All language subtitles for American Greed s05e04 Hackers Operation Get Rich or Die Tryin
Afrikaans
Akan
Albanian
Amharic
Arabic
Armenian
Azerbaijani
Basque
Belarusian
Bemba
Bengali
Bihari
Bosnian
Breton
Bulgarian
Cambodian
Catalan
Cebuano
Cherokee
Chichewa
Chinese (Simplified)
Chinese (Traditional)
Corsican
Croatian
Czech
Danish
Dutch
English
Esperanto
Estonian
Ewe
Faroese
Filipino
Finnish
French
Frisian
Ga
Galician
Georgian
German
Greek
Guarani
Gujarati
Haitian Creole
Hausa
Hawaiian
Hebrew
Hindi
Hmong
Hungarian
Icelandic
Igbo
Indonesian
Interlingua
Irish
Italian
Japanese
Javanese
Kannada
Kazakh
Kinyarwanda
Kirundi
Kongo
Korean
Krio (Sierra Leone)
Kurdish
Kurdish (SoranĂ®)
Kyrgyz
Laothian
Latin
Latvian
Lingala
Lithuanian
Lozi
Luganda
Luo
Luxembourgish
Macedonian
Malagasy
Malay
Malayalam
Maltese
Maori
Marathi
Mauritian Creole
Moldavian
Mongolian
Myanmar (Burmese)
Montenegrin
Nepali
Nigerian Pidgin
Northern Sotho
Norwegian
Norwegian (Nynorsk)
Occitan
Oriya
Oromo
Pashto
Persian
Polish
Portuguese (Brazil)
Portuguese (Portugal)
Punjabi
Quechua
Romanian
Romansh
Runyakitara
Russian
Samoan
Scots Gaelic
Serbian
Serbo-Croatian
Sesotho
Setswana
Seychellois Creole
Shona
Sindhi
Sinhalese
Slovak
Slovenian
Somali
Spanish
Spanish (Latin American)
Sundanese
Swahili
Swedish
Tajik
Tamil
Tatar
Telugu
Thai
Tigrinya
Tonga
Tshiluba
Tumbuka
Turkish
Turkmen
Twi
Uighur
Ukrainian
Urdu
Uzbek
Vietnamese
Welsh
Wolof
Xhosa
Yiddish
Yoruba
Zulu
Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated:
1
00:00:04,910 --> 00:00:10,810
In this episode of American Greed, it's
called Operation Get Rich or Die Trying.
2
00:00:11,130 --> 00:00:13,570
The biggest ID theft in U .S. history.
3
00:00:13,930 --> 00:00:19,250
A mysterious ring of social outcasts
with an insatiable appetite for sex,
4
00:00:19,550 --> 00:00:21,750
and your encrypted information.
5
00:00:22,510 --> 00:00:27,730
There's a very fine line between
exploiting a system to check it out or
6
00:00:27,730 --> 00:00:29,730
exploiting a system for gain.
7
00:00:29,950 --> 00:00:32,170
They were looking for data any way they
could get it.
8
00:00:32,750 --> 00:00:36,870
They steal credit card numbers and make
a fortune by selling them on the black
9
00:00:36,870 --> 00:00:39,910
market. It just kept building upon
itself.
10
00:00:40,250 --> 00:00:45,630
500 ,000 numbers, then a million
numbers, up to 130 million numbers.
11
00:00:45,890 --> 00:00:49,030
You or I might be a victim of this
crime, and we would never know.
12
00:00:49,750 --> 00:00:55,710
Victims lose millions, but no one pays a
greater price than one of the gang's
13
00:00:55,710 --> 00:00:57,970
own. It just cracked under the pressure.
14
00:01:12,490 --> 00:01:18,050
In May 2008, federal agents in full SWAT
gear fan out across South Florida.
15
00:01:18,270 --> 00:01:24,230
They raid private homes, condos, even a
suite at Miami's posh National Hotel.
16
00:01:24,790 --> 00:01:30,490
We received multiple search warrants for
numerous houses, cars, for safety
17
00:01:30,490 --> 00:01:34,870
deposit boxes, for servers, even
individuals in case they had possessed
18
00:01:34,870 --> 00:01:37,710
drives or media in their pockets or in
their backpacks.
19
00:01:38,190 --> 00:01:42,930
Agents seize more than a dozen computers
and obtain search warrants for servers
20
00:01:42,930 --> 00:01:47,970
overseas. On those servers, they find
millions of credit card numbers.
21
00:01:48,390 --> 00:01:54,730
Their victims were a whole range from
small banks and credit unions to some of
22
00:01:54,730 --> 00:01:58,970
the largest retailers, well -known
restaurant chains, and some of the
23
00:01:58,970 --> 00:02:01,150
credit card processors in the United
States.
24
00:02:01,790 --> 00:02:06,230
The scheme's mastermind is 26 -year -old
Albert Gonzalez.
25
00:02:07,040 --> 00:02:11,500
The problem with hackers is that those
who might be inclined to try to make
26
00:02:11,500 --> 00:02:14,080
money off of their skills is that they
don't know anything about the criminal
27
00:02:14,080 --> 00:02:17,480
underworld. And the criminal underworld
might not know that much about hacking,
28
00:02:17,600 --> 00:02:19,240
but he could bridge both worlds.
29
00:02:20,040 --> 00:02:25,300
I've always thought of him as a
forerunner, sort of criminal industry
30
00:02:25,300 --> 00:02:26,300
this whole area.
31
00:02:26,400 --> 00:02:33,280
For Gonzalez, who also goes by the
handles Soup Nazi, Kumbhajani, and
32
00:02:33,320 --> 00:02:35,140
anonymity is key.
33
00:02:35,980 --> 00:02:39,720
Most individuals will have more than one
handle. So on one particular forum,
34
00:02:39,760 --> 00:02:42,780
you'll be known as a certain individual.
On another forum, you'll be known as
35
00:02:42,780 --> 00:02:46,000
something else. In some places, you'll
have a number. It'll be a sequence
36
00:02:46,000 --> 00:02:49,180
number, a non -sequence number,
depending upon what you're doing.
37
00:02:49,840 --> 00:02:53,480
These criminals can communicate to one
another anonymously, so a lot of times
38
00:02:53,480 --> 00:02:57,100
the co -conspirators may not know each
other in real life, but they communicate
39
00:02:57,100 --> 00:03:00,900
via instant messaging, and they can
assist each other in their crimes.
40
00:03:01,880 --> 00:03:04,640
But Gonzalez is no ordinary criminal.
41
00:03:05,320 --> 00:03:09,780
He'll soon be known as the most cunning
cyber crook in American history.
42
00:03:12,800 --> 00:03:16,420
Albert Gonzales spends his childhood in
South Florida.
43
00:03:16,780 --> 00:03:23,440
His father came to America from Cuba on
a homemade raft in the 1970s. And they
44
00:03:23,440 --> 00:03:26,400
raised him in a working class
neighborhood in Miami.
45
00:03:27,700 --> 00:03:32,240
Gonzales earns allowance working for his
father's landscaping business.
46
00:03:32,760 --> 00:03:34,500
Albert grew up in a very...
47
00:03:34,800 --> 00:03:39,500
politically conservative home, church
-going Catholics, in a working -class
48
00:03:39,500 --> 00:03:45,240
environment. And he was a very sweet,
good -natured boy, outgoing.
49
00:03:45,600 --> 00:03:51,940
But all that changed when Albert was
about 12 years old, and he bought his
50
00:03:51,940 --> 00:03:56,160
computer. At first, his hobby seems
innocent enough.
51
00:03:56,360 --> 00:03:59,620
He just absolutely loved it, and he
wanted to spend all his time with it.
52
00:03:59,980 --> 00:04:05,040
But before long, Gonzalez's fascination
with computers becomes an obsession.
53
00:04:05,800 --> 00:04:10,400
His grades started dropping. His mom
begged him to see a psychologist, and he
54
00:04:10,400 --> 00:04:11,660
absolutely refused.
55
00:04:12,260 --> 00:04:17,240
He falls in with a group of hackers
called the Keebler Elves Gang, and they
56
00:04:17,240 --> 00:04:19,860
into NASA and the Indian government's
website.
