All language subtitles for Mayday.Air.Disaster.S25E08.Firebomber.Down.1080p.AMZN.WEB-DL.DDP5.1.H.264-BLOOM_track3_[eng]

New South Wales,
Australia. 2020.

After dropping
a load of fire retardant...

- The load is away.

- Firefighters on the ground

witness the unthinkable.

- Whoa!
- AC 1-30 firebomber crashes,

killing all three crew members.

- It's a guttural,
visceral loss.

- Investigators must determine
the cause of the crash

within an active fire zone.

- Look at that.
Complete destruction.

- And they must do it
without a Flight Data Recorder

or a cockpit voice recorder.

- This is a lot
of important data

that we did not have access to.

- But fellow pilots
do provide valuable insight.

- I didn't think it was safe.
I rejected the task.

- Why was the fire bomber
even out there?

- Mayday, Mayday!

- Pull up!

Coulson Aviation
B 1-3-7

is circling above a wildfire

near Adaminaby, Australia.

- Two thousand feet.
- Copy. Two thousand feet.

Let's make another turn
and see what we can see.

- Coulson Aviation
is one of the world's

leading aerial
firefighting companies.

Headquartered
in British Columbia, Canada,

they operate a fleet
of fixed and rotary-wing

firefighting aircraft
around the world.

- The majority
of aerial firefighters

are private companies,

and they are contracted
by the government.

- Visibility is still
pretty bad.

I think we're going
to need a closer look.

- Yeah. I'm going to take her
down to 1,000 feet.

- The crew of the 7-37
is searching for somewhere

to drop 4,000 gallons
of fire retardant.

- Descending to 1,000 feet.

- So they're looking
for that sweet spot.

They're looking for the perfect
drop altitude

with the perfect line
to be able to drop

that retardant right where
the firefighter needs it.

- The 7-37's mission

is just one battle
in a much bigger war.

- The Black Summer fires
were some of the worst

that Australia has seen.

New South Wales was the hardest
hit state.

They suffered a loss
of 21% of its alpine vegetation,

which encompassed over
68,000 acres of burned area.

It challenged everybody
in the fire services,

in aerial firefighting

in ways that they have never
been challenged before.

- Air crews from
the United States

and around the world respond
to the call for help

and join their
Australian counterparts

to battle the wildfires.

As the crew prepares,

they get as low as they can
to make a drop.

- Descending to 800 feet.

- 800 feet.

- Whoa. We've got wind shear.

- There's been a rapid change
in wind speed and direction.

- Affirmative.
- Increasing thrust.

Climbing.

- In aerial firefighting,

you've got to get very low
and very slow,

and at times you'll
all of a sudden get hit

by a gust that
you weren't expecting.

- Alright. I think we got her
back under control.

- Aerial firefighting
pilots face unique challenges

compared to your average,
everyday pilot.

That's why they are
so experienced

and so skilled in what they do.

- Alright, can you get us
direct to base?

- After almost 30 minutes
of difficult flying

in dangerous conditions,

the crew decides not to return
to the fire in Adaminaby.

- Heading set for return
to Richmond air base.

- Auto-pilot on.

You know what, though?
We need to contact Fire Control,

and the bird dog.

Everybody needs to know
that conditions out there

are deteriorating rapidly.

- Agreed. A hundred per cent.

- The crew sends out a warning
about the conditions

to the control center
and their lead plane.

- There's often
what's called a "bird dog"

or a lead plane, which is
a much smaller aircraft,

more nimble,
a very experienced pilot

who can better assess
the drop for the tanker pilot,

before the tanker pilot
even arrives.

Coulson B
1-3-4 en route

to Adaminaby.

- Did you hear that? B 1-3-4?

- The pilots of the 7-37

overhear another
Coulson aircraft

headed to the fire zone
they just abandoned.

- Uh, B 1-3-4, this is B 1-3-7,
do you read?

