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00:00:20,394 --> 00:00:22,771
A horrific
collision in the skies
2
00:00:22,896 --> 00:00:24,690
above southern Germany...
3
00:00:26,067 --> 00:00:28,902
...is witnessed by people
on the ground.
4
00:00:39,747 --> 00:00:42,375
- 71 people are dead.
5
00:00:44,627 --> 00:00:47,171
We as accident
investigators did not
6
00:00:47,296 --> 00:00:51,134
have an idea of what
exactly happened.
7
00:00:52,801 --> 00:00:53,927
- It doesn't make sense.
8
00:00:54,094 --> 00:00:57,057
- The radar data only
deepens the mystery.
9
00:00:57,182 --> 00:00:59,225
- Neither one is trying
to get out of the way.
10
00:00:59,392 --> 00:01:01,351
- I just gotta use
the facilities.
11
00:01:01,478 --> 00:01:04,147
- Descend? Really?
We're going to descend?
12
00:01:04,272 --> 00:01:05,899
Expedite decent.
13
00:01:06,024 --> 00:01:07,400
To solve
the mystery,
14
00:01:07,566 --> 00:01:10,569
investigators will need
to disentangle a web
15
00:01:10,736 --> 00:01:12,572
of critical radio transmissions.
16
00:01:12,697 --> 00:01:14,615
The controller
is guiding us down.
17
00:01:14,783 --> 00:01:16,992
A lot of things
had to fall into place
18
00:01:17,117 --> 00:01:19,245
just the wrong way
for this to occur.
19
00:01:19,412 --> 00:01:20,914
It really woke
a lot of people up.
20
00:01:22,456 --> 00:01:24,375
- Mayday, Mayday.
21
00:01:26,795 --> 00:01:28,587
Pull up!
22
00:01:44,394 --> 00:01:47,231
It's 11 p.m.
in Switzerland,
23
00:01:47,356 --> 00:01:51,277
and airports across the region
are closing down for the night.
24
00:01:56,990 --> 00:01:58,367
- You're off?
25
00:01:58,992 --> 00:02:00,411
See you in a few hours.
26
00:02:00,537 --> 00:02:03,748
- In the Skyguide
Control Center in Zurich...
27
00:02:03,873 --> 00:02:06,459
- Thai Inter 9-3-3,
proceed to ALGOI.
28
00:02:06,626 --> 00:02:10,629
Copy, proceed
to ALGOI, Thai Inter 9-3-3.
29
00:02:10,796 --> 00:02:13,133
...Air Traffic
Controller Peter Nielsen
30
00:02:13,299 --> 00:02:15,300
is working the night shift.
31
00:02:15,425 --> 00:02:18,513
- Bavarian 3-0-5,
descend flight level 2-2-0.
32
00:02:20,389 --> 00:02:23,143
- He's been on the clock
for just over three hours,
33
00:02:23,308 --> 00:02:25,645
and has six more to go.
34
00:02:28,605 --> 00:02:31,693
Tom Laursen is a former
Skyguide controller
35
00:02:31,860 --> 00:02:33,777
who worked with Peter Nielsen.
36
00:02:36,364 --> 00:02:38,699
The night shift
in Zurich at the time
37
00:02:38,866 --> 00:02:40,868
had quite a lot of traffic,
38
00:02:41,034 --> 00:02:42,912
but around 11:30-12 o'clock,
39
00:02:43,037 --> 00:02:45,497
it reduced to five to seven
aircrafts an hour,
40
00:02:45,664 --> 00:02:48,877
and it was possible
to do it alone.
41
00:02:49,043 --> 00:02:52,129
- Topswiss 9-3-5,
proceed direct to TORPA.
42
00:02:52,254 --> 00:02:55,842
Direct to TORPA,
Topswiss 9-3-5, thank you.
43
00:02:56,758 --> 00:02:59,012
Nielsen manages
the safe transit
44
00:02:59,137 --> 00:03:01,639
of all aircraft in his airspace.
45
00:03:02,223 --> 00:03:04,850
- For further instruction,
contact Padua 1-2-0
46
00:03:05,018 --> 00:03:07,103
decimal 7-2, bye-bye.
47
00:03:09,229 --> 00:03:11,399
- Air traffic control
is one of the most stressful
48
00:03:11,566 --> 00:03:14,193
jobs in the world.
And a lot of it does hinge
49
00:03:14,318 --> 00:03:16,945
on decisions made by one person.
50
00:03:17,697 --> 00:03:19,866
Ah,
Swiss Radar, good evening,
51
00:03:20,032 --> 00:03:21,825
DILMUN 6-1-1.
52
00:03:21,950 --> 00:03:25,663
Nielsen hears from
another plane in his airspace.
53
00:03:26,538 --> 00:03:30,460
- Just leveling
at flight level 2-6-0.
54
00:03:31,419 --> 00:03:33,712
- DILMUN 6-1-1 is the call sign
55
00:03:33,879 --> 00:03:37,758
for a Boeing cargo jet
owned by the courier, DHL.
56
00:03:39,676 --> 00:03:42,055
It departed from Bergamo,
Italy,
57
00:03:42,222 --> 00:03:45,265
and is flying through
Swiss then German airspace,
58
00:03:45,432 --> 00:03:47,852
on its way to Brussels, Belgium.
59
00:03:49,395 --> 00:03:52,731
- DILMUN 6-1-1, squawk 7-5-2-4.
60
00:03:52,856 --> 00:03:54,525
- 7-5-2-4,
61
00:03:54,651 --> 00:03:55,818
6-1-1.
62
00:03:58,111 --> 00:03:59,739
- DILMUN 6-1-1,
63
00:03:59,864 --> 00:04:02,574
climb flight level 3-2-0.
64
00:04:03,825 --> 00:04:05,954
Nielsen clears
the flight to climb
65
00:04:06,120 --> 00:04:07,413
to a higher altitude.
66
00:04:07,538 --> 00:04:09,748
- Roger, climb flight level
3-2-0,
67
00:04:09,915 --> 00:04:13,669
and requesting 3-6-0,
thanks, if it's available.
68
00:04:15,212 --> 00:04:17,464
Pilots ask
for the most efficient
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00:04:17,632 --> 00:04:19,591
flight level
that they can fly at,
70
00:04:19,716 --> 00:04:24,973
and in this case 36,000 feet
is much more fuel efficient.
71
00:04:25,139 --> 00:04:28,600
- DILMUN 6-1-1,
climb flight level 3-6-0.
72
00:04:29,726 --> 00:04:34,148
- Climb flight level 3-6-0,
DILMUN 6-1-1.
73
00:04:38,278 --> 00:04:42,656
- Nielsen clears Flight 6-1-1
to 36,000 feet
74
00:04:42,824 --> 00:04:44,742
and tracks the change.
75
00:04:47,327 --> 00:04:51,874
You use flight strips
to plan the traffic ahead.
76
00:04:52,000 --> 00:04:54,293
With the strips
and flight screen,
77
00:04:54,418 --> 00:04:57,129
we have a good picture
of what is going to happen.
78
00:04:59,923 --> 00:05:04,595
- But at 11:30, Nielsen's night
shift takes a turn.
79
00:05:05,555 --> 00:05:08,682
Zurich, good evening,
Bravo Tango Charlie--
80
00:05:08,850 --> 00:05:13,312
Zurich,
hello, Aero Lloyd 1-1-3-5.
81
00:05:13,437 --> 00:05:15,982
Two transmissions
come in together,
82
00:05:16,149 --> 00:05:19,110
one at the workstation
beside him.
83
00:05:20,819 --> 00:05:25,408
There's an Airbus on approach
to Friedrichshafen,
84
00:05:25,533 --> 00:05:28,326
and another plane flying
at a higher altitude,
85
00:05:28,494 --> 00:05:30,329
in the "upper sector".