57
00:04:20,360 --> 00:04:21,519
It was about...
58
00:04:21,870 --> 00:04:26,510
Being able to pick those locks and get
those bragging rights to be able to say,
59
00:04:26,630 --> 00:04:31,530
see, I did this. I might just be a
teenager, and I might be powerless in
60
00:04:31,530 --> 00:04:33,810
real world, but online, I'm like a god.
61
00:04:34,570 --> 00:04:39,910
After graduating in 1999, Gonzalez
enrolls in community college.
62
00:04:40,430 --> 00:04:44,130
Albert dropped out of Miami Dade
Community College after less than a
63
00:04:44,130 --> 00:04:50,010
and moved to New York to take a job with
a dot -com company, which very quickly
64
00:04:50,010 --> 00:04:51,010
went under.
65
00:04:51,260 --> 00:04:56,400
Then he took a job with Siemens in their
IT department, but they very quickly
66
00:04:56,400 --> 00:04:59,420
relocated to Pennsylvania, and he opted
not to move with them.
67
00:05:00,600 --> 00:05:05,200
Jobless, he begins dabbling in drugs and
illegal online activity.
68
00:05:06,060 --> 00:05:10,080
He was in New York sort of feeling like
he had hit rock bottom and not really
69
00:05:10,080 --> 00:05:13,900
knowing what his options were. What he
did know was that he was really good at
70
00:05:13,900 --> 00:05:17,260
hacking, and he had access to...
71
00:05:17,870 --> 00:05:22,150
this internet carding forum that he was
well aware of called Shadow Crew, and
72
00:05:22,150 --> 00:05:25,210
that seemed like as good a career option
as any.
73
00:05:25,530 --> 00:05:31,530
In 2002, black market carding websites
like Shadow Crew are beginning to crop
74
00:05:31,530 --> 00:05:36,620
up. You go to these forums. You can buy
or sell credit and debit card
75
00:05:36,620 --> 00:05:38,820
information. You can buy access to
retailers.
76
00:05:39,180 --> 00:05:43,060
You can even hire people to launder your
money off of these web pages.
77
00:05:43,500 --> 00:05:50,160
These carding forums have no boundaries,
and criminals from every continent join
78
00:05:50,160 --> 00:05:51,700
them and participate in them.
79
00:05:52,500 --> 00:05:54,740
Using the alias Kumbhajani...
80
00:05:55,100 --> 00:05:58,360
Gonzalez quickly becomes a shadow crew
site administrator.
81
00:05:58,720 --> 00:06:04,740
He helps crooks sell more than a million
stolen cards for between $10 and $15 a
82
00:06:04,740 --> 00:06:06,500
piece. It's millions.
83
00:06:06,880 --> 00:06:10,480
I mean, we're not talking about somebody
making a couple of thousand or five,
84
00:06:10,560 --> 00:06:13,580
ten, fifteen thousand. We're talking
about millions and millions of dollars.
85
00:06:13,580 --> 00:06:18,560
they steal a debit card number and a
PIN, and they can re -encode that on
86
00:06:18,560 --> 00:06:22,740
plastic, walk up to an ATM, put the PIN
in, and clean out the account.
87
00:06:24,540 --> 00:06:27,960
Shadow crew members call these cash -out
trips.
88
00:06:28,760 --> 00:06:33,020
Once that ATM is out, you go to the next
one, and you continue to do that until
89
00:06:33,020 --> 00:06:35,680
you're either out of cards or the ATMs
are out of money.
90
00:06:36,120 --> 00:06:40,940
It's a cash -out trip that would be
Gonzalez's unlikely downfall.
91
00:06:41,300 --> 00:06:47,800
In 2003, New York police officers see a
young man loading card after card into a
92
00:06:47,800 --> 00:06:49,560
nearby ATM machine.
93
00:06:52,750 --> 00:06:58,210
During the arrest, officers discover
he's cyber criminal Albert Gonzalez, and
94
00:06:58,210 --> 00:06:59,870
they turn him over to the Secret
Service.
95
00:07:00,310 --> 00:07:06,410
The Secret Service is responsible for
investigating cyber crime, and they very
96
00:07:06,410 --> 00:07:10,810
quickly recognized Albert's potential in
helping them to bust other cyber
97
00:07:10,810 --> 00:07:15,970
criminals. There are places that a
cooperating defendant in the cyber world
98
00:07:15,970 --> 00:07:20,510
bring you that you can't go on your own,
and that is the value of working with
99
00:07:20,510 --> 00:07:25,780
them. The Secret Service flips Gonzalez
and pays him $75 ,000 a year to help
100
00:07:25,780 --> 00:07:27,740
with Operation Firewall.
101
00:07:28,160 --> 00:07:32,360
It wasn't as if we were all sitting
around a table together and he was
102
00:07:32,520 --> 00:07:37,740
hearing, understanding our strategies,
our techniques. His role was to continue
103
00:07:37,740 --> 00:07:42,580
as administrator of the site, typing on
a computer, communicating with his
104
00:07:42,580 --> 00:07:48,060
individuals. The successful undercover
sting nets 28 Shadow Crew members.
105
00:07:48,910 --> 00:07:53,550
It was a benchmark investigation,
benchmark prosecution, and everything
106
00:07:53,550 --> 00:07:54,770
every step of the way.
107
00:07:55,390 --> 00:07:59,410
Authorities say the thieves they
arrested had cost more than $4 million
108
00:07:59,410 --> 00:08:00,410
losses.
109
00:08:00,830 --> 00:08:05,670
After Operation Firewall, the Secret
Service cuts Gonzalez loose and he
110
00:08:05,670 --> 00:08:06,670
to Miami.
111
00:08:07,270 --> 00:08:09,690
Once a hacker, always a hacker.
112
00:08:10,530 --> 00:08:15,010
Legitimacy for him was not really an
option at that point because...
113
00:08:15,760 --> 00:08:20,860
Albert had gained so much insight while
working for the feds, and he was not a
114
00:08:20,860 --> 00:08:23,260
person to pass on an opportunity.
115
00:08:24,120 --> 00:08:29,660
Next on American Greed, Gonzalez forms
his own gang with a plan to make
116
00:08:29,660 --> 00:08:33,299
millions. He called it Operation Get
Rich or Die Trying.
117
00:08:33,539 --> 00:08:38,179
It certainly was a very ominous title,
and it certainly foreshadowed what was
118
00:08:38,179 --> 00:08:39,179
come.
119
00:08:53,800 --> 00:08:54,920
Miami, Florida.
120
00:08:55,320 --> 00:09:01,200
It's a playground for the world's
wealthiest and for those aspiring to
121
00:09:01,200 --> 00:09:04,660
all, like 23 -year -old hacker Albert
Gonzalez.
122
00:09:05,320 --> 00:09:11,240
In October 2004, Gonzalez turns rat and
helps the Secret Service bring down
123
00:09:11,240 --> 00:09:14,640
Shadow Crew, the biggest cybercrime bust
to date.
124
00:09:15,060 --> 00:09:20,220
But all the while, he's plotting
Operation Get Rich or Die Trying.
125
00:09:20,830 --> 00:09:25,290
I think it's safe to say the Secret
Service had no idea that Albert was
126
00:09:25,290 --> 00:09:30,430
both sides, that he was becoming a
master criminal while at the same time
127
00:09:30,430 --> 00:09:32,150
working as a snitch for them.
128
00:09:32,790 --> 00:09:39,270
His overall business plan was to break
into a series of major
129
00:09:39,270 --> 00:09:45,070
retailers, obtain their credit and debit
card information, and then either to
130
00:09:45,070 --> 00:09:49,530
sell them or in fact use other members
of his gang to...
131
00:09:49,840 --> 00:09:54,980
cash them out to go to ATMs and use them
as essentially cows and milk them until
132
00:09:54,980 --> 00:09:55,980
they were dry.
133
00:09:56,820 --> 00:10:01,760
Gonzalez enlists the help of several
hackers he'd met online years before.
134
00:10:02,200 --> 00:10:06,300
They started off as teenage friends
trying to get into government sites,
135
00:10:06,560 --> 00:10:13,500
military sites, and very quickly that
changed from hacking for fun and
136
00:10:13,500 --> 00:10:15,440
to hacking for profit.
