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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:18,559 --> 00:00:20,018 - Scoops. 2 00:00:20,144 --> 00:00:21,478 Pilots from Airborne Express... 3 00:00:21,562 --> 00:00:22,396 - On. 4 00:00:22,521 --> 00:00:23,522 -...are testing a plane 5 00:00:23,647 --> 00:00:25,524 that's been recently modified. 6 00:00:25,608 --> 00:00:27,693 - Kick the tires, light the fires, and make sure 7 00:00:27,777 --> 00:00:29,903 she's exactly as advertised. 8 00:00:30,030 --> 00:00:32,115 - The next thing is our stall series. 9 00:00:32,240 --> 00:00:33,741 - These pilots were trying 10 00:00:33,866 --> 00:00:36,076 to test the stall warning system. 11 00:00:36,201 --> 00:00:38,537 - Feeling some buffet here. 12 00:00:38,662 --> 00:00:39,997 - That's a stall right there. 13 00:00:40,081 --> 00:00:43,042 - But something goes terribly wrong. 14 00:00:43,752 --> 00:00:45,378 - It's number two engine. 15 00:00:46,920 --> 00:00:48,631 Pull up. 16 00:00:48,756 --> 00:00:50,549 - Really? Really?! 17 00:00:50,674 --> 00:00:52,093 - Terrain. 18 00:00:52,218 --> 00:00:55,889 Flight 8-2-7 crashes into a mountain in Virginia. 19 00:00:56,014 --> 00:00:58,223 Everyone onboard is killed. 20 00:00:58,307 --> 00:01:01,268 - It was just complete devastation. 21 00:01:01,393 --> 00:01:05,189 - While the flight data confirms the plane entered a stall... 22 00:01:05,272 --> 00:01:07,566 - And then here, the airspeed falls off a cliff. 23 00:01:07,691 --> 00:01:10,486 - ...it doesn't explain why the pilots weren't able 24 00:01:10,611 --> 00:01:14,615 to recover from the very condition they were testing. 25 00:01:14,740 --> 00:01:16,909 - It's a sobering thought and a significant one. 26 00:01:18,203 --> 00:01:19,537 - Mayday, Mayday. 27 00:01:22,790 --> 00:01:24,459 - Pull up. 28 00:01:38,972 --> 00:01:41,141 It's three days before Christmas 29 00:01:41,266 --> 00:01:43,769 at Piedmont Triad International Airport 30 00:01:43,894 --> 00:01:46,188 in Greensboro, North Carolina. 31 00:01:46,647 --> 00:01:49,858 The crew of Airborne Express Flight 8-2-7 32 00:01:49,983 --> 00:01:52,069 and three technicians in the cabin 33 00:01:52,153 --> 00:01:54,239 have been waiting more than four hours 34 00:01:54,322 --> 00:01:56,323 for maintenance to be completed. 35 00:01:56,448 --> 00:01:58,200 - Think we're getting out of here tonight? 36 00:01:58,325 --> 00:02:00,078 - At this rate, I think we're all gonna be spending 37 00:02:00,161 --> 00:02:02,079 Christmas together in this cockpit. 38 00:02:02,162 --> 00:02:03,498 What do you think, Terry? 39 00:02:03,623 --> 00:02:06,126 - I think you can explain that one to my wife and kids. 40 00:02:06,209 --> 00:02:08,461 Flight 8-2-7, aircraft is cleared 41 00:02:08,544 --> 00:02:11,421 and released. Have a good flight and a Merry Christmas. 42 00:02:11,506 --> 00:02:14,758 - Roger, 8-2-7. Happy holidays, Dispatch. 43 00:02:14,842 --> 00:02:16,468 Finally. 44 00:02:17,719 --> 00:02:19,514 Just after 5 p.m., 45 00:02:19,639 --> 00:02:23,100 Flight 8-2-7 is given clearance to fly. 46 00:02:25,520 --> 00:02:29,064 The flight engineer is 52-year-old military veteran 47 00:02:29,189 --> 00:02:30,900 Terry Waelti. 48 00:02:31,025 --> 00:02:34,987 - Taxi and pre-takeoff checklist. Brakes. 49 00:02:35,697 --> 00:02:40,075 - Flying tonight is 37-year-old Captain Keith Leming. 50 00:02:40,868 --> 00:02:42,662 - Checked. - Checked. 51 00:02:43,288 --> 00:02:47,375 - Cabin and freon compressors are off. Anti-skid? 52 00:02:48,501 --> 00:02:50,336 - Armed. - While not flying, 53 00:02:50,461 --> 00:02:52,881 48-year-old Captain Garth Avery, 54 00:02:53,006 --> 00:02:55,842 is the designated pilot-in-command. 55 00:02:56,717 --> 00:02:58,635 - They were very experienced as pilots. 56 00:02:58,719 --> 00:03:00,680 The flight engineer was incredibly experienced, 57 00:03:00,805 --> 00:03:03,181 and they all knew the DC-8 and had many, many hours 58 00:03:03,307 --> 00:03:04,516 in this airplane. 59 00:03:04,641 --> 00:03:07,937 - Taxi and pre-takeoff checklist complete. 60 00:03:08,062 --> 00:03:11,649 Tower, ABX 8-2-7 heavy is ready to go. 61 00:03:12,984 --> 00:03:14,401 - The flight crew is operating 62 00:03:14,526 --> 00:03:17,864 a modified McDonnell Douglas DC-8. 63 00:03:18,531 --> 00:03:21,700 - The DC-8 is an incredibly reliable machine, 64 00:03:21,783 --> 00:03:23,745 and it always has been. 65 00:03:23,870 --> 00:03:25,997 - The DC-8 is a long-range, 66 00:03:26,080 --> 00:03:30,376 narrow-body jetliner introduced in 1959. 67 00:03:33,587 --> 00:03:36,883 - As long as you use it exactly the way it was designed, 68 00:03:36,966 --> 00:03:38,717 they're just as tough as nails. 69 00:03:39,635 --> 00:03:41,512 - V-1. Rotate. 70 00:03:46,308 --> 00:03:50,812 - At 5:40 p.m., Flight 8-2-7 takes off. 71 00:03:57,069 --> 00:03:59,822 - Positive rate, gear up. 72 00:03:59,948 --> 00:04:01,574 - Positive rate... 73 00:04:04,826 --> 00:04:06,663 One thousand feet. 74 00:04:06,788 --> 00:04:07,997 - Roger. 75 00:04:08,122 --> 00:04:10,415 - Although it's a lesser-known airline, 76 00:04:10,540 --> 00:04:13,044 Airborne Express, or ABX, 77 00:04:13,127 --> 00:04:15,170 is one of the largest cargo carriers 78 00:04:15,295 --> 00:04:17,089 in the United States, 79 00:04:17,173 --> 00:04:20,134 after both Federal Express and UPS. 80 00:04:21,468 --> 00:04:23,637 In a bid to expand its fleet, 81 00:04:23,762 --> 00:04:25,473 ABX purchased the aircraft 82 00:04:25,598 --> 00:04:27,641 that would become Flight 8-2-7 83 00:04:27,766 --> 00:04:31,103 and modified it before putting it into service. 84 00:04:32,312 --> 00:04:34,023 - ABX 8-2-7 85 00:04:34,148 --> 00:04:37,819 is 2,500 for 5,000. 86 00:04:38,987 --> 00:04:42,615 - MCT set. Ignition off. 87 00:04:42,699 --> 00:04:45,617 - But before this plane can be added to the fleet, 88 00:04:45,742 --> 00:04:48,288 it has to be taken for a test flight. 89 00:04:50,581 --> 00:04:53,834 This is known as a Functional Evaluation Flight, 90 00:04:53,959 --> 00:04:55,711 or F-E-F. 91 00:04:57,338 --> 00:04:58,964 - A Functional Evaluation Flight 92 00:04:59,089 --> 00:05:00,425 is basically to see that everything 93 00:05:00,507 --> 00:05:02,427 is as it's supposed to be, 94 00:05:02,509 --> 00:05:04,637 kick the tires, light the fires, go out and fly, 95 00:05:04,721 --> 00:05:07,889 and make sure she's exactly as advertised. 96 00:05:09,057 --> 00:05:11,269 - After departing Greensboro, 97 00:05:11,351 --> 00:05:14,480 Flight 8-2-7 is scheduled to spend about two hours 98 00:05:14,564 --> 00:05:17,524 flying the F-E-F before returning to the airport. 99 00:05:17,649 --> 00:05:19,776 ABX 8-2-7, for our maintenance 100 00:05:19,860 --> 00:05:23,447 check, can we get a block of 1-0 to 1-2 thousand? 101 00:05:23,531 --> 00:05:26,742 - The flight crew needs a dedicated block of airspace 102 00:05:26,867 --> 00:05:27,994 to perform the tests. 103 00:05:28,119 --> 00:05:30,329 Could you take a block of, uh, 104 00:05:30,413 --> 00:05:32,290 thirteen to fifteen? 105 00:05:32,372 --> 00:05:34,250 - We can do that. 106 00:05:36,168 --> 00:05:37,627 - ABX 8-2-7, roger, 107 00:05:37,711 --> 00:05:39,297 climb and maintain block altitude 108 00:05:39,379 --> 00:05:41,716 of 1-3 thousand through 1-5 thousand. 109 00:05:43,300 --> 00:05:45,802 - Having reached a quiet block of airspace, 110 00:05:45,887 --> 00:05:49,682 the crew works its way through the F-E-F checklist. 111 00:05:51,641 --> 00:05:53,226 - Scoops? 