86
00:05:31,122 --> 00:05:33,750
Aero Lloyd 1-1-3-5,
87
00:05:33,875 --> 00:05:36,502
descending flight level 8-0.
88
00:05:36,668 --> 00:05:40,673
- Nielson briefly responds
to the Airbus now on approach.
89
00:05:40,839 --> 00:05:45,218
- Aero Lloyd 1-1-3-5,
roger, ah, call you back.
90
00:05:48,139 --> 00:05:50,391
- He needs to identify
the aircraft
91
00:05:50,557 --> 00:05:52,810
now entering the upper sector.
92
00:05:53,560 --> 00:05:56,189
- Station calling,
say again, please.
93
00:05:56,355 --> 00:05:59,192
Ah, Zurich,
good evening.
94
00:06:00,567 --> 00:06:05,531
- The aircraft is a Bashkirian
Airlines Tupolev 1-54.
95
00:06:08,576 --> 00:06:11,329
The Russian plane
is slightly ahead of schedule,
96
00:06:11,454 --> 00:06:14,290
crossing from Moscow
to Barcelona.
97
00:06:15,375 --> 00:06:18,086
- Bravo Tango Charlie 2-9-3-7,
98
00:06:18,252 --> 00:06:20,670
level 3-6-0.
99
00:06:25,593 --> 00:06:28,053
- 40-year-old Oleg Grigoriev
100
00:06:28,178 --> 00:06:31,307
is Bashkirian Airlines'
Chief Pilot.
101
00:06:31,432 --> 00:06:34,851
Tonight, he's evaluating
the 52-year-old captain,
102
00:06:34,976 --> 00:06:36,312
Alexander Gross,
103
00:06:36,437 --> 00:06:39,232
who has more than 10 years
flying experience,
104
00:06:39,399 --> 00:06:42,651
but has flown to Barcelona
only once before.
105
00:06:42,776 --> 00:06:44,528
- Smooth enough for you?
106
00:06:44,653 --> 00:06:45,654
- So far.
107
00:06:49,158 --> 00:06:51,411
- It's a bit bumpy back here.
108
00:06:51,576 --> 00:06:53,870
- First Officer, Murat Itkulov,
109
00:06:53,995 --> 00:06:57,791
41, is the captain's second
pair of eyes.
110
00:06:57,959 --> 00:07:00,293
- Then you better
tighten your belt, huh?
111
00:07:05,632 --> 00:07:08,427
- The flight is carrying
a group of students
112
00:07:08,593 --> 00:07:11,764
and some of their parents
on a school trip to Spain.
113
00:07:17,144 --> 00:07:21,274
As Nielsen gives the Tupolev
crew their transponder code...
114
00:07:21,439 --> 00:07:24,110
- Bravo Tango Charlie 2-9-3-7,
squawk, ah--
115
00:07:24,276 --> 00:07:25,819
7-5-2-0.
116
00:07:25,987 --> 00:07:27,779
...inbound,
the final approach fix
117
00:07:27,904 --> 00:07:30,074
for I-L-S--
...the Airbus crew
118
00:07:30,199 --> 00:07:33,161
on approach tries to confirm
their landing instructions.
119
00:07:33,326 --> 00:07:35,663
- Yes, I expect so,
call you back shortly.
120
00:07:40,041 --> 00:07:44,463
Aero Lloyd
1-1-3-5, request lower.
121
00:07:48,050 --> 00:07:51,052
- Aero Lloyd 1-1-3-5,
descend flight level 7-0.
122
00:07:51,178 --> 00:07:56,850
- Descending flight level 7-0,
Aero Lloyd 1-1-3-5.
123
00:07:57,017 --> 00:08:00,187
- As the Airbus gets closer
to Friedrichshafen,
124
00:08:00,353 --> 00:08:02,398
Nielsen calls
the Tower Controller
125
00:08:02,523 --> 00:08:03,983
to hand off the aircraft.
126
00:08:04,149 --> 00:08:06,485
The desired
connection is not possible.
127
00:08:06,610 --> 00:08:08,321
- But he can't get through.
128
00:08:09,029 --> 00:08:11,656
- Find me the number
for Friedrichshafen Tower.
129
00:08:19,790 --> 00:08:21,000
He tries again.
130
00:08:21,125 --> 00:08:24,002
The desired
connection is not possible.
131
00:08:24,127 --> 00:08:26,672
Please check the number.
- This isn't working either.
132
00:08:28,841 --> 00:08:30,759
Aero Lloyd 1-1-3-5?
133
00:08:30,884 --> 00:08:34,221
Aero Lloyd
1-1-3-5, go ahead, sir.
134
00:08:34,388 --> 00:08:36,224
- I lost my phone connection
to Friedrichshafen.
135
00:08:36,389 --> 00:08:39,559
Can you please call them
on 1-2-4 decimal 3-5
136
00:08:39,726 --> 00:08:42,812
and tell them you're coming
I-L-S 2-4 with 20 miles now?
137
00:08:42,938 --> 00:08:44,774
Okay, will do.
138
00:08:44,899 --> 00:08:46,399
- Thank you.
139
00:08:48,193 --> 00:08:51,113
With the approaching
Airbus handed off,
140
00:08:51,239 --> 00:08:53,658
Nielsen returns
to his other aircraft,
141
00:08:53,783 --> 00:08:57,745
the Tupolev passenger jet
that's westbound to Barcelona...
142
00:08:58,828 --> 00:09:03,458
...and the Boeing cargo jet,
northbound to Luxembourg.
143
00:09:07,421 --> 00:09:09,798
Nielsen notices that
both planes are moving
144
00:09:09,923 --> 00:09:13,385
toward each other
at 36,000 feet.
145
00:09:14,470 --> 00:09:16,764
- Controllers will react.
146
00:09:16,931 --> 00:09:19,767
They will do something
to separate aircraft.
147
00:09:21,226 --> 00:09:25,355
- Nielsen realises the Tupolev
is soon scheduled to descend
148
00:09:25,480 --> 00:09:27,232
to 35,000 feet.
149
00:09:27,399 --> 00:09:29,277
- Bravo Tango Charlie 2-9-3-7,
150
00:09:29,442 --> 00:09:32,738
descend flight level, 3-5-0,
expedite,
151
00:09:32,904 --> 00:09:34,740
I have crossing traffic.
152
00:09:36,325 --> 00:09:39,370
- Descending an aircraft
is an automatic response
153
00:09:39,495 --> 00:09:41,330
for air traffic controllers,
154
00:09:41,455 --> 00:09:44,457
because descending
is a lot easier than climbing.
155
00:09:44,625 --> 00:09:48,629
It's the easiest way
to solve a conflict.
156
00:09:49,046 --> 00:09:51,090
- Bravo Tango Charlie 2-9-3-7,
157
00:09:51,215 --> 00:09:54,467
descend level 3-5-0,
expedite descent.
158
00:09:54,634 --> 00:09:57,429
Expedite descent
to level 3-5-0...
159
00:09:57,554 --> 00:09:58,681
...Lloyd,
160
00:09:58,806 --> 00:10:00,932
- 1-1-3-5.
- ...2-9-3-7.
161
00:10:02,143 --> 00:10:06,105
- Yes. We have traffic
in your position now at 3-6-0.
162
00:10:07,898 --> 00:10:10,942
Zurich?
From the Aero Lloyd 1-1-3-5.
163
00:10:11,110 --> 00:10:13,028
- Yes, go ahead.
164
00:10:13,153 --> 00:10:16,615
- We've made contact with
Friedrichshafen airport.