137
00:10:15,720 --> 00:10:22,700
A number of the collaborators of Albert
Gonzalez had significant day
138
00:10:22,700 --> 00:10:28,900
jobs. They were doing security intrusion
work, earning tens of thousands or, in
139
00:10:28,900 --> 00:10:32,680
at least one case, in excess of $100
,000 a year in salary.
140
00:10:33,800 --> 00:10:40,620
Stephen Watt, Patrick Toohey, Chris
Scott, and Jonathan James become
141
00:10:40,620 --> 00:10:41,740
hack pack.
142
00:10:42,020 --> 00:10:45,000
Stephen Watt was a coding genius.
143
00:10:45,260 --> 00:10:47,440
He graduated from high school at 16.
144
00:10:48,190 --> 00:10:53,590
He graduated from college at age 19 and
went on to take a job in the IT
145
00:10:53,590 --> 00:10:58,130
department of Morgan Stanley, a Wall
Street investment banking firm in
146
00:10:58,130 --> 00:10:59,130
Manhattan.
147
00:10:59,870 --> 00:11:04,350
Gonzalez meets Patrick Toohey on a
shadow crew cash -out trip in 2003.
148
00:11:05,870 --> 00:11:10,290
He came from a household with a shifting
cast of characters and had turned to
149
00:11:10,290 --> 00:11:16,030
hacking as a way to kind of funnel his
alienation, his rage.
150
00:11:16,780 --> 00:11:20,940
Patrick would do anything that Albert
asked, from the coding to the cash -out
151
00:11:20,940 --> 00:11:24,780
trips and anything in between. He
probably would have picked up Albert's
152
00:11:24,780 --> 00:11:25,860
cleaning if he asked him to.
153
00:11:26,800 --> 00:11:30,060
Chris Scott and Jonathan James round out
the gang.
154
00:11:30,700 --> 00:11:36,980
Chris Scott was a depressed, overweight
geek from Miami
155
00:11:36,980 --> 00:11:42,880
who had been ejected from his high
school for disabling all of the
156
00:11:42,880 --> 00:11:43,880
with the virus.
157
00:11:44,220 --> 00:11:49,060
Chris's greatest strength was probably
that he was best friends with Jonathan
158
00:11:49,060 --> 00:11:55,100
James, who was probably the most famous
hacker at the time. He was very well
159
00:11:55,100 --> 00:12:01,680
known. At 16, Jonathan James stakes his
claim to fame by serving six months for
160
00:12:01,680 --> 00:12:06,900
hacking into NASA and Defense Department
computers, becoming the youngest hacker
161
00:12:06,900 --> 00:12:07,900
ever sentenced.
162
00:12:08,200 --> 00:12:12,080
Together, Gonzalez and his crew become a
tight -knit band of brothers.
163
00:12:12,810 --> 00:12:19,050
These guys are driven by a lot of the
same things that we're driven by. They
164
00:12:19,050 --> 00:12:25,550
have an ego, they like challenge, and of
course they like money and everything
165
00:12:25,550 --> 00:12:26,870
you can get from money.
166
00:12:27,430 --> 00:12:32,810
Operation Get Rich starts small, using a
technique called war driving.
167
00:12:33,190 --> 00:12:38,230
So we've just gone by a really nice
place that was not very well encrypted.
168
00:12:39,180 --> 00:12:44,340
Chris Roberts is a gray hat hacker, an
Internet security expert specializing in
169
00:12:44,340 --> 00:12:45,340
fraud.
170
00:12:45,640 --> 00:12:49,200
As we're driving along here, we're still
pulling in a lot of wireless access
171
00:12:49,200 --> 00:12:50,640
points, a lot of systems.
172
00:12:50,920 --> 00:12:53,640
Some are encrypted, some aren't very
well encrypted.
173
00:12:53,940 --> 00:12:59,280
And we've pulled in 800 access points
and almost 500 computers and systems
174
00:12:59,280 --> 00:13:00,119
are attached to them.
175
00:13:00,120 --> 00:13:06,540
Like Roberts, the hack pack uses a Wi
-Fi antenna to find unencrypted or
176
00:13:06,540 --> 00:13:08,060
vulnerable networks.
177
00:13:08,910 --> 00:13:12,570
We're able to just listen in and see
what kind of wireless systems are
178
00:13:12,570 --> 00:13:16,010
advertising, no different than a radio.
As you drive along with a radio, you go
179
00:13:16,010 --> 00:13:17,330
in and out of signal strengths.
180
00:13:17,870 --> 00:13:19,610
This is basically the same thing.
181
00:13:20,390 --> 00:13:26,530
Chris Scott and Jonathan James tune in
to one store at a time along US 1 in
182
00:13:26,530 --> 00:13:31,130
Miami. They'll have pulled into every
single one of these retail areas, slowly
183
00:13:31,130 --> 00:13:35,290
driven through to see what wireless
access points were advertising.
184
00:13:36,120 --> 00:13:39,040
and then to see which ones were
encrypted or which ones were not
185
00:13:39,880 --> 00:13:46,760
The first one that they found was BJ's
Wholesale Club, where they parked
186
00:13:46,760 --> 00:13:52,760
and downloaded all of the credit and
debit card numbers as they were being
187
00:13:52,760 --> 00:13:54,980
swiped. by the customers.
188
00:13:55,640 --> 00:14:00,020
Gonzalez forwards thousands of card
numbers to Patrick Toohey and other
189
00:14:00,020 --> 00:14:03,820
associates. So at that point in time,
you need a little device which is a card
190
00:14:03,820 --> 00:14:06,760
reader and a writer, and you also need
some blank credit cards.
191
00:14:07,420 --> 00:14:13,820
They then encode the information onto
blanks, and runners cash them out at
192
00:14:14,880 --> 00:14:19,480
Gonzalez, who was raised a Catholic,
feels a slight twinge of guilt.
193
00:14:20,200 --> 00:14:24,080
He told Patrick, we're going to hell for
this. And he really meant it.
194
00:14:24,720 --> 00:14:28,800
But he made himself feel better by
telling himself that once the fraud was
195
00:14:28,800 --> 00:14:32,720
detected, then the credit card companies
would restore people's money and all
196
00:14:32,720 --> 00:14:33,720
would be fine.
197
00:14:34,160 --> 00:14:37,540
But war driving and cashing out is
risky.
198
00:14:38,020 --> 00:14:42,640
I physically have to put myself in a
position where I might be videotaped. I
199
00:14:42,640 --> 00:14:44,240
might be caught on a surveillance
camera.
200
00:14:44,640 --> 00:14:48,080
Somebody might be clever enough to work
out that these stores are getting hit.
201
00:14:48,560 --> 00:14:52,640
Albert Gonzalez himself had learned that
cashing out was a dangerous mechanism
202
00:14:52,640 --> 00:14:56,080
because he himself had been arrested
while cashing out.
203
00:14:56,320 --> 00:15:00,440
Gonzalez knows there's a better way to
generate higher volume with less
204
00:15:00,440 --> 00:15:06,540
exposure. He's associating with elite
carters and hackers in Eastern Europe
205
00:15:06,540 --> 00:15:10,760
other places, so he's trying to refine
his techniques and make them even better
206
00:15:10,760 --> 00:15:11,760
and less risky.
207
00:15:12,270 --> 00:15:17,910
To do this, Gonzalez needs a program
called a sniffer code, which he lacks
208
00:15:17,910 --> 00:15:19,270
technical skills to write.
209
00:15:19,630 --> 00:15:23,070
That program then, on its own, will look
around your computer.
210
00:15:23,630 --> 00:15:26,890
It'll look around for your social, it'll
look around for your credit cards,
211
00:15:27,030 --> 00:15:29,330
it'll look around for your banking
information, basically whatever I've
212
00:15:29,330 --> 00:15:30,330
programmed it to do.
213
00:15:30,570 --> 00:15:34,370
And then it will call back to me and
say, here's all the information, have a
214
00:15:34,370 --> 00:15:35,370
nice day.
