crosses some of the most rugged and isolated terrain in the world.

The flight is over a spectacular part of Alaska.

The entire, um, Alaska Peninsula is in view.

It's a great view. You can go grab a window seat further back.

My son did move to a couple of rows back so that he could get that view, too.

The pilots are flying a Swedish made Saab 2000.

Saab 2000 is a twin-engine turbojet aircraft. It seats approximately 50 people.

It's a good aircraft for reaching remote communities in Alaska.

Dutch Ops 3296.

Thirty minutes before landing, the first officer contacts the weather

observer at Unalaska Airport for the latest conditions.

Hello, 3296. Right now, winds,

210 at 6 knots, gusting to 14.

Temperature 8, dew point 1.

Altimeter 29.50.

All right, copy the weather.

The airport at Dutch Harbor has a short runway,

vulnerable to severe and unpredictable weather.

Pilots need special training to land here.

The terrain around the area in Dutch Harbor is mountainous.

The wind conditions can change in seconds.

Turbulence can be bad. Icing can be bad. So we have dedicated weather observers.

That is, invaluable.

What did she say the wind was?

Wind was 210.

-Pretty much a direct crosswind. -Hm.

I guess we can go ahead and start heading down.

All right.

Peninsula 3296, are you planning on RNAV runway 31?

Twenty minutes before landing, Anchorage Air Traffic Control

asks the pilots about their runway preference.

Affirmative. Uh, uh, negative.

We want the RNAV 13, Peninsula 3296.

Unalaska Airport is on an island, tucked behind a 1,600 foot mountain.

Planes can land in either direction,

runway 13 from the west, or runway 31 from the east.

Most pilots would prefer to use runway 13, basically because they have more room to

maneuver, more room to escape if you've got to punch out, or you've got to go around.

And just like the other day, if there's any major changes in the wind,

-we'll just. -We'll switch.

We always prepare for the worst and hope for the best.

Minimize risk. That's what we do.

Ladies and gentlemen, in order to…

Twelve miles from the airport, passengers prepare for landing.

…items are stowed completely beneath the seat in front of you.

All right. Flaps 20. Flight attendant is secure.

Flaps set 20. Indicating 20.

Gear down.

Four minutes from the airport, the crew begins the landing procedure.

Down three green.

At less than 1,000 feet,

the plane is rocked by turbulence.

Ah, bump.

There's a bit of a bump there too.

-Yeah. -Yeah, there you go.

It's gonna be ugly in here, isn't it?

Hmm.

Paul was fighting the winds as we were coming in.

Seconds from touchdown, Captain Wells notices he's too high for a safe landing.

An updraft may cause you to balloon, so that causes you to go high.

-What do you think? -Go around.

At Dutch Harbor, I don't take chances. If we're high, we're going around.

Max power.

I would not have been able to safely,

get back down, without, putting people at, horrible risk.

The pilot pulled up and went around.

I was assuming it was because of, uh, visibility issues.

Dutch Harbor traffic, Peninsula 3296, going around.

We're gonna come back around for a visual.

We were contending with the terrain,

a lower layer of clouds, and maintaining a safe airspeed.

You're very busy scanning inside and outside of the airplane.

It only takes three minutes before the pilots of PenAir flight 3296

are ready to attempt another landing.

If we couldn't land on this attempt, then we would go to our alternate airport.

200.

-Plus 10, you got it? -Got it.

The pilots are seconds from touching down.

-Sink rate. -Yeah, I know.

Seemed like we floated down the runway quite a bit, which didn't alarm me too much.

-Down. -Okay, you got the yoke.

I got it yeah, we're down there, 80 knots.

As the captain begins slowing the plane,

something isn't right.

I was pushing on the brakes harder,

and noticing that I'm not getting any more effect from the brakes.

When I saw the wind suck, the wind was definitely strong.

And at that point, all alarm bells went off in me.

-Brakes. -I got 'em all the way down.

The pilots cannot reduce their plane's speed.

I had to make a decision on whether to continue the landing or abort.

In an instant, I realized that,

no, there's not enough room to get the aircraft airborne again.