- Coulson B-1-3-4,
a modified Hercules C-1-30

with a crew of three,

is approaching
the fire in Adaminaby.

- Good afternoon, B 1-3-7.

B 1-3-4, reading you
loud and clear.

- The pilot-in-command
is 45-year-old Ian McBeth.

He's flown nearly 1,000

firefighting missions
like this one.

We just did
a drop at Adaminaby.

Conditions are very bad.

We had some crazy wind,
and visibility is really poor.

You can go take a look,
but I'm not going back there.

- Copy that, B 1-3-7.

We'll assess conditions
carefully.

Thanks for the warning.

- Communications
in aerial firefighting

is an integral part
of the overall firefight

for weather conditions
and changes on the fire ground.

- The C 1-30 co-pilot
is 42-year-old Paul Hudson,

a former U.S. Marine pilot.

43-year-old Flight Engineer
Rick DeMorgan

is on leave from active duty
in the United States Air Force.

- If you were to put together
the perfect crew

for the type of thing
that 1-34 was fighting,

you would get these guys,
or somebody exactly like them.

- Now approaching
the target area in Adaminaby,

the crew descends
to 25-hundred feet

and begins a circuit pattern.

- Hoo-boy.
There's that chop B 1-3-7

was talking about.

- And no doubt this wind
will be pushing the smoke

all over the fire ground.

Visibility is terrible.

- Another day at the office,
right, fellas?

Well, let's take her down
to 2,000 feet,

get a closer look.

- Despite the other
crew's warnings,

McBeth wants to assess
conditions for himself.

- Aerial firefighters
are a unique breed

in that they're highly
experienced pilots

before they ever get
behind the controls

of an aerial firefighting
aircraft.

They are already people
who conduct risk assessments.

They're people that know
how to handle

a crisis situation.

- Coming around
for one more circuit.

- Though the conditions
seem dire,

a C 1-30 fire bomber
like B 1-3-4

is modified for such
extreme conditions.

- The C 1-30
is an amazing aircraft.

It's a robust, strong airplane

that was built to haul
and deliver a lot of cargo

and a lot of weight.
They make wonderful air-tankers.

- C 1-30 air tankers
are retrofitted

with structural reinforcements
in their fuselage

to accommodate tanks
that carry more than

16 tons of fire retardant.

- Having four big engines
on the C-130 like that,

it is wonderful to be able
to power out of something

if you find yourself
in a position to be in trouble.

- But no aircraft
is invulnerable,

and for professional
flight crews,

safety is a priority.

- The 7-37 crew was dead right.
These winds are too crazy.

Alright, I'm calling
this one off.

I'll notify Fire Control.

Cooma FCC, Coulson B 1-3-4.

Go ahead,
Coulson B 1-3-4.

- Cooma FCC,
conditions at Adaminaby

too smoky and windy.

There's no way
to make a drop here.

- Copy that, Coulson B 1-3-4.

The Fire Control
Centre in Cooma, Australia

serves as a local base
for the New South Wales

Rural Fire Service.

It coordinates firefighting
efforts in the area,

both on the ground
and in the air.

- B 1-3-4, we're sending
through coordinates

for an alternative target
at Peak View.

Standby.

Your new heading
is zero-eight-five.

- Copy that, Cooma FCC,
zero-eight-five.

Proceeding to Peak View.

The C 1-30
is directed to another fire.

- New heading is set.

- Alright, Plan B. Here we go.

- When you've got
a crew assessing the situation

and saying it's a little bit
too windy,

it's a little bit too smoky,
uh, let's not drop here,

it's a good thing to have
the ability to go

onto another location.

- The C 1-30 is re-routed

to an area 58 kilometers
to the east of Adaminaby

known as Peak View,

a remote area of hills
and farmland

running up to a mountain ridge.

- Alright, let's see
what we've got here.

There, along that ridgeline,

if we aim for the east side.

