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1
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- Scoops.
2
00:00:20,144 --> 00:00:21,478
Pilots from
Airborne Express...
3
00:00:21,562 --> 00:00:22,396
- On.
4
00:00:22,521 --> 00:00:23,522
-...are testing a plane
5
00:00:23,647 --> 00:00:25,524
that's been recently modified.
6
00:00:25,608 --> 00:00:27,693
- Kick the tires,
light the fires, and make sure
7
00:00:27,777 --> 00:00:29,903
she's exactly as advertised.
8
00:00:30,030 --> 00:00:32,115
- The next thing
is our stall series.
9
00:00:32,240 --> 00:00:33,741
- These pilots were trying
10
00:00:33,866 --> 00:00:36,076
to test the stall
warning system.
11
00:00:36,201 --> 00:00:38,537
- Feeling some buffet here.
12
00:00:38,662 --> 00:00:39,997
- That's a stall right there.
13
00:00:40,081 --> 00:00:43,042
- But something goes
terribly wrong.
14
00:00:43,752 --> 00:00:45,378
- It's number two engine.
15
00:00:46,920 --> 00:00:48,631
Pull up.
16
00:00:48,756 --> 00:00:50,549
- Really? Really?!
17
00:00:50,674 --> 00:00:52,093
- Terrain.
18
00:00:52,218 --> 00:00:55,889
Flight 8-2-7 crashes
into a mountain in Virginia.
19
00:00:56,014 --> 00:00:58,223
Everyone onboard is killed.
20
00:00:58,307 --> 00:01:01,268
- It was just
complete devastation.
21
00:01:01,393 --> 00:01:05,189
- While the flight data confirms
the plane entered a stall...
22
00:01:05,272 --> 00:01:07,566
- And then here,
the airspeed falls off a cliff.
23
00:01:07,691 --> 00:01:10,486
- ...it doesn't explain
why the pilots weren't able
24
00:01:10,611 --> 00:01:14,615
to recover from the very
condition they were testing.
25
00:01:14,740 --> 00:01:16,909
- It's a sobering thought
and a significant one.
26
00:01:18,203 --> 00:01:19,537
- Mayday, Mayday.
27
00:01:22,790 --> 00:01:24,459
- Pull up.
28
00:01:38,972 --> 00:01:41,141
It's three days
before Christmas
29
00:01:41,266 --> 00:01:43,769
at Piedmont Triad
International Airport
30
00:01:43,894 --> 00:01:46,188
in Greensboro, North Carolina.
31
00:01:46,647 --> 00:01:49,858
The crew of Airborne Express
Flight 8-2-7
32
00:01:49,983 --> 00:01:52,069
and three technicians
in the cabin
33
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have been waiting
more than four hours
34
00:01:54,322 --> 00:01:56,323
for maintenance to be completed.
35
00:01:56,448 --> 00:01:58,200
- Think we're getting
out of here tonight?
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00:01:58,325 --> 00:02:00,078
- At this rate, I think
we're all gonna be spending
37
00:02:00,161 --> 00:02:02,079
Christmas together
in this cockpit.
38
00:02:02,162 --> 00:02:03,498
What do you think, Terry?
39
00:02:03,623 --> 00:02:06,126
- I think you can explain
that one to my wife and kids.
40
00:02:06,209 --> 00:02:08,461
Flight 8-2-7,
aircraft is cleared
41
00:02:08,544 --> 00:02:11,421
and released. Have a good flight
and a Merry Christmas.
42
00:02:11,506 --> 00:02:14,758
- Roger, 8-2-7. Happy holidays,
Dispatch.
43
00:02:14,842 --> 00:02:16,468
Finally.
44
00:02:17,719 --> 00:02:19,514
Just after 5 p.m.,
45
00:02:19,639 --> 00:02:23,100
Flight 8-2-7
is given clearance to fly.
46
00:02:25,520 --> 00:02:29,064
The flight engineer
is 52-year-old military veteran
47
00:02:29,189 --> 00:02:30,900
Terry Waelti.
48
00:02:31,025 --> 00:02:34,987
- Taxi and pre-takeoff
checklist. Brakes.
49
00:02:35,697 --> 00:02:40,075
- Flying tonight is 37-year-old
Captain Keith Leming.
50
00:02:40,868 --> 00:02:42,662
- Checked.
- Checked.
51
00:02:43,288 --> 00:02:47,375
- Cabin and freon compressors
are off. Anti-skid?
52
00:02:48,501 --> 00:02:50,336
- Armed.
- While not flying,
53
00:02:50,461 --> 00:02:52,881
48-year-old Captain Garth Avery,
54
00:02:53,006 --> 00:02:55,842
is the designated
pilot-in-command.
55
00:02:56,717 --> 00:02:58,635
- They were very experienced
as pilots.
56
00:02:58,719 --> 00:03:00,680
The flight engineer
was incredibly experienced,
57
00:03:00,805 --> 00:03:03,181
and they all knew the DC-8
and had many, many hours
58
00:03:03,307 --> 00:03:04,516
in this airplane.
59
00:03:04,641 --> 00:03:07,937
- Taxi and
pre-takeoff checklist complete.
60
00:03:08,062 --> 00:03:11,649
Tower, ABX 8-2-7 heavy
is ready to go.
61
00:03:12,984 --> 00:03:14,401
- The flight crew is operating
62
00:03:14,526 --> 00:03:17,864
a modified McDonnell
Douglas DC-8.
63
00:03:18,531 --> 00:03:21,700
- The DC-8 is an incredibly
reliable machine,
64
00:03:21,783 --> 00:03:23,745
and it always has been.
65
00:03:23,870 --> 00:03:25,997
- The DC-8 is a long-range,
66
00:03:26,080 --> 00:03:30,376
narrow-body jetliner
introduced in 1959.
67
00:03:33,587 --> 00:03:36,883
- As long as you use it
exactly the way it was designed,
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00:03:36,966 --> 00:03:38,717
they're just as tough
as nails.
69
00:03:39,635 --> 00:03:41,512
- V-1. Rotate.
70
00:03:46,308 --> 00:03:50,812
- At 5:40 p.m.,
Flight 8-2-7 takes off.
71
00:03:57,069 --> 00:03:59,822
- Positive rate, gear up.
72
00:03:59,948 --> 00:04:01,574
- Positive rate...
73
00:04:04,826 --> 00:04:06,663
One thousand feet.
74
00:04:06,788 --> 00:04:07,997
- Roger.
75
00:04:08,122 --> 00:04:10,415
- Although it's a lesser-known
airline,
76
00:04:10,540 --> 00:04:13,044
Airborne Express, or ABX,
77
00:04:13,127 --> 00:04:15,170
is one of the largest
cargo carriers
78
00:04:15,295 --> 00:04:17,089
in the United States,
79
00:04:17,173 --> 00:04:20,134
after both Federal Express
and UPS.
80
00:04:21,468 --> 00:04:23,637
In a bid to expand its fleet,
81
00:04:23,762 --> 00:04:25,473
ABX purchased the aircraft
82
00:04:25,598 --> 00:04:27,641
that would become Flight 8-2-7
83
00:04:27,766 --> 00:04:31,103
and modified it
before putting it into service.
84
00:04:32,312 --> 00:04:34,023
- ABX 8-2-7
85
00:04:34,148 --> 00:04:37,819
is 2,500 for 5,000.
86
00:04:38,987 --> 00:04:42,615
- MCT set. Ignition off.
87
00:04:42,699 --> 00:04:45,617
- But before this plane
can be added to the fleet,
88
00:04:45,742 --> 00:04:48,288
it has to be taken
for a test flight.
89
00:04:50,581 --> 00:04:53,834
This is known as
a Functional Evaluation Flight,
90
00:04:53,959 --> 00:04:55,711
or F-E-F.
91
00:04:57,338 --> 00:04:58,964
- A Functional
Evaluation Flight
92
00:04:59,089 --> 00:05:00,425
is basically to see
that everything
93
00:05:00,507 --> 00:05:02,427
is as it's supposed to be,
94
00:05:02,509 --> 00:05:04,637
kick the tires,
light the fires, go out and fly,
95
00:05:04,721 --> 00:05:07,889
and make sure she's exactly
as advertised.
96
00:05:09,057 --> 00:05:11,269
- After departing Greensboro,
97
00:05:11,351 --> 00:05:14,480
Flight 8-2-7 is scheduled
to spend about two hours
98
00:05:14,564 --> 00:05:17,524
flying the F-E-F before
returning to the airport.
99
00:05:17,649 --> 00:05:19,776
ABX 8-2-7, for our maintenance
100
00:05:19,860 --> 00:05:23,447
check, can we get a block
of 1-0 to 1-2 thousand?
101
00:05:23,531 --> 00:05:26,742
- The flight crew needs
a dedicated block of airspace
102
00:05:26,867 --> 00:05:27,994
to perform the tests.
103
00:05:28,119 --> 00:05:30,329
Could you take a block of, uh,
104
00:05:30,413 --> 00:05:32,290
thirteen to fifteen?
105
00:05:32,372 --> 00:05:34,250
- We can do that.
106
00:05:36,168 --> 00:05:37,627
- ABX 8-2-7, roger,
107
00:05:37,711 --> 00:05:39,297
climb and maintain
block altitude
108
00:05:39,379 --> 00:05:41,716
of 1-3 thousand
through 1-5 thousand.