215
00:15:35,850 --> 00:15:40,990
Gonzalez calls on Stephen Watt, who
fires off the code in ten hours, free of
216
00:15:40,990 --> 00:15:46,500
charge. It was really the key to this
being the cybercrime of the century.
217
00:15:47,160 --> 00:15:52,500
Once the sniffer code is installed, they
can access, copy, and download data
218
00:15:52,500 --> 00:15:55,480
remotely. And it starts to pour in.
219
00:15:55,720 --> 00:15:58,780
Obviously, when you're attacking a
system, when you're gathering data, you
220
00:15:58,780 --> 00:15:59,880
somewhere to put this information.
221
00:16:00,600 --> 00:16:03,700
You're not going to want to put it right
on your computer, because if your
222
00:16:03,700 --> 00:16:07,880
computer gets lost, stolen, taken, or
seized, you've just handed somebody a
223
00:16:07,880 --> 00:16:08,880
amount of evidence.
224
00:16:09,050 --> 00:16:12,330
Gonzalez needs a safe place to stash the
data.
225
00:16:12,870 --> 00:16:18,930
Patrick Toohey had set up servers in
Latvia, Singapore, China, and Ukraine to
226
00:16:18,930 --> 00:16:21,850
store all of these reams and reams,
mountains of data.
227
00:16:22,410 --> 00:16:27,010
But in storage, the numbers near their
expiration dates and they diminish in
228
00:16:27,010 --> 00:16:28,010
value.
229
00:16:28,330 --> 00:16:32,730
So he calls on an international crime
lord to expedite distribution.
230
00:16:34,010 --> 00:16:36,230
Maxi Khrushchev is a Ukrainian national.
231
00:16:36,750 --> 00:16:40,490
who was the biggest wholesaler of credit
and debit cards around the world.
232
00:16:41,830 --> 00:16:48,250
Yastrzemski sells the card numbers for
between $150 and $300 a pop, of which
233
00:16:48,250 --> 00:16:49,470
Gonzalez takes half.
234
00:16:50,050 --> 00:16:53,890
Yastrzemski would sell those cards via
the Internet or in these carding forums
235
00:16:53,890 --> 00:16:59,010
or portals to other lower -level
salespeople who would then turn around
236
00:16:59,010 --> 00:17:00,010
them again.
237
00:17:00,320 --> 00:17:04,460
Yastrzemski distributes the profits to
Gonzalez through online currency
238
00:17:04,460 --> 00:17:11,440
exchanges. Soon, packages containing up
to $370 ,000 are piling up
239
00:17:11,440 --> 00:17:12,819
at Gonzalez's Dropbox.
240
00:17:13,200 --> 00:17:17,859
He actually complained to Stephen Watt
that once his money counter broke from
241
00:17:17,859 --> 00:17:22,500
overuse, and he complained that he had
to count manually $340 ,000.
242
00:17:23,930 --> 00:17:29,850
By the summer of 2005, Gonzalez begins
to indulge in his new lifestyle as a
243
00:17:29,850 --> 00:17:34,050
mogul. It was completely over the top. I
would say much of the profits from
244
00:17:34,050 --> 00:17:36,730
Operation Get Rich or Guy Trying went
right up their noses.
245
00:17:37,230 --> 00:17:43,150
Gonzalez and his crew book a $5 ,000 a
night suite at the Lowe's Hotel in South
246
00:17:43,150 --> 00:17:48,830
Beach. When they were in Miami, they
would make this insane concoction called
247
00:17:48,830 --> 00:17:49,950
magic milkshake.
248
00:17:50,280 --> 00:17:55,880
which was cookies and cream, Haagen
-Dazs ice cream, skim milk, magic
249
00:17:56,320 --> 00:18:02,300
LSD, and ecstasy, all blended together
to create just the most
250
00:18:02,300 --> 00:18:06,180
extreme, insane experience ever.
251
00:18:07,860 --> 00:18:13,420
Gonzalez also throws himself an
extravagant party to celebrate his
252
00:18:13,420 --> 00:18:14,420
New York City.
253
00:18:16,480 --> 00:18:21,600
Lay out a drug buffet on the coffee
table. So C for Coke, E for ecstasy.
254
00:18:22,220 --> 00:18:24,520
They had the best champagne.
255
00:18:24,720 --> 00:18:26,260
They had the best designer drugs.
256
00:18:26,560 --> 00:18:31,160
They had the most beautiful women there.
It was like life as they would design
257
00:18:31,160 --> 00:18:37,160
it. Despite this drug -fueled lifestyle,
Gonzalez never loses control of his
258
00:18:37,160 --> 00:18:39,520
business. He was always reachable.
259
00:18:40,060 --> 00:18:44,440
He slept with his laptop next to him. He
brought his laptop with him on
260
00:18:44,440 --> 00:18:47,260
vacation, to the gym. He always had it
with him.
261
00:18:48,360 --> 00:18:53,420
Next on American Greed, Operation Get
Rich or Die Tryin' gets more
262
00:18:53,420 --> 00:18:56,660
sophisticated, and the hackers up the
ante.
263
00:18:56,980 --> 00:19:01,940
The idea that these guys were able to
slip past all of these levels of
264
00:19:01,940 --> 00:19:03,620
security was just incredible.
265
00:19:04,060 --> 00:19:07,380
And the hackers take one company to the
brink.
266
00:19:07,790 --> 00:19:12,030
What do you do when you're facing the
worst possible thing that can happen to
267
00:19:12,030 --> 00:19:13,030
your company?
268
00:19:24,890 --> 00:19:30,870
By 2005, Albert Gonzalez and his crew
have successfully hacked into several
269
00:19:30,870 --> 00:19:33,750
retailers along US -1 in South Florida.
270
00:19:35,060 --> 00:19:40,700
These big box stores send data to
corporate servers, which Gonzalez knows
271
00:19:40,700 --> 00:19:41,860
real goldmine.
272
00:19:42,620 --> 00:19:45,920
It's very much a case of like, well,
hang on, if I can do it to these couple
273
00:19:45,920 --> 00:19:51,980
individuals in a store, or if I can do
it to these couple of stores, can I do
274
00:19:51,980 --> 00:19:55,600
to more stores? Can I do it to a series
of stores? Can I do it to a bigger
275
00:19:55,600 --> 00:20:00,040
store? And then you go to, can I
actually get the core centralized
276
00:20:00,040 --> 00:20:01,040
then it's like, wow, okay.
277
00:20:01,370 --> 00:20:04,710
If I can get the core system, who
processes all the data? I can go for the
278
00:20:04,710 --> 00:20:09,010
mother load at that point. He orders his
crew to perform reconnaissance on
279
00:20:09,010 --> 00:20:10,010
potential targets.
280
00:20:10,330 --> 00:20:14,850
They identified them in a variety of
ways. Christopher Scott simply going up
281
00:20:14,850 --> 00:20:19,170
down Route 1 with his computer, seeing
where there were vulnerable access
282
00:20:19,170 --> 00:20:24,690
points, going down the list of Fortune
500 companies, identifying companies
283
00:20:24,690 --> 00:20:27,790
shared a common credit card processing
system.
284
00:20:28,360 --> 00:20:31,760
We're identifying ones that had
vulnerable payment systems.
285
00:20:32,680 --> 00:20:36,580
So they'd walk in, maybe make a
purchase, or just walk in and look to
286
00:20:36,580 --> 00:20:40,100
point -of -sales terminal the stores
were using so they could reverse
287
00:20:40,100 --> 00:20:43,840
how to break into the corporate networks
through these different point -of
288
00:20:43,840 --> 00:20:44,840
-sales terminals.
289
00:20:45,040 --> 00:20:51,260
That July, they hit TJX Companies, the
publicly traded parent of Marshalls and
290
00:20:51,260 --> 00:20:52,400
TJ Maxx.
291
00:20:52,840 --> 00:20:57,800
Christopher Scott breaks into two
vulnerable wireless access points at two
292
00:20:57,800 --> 00:21:02,980
Marshall stores along Route 1 in
Florida. Within a matter of weeks, he's
293
00:21:02,980 --> 00:21:09,380
move from there into one of the major
payment card processing servers that TJX
294
00:21:09,380 --> 00:21:10,380
is using.