- I see it.
Yeah, that could work.

- Let's get a closer look.

Starting first circuit now.

- Following standard procedure,

the C 1-30 flies
several low altitude circuits

over the fire ground.

- There's a multitude
of factors

that air-tanker pilots look at
when they go into a fire.

We're talking about
the fire behavior.

We're talking about the weather.

What are my escape routes like?

- Alright,
that's three circuits.

I'd say we're good to drop
just east of that ridge there.

Agreed?
- Yes, sir.

- Good to go.

Standby.
Descending towards drop area.

- Now all that's needed
is for the C 1-30

to get in close enough
to make a successful drop.

The crew
of Bomber 1-3-4

prepares to drop a load
of fire retardant

on a wildfire near
Peak View, Australia.

- Okay, there's our line.

Release point in sight.

Rolling in on final.

- Passing through 400 feet.

300.

Standby to drop.

- Hang on. Almost there.

- Probably the most critical
time in this whole process

is on the drop,
because you're losing

a lot of weight in the airplane,
which means the aerodynamics

of the airplane
are gonna be different.

You're gonna need to climb fast.

- We are at 200 feet.
Clear to drop.

- Dropping. Dropping.
Load is away.

- As soon as the C 1-30 drops
its load of fire retardant...

- Climb thrust, flaps 50.

- Flaps 50.

- ...the crew tries
to regain altitude.

- Whoa! Hang on.

Come on.

- Still not gaining altitude.

- But the plane won't climb.

Bomber 1-3-4 has crashed
into the Australian bush.

- Tragically, there appears
to be no survivors

as a result of the crash.

- The aerial firefighter
community is very small

and it's a guttural,
visceral loss.

- If we could just have
a minute silence.

- When I got the call
that Bomber 1-34 had crashed,

near Cooma, New South Wales,

a Hercules, a C 1-30
is a very reliable airplane,

and I honestly
couldn't believe it.

- So, how far
is the crash site from Cooma?

- The Australian
Transport Safety Bureau,

or ATSB, is alerted
to the disaster immediately.

- About 35 miles northeast,
near Peak View.

- I know that area.
That's pretty remote.

- It's surrounded
by brush fires.

We've a few teams
dispatched to the area.

- It was located on
a single direction access road

that was impacted by fire
a number of times

during our on-site activities.

- So, the firebomber
is a modified C 1-30.

What do we know
about its history?

- While investigators wait
for updates from the crash site,

they look into the plane's
history for anything

that could explain the crash.

- Alright,
here's the certificate

of airworthiness.

Looks like everything is in
accordance with FAA standards.

- And according
to the aircraft specs,

it was converted
to fire bomber in 2018.

Since then, it's accrued
683 hours

of firefighting operations.

- And it had an inspection
just yesterday.

- Any issues?

- Nothing significant.

- A review of the aircraft's
maintenance logbooks

and worksheets showed
that there was no pre-existing

defects prior
to the flight departing.

So we were now looking
at something happening

during the flight
that we had to consider.

- Investigators continue to sift
through the aircraft's records.

- Take a look at this.

The C 1-30 was equipped
with a cockpit voice recorder,

but no Flight Data Recorder.

Nor was it required to have one.

- Really? Well, that makes it
more challenging.

- Where aircraft are fitted
with a Flight Data Recorder,

this gives investigators
a huge amount of information

that can be used to determine
aircraft performance.

This is a lot of important data
that we did not have access to.

- Thank you.

- Footage from
the New South Wales Police

gives investigators
a bird's-eye-view

of the severity of the crash.

- Look at that.

- The scale of devastation
was incredible to see.

It was a shocking sight.

All that was recognizable
while approaching

was that tail
and the aft section.

Everything forward
of the back of the wing

was in multiple pieces
throughout the site.

- So the first point
of impact is here.

It clipped a tree.

Then the wreckage extends
all the way up to here.