109
00:05:43,300 --> 00:05:45,802
- Having reached a quiet block
of airspace,
110
00:05:45,887 --> 00:05:49,682
the crew works its way
through the F-E-F checklist.
111
00:05:51,641 --> 00:05:53,226
- Scoops?
112
00:05:55,646 --> 00:05:56,564
- On.
113
00:05:56,689 --> 00:05:58,483
- The DC-8's scoops are part
114
00:05:58,565 --> 00:06:00,651
of its pressurization system.
115
00:06:01,569 --> 00:06:03,862
- Didn't get the left one.
Try again.
116
00:06:05,281 --> 00:06:07,283
- It's really common
on test flights,
117
00:06:07,408 --> 00:06:09,285
to have issues crop up.
118
00:06:09,410 --> 00:06:11,370
This airplane had undergone
so many changes
119
00:06:11,495 --> 00:06:13,872
that it needed
a thorough test flight.
120
00:06:13,956 --> 00:06:16,875
- Alright. Scoops... off.
121
00:06:20,588 --> 00:06:22,548
- The left one ain't working.
122
00:06:23,673 --> 00:06:25,968
- With multiple redundancies
built into
123
00:06:26,093 --> 00:06:27,552
the pressurization system,
124
00:06:27,637 --> 00:06:30,764
the pilots are safe
to continue their flight.
125
00:06:34,101 --> 00:06:37,396
- ABX 8-2-7, turn right,
heading of 3-6-0
126
00:06:37,521 --> 00:06:38,980
vectors for traffic.
127
00:06:39,107 --> 00:06:41,858
- Air Traffic Control
monitors the airspace,
128
00:06:41,942 --> 00:06:45,112
redirecting Flight 8-2-7
when necessary.
129
00:06:45,237 --> 00:06:46,613
ABX 8-2-7,
130
00:06:46,738 --> 00:06:48,324
right 3-6-0.
131
00:06:50,242 --> 00:06:52,577
And then we're gonna do
our manual drop.
132
00:06:52,661 --> 00:06:55,206
You ready for hydraulics
to come off, Keith?
133
00:06:55,288 --> 00:06:56,915
- Uh, yeah, go right ahead.
134
00:06:57,040 --> 00:06:58,793
- Okay, go ahead, Terry.
135
00:06:58,918 --> 00:07:02,379
- The manual drop
tests the plane's landing gear
136
00:07:02,463 --> 00:07:04,841
without the use of hydraulics.
137
00:07:04,966 --> 00:07:08,802
- Okay, gear free fall
one point five, V-S zero.
138
00:07:08,927 --> 00:07:12,432
- Okay, you ready?
- Ready. Gear down.
139
00:07:14,307 --> 00:07:17,853
- Gear... down. Three green.
140
00:07:17,978 --> 00:07:20,273
- Got it.
141
00:07:21,189 --> 00:07:23,526
- We're getting a little bit
of ice here.
142
00:07:25,653 --> 00:07:27,196
- The biggest hazard
from icing
143
00:07:27,321 --> 00:07:29,990
is that it changes the shape
of the wing.
144
00:07:30,115 --> 00:07:34,036
And the airplane doesn't fly
nearly as well as it did.
145
00:07:34,161 --> 00:07:35,913
- The crew comes up with a plan
146
00:07:35,997 --> 00:07:39,459
to avoid performance issues
from ice build-up.
147
00:07:39,541 --> 00:07:41,168
- Garth, if we go up 15,
148
00:07:41,293 --> 00:07:43,336
I think we could
get out of this stuff.
149
00:07:43,463 --> 00:07:45,548
- Uh, yeah,
you can go up there.
150
00:07:45,673 --> 00:07:47,300
We've got that block.
151
00:07:56,559 --> 00:07:59,144
- As the flight
climbs out of the weather,
152
00:07:59,269 --> 00:08:01,439
the crew continues the tests.
153
00:08:03,232 --> 00:08:05,233
- The next thing
is our stall series.
154
00:08:05,776 --> 00:08:08,696
- For the stall series,
the pilots will intentionally
155
00:08:08,821 --> 00:08:11,574
slow the airplane
until it's just about to stall,
156
00:08:11,699 --> 00:08:14,785
to determine when
the stick shaker activates.
157
00:08:16,245 --> 00:08:19,874
Most commercial planes
use a stick shaker system.
158
00:08:21,083 --> 00:08:23,752
It's a vibrating warning
on the control column
159
00:08:23,877 --> 00:08:26,129
that alerts the pilots
to take action
160
00:08:26,213 --> 00:08:28,089
before the plane
actually stalls.
161
00:08:28,216 --> 00:08:30,134
- We should stall at 122.
162
00:08:30,218 --> 00:08:32,470
I'm gonna set that
in my interior bug.
163
00:08:32,552 --> 00:08:34,596
- The pilots set
their target speed
164
00:08:34,721 --> 00:08:37,057
for when the plane
is expected to stall.
165
00:08:37,182 --> 00:08:38,183
- Mine's set.
166
00:08:38,308 --> 00:08:39,726
- Shaker 128.
167
00:08:39,851 --> 00:08:42,395
If you just call out
your numbers, I'll record 'em.
168
00:08:43,438 --> 00:08:45,357
- They have to write down
the airspeed at which
169
00:08:45,441 --> 00:08:47,317
the stick shaker triggers,
170
00:08:47,400 --> 00:08:49,195
and then they have
to write down the airspeed
171
00:08:49,278 --> 00:08:51,072
at which the stall begins.
172
00:08:51,197 --> 00:08:53,282
- Captain Leming slows the plane
173
00:08:53,407 --> 00:08:55,326
at a rate of one knot
per second
174
00:08:55,408 --> 00:08:57,702
to reach the stall speed.
175
00:09:00,706 --> 00:09:02,625
- Feeling some buffet here.
176
00:09:02,750 --> 00:09:05,543
- The pilots detect a change
in the aircraft.
177
00:09:05,628 --> 00:09:07,587
- Yeah, that's pretty early.
178
00:09:09,548 --> 00:09:11,384
- As an airplane
approaches stall,
179
00:09:11,466 --> 00:09:13,344
it starts talking to the pilots.
180
00:09:13,427 --> 00:09:16,721
The airplane starts
vibrating or buffeting.
181
00:09:16,846 --> 00:09:19,725
- They quickly take action
to avoid a stall.
182
00:09:19,850 --> 00:09:22,061
- Set max power.
183
00:09:22,144 --> 00:09:23,687
- One thirty-three.
184
00:09:28,985 --> 00:09:32,738
- Then, one of the plane's
left engines begins to surge.
185
00:09:40,705 --> 00:09:42,581
- That's number two engine.
186
00:09:44,207 --> 00:09:47,086
- That's not normal,
and you know it's not normal.
187
00:09:47,168 --> 00:09:49,504
And so, something like that's
gonna get your attention.
188
00:09:49,629 --> 00:09:51,423
- Pull it back.
189
00:09:56,220 --> 00:09:57,721
- You got it.
190
00:09:57,804 --> 00:10:00,765
- The plane now
banks to the left...
191
00:10:03,144 --> 00:10:04,894
and begins to drop.
192
00:10:10,985 --> 00:10:13,278
The pilots attempt
to level the wings
193
00:10:13,403 --> 00:10:15,572
and slow the plane's descent.
194
00:10:16,282 --> 00:10:18,908
- Alright.
- Okay?
195
00:10:18,993 --> 00:10:20,785
- Got it.
196
00:10:32,005 --> 00:10:33,966
- Realising that the plane
is descending
197
00:10:34,091 --> 00:10:36,134
below his jurisdiction,
the controller
198
00:10:36,259 --> 00:10:39,138
assigns the pilots
to a new radio frequency.
199
00:10:39,263 --> 00:10:42,850
- 8-2-7, change to Indianapolis
1-2-8 point four.
200
00:10:47,229 --> 00:10:50,149
- But the controller's calls
to change frequencies
201
00:10:50,274 --> 00:10:51,649
go unanswered.
202
00:10:51,775 --> 00:10:55,028
The flight crew is busy
trying to recover the plane.
203
00:11:01,451 --> 00:11:02,827
ABX 8-2-7,
204
00:11:02,912 --> 00:11:05,121
Indianapolis 128 point four.
205
00:11:05,206 --> 00:11:06,831
- Uh, ABX 8-2-7,
206
00:11:06,916 --> 00:11:08,625
we're gonna stay
on this frequency a minute,
207
00:11:08,708 --> 00:11:11,336
descending through 8,000,
call you right back.
208
00:11:12,879 --> 00:11:15,924
- ABX 8-2-7,
you're in an emergency descent?
209
00:11:16,049 --> 00:11:17,551
- Yes, sir.
210
00:11:19,595 --> 00:11:21,846
Airborne Express
Flight 8-2-7
211
00:11:21,971 --> 00:11:25,350
is out of control
and plummeting to the ground.
212
00:11:25,433 --> 00:11:26,811
- Rudder.
- I got it.
213
00:11:34,652 --> 00:11:37,404
Seeing that
Flight 8-2-7 is in trouble,
214
00:11:37,529 --> 00:11:39,740
the controller checks
air traffic in the area
215
00:11:39,865 --> 00:11:42,784
to find a safe altitude
for the plane.