165
00:10:16,740 --> 00:10:18,116
But then...
166
00:10:19,619 --> 00:10:22,495
...as the Aero Lloyd
flight signs off...
167
00:10:27,043 --> 00:10:28,126
- Affirm, bye-bye.
168
00:10:28,293 --> 00:10:29,461
Bye-bye.
169
00:10:34,508 --> 00:10:38,763
- The Boeing has disappeared
from the controller's screen.
170
00:10:39,388 --> 00:10:43,142
And the Tupolev's radar signal
is lost.
171
00:10:51,817 --> 00:10:53,943
- Bravo Tango Charlie 2-9-3-7?
172
00:10:54,736 --> 00:10:56,947
Air traffic
controller Peter Nielsen
173
00:10:57,072 --> 00:11:01,534
has lost contact with two planes
flying over southern Germany.
174
00:11:03,370 --> 00:11:05,873
- Bravo Tango Charlie 2-9-3-7?
175
00:11:09,335 --> 00:11:11,044
He called
the aircrafts
176
00:11:11,211 --> 00:11:13,172
and got no response.
177
00:11:25,643 --> 00:11:29,187
He must have understood
that it was a collision.
178
00:11:45,788 --> 00:11:48,124
Near the town
of Uberlingen,
179
00:11:48,249 --> 00:11:51,711
people watch as fireballs
fall out of the sky.
180
00:11:59,592 --> 00:12:03,681
Huge sections of both planes
have crashed to the ground.
181
00:12:07,725 --> 00:12:10,479
There is no shortage
of witnesses.
182
00:12:30,582 --> 00:12:34,169
- First responders are on site
within minutes.
183
00:12:34,294 --> 00:12:37,047
And by dawn,
crash investigators
184
00:12:37,173 --> 00:12:39,091
from Germany's Federal Bureau
185
00:12:39,216 --> 00:12:41,134
of Aircraft
Accident Investigation,
186
00:12:41,302 --> 00:12:43,596
the BFU, are there too.
187
00:12:46,139 --> 00:12:49,393
- At the accident site,
you just document
188
00:12:49,518 --> 00:12:53,272
what the wreckage tells you.
189
00:12:56,484 --> 00:12:58,360
- The wreckage of the Tupolev
190
00:12:58,485 --> 00:13:01,447
is spread over
four distinct areas.
191
00:13:05,116 --> 00:13:07,620
- There would be maybe
a hundred meters
192
00:13:07,787 --> 00:13:09,288
between some parts.
193
00:13:09,455 --> 00:13:11,581
So it clearly indicates
that there must have been
194
00:13:11,706 --> 00:13:14,250
an in-flight break-up
of the Tupolev.
195
00:13:16,921 --> 00:13:19,298
- Most of the Boeing is found
in a forest
196
00:13:19,465 --> 00:13:22,091
outside the village
of Taisersdorf,
197
00:13:22,217 --> 00:13:24,595
but one section is missing.
198
00:13:26,471 --> 00:13:28,682
The only part
of the Boeing that was missing
199
00:13:28,849 --> 00:13:30,225
was the vertical tail,
200
00:13:30,350 --> 00:13:33,102
and this later has been
found together
201
00:13:33,229 --> 00:13:35,773
with parts from the Tupolev,
202
00:13:35,898 --> 00:13:37,607
indicating that the collision
203
00:13:37,732 --> 00:13:40,360
took place between
the two aircraft.
204
00:13:45,448 --> 00:13:47,784
- Seventy-one people are dead.
205
00:13:50,328 --> 00:13:52,413
Forty-five of them
are Russian students
206
00:13:52,539 --> 00:13:54,707
from the city of Ufa.
207
00:14:11,015 --> 00:14:14,227
Investigators soon recover
much of the wreckage,
208
00:14:14,394 --> 00:14:17,480
including the black boxes
from both planes.
209
00:14:21,235 --> 00:14:23,320
- Hey. Over here.
210
00:14:23,821 --> 00:14:26,740
- But before they get readouts
from the black boxes,
211
00:14:26,907 --> 00:14:30,494
investigators start
to reconstruct the collision.
212
00:14:33,163 --> 00:14:35,331
- So, this piece is interesting.
213
00:14:37,083 --> 00:14:39,294
- We as accident investigators
214
00:14:39,419 --> 00:14:41,504
did not have an idea
215
00:14:41,629 --> 00:14:46,051
about the details
of what exactly happened.
216
00:14:46,594 --> 00:14:49,846
- This red paint could have come
from the Boeing.
217
00:14:49,971 --> 00:14:51,389
- Mm-hmm.
218
00:14:51,514 --> 00:14:53,475
- And then over here...
219
00:14:54,601 --> 00:14:56,769
The main issue
is to understand
220
00:14:56,937 --> 00:15:00,231
which aircraft part collide
with the other one,
221
00:15:00,399 --> 00:15:04,485
and which came from
the impact to the ground.
222
00:15:07,239 --> 00:15:09,741
- Okay. So, I've marked
all the areas
223
00:15:09,866 --> 00:15:11,909
where the red paint
from the Boeing
224
00:15:12,076 --> 00:15:14,203
transferred onto the Tupolev.
225
00:15:14,330 --> 00:15:18,082
And we even found
part of the Boeing's rudder
226
00:15:18,250 --> 00:15:20,628
imbedded in the Tupolev
right here.
227
00:15:23,129 --> 00:15:27,884
- The only way
this could have happened
228
00:15:28,009 --> 00:15:31,471
is if the Tupolev
229
00:15:31,639 --> 00:15:34,099
flew straight into the Boeing,
230
00:15:34,224 --> 00:15:37,519
like... this.
231
00:15:48,322 --> 00:15:50,658
- The question is,
how can it happen
232
00:15:50,823 --> 00:15:54,327
that two planes
are at the same place
233
00:15:54,495 --> 00:15:56,080
at the same time?
234
00:16:00,750 --> 00:16:02,126
- Thank you.
235
00:16:03,671 --> 00:16:07,341
Okay. So, we've compiled
all of the radar data
236
00:16:07,508 --> 00:16:08,966
from air traffic control.
237
00:16:09,134 --> 00:16:11,845
- Okay, let's see what happened.
238
00:16:14,847 --> 00:16:18,476
- Both planes are cruising
at 36,000 feet.
239
00:16:20,520 --> 00:16:22,480
They both start descending.
240
00:16:22,648 --> 00:16:24,942
- At exactly the same time.
241
00:16:27,820 --> 00:16:30,614
- Neither one is trying
to get out of the way.
242
00:16:35,535 --> 00:16:38,038
- Ninety degrees
at the same altitude
243
00:16:38,205 --> 00:16:39,498
is about as simple as it comes.
244
00:16:39,623 --> 00:16:43,168
A turn, a descent of one,
a climb of one.
245
00:16:43,335 --> 00:16:45,504
So, how did we get
to this point?
246
00:16:47,548 --> 00:16:49,549
- It doesn't make sense.
247
00:16:49,716 --> 00:16:53,345
Why would both planes descend?
248
00:16:57,307 --> 00:16:58,892
- We all were of the opinion
249
00:16:59,058 --> 00:17:02,187
that the air traffic
control system in Europe
250
00:17:02,312 --> 00:17:03,855
would be very, very safe.
251
00:17:05,356 --> 00:17:07,608
So it was really hard
to understand
252
00:17:07,734 --> 00:17:10,738
that an accident like this
could occur.
253
00:17:12,239 --> 00:17:13,615
- Let's explore this.
254
00:17:13,740 --> 00:17:15,742
- I'll get the weather data.
255
00:17:17,452 --> 00:17:19,579
The basic
way for pilots
256
00:17:19,747 --> 00:17:22,915
to avoid collisions is called
"see and avoid."