- Investigators discover
that after impact,

the wreckage slid
600 feet uphill.

- It must have come
in pretty steep

for that kind of damage.

- It was evident
that the aircraft

had come in quite heavy.

We're talking a lot
of energy here.

- So what could have caused
the devastating crash?

- Investigating an accident
like this,

we start to sort of think about

what could possibly
have gone wrong?

Are we looking at an engineering
issue here?

Are we looking at
an operational issue here?

Or are we looking, even,
at an environmental issue?

- With that level
of devastation,

we have to consider
a structural problem.

- Agreed.

Did the Coulson
C 1-30 experience

a structural failure

prior to crashing violently
into the ground?

- One of the fundamental things
we have to determine,

is all the aircraft
on the site?

- So the cockpit was torn away
and the nose is here.

- We have to locate,
effectively, the four corners

of the aircraft to determine
that all the components

of the C 1-30 were on site.

- There's evidence
of the left wing tip...

and the right...

And, of course, the tail.

It's all there.

- The C 1-30 did not suffer

any kind of structural failure
prior to impact.

- If there had've been
an in-flight break up,

there would have been pieces
of the aircraft that

weren't in the wreckage site.

They would have been further
back along the flight path.

- Look at this.

We've got retardant
at the site.

- So they only released
a partial load,

which means they were
carrying extra weight.

- Typically, the flight crew
are trained

if they do run into
any emergency situation

to dump that retardant.

This would increase
the aircraft's performance.

- Why didn't the crew release
its remaining fire retardant?

- It could be a factor
if they were struggling

to regain altitude.

- Whoa. Hang on.

Come on.

- Still not gaining altitude.

- We've got something.

- Several days after the crash

of the Coulson fire bomber,

the investigation receives
unexpected evidence.

- Eyewitness video from the RFS.

- A firefighter with the RFS,

or Rural Fire Service,

captured the final seconds
of the C 1-30 on video.

- We were provided
with a witness video

which had captured
the last 25 seconds

of the aircraft's flight.

Whoa!

- You see it coming in low.

It drops the fire retardant.

- And then it looks like
it starts to climb.

- Right.

And for some reason,
it doesn't regain altitude.

All of a sudden...

Whoa!

- The witness videos
essentially provided

an unedited version of
the aircraft's final movement.

A short time after
the retardant drop,

the aircraft became
obscured by smoke.

- I think there's more
we can do with this video.

- Typically, when we receive
a witness video,

we're able to use basic
photogrammetry on determining

the aircraft attitude.
In this case,

we're using new software
that we had just got access to.

Will video analysis
software provide investigators

with more information
about how and why

the Coulson fire bomber crashed?

- The use
of the 3D tracking software

allowed us to look
at the witness video

in a lot more detail.
We could look at the aircraft's,

uh, attitude.
We could look at the pitch

and roll angles
to get a better sense

of what was happening.

- Okay, that's everything.

- At the beginning of the drop,
the pitch is level

with a slight left bank.

- It seems pretty normal.

- After the drop,
the plane is banked left

and pitched up.
- They're climbing out.

- For 10 seconds
following the drop,

we could see that the aircraft
had established

a positive rate of climb

up to about 170 feet
above the drop height.

- And through
the remaining images,

the plane appears to be sinking.

It looks like a stall.

- All the signs are there.

- The witness video
showed that the aircraft's

final movements were consistent
with an aerodynamic stall

in terms of the aircraft
stopped climbing

and the rolling movement
of the aircraft.

However, without
a Flight Data Recorder,

we were unable to confirm
with a degree of certainty

that the aircraft had stalled.

- The question is...

Did it stall and if so, why?

Will the wreckage
of the Coulson C 1-30

support the ATSB's theory
that the fire bomber stalled?

- Excellent.
The Cockpit Voice Recorder?

Let's get that to HQ
for download, straight away.