In the cabin, Steve Ranney notices, too.

Brace!

Everyone brace!

I actually went in the brace position and I told the passengers around me to brace.

Hang on, I'm sliding.

The plane is swerving back and forth.

I thought I was going to be able to turn off into the taxi area,

but I was going too fast.

The pilots are running out of runway.

All I could see is water.

The pilots of PenAir flight 3296 are unable to stop their airplane.

I saw the perimeter road and I told Paul, go right, go right!

The only option was the road.

The plane crashes through a fence,

strikes a boulder and is propelled towards the water.

That destroyed our exit plan.

They have only a few seconds to stop.

Now all I kept thinking was "We're going to go in."

The left engine strikes a signal post and road sign,

shattering the propellers into deadly fragments.

Holy crap.

We need to evacuate.

Evacuate right-hand side. Get out and get away.

In the cabin, it's eerily quiet.

I could feel blood running down my face and my shoulder was sore and my head hurt.

It was very, very surreal.

a propeller blade has pierced the cabin and struck Steve Ranney.

There was a propeller blade stuck, up in the ceiling right up against me.

Jacob, get off the plane! Don't wait for me!

Steve's son, Jacob, is lucky to walk away from the accident unharmed.

He would not have survived, in the seat

next to me because the blade was literally right there.

But a passenger near him is severely injured.

I had had a fair amount of training because of my job,

and so it was more or less an automatic reflex to go over and, you know,

check for his pulse see if he's still breathing.

Within minutes emergency responders arrive and transport

ten injured passengers to hospital.

38 year old passenger David Altman later succumbs to his injuries.

In ten years, he's one of only two people

to be killed on a domestic flight in the United States.

I was met in the hospital by a doctor.

They told me he hadn't made it, and that was a, a crushing blow.

Investigators from the NTSB, the National Transportation Safety Board

are dispatched to the area as the plane is hoisted

onto a barge and taken to a secure location.

We weren't able to offload it the next day because of the weather,

so it took a day, to get the airplane secured.

We're on record at 5:46 p.m.

Investigators are eager to interview the pilot.

Memories tend to fade and they tend to change,

so we want to get to the information as soon as possible.

I didn't even have any sleep before I showed up for that interview.

And so you're not, you know, you're not 100% clear.

Okay.

Take us through the events leading up to the accident.

Um…

Everything was, normal. Just a, nice flight.

"Everything was going fine until it wasn't."

And this is pretty common when we talk to pilots after accidents.

When I went to turn off the anti-ice I, got out of position on final.

Captain Wells explains that the plane was hit by

an updraft just as he took his eyes off the gauges.

-What do you think? -Go around.

Max power.

We were too high.

And instead of doing the stabilized approach,

and continue to the runway, we elected to go around.

So you're now set up for a second landing.

Do you remember your speed at touchdown?

126.

And where did you touch down?

I planted it pretty much on the 1,000, right on the touchdown zone.

Put it in reverse, and then I noticed it had stopped decelerating.

I, pushed down as hard as I could.

But there was no response from the brakes.

Brakes!

I got 'em all the way down.

-No response? -Exactly.

Zero braking. But like on ice.

That was puzzling. We knew we had to look at the braking system to understand

what was occurring there.

Did you get an update from the weather observer?

Yes they said, anywhere from 10 to 20 knots.

The winds were changing.

Any concerns at all on the second approach?

The winds were dying down on the water. It looked like a direct crosswind.

I, had no doubt that this was going to be a fine approach.

The captain said that he believed that they were flying

into a crosswind and was confident in that approach.

Your FO did the pre-flight on the aircraft?

He did.

Did he bring anything to your attention at all that was out of the ordinary?

He did, actually.

He noticed something with one of the tires.

-Pre-flight inspection complete. -Any issues?

Bald spot on the left outboard.

Investigators learn that a pre-flight inspection of flight 3296,

revealed a worn tire on the left outboard wheel.

It's not showing any cord. I'm not worried about it.

It was not down past the red line on the tire

and didn't, to me, appear to be of any concern.

I've had maintenance come to look at tires,

that are in very similar conditions to this tire.