257
00:17:23,875 --> 00:17:25,294
The pilots look out the window,
258
00:17:25,419 --> 00:17:29,631
see the other aircraft,
and don't collide.
259
00:17:30,423 --> 00:17:32,425
- It was a clear night.
260
00:17:33,676 --> 00:17:36,221
No moon at the time
of the collision.
261
00:17:36,971 --> 00:17:39,557
The sky
was pitch-black .
262
00:17:40,642 --> 00:17:42,227
- Even with anti-collision
lights,
263
00:17:42,394 --> 00:17:45,689
judging altitude and distance
would have been impossible.
264
00:17:50,443 --> 00:17:52,488
For jets operating
at high altitudes,
265
00:17:52,613 --> 00:17:55,574
moving at seven miles a minute,
266
00:17:55,699 --> 00:17:58,410
finding some little dot
even in a clear sky
267
00:17:58,576 --> 00:18:00,578
is nearly impossible.
268
00:18:01,329 --> 00:18:04,583
- So, we can eliminate that.
269
00:18:05,500 --> 00:18:07,419
What about ATC separation?
270
00:18:07,586 --> 00:18:09,421
Can we interview
the controller yet?
271
00:18:09,546 --> 00:18:11,173
- We're making arrangements
to speak with him
272
00:18:11,298 --> 00:18:12,633
about the accident.
273
00:18:12,799 --> 00:18:15,844
- Where are we at with
the T-CAS recovery?
274
00:18:15,969 --> 00:18:17,471
- I'll check.
275
00:18:21,724 --> 00:18:22,934
The T-CAS,
276
00:18:23,102 --> 00:18:25,520
or Traffic Collision
Avoidance System,
277
00:18:25,645 --> 00:18:27,689
uses transponders
on the aircraft
278
00:18:27,815 --> 00:18:30,651
to transmit a plane's location
to others.
279
00:18:30,817 --> 00:18:33,444
If two aircraft appear
to be on a collision course...
280
00:18:33,612 --> 00:18:35,279
Traffic. Traffic.
281
00:18:35,446 --> 00:18:36,781
- ...an alarm sounds,
282
00:18:36,906 --> 00:18:39,201
warning pilots to change course.
283
00:18:40,326 --> 00:18:44,123
- T-CAS is intended for
when we need a last-ditch effort
284
00:18:44,288 --> 00:18:46,916
to just keep them
from hitting.
285
00:18:49,169 --> 00:18:50,837
- Yeah. Thank you.
286
00:18:53,339 --> 00:18:54,674
We got the Tupolev's T-CAS,
287
00:18:54,842 --> 00:18:57,760
but no luck on the Boeing.
It's too damaged.
288
00:19:03,307 --> 00:19:04,934
- The major question for us:
289
00:19:05,059 --> 00:19:08,730
Did the T-CAS computer
work as per design?
290
00:19:09,856 --> 00:19:14,987
The T-CAS computer of the Boeing
was destroyed completely.
291
00:19:15,112 --> 00:19:16,571
And that was a problem.
292
00:19:18,365 --> 00:19:20,491
- If T-CAS is at fault,
293
00:19:20,616 --> 00:19:21,826
it could threaten the safety
294
00:19:21,993 --> 00:19:28,625
of air travel
throughout the world.
295
00:19:28,750 --> 00:19:31,170
Investigators
looking into the Uberlingen
296
00:19:31,295 --> 00:19:34,006
mid-air collision
examine the T-CAS data
297
00:19:34,173 --> 00:19:35,923
from the Tupolev plane
298
00:19:36,048 --> 00:19:38,719
to determine
if it was working properly.
299
00:19:42,597 --> 00:19:44,682
- Wait a sec...
300
00:19:48,686 --> 00:19:51,606
The Tupolev's T-CAS
recorded data for both planes.
301
00:19:54,984 --> 00:19:59,405
- There's an identical
set of files for both flights.
302
00:20:00,324 --> 00:20:03,035
- That was a big moment in
the course of the investigation,
303
00:20:03,160 --> 00:20:05,662
and we were very
happy about that.
304
00:20:08,915 --> 00:20:12,419
- Investigators compare
the T-CAS altitude data
305
00:20:12,586 --> 00:20:15,713
with the radar data
from both planes.
306
00:20:17,633 --> 00:20:20,093
- The altitudes
match perfectly.
307
00:20:20,259 --> 00:20:23,430
- What instruction did T-CAS
give each plane?
308
00:20:24,431 --> 00:20:26,223
Start with the Boeing.
309
00:20:27,558 --> 00:20:29,894
- Did T-CAS provide
each aircraft
310
00:20:30,019 --> 00:20:33,230
with the proper instructions
to avoid each other?
311
00:20:36,359 --> 00:20:38,237
- It told them to descend.
312
00:20:38,945 --> 00:20:40,905
- Which the Boeing did.
313
00:20:42,950 --> 00:20:44,742
Now the Tupolev.
314
00:20:48,704 --> 00:20:51,708
- Investigators discover
that T-CAS correctly
315
00:20:51,833 --> 00:20:55,127
advised the Tupolev
pilots to climb.
316
00:20:55,295 --> 00:20:58,006
- But they descended,
317
00:20:58,131 --> 00:20:59,799
just like the Boeing.
318
00:20:59,967 --> 00:21:04,596
So why didn't they follow
the T-CAS instruction?
319
00:21:09,977 --> 00:21:12,895
T-CAS did
what T-CAS should have done.
320
00:21:14,480 --> 00:21:17,567
If pilots were to follow
the T-CAS instruction,
321
00:21:17,692 --> 00:21:20,487
T-CAS would have prevented
the accident.
322
00:21:21,320 --> 00:21:23,365
- Investigators turn
to the Tupolev's
323
00:21:23,490 --> 00:21:26,326
cockpit voice recording,
or CVR,
324
00:21:26,492 --> 00:21:28,412
to determine why
the Russian crew
325
00:21:28,537 --> 00:21:30,747
disobeyed the T-CAS instruction.
326
00:21:34,209 --> 00:21:36,002
Look here,
327
00:21:36,169 --> 00:21:38,046
on the VSI,
328
00:21:38,171 --> 00:21:40,673
there's a plane
approaching on our left.
329
00:21:43,509 --> 00:21:45,761
- They first became aware
of the Boeing
330
00:21:45,886 --> 00:21:49,266
two-and-a-half minutes
before the collision.
331
00:21:52,810 --> 00:21:55,314
- They're still more
than 25 miles apart.
332
00:21:55,480 --> 00:21:57,982
It's ample time
to avoid the Boeing.
333
00:21:58,107 --> 00:22:00,484
- So why didn't they?
334
00:22:04,489 --> 00:22:06,700
- We have the same altitude.
335
00:22:09,118 --> 00:22:11,579
It's coming towards us.
336
00:22:12,622 --> 00:22:15,916
No,
he has a parallel heading.
337
00:22:20,212 --> 00:22:22,173
- For the next
minute-and-a-half,
338
00:22:22,298 --> 00:22:25,218
the crew discusses
the Boeing's position.
339
00:22:25,384 --> 00:22:27,679
Here, visually...
340
00:22:28,387 --> 00:22:30,891
...this is showing us zero.
341
00:22:31,557 --> 00:22:34,644
- Zero on the T-CAS means
there is no difference
342
00:22:34,769 --> 00:22:38,565
in altitude between them
and the approaching Boeing.
343
00:22:42,152 --> 00:22:46,073
- They seem unsure if the Boeing
is actually a threat.
344
00:22:46,239 --> 00:22:49,366
- Agreed. But T-CAS
should warn them
345
00:22:49,492 --> 00:22:51,912
if the Boeing
is getting too close.