295
00:21:10,490 --> 00:21:13,530
You have access at that point in time to
the corporate site because now you have
296
00:21:13,530 --> 00:21:18,050
all of these stores that are sending
their daily, weekly, monthly batches all
297
00:21:18,050 --> 00:21:19,210
the way up to the corporate location.
298
00:21:19,850 --> 00:21:24,430
Chris Scott, Gonzales' foot soldier,
explores the network.
299
00:21:24,910 --> 00:21:30,050
He gets increasing amounts of rights or
privileges to move around the system and
300
00:21:30,050 --> 00:21:36,950
discovers a storage location that has 40
or 50 million payment card numbers.
301
00:21:37,090 --> 00:21:39,330
They download that batch of data.
302
00:21:40,000 --> 00:21:41,480
But Gonzalez isn't satisfied.
303
00:21:41,900 --> 00:21:47,380
He wants access to all the numbers
coming into TJX, not just the numbers in
304
00:21:47,380 --> 00:21:54,020
storage. In May 2006, Chris Scott
installs and configures a VPN, or
305
00:21:54,020 --> 00:21:55,500
Virtual Private Network.
306
00:21:56,270 --> 00:21:59,990
Albert's crew had set up a virtual
private network, which is a secure
307
00:21:59,990 --> 00:22:03,590
between TJX's server and one of Albert's
servers.
308
00:22:03,890 --> 00:22:07,590
So whenever they wanted to, they could
just tap that keg, open up the
309
00:22:07,590 --> 00:22:12,630
connection, and let the data stream from
TJX's server right onto Albert's.
310
00:22:13,350 --> 00:22:18,710
Scott then installs a snipper code, the
program that copies numbers while
311
00:22:18,710 --> 00:22:19,710
they're being processed.
312
00:22:19,910 --> 00:22:24,730
It turns out that there's a very tiny
window of time when the...
313
00:22:25,160 --> 00:22:28,960
Credit and debit card numbers aren't
being encrypted when it happens to be in
314
00:22:28,960 --> 00:22:30,580
the open as it's being processed.
315
00:22:30,800 --> 00:22:35,380
And it's during that period that they
make a photocopy of it all for
316
00:22:36,280 --> 00:22:42,820
Using the handle 201679996, Gonzalez
instant messages
317
00:22:42,820 --> 00:22:46,360
Maxim Yastrzemski, his Ukrainian partner
in crime.
318
00:22:47,020 --> 00:22:49,620
In that chat, he mentioned the sniffer
code.
319
00:22:49,940 --> 00:22:52,920
Soon, Yastrzemski could expect more
data.
320
00:22:54,760 --> 00:23:00,020
Business is booming for Gonzalez, whose
crew downloads more than 45 million card
321
00:23:00,020 --> 00:23:01,900
numbers through December 2006.
322
00:23:03,020 --> 00:23:06,860
If you shopped at any of these retail
stores during that period of time,
323
00:23:06,860 --> 00:23:09,840
a very good chance that your credit card
or debit card was compromised.
324
00:23:10,360 --> 00:23:16,540
That Christmas, more than 18 months
after Gonzalez's crew first hit TJX, the
325
00:23:16,540 --> 00:23:20,040
retail giant detects suspicious software
on its systems.
326
00:23:20,660 --> 00:23:23,960
Alarm bells sound, and the feds begin to
investigate.
327
00:23:24,570 --> 00:23:28,870
We didn't know if it was one individual,
if it was several different groups
328
00:23:28,870 --> 00:23:30,710
doing these compromises.
329
00:23:30,910 --> 00:23:34,710
What did we know from the forensics as
to where it was going? Did it look like
330
00:23:34,710 --> 00:23:38,770
anybody else that we'd ever seen? All of
these things were being carefully
331
00:23:38,770 --> 00:23:43,110
followed out, wholly, I'm embarrassed to
say, unsuccessfully.
332
00:23:44,050 --> 00:23:46,130
By January 2007...
333
00:23:47,120 --> 00:23:51,520
Gonzalez has pulled in more than 45
million credit and debit card numbers
334
00:23:51,520 --> 00:23:55,300
TJX, and he decides to get out of the
corporate system.
335
00:23:55,780 --> 00:23:58,820
The trouble is beginning to brew half a
world away.
336
00:23:59,320 --> 00:24:03,540
The Secret Service had been conducting a
totally separate and totally unrelated
337
00:24:03,540 --> 00:24:10,320
investigation into Maxim Yastrzemski for
his international sale of credit and
338
00:24:10,320 --> 00:24:11,380
debit card numbers.
339
00:24:11,740 --> 00:24:15,460
Turkish authorities arrest Maxim
Yastrzemski that July.
340
00:24:16,280 --> 00:24:23,120
That leads to the seizure of a laptop
computer, which the Turks provide to the
341
00:24:23,120 --> 00:24:24,120
Secret Service.
342
00:24:24,180 --> 00:24:29,180
When they opened up his computer, they
found all kinds of things, including
343
00:24:29,180 --> 00:24:34,580
of chat logs with an American who went
by an obscure string of numbers.
344
00:24:35,600 --> 00:24:41,880
201 -67 -9996 is passing on a piece of
software and
345
00:24:41,880 --> 00:24:46,790
says... It's one that I modified for use
in TJX.
346
00:24:47,110 --> 00:24:53,310
And that starts the investigation of who
201 is and how Maxim Yastrzemski
347
00:24:53,310 --> 00:24:57,150
relates to TJX and to other
investigations.
348
00:24:58,150 --> 00:25:03,330
They find further chats about a breach
of Dave & Buster's, the entertainment
349
00:25:03,330 --> 00:25:09,130
chain. Maszak Yastrzemski said he had
another hacker who was into a company
350
00:25:09,130 --> 00:25:10,970
named D &B in the United States.
351
00:25:11,610 --> 00:25:17,390
Yastrzemski had asked 201 to provide a
sniffer code to capture Dave and
352
00:25:17,390 --> 00:25:18,390
credit card data.
353
00:25:18,750 --> 00:25:23,630
That sniffer program was the same
sniffer that was utilized in the TJX
354
00:25:23,630 --> 00:25:30,030
that was our first clue that 201 -67996
may have been involved with TJX. The
355
00:25:30,030 --> 00:25:31,830
feds followed these leads for months.
356
00:25:32,570 --> 00:25:38,070
Just as Gonzales heads into the final
phase of Operation Get Rich, with
357
00:25:38,070 --> 00:25:42,430
Yastrzemski behind bars, Gonzales
decides to keep a closer eye on his
358
00:25:42,430 --> 00:25:45,950
associates, especially Patrick Toohey,
his right -hand man.
359
00:25:46,330 --> 00:25:51,090
It was more important than ever that he
exert as much control as possible over
360
00:25:51,090 --> 00:25:52,090
all of the variables.
361
00:25:52,410 --> 00:25:56,210
In August, Gonzales moves Toohey into
his Miami condo.
362
00:25:56,470 --> 00:26:00,050
It's a far cry from the hotel suites
they've partied in before.
363
00:26:00,890 --> 00:26:04,230
It was a dump. In part, it was because
he wanted to live under the radar,
364
00:26:04,270 --> 00:26:08,010
because he understood from his
experience with law enforcement that
365
00:26:08,010 --> 00:26:10,030
money is one of those things that gives
you away.
366
00:26:10,370 --> 00:26:13,490
It's different, though, from some of the
hackers we've seen in Eastern Europe
367
00:26:13,490 --> 00:26:17,830
where they'll buy a restaurant, they'll
buy a housing project or complex,
368
00:26:17,950 --> 00:26:20,010
they'll buy million -dollar apartments.
369
00:26:20,350 --> 00:26:21,810
That wasn't this crew here.
370
00:26:22,110 --> 00:26:27,790
They might buy a few nice computers or
recreational items, but they're not
371
00:26:27,790 --> 00:26:29,630
living in the million -dollar apartments
in Manhattan.
372
00:26:30,840 --> 00:26:35,800
By late fall, Operation Get Rich
progresses from more driving to more
373
00:26:35,800 --> 00:26:37,640
complicated web -based hacks.