They've basically said "It's within serviceable limits,

and you can continue your flight."

Have you reached any conclusion, just in your own head,

about what you think went wrong or may have happened?

If I had to make my best guess, I don't think it was brake failure.

I think more than likely, it was one of those showers that put down some sleet or

hail on the runway and, I just couldn't see it.

That's the, only thing I can think of.

Anything else you'd like to add?

I can't be more proud…

I'm sorry.

Take your time.

I couldn't be more proud of my crew.

The captain did get rather emotional, given his involvement in the accident.

So, they came in on runway 13 and the pilot said his airspeed

was 126 knots and they touched down at the 1,000 foot mark.

Why did flight 3296 come off the runway?

At that speed, they should have been able to stop well before the end of the runway.

Specifically for runway overruns, we're looking at how the airplane was

configured, what those runway lengths were,

as well as what it takes operationally, to fly that airplane into the airport.

What were the runway conditions?

Was there rain, ice, snow, anything on that runway that would have prevented the

airplane from stopping on its surface?

No rain. Seven degrees.

-So, hydroplaning is out of the question. -Too warm for ice to form.

Investigators eliminate the captain's theory.

Weather conditions did not make the runway slippery.

In this case, the runway wasn't contaminated.

But there was plenty of information that the runway can tell us.

What about debris, skid marks? Where are we at with the runway survey?

Got it here.

The team looks for any evidence left behind on the runway.

The runway evidence was critical. We walked the runway numerous times.

We, documented the heck out of the runway.

Starting at 1,835 feet past the threshold, we've got a dark 170 foot long skid mark.

Then there's further skidding down the runway.

Skid marks on the tarmac are made when the wheels lock.

Then the plane crosses the center line to the right and then straightens out.

Which tire skidded?

Based on the position of the skid mark, it's outboard tire, left side.

The Saab 2000 has four main wheels that brake.

Why would only one of them skid?

Wasn't that the one with the bald spot?

Yup.

The tire mark was a continuous black mark. It didn't have any tread marks on it.

So we knew, right off the bat that the tire was

skidding on the bald spot and not on the tread.

We also found tire fragments, here.

-So the tire blew? -Yeah.

Hold on. That's one heck of a long skid.

Even a brand new tire would have blown.

The fact that the airplane was skidding on the bald spot,

may have caused it to burst a fraction of a second earlier,

but in the end, it wasn't a contributing factor.

This shouldn't happen. The plane has an anti-skid system.

The anti-skid system is activated when one of the

sensors on the four main wheels detects a skid.

The brake pressure is released, either on both inboard wheels or both outboard

wheels, ensuring the plane remains stable

while allowing the other two wheels to slow the plane.

After we first noticed that there was a flat spot and a hole in the tire,

we were immediately drawn to the anti-skid system because

that's the purpose of the anti-skid system, to stop skids.

Did the system fail, causing flight 3296 to run off the runway?

Any news?

It's going to take some time for the technicians

to break down and test those brakes.

Like you said, that is a long skid.

Why would they need to brake so hard for so long?

In the meantime, investigators consider other theories about the long skid marks.

Overweight?

Could the plane have exceeded its maximum allowable landing weight,

requiring the pilot to brake harder than usual?

A heavier airplane essentially has, more inertia.

So, when a heavier airplane comes in to land, it would take longer to stop.

According to the manifest, the captain calculated their landing weight at,

45,213 pounds.

And the maximum allowable?

46,114.

900 pounds under. Close, but, within the limits.

The airplane was not overloaded, and we could rule out,

an overweight airplane as a contributing factor for this event.

What else might cause a pilot to brake so hard?

The captain said that they had a crosswind,

but, maybe the direction changed to a tailwind.

A tailwind during landing essentially means that you are

moving faster over the ground than you normally would.

So you would take up more space on the runway to safely stop.

The automated weather system only gives hourly reports.

Real-time updates come from a weather observer at the airport.

I'll deal with that.

I'll go help with the anti-skid system.

Could flight 3296 have been hit by an unexpected gust of wind,

causing it to land too fast, and overshoot the runway?