346
00:22:53,997 --> 00:22:55,164
Traffic. Traffic.
347
00:22:55,289 --> 00:22:57,959
- There it is.
Traffic. Traffic!
348
00:22:58,085 --> 00:22:59,419
Traffic!
349
00:22:59,586 --> 00:23:01,505
Traffic. Traffic.
350
00:23:01,630 --> 00:23:03,382
Fifty seconds
before impact,
351
00:23:03,507 --> 00:23:06,050
the T-CAS issues the first
aural warning
352
00:23:06,175 --> 00:23:09,346
when the oncoming plane
is less than 10 miles away
353
00:23:09,471 --> 00:23:11,222
and closing fast.
354
00:23:11,347 --> 00:23:13,557
Traffic. Traffic.
355
00:23:15,018 --> 00:23:17,854
- Moments later, the crew
receives an instruction
356
00:23:17,979 --> 00:23:19,439
from air traffic control.
357
00:23:19,605 --> 00:23:21,441
Bravo Tango Charlie
2-9-3-7,
358
00:23:21,607 --> 00:23:25,278
descend flight level,
3-5-0, expedite.
359
00:23:25,444 --> 00:23:26,613
I have crossing traffic.
360
00:23:26,779 --> 00:23:28,365
- Descend.
361
00:23:29,782 --> 00:23:32,201
Followed by
a different instruction
362
00:23:32,326 --> 00:23:33,412
from T-CAS.
363
00:23:33,577 --> 00:23:35,538
Climb. Climb.
364
00:23:36,080 --> 00:23:38,875
Climb. Climb.
365
00:23:41,336 --> 00:23:43,922
- The crew got
conflicting instructions.
366
00:23:49,385 --> 00:23:52,263
- T-CAS told the crew to climb,
367
00:23:52,431 --> 00:23:54,974
the controller
told them to descend.
368
00:23:55,142 --> 00:23:57,769
- Climb. Climb.
- It says climb.
369
00:23:57,935 --> 00:23:59,770
- The controller
is guiding us down.
370
00:23:59,895 --> 00:24:03,232
- Descend? Really?
We're going to descend?
371
00:24:04,151 --> 00:24:06,736
- The captain follows
the Chief Pilot's command
372
00:24:06,862 --> 00:24:09,489
and puts the plane
into a steep descent.
373
00:24:09,655 --> 00:24:11,866
Bravo Tango Charlie
2-9-3-7,
374
00:24:11,991 --> 00:24:14,786
descend level 3-5-0,
375
00:24:14,952 --> 00:24:16,453
expedite descent.
376
00:24:16,579 --> 00:24:19,332
- Descend level 3-5-0,
377
00:24:19,499 --> 00:24:22,461
Bravo Tango Charlie 2-9-3-7.
378
00:24:23,295 --> 00:24:27,048
Yes, we have traffic
in your position now at 3-6-0.
379
00:24:31,553 --> 00:24:32,679
Moments from disaster,
380
00:24:32,846 --> 00:24:35,265
T-CAS issues a final command.
381
00:24:35,390 --> 00:24:37,017
Increase climb.
382
00:24:37,183 --> 00:24:40,060
Increase climb. Increase climb.
383
00:24:40,186 --> 00:24:42,021
- But it comes too late.
384
00:25:00,332 --> 00:25:03,167
- Well, there we have it.
385
00:25:03,876 --> 00:25:06,671
The Chief Pilot followed
the controller's instruction
386
00:25:06,837 --> 00:25:07,797
to descend,
387
00:25:07,923 --> 00:25:10,759
instead of the T-CAS's
instruction to climb.
388
00:25:20,018 --> 00:25:23,145
Each one of these guys
got T-CAS training.
389
00:25:25,022 --> 00:25:28,609
They should have known that
T-CAS is the final authority.
390
00:25:29,778 --> 00:25:33,698
- So why did the Chief Pilot
listen to the controller
391
00:25:33,865 --> 00:25:35,616
instead of T-CAS?
392
00:25:44,750 --> 00:25:47,586
Investigators
of the Uberlingen disaster
393
00:25:47,753 --> 00:25:51,132
examine the T-CAS training
of the Russian crew
394
00:25:51,258 --> 00:25:54,928
to determine why they followed
the ATC instruction
395
00:25:55,095 --> 00:25:57,055
instead of T-CAS.
396
00:25:57,221 --> 00:26:00,392
- Hey. I think
I found something.
397
00:26:01,226 --> 00:26:04,311
"T-CAS 2000
is intended as a back-up
398
00:26:04,436 --> 00:26:06,146
to visual collision avoidance,
399
00:26:06,272 --> 00:26:07,941
application
of right-of-way rules
400
00:26:08,107 --> 00:26:10,067
and ATC separation services."
401
00:26:10,902 --> 00:26:12,319
- A back-up?
402
00:26:17,200 --> 00:26:18,617
Look at this.
403
00:26:19,661 --> 00:26:22,413
"For the avoidance
of in-flight collisions,
404
00:26:22,538 --> 00:26:27,167
instructions issued by ATC
is the most important tool.
405
00:26:27,294 --> 00:26:31,423
T-CAS is an additional
instrument."
406
00:26:31,588 --> 00:26:35,426
- So, if it comes down
to T-CAS versus ATC,
407
00:26:35,551 --> 00:26:39,806
the Russian pilots go
with the ATC's instructions.
408
00:26:39,972 --> 00:26:41,682
- It seems that way.
409
00:26:43,852 --> 00:26:47,855
- We asked Russian
flight crews and pilots told us,
410
00:26:47,980 --> 00:26:50,150
yes, it's a back-up for ATC,
411
00:26:50,317 --> 00:26:53,278
and so they explained
that the flight crew
412
00:26:53,403 --> 00:26:56,655
of the Tupolev did
what they should have done.
413
00:26:58,407 --> 00:27:03,371
- But the Boeing crew
followed the T-CAS instruction.
414
00:27:04,038 --> 00:27:07,166
Descend. Descend.
415
00:27:08,460 --> 00:27:11,796
- I wonder if they
informed the controller
416
00:27:11,962 --> 00:27:13,632
they were descending.
417
00:27:13,798 --> 00:27:15,549
The final approach fix
418
00:27:15,674 --> 00:27:17,176
for I-L-S runway 2-4.
419
00:27:17,344 --> 00:27:19,220
Did the controller
know the Boeing
420
00:27:19,346 --> 00:27:20,805
was also descending?
421
00:27:20,971 --> 00:27:23,057
- Call you back shortly.
422
00:27:24,224 --> 00:27:27,311
- Let's have a listen
to the cockpit voice recording.
423
00:27:28,438 --> 00:27:30,856
For the flight crews,
there is a clear
424
00:27:31,023 --> 00:27:33,192
operating procedure.
425
00:27:33,359 --> 00:27:36,653
As soon as possible,
they have to report it to ATC.
426
00:27:37,489 --> 00:27:39,490
That was the reason
why we had to listen
427
00:27:39,615 --> 00:27:41,617
to the Boeing cockpit
voice recorder.
428
00:27:41,742 --> 00:27:44,078
Ah, Swiss radar. Good evening.
429
00:27:44,203 --> 00:27:45,829
DILMUN 6-1-1.
430
00:27:46,789 --> 00:27:50,417
DILMUN 6-1-1,
climb flight level 3-6-0.
431
00:27:51,461 --> 00:27:55,464
- Climb flight level 3-6-0,
DILMUN 6-1-1.
432
00:27:56,548 --> 00:27:58,218
- The flight is uneventful,
433
00:27:58,384 --> 00:28:00,761
right up until a minute
before the collision.