374
00:26:38,440 --> 00:26:43,140
Gonzalez conspires with TUI and two
Russians to commit a series of other
375
00:26:43,140 --> 00:26:47,960
intrusions using a diabolical plan known
as a SQL injection attack.
376
00:26:48,440 --> 00:26:54,440
SQL injection attack is an internet
-based attack on a website that's
377
00:26:54,440 --> 00:26:58,940
-driven. So the most important
difference is you don't need that
378
00:26:58,940 --> 00:27:00,080
proximity anymore.
379
00:27:00,670 --> 00:27:06,130
to conduct these types of remote hacks
into systems. You can be sitting in
380
00:27:06,130 --> 00:27:11,570
and do a SQL injection, internet -based
attack on a computer system in
381
00:27:11,570 --> 00:27:12,570
California.
382
00:27:13,090 --> 00:27:19,410
Coming up, Gonzalez and his co
-conspirators go to the motherlode and
383
00:27:19,410 --> 00:27:23,330
credit card processing company, their
biggest prize yet.
384
00:27:23,530 --> 00:27:25,290
They were in a position to...
385
00:27:26,179 --> 00:27:32,880
accessed tens of millions of payment
card numbers quickly, and that was a
386
00:27:32,880 --> 00:27:36,460
goose. So the hack is the credit card
processing company. It's like the Holy
387
00:27:36,460 --> 00:27:37,720
Grail at that point in time.
388
00:27:40,680 --> 00:27:47,660
By December 2007,
389
00:27:48,060 --> 00:27:52,680
Operation Get Rich or Die Tryin' has
entered its most ambitious phase yet.
390
00:27:53,280 --> 00:27:57,860
Albert Gonzalez and his co -conspirators
target several companies, including
391
00:27:57,860 --> 00:28:01,820
Heartland Payment Systems, one of the
world's largest payment processors.
392
00:28:02,440 --> 00:28:08,140
We process for about 250 ,000 locations
in America and a few in Canada,
393
00:28:08,320 --> 00:28:12,320
and we process about 4 billion
transactions a year.
394
00:28:12,760 --> 00:28:17,660
Bob Carr is the founder, chairman, and
chief executive officer of Heartland
395
00:28:17,660 --> 00:28:18,660
Payment Systems.
396
00:28:19,340 --> 00:28:25,300
There's no doubt that people who process
billions of transactions are the mother
397
00:28:25,300 --> 00:28:27,200
load of data, that's for sure.
398
00:28:27,560 --> 00:28:32,640
When we were doing our initial public
offering of stock on the roadshow, the
399
00:28:32,640 --> 00:28:36,380
question everyone asked is, what keeps
you awake at night? And my answer was
400
00:28:36,380 --> 00:28:37,900
always getting breached.
401
00:28:38,360 --> 00:28:43,020
But Carr is totally unaware that his
worst nightmare is coming true.
402
00:28:44,140 --> 00:28:47,620
Gonzalez and Patrick Toohey invisibly
hack into Heartland.
403
00:28:48,060 --> 00:28:50,060
using a sequel injection attack.
404
00:28:50,600 --> 00:28:53,540
If I were to walk up to you on the
street and say, can you tell me the
405
00:28:53,740 --> 00:28:54,760
you'd tell me the time.
406
00:28:55,060 --> 00:28:57,900
But if I were to walk up to you on the
street and say, can you tell me your
407
00:28:57,900 --> 00:29:01,340
name, address, social security number
and mother's maiden name, then you're
408
00:29:01,340 --> 00:29:02,099
going to do that.
409
00:29:02,100 --> 00:29:05,060
You're smart enough to know the
difference between information you
410
00:29:05,060 --> 00:29:06,880
out and information you shouldn't give
out.
411
00:29:07,400 --> 00:29:08,540
Whereas with...
412
00:29:08,830 --> 00:29:13,190
A website that's subjected to a SQL
injection attack, it's not programmed to
413
00:29:13,190 --> 00:29:16,950
correctly recognize which commands it
should obey and which commands it should
414
00:29:16,950 --> 00:29:23,150
ignore. They install a sniffer code to
copy data in small, well -timed chunks.
415
00:29:23,690 --> 00:29:27,430
From there, it was a matter of having
that sniffing software work and send the
416
00:29:27,430 --> 00:29:31,150
payment card information, the credit and
debit card information out to...
417
00:29:31,600 --> 00:29:34,740
Hacking platforms in foreign countries
and in the United States that could be
418
00:29:34,740 --> 00:29:39,280
used to receive and store the card data
that was stolen, but also the malware,
419
00:29:39,500 --> 00:29:41,180
the software that was used to sell it.
420
00:29:42,120 --> 00:29:45,480
For months, the hackers tap into
Heartland's network.
421
00:29:46,160 --> 00:29:49,280
You don't want to turn the spigot on the
whole way and just drain the thing
422
00:29:49,280 --> 00:29:53,540
immediately. You want to take a little
bit of time and keep on taking it.
423
00:29:53,800 --> 00:29:58,360
They access more than 130 million credit
and debit card numbers.
424
00:29:58,700 --> 00:30:00,160
These bad guys spent.
425
00:30:00,620 --> 00:30:04,580
Hours and hours and hours for months and
months and months trying to figure out
426
00:30:04,580 --> 00:30:09,040
and customize an attack that would get
through and get into our payments
427
00:30:09,040 --> 00:30:10,620
network, and they were able to do that.
428
00:30:11,580 --> 00:30:16,240
Back at the Secret Service, agents have
been combing through Maxim Yastrzemski's
429
00:30:16,240 --> 00:30:17,240
computer.
430
00:30:17,640 --> 00:30:21,740
They find chats referring to someone
with the initials CJ.
431
00:30:22,600 --> 00:30:24,880
CJ is short for Kumbhajani.
432
00:30:25,420 --> 00:30:31,140
which is the name we had Gonzalez use
when he was an informant in Operation
433
00:30:31,140 --> 00:30:37,260
Firewall. It's a very small connection,
very much at the periphery, but we had
434
00:30:37,260 --> 00:30:41,100
one or two of those little indications
start to unravel.
435
00:30:41,840 --> 00:30:45,960
They also learn the Ukrainian crime lord
has been chatting with a mysterious
436
00:30:45,960 --> 00:30:52,700
American, 201 -67 -9996, who was somehow
involved in the
437
00:30:52,700 --> 00:30:54,180
TJX hack.
438
00:30:55,150 --> 00:31:01,990
201 -679 -996 is connected to an email
address, supnazi at
439
00:31:01,990 --> 00:31:03,330
efnet .ru.
440
00:31:03,630 --> 00:31:09,050
And the Secret Service recognizes that
email address as one that has been used
441
00:31:09,050 --> 00:31:14,850
previously by Albert Gonzalez. For the
first time, there was a major lead.
442
00:31:16,490 --> 00:31:18,730
Shockwaves ripple through the Secret
Service.
443
00:31:18,990 --> 00:31:21,510
Is Gonzalez playing both sides?
444
00:31:22,540 --> 00:31:27,460
While Albert is masterminding this
incredible cybercrime, he is still
445
00:31:27,460 --> 00:31:28,620
an informant for the Fed.
446
00:31:29,860 --> 00:31:34,420
Agents move quickly to secure warrants
to arrest Gonzalez and his crew.
447
00:31:34,800 --> 00:31:36,020
And by now...
448
00:31:36,270 --> 00:31:39,010
Gonzalez knows the heat is coming down.
449
00:31:39,430 --> 00:31:43,010
When you were involved with someone that
gets arrested, you're going to be more
450
00:31:43,010 --> 00:31:47,490
apprehensive. And we had seen in the
chats that 201 person being apprehensive
451
00:31:47,490 --> 00:31:48,490
about that situation.
452
00:31:49,010 --> 00:31:55,970
So he most likely knew from reading
public information about our cases,
453
00:31:55,970 --> 00:31:58,250
things that we were closing in.
454
00:31:58,750 --> 00:32:03,070
On May 7, 2008, after nearly a year
-long investigation,
455
00:32:04,010 --> 00:32:06,150
The feds go after their informant.