- Finding the cockpit
voice recorder gave us

an opportunity to understand

the crew's communications
within the cockpit.

- While data from
the Cockpit Voice Recorder,

or CVR, is processed,

investigators examine
the engines.

- Thanks for coming in.

- An expert from
the engine manufacturer,

Rolls Royce,
assists with the examination.

- Were the engines operating?

Were they operating comparably

across all four of them?

And is an engine failure

why this aircraft
stopped flying?

- As you can see,
there's pretty heavy impact

and fire damage.
- Well, let's have a look.

Have a look at that.

- The compressor blades
are badly damaged.

And that looks like
molten metal.

- All signs of engine ingestion.

- There was a significant
explosion and fireball

when this aircraft
impacted the ground.

The evidence of molten metal
inside the compressor casing

was indicative that
the engines were operating

when this fireball occurred.

The engines had ingested
the fire

and the broken bits of metal.

- I just got confirmation
from our wreckage team,

the flaps were at 50.

That's the right configuration
for climb out.

- So we've ruled out
engine failure

and improper configuration
as causes for a stall.

- Normally,
we would have airspeed

and engine parameter data
from the Flight Data Recorder,

but because we didn't,
we had to come up

with different ways
to determine

if the aircraft
aerodynamically stalled.

- Let's look at
the CVR transcript.

- Will it explain
what could have caused

the C 1-30 to stall?

- Training exercise?
What is this?

- This is not our flight.

It looks like it's from
a previous flight in California.

- Nine months prior
to the accident flight,

the inertia switch had activated
during the hard landing.

This meant that
the recording device

stopped recording
any further information.

- With no CVR or FDR available,

investigators turn
to what data they do have.

- Okay. According
to the equipment list,

the C 1-30 was equipped
with two tracking devices:

The ADS-B and SKYTRAC.

- ADS-B and SKYTRAC

are two onboard
positioning systems

that transmit
the plane's location

and other data to satellites

and ground stations
in real time.

- At the very least,
that'll give us a flight path.

- And perhaps more evidence
of a stall.

- We had to look
at alternative ways

to start looking
at the aircraft performance.

This included other real time
tracking data

that was available to us.

- I've got the data.

- So, they approach the area
at 2,000 feet.

They complete their first
circuit at 15-hundred feet.

Second circuit at 500 feet.

Final circuit, 1,000 feet.

- They're doing a proper
survey of the situation.

- This is really to assess
the weather conditions

at that lower level...

- Okay, so what about
the drop itself?

...before they
drop into the higher risk

200-foot altitude.

- They make the drop
at 200 feet,

and then they climb up to 370.

- They're at a very
low altitude.

Three seconds later...

- What airspeed would
the plane have to be flying

in order to stall if it was
in a climb out configuration?

While the tracking
data further supports

the enhanced witness video,

can it reveal if the plane
was flying so slowly

that it stalled?

- An airplane has
a specific stall speed

for specific configurations:

flaps up, flaps down,
and particular weight.

- That's flaps, 50.

Weight, 131,000 pounds

after a partial retardant drop.

- Investigators start
by calculating the stall speed

of a C 1-30 on climb out.

- We'll need to factor in
some turbulence

near the drop area.

- Turbulence introduces
the possibility that

you're gonna have a sudden
updraft or a sudden downdraft

and it's going to affect
your altitude and your attitude.

- Alright, let's start
with moderate turbulence

with a load factor
from 0.5 Gs to 0.99 Gs.

- They factor in
different levels of turbulence

likely present at the time
of the incident.

- And severe turbulence
up to 1.99 Gs.

- The higher the turbulence,

the higher your airspeed
needs to be

to ensure that you don't stall.

- Alright, that should do it.

So in moderate turbulence,
the C 1-30 stall speed

is between 101 and 117 knots.

In severe turbulence,
it's between 117 and 143 knots.

- Was the C 1-30
flying at a stall speed

between 101 and 143 knots,

causing it to plummet
to the ground?