434
00:28:01,930 --> 00:28:03,597
First Officer, Brant Campioni,
435
00:28:03,722 --> 00:28:06,768
sees an opportunity
to take a quick break.
436
00:28:08,519 --> 00:28:10,521
- I just gotta use
the facilities.
437
00:28:11,815 --> 00:28:13,232
Handing over.
438
00:28:13,400 --> 00:28:15,652
- Okay, taking over.
439
00:28:18,278 --> 00:28:21,865
- Captain Paul Phillips
takes control of the flight.
440
00:28:23,742 --> 00:28:24,993
- Anything I can get you?
441
00:28:25,119 --> 00:28:27,288
Nah, I'm good.
442
00:28:29,582 --> 00:28:32,460
Traffic. Traffic.
443
00:28:32,585 --> 00:28:33,461
Traffic.
444
00:28:33,586 --> 00:28:36,338
- That's the T-CAS's
first conflict alert.
445
00:28:36,881 --> 00:28:40,259
Descend. Descend.
446
00:28:40,844 --> 00:28:43,680
Descend. Descend.
447
00:28:54,315 --> 00:28:57,067
- Traffic. Right there.
- Yeah.
448
00:28:57,234 --> 00:28:59,570
- Fifty seconds
before the collision,
449
00:28:59,695 --> 00:29:03,157
T-CAS warns the Boeing crew
of the Tupolev's approach.
450
00:29:03,282 --> 00:29:06,661
Increase descent.
Increase descent.
451
00:29:06,786 --> 00:29:09,038
- Increase?
- Increase descent.
452
00:29:09,163 --> 00:29:10,664
Increase descent.
453
00:29:16,378 --> 00:29:17,922
- DILMUN 600...
454
00:29:18,047 --> 00:29:19,590
T-CAS descend.
455
00:29:23,094 --> 00:29:24,261
- No doubt about it.
456
00:29:24,386 --> 00:29:28,391
They informed the ATC
that they were descending.
457
00:29:31,144 --> 00:29:32,895
Let's hear the rest.
458
00:29:37,066 --> 00:29:38,317
Increase descent.
459
00:29:38,484 --> 00:29:40,903
Increase descent.
Increase descent.
460
00:29:41,028 --> 00:29:41,945
- Descend.
461
00:29:42,070 --> 00:29:43,906
Increase descent.
462
00:29:44,031 --> 00:29:46,241
Descend hard!
463
00:29:46,366 --> 00:29:48,243
Increase descent.
464
00:30:11,768 --> 00:30:15,730
- Okay. So the Boeing crew
did nothing wrong.
465
00:30:15,855 --> 00:30:20,026
They followed T-CAS
and informed the controller.
466
00:30:20,192 --> 00:30:26,657
- But the controller instructs
the Tupolev to descend twice,
467
00:30:26,825 --> 00:30:29,868
warns them about
the crossing traffic,
468
00:30:31,871 --> 00:30:33,623
and then immediately,
469
00:30:33,748 --> 00:30:36,084
the Boeing reports
it's descending.
470
00:30:36,835 --> 00:30:39,671
- He's still got two planes
on a collision course.
471
00:30:39,836 --> 00:30:41,838
- He's already been talking
to the Tupolev crew,
472
00:30:41,964 --> 00:30:46,553
so why didn't he just tell them
to change course and climb?
473
00:30:49,263 --> 00:30:52,851
If the controller
knew the Boeing was descending,
474
00:30:52,976 --> 00:30:56,520
why did he let the Tupolev
also descend?
475
00:30:58,815 --> 00:31:00,650
- A major part
of the investigation
476
00:31:00,775 --> 00:31:04,278
was to identify
what the controller did
477
00:31:04,403 --> 00:31:06,865
and how he did perform his job.
478
00:31:07,865 --> 00:31:09,951
- Did Peter Neilson's actions
479
00:31:10,076 --> 00:31:13,371
play a role in the Uberlingen
mid-air collision?
480
00:31:13,538 --> 00:31:16,875
- Bravo Tango Charlie 2-9-3-7,
expedite descent.
481
00:31:21,712 --> 00:31:23,964
to Peter Nielsen'sa: Inn
482
00:31:24,089 --> 00:31:27,050
radio transmissions
to determine how two planes
483
00:31:27,218 --> 00:31:30,971
on his watch could have collided
over Uberlingen, Germany.
484
00:31:31,096 --> 00:31:34,517
- Let's start 30 seconds
before the collision
485
00:31:34,642 --> 00:31:38,980
when the Boeing pilots informed
the controller of their descent.
486
00:31:41,231 --> 00:31:43,734
Descending flight, level 7-0.
487
00:31:43,902 --> 00:31:46,362
Aero Lloyd 1-1-3-5.
488
00:31:46,487 --> 00:31:49,615
- It sounds like the controller
was talking to a third aircraft.
489
00:31:51,701 --> 00:31:53,161
- Just as the Boeing aircraft
490
00:31:53,286 --> 00:31:56,204
advised the controller
of their T-CAS descent...
491
00:31:56,330 --> 00:31:59,916
- DILMUN 600. T-CAS descent--
- From the Aero Lloyd 1-1-3-5.
492
00:32:00,084 --> 00:32:01,376
- Yes, go ahead.
493
00:32:01,501 --> 00:32:04,172
- ...the controller received
a simultaneous message
494
00:32:04,297 --> 00:32:06,132
from another aircraft.
495
00:32:06,298 --> 00:32:07,174
We made contact
496
00:32:07,299 --> 00:32:09,635
with Friedrichshafen airport.
497
00:32:13,138 --> 00:32:15,016
- So the call from
the Boeing crew came in
498
00:32:15,141 --> 00:32:17,018
at exactly the same time
as the controller
499
00:32:17,143 --> 00:32:19,938
was dealing with
the Aero Lloyd flight.
500
00:32:21,146 --> 00:32:24,025
When the Boeing
pilots mentioned T-CAS descent,
501
00:32:24,150 --> 00:32:26,152
he probably didn't even
hear it, or it just
502
00:32:26,318 --> 00:32:28,528
was something that
he didn't process as an issue,
503
00:32:28,654 --> 00:32:31,449
thinking that everything
over on that airspace
504
00:32:31,574 --> 00:32:33,116
was already taken care of.
505
00:32:34,160 --> 00:32:37,954
- But juggling three planes
isn't unusual.
506
00:32:38,080 --> 00:32:40,083
There's got to be
more to this.
507
00:32:41,917 --> 00:32:44,045
- Investigators listen
to earlier parts
508
00:32:44,170 --> 00:32:46,338
of the ATC recording.
509
00:32:47,464 --> 00:32:49,592
Zurich,
good evening,
510
00:32:49,717 --> 00:32:50,676
Bravo Tango Charlie 2-9--
511
00:32:50,843 --> 00:32:51,970
Zurich, hello,
512
00:32:52,095 --> 00:32:54,471
Aero Lloyd 1-1-3-5.
513
00:32:57,557 --> 00:32:59,143
They hear
the Tupolev
514
00:32:59,309 --> 00:33:03,314
and Aero Lloyd Flights competing
for Nielsen's attention.
515
00:33:04,356 --> 00:33:06,733
Aero Lloyd 1-1-3-5,
roger, ah--
516
00:33:06,858 --> 00:33:09,487
...good evening.
Bravo Tango Charlie 2-9--
517
00:33:09,612 --> 00:33:11,196
- I'll call you back.
518
00:33:13,199 --> 00:33:15,492
Station calling,
say again, please.
519
00:33:15,660 --> 00:33:17,619
Ah, Zurich,
good evening.
520
00:33:17,744 --> 00:33:20,414
Bravo Tango Charlie 2-9-3-7,
521
00:33:20,539 --> 00:33:22,290
level 3-6-0.