-Thanks for coming in. -You bet.

Investigators question the on-site weather observer at Unalaska Airport,

about the wind conditions when PenAir flight 3296 landed.

So first, um, how early do you start providing crews with weather data?

About 20 to 30 minutes out.

-And up until when? -Two to three miles out.

Dutch Harbor is a very unique airport.

The topography around the runway actually lends

to very rapidly changing weather conditions.

And so a weather observer on the ground provides the ability

to get updated information to pilots as it's happening.

And what was the weather like at the airport when PenAir was on approach?

There was a storm coming in, but at the time it was clear.

And what about the wind on the first attempt?

270 degrees at 10 knots.

Looks like a crosswind. And second attempt?

About three minutes out the wind shifted around to,

290 at 16 knots, gusting to 30 knots.

-30 knot tailwind? -Mm-hmm.

That would be an excessive tailwind.

If a pilot decides to land with that tailwind,

they essentially become a test pilot.

What about when they landed? What was the tailwind then?

The winds were, 15 knots.

Investigators confirm their suspicions about a tailwind on landing.

-Thank you for your time. -My pleasure.

One danger associated with landing in a tailwind is, excessive ground speed,

which potentially puts you in a situation where

you run out of runway to safely stop the airplane.

What's the Saab 2000 max tailwind for landing?

Was a 15 knot tailwind too much for the Saab to manage?

15 knots.

Right at the limit. Why would they risk it?

-Down. -Okay, you got the yoke.

I got it yeah, we're down there.

Investigators now know the pilots of PenAir 3296 approached a difficult airport in

tricky conditions, touching down with a tailwind nearing the plane's limits.

-Brakes. -I got 'em all the way down.

Okay. Weight roughly 45,000 pounds. Speed at touchdown 126 knots.

Investigators calculate how a 15 knot tailwind affects the pilot's ability to stop.

Our aircraft performance group developed several scenarios, to understand whether

an aircraft would be able to stop given those circumstances.

Tailwind 15 knots, flaps 20.

And let's do a loss of half of the braking power because of the skid.

When the left outboard tire began to skid, the Saab's anti-skid system would have

released brake pressure to both outboard wheels, drastically reducing braking power.

They had room to spare.

With a tailwind of 15 knots and two working brakes,

the plane could have stopped.

What are we missing?

Let's look at the FDR data.

Hold on a sec.

Just after touchdown, there's an anti-skid fault caution.

This supports investigators' earlier suspicions that an anti-skid failure

played a part in the accident.

Hang on, I'm sliding.

We gotta get to the bottom of that warning.

In this case we did have a fault, on the flight data recorder,

related to this system that we couldn't explain.

And so, with that information, uh, we needed to do a deeper dive, in a lab.

No issues with the control unit. Wheel sensors.

Same with the control valves.

We tested all the components, of the anti-skid system.

There were no significant faults. So, it was a mystery.

There's still the cables that connect the components.

Investigators focus on the wires that carry signals from the wheels.

Right here. Let's take a look at the wiring.

They request that the cables be removed from the left landing gear,

as that was the side that locked.

Hey there. Can we get those wire harnesses sent up to the lab?

When the airplane departed the runway, it hit a ditch and some larger boulders.

And, it collapsed the left main gear, which caused the wiring to fracture.

These are pretty beat up.

Investigators examine where the cables were connected to the wheels.

These are identical. Can't tell the left one from the right.

The team discovers a potential design flaw within the anti-skid system.

The connectors at the wheels didn't have any distinguishing features.

So this created potential for miswiring.

Could the brake cables have been connected to the wrong wheels?

Investigators examine the wires inside the cables.

Normally, we're able to open up a wiring bundle and look at the wire numbers on the

wires and compare it to an electrical diagram

and determine if it's connected properly.

There's no numbering on these wires.

We found the wires were so small, the manufacturer didn't put wire numbers on them.

So we were concerned about not being able to

determine if they're correctly connected.

There should be three wires inside the anti-skid cables.

So we got three here.

Then investigators notice something out of the ordinary.