216
00:11:45,203 --> 00:11:48,499
- Okay, um,
can you hold 7,000?
217
00:11:49,082 --> 00:11:51,210
- But there's no answer.
218
00:11:52,919 --> 00:11:56,716
Flight 8-2-7 is less
than 5,000 feet from the ground
219
00:11:56,841 --> 00:11:58,466
and descending fast.
220
00:12:00,594 --> 00:12:02,554
- Now bring it back.
Left rudder.
221
00:12:04,764 --> 00:12:06,892
Okay good. Easy.
222
00:12:06,975 --> 00:12:08,769
- They could tell
they were in an emergency.
223
00:12:08,894 --> 00:12:10,395
They could tell
they'd lost control.
224
00:12:10,520 --> 00:12:12,480
They were probably
frightened to death.
225
00:12:12,605 --> 00:12:14,357
- The pilots
continue their efforts
226
00:12:14,442 --> 00:12:17,485
to recover the aircraft,
but are now too low.
227
00:12:17,610 --> 00:12:19,279
Pull up.
228
00:12:20,197 --> 00:12:22,240
Terrain. Terrain. Pull up.
229
00:12:22,323 --> 00:12:24,451
- Really? Really?!
230
00:12:26,077 --> 00:12:28,456
- Airspeed low. Pull up.
231
00:12:28,581 --> 00:12:31,625
Just half an hour
into a standard test flight...
232
00:12:35,336 --> 00:12:36,797
...the DC-8 crashes
233
00:12:36,922 --> 00:12:40,592
into the East River Mountain
in Narrows, Virginia.
234
00:12:43,303 --> 00:12:45,931
- ABX 8-2-7, do you copy?
235
00:12:47,850 --> 00:12:49,851
ABX 8-2-7, do you copy?
236
00:12:52,020 --> 00:12:54,481
- No one has survived.
237
00:12:55,566 --> 00:12:59,611
- The mountains lit up,
and there was a explosion,
238
00:12:59,736 --> 00:13:01,822
black smoke,
239
00:13:01,947 --> 00:13:05,366
and red and blue flames
coming up off that.
240
00:13:06,494 --> 00:13:07,787
- News of the crash
241
00:13:07,870 --> 00:13:10,663
quickly spreads throughout
the community.
242
00:13:12,625 --> 00:13:14,083
Grief counselors
arrived today
243
00:13:14,168 --> 00:13:15,376
at Airborne's headquarters
244
00:13:15,503 --> 00:13:18,214
to help family and friends
cope with their loss.
245
00:13:18,798 --> 00:13:21,549
- Obviously, it's just
a terrible time
246
00:13:21,674 --> 00:13:23,384
for everyone here,
particularly at...
247
00:13:23,510 --> 00:13:25,095
at this time of year.
248
00:13:25,178 --> 00:13:27,639
- Bob MacIntosh from the NTSB,
249
00:13:27,722 --> 00:13:29,975
the National Transportation
Safety Board,
250
00:13:30,100 --> 00:13:31,976
leads the investigation.
251
00:13:32,061 --> 00:13:33,604
- We know this was a...
252
00:13:33,687 --> 00:13:35,355
a maintenance
examination flight.
253
00:13:35,480 --> 00:13:37,441
Obviously,
it was not successful,
254
00:13:37,524 --> 00:13:40,402
and that's about all
I can tell you right now.
255
00:13:40,735 --> 00:13:43,989
The wreckage site certainly
presented some challenges.
256
00:13:44,072 --> 00:13:47,909
We were going to have to deal
with some mountainous terrain.
257
00:13:48,034 --> 00:13:50,328
We had to get to work.
258
00:13:51,705 --> 00:13:54,457
- Benjamin Berman
is one of the first team members
259
00:13:54,542 --> 00:13:56,168
to arrive at the crash site.
260
00:13:56,876 --> 00:13:58,671
- I got to the top
of the mountain
261
00:13:58,754 --> 00:14:00,798
and I looked out at the scene,
262
00:14:00,880 --> 00:14:04,759
and it was just complete
devastation.
263
00:14:06,135 --> 00:14:08,264
I really thought, you know,
what is it that could have
264
00:14:08,389 --> 00:14:10,224
brought that plane down?
265
00:14:10,975 --> 00:14:13,811
That's our job
as NTSB investigators.
266
00:14:13,894 --> 00:14:16,855
- Investigators begin
their painstaking efforts
267
00:14:16,938 --> 00:14:19,232
to transport pieces
of the demolished plane
268
00:14:19,357 --> 00:14:21,818
to a hangar for examination.
269
00:14:24,697 --> 00:14:26,782
- We found the four corners.
270
00:14:26,907 --> 00:14:29,326
Looks like the plane was intact
when it hit the mountain.
271
00:14:29,409 --> 00:14:31,495
- So, if you can see
all four corners,
272
00:14:31,578 --> 00:14:34,539
which are the nose,
the right-wing tip,
273
00:14:34,664 --> 00:14:36,417
the tail, and the left wing tip,
274
00:14:36,542 --> 00:14:38,918
in close proximity,
it probably means
275
00:14:39,043 --> 00:14:43,048
the airplane was intact
until it hit the ground.
276
00:14:44,884 --> 00:14:47,595
- This particular
wreckage scene told us
277
00:14:47,720 --> 00:14:50,597
that we most probably
had a loss of control,
278
00:14:50,722 --> 00:14:53,182
and that we were gonna
have to find the, uh...
279
00:14:53,267 --> 00:14:55,519
reason for that loss of control.
280
00:14:55,602 --> 00:14:58,062
- We recovered the CVR and FDR.
281
00:14:59,606 --> 00:15:01,107
Let's get them off
to Washington.
282
00:15:01,232 --> 00:15:04,528
- That cockpit voice recorder
was going to tell us
283
00:15:04,611 --> 00:15:08,698
not only what they said,
but how they said it.
284
00:15:12,952 --> 00:15:16,414
- While investigators wait
for the CVR download...
285
00:15:16,498 --> 00:15:18,583
- I got the checklists
for the FEF.
286
00:15:18,708 --> 00:15:21,586
- ...they review the checklist
the flight crew was using
287
00:15:21,711 --> 00:15:23,755
during the Functional
Evaluation Flight
288
00:15:23,880 --> 00:15:25,090
to get a better understanding
289
00:15:25,173 --> 00:15:27,967
of what they were doing
prior to the crash.
290
00:15:30,638 --> 00:15:33,182
- It looks like
standard FEF stuff.
291
00:15:33,307 --> 00:15:37,269
They're testing
the flaps, rudder,
292
00:15:37,394 --> 00:15:40,063
landing gear, stall system.
293
00:15:40,147 --> 00:15:42,607
- There's nothing unusual
on the list of tests
294
00:15:42,691 --> 00:15:44,610
the pilots were performing.
295
00:15:44,692 --> 00:15:46,278
- Well, maybe there was
a problem with the plane
296
00:15:46,361 --> 00:15:48,447
before the FEF.
297
00:15:48,572 --> 00:15:50,073
I'll get Berman to talk
to the maintenance team
298
00:15:50,157 --> 00:15:51,951
that modified the plane.
299
00:15:54,202 --> 00:15:55,788
- It was an old airplane,
300
00:15:55,870 --> 00:15:59,207
but it had just come out
of a major retrofit.
301
00:15:59,875 --> 00:16:01,293
- Can you take me through
exactly
302
00:16:01,376 --> 00:16:02,919
what you guys did
to the airplane?
303
00:16:03,003 --> 00:16:04,922
- Well, it was a fairly
major overhaul.
304
00:16:05,004 --> 00:16:07,758
- Investigators learn
that extensive maintenance
305
00:16:07,841 --> 00:16:10,385
and modifications
were carried out on the aircraft
306
00:16:10,510 --> 00:16:12,721
over the course of six months.
307
00:16:12,846 --> 00:16:14,264
- Yeah, it looks like
you guys pretty well
308
00:16:14,347 --> 00:16:17,308
took the whole thing apart
and put it back together, huh?
309
00:16:18,018 --> 00:16:20,019
- As we looked
at the maintenance records,
310
00:16:20,144 --> 00:16:22,898
we could find that, uh,
there was a great deal of work
311
00:16:23,023 --> 00:16:25,149
that had been done
on the aircraft.
312
00:16:25,274 --> 00:16:28,361
Perhaps something had
fallen through the cracks.
313
00:16:29,028 --> 00:16:31,447
- Could technicians
have overlooked something
314
00:16:31,532 --> 00:16:33,658
during the modification
of the airplane,
315
00:16:33,783 --> 00:16:36,160
causing the pilots
of Flight 8-2-7
316
00:16:36,245 --> 00:16:37,538
to lose control?
317
00:16:37,663 --> 00:16:39,999
Pull up.
318
00:16:40,124 --> 00:16:42,500
Terrain. Terrain. Pull up.
- Really? Really?!
319
00:16:45,211 --> 00:16:48,506
- I've got the dispatch logs
for the plane right here.
320
00:16:48,590 --> 00:16:52,344
Investigators review
Airborne Express Flight 8-2-7's
321
00:16:52,469 --> 00:16:54,888
dispatch logs to see
if any malfunctions
322
00:16:55,014 --> 00:16:58,225
were reported after the plane
was released from maintenance.