112 00:05:55,646 --> 00:05:56,564 - On. 113 00:05:56,689 --> 00:05:58,483 - The DC-8's scoops are part 114 00:05:58,565 --> 00:06:00,651 of its pressurization system. 115 00:06:01,569 --> 00:06:03,862 - Didn't get the left one. Try again. 116 00:06:05,281 --> 00:06:07,283 - It's really common on test flights, 117 00:06:07,408 --> 00:06:09,285 to have issues crop up. 118 00:06:09,410 --> 00:06:11,370 This airplane had undergone so many changes 119 00:06:11,495 --> 00:06:13,872 that it needed a thorough test flight. 120 00:06:13,956 --> 00:06:16,875 - Alright. Scoops... off. 121 00:06:20,588 --> 00:06:22,548 - The left one ain't working. 122 00:06:23,673 --> 00:06:25,968 - With multiple redundancies built into 123 00:06:26,093 --> 00:06:27,552 the pressurization system, 124 00:06:27,637 --> 00:06:30,764 the pilots are safe to continue their flight. 125 00:06:34,101 --> 00:06:37,396 - ABX 8-2-7, turn right, heading of 3-6-0 126 00:06:37,521 --> 00:06:38,980 vectors for traffic. 127 00:06:39,107 --> 00:06:41,858 - Air Traffic Control monitors the airspace, 128 00:06:41,942 --> 00:06:45,112 redirecting Flight 8-2-7 when necessary. 129 00:06:45,237 --> 00:06:46,613 ABX 8-2-7, 130 00:06:46,738 --> 00:06:48,324 right 3-6-0. 131 00:06:50,242 --> 00:06:52,577 And then we're gonna do our manual drop. 132 00:06:52,661 --> 00:06:55,206 You ready for hydraulics to come off, Keith? 133 00:06:55,288 --> 00:06:56,915 - Uh, yeah, go right ahead. 134 00:06:57,040 --> 00:06:58,793 - Okay, go ahead, Terry. 135 00:06:58,918 --> 00:07:02,379 - The manual drop tests the plane's landing gear 136 00:07:02,463 --> 00:07:04,841 without the use of hydraulics. 137 00:07:04,966 --> 00:07:08,802 - Okay, gear free fall one point five, V-S zero. 138 00:07:08,927 --> 00:07:12,432 - Okay, you ready? - Ready. Gear down. 139 00:07:14,307 --> 00:07:17,853 - Gear... down. Three green. 140 00:07:17,978 --> 00:07:20,273 - Got it. 141 00:07:21,189 --> 00:07:23,526 - We're getting a little bit of ice here. 142 00:07:25,653 --> 00:07:27,196 - The biggest hazard from icing 143 00:07:27,321 --> 00:07:29,990 is that it changes the shape of the wing. 144 00:07:30,115 --> 00:07:34,036 And the airplane doesn't fly nearly as well as it did. 145 00:07:34,161 --> 00:07:35,913 - The crew comes up with a plan 146 00:07:35,997 --> 00:07:39,459 to avoid performance issues from ice build-up. 147 00:07:39,541 --> 00:07:41,168 - Garth, if we go up 15, 148 00:07:41,293 --> 00:07:43,336 I think we could get out of this stuff. 149 00:07:43,463 --> 00:07:45,548 - Uh, yeah, you can go up there. 150 00:07:45,673 --> 00:07:47,300 We've got that block. 151 00:07:56,559 --> 00:07:59,144 - As the flight climbs out of the weather, 152 00:07:59,269 --> 00:08:01,439 the crew continues the tests. 153 00:08:03,232 --> 00:08:05,233 - The next thing is our stall series. 154 00:08:05,776 --> 00:08:08,696 - For the stall series, the pilots will intentionally 155 00:08:08,821 --> 00:08:11,574 slow the airplane until it's just about to stall, 156 00:08:11,699 --> 00:08:14,785 to determine when the stick shaker activates. 157 00:08:16,245 --> 00:08:19,874 Most commercial planes use a stick shaker system. 158 00:08:21,083 --> 00:08:23,752 It's a vibrating warning on the control column 159 00:08:23,877 --> 00:08:26,129 that alerts the pilots to take action 160 00:08:26,213 --> 00:08:28,089 before the plane actually stalls. 161 00:08:28,216 --> 00:08:30,134 - We should stall at 122. 162 00:08:30,218 --> 00:08:32,470 I'm gonna set that in my interior bug. 163 00:08:32,552 --> 00:08:34,596 - The pilots set their target speed 164 00:08:34,721 --> 00:08:37,057 for when the plane is expected to stall. 165 00:08:37,182 --> 00:08:38,183 - Mine's set. 166 00:08:38,308 --> 00:08:39,726 - Shaker 128. 167 00:08:39,851 --> 00:08:42,395 If you just call out your numbers, I'll record 'em. 168 00:08:43,438 --> 00:08:45,357 - They have to write down the airspeed at which 169 00:08:45,441 --> 00:08:47,317 the stick shaker triggers, 170 00:08:47,400 --> 00:08:49,195 and then they have to write down the airspeed 171 00:08:49,278 --> 00:08:51,072 at which the stall begins. 172 00:08:51,197 --> 00:08:53,282 - Captain Leming slows the plane 173 00:08:53,407 --> 00:08:55,326 at a rate of one knot per second 174 00:08:55,408 --> 00:08:57,702 to reach the stall speed. 175 00:09:00,706 --> 00:09:02,625 - Feeling some buffet here. 176 00:09:02,750 --> 00:09:05,543 - The pilots detect a change in the aircraft. 177 00:09:05,628 --> 00:09:07,587 - Yeah, that's pretty early. 178 00:09:09,548 --> 00:09:11,384 - As an airplane approaches stall, 179 00:09:11,466 --> 00:09:13,344 it starts talking to the pilots. 180 00:09:13,427 --> 00:09:16,721 The airplane starts vibrating or buffeting. 181 00:09:16,846 --> 00:09:19,725 - They quickly take action to avoid a stall. 182 00:09:19,850 --> 00:09:22,061 - Set max power. 183 00:09:22,144 --> 00:09:23,687 - One thirty-three. 184 00:09:28,985 --> 00:09:32,738 - Then, one of the plane's left engines begins to surge. 185 00:09:40,705 --> 00:09:42,581 - That's number two engine. 186 00:09:44,207 --> 00:09:47,086 - That's not normal, and you know it's not normal. 187 00:09:47,168 --> 00:09:49,504 And so, something like that's gonna get your attention. 188 00:09:49,629 --> 00:09:51,423 - Pull it back. 189 00:09:56,220 --> 00:09:57,721 - You got it. 190 00:09:57,804 --> 00:10:00,765 - The plane now banks to the left... 191 00:10:03,144 --> 00:10:04,894 and begins to drop. 192 00:10:10,985 --> 00:10:13,278 The pilots attempt to level the wings 193 00:10:13,403 --> 00:10:15,572 and slow the plane's descent. 194 00:10:16,282 --> 00:10:18,908 - Alright. - Okay? 195 00:10:18,993 --> 00:10:20,785 - Got it. 196 00:10:32,005 --> 00:10:33,966 - Realising that the plane is descending 197 00:10:34,091 --> 00:10:36,134 below his jurisdiction, the controller 198 00:10:36,259 --> 00:10:39,138 assigns the pilots to a new radio frequency. 199 00:10:39,263 --> 00:10:42,850 - 8-2-7, change to Indianapolis 1-2-8 point four. 200 00:10:47,229 --> 00:10:50,149 - But the controller's calls to change frequencies 201 00:10:50,274 --> 00:10:51,649 go unanswered. 202 00:10:51,775 --> 00:10:55,028 The flight crew is busy trying to recover the plane. 203 00:11:01,451 --> 00:11:02,827 ABX 8-2-7, 204 00:11:02,912 --> 00:11:05,121 Indianapolis 128 point four. 205 00:11:05,206 --> 00:11:06,831 - Uh, ABX 8-2-7, 206 00:11:06,916 --> 00:11:08,625 we're gonna stay on this frequency a minute, 207 00:11:08,708 --> 00:11:11,336 descending through 8,000, call you right back. 208 00:11:12,879 --> 00:11:15,924 - ABX 8-2-7, you're in an emergency descent? 209 00:11:16,049 --> 00:11:17,551 - Yes, sir. 210 00:11:19,595 --> 00:11:21,846 Airborne Express Flight 8-2-7 211 00:11:21,971 --> 00:11:25,350 is out of control and plummeting to the ground. 212 00:11:25,433 --> 00:11:26,811 - Rudder. - I got it. 213 00:11:34,652 --> 00:11:37,404 Seeing that Flight 8-2-7 is in trouble, 214 00:11:37,529 --> 00:11:39,740 the controller checks air traffic in the area 215 00:11:39,865 --> 00:11:42,784 to find a safe altitude for the plane. 216 00:11:45,203 --> 00:11:48,499 - Okay, um, can you hold 7,000? 217 00:11:49,082 --> 00:11:51,210 - But there's no answer. 218 00:11:52,919 --> 00:11:56,716 Flight 8-2-7 is less than 5,000 feet from the ground 219 00:11:56,841 --> 00:11:58,466 and descending fast. 220 00:12:00,594 --> 00:12:02,554 - Now bring it back. Left rudder. 221 00:12:04,764 --> 00:12:06,892 Okay good. Easy. 222 00:12:06,975 --> 00:12:08,769 - They could tell they were in an emergency. 223 00:12:08,894 --> 00:12:10,395 They could tell they'd lost control. 