456
00:32:06,370 --> 00:32:11,350
These young kids had access to documents
that would allow them to immediately
457
00:32:11,350 --> 00:32:12,350
flee the country.
458
00:32:12,490 --> 00:32:17,450
And we were very, very concerned that
Gonzalez was going to be one of those,
459
00:32:17,450 --> 00:32:20,090
once he was gone, we would never get him
back.
460
00:32:22,610 --> 00:32:29,390
About 150 agents scour Gonzalez's condo,
his parents' house, and several other
461
00:32:29,390 --> 00:32:30,390
residences.
462
00:32:30,910 --> 00:32:32,790
From Gonzalez's condominium.
463
00:32:33,160 --> 00:32:39,340
There was multiple computers and media
that was seized, a large quantity of
464
00:32:39,340 --> 00:32:41,720
from Gonzalez's parents' residence.
465
00:32:41,940 --> 00:32:46,080
We seized a number of computers,
documents, a money counter.
466
00:32:46,680 --> 00:32:49,240
But Gonzalez is nowhere to be found.
467
00:32:50,040 --> 00:32:53,960
When they arrived at the place where
they thought Albert Gonzalez would be,
468
00:32:53,960 --> 00:32:56,080
his parents' house or his girlfriend's
house, he was neither.
469
00:32:56,460 --> 00:32:58,480
And that's when the panic began.
470
00:32:59,420 --> 00:33:03,980
On a tip, they search a suite at the
National Hotel in Miami's South Beach,
471
00:33:04,300 --> 00:33:10,900
where they find Gonzalez, along with two
laptops, $22 ,000 in cash, and a Glock
472
00:33:10,900 --> 00:33:11,980
27 handgun.
473
00:33:12,960 --> 00:33:16,400
They arrest Gonzalez and Christopher
Scott that same day.
474
00:33:16,980 --> 00:33:19,340
Patrick Toohey is arrested soon after.
475
00:33:19,620 --> 00:33:24,080
Patrick knew he was sunk. He knew that
he and the entire operation, they were
476
00:33:24,080 --> 00:33:27,080
just dead meat. He started talking
immediately.
477
00:33:27,900 --> 00:33:32,720
After Albert discovered that Patrick was
cooperating, Albert himself became very
478
00:33:32,720 --> 00:33:37,320
cooperative, and he led them to a lot of
information, including he told them
479
00:33:37,320 --> 00:33:39,700
where the money was buried in his
parents' backyard.
480
00:33:40,900 --> 00:33:45,500
Investigators return to Albert's
childhood home, where they search the
481
00:33:45,840 --> 00:33:48,880
They find a barrel buried beneath a palm
tree.
482
00:33:49,160 --> 00:33:55,200
Once the earth was unsealed, inside was
over $1 million of vacuum -packed cash.
483
00:33:55,820 --> 00:34:01,420
Gonzalez has stashed $1 .1 million in
plastic bags for safekeeping.
484
00:34:02,000 --> 00:34:05,820
Soon, the feds unearth more secrets
about the case.
485
00:34:06,220 --> 00:34:11,480
When we executed those search warrants,
one of the individuals spoke and said
486
00:34:11,480 --> 00:34:14,719
that Albert Gonzalez used the nickname
Segveg.
487
00:34:15,040 --> 00:34:21,020
And that was the evidence we were
looking for to get us over the edge and
488
00:34:21,020 --> 00:34:22,080
able to indict him.
489
00:34:22,500 --> 00:34:27,260
Segveg. The handle Gonzalez used during
chats with Yastrzemski about Dave and
490
00:34:27,260 --> 00:34:32,239
Busters clinches it for the feds.
Finally, really, we're starting to
491
00:34:32,239 --> 00:34:36,000
understand all these data breaches we
had seen happen over the years. It was
492
00:34:36,000 --> 00:34:37,000
really exciting.
493
00:34:37,020 --> 00:34:38,020
It was shocking.
494
00:34:38,560 --> 00:34:43,820
A few weeks later, the criminal
complaint against Gonzalez is posted
495
00:34:43,820 --> 00:34:45,260
it rocks the hacking underworld.
496
00:34:46,250 --> 00:34:48,750
This is a very close community of
hackers.
497
00:34:49,010 --> 00:34:52,330
These are people you have to remember
who are very alienated from the rest of
498
00:34:52,330 --> 00:34:55,170
society. They feel that all they have is
each other.
499
00:34:55,949 --> 00:35:01,470
24 -year -old Jonathan James, Gonzalez's
former war driver, was shocked to learn
500
00:35:01,470 --> 00:35:04,950
that his boss has been working for the
Secret Service since 2003.
501
00:35:05,690 --> 00:35:08,890
There's just been this nice set of
clicky groups, and you can trust
502
00:35:08,970 --> 00:35:11,090
and now you're like, well, whose side
are you on?
503
00:35:11,680 --> 00:35:16,780
James, who had become famous for hacking
as a teen, believes his friends will
504
00:35:16,780 --> 00:35:17,780
rat him out.
505
00:35:18,440 --> 00:35:23,780
Coming up, James takes matters into his
own hands, and Operation Get Rich or Die
506
00:35:23,780 --> 00:35:25,840
Tryin' takes a deadly turn.
507
00:35:26,420 --> 00:35:31,380
He did not want to have that kind of
heat on him again, and the idea that
508
00:35:31,380 --> 00:35:34,320
were now turning on each other, it was
intolerable to him.
509
00:35:44,840 --> 00:35:51,080
In May 2008, with Albert Gonzalez and
his hack pack behind bars, the feds
510
00:35:51,080 --> 00:35:52,300
to shore up their case.
511
00:35:52,780 --> 00:35:56,800
But Jonathan James, one of Gonzalez's
war drivers, is still free.
512
00:35:57,140 --> 00:36:02,320
And he jumps to the conclusion that
Gonzalez is going to set him up. He said
513
00:36:02,320 --> 00:36:07,620
that he was sure that he was going to be
the scapegoat for this crime, given his
514
00:36:07,620 --> 00:36:12,600
notoriety, and also given that he knew
that Albert...
515
00:36:12,910 --> 00:36:16,550
was a government cooperator, and he was
sure that Albert was going to pin the
516
00:36:16,550 --> 00:36:17,550
crime on him.
517
00:36:17,670 --> 00:36:19,970
James pens a letter titled Storytime.
518
00:36:20,230 --> 00:36:23,170
In it, he says he had nothing to do with
the hats.
519
00:36:23,690 --> 00:36:27,650
He couldn't bear the idea that they were
all betraying each other. Once these
520
00:36:27,650 --> 00:36:29,870
hackers turned on each other, they had
nobody left.
521
00:36:30,550 --> 00:36:34,970
Remember, it's not whether you win or
lose, it's whether I win or lose. And
522
00:36:34,970 --> 00:36:40,370
sitting in jail for 20, 10, or even 5
years for a crime I didn't commit is not
523
00:36:40,370 --> 00:36:41,430
me winning.
524
00:36:42,230 --> 00:36:43,230
I die free.
525
00:36:44,250 --> 00:36:50,470
Minutes later, he picks up a handgun,
points it to his temple, and pulls the
526
00:36:50,470 --> 00:36:51,470
trigger.
527
00:36:51,830 --> 00:36:57,010
If he, in fact, played a part in this
crime, he played a very small part, and
528
00:36:57,010 --> 00:37:00,850
it's not clear whether he would have
been indicted had he not killed himself.
529
00:37:02,410 --> 00:37:07,330
The feds file more indictments against
Gonzalez and his crew in August 2008.
530
00:37:08,300 --> 00:37:12,480
And for the first time, the scope of the
crime becomes clear.
531
00:37:12,900 --> 00:37:16,980
We had to keep replacing our press
releases. This is the most significant,
532
00:37:17,240 --> 00:37:21,100
largest data breach we've had. It just
kept building upon itself.
533
00:37:21,600 --> 00:37:24,260
500 ,000 numbers, then a million
numbers.
534
00:37:24,860 --> 00:37:29,140
The first indictment is filed in New
York for the Dave and Buster's breach.
535
00:37:29,840 --> 00:37:31,420
The second in Massachusetts.