323
00:16:58,350 --> 00:17:00,269
- It looks like
they finished the modifications
324
00:17:00,394 --> 00:17:03,355
and delivered the plane
on December 15th,
325
00:17:03,438 --> 00:17:05,606
one week before the crash.
326
00:17:07,608 --> 00:17:08,652
Wait a second...
327
00:17:10,319 --> 00:17:13,198
This wasn't the pilots'
first attempt at this flight.
328
00:17:15,409 --> 00:17:20,038
- The fact that they tried
to do the flight earlier,
329
00:17:20,122 --> 00:17:21,789
that was really relevant.
330
00:17:21,914 --> 00:17:23,375
- Look here.
The pilots conducted
331
00:17:23,500 --> 00:17:27,378
a partial FEF the day
before the crash.
332
00:17:27,921 --> 00:17:31,508
They scrapped it midway through,
low hydraulic pressure.
333
00:17:32,342 --> 00:17:34,344
- That can mean
getting the landing gear down
334
00:17:34,428 --> 00:17:36,137
and in place or not, uh...
335
00:17:36,262 --> 00:17:38,515
or being able to power
the flight controls or not.
336
00:17:38,598 --> 00:17:40,976
If the hydraulic pressure
is not right,
337
00:17:41,101 --> 00:17:42,560
that's very serious.
338
00:17:43,103 --> 00:17:45,396
- Okay.
339
00:17:45,480 --> 00:17:48,317
And what did you think caused
the low hydraulic pressure?
340
00:17:48,442 --> 00:17:51,944
- Did a hydraulic issue
cause a loss of control?
341
00:17:52,069 --> 00:17:54,198
- Got it.
The maintenance crews say
342
00:17:54,280 --> 00:17:56,157
that they suspected
that trapped air in the lines
343
00:17:56,282 --> 00:17:58,326
led to low hydraulic
quantity indication.
344
00:17:58,451 --> 00:17:59,912
- Did they fix it?
- Yeah.
345
00:18:00,037 --> 00:18:01,288
They replaced
the nose gear actuator
346
00:18:01,413 --> 00:18:05,000
the day of the accident.
- But was that the end of it?
347
00:18:05,125 --> 00:18:07,752
Or did our pilots
end up having issues
348
00:18:07,877 --> 00:18:09,671
with the hydraulics again?
349
00:18:11,798 --> 00:18:14,675
- We needed to figure out
what had been going on.
350
00:18:14,801 --> 00:18:18,471
Could something have gone
wrong in that maintenance?
351
00:18:20,641 --> 00:18:23,143
- Investigators are able
to recover the plane's
352
00:18:23,268 --> 00:18:25,604
rudder components
from the crash site.
353
00:18:25,729 --> 00:18:28,105
They examine them
for any signs of damage
354
00:18:28,231 --> 00:18:30,317
to the hydraulic system.
355
00:18:31,151 --> 00:18:33,945
- No pre-impact hydraulic leaks.
356
00:18:34,028 --> 00:18:36,323
The hydraulic system
was working fine.
357
00:18:36,949 --> 00:18:39,492
- The hydraulic system
wasn't a probable cause
358
00:18:39,617 --> 00:18:42,412
for the mishap
and loss of control.
359
00:18:42,496 --> 00:18:46,165
- If it wasn't the hydraulic
system, what was it?
360
00:18:47,416 --> 00:18:51,130
We should call the witness list.
Maybe somebody saw something.
361
00:18:58,095 --> 00:19:00,931
You were outside your home
at the time?
362
00:19:01,013 --> 00:19:02,182
And what did you hear?
363
00:19:02,307 --> 00:19:04,058
- The team begins
to interview witnesses
364
00:19:04,183 --> 00:19:06,310
to see if anyone
heard or saw something
365
00:19:06,394 --> 00:19:08,646
that could point to the cause
of the crash.
366
00:19:08,730 --> 00:19:10,648
- The local newspaper people
were there
367
00:19:10,773 --> 00:19:15,194
asking people what they had
heard and seen that night.
368
00:19:15,319 --> 00:19:17,823
- All you could see
was just parts.
369
00:19:17,905 --> 00:19:21,285
It just, the plane
had cleared out a big path.
370
00:19:21,367 --> 00:19:24,496
- That area
was full of information.
371
00:19:24,621 --> 00:19:27,374
- Witnesses describe
seeing the plane descend
372
00:19:27,499 --> 00:19:29,500
out of the clouds
at a steep angle
373
00:19:29,585 --> 00:19:32,421
and hit the mountain
at high speed.
374
00:19:36,173 --> 00:19:37,843
- Thank you so much
for your time.
375
00:19:39,260 --> 00:19:40,846
I think we've got something.
376
00:19:40,929 --> 00:19:42,263
- Three witnesses confirm
377
00:19:42,388 --> 00:19:45,517
they could hear the plane
making a banging sound
378
00:19:45,601 --> 00:19:47,685
followed by a slapping sound.
379
00:19:48,311 --> 00:19:50,689
- Kind of an odd noise.
380
00:19:50,814 --> 00:19:53,567
It sounded kind of low,
381
00:19:53,692 --> 00:19:56,236
and then he started
coming up real loud.
382
00:19:57,445 --> 00:19:59,948
- The witnesses told us
that there was slapping
383
00:20:00,073 --> 00:20:02,284
and banging that they heard.
384
00:20:07,372 --> 00:20:10,375
- If airflow entering the engine
is disrupted,
385
00:20:10,459 --> 00:20:13,045
it can cause the engines
to backfire.
386
00:20:14,755 --> 00:20:17,590
If airflow
over a wing is disrupted,
387
00:20:17,715 --> 00:20:19,968
it can make a slapping sound.
388
00:20:20,093 --> 00:20:22,511
Both can be signs of a stall.
389
00:20:24,513 --> 00:20:26,432
- If the witness reports
were true,
390
00:20:26,557 --> 00:20:29,560
it suggested that possibly
there was an engine issue
391
00:20:29,644 --> 00:20:32,521
that may have been part
of the sequence of events.
392
00:20:32,605 --> 00:20:35,567
However, it would require
further examination
393
00:20:35,692 --> 00:20:37,736
of the flight data recorder.
394
00:20:37,861 --> 00:20:40,489
- NTSB Investigators
turn to the plane's
395
00:20:40,614 --> 00:20:42,865
Flight Data Recorder to confirm
396
00:20:42,950 --> 00:20:44,201
whether Flight 8-2-7
397
00:20:44,284 --> 00:20:46,912
was in a stall
before it crashed.
398
00:20:47,621 --> 00:20:49,830
- Isolate the airspeed.
399
00:20:52,541 --> 00:20:55,586
There's a gradual reduction
in airspeed here.
400
00:20:55,671 --> 00:20:57,923
- One knot per second. It looks
like they were setting up
401
00:20:58,006 --> 00:20:59,924
for the stall series.
402
00:21:00,008 --> 00:21:03,470
- And then here,
airspeed falls off a cliff.
403
00:21:04,471 --> 00:21:06,390
- That's a stall.
404
00:21:06,472 --> 00:21:08,474
- Let's see
the engine parameters.
405
00:21:08,599 --> 00:21:10,602
- They search
for further confirmation
406
00:21:10,727 --> 00:21:13,020
that Flight 8-2-7 stalled.
407
00:21:13,605 --> 00:21:15,065
- It looks like
a compressor surge
408
00:21:15,147 --> 00:21:16,942
from the number two engine.
409
00:21:20,653 --> 00:21:22,489
- That tracks with
what the witnesses said
410
00:21:22,614 --> 00:21:23,781
they were hearing.
411
00:21:23,906 --> 00:21:25,616
- Lack of airspeed
and a compressor surge
412
00:21:25,701 --> 00:21:28,619
are clear signs
that the plane stalled.
413
00:21:28,703 --> 00:21:30,497
- Give me the roll angle.
414
00:21:33,040 --> 00:21:37,503
- They were banking left,
right, left, right, left.
415
00:21:38,672 --> 00:21:40,589
- They were in a roll reversal.
416
00:21:41,590 --> 00:21:44,135
- A roll reversal
is a phenomenon that occurs
417
00:21:44,260 --> 00:21:46,971
when a plane banks steeply
to the left and right,
418
00:21:47,096 --> 00:21:50,349
in the opposite direction
of a pilot's inputs.
419
00:21:50,474 --> 00:21:53,394
It's usually
the result of a stall.
420
00:21:58,357 --> 00:22:01,403
- You're flying slow enough.
You're just barely possessed
421
00:22:01,528 --> 00:22:04,030
of enough lift
to stay in the air.
422
00:22:04,155 --> 00:22:06,365
And now the airplane
does exactly the opposite
423
00:22:06,490 --> 00:22:08,701
of what you were
asking it to do.
424
00:22:13,789 --> 00:22:16,876
- Yeah, that's four
roll reversals before the crash.
425
00:22:17,001 --> 00:22:19,546
- How did the crew
of Flight 8-2-7
426
00:22:19,671 --> 00:22:22,840
allow their plane
to get so out of control?
427
00:22:26,385 --> 00:22:28,555
With the arrival
of Flight 8-2-7's
428
00:22:28,680 --> 00:22:31,098
Cockpit Voice Recorder, or CVR,
429
00:22:31,223 --> 00:22:33,226
investigators zero in
on the test
430
00:22:33,352 --> 00:22:35,311
the pilots
were conducting immediately
431
00:22:35,394 --> 00:22:37,689
before the plane stalled.