522
00:33:22,416 --> 00:33:26,837
Aero Lloyd
1-1-3-5, requesting lower.
523
00:33:27,672 --> 00:33:31,049
- Aero Lloyd 1-1-3-5,
descend flight level 7-0.
524
00:33:31,217 --> 00:33:34,178
- During the last five minutes
before the collision,
525
00:33:34,303 --> 00:33:36,888
the workload
increased very much.
526
00:33:39,057 --> 00:33:41,769
Investigators
hear Nielsen having difficulty
527
00:33:41,894 --> 00:33:44,730
contacting the airport
where the Aero Lloyd flight
528
00:33:44,896 --> 00:33:46,648
was due to land.
529
00:33:47,525 --> 00:33:50,068
The desired
connection is not possible.
530
00:33:50,236 --> 00:33:52,654
- Find me the number
for Friedrichshafen Tower.
531
00:33:54,281 --> 00:33:57,367
- How many times does he try
calling Friedrichshafen?
532
00:34:00,038 --> 00:34:02,080
- Seven.
- He spent a lot of time
533
00:34:02,248 --> 00:34:04,791
on something that should have
taken seconds.
534
00:34:09,422 --> 00:34:12,382
The desired
connection is not possible.
535
00:34:12,550 --> 00:34:14,844
Please check the number.
- This isn't working either.
536
00:34:17,637 --> 00:34:20,391
- So, how did he end up
537
00:34:20,516 --> 00:34:23,268
in this situation
in the first place?
538
00:34:26,063 --> 00:34:27,648
Normally,
an inbound call is just
539
00:34:27,773 --> 00:34:29,567
a few seconds.
540
00:34:30,568 --> 00:34:33,278
But dealing with
the communication system
541
00:34:33,445 --> 00:34:34,989
took a lot of time
that then allowed
542
00:34:35,114 --> 00:34:37,742
the two collision aircraft
to get ever closer
543
00:34:37,909 --> 00:34:40,202
at this very high rate of speed.
544
00:34:44,956 --> 00:34:46,541
- Thanks for coming in.
545
00:34:49,253 --> 00:34:51,713
- Investigators interview
Peter Nielsen
546
00:34:51,838 --> 00:34:55,175
to assess his workload
on the night of the accident.
547
00:34:57,177 --> 00:34:59,847
- So, at the time
of the accident,
548
00:34:59,972 --> 00:35:04,101
you seemed to be working
two different workstations. Why?
549
00:35:04,559 --> 00:35:06,269
- There are two controllers
on the night shift,
550
00:35:06,394 --> 00:35:08,438
but one controller always
takes a rest
551
00:35:08,563 --> 00:35:11,275
as traffic decreases
for the night.
552
00:35:18,074 --> 00:35:19,659
- You're off?
553
00:35:20,451 --> 00:35:22,202
See you in a few hours.
554
00:35:24,371 --> 00:35:25,581
They come back
in the morning
555
00:35:25,706 --> 00:35:27,208
when traffic picks up.
556
00:35:28,501 --> 00:35:30,878
- And is that
standard procedure?
557
00:35:31,503 --> 00:35:33,713
- It's not written down
anywhere in company policies,
558
00:35:33,840 --> 00:35:37,552
but... management lets us do it.
559
00:35:39,512 --> 00:35:40,847
- Okay.
560
00:35:41,722 --> 00:35:44,641
So, 13 seconds
before the collision,
561
00:35:44,766 --> 00:35:48,478
the Boeing radioed that they
were doing a T-CAS descent.
562
00:35:50,021 --> 00:35:51,983
Did you hear that transmission?
563
00:35:52,150 --> 00:35:53,525
- No, I didn't.
564
00:35:53,693 --> 00:35:55,902
I guess I was dealing
with the Aero Lloyd flight
565
00:35:56,027 --> 00:35:57,697
approaching Friedrichshafen.
566
00:35:59,197 --> 00:36:00,615
I couldn't get through
to the airport.
567
00:36:00,740 --> 00:36:02,952
The phone was down
for some reason.
568
00:36:05,036 --> 00:36:08,916
- Is there anything else you can
think of that might help us?
569
00:36:09,041 --> 00:36:10,376
- Yeah.
570
00:36:11,418 --> 00:36:13,378
Normally, the computer system
issues an alert
571
00:36:13,545 --> 00:36:17,132
well before two planes
get too close together.
572
00:36:18,175 --> 00:36:20,635
But I never got that alert.
573
00:36:32,273 --> 00:36:33,690
The air traffic
control radar system
574
00:36:33,858 --> 00:36:36,527
has what's called,
"conflict alert system."
575
00:36:37,235 --> 00:36:38,237
It's looking at the airplanes
576
00:36:38,403 --> 00:36:40,780
and, based on their
current speed,
577
00:36:40,907 --> 00:36:42,157
and altitude, and heading,
578
00:36:42,282 --> 00:36:45,161
is projecting out to see
if airplanes
579
00:36:45,286 --> 00:36:47,871
are coming into conflict
with each other.
580
00:36:50,498 --> 00:36:52,793
The controller
was under very high pressure
581
00:36:52,918 --> 00:36:54,670
during the last minutes.
582
00:36:55,253 --> 00:36:56,672
Expedite descent
to level 3-5--
583
00:36:56,797 --> 00:36:58,298
Zurich, from the Aero Lloyd--
584
00:36:58,423 --> 00:37:00,550
Bravo Tango Charlie
2-9-3-7.
585
00:37:00,675 --> 00:37:02,302
- It was, at the end for him,
586
00:37:02,427 --> 00:37:04,804
a really difficult situation.
587
00:37:06,849 --> 00:37:09,393
- Was Peter Neilson
fully equipped
588
00:37:09,559 --> 00:37:11,771
to prevent the collision
that cost the lives
589
00:37:11,938 --> 00:37:14,231
of 71 people?
590
00:37:17,275 --> 00:37:19,070
Investigators
interview officials
591
00:37:19,195 --> 00:37:22,155
from Skyguide to find out
why Peter Neilson
592
00:37:22,280 --> 00:37:24,992
never received a warning
of the impending collision
593
00:37:25,117 --> 00:37:27,494
above Uberlingen, Germany.
594
00:37:29,121 --> 00:37:33,751
- Why were the control system's
conflict alerts
595
00:37:33,876 --> 00:37:36,920
and telephones both down?
596
00:37:39,215 --> 00:37:40,590
What's this?
597
00:37:40,757 --> 00:37:42,592
- A work order
598
00:37:42,717 --> 00:37:44,844
for a computer upgrade.
599
00:37:47,014 --> 00:37:49,224
A new software
was to be implemented
600
00:37:49,349 --> 00:37:52,519
on the main screen,
which meant that the controller
601
00:37:52,644 --> 00:37:55,063
had to work
on the back-up system.
602
00:37:56,648 --> 00:38:00,193
The software in the telephone
system also had to be updated.
603
00:38:01,195 --> 00:38:04,614
- So, is this why
there was no
604
00:38:04,782 --> 00:38:07,242
phone or visual conflict alert?
605
00:38:07,367 --> 00:38:09,619
- Yes.
606
00:38:09,786 --> 00:38:13,291
- But it doesn't say
that anywhere.
607
00:38:15,501 --> 00:38:19,338
Was Nielsen warned about this
before his shift?
608
00:38:19,505 --> 00:38:21,423
- Not that I'm aware.
609
00:38:24,010 --> 00:38:26,387
- One other thing.
610
00:38:26,929 --> 00:38:29,472
Why does management allow
one of the controllers
611
00:38:29,597 --> 00:38:33,268
working nights to be on break
most of the shift?