536
00:37:32,320 --> 00:37:38,120
for the hacks into TJX companies, BJ's
Wholesale Club, OfficeMax, and several
537
00:37:38,120 --> 00:37:39,120
other businesses.
538
00:37:39,780 --> 00:37:44,900
But despite being in jail, Gonzalez is
still wreaking havoc on the outside.
539
00:37:45,460 --> 00:37:50,760
In October 2008, credit card companies
warned Heartland Payment Systems of
540
00:37:50,760 --> 00:37:52,100
suspicious activity.
541
00:37:52,660 --> 00:37:58,220
We hired forensics companies to help try
to find it. We got a report that there
542
00:37:58,220 --> 00:38:00,940
were no problems found, so we thought we
were in the clear.
543
00:38:01,370 --> 00:38:05,650
When forensics companies tell you that
they can't find anything and they do
544
00:38:05,650 --> 00:38:09,710
for a living, you get some sense of
comfort that there's not a problem.
545
00:38:10,370 --> 00:38:17,050
Three months go by, and in January 2009,
Heartland chiefs get the call they've
546
00:38:17,050 --> 00:38:18,050
been dreading.
547
00:38:18,250 --> 00:38:23,750
Someone had found data in our system
that could not be explained, data that
548
00:38:23,750 --> 00:38:24,750
did not create.
549
00:38:24,770 --> 00:38:29,210
In the next couple of days, we learned
that there was malware that was creating
550
00:38:29,210 --> 00:38:30,210
this data.
551
00:38:30,270 --> 00:38:34,850
And that turned out to be the card
numbers that were put into files that
552
00:38:34,850 --> 00:38:39,790
compressed. I knew it would be
disastrous for a lot of the stockholders
553
00:38:39,790 --> 00:38:40,850
company, including me.
554
00:38:41,870 --> 00:38:45,210
Heartland goes public with news of the
breach days later.
555
00:38:45,650 --> 00:38:50,250
Another big story at 6. A credit card
processing company gets hacked into.
556
00:38:50,690 --> 00:38:55,990
The company's stock plummets from about
$16 a share to less than $4.
557
00:38:56,530 --> 00:38:58,510
But the loss is really much greater.
558
00:38:59,120 --> 00:39:04,920
We've reported losses of $139 million
that we've paid out or booked that we
559
00:39:04,920 --> 00:39:10,980
pay out. So we suffered a net $110
million loss, and we still don't know if
560
00:39:10,980 --> 00:39:15,540
we're finished. We probably are not, but
we think the bulk of it is behind us.
561
00:39:15,740 --> 00:39:18,500
In focus this evening, security in
cyberspace.
562
00:39:18,740 --> 00:39:23,300
A lot of people will look at Heartland,
and they don't want to be the next
563
00:39:23,300 --> 00:39:24,300
headline on CNBC.
564
00:39:24,500 --> 00:39:27,120
So they're going to be quite careful,
too.
565
00:39:27,830 --> 00:39:30,990
improve the standards and make sure that
they're defending themselves.
566
00:39:31,410 --> 00:39:37,390
In August 2009, Gonzalez, Patrick
Toohey, and two unnamed Russian hackers
567
00:39:37,390 --> 00:39:41,850
indicted in New Jersey for conspiring to
break into Heartland and several other
568
00:39:41,850 --> 00:39:46,110
companies. Software has sort of a
digital fingerprint, a kind of digital
569
00:39:46,350 --> 00:39:50,010
And in the process of investigating it,
if it has that same DNA, there's a link
570
00:39:50,010 --> 00:39:51,570
between those two victim sites.
571
00:39:51,870 --> 00:39:53,970
And what we ended up with was...
572
00:39:54,480 --> 00:39:57,920
enough similarities between the five
victim sites to know that we were
573
00:39:57,920 --> 00:39:59,560
with one hacking crew.
574
00:39:59,800 --> 00:40:04,600
But much about the case remains a
mystery, like how many credit card
575
00:40:04,600 --> 00:40:05,519
were stolen.
576
00:40:05,520 --> 00:40:11,940
There were tens of millions more at TJX
and in excess of 100 million at
577
00:40:11,940 --> 00:40:16,280
Heartland that could have been taken,
but nobody knows the exact number.
578
00:40:16,600 --> 00:40:21,220
And how much money Gonzalez and his crew
ultimately earned from their hacks.
579
00:40:21,920 --> 00:40:24,020
They're young kids. They spent a lot of
money.
580
00:40:24,320 --> 00:40:29,480
They spent a lot of money on partying, a
lot of money on drugs, fun nights out,
581
00:40:29,600 --> 00:40:35,640
spending $80 ,000. So it's hard for us
to know if they didn't just spend most
582
00:40:35,640 --> 00:40:36,640
it, too.
583
00:40:37,180 --> 00:40:43,100
Prosecutors do know that victims lose at
least $400 million, and restitution is
584
00:40:43,100 --> 00:40:45,020
set at $172 million.
585
00:40:45,520 --> 00:40:51,240
Gonzalez, with his team, committed the
largest identity theft.
586
00:40:51,840 --> 00:40:55,240
ever prosecuted in the United States and
perhaps the world.
587
00:40:55,440 --> 00:41:02,180
The dollar loss was so large that it
changed the behavior of corporations as
588
00:41:02,180 --> 00:41:06,660
they realized that they had to increase
the level of security because there was
589
00:41:06,660 --> 00:41:08,820
a large dollar risk involved.
590
00:41:09,120 --> 00:41:14,060
So it was changing to the whole culture
in the size of what he did.
591
00:41:14,800 --> 00:41:19,840
Patrick Tuohy, Stephen Watt, Chris Scott
and Maxim Yastrzemski.
592
00:41:20,430 --> 00:41:22,990
all served multi -year sentences in
prison.
593
00:41:24,250 --> 00:41:29,510
And as for Gonzalez... He agreed to
plead guilty to all of them and
594
00:41:29,510 --> 00:41:33,850
received a 20 -year sentence to run on
each of them at the same time.
595
00:41:34,290 --> 00:41:40,690
Restitution well in excess of $100
million and forfeiture of jewelry,
596
00:41:40,890 --> 00:41:46,410
computers, and over a million dollars in
cash that had been dug up in his
597
00:41:46,410 --> 00:41:47,410
parents' backyard.
598
00:41:48,040 --> 00:41:52,300
At sentencing, Gonzalez's attorney
argues these were not crimes of greed.
599
00:41:52,700 --> 00:41:57,960
Rather, that Gonzalez suffers from
Asperger's syndrome, a mild form of
600
00:41:58,200 --> 00:42:00,540
which could explain his addiction to
computers.
601
00:42:01,360 --> 00:42:07,400
People with Asperger's are unable to
relate to other people. Whereas Albert
602
00:42:07,400 --> 00:42:09,160
a natural leader.
603
00:42:09,380 --> 00:42:15,920
He, by definition, could relate to other
people, size them up, negotiate with
604
00:42:15,920 --> 00:42:20,100
them. squeeze work product out of them.
He was the exact opposite of somebody
605
00:42:20,100 --> 00:42:21,100
with Asperger's.
606
00:42:21,420 --> 00:42:25,360
Court -appointed psychologists find no
evidence of the disorder.
607
00:42:25,900 --> 00:42:31,800
These guys spent a lot of time on their
computers, but so does about half to two
608
00:42:31,800 --> 00:42:35,040
-thirds of all the students at nearby
MIT.
609
00:42:35,360 --> 00:42:39,480
So the fact that you spend a lot of time
on your computer as a kid, that you
610
00:42:39,480 --> 00:42:43,240
communicate with others on your
computers, does not justify crime.
611
00:42:44,340 --> 00:42:50,370
In the end, What begins as teenagers
hacking for fun soon becomes the
612
00:42:50,370 --> 00:42:54,710
cybercrime in history, an operation that
lives up to its name.
613
00:42:55,290 --> 00:43:00,990
When Albert called this caper Operation
Get Rich or Die Trying, I'm sure he
614
00:43:00,990 --> 00:43:02,910
didn't actually intend for anyone to
die.
57200
Can't find what you're looking for?
Get subtitles in any language from opensubtitles.com, and translate them here.