224 00:12:10,520 --> 00:12:12,480 They were probably frightened to death. 225 00:12:12,605 --> 00:12:14,357 - The pilots continue their efforts 226 00:12:14,442 --> 00:12:17,485 to recover the aircraft, but are now too low. 227 00:12:17,610 --> 00:12:19,279 Pull up. 228 00:12:20,197 --> 00:12:22,240 Terrain. Terrain. Pull up. 229 00:12:22,323 --> 00:12:24,451 - Really? Really?! 230 00:12:26,077 --> 00:12:28,456 - Airspeed low. Pull up. 231 00:12:28,581 --> 00:12:31,625 Just half an hour into a standard test flight... 232 00:12:35,336 --> 00:12:36,797 ...the DC-8 crashes 233 00:12:36,922 --> 00:12:40,592 into the East River Mountain in Narrows, Virginia. 234 00:12:43,303 --> 00:12:45,931 - ABX 8-2-7, do you copy? 235 00:12:47,850 --> 00:12:49,851 ABX 8-2-7, do you copy? 236 00:12:52,020 --> 00:12:54,481 - No one has survived. 237 00:12:55,566 --> 00:12:59,611 - The mountains lit up, and there was a explosion, 238 00:12:59,736 --> 00:13:01,822 black smoke, 239 00:13:01,947 --> 00:13:05,366 and red and blue flames coming up off that. 240 00:13:06,494 --> 00:13:07,787 - News of the crash 241 00:13:07,870 --> 00:13:10,663 quickly spreads throughout the community. 242 00:13:12,625 --> 00:13:14,083 Grief counselors arrived today 243 00:13:14,168 --> 00:13:15,376 at Airborne's headquarters 244 00:13:15,503 --> 00:13:18,214 to help family and friends cope with their loss. 245 00:13:18,798 --> 00:13:21,549 - Obviously, it's just a terrible time 246 00:13:21,674 --> 00:13:23,384 for everyone here, particularly at... 247 00:13:23,510 --> 00:13:25,095 at this time of year. 248 00:13:25,178 --> 00:13:27,639 - Bob MacIntosh from the NTSB, 249 00:13:27,722 --> 00:13:29,975 the National Transportation Safety Board, 250 00:13:30,100 --> 00:13:31,976 leads the investigation. 251 00:13:32,061 --> 00:13:33,604 - We know this was a... 252 00:13:33,687 --> 00:13:35,355 a maintenance examination flight. 253 00:13:35,480 --> 00:13:37,441 Obviously, it was not successful, 254 00:13:37,524 --> 00:13:40,402 and that's about all I can tell you right now. 255 00:13:40,735 --> 00:13:43,989 The wreckage site certainly presented some challenges. 256 00:13:44,072 --> 00:13:47,909 We were going to have to deal with some mountainous terrain. 257 00:13:48,034 --> 00:13:50,328 We had to get to work. 258 00:13:51,705 --> 00:13:54,457 - Benjamin Berman is one of the first team members 259 00:13:54,542 --> 00:13:56,168 to arrive at the crash site. 260 00:13:56,876 --> 00:13:58,671 - I got to the top of the mountain 261 00:13:58,754 --> 00:14:00,798 and I looked out at the scene, 262 00:14:00,880 --> 00:14:04,759 and it was just complete devastation. 263 00:14:06,135 --> 00:14:08,264 I really thought, you know, what is it that could have 264 00:14:08,389 --> 00:14:10,224 brought that plane down? 265 00:14:10,975 --> 00:14:13,811 That's our job as NTSB investigators. 266 00:14:13,894 --> 00:14:16,855 - Investigators begin their painstaking efforts 267 00:14:16,938 --> 00:14:19,232 to transport pieces of the demolished plane 268 00:14:19,357 --> 00:14:21,818 to a hangar for examination. 269 00:14:24,697 --> 00:14:26,782 - We found the four corners. 270 00:14:26,907 --> 00:14:29,326 Looks like the plane was intact when it hit the mountain. 271 00:14:29,409 --> 00:14:31,495 - So, if you can see all four corners, 272 00:14:31,578 --> 00:14:34,539 which are the nose, the right-wing tip, 273 00:14:34,664 --> 00:14:36,417 the tail, and the left wing tip, 274 00:14:36,542 --> 00:14:38,918 in close proximity, it probably means 275 00:14:39,043 --> 00:14:43,048 the airplane was intact until it hit the ground. 276 00:14:44,884 --> 00:14:47,595 - This particular wreckage scene told us 277 00:14:47,720 --> 00:14:50,597 that we most probably had a loss of control, 278 00:14:50,722 --> 00:14:53,182 and that we were gonna have to find the, uh... 279 00:14:53,267 --> 00:14:55,519 reason for that loss of control. 280 00:14:55,602 --> 00:14:58,062 - We recovered the CVR and FDR. 281 00:14:59,606 --> 00:15:01,107 Let's get them off to Washington. 282 00:15:01,232 --> 00:15:04,528 - That cockpit voice recorder was going to tell us 283 00:15:04,611 --> 00:15:08,698 not only what they said, but how they said it. 284 00:15:12,952 --> 00:15:16,414 - While investigators wait for the CVR download... 285 00:15:16,498 --> 00:15:18,583 - I got the checklists for the FEF. 286 00:15:18,708 --> 00:15:21,586 - ...they review the checklist the flight crew was using 287 00:15:21,711 --> 00:15:23,755 during the Functional Evaluation Flight 288 00:15:23,880 --> 00:15:25,090 to get a better understanding 289 00:15:25,173 --> 00:15:27,967 of what they were doing prior to the crash. 290 00:15:30,638 --> 00:15:33,182 - It looks like standard FEF stuff. 291 00:15:33,307 --> 00:15:37,269 They're testing the flaps, rudder, 292 00:15:37,394 --> 00:15:40,063 landing gear, stall system. 293 00:15:40,147 --> 00:15:42,607 - There's nothing unusual on the list of tests 294 00:15:42,691 --> 00:15:44,610 the pilots were performing. 295 00:15:44,692 --> 00:15:46,278 - Well, maybe there was a problem with the plane 296 00:15:46,361 --> 00:15:48,447 before the FEF. 297 00:15:48,572 --> 00:15:50,073 I'll get Berman to talk to the maintenance team 298 00:15:50,157 --> 00:15:51,951 that modified the plane. 299 00:15:54,202 --> 00:15:55,788 - It was an old airplane, 300 00:15:55,870 --> 00:15:59,207 but it had just come out of a major retrofit. 301 00:15:59,875 --> 00:16:01,293 - Can you take me through exactly 302 00:16:01,376 --> 00:16:02,919 what you guys did to the airplane? 303 00:16:03,003 --> 00:16:04,922 - Well, it was a fairly major overhaul. 304 00:16:05,004 --> 00:16:07,758 - Investigators learn that extensive maintenance 305 00:16:07,841 --> 00:16:10,385 and modifications were carried out on the aircraft 306 00:16:10,510 --> 00:16:12,721 over the course of six months. 307 00:16:12,846 --> 00:16:14,264 - Yeah, it looks like you guys pretty well 308 00:16:14,347 --> 00:16:17,308 took the whole thing apart and put it back together, huh? 309 00:16:18,018 --> 00:16:20,019 - As we looked at the maintenance records, 310 00:16:20,144 --> 00:16:22,898 we could find that, uh, there was a great deal of work 311 00:16:23,023 --> 00:16:25,149 that had been done on the aircraft. 312 00:16:25,274 --> 00:16:28,361 Perhaps something had fallen through the cracks. 313 00:16:29,028 --> 00:16:31,447 - Could technicians have overlooked something 314 00:16:31,532 --> 00:16:33,658 during the modification of the airplane, 315 00:16:33,783 --> 00:16:36,160 causing the pilots of Flight 8-2-7 316 00:16:36,245 --> 00:16:37,538 to lose control? 317 00:16:37,663 --> 00:16:39,999 Pull up. 318 00:16:40,124 --> 00:16:42,500 Terrain. Terrain. Pull up. - Really? Really?! 319 00:16:45,211 --> 00:16:48,506 - I've got the dispatch logs for the plane right here. 320 00:16:48,590 --> 00:16:52,344 Investigators review Airborne Express Flight 8-2-7's 321 00:16:52,469 --> 00:16:54,888 dispatch logs to see if any malfunctions 322 00:16:55,014 --> 00:16:58,225 were reported after the plane was released from maintenance. 323 00:16:58,350 --> 00:17:00,269 - It looks like they finished the modifications 324 00:17:00,394 --> 00:17:03,355 and delivered the plane on December 15th, 325 00:17:03,438 --> 00:17:05,606 one week before the crash. 326 00:17:07,608 --> 00:17:08,652 Wait a second... 327 00:17:10,319 --> 00:17:13,198 This wasn't the pilots' first attempt at this flight. 328 00:17:15,409 --> 00:17:20,038 - The fact that they tried to do the flight earlier, 329 00:17:20,122 --> 00:17:21,789 that was really relevant. 