612
00:38:33,393 --> 00:38:37,273
- It started when there were
three controllers at night.
613
00:38:37,690 --> 00:38:40,318
- But there are only two now.
614
00:38:41,027 --> 00:38:44,195
- We didn't change the practice.
615
00:38:48,784 --> 00:38:50,369
- Thank you.
616
00:38:53,371 --> 00:38:55,583
That was the way
they did it,
617
00:38:55,708 --> 00:38:59,295
one controller on screen
and the other was on break.
618
00:38:59,420 --> 00:39:02,340
And this was accepted
by the management.
619
00:39:03,215 --> 00:39:08,179
- Bravo Tango Charlie 2-9-3-7,
descend flight level 3-5-0.
620
00:39:08,346 --> 00:39:11,139
- Climb.
- It says climb.
621
00:39:11,264 --> 00:39:12,891
- The controller
is guiding us down.
622
00:39:13,059 --> 00:39:14,851
- Climb.
- Descend? Really?
623
00:39:15,018 --> 00:39:16,394
We're going to descend?
624
00:39:17,396 --> 00:39:20,023
- Investigators
now understand...
625
00:39:20,148 --> 00:39:22,025
- Bravo Tango Charlie 2-9-3-7,
626
00:39:22,193 --> 00:39:25,403
descend level 3-5-0,
expedite descent.
627
00:39:25,570 --> 00:39:27,864
Expedite descent
to level 3-5--
628
00:39:28,032 --> 00:39:29,199
Zurich? From the Aero Lloyd--
629
00:39:29,367 --> 00:39:31,284
- Bravo Tango Charlie
2-9-3-7.
630
00:39:31,409 --> 00:39:33,036
...why two flights...
631
00:39:33,161 --> 00:39:35,039
- Increase descent.
- Descend!
632
00:39:35,164 --> 00:39:37,708
- Increase descent.
- Descend hard!
633
00:39:38,250 --> 00:39:40,668
...ended in disaster.
634
00:39:56,268 --> 00:39:59,188
While completing
their final report...
635
00:40:00,398 --> 00:40:02,148
- BFU, hello.
636
00:40:07,028 --> 00:40:08,530
What?
637
00:40:11,826 --> 00:40:14,744
- ...the story of the Uberlingen
mid-air collision
638
00:40:14,869 --> 00:40:17,123
takes another tragic turn.
639
00:40:22,628 --> 00:40:25,422
On February 24, 2004,
640
00:40:25,588 --> 00:40:29,135
almost two years
after the Uberlingen disaster,
641
00:40:29,300 --> 00:40:33,139
Peter Nielsen is murdered
in his front garden.
642
00:40:33,304 --> 00:40:37,184
His wife and three children
are witnesses to the crime.
643
00:40:38,601 --> 00:40:40,980
- We couldn't believe it.
644
00:40:41,146 --> 00:40:43,523
We couldn't believe it,
because it was, for us,
645
00:40:43,648 --> 00:40:48,237
like a TV story,
and it was not real life.
646
00:40:48,362 --> 00:40:52,199
But yes, it was real life.
647
00:40:55,869 --> 00:40:57,663
- Did they catch the killer?
648
00:41:00,666 --> 00:41:02,208
- Yeah.
649
00:41:02,333 --> 00:41:05,295
Apparently his family
was on the Tupolev.
650
00:41:12,177 --> 00:41:15,014
- A Russian man, Vitaly Kaloyev,
651
00:41:15,181 --> 00:41:18,184
is arrested
for Peter Nielsen's murder.
652
00:41:20,351 --> 00:41:22,480
Kaloyev's wife and two children
653
00:41:22,646 --> 00:41:25,315
were killed
in the Uberlingen collision.
654
00:41:26,192 --> 00:41:28,943
He tells police he went
to Nielsen's house
655
00:41:29,068 --> 00:41:31,155
seeking an apology.
656
00:41:39,163 --> 00:41:41,164
But Nielsen isn't found at fault
657
00:41:41,331 --> 00:41:44,501
for the collision
in the BFU's final report.
658
00:41:49,215 --> 00:41:51,132
Zurich?
Hello, Aero Lloyd...
659
00:41:51,257 --> 00:41:53,802
Instead,
it concludes he was unable
660
00:41:53,927 --> 00:41:57,681
to safely carry out
the tasks required of him.
661
00:42:01,143 --> 00:42:05,063
The BFU points to the fact
that Nielson was working alone
662
00:42:05,231 --> 00:42:07,440
as a cause for the accident.
663
00:42:11,402 --> 00:42:13,364
Bravo Tango Charlie
2-9-3-7,
664
00:42:13,530 --> 00:42:16,992
descend flight level, 3-5-0.
Expedite.
665
00:42:17,117 --> 00:42:20,161
I have crossing traffic.
- Descend.
666
00:42:20,286 --> 00:42:22,873
- But the report
also highlights deficiencies
667
00:42:22,998 --> 00:42:25,000
in aviation regulations
668
00:42:25,125 --> 00:42:27,628
that allowed for
the Russian pilots' confusion
669
00:42:27,753 --> 00:42:29,380
- over the use of T-CAS.
- Climb.
670
00:42:29,547 --> 00:42:31,130
- It says climb.
- Climb.
671
00:42:31,257 --> 00:42:33,050
- The controller
is guiding us down.
672
00:42:33,217 --> 00:42:35,844
- Descend?
We're going to descend?
673
00:42:35,969 --> 00:42:39,806
Climb. Climb. Climb.
674
00:42:39,931 --> 00:42:44,519
- The BFU's most prominent
recommendation is simple.
675
00:42:45,144 --> 00:42:49,108
- Pilots have to follow
the T-CAS instruction,
676
00:42:49,275 --> 00:42:51,402
not to follow
the ATC instruction,
677
00:42:51,527 --> 00:42:54,153
because T-CAS is a safety net.
678
00:42:55,864 --> 00:42:59,367
- Eventually, four Skyguide
middle managers,
679
00:42:59,492 --> 00:43:01,244
who weren't even working
the night
680
00:43:01,411 --> 00:43:03,079
of the Uberlingen disaster,
681
00:43:03,246 --> 00:43:06,125
are convicted
of negligent homicide.
682
00:43:08,918 --> 00:43:12,297
This accident,
it was really a watershed event.
683
00:43:12,463 --> 00:43:15,509
A lot of things had to fall
into place
684
00:43:15,634 --> 00:43:17,844
just the wrong ways
for this to occur.
685
00:43:19,054 --> 00:43:20,806
And it changed a lot of things.
686
00:43:23,349 --> 00:43:25,436
A lot of the way people
looked at ATC,
687
00:43:25,561 --> 00:43:29,188
collision avoidance, and it
really woke a lot of people up.
688
00:43:32,108 --> 00:43:34,193
In 2005,
689
00:43:34,320 --> 00:43:36,237
Vitaly Kaloyev is convicted
690
00:43:36,362 --> 00:43:39,742
of the premeditated
homicide of Peter Nielsen.
691
00:43:41,784 --> 00:43:45,581
Two years later,
he's released from prison.
692
00:43:57,175 --> 00:43:59,719
Today, nine steel "pearls"
693
00:43:59,844 --> 00:44:01,929
representing a torn necklace,
694
00:44:02,056 --> 00:44:05,809
mark the locations where
victims' bodies were found.
695
00:44:07,894 --> 00:44:10,271
And a memorial inside Skyguide
696
00:44:10,396 --> 00:44:13,025
marks both the date
of the collision
697
00:44:13,192 --> 00:44:16,277
and that of
Peter Nielsen's murder.
698
00:44:21,784 --> 00:44:24,369
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51995
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