432
00:22:38,690 --> 00:22:40,400
- Okay, are you ready?
433
00:22:40,525 --> 00:22:41,692
- Ready.
434
00:22:43,236 --> 00:22:45,279
The next
thing is our stall series.
435
00:22:45,404 --> 00:22:47,115
We should
stall at 122.
436
00:22:47,240 --> 00:22:49,617
I'm gonna set that
in my interior bug.
437
00:22:51,202 --> 00:22:52,828
- Mine's set.
438
00:22:52,913 --> 00:22:54,455
- Shaker 128.
439
00:22:54,580 --> 00:22:56,750
If you just call out
your numbers, I'll record 'em.
440
00:23:01,212 --> 00:23:03,048
Investigators listen
to the pilots
441
00:23:03,173 --> 00:23:06,050
working their way through
the stall series.
442
00:23:07,344 --> 00:23:09,679
Feeling some buffet here.
443
00:23:09,762 --> 00:23:11,681
- Yeah, that's pretty early.
444
00:23:15,894 --> 00:23:18,855
- So the plane entered a stall
sooner than they expected.
445
00:23:18,939 --> 00:23:20,065
- Yeah.
446
00:23:21,316 --> 00:23:24,486
- When I was looking
through the transcript before,
447
00:23:24,611 --> 00:23:26,570
there was something
that Captain Leming said earlier
448
00:23:26,695 --> 00:23:28,573
in the flight, uh...
449
00:23:29,782 --> 00:23:33,077
Captain Leming, "We're getting
a little bit of ice here."
450
00:23:34,203 --> 00:23:35,788
- Garth, if we go up 15,
451
00:23:35,913 --> 00:23:37,707
I think we can get
out of this stuff.
452
00:23:37,790 --> 00:23:41,086
- Uh, yeah, you can go up there.
We've got that block.
453
00:23:42,295 --> 00:23:43,922
- So ice builds up,
454
00:23:44,047 --> 00:23:45,548
disrupts airflow
over the wing...
455
00:23:45,632 --> 00:23:47,424
- Decreases lift,
increases drag...
456
00:23:47,509 --> 00:23:49,594
- And the plane would have
stalled at a higher airspeed
457
00:23:49,678 --> 00:23:51,262
than they calculated.
458
00:23:53,472 --> 00:23:56,852
- Did ice accumulation
on Flight 8-2-7
459
00:23:56,977 --> 00:23:59,186
cause a premature stall?
460
00:24:02,148 --> 00:24:04,276
It's happened before.
461
00:24:04,401 --> 00:24:07,528
December the 12th, 1985.
462
00:24:07,653 --> 00:24:09,990
Evidence suggested that
shortly after taking off
463
00:24:10,115 --> 00:24:14,076
from Gander International
Airport in wintry conditions,
464
00:24:14,161 --> 00:24:17,873
a build-up of ice
on Arrow Air Flight 12-85
465
00:24:17,998 --> 00:24:21,250
caused the plane to stall
at a higher airspeed,
466
00:24:21,334 --> 00:24:26,506
leading to a crash that killed
all 256 people on board.
467
00:24:28,424 --> 00:24:30,969
Investigators study
meteorological reports
468
00:24:31,094 --> 00:24:33,180
to determine if Flight 8-2-7
469
00:24:33,305 --> 00:24:35,765
was flying through
icing conditions.
470
00:24:35,848 --> 00:24:39,310
- There's a scattered area
of light rain here
471
00:24:39,394 --> 00:24:41,896
along 8-2-7's flight path.
472
00:24:42,021 --> 00:24:46,067
Cloud tops out
at around 14,000 feet.
473
00:24:46,192 --> 00:24:47,943
What was their altitude
block again?
474
00:24:48,028 --> 00:24:51,071
- Uh, 13 to 15,000.
475
00:24:51,655 --> 00:24:54,201
- The type of weather they were
in the night of the accident
476
00:24:54,326 --> 00:24:56,661
was really conducive to icing.
477
00:24:56,786 --> 00:24:58,913
They were in prime territory
to pick up ice
478
00:24:59,038 --> 00:25:01,500
whenever they were
in the clouds.
479
00:25:01,625 --> 00:25:05,336
- What speed did the pilots
say they expected the stall?
480
00:25:05,921 --> 00:25:08,839
- Stall 1-22, shaker 1-28.
481
00:25:11,384 --> 00:25:13,345
- Well, according to the FDR,
482
00:25:13,428 --> 00:25:16,515
the plane stalled at 126 knots.
483
00:25:19,601 --> 00:25:21,603
- That's only
four knots earlier.
484
00:25:22,686 --> 00:25:24,689
- So even if there was ice,
it was likely to have had
485
00:25:24,772 --> 00:25:26,732
little impact. I mean,
certainly not enough
486
00:25:26,857 --> 00:25:28,859
to make the plane unrecoverable.
487
00:25:30,862 --> 00:25:34,406
- Whether there was a great deal
of contribution from ice,
488
00:25:34,531 --> 00:25:36,326
we could never determine,
489
00:25:36,409 --> 00:25:38,369
but, uh, the consensus
490
00:25:38,494 --> 00:25:41,038
was that it was not
a major element
491
00:25:41,163 --> 00:25:43,540
in the cause of the accident.
492
00:25:46,294 --> 00:25:49,548
- You said stall
1-22 knots, shaker 1-28?
493
00:25:49,673 --> 00:25:51,173
Mm-hmm.
- Well, when we were listening
494
00:25:51,258 --> 00:25:52,925
to the CVR,
I don't remember hearing
495
00:25:53,050 --> 00:25:54,426
the stick shaker.
496
00:25:56,429 --> 00:25:58,097
- The purpose
of the stick shaker
497
00:25:58,222 --> 00:26:00,141
is to get
your undivided attention,
498
00:26:00,267 --> 00:26:03,228
not only by noise,
but by shaking you.
499
00:26:07,106 --> 00:26:09,108
Because there's only one thing
that that's telling you,
500
00:26:09,233 --> 00:26:10,818
and that is,
"If you slow any more,
501
00:26:10,943 --> 00:26:11,861
I'm gonna stall."
502
00:26:11,944 --> 00:26:13,529
- Let's have a listen.
503
00:26:14,739 --> 00:26:17,284
- Did the pilots receive
proper warning
504
00:26:17,409 --> 00:26:20,369
that their plane
was entering a stall?
505
00:26:21,578 --> 00:26:23,038
I'm feeling some buffet.
506
00:26:23,123 --> 00:26:24,583
- Yeah, that's pretty early.
507
00:26:24,708 --> 00:26:27,919
- That's a stall right there,
that ain't no shaker.
508
00:26:32,464 --> 00:26:34,300
- So, they're slowing
the plane down,
509
00:26:34,425 --> 00:26:35,801
waiting for the shaker
to activate...
510
00:26:35,926 --> 00:26:37,636
- Then all of a sudden,
they're in a stall.
511
00:26:37,761 --> 00:26:40,390
No warning.
- So the shaker failed?
512
00:26:41,641 --> 00:26:44,603
- With no stall warning there,
the pilots had, in a sense,
513
00:26:44,685 --> 00:26:47,480
a right to believe
they weren't stalling.
514
00:26:47,605 --> 00:26:49,316
Well, what's going on here?
Well, it's not a stall,
515
00:26:49,441 --> 00:26:51,859
because the stick shaker's
not vibrating.
516
00:26:52,484 --> 00:26:54,445
- Well, the question is,
when did it fail?
517
00:26:54,528 --> 00:26:56,448
During the flight or before?
518
00:27:06,875 --> 00:27:09,669
To determine if
the stick shaker malfunctioned,
519
00:27:09,794 --> 00:27:11,671
investigators search
the wreckage
520
00:27:11,796 --> 00:27:15,508
for stall components that might
have survived the fiery crash.
521
00:27:20,846 --> 00:27:22,515
- Nothing, huh?
522
00:27:22,641 --> 00:27:24,183
Yeah, that's what we thought.
523
00:27:24,308 --> 00:27:26,519
The stall system
was completely destroyed.
524
00:27:28,188 --> 00:27:31,816
- We never were able
to exactly identify
525
00:27:31,900 --> 00:27:35,028
what that failure point
was in the system.
526
00:27:36,028 --> 00:27:38,615
Our team wanted to find out
how much maintenance
527
00:27:38,698 --> 00:27:42,410
and inspection had
taken place on the system.
528
00:27:46,498 --> 00:27:48,958
- With no clues in the wreckage,
529
00:27:49,041 --> 00:27:52,461
NTSB Investigators speak
to the maintenance technician
530
00:27:52,545 --> 00:27:55,339
about Flight 8-2-7's
stall warning system.
531
00:27:55,423 --> 00:27:57,424
- Hey, thanks for your time.
532
00:27:57,549 --> 00:28:00,178
Did you test the stick shaker?
533
00:28:00,260 --> 00:28:04,015
- Yeah, we did, on...
534
00:28:05,517 --> 00:28:07,059
On December 5th.
535
00:28:07,852 --> 00:28:10,480
- Two weeks before the accident.
How extensive a test?
536
00:28:10,563 --> 00:28:14,358
- Quite extensive.