There's four wires here.

There's an extra wire on the top half of this cable.

The wiring inside the top and bottom half of the outboard cable, doesn't match.

There's four in each of these.

The top outboard cable and the bottom inboard cable each had an extra wire,

which means only one thing.

They're crossed. No wonder the anti-skid system failed.

When the left outboard wheel began to skid,

the anti-skid system mistakenly released pressure to the inboard brakes.

As a result, the skid continued and the left outboard tire burst.

That was really the "aha" moment.

When you have crossed wires, the airplane is then dumping the brake pressure to the

two, perfectly good wheels, and allowing the other tire to skid.

-Brakes. -I got 'em all the way down.

Without braking power to the two inboard wheels, and a blown left outboard tire,

the pilots had a massively reduced ability to brake.

You're reducing the effective braking capacity by 75%

and now only the right outboard tire is providing braking.

The cables have to go through the entire landing gear.

How did maintenance workers mistakenly cross the wires of the braking system,

leaving the pilots of PenAir flight 3296 with only one

of four main landing gear brakes to stop their plane?

See? It's not a straight line.

And the wheel attachments are identical.

So imagine trying to feed two wires through

a small hole at the base of the landing gear.

How do you know which one went to the left and which one went to the right?

It would just be so easy to confuse the two.

How long could these have been crossed?

According to the records, there was a full overhaul of the left main landing gear.

-When? -January, 2017.

The wires were crossed two and a half years prior to the accident.

We found out that the aircraft had been sitting,

uh, for a couple of years, in overhaul.

And there wasn't any sort of procedure, to check to see if there was any cross wiring.

So how many flights did it make once it was back in service?

About 500.

They learned that the misrouted anti-skid wiring went undetected for nearly four months.

So why did 500 flights manage to stop but not these guys?

Maybe the malfunction was happening just, on a smaller scale.

The balding tire?

Was the worn left outboard tire,

an indication of the malfunctioning anti-skid system?

We suspected that there were events of skidding.

But the difficult thing is, it would have to skid more than a second and a half,

for the airplane, to display a fault, that the s-system was malfunctioning.

So this could have been happening gradually,

with repeated small skids creating the bald spot on the tire.

Yeah. But when they landed at that speed with that tailwind,

they braked longer and harder than in previous flights.

-Brakes! -I got 'em all the way down.

That's really the insidious nature of this fault.

You're not going to find out about this cross wiring until

you really need it when you're slamming on the brakes.

Ah! Hang on. I'm sliding.

With the hidden anti-skid fault,

investigators conclude the pilots of PenAir flight 3296

could not have stopped their plane on runway 13.

There's one thing I'm curious about.

Could they have stopped if they landed into the wind on runway 31 instead?

It's possible.

Their landing speeds would have been slower and the drag

caused by the extra wind, would have stopped it in time.

Then why did they choose runway 13 and the tailwind?

Did the pilots of PenAir flight 3296, ignore crucial information about the wind

and execute a risky landing?

The decision to land on runway 13 with the reported tailwind was an inappropriate decision.

This was an experienced crew and, we weren't sure what exactly had happened.

Investigators turn to the cockpit voice recorder for answers.

Pull up from the go around onward.

-What do you think? -Go around.

Max power.

Dutch Harbor traffic, Peninsula 3296, going around.

We're going to come back around for a visual.

Yeah, we're just going to get out of here, do a 180, and come back in.

Roger, all right. You're at 1,000 feet.

Pause for a second.

So the captain says that he's doing a 180, which would line him up with 31.

But that's not what he does.

He takes a sweeping 360 degree turn around the mountain to 13.

Why?

We're at 1,200, coming back around for a one, uh, for a visual 13.

31. 31.

31? I thought we were doing 13.

Uh, okay. Sure. I'll try it again.

Stop the tape.

So the captain wants to go to 31, but the first officer questions it.

There was a back and forth between the captain and first officer in terms of

which runway to use.

I would categorize the captain's leadership, as poor.

Okay. Get a wind check from her again.

As the crew finalizes the second approach, the captain stays on top of the wind reports.