330 00:17:21,914 --> 00:17:23,375 - Look here. The pilots conducted 331 00:17:23,500 --> 00:17:27,378 a partial FEF the day before the crash. 332 00:17:27,921 --> 00:17:31,508 They scrapped it midway through, low hydraulic pressure. 333 00:17:32,342 --> 00:17:34,344 - That can mean getting the landing gear down 334 00:17:34,428 --> 00:17:36,137 and in place or not, uh... 335 00:17:36,262 --> 00:17:38,515 or being able to power the flight controls or not. 336 00:17:38,598 --> 00:17:40,976 If the hydraulic pressure is not right, 337 00:17:41,101 --> 00:17:42,560 that's very serious. 338 00:17:43,103 --> 00:17:45,396 - Okay. 339 00:17:45,480 --> 00:17:48,317 And what did you think caused the low hydraulic pressure? 340 00:17:48,442 --> 00:17:51,944 - Did a hydraulic issue cause a loss of control? 341 00:17:52,069 --> 00:17:54,198 - Got it. The maintenance crews say 342 00:17:54,280 --> 00:17:56,157 that they suspected that trapped air in the lines 343 00:17:56,282 --> 00:17:58,326 led to low hydraulic quantity indication. 344 00:17:58,451 --> 00:17:59,912 - Did they fix it? - Yeah. 345 00:18:00,037 --> 00:18:01,288 They replaced the nose gear actuator 346 00:18:01,413 --> 00:18:05,000 the day of the accident. - But was that the end of it? 347 00:18:05,125 --> 00:18:07,752 Or did our pilots end up having issues 348 00:18:07,877 --> 00:18:09,671 with the hydraulics again? 349 00:18:11,798 --> 00:18:14,675 - We needed to figure out what had been going on. 350 00:18:14,801 --> 00:18:18,471 Could something have gone wrong in that maintenance? 351 00:18:20,641 --> 00:18:23,143 - Investigators are able to recover the plane's 352 00:18:23,268 --> 00:18:25,604 rudder components from the crash site. 353 00:18:25,729 --> 00:18:28,105 They examine them for any signs of damage 354 00:18:28,231 --> 00:18:30,317 to the hydraulic system. 355 00:18:31,151 --> 00:18:33,945 - No pre-impact hydraulic leaks. 356 00:18:34,028 --> 00:18:36,323 The hydraulic system was working fine. 357 00:18:36,949 --> 00:18:39,492 - The hydraulic system wasn't a probable cause 358 00:18:39,617 --> 00:18:42,412 for the mishap and loss of control. 359 00:18:42,496 --> 00:18:46,165 - If it wasn't the hydraulic system, what was it? 360 00:18:47,416 --> 00:18:51,130 We should call the witness list. Maybe somebody saw something. 361 00:18:58,095 --> 00:19:00,931 You were outside your home at the time? 362 00:19:01,013 --> 00:19:02,182 And what did you hear? 363 00:19:02,307 --> 00:19:04,058 - The team begins to interview witnesses 364 00:19:04,183 --> 00:19:06,310 to see if anyone heard or saw something 365 00:19:06,394 --> 00:19:08,646 that could point to the cause of the crash. 366 00:19:08,730 --> 00:19:10,648 - The local newspaper people were there 367 00:19:10,773 --> 00:19:15,194 asking people what they had heard and seen that night. 368 00:19:15,319 --> 00:19:17,823 - All you could see was just parts. 369 00:19:17,905 --> 00:19:21,285 It just, the plane had cleared out a big path. 370 00:19:21,367 --> 00:19:24,496 - That area was full of information. 371 00:19:24,621 --> 00:19:27,374 - Witnesses describe seeing the plane descend 372 00:19:27,499 --> 00:19:29,500 out of the clouds at a steep angle 373 00:19:29,585 --> 00:19:32,421 and hit the mountain at high speed. 374 00:19:36,173 --> 00:19:37,843 - Thank you so much for your time. 375 00:19:39,260 --> 00:19:40,846 I think we've got something. 376 00:19:40,929 --> 00:19:42,263 - Three witnesses confirm 377 00:19:42,388 --> 00:19:45,517 they could hear the plane making a banging sound 378 00:19:45,601 --> 00:19:47,685 followed by a slapping sound. 379 00:19:48,311 --> 00:19:50,689 - Kind of an odd noise. 380 00:19:50,814 --> 00:19:53,567 It sounded kind of low, 381 00:19:53,692 --> 00:19:56,236 and then he started coming up real loud. 382 00:19:57,445 --> 00:19:59,948 - The witnesses told us that there was slapping 383 00:20:00,073 --> 00:20:02,284 and banging that they heard. 384 00:20:07,372 --> 00:20:10,375 - If airflow entering the engine is disrupted, 385 00:20:10,459 --> 00:20:13,045 it can cause the engines to backfire. 386 00:20:14,755 --> 00:20:17,590 If airflow over a wing is disrupted, 387 00:20:17,715 --> 00:20:19,968 it can make a slapping sound. 388 00:20:20,093 --> 00:20:22,511 Both can be signs of a stall. 389 00:20:24,513 --> 00:20:26,432 - If the witness reports were true, 390 00:20:26,557 --> 00:20:29,560 it suggested that possibly there was an engine issue 391 00:20:29,644 --> 00:20:32,521 that may have been part of the sequence of events. 392 00:20:32,605 --> 00:20:35,567 However, it would require further examination 393 00:20:35,692 --> 00:20:37,736 of the flight data recorder. 394 00:20:37,861 --> 00:20:40,489 - NTSB Investigators turn to the plane's 395 00:20:40,614 --> 00:20:42,865 Flight Data Recorder to confirm 396 00:20:42,950 --> 00:20:44,201 whether Flight 8-2-7 397 00:20:44,284 --> 00:20:46,912 was in a stall before it crashed. 398 00:20:47,621 --> 00:20:49,830 - Isolate the airspeed. 399 00:20:52,541 --> 00:20:55,586 There's a gradual reduction in airspeed here. 400 00:20:55,671 --> 00:20:57,923 - One knot per second. It looks like they were setting up 401 00:20:58,006 --> 00:20:59,924 for the stall series. 402 00:21:00,008 --> 00:21:03,470 - And then here, airspeed falls off a cliff. 403 00:21:04,471 --> 00:21:06,390 - That's a stall. 404 00:21:06,472 --> 00:21:08,474 - Let's see the engine parameters. 405 00:21:08,599 --> 00:21:10,602 - They search for further confirmation 406 00:21:10,727 --> 00:21:13,020 that Flight 8-2-7 stalled. 407 00:21:13,605 --> 00:21:15,065 - It looks like a compressor surge 408 00:21:15,147 --> 00:21:16,942 from the number two engine. 409 00:21:20,653 --> 00:21:22,489 - That tracks with what the witnesses said 410 00:21:22,614 --> 00:21:23,781 they were hearing. 411 00:21:23,906 --> 00:21:25,616 - Lack of airspeed and a compressor surge 412 00:21:25,701 --> 00:21:28,619 are clear signs that the plane stalled. 413 00:21:28,703 --> 00:21:30,497 - Give me the roll angle. 414 00:21:33,040 --> 00:21:37,503 - They were banking left, right, left, right, left. 415 00:21:38,672 --> 00:21:40,589 - They were in a roll reversal. 416 00:21:41,590 --> 00:21:44,135 - A roll reversal is a phenomenon that occurs 417 00:21:44,260 --> 00:21:46,971 when a plane banks steeply to the left and right, 418 00:21:47,096 --> 00:21:50,349 in the opposite direction of a pilot's inputs. 419 00:21:50,474 --> 00:21:53,394 It's usually the result of a stall. 420 00:21:58,357 --> 00:22:01,403 - You're flying slow enough. You're just barely possessed 421 00:22:01,528 --> 00:22:04,030 of enough lift to stay in the air. 422 00:22:04,155 --> 00:22:06,365 And now the airplane does exactly the opposite 423 00:22:06,490 --> 00:22:08,701 of what you were asking it to do. 424 00:22:13,789 --> 00:22:16,876 - Yeah, that's four roll reversals before the crash. 425 00:22:17,001 --> 00:22:19,546 - How did the crew of Flight 8-2-7 426 00:22:19,671 --> 00:22:22,840 allow their plane to get so out of control? 427 00:22:26,385 --> 00:22:28,555 With the arrival of Flight 8-2-7's 428 00:22:28,680 --> 00:22:31,098 Cockpit Voice Recorder, or CVR, 429 00:22:31,223 --> 00:22:33,226 investigators zero in on the test 430 00:22:33,352 --> 00:22:35,311 the pilots were conducting immediately 431 00:22:35,394 --> 00:22:37,689 before the plane stalled. 432 00:22:38,690 --> 00:22:40,400 - Okay, are you ready? 433 00:22:40,525 --> 00:22:41,692 - Ready. 434 00:22:43,236 --> 00:22:45,279 The next thing is our stall series. 