Have a look.
537
00:28:16,443 --> 00:28:18,238
- The shaker,
the heating components.
538
00:28:18,363 --> 00:28:19,905
- The stick shaker system
539
00:28:20,030 --> 00:28:23,492
passed all those pre-flight
maintenance checks.
540
00:28:24,160 --> 00:28:25,869
- What about the transducer?
541
00:28:27,497 --> 00:28:28,748
- Let me check.
542
00:28:30,040 --> 00:28:32,251
- The transducer is a small flap
543
00:28:32,376 --> 00:28:35,003
nestled in the recessed
part of the wing.
544
00:28:35,087 --> 00:28:38,590
It moves backwards
when airflow is detected.
545
00:28:38,717 --> 00:28:40,969
When there is insufficient
air over the wings,
546
00:28:41,094 --> 00:28:45,390
it moves forward and triggers
the stick shaker to activate.
547
00:28:49,728 --> 00:28:50,936
- No.
548
00:28:51,813 --> 00:28:54,898
No, it doesn't look like
we tested the transducer.
549
00:28:57,986 --> 00:29:01,239
- That part is not covered
by the pre-flight test.
550
00:29:02,115 --> 00:29:05,076
It suggests that the failure
of the stick shaker to work
551
00:29:05,160 --> 00:29:07,162
was a bad transducer.
552
00:29:10,539 --> 00:29:12,250
But to me, why it failed
553
00:29:12,375 --> 00:29:14,669
wasn't as important as...
554
00:29:14,794 --> 00:29:18,506
what the effect of it failing
was on the crew.
555
00:29:19,632 --> 00:29:21,049
- Feeling some buffet here.
556
00:29:21,134 --> 00:29:22,551
- Yeah, that's pretty early.
557
00:29:22,634 --> 00:29:24,929
- That's a stall right there,
that ain't no shaker.
558
00:29:25,012 --> 00:29:27,432
- Even without the stick shaker
activating,
559
00:29:27,515 --> 00:29:30,393
the flight crew knew
they were in a stall.
560
00:29:30,977 --> 00:29:34,063
That's number two engine.
561
00:29:34,146 --> 00:29:36,441
Bring it back. Okay, good.
562
00:29:36,523 --> 00:29:38,777
- But if they knew...
563
00:29:38,859 --> 00:29:39,611
- Left rudder.
564
00:29:39,693 --> 00:29:40,737
- ...why couldn't they recover?
565
00:29:40,819 --> 00:29:42,113
- Easy.
- Terrain. Terrain.
566
00:29:42,196 --> 00:29:43,364
- Bring it back.
- Pull up.
567
00:29:43,490 --> 00:29:44,615
Rudder.
568
00:29:44,699 --> 00:29:46,451
- Really?
- Terrain. Terrain.
569
00:29:53,333 --> 00:29:57,127
Investigators return
to Flight 8-2-7's CVR
570
00:29:57,211 --> 00:30:00,006
to get a better sense
of the actions the pilots took
571
00:30:00,131 --> 00:30:02,799
when their aircraft
went into a stall.
572
00:30:02,884 --> 00:30:04,093
That's a stall right there.
573
00:30:04,176 --> 00:30:06,054
That ain't no shaker.
574
00:30:06,679 --> 00:30:08,222
- Set max power.
575
00:30:08,347 --> 00:30:10,474
- One thirty-three.
576
00:30:11,893 --> 00:30:14,229
- So, as soon as they
recognize they're in a stall,
577
00:30:14,354 --> 00:30:15,771
they push power
to the engines.
578
00:30:15,855 --> 00:30:17,272
- That's the right move.
579
00:30:19,651 --> 00:30:20,943
That's number two engine.
580
00:30:21,027 --> 00:30:22,528
- There's the engine surge.
581
00:30:22,653 --> 00:30:23,820
- Pull it back.
582
00:30:28,409 --> 00:30:30,494
- So what did they do next?
583
00:30:32,163 --> 00:30:33,580
- Alright.
584
00:30:33,705 --> 00:30:35,708
- Okay.
585
00:30:35,834 --> 00:30:37,751
Start bringing the nose back up.
586
00:30:43,549 --> 00:30:44,843
- They pulled the nose up?
587
00:30:44,925 --> 00:30:46,635
- That would make
the stall worse.
588
00:30:46,719 --> 00:30:49,263
- Pulling back on
the control column
589
00:30:49,388 --> 00:30:52,016
in response to a stall
is inconsistent
590
00:30:52,099 --> 00:30:53,893
with a normal stall recovery
591
00:30:54,018 --> 00:30:58,855
and would not reduce angle
of attack and break the stall.
592
00:30:59,898 --> 00:31:03,152
- Well, that's what would have
triggered the roll reversal.
593
00:31:04,362 --> 00:31:05,864
- How'd they deal with that?
594
00:31:07,740 --> 00:31:08,865
- Rudder.
595
00:31:08,991 --> 00:31:10,785
- Got it.
- Rudder.
596
00:31:10,910 --> 00:31:12,953
- Got it.
- Left rudder.
597
00:31:13,078 --> 00:31:14,497
- The left rudder's buried.
598
00:31:14,580 --> 00:31:16,749
- Investigators discover
that in addition
599
00:31:16,875 --> 00:31:19,669
to moving the control wheel
right and left,
600
00:31:19,751 --> 00:31:23,882
the pilots also used the rudder
to stop the plane from rolling.
601
00:31:25,048 --> 00:31:26,342
- You have to be ahead of it.
602
00:31:26,425 --> 00:31:29,220
And that's a very
difficult thing to do.
603
00:31:30,930 --> 00:31:33,057
- So they spend
almost a minute
604
00:31:33,141 --> 00:31:34,474
trying to fight
the roll reversal
605
00:31:34,601 --> 00:31:37,854
with the rudder.
And no mention of a stall.
606
00:31:39,396 --> 00:31:41,691
- Investigators suspect
that the pilots
607
00:31:41,773 --> 00:31:45,403
were so preoccupied
dealing with the roll reversal
608
00:31:45,486 --> 00:31:49,406
that they failed to realize
that the plane was in a stall.
609
00:31:52,618 --> 00:31:54,119
- It still doesn't explain
why Captain Leming
610
00:31:54,244 --> 00:31:55,246
would have pulled back
on the yoke
611
00:31:55,371 --> 00:31:57,539
to try to recover
from the stall.
612
00:32:00,876 --> 00:32:03,922
- To recover from the stall,
you can't pull back.
613
00:32:04,005 --> 00:32:06,465
You need to point the nose
of the airplane down
614
00:32:06,590 --> 00:32:09,259
even more in order
to gain speed,
615
00:32:09,384 --> 00:32:11,261
or you will not recover.
616
00:32:11,346 --> 00:32:13,806
You will fly into
the mountaintop in Virginia.
617
00:32:13,932 --> 00:32:15,474
Terrain. Terrain.
618
00:32:15,599 --> 00:32:17,602
Pull up.
619
00:32:17,727 --> 00:32:19,186
Terrain. Terrain.
620
00:32:22,356 --> 00:32:24,317
- And we wanted to know why,
621
00:32:24,442 --> 00:32:26,361
why did he do that?
622
00:32:26,486 --> 00:32:28,779
Especially at those most
critical moments.
623
00:32:34,160 --> 00:32:35,536
- Morning, Bob.
624
00:32:35,662 --> 00:32:37,038
- I'm looking to see
if there's anything
625
00:32:37,163 --> 00:32:39,874
in ABX's operations manual
on the DC-8.
626
00:32:39,999 --> 00:32:41,250
Here's a copy.
627
00:32:42,000 --> 00:32:45,171
- Investigators search through
ABX's procedures
628
00:32:45,296 --> 00:32:47,298
to understand
why Captain Leming
629
00:32:47,423 --> 00:32:49,342
pulled back
on the control column
630
00:32:49,467 --> 00:32:52,511
to recover from
Flight 8-2-7's stall.
631
00:32:53,179 --> 00:32:54,430
- Wait.
632
00:32:54,513 --> 00:32:56,307
Bob, did you see this?
633
00:32:57,599 --> 00:32:59,978
It says that priority
in a stall recovery
634
00:33:00,060 --> 00:33:03,522
is to maintain altitude
by increasing the pitch.
635
00:33:05,857 --> 00:33:07,693
- Pulling back
on the control column
636
00:33:07,818 --> 00:33:10,320
increases the pitch
of an aircraft.
637
00:33:11,614 --> 00:33:13,490
- Well, it might be okay
for an approach to a stall,
638
00:33:13,574 --> 00:33:15,617
but not for an actual stall.
639
00:33:16,952 --> 00:33:19,372
- So, the things that you do
to recover
640
00:33:19,497 --> 00:33:21,665
from an approach to stall
641
00:33:21,749 --> 00:33:24,376
are totally different
from what you do
642
00:33:24,501 --> 00:33:26,837
to recover from an actual stall.
643
00:33:26,962 --> 00:33:29,048
If you're right over the trees,
you gotta try
644
00:33:29,173 --> 00:33:30,674
the approach to stall recovery
645
00:33:30,758 --> 00:33:32,801
because you're gonna hit
the trees.