Dutch weather 3296, another wind check.

Right now, midfield winds at 300 at 24 knots.

-Oh, God. -Oh, crap.

Stop the tape.

Sounds like they're not happy with that tailwind.

And yet, they kept going.

The CVR raises questions about the captain's report of a crosswind.

They were surprised of the, wind direction and speed,

but the interesting thing is is that, they were aware of the tailwind limitation,

for that particular aircraft.

But they continued on with the decision to land.

-Try it again? -Keep talking to weather.

Why would the pilots of PenAir flight 3296

decide to land with a tailwind on a short runway in Dutch Harbor, Alaska?

…at 24 knots.

-All right, we'll try it again. -All right.

-Last try. -Rog.

It's like the captain's just going along with what his first officer's saying.

He needs to take on more leadership.

The captain suspected 31 was the better option, but he never stated his preference.

The captain's capitulation to land on 13 does show ineffective leadership,

and, that he did not fully, evaluate the circumstances at hand in order to make,

a-an objective decision.

Maybe he was fixated on landing.

Instead of communicating their options, they continue their approach.

-Give me speed. -Plus 15.

Investigators conclude the pilot's decision to land on runway 13,

was intentional, and inappropriate.

By making that decision, they put themselves at risk,

but they also put the passengers at risk.

Crossed wires, tailwind, some poor leadership, it all added up.

And very little margin for error at such a tricky airport.

The pilots of PenAir flight 3296 defend their decision to land on runway 13.

We're at 1,200, coming back around for a one, uh, the visual 13.

31. 31.

31? I thought we were doing 13.

Uh, okay, sure. We'll try again.

After the first landing attempt, the captain claims his first officer saw

no change in wind conditions on the runway.

He called my attention to it, so I looked again to evaluate the situation.

He was correct, it was a crosswind.

If the conditions hadn't changed, I didn't see a reason to change the plan.

Dutch weather 3296 another wind check.

Right now, midfield winds at 300 at 24 knots.

-Oh God. -Oh crap.

What we were seeing, was not what she was, uh, reporting at that point in time.

Those winds were clearly a crosswind.

We could see the white caps, and then the windsock itself was showing a crosswind.

Commercial pilot and passenger Steve Ranney saw something different.

I saw a direct tailwind, 20 to 30 knots.

As a commercial pilot, that is something that I would not have attempted.

When you get conflicting information from what

you're seeing, that is a tough call for a pilot.

Down.

-Okay, you got the yoke. -I got it yeah, we're down there, 80 knots.

When the brakes malfunction, the captain is unable to slow the plane.

-Brakes. -I got 'em all the way down.

We had no braking power at all.

If we had one operational brake still, it would have locked up and blown as well.

This particular aircraft didn't have an emergency brake.

So in the event that the main system failed,

there's no way to bring this aircraft to a brake stop.

Hang on. I'm sliding.

Quick thinking and turning the plane towards a road,

avoids a full plunge into Dutch Harbor.

Go right. Go right.

The key to not go into the water was our decision to land on 13.

We had the perimeter road. There was a lot more room on the 13 side.

Tragically, fragments of the left propeller ripped through the fuselage,

killing a passenger.

You never want to lose a passenger, for any reason.

Um…

That's, that's been very hard for me.

Investigators conclude the probable cause of the accident,

is incorrect wiring of the anti-skid system.

Contributing to the accident is the pilot's inappropriate decision to land on

a runway with a powerful reported tailwind.

That, troubles me because,

are we supposed to just blindly rely on our weather observers?

Or are we supposed to make a decision as the

pilots on what the best course of action is, based on what we see?

Saab released a service bulletin, advising operators to inspect

the anti-skid system for crossed wiring.

You know you can't afford for human error, to be, allowed in connecting wires.

That's a very basic thing, especially on a critical safety system such as the brakes.

For Steve Ranney, the ordeal changed his attitude about flying.

It took quite a while for myself to be comfortable

again, but we live in a place where we have to fly.

There's no choices about it.

I would hope that there are lessons here as far as, uh, weather and maintenance

that can keep accidents like this from happening, again.

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