- Pull up the groundspeed
from the tracking data?

- To determine if the C 1-30
was flying at stall speed,

investigators examine
the groundspeed

recorded in the tracking data.

- We didn't have
the airspeed,

and therefore,
had to estimate it

based on ground speeds
that had been recorded.

- Okay...
Groundspeed for the C 1-30

is 144 knots before they dropped
the retardant,

increasing to 151 knots
before impact.

- Alright. Now let's factor
in the windspeed.

- We knew that they were
flying in hazardous

environmental conditions
which included gusting

and changing wind conditions,

and this then posed
a challenge for us

to determine
what the airspeed was.

- Airspeed measures
a plane's speed relative

to the air it's flying through.

- That's the weather
at Peak View,

less than a mile
from the crash site.

- We've got
a lot of turbulence

with winds gusting
from the north-west...

15, 30, and 40 knots.

Pull up the aerial image
from the crash site.

What direction was
the C 1-30 flying?

- Right after the drop,
the C 1-30 was flying

south, south-east.

- With winds
from the north-west,

that would mean they would have
had a tailwind.

- A tail wind
as high as 40 knots.

That's extreme.

It sounds like wind shear.

- Wind shear is a sudden
change in the wind's direction

or speed resulting in drastic
changes to a plane's airspeed.

At low altitudes,
it can be deadly.

- If you have a sudden
tail wind,

that's going to rob you
of airspeed.

And you may have a struggle
staying in the air.

- Alright,
we've got the windspeed.

Now let's calculate
the airspeed.

- To calculate
the C 1-30's airspeed,

investigators also factor in
other weather data on the day.

- Temperature.
Atmospheric pressure.

- The airspeed was
between 100 and 123 knots

in the last 20 seconds
of flight.

- There it is.
The C 1-30's airspeed

falls within its stall speed
in those conditions.

- The team concludes
the plane

was hit by wind shear...

- Whoa, hang on.

- ...that resulted in a sudden
increase in tailwind...

- Still not gaining altitude.

- ...which robbed the plane
of vital airspeed

and caused it to stall.

- Here's what's troubling.

Many planes experience
wind shear events

and don't crash.
So why did the C 1-30?

Investigators
examine Coulson's

onboard safety features

to determine if their pilots
were equipped

with a warning system
that could have helped them

recover from wind shear events.

- It looks like some
of the Coulson aircraft

like the 7-37

have an onboard wind shear
warning system.

- Oh. We've got wind shear.

Wind shear. Wind shear.

Wind shear.

- Affirmative.
- Terrain. Terrain.

Pull up.

- Anytime you can put
something in the cockpit

that is going to give you
the capability

of identifying wind shear,

or the potential for wind shear,
it is a win.

Did the Coulson
C 1-30 firebomber

also have a wind shear
warning system?

- The C 1-30 did not have
a wind shear warning system.

- The C 1-30 H model aircraft

was built in the early '80s.

- Whoa. Hang on.

- Coulson believed that
their highly experienced pilots

would be better able
to identify wind shear

than an onboard warning system.

- Wind shear!

Wind shear.

- They are trained
to recognize the onset

of wind shift through
the degradation

of the aircraft performance.

- Come on. Come on.

- A wind shear warning
at a higher altitude

would have allowed the crews
to immediately respond

to the situation.
But if such a warning occurred

at a low altitude,

there may not have been
sufficient time

for the crew to recover.

- We're at 200 feet.
Clear to drop.

- Dropping. Dropping.
Load is away.

- Investigators conclude
that wind shear warning or not,

at such a low altitude...

- Whoa! Hang on.

Come on.

- ...with 25,000 pounds

of fire retardant
still onboard...

- Still not gaining altitude.

- ...the C-130 firebomber
was just too heavy...

- If all the retardant
had been dumped,

it would have increased
the aircraft's performance

by about 50%.