646
00:33:32,884 --> 00:33:35,637
If you're at 36,000 feet
and you stall,
647
00:33:35,721 --> 00:33:39,474
if you don't put the nose down
five or ten degrees,
648
00:33:39,558 --> 00:33:40,852
you're not gonna recover.
649
00:33:40,934 --> 00:33:43,938
- That can't be
the current procedure, can it?
650
00:33:54,240 --> 00:33:56,366
- I've got a joint memo
with the FAA.
651
00:33:56,491 --> 00:33:58,577
- Investigators discover
an update
652
00:33:58,702 --> 00:34:01,913
to Airborne Express' flight
test procedures.
653
00:34:02,038 --> 00:34:03,165
- And what's it say?
654
00:34:03,249 --> 00:34:06,210
- The updated procedure
called for a reduction of pitch
655
00:34:06,294 --> 00:34:08,128
to recover from a stall.
656
00:34:09,047 --> 00:34:11,507
- The revised procedure
called for pilots
657
00:34:11,590 --> 00:34:14,510
to lower the nose
when entering a stall,
658
00:34:14,594 --> 00:34:17,304
the opposite
of what Captain Leming did.
659
00:34:17,889 --> 00:34:20,766
- The change was made
after a loss-of-control incident
660
00:34:20,891 --> 00:34:22,976
in May 1991.
661
00:34:23,518 --> 00:34:25,855
- May '91... May.
662
00:34:25,938 --> 00:34:27,065
What flight was that?
663
00:34:27,898 --> 00:34:31,735
- It was a DC-8
doing a post-modification FEF.
664
00:34:31,818 --> 00:34:34,905
- The same plane
and flight as 8-2-7.
665
00:34:35,030 --> 00:34:37,157
- On May 16th, 1991,
666
00:34:37,282 --> 00:34:43,289
another Airborne Express DC-8
lost control during an F-E-F.
667
00:34:43,789 --> 00:34:46,333
- The pilots managed
to recover from the stall.
668
00:34:46,458 --> 00:34:48,210
And the policy has been
to reduce pitch
669
00:34:48,293 --> 00:34:50,588
during a stall ever since.
670
00:34:51,547 --> 00:34:53,340
- So, why didn't the crew
of Flight 8-2-7
671
00:34:53,465 --> 00:34:55,467
use the updated procedure?
672
00:34:58,721 --> 00:35:00,181
Okay.
673
00:35:00,306 --> 00:35:02,809
- We learned that the director
of Flight Technical Programs
674
00:35:02,934 --> 00:35:05,186
was responsible
for the procedures,
675
00:35:05,311 --> 00:35:07,438
the checklists,
and the selection
676
00:35:07,563 --> 00:35:09,106
and training of pilots.
677
00:35:09,190 --> 00:35:12,568
As a result, we wanted
to talk to him to learn more.
678
00:35:12,652 --> 00:35:14,945
- The NTSB meets with
the airline's
679
00:35:15,028 --> 00:35:16,947
Director of Flight
Technical Programs
680
00:35:17,072 --> 00:35:19,659
to determine why the crew
of Flight 8-2-7
681
00:35:19,784 --> 00:35:22,494
didn't follow
the updated procedure.
682
00:35:22,619 --> 00:35:24,163
- I just have a few
questions to ask,
683
00:35:24,288 --> 00:35:25,789
and then I'll let you
get back to work.
684
00:35:25,914 --> 00:35:26,873
- Of course.
685
00:35:26,998 --> 00:35:29,710
- How do ABX pilots train
to recover from a stall?
686
00:35:29,835 --> 00:35:32,380
- I tell them whatever you do,
don't lose altitude.
687
00:35:32,505 --> 00:35:34,798
So if you're in a stall,
you set max power
688
00:35:34,923 --> 00:35:37,467
and you increase
the pitch of the aircraft.
689
00:35:37,592 --> 00:35:38,927
- Well, that's different
from the updated policy,
690
00:35:39,010 --> 00:35:41,639
which calls for a nose down
pitch recovery.
691
00:35:44,016 --> 00:35:45,434
- Correct.
692
00:35:45,518 --> 00:35:47,561
- He just didn't agree
that that was necessary.
693
00:35:47,686 --> 00:35:48,646
- If you increase the pitch,
694
00:35:48,771 --> 00:35:50,565
you'll make the stall
even worse.
695
00:35:50,690 --> 00:35:52,275
- The engines
are properly spooled
696
00:35:52,358 --> 00:35:54,318
as you're approaching a stall.
697
00:35:54,443 --> 00:35:56,070
You can power
your way out of it.
698
00:35:56,195 --> 00:35:58,489
- The director believed
that if the engines
699
00:35:58,572 --> 00:35:59,699
were running properly,
700
00:35:59,824 --> 00:36:01,659
pilots could increase thrust
701
00:36:01,784 --> 00:36:04,036
and fly out of a stall.
702
00:36:04,661 --> 00:36:08,206
- He had his own opinions
about what should be done,
703
00:36:08,331 --> 00:36:10,126
and they were not
in agreement
704
00:36:10,208 --> 00:36:12,210
with the proper procedure.
705
00:36:21,219 --> 00:36:24,056
- See, what I don't get is...
706
00:36:24,181 --> 00:36:25,516
old procedure, new procedure,
707
00:36:25,641 --> 00:36:27,643
there is no procedure
that says to pull back
708
00:36:27,726 --> 00:36:29,019
for the duration of the stall.
709
00:36:29,103 --> 00:36:31,021
- I keep going back
to the way they were dealing
710
00:36:31,105 --> 00:36:32,523
with this roll reversal.
711
00:36:35,150 --> 00:36:36,985
- Rudder. Rudder.
712
00:36:37,068 --> 00:36:38,445
- Got it.
713
00:36:38,570 --> 00:36:39,864
- And left rudder.
714
00:36:40,572 --> 00:36:43,867
- The crew were unable
to recover the airplane
715
00:36:43,951 --> 00:36:47,371
in the approximately 90 seconds
that it took
716
00:36:47,496 --> 00:36:49,831
from when this lack
of the stick shaker
717
00:36:49,916 --> 00:36:52,460
was identified,
to when it impacted terrain,
718
00:36:52,585 --> 00:36:54,210
and our question was, why?
719
00:36:54,295 --> 00:36:58,757
- Investigators assess
ABX's DC-8 flight simulator
720
00:36:58,882 --> 00:37:02,177
to see exactly how flight crew
experienced a stall
721
00:37:02,260 --> 00:37:03,887
during their training.
722
00:37:03,971 --> 00:37:07,099
- Now, I'm going to slow
this thing down into a stall.
723
00:37:13,105 --> 00:37:14,898
There's the shaker...
724
00:37:17,443 --> 00:37:18,860
There's the stall.
725
00:37:18,945 --> 00:37:20,403
And I'm going to pull back
on the yoke
726
00:37:20,528 --> 00:37:22,614
like our pilots did.
727
00:37:22,739 --> 00:37:26,369
- So, I continued
to raise the nose
728
00:37:26,452 --> 00:37:28,913
up higher and higher,
729
00:37:28,996 --> 00:37:32,750
and I was just astounded
at what the simulator did,
730
00:37:32,833 --> 00:37:35,335
or mainly, what it didn't do.
731
00:37:43,469 --> 00:37:45,846
- Well, we're in a stall
732
00:37:45,972 --> 00:37:49,141
and there's no roll,
no pitch down,
733
00:37:49,266 --> 00:37:52,186
nothing like you would see
in a real life stall.
734
00:37:52,311 --> 00:37:56,148
- The simulator just kind of
reached the end of its program.
735
00:37:56,273 --> 00:37:58,483
It just sat there.
736
00:37:58,608 --> 00:37:59,943
- If this is how
they were trained,
737
00:38:00,068 --> 00:38:02,989
they would have no idea
how a stall truly feels.
738
00:38:05,699 --> 00:38:08,744
- Their training was not only
zero training,
739
00:38:08,827 --> 00:38:10,663
it was negative training.
740
00:38:10,788 --> 00:38:12,331
It gave them a false impression
741
00:38:12,456 --> 00:38:14,291
of what they would experience.
742
00:38:14,375 --> 00:38:16,710
They would have
been startled...
743
00:38:16,835 --> 00:38:18,920
- Left rudder.
- at what the wings did
744
00:38:19,005 --> 00:38:21,090
- with the roll...
- Okay. Easy.
745
00:38:21,172 --> 00:38:22,465
Don't... Don't...
746
00:38:22,550 --> 00:38:25,302
- ...and they would not
have recognized it
747
00:38:25,385 --> 00:38:29,014
necessarily as a symptom
of a stall,
748
00:38:29,139 --> 00:38:32,018
because in their simulator,
it didn't have that symptom.
749
00:38:32,518 --> 00:38:34,811
- Maybe they didn't realize
they were still in the stall,
750
00:38:34,894 --> 00:38:36,646
but surely,
there were other indicators
751
00:38:36,731 --> 00:38:39,108
that they were falling
out of the sky.
752
00:38:44,864 --> 00:38:47,365
Why didn't
the pilots of Flight 8-2-7
753
00:38:47,490 --> 00:38:50,244
realize they were diving
towards a mountain?
754
00:38:50,869 --> 00:38:54,873
- Okay, put yourself
in the pilot's shoes.
755
00:38:55,623 --> 00:38:57,668
You realize you're in a stall.
756
00:38:58,543 --> 00:38:59,961
- Feeling some buffet here.
757
00:39:00,045 --> 00:39:01,380
- Yeah, that's pretty early.
758
00:39:01,505 --> 00:39:04,342
- That's a stall right there.
That ain't no shaker.
759
00:39:04,467 --> 00:39:07,427
- You push power to the engines.
Pull back on the yoke.
760
00:39:07,552 --> 00:39:09,804
- Start bringing
the nose back up.
761
00:39:12,974 --> 00:39:14,934
- Your number two engine surges.
762
00:39:23,735 --> 00:39:26,530
- That's number two engine.
- Pull it back.
763
00:39:28,407 --> 00:39:30,701
- Now you're dealing
with a roll.
764
00:39:37,083 --> 00:39:39,210
The plane's banking
left and right.
765
00:39:39,293 --> 00:39:40,920
You're applying rudder.
766
00:39:41,045 --> 00:39:42,295
- Rudder.
- Got it.
767
00:39:42,420 --> 00:39:44,715
- Rudder. Rudder.
- Got it.
768
00:39:45,423 --> 00:39:46,925
- You got ATC in your ear
769
00:39:47,050 --> 00:39:48,385
telling you to
switch frequencies.
770
00:39:48,469 --> 00:39:52,222
- 8-2-7, change to Indianapolis
128 point four.
771
00:39:53,264 --> 00:39:55,351
- You look outside.
What do you see?
772
00:39:56,184 --> 00:39:57,311
- Nothing.
773
00:40:01,273 --> 00:40:04,068
- Right,
because it's pitch black out,
774
00:40:04,150 --> 00:40:05,443
and you're in the clouds.
775
00:40:05,568 --> 00:40:06,612
There's no visible horizon.
776
00:40:06,737 --> 00:40:08,739
You're just flying
on instruments.
777
00:40:08,864 --> 00:40:11,909
- They had no visual cues.
- Exactly.
778
00:40:12,742 --> 00:40:15,579
- You're now removing
the visual aspect
779
00:40:15,704 --> 00:40:19,166
of a horizon out there
that can help anchor you.
780
00:40:19,291 --> 00:40:21,293
You're just stacking
the deck against yourself.
781
00:40:21,418 --> 00:40:23,420
- Now, the question is,
782
00:40:23,545 --> 00:40:26,172
what were they doing flying
a stall series test at night
783
00:40:26,297 --> 00:40:27,715
in the first place?
784
00:40:29,467 --> 00:40:32,554
- Investigators review
the flight's dispatch logs
785
00:40:32,637 --> 00:40:36,182
to retrace the pilots' steps
on the day of the accident.
786
00:40:36,976 --> 00:40:39,769
- The FEF was scheduled
for 1:20 p.m.,
787
00:40:39,894 --> 00:40:42,565
but the maintenance delays
pushed it past sundown.
788
00:40:42,648 --> 00:40:44,108
Had they just pushed it
to the next day,
789
00:40:44,190 --> 00:40:45,775
none of this
would have happened.
790
00:40:45,900 --> 00:40:47,610
- So why didn't they?
791
00:40:47,695 --> 00:40:50,072
Why go through
with the FEF at night?
792
00:40:52,324 --> 00:40:54,577
- Alright.
793
00:40:56,327 --> 00:40:59,456
- One of the key decisions
was to conduct the check flight
794
00:40:59,539 --> 00:41:01,125
later at night
than they'd planned
795
00:41:01,250 --> 00:41:03,460
in the darkness hours.
And so, you know,
796
00:41:03,585 --> 00:41:05,336
did anyone pressure them
into doing that?
797
00:41:06,045 --> 00:41:09,717
- What was the ABX policy
on when to fly an FEF?
798
00:41:09,842 --> 00:41:12,677
- Investigators return
to ABX's Director
799
00:41:12,802 --> 00:41:14,554
of Flight Technical Programs
800
00:41:14,679 --> 00:41:18,726
to find out why the pilots
proceeded with an FEF at night.
801
00:41:20,186 --> 00:41:21,978
- No policy, necessarily.
802
00:41:22,103 --> 00:41:24,648
Just a preference to fly them
during the day.
803
00:41:24,731 --> 00:41:26,483
- Do ABX pilots
understand the risks
804
00:41:26,567 --> 00:41:28,402
of flying an FEF at night?
- Sure,
805
00:41:28,527 --> 00:41:30,905
and I'd rather they
conduct them during the day,
806
00:41:31,030 --> 00:41:34,492
but there's no prohibition
against doing them at night.
807
00:41:34,617 --> 00:41:36,242
- And what are the recommended
weather conditions
808
00:41:36,367 --> 00:41:37,619
for flying an FEF?
809
00:41:37,702 --> 00:41:39,954
- Preference is to fly
in clear skies
810
00:41:40,039 --> 00:41:41,498
and not on instrument,
811
00:41:41,623 --> 00:41:44,876
but we have no specific
restrictions on that.
812
00:41:46,628 --> 00:41:49,923
- We discovered that
there was no written policy
813
00:41:50,048 --> 00:41:53,427
prohibiting this flight from
being conducted at night.
814
00:41:53,552 --> 00:41:55,679
- The NTSB's investigation
815
00:41:55,804 --> 00:41:57,764
has uncovered numerous factors
816
00:41:57,889 --> 00:42:01,059
that led to the crash
of Flight 8-2-7.
817
00:42:02,228 --> 00:42:03,686
- Stick shaker malfunction,
818
00:42:03,771 --> 00:42:06,440
incorrect stall procedure,
819
00:42:06,565 --> 00:42:08,358
negative simulator training,
820
00:42:08,483 --> 00:42:10,068
FEF at night.
821
00:42:11,445 --> 00:42:13,697
Had just one of these
factors not been present,
822
00:42:13,780 --> 00:42:16,074
the crew would likely
have survived.
823
00:42:18,952 --> 00:42:22,289
- I think this accident
was caused by a failure
824
00:42:22,414 --> 00:42:25,000
to recognize that
a functional evaluation flight
825
00:42:25,083 --> 00:42:27,335
requires rigorous preparation
826
00:42:27,418 --> 00:42:31,382
and criteria and controls
to be placed on it
827
00:42:31,465 --> 00:42:34,842
to protect the pilots
who are flying it.
828
00:42:34,927 --> 00:42:37,221
- Start bringing
the nose back up.
829
00:42:37,846 --> 00:42:39,931
- This was not God reaching down
830
00:42:40,056 --> 00:42:42,226
and slapping
an airplane out of the sky.
831
00:42:42,351 --> 00:42:44,311
There were reasons
for this happening,
832
00:42:44,436 --> 00:42:46,646
and this could have
been avoided.
833
00:42:47,606 --> 00:42:50,525
- In the wake of the crash
of Flight 8-2-7,
834
00:42:50,608 --> 00:42:53,612
the NTSB makes a series
of recommendations
835
00:42:53,737 --> 00:42:56,699
to make Functional
Evaluation Flights safer,
836
00:42:56,782 --> 00:43:00,577
and to better prepare pilots
for stall conditions.
837
00:43:01,452 --> 00:43:04,123
- This accident brought
a lot of significant
838
00:43:04,248 --> 00:43:05,833
changes to the industry.
839
00:43:07,041 --> 00:43:09,878
- We issued recommendations
to try to improve
840
00:43:09,961 --> 00:43:12,755
airline oversight
and FAA oversight
841
00:43:12,840 --> 00:43:15,675
of functional evaluation
programs.
842
00:43:15,800 --> 00:43:19,429
And those efforts
were successful.
843
00:43:20,014 --> 00:43:22,432
- Flight simulators
used for airline training
844
00:43:22,557 --> 00:43:25,476
were made much more realistic.
845
00:43:25,603 --> 00:43:27,563
Every airline pilot
846
00:43:27,646 --> 00:43:30,440
receives training
in recovering the airplane
847
00:43:30,523 --> 00:43:32,525
from a high-altitude stall
848
00:43:32,650 --> 00:43:35,820
where they have to use
this Airborne Express
849
00:43:35,945 --> 00:43:39,949
revised stall recovery procedure
to get the job done.
850
00:43:40,492 --> 00:43:42,744
- The report also recommends
a revision
851
00:43:42,827 --> 00:43:45,204
to the DC-8 maintenance manual
852
00:43:45,331 --> 00:43:47,041
calling for regular calibration
853
00:43:47,166 --> 00:43:50,628
and testing of the complete
stall warning system.
854
00:43:50,710 --> 00:43:52,545
- There might have been
other airplanes out there,
855
00:43:52,670 --> 00:43:54,922
you know,
flying around in service
856
00:43:55,007 --> 00:43:57,967
where the stall warning system
really wasn't working.
857
00:43:58,052 --> 00:44:00,971
It's a sobering thought,
and a significant one.
858
00:44:04,557 --> 00:44:06,559
- The strength
of aviation safety
859
00:44:06,684 --> 00:44:09,605
is a direct result of learning
the most we can learn
860
00:44:09,688 --> 00:44:11,481
from every single accident.
861
00:44:11,606 --> 00:44:13,192
This wasn't an accident in vain.
862
00:44:13,317 --> 00:44:14,485
Yes, it could have
been prevented,
863
00:44:14,568 --> 00:44:16,487
but now, we know how.
864
00:44:22,201 --> 00:44:23,827
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