435 00:22:45,404 --> 00:22:47,115 We should stall at 122. 436 00:22:47,240 --> 00:22:49,617 I'm gonna set that in my interior bug. 437 00:22:51,202 --> 00:22:52,828 - Mine's set. 438 00:22:52,913 --> 00:22:54,455 - Shaker 128. 439 00:22:54,580 --> 00:22:56,750 If you just call out your numbers, I'll record 'em. 440 00:23:01,212 --> 00:23:03,048 Investigators listen to the pilots 441 00:23:03,173 --> 00:23:06,050 working their way through the stall series. 442 00:23:07,344 --> 00:23:09,679 Feeling some buffet here. 443 00:23:09,762 --> 00:23:11,681 - Yeah, that's pretty early. 444 00:23:15,894 --> 00:23:18,855 - So the plane entered a stall sooner than they expected. 445 00:23:18,939 --> 00:23:20,065 - Yeah. 446 00:23:21,316 --> 00:23:24,486 - When I was looking through the transcript before, 447 00:23:24,611 --> 00:23:26,570 there was something that Captain Leming said earlier 448 00:23:26,695 --> 00:23:28,573 in the flight, uh... 449 00:23:29,782 --> 00:23:33,077 Captain Leming, "We're getting a little bit of ice here." 450 00:23:34,203 --> 00:23:35,788 - Garth, if we go up 15, 451 00:23:35,913 --> 00:23:37,707 I think we can get out of this stuff. 452 00:23:37,790 --> 00:23:41,086 - Uh, yeah, you can go up there. We've got that block. 453 00:23:42,295 --> 00:23:43,922 - So ice builds up, 454 00:23:44,047 --> 00:23:45,548 disrupts airflow over the wing... 455 00:23:45,632 --> 00:23:47,424 - Decreases lift, increases drag... 456 00:23:47,509 --> 00:23:49,594 - And the plane would have stalled at a higher airspeed 457 00:23:49,678 --> 00:23:51,262 than they calculated. 458 00:23:53,472 --> 00:23:56,852 - Did ice accumulation on Flight 8-2-7 459 00:23:56,977 --> 00:23:59,186 cause a premature stall? 460 00:24:02,148 --> 00:24:04,276 It's happened before. 461 00:24:04,401 --> 00:24:07,528 December the 12th, 1985. 462 00:24:07,653 --> 00:24:09,990 Evidence suggested that shortly after taking off 463 00:24:10,115 --> 00:24:14,076 from Gander International Airport in wintry conditions, 464 00:24:14,161 --> 00:24:17,873 a build-up of ice on Arrow Air Flight 12-85 465 00:24:17,998 --> 00:24:21,250 caused the plane to stall at a higher airspeed, 466 00:24:21,334 --> 00:24:26,506 leading to a crash that killed all 256 people on board. 467 00:24:28,424 --> 00:24:30,969 Investigators study meteorological reports 468 00:24:31,094 --> 00:24:33,180 to determine if Flight 8-2-7 469 00:24:33,305 --> 00:24:35,765 was flying through icing conditions. 470 00:24:35,848 --> 00:24:39,310 - There's a scattered area of light rain here 471 00:24:39,394 --> 00:24:41,896 along 8-2-7's flight path. 472 00:24:42,021 --> 00:24:46,067 Cloud tops out at around 14,000 feet. 473 00:24:46,192 --> 00:24:47,943 What was their altitude block again? 474 00:24:48,028 --> 00:24:51,071 - Uh, 13 to 15,000. 475 00:24:51,655 --> 00:24:54,201 - The type of weather they were in the night of the accident 476 00:24:54,326 --> 00:24:56,661 was really conducive to icing. 477 00:24:56,786 --> 00:24:58,913 They were in prime territory to pick up ice 478 00:24:59,038 --> 00:25:01,500 whenever they were in the clouds. 479 00:25:01,625 --> 00:25:05,336 - What speed did the pilots say they expected the stall? 480 00:25:05,921 --> 00:25:08,839 - Stall 1-22, shaker 1-28. 481 00:25:11,384 --> 00:25:13,345 - Well, according to the FDR, 482 00:25:13,428 --> 00:25:16,515 the plane stalled at 126 knots. 483 00:25:19,601 --> 00:25:21,603 - That's only four knots earlier. 484 00:25:22,686 --> 00:25:24,689 - So even if there was ice, it was likely to have had 485 00:25:24,772 --> 00:25:26,732 little impact. I mean, certainly not enough 486 00:25:26,857 --> 00:25:28,859 to make the plane unrecoverable. 487 00:25:30,862 --> 00:25:34,406 - Whether there was a great deal of contribution from ice, 488 00:25:34,531 --> 00:25:36,326 we could never determine, 489 00:25:36,409 --> 00:25:38,369 but, uh, the consensus 490 00:25:38,494 --> 00:25:41,038 was that it was not a major element 491 00:25:41,163 --> 00:25:43,540 in the cause of the accident. 492 00:25:46,294 --> 00:25:49,548 - You said stall 1-22 knots, shaker 1-28? 493 00:25:49,673 --> 00:25:51,173 Mm-hmm. - Well, when we were listening 494 00:25:51,258 --> 00:25:52,925 to the CVR, I don't remember hearing 495 00:25:53,050 --> 00:25:54,426 the stick shaker. 496 00:25:56,429 --> 00:25:58,097 - The purpose of the stick shaker 497 00:25:58,222 --> 00:26:00,141 is to get your undivided attention, 498 00:26:00,267 --> 00:26:03,228 not only by noise, but by shaking you. 499 00:26:07,106 --> 00:26:09,108 Because there's only one thing that that's telling you, 500 00:26:09,233 --> 00:26:10,818 and that is, "If you slow any more, 501 00:26:10,943 --> 00:26:11,861 I'm gonna stall." 502 00:26:11,944 --> 00:26:13,529 - Let's have a listen. 503 00:26:14,739 --> 00:26:17,284 - Did the pilots receive proper warning 504 00:26:17,409 --> 00:26:20,369 that their plane was entering a stall? 505 00:26:21,578 --> 00:26:23,038 I'm feeling some buffet. 506 00:26:23,123 --> 00:26:24,583 - Yeah, that's pretty early. 507 00:26:24,708 --> 00:26:27,919 - That's a stall right there, that ain't no shaker. 508 00:26:32,464 --> 00:26:34,300 - So, they're slowing the plane down, 509 00:26:34,425 --> 00:26:35,801 waiting for the shaker to activate... 510 00:26:35,926 --> 00:26:37,636 - Then all of a sudden, they're in a stall. 511 00:26:37,761 --> 00:26:40,390 No warning. - So the shaker failed? 512 00:26:41,641 --> 00:26:44,603 - With no stall warning there, the pilots had, in a sense, 513 00:26:44,685 --> 00:26:47,480 a right to believe they weren't stalling. 514 00:26:47,605 --> 00:26:49,316 Well, what's going on here? Well, it's not a stall, 515 00:26:49,441 --> 00:26:51,859 because the stick shaker's not vibrating. 516 00:26:52,484 --> 00:26:54,445 - Well, the question is, when did it fail? 517 00:26:54,528 --> 00:26:56,448 During the flight or before? 518 00:27:06,875 --> 00:27:09,669 To determine if the stick shaker malfunctioned, 519 00:27:09,794 --> 00:27:11,671 investigators search the wreckage 520 00:27:11,796 --> 00:27:15,508 for stall components that might have survived the fiery crash. 521 00:27:20,846 --> 00:27:22,515 - Nothing, huh? 522 00:27:22,641 --> 00:27:24,183 Yeah, that's what we thought. 523 00:27:24,308 --> 00:27:26,519 The stall system was completely destroyed. 524 00:27:28,188 --> 00:27:31,816 - We never were able to exactly identify 525 00:27:31,900 --> 00:27:35,028 what that failure point was in the system. 526 00:27:36,028 --> 00:27:38,615 Our team wanted to find out how much maintenance 527 00:27:38,698 --> 00:27:42,410 and inspection had taken place on the system. 528 00:27:46,498 --> 00:27:48,958 - With no clues in the wreckage, 529 00:27:49,041 --> 00:27:52,461 NTSB Investigators speak to the maintenance technician 530 00:27:52,545 --> 00:27:55,339 about Flight 8-2-7's stall warning system. 531 00:27:55,423 --> 00:27:57,424 - Hey, thanks for your time. 532 00:27:57,549 --> 00:28:00,178 Did you test the stick shaker? 533 00:28:00,260 --> 00:28:04,015 - Yeah, we did, on... 534 00:28:05,517 --> 00:28:07,059 On December 5th. 535 00:28:07,852 --> 00:28:10,480 - Two weeks before the accident. How extensive a test? 536 00:28:10,563 --> 00:28:14,358 - Quite extensive. Have a look. 537 00:28:16,443 --> 00:28:18,238 - The shaker, the heating components. 538 00:28:18,363 --> 00:28:19,905 - The stick shaker system 539 00:28:20,030 --> 00:28:23,492 passed all those pre-flight maintenance checks. 540 00:28:24,160 --> 00:28:25,869 - What about the transducer? 541 00:28:27,497 --> 00:28:28,748 - Let me check. 542 00:28:30,040 --> 00:28:32,251 - The transducer is a small flap 543 00:28:32,376 --> 00:28:35,003 nestled in the recessed part of the wing. 544 00:28:35,087 --> 00:28:38,590 It moves backwards when airflow is detected. 545 00:28:38,717 --> 00:28:40,969 When there is insufficient air over the wings, 546 00:28:41,094 --> 00:28:45,390 it moves forward and triggers the stick shaker to activate. 547 00:28:49,728 --> 00:28:50,936 - No. 548 00:28:51,813 --> 00:28:54,898 No, it doesn't look like we tested the transducer. 549 00:28:57,986 --> 00:29:01,239 - That part is not covered by the pre-flight test. 550 00:29:02,115 --> 00:29:05,076 It suggests that the failure of the stick shaker to work 551 00:29:05,160 --> 00:29:07,162 was a bad transducer. 552 00:29:10,539 --> 00:29:12,250 But to me, why it failed 553 00:29:12,375 --> 00:29:14,669 wasn't as important as... 554 00:29:14,794 --> 00:29:18,506 what the effect of it failing was on the crew. 555 00:29:19,632 --> 00:29:21,049 - Feeling some buffet here. 556 00:29:21,134 --> 00:29:22,551 - Yeah, that's pretty early. 557 00:29:22,634 --> 00:29:24,929 - That's a stall right there, that ain't no shaker. 558 00:29:25,012 --> 00:29:27,432 - Even without the stick shaker activating, 559 00:29:27,515 --> 00:29:30,393 the flight crew knew they were in a stall. 560 00:29:30,977 --> 00:29:34,063 That's number two engine. 561 00:29:34,146 --> 00:29:36,441 Bring it back. Okay, good. 562 00:29:36,523 --> 00:29:38,777 - But if they knew... 563 00:29:38,859 --> 00:29:39,611 - Left rudder. 564 00:29:39,693 --> 00:29:40,737 - ...why couldn't they recover? 565 00:29:40,819 --> 00:29:42,113 - Easy. - Terrain. Terrain. 566 00:29:42,196 --> 00:29:43,364 - Bring it back. - Pull up. 567 00:29:43,490 --> 00:29:44,615 Rudder. 568 00:29:44,699 --> 00:29:46,451 - Really? - Terrain. Terrain. 569 00:29:53,333 --> 00:29:57,127 Investigators return to Flight 8-2-7's CVR 570 00:29:57,211 --> 00:30:00,006 to get a better sense of the actions the pilots took 571 00:30:00,131 --> 00:30:02,799 when their aircraft went into a stall. 572 00:30:02,884 --> 00:30:04,093 That's a stall right there. 573 00:30:04,176 --> 00:30:06,054 That ain't no shaker. 574 00:30:06,679 --> 00:30:08,222 - Set max power. 575 00:30:08,347 --> 00:30:10,474 - One thirty-three. 576 00:30:11,893 --> 00:30:14,229 - So, as soon as they recognize they're in a stall, 577 00:30:14,354 --> 00:30:15,771 they push power to the engines. 578 00:30:15,855 --> 00:30:17,272 - That's the right move. 579 00:30:19,651 --> 00:30:20,943 That's number two engine. 580 00:30:21,027 --> 00:30:22,528 - There's the engine surge. 581 00:30:22,653 --> 00:30:23,820 - Pull it back. 582 00:30:28,409 --> 00:30:30,494 - So what did they do next? 583 00:30:32,163 --> 00:30:33,580 - Alright. 584 00:30:33,705 --> 00:30:35,708 - Okay. 585 00:30:35,834 --> 00:30:37,751 Start bringing the nose back up. 586 00:30:43,549 --> 00:30:44,843 - They pulled the nose up? 587 00:30:44,925 --> 00:30:46,635 - That would make the stall worse. 588 00:30:46,719 --> 00:30:49,263 - Pulling back on the control column 589 00:30:49,388 --> 00:30:52,016 in response to a stall is inconsistent 590 00:30:52,099 --> 00:30:53,893 with a normal stall recovery 591 00:30:54,018 --> 00:30:58,855 and would not reduce angle of attack and break the stall. 592 00:30:59,898 --> 00:31:03,152 - Well, that's what would have triggered the roll reversal. 593 00:31:04,362 --> 00:31:05,864 - How'd they deal with that? 594 00:31:07,740 --> 00:31:08,865 - Rudder. 595 00:31:08,991 --> 00:31:10,785 - Got it. - Rudder. 596 00:31:10,910 --> 00:31:12,953 - Got it. - Left rudder. 597 00:31:13,078 --> 00:31:14,497 - The left rudder's buried. 598 00:31:14,580 --> 00:31:16,749 - Investigators discover that in addition 599 00:31:16,875 --> 00:31:19,669 to moving the control wheel right and left, 600 00:31:19,751 --> 00:31:23,882 the pilots also used the rudder to stop the plane from rolling. 601 00:31:25,048 --> 00:31:26,342 - You have to be ahead of it. 602 00:31:26,425 --> 00:31:29,220 And that's a very difficult thing to do. 603 00:31:30,930 --> 00:31:33,057 - So they spend almost a minute 604 00:31:33,141 --> 00:31:34,474 trying to fight the roll reversal 605 00:31:34,601 --> 00:31:37,854 with the rudder. And no mention of a stall. 606 00:31:39,396 --> 00:31:41,691 - Investigators suspect that the pilots 607 00:31:41,773 --> 00:31:45,403 were so preoccupied dealing with the roll reversal 608 00:31:45,486 --> 00:31:49,406 that they failed to realize that the plane was in a stall. 609 00:31:52,618 --> 00:31:54,119 - It still doesn't explain why Captain Leming 610 00:31:54,244 --> 00:31:55,246 would have pulled back on the yoke 611 00:31:55,371 --> 00:31:57,539 to try to recover from the stall. 612 00:32:00,876 --> 00:32:03,922 - To recover from the stall, you can't pull back. 613 00:32:04,005 --> 00:32:06,465 You need to point the nose of the airplane down 614 00:32:06,590 --> 00:32:09,259 even more in order to gain speed, 615 00:32:09,384 --> 00:32:11,261 or you will not recover. 616 00:32:11,346 --> 00:32:13,806 You will fly into the mountaintop in Virginia. 617 00:32:13,932 --> 00:32:15,474 Terrain. Terrain. 618 00:32:15,599 --> 00:32:17,602 Pull up. 619 00:32:17,727 --> 00:32:19,186 Terrain. Terrain. 620 00:32:22,356 --> 00:32:24,317 - And we wanted to know why, 621 00:32:24,442 --> 00:32:26,361 why did he do that? 622 00:32:26,486 --> 00:32:28,779 Especially at those most critical moments. 623 00:32:34,160 --> 00:32:35,536 - Morning, Bob. 624 00:32:35,662 --> 00:32:37,038 - I'm looking to see if there's anything 625 00:32:37,163 --> 00:32:39,874 in ABX's operations manual on the DC-8. 626 00:32:39,999 --> 00:32:41,250 Here's a copy. 627 00:32:42,000 --> 00:32:45,171 - Investigators search through ABX's procedures 628 00:32:45,296 --> 00:32:47,298 to understand why Captain Leming 629 00:32:47,423 --> 00:32:49,342 pulled back on the control column 630 00:32:49,467 --> 00:32:52,511 to recover from Flight 8-2-7's stall. 631 00:32:53,179 --> 00:32:54,430 - Wait. 632 00:32:54,513 --> 00:32:56,307 Bob, did you see this? 633 00:32:57,599 --> 00:32:59,978 It says that priority in a stall recovery 634 00:33:00,060 --> 00:33:03,522 is to maintain altitude by increasing the pitch. 635 00:33:05,857 --> 00:33:07,693 - Pulling back on the control column 636 00:33:07,818 --> 00:33:10,320 increases the pitch of an aircraft. 637 00:33:11,614 --> 00:33:13,490 - Well, it might be okay for an approach to a stall, 638 00:33:13,574 --> 00:33:15,617 but not for an actual stall. 639 00:33:16,952 --> 00:33:19,372 - So, the things that you do to recover 640 00:33:19,497 --> 00:33:21,665 from an approach to stall 641 00:33:21,749 --> 00:33:24,376 are totally different from what you do 642 00:33:24,501 --> 00:33:26,837 to recover from an actual stall. 643 00:33:26,962 --> 00:33:29,048 If you're right over the trees, you gotta try 644 00:33:29,173 --> 00:33:30,674 the approach to stall recovery 645 00:33:30,758 --> 00:33:32,801 because you're gonna hit the trees. 646 00:33:32,884 --> 00:33:35,637 If you're at 36,000 feet and you stall, 647 00:33:35,721 --> 00:33:39,474 if you don't put the nose down five or ten degrees, 648 00:33:39,558 --> 00:33:40,852 you're not gonna recover. 649 00:33:40,934 --> 00:33:43,938 - That can't be the current procedure, can it? 650 00:33:54,240 --> 00:33:56,366 - I've got a joint memo with the FAA. 651 00:33:56,491 --> 00:33:58,577 - Investigators discover an update 652 00:33:58,702 --> 00:34:01,913 to Airborne Express' flight test procedures. 653 00:34:02,038 --> 00:34:03,165 - And what's it say? 654 00:34:03,249 --> 00:34:06,210 - The updated procedure called for a reduction of pitch 655 00:34:06,294 --> 00:34:08,128 to recover from a stall. 656 00:34:09,047 --> 00:34:11,507 - The revised procedure called for pilots 657 00:34:11,590 --> 00:34:14,510 to lower the nose when entering a stall, 658 00:34:14,594 --> 00:34:17,304 the opposite of what Captain Leming did. 659 00:34:17,889 --> 00:34:20,766 - The change was made after a loss-of-control incident 660 00:34:20,891 --> 00:34:22,976 in May 1991. 661 00:34:23,518 --> 00:34:25,855 - May '91... May. 662 00:34:25,938 --> 00:34:27,065 What flight was that? 663 00:34:27,898 --> 00:34:31,735 - It was a DC-8 doing a post-modification FEF. 664 00:34:31,818 --> 00:34:34,905 - The same plane and flight as 8-2-7. 665 00:34:35,030 --> 00:34:37,157 - On May 16th, 1991, 666 00:34:37,282 --> 00:34:43,289 another Airborne Express DC-8 lost control during an F-E-F. 667 00:34:43,789 --> 00:34:46,333 - The pilots managed to recover from the stall. 668 00:34:46,458 --> 00:34:48,210 And the policy has been to reduce pitch 669 00:34:48,293 --> 00:34:50,588 during a stall ever since. 670 00:34:51,547 --> 00:34:53,340 - So, why didn't the crew of Flight 8-2-7 671 00:34:53,465 --> 00:34:55,467 use the updated procedure? 672 00:34:58,721 --> 00:35:00,181 Okay. 673 00:35:00,306 --> 00:35:02,809 - We learned that the director of Flight Technical Programs 674 00:35:02,934 --> 00:35:05,186 was responsible for the procedures, 675 00:35:05,311 --> 00:35:07,438 the checklists, and the selection 676 00:35:07,563 --> 00:35:09,106 and training of pilots. 677 00:35:09,190 --> 00:35:12,568 As a result, we wanted to talk to him to learn more. 678 00:35:12,652 --> 00:35:14,945 - The NTSB meets with the airline's 679 00:35:15,028 --> 00:35:16,947 Director of Flight Technical Programs 680 00:35:17,072 --> 00:35:19,659 to determine why the crew of Flight 8-2-7 681 00:35:19,784 --> 00:35:22,494 didn't follow the updated procedure. 682 00:35:22,619 --> 00:35:24,163 - I just have a few questions to ask, 683 00:35:24,288 --> 00:35:25,789 and then I'll let you get back to work. 684 00:35:25,914 --> 00:35:26,873 - Of course. 685 00:35:26,998 --> 00:35:29,710 - How do ABX pilots train to recover from a stall? 686 00:35:29,835 --> 00:35:32,380 - I tell them whatever you do, don't lose altitude. 687 00:35:32,505 --> 00:35:34,798 So if you're in a stall, you set max power 688 00:35:34,923 --> 00:35:37,467 and you increase the pitch of the aircraft. 689 00:35:37,592 --> 00:35:38,927 - Well, that's different from the updated policy, 690 00:35:39,010 --> 00:35:41,639 which calls for a nose down pitch recovery. 691 00:35:44,016 --> 00:35:45,434 - Correct. 692 00:35:45,518 --> 00:35:47,561 - He just didn't agree that that was necessary. 693 00:35:47,686 --> 00:35:48,646 - If you increase the pitch, 694 00:35:48,771 --> 00:35:50,565 you'll make the stall even worse. 695 00:35:50,690 --> 00:35:52,275 - The engines are properly spooled 696 00:35:52,358 --> 00:35:54,318 as you're approaching a stall. 697 00:35:54,443 --> 00:35:56,070 You can power your way out of it. 698 00:35:56,195 --> 00:35:58,489 - The director believed that if the engines 699 00:35:58,572 --> 00:35:59,699 were running properly, 700 00:35:59,824 --> 00:36:01,659 pilots could increase thrust 701 00:36:01,784 --> 00:36:04,036 and fly out of a stall. 702 00:36:04,661 --> 00:36:08,206 - He had his own opinions about what should be done, 703 00:36:08,331 --> 00:36:10,126 and they were not in agreement 704 00:36:10,208 --> 00:36:12,210 with the proper procedure. 705 00:36:21,219 --> 00:36:24,056 - See, what I don't get is... 706 00:36:24,181 --> 00:36:25,516 old procedure, new procedure, 707 00:36:25,641 --> 00:36:27,643 there is no procedure that says to pull back 708 00:36:27,726 --> 00:36:29,019 for the duration of the stall. 709 00:36:29,103 --> 00:36:31,021 - I keep going back to the way they were dealing 710 00:36:31,105 --> 00:36:32,523 with this roll reversal. 711 00:36:35,150 --> 00:36:36,985 - Rudder. Rudder. 712 00:36:37,068 --> 00:36:38,445 - Got it. 713 00:36:38,570 --> 00:36:39,864 - And left rudder. 714 00:36:40,572 --> 00:36:43,867 - The crew were unable to recover the airplane 715 00:36:43,951 --> 00:36:47,371 in the approximately 90 seconds that it took 716 00:36:47,496 --> 00:36:49,831 from when this lack of the stick shaker 717 00:36:49,916 --> 00:36:52,460 was identified, to when it impacted terrain, 718 00:36:52,585 --> 00:36:54,210 and our question was, why? 719 00:36:54,295 --> 00:36:58,757 - Investigators assess ABX's DC-8 flight simulator 720 00:36:58,882 --> 00:37:02,177 to see exactly how flight crew experienced a stall 721 00:37:02,260 --> 00:37:03,887 during their training. 722 00:37:03,971 --> 00:37:07,099 - Now, I'm going to slow this thing down into a stall. 723 00:37:13,105 --> 00:37:14,898 There's the shaker... 724 00:37:17,443 --> 00:37:18,860 There's the stall. 725 00:37:18,945 --> 00:37:20,403 And I'm going to pull back on the yoke 726 00:37:20,528 --> 00:37:22,614 like our pilots did. 727 00:37:22,739 --> 00:37:26,369 - So, I continued to raise the nose 728 00:37:26,452 --> 00:37:28,913 up higher and higher, 729 00:37:28,996 --> 00:37:32,750 and I was just astounded at what the simulator did, 730 00:37:32,833 --> 00:37:35,335 or mainly, what it didn't do. 731 00:37:43,469 --> 00:37:45,846 - Well, we're in a stall 732 00:37:45,972 --> 00:37:49,141 and there's no roll, no pitch down, 733 00:37:49,266 --> 00:37:52,186 nothing like you would see in a real life stall. 734 00:37:52,311 --> 00:37:56,148 - The simulator just kind of reached the end of its program. 735 00:37:56,273 --> 00:37:58,483 It just sat there. 736 00:37:58,608 --> 00:37:59,943 - If this is how they were trained, 737 00:38:00,068 --> 00:38:02,989 they would have no idea how a stall truly feels. 738 00:38:05,699 --> 00:38:08,744 - Their training was not only zero training, 739 00:38:08,827 --> 00:38:10,663 it was negative training. 740 00:38:10,788 --> 00:38:12,331 It gave them a false impression 741 00:38:12,456 --> 00:38:14,291 of what they would experience. 742 00:38:14,375 --> 00:38:16,710 They would have been startled... 743 00:38:16,835 --> 00:38:18,920 - Left rudder. - at what the wings did 744 00:38:19,005 --> 00:38:21,090 - with the roll... - Okay. Easy. 745 00:38:21,172 --> 00:38:22,465 Don't... Don't... 746 00:38:22,550 --> 00:38:25,302 - ...and they would not have recognized it 747 00:38:25,385 --> 00:38:29,014 necessarily as a symptom of a stall, 748 00:38:29,139 --> 00:38:32,018 because in their simulator, it didn't have that symptom. 749 00:38:32,518 --> 00:38:34,811 - Maybe they didn't realize they were still in the stall, 750 00:38:34,894 --> 00:38:36,646 but surely, there were other indicators 751 00:38:36,731 --> 00:38:39,108 that they were falling out of the sky. 752 00:38:44,864 --> 00:38:47,365 Why didn't the pilots of Flight 8-2-7 753 00:38:47,490 --> 00:38:50,244 realize they were diving towards a mountain? 754 00:38:50,869 --> 00:38:54,873 - Okay, put yourself in the pilot's shoes. 755 00:38:55,623 --> 00:38:57,668 You realize you're in a stall. 756 00:38:58,543 --> 00:38:59,961 - Feeling some buffet here. 757 00:39:00,045 --> 00:39:01,380 - Yeah, that's pretty early. 758 00:39:01,505 --> 00:39:04,342 - That's a stall right there. That ain't no shaker. 759 00:39:04,467 --> 00:39:07,427 - You push power to the engines. Pull back on the yoke. 760 00:39:07,552 --> 00:39:09,804 - Start bringing the nose back up. 761 00:39:12,974 --> 00:39:14,934 - Your number two engine surges. 762 00:39:23,735 --> 00:39:26,530 - That's number two engine. - Pull it back. 763 00:39:28,407 --> 00:39:30,701 - Now you're dealing with a roll. 764 00:39:37,083 --> 00:39:39,210 The plane's banking left and right. 765 00:39:39,293 --> 00:39:40,920 You're applying rudder. 766 00:39:41,045 --> 00:39:42,295 - Rudder. - Got it. 767 00:39:42,420 --> 00:39:44,715 - Rudder. Rudder. - Got it. 768 00:39:45,423 --> 00:39:46,925 - You got ATC in your ear 769 00:39:47,050 --> 00:39:48,385 telling you to switch frequencies. 770 00:39:48,469 --> 00:39:52,222 - 8-2-7, change to Indianapolis 128 point four. 771 00:39:53,264 --> 00:39:55,351 - You look outside. What do you see? 772 00:39:56,184 --> 00:39:57,311 - Nothing. 773 00:40:01,273 --> 00:40:04,068 - Right, because it's pitch black out, 774 00:40:04,150 --> 00:40:05,443 and you're in the clouds. 775 00:40:05,568 --> 00:40:06,612 There's no visible horizon. 776 00:40:06,737 --> 00:40:08,739 You're just flying on instruments. 777 00:40:08,864 --> 00:40:11,909 - They had no visual cues. - Exactly. 778 00:40:12,742 --> 00:40:15,579 - You're now removing the visual aspect 779 00:40:15,704 --> 00:40:19,166 of a horizon out there that can help anchor you. 780 00:40:19,291 --> 00:40:21,293 You're just stacking the deck against yourself. 781 00:40:21,418 --> 00:40:23,420 - Now, the question is, 782 00:40:23,545 --> 00:40:26,172 what were they doing flying a stall series test at night 783 00:40:26,297 --> 00:40:27,715 in the first place? 784 00:40:29,467 --> 00:40:32,554 - Investigators review the flight's dispatch logs 785 00:40:32,637 --> 00:40:36,182 to retrace the pilots' steps on the day of the accident. 786 00:40:36,976 --> 00:40:39,769 - The FEF was scheduled for 1:20 p.m., 787 00:40:39,894 --> 00:40:42,565 but the maintenance delays pushed it past sundown. 788 00:40:42,648 --> 00:40:44,108 Had they just pushed it to the next day, 789 00:40:44,190 --> 00:40:45,775 none of this would have happened. 790 00:40:45,900 --> 00:40:47,610 - So why didn't they? 791 00:40:47,695 --> 00:40:50,072 Why go through with the FEF at night? 792 00:40:52,324 --> 00:40:54,577 - Alright. 793 00:40:56,327 --> 00:40:59,456 - One of the key decisions was to conduct the check flight 794 00:40:59,539 --> 00:41:01,125 later at night than they'd planned 795 00:41:01,250 --> 00:41:03,460 in the darkness hours. And so, you know, 796 00:41:03,585 --> 00:41:05,336 did anyone pressure them into doing that? 797 00:41:06,045 --> 00:41:09,717 - What was the ABX policy on when to fly an FEF? 798 00:41:09,842 --> 00:41:12,677 - Investigators return to ABX's Director 799 00:41:12,802 --> 00:41:14,554 of Flight Technical Programs 800 00:41:14,679 --> 00:41:18,726 to find out why the pilots proceeded with an FEF at night. 801 00:41:20,186 --> 00:41:21,978 - No policy, necessarily. 802 00:41:22,103 --> 00:41:24,648 Just a preference to fly them during the day. 803 00:41:24,731 --> 00:41:26,483 - Do ABX pilots understand the risks 804 00:41:26,567 --> 00:41:28,402 of flying an FEF at night? - Sure, 805 00:41:28,527 --> 00:41:30,905 and I'd rather they conduct them during the day, 806 00:41:31,030 --> 00:41:34,492 but there's no prohibition against doing them at night. 807 00:41:34,617 --> 00:41:36,242 - And what are the recommended weather conditions 808 00:41:36,367 --> 00:41:37,619 for flying an FEF? 809 00:41:37,702 --> 00:41:39,954 - Preference is to fly in clear skies 810 00:41:40,039 --> 00:41:41,498 and not on instrument, 811 00:41:41,623 --> 00:41:44,876 but we have no specific restrictions on that. 812 00:41:46,628 --> 00:41:49,923 - We discovered that there was no written policy 813 00:41:50,048 --> 00:41:53,427 prohibiting this flight from being conducted at night. 814 00:41:53,552 --> 00:41:55,679 - The NTSB's investigation 815 00:41:55,804 --> 00:41:57,764 has uncovered numerous factors 816 00:41:57,889 --> 00:42:01,059 that led to the crash of Flight 8-2-7. 817 00:42:02,228 --> 00:42:03,686 - Stick shaker malfunction, 818 00:42:03,771 --> 00:42:06,440 incorrect stall procedure, 819 00:42:06,565 --> 00:42:08,358 negative simulator training, 820 00:42:08,483 --> 00:42:10,068 FEF at night. 821 00:42:11,445 --> 00:42:13,697 Had just one of these factors not been present, 822 00:42:13,780 --> 00:42:16,074 the crew would likely have survived. 823 00:42:18,952 --> 00:42:22,289 - I think this accident was caused by a failure 824 00:42:22,414 --> 00:42:25,000 to recognize that a functional evaluation flight 825 00:42:25,083 --> 00:42:27,335 requires rigorous preparation 826 00:42:27,418 --> 00:42:31,382 and criteria and controls to be placed on it 827 00:42:31,465 --> 00:42:34,842 to protect the pilots who are flying it. 828 00:42:34,927 --> 00:42:37,221 - Start bringing the nose back up. 829 00:42:37,846 --> 00:42:39,931 - This was not God reaching down 830 00:42:40,056 --> 00:42:42,226 and slapping an airplane out of the sky. 831 00:42:42,351 --> 00:42:44,311 There were reasons for this happening, 832 00:42:44,436 --> 00:42:46,646 and this could have been avoided. 833 00:42:47,606 --> 00:42:50,525 - In the wake of the crash of Flight 8-2-7, 834 00:42:50,608 --> 00:42:53,612 the NTSB makes a series of recommendations 835 00:42:53,737 --> 00:42:56,699 to make Functional Evaluation Flights safer, 836 00:42:56,782 --> 00:43:00,577 and to better prepare pilots for stall conditions. 837 00:43:01,452 --> 00:43:04,123 - This accident brought a lot of significant 838 00:43:04,248 --> 00:43:05,833 changes to the industry. 839 00:43:07,041 --> 00:43:09,878 - We issued recommendations to try to improve 840 00:43:09,961 --> 00:43:12,755 airline oversight and FAA oversight 841 00:43:12,840 --> 00:43:15,675 of functional evaluation programs. 842 00:43:15,800 --> 00:43:19,429 And those efforts were successful. 843 00:43:20,014 --> 00:43:22,432 - Flight simulators used for airline training 844 00:43:22,557 --> 00:43:25,476 were made much more realistic. 845 00:43:25,603 --> 00:43:27,563 Every airline pilot 846 00:43:27,646 --> 00:43:30,440 receives training in recovering the airplane 847 00:43:30,523 --> 00:43:32,525 from a high-altitude stall 848 00:43:32,650 --> 00:43:35,820 where they have to use this Airborne Express 849 00:43:35,945 --> 00:43:39,949 revised stall recovery procedure to get the job done. 850 00:43:40,492 --> 00:43:42,744 - The report also recommends a revision 851 00:43:42,827 --> 00:43:45,204 to the DC-8 maintenance manual 852 00:43:45,331 --> 00:43:47,041 calling for regular calibration 853 00:43:47,166 --> 00:43:50,628 and testing of the complete stall warning system. 854 00:43:50,710 --> 00:43:52,545 - There might have been other airplanes out there, 855 00:43:52,670 --> 00:43:54,922 you know, flying around in service 856 00:43:55,007 --> 00:43:57,967 where the stall warning system really wasn't working. 857 00:43:58,052 --> 00:44:00,971 It's a sobering thought, and a significant one. 858 00:44:04,557 --> 00:44:06,559 - The strength of aviation safety 859 00:44:06,684 --> 00:44:09,605 is a direct result of learning the most we can learn 860 00:44:09,688 --> 00:44:11,481 from every single accident. 861 00:44:11,606 --> 00:44:13,192 This wasn't an accident in vain. 862 00:44:13,317 --> 00:44:14,485 Yes, it could have been prevented, 863 00:44:14,568 --> 00:44:16,487 but now, we know how. 864 00:44:22,201 --> 00:44:23,827 Subtitling: difuze 65411

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