- ...and lost too much airspeed

from the extreme
wind shear event.

- Wind shear. Maximum thrust.

- As a result of flying
into a combination

of wind shear and tailwind

at low altitude
and a relatively slow speed,

the aircraft performance decayed
into the stall region...

- We're stalling.

- ...resulting in the aircraft
colliding with terrain.

- But understanding
why the C 1-30 crashed

doesn't entirely
explain the accident.

- Given the dangerous
conditions,

why was the firebomber
even out there?

- As aerial firefighting
is operating

within a very
dynamic environment,

it's important that any
new information

or changing information
is communicated

to ensure that the safety
of flight

and the operation as a whole

is maintained
to a high standard.

- Investigators examine
the vast communication network

involved in monitoring
and dispatching firefighters

the day the C 1-30 crashed.

- Who knew what and when?

- There is a large
number of individuals

at various different locations
all with different information.

- What were the pilots told

about weather conditions
in the drop zones?

- There were three planes
tasked to Adaminaby

on the day of the crash.

First, the 7-37
departs at 11:27 AM.

- And what time
did the C 1-30 depart?

It departed at 12:05 PM.

- And the bird dog's
departure?

What is it?

At 12:04 PM,

virtually the same time
the C 1-30 departed,

the bird dog declined the task.

- We had learned through
the investigation

that the bird dog pilot
assigned to Adaminaby

had rejected that tasking.

- But why?

- Why did you reject
the tasking?

Investigators speak
with the bird dog pilot

to understand why he refused
the assignment.

- I was in the Snowy Mountains
a couple weeks earlier.

- There was heavy turbulence.

The bird dog pilot
experienced a downdraft

and an uncommanded
30 to 40 degree roll.

- You were able to recover?

- Barely. I had to execute
an escape maneuver.

- So tell me about
the day of the accident.

- The forecast

and the conditions
were even worse.

I didn't think it was safe,
I rejected the task.

- You told the Richmond
Air Base manager.

Did you tell anyone else?

- I thought they would
inform the other aircraft.

- The bird dog pilot expected
that their decision

not to fly
and to reject the task

based on the weather
would be communicated

to other crews who were going
to operate in that same area.

- The Richmond Airbase
informed the State Air Desk

that the bird dog rejected
the task,

but did the State Air Desk
tell other crews?

- They didn't tell the 7-37
or the C 1-30.

- What time did the 7-37
leave Adaminaby?

12:25 PM.

- Did they return to the area?

- It doesn't look like it.

But the conditions
were really bad.

- The pilot-in-command
warned the bird dog

of the conditions
and that they wouldn't

be returning to the area.

- Well that's not all.
They also reported the situation

to Cooma Fire Control.

- Uh, Cooma FCC,
this is B 1-3-7.

Conditions in Adaminaby
are dangerous.

Cancel all aircraft
operating in the area.

- They even radioed
the Richmond Air Base.

Investigators learn
the 7-37 made multiple efforts

to advise others
of the dangers in Adaminaby.

- Did anyone inform
the C 1-30 of those messages?

- Not the Richmond Air Base,
not the State Air Desk.

No official body told the C 1-30
that conditions were worsening.

- While there was
a lot of information

that was being shared
with all the flight crews

on that particular day,

there were missed opportunities
to provide the crew

of bomber 1-3-4
with a lot more information

about what was happening
in this area.

- It looks like the 7-37
overheard the C 1-30

on the approach frequency
and reached out to them.

- We just did a drop.

Conditions are very bad.
We had some crazy wind

and visibility is really poor.

You can go take a look,
but I'm not going back there.

- Copy that, B 1-3-7.

We'll assess conditions
carefully.

Thanks for the warning.

Despite warnings
about the conditions

at Adaminaby
proving to be correct...

- The 7-37 crew was dead right.

Cooma FCC, there's no way
to make a drop here.

- Copy that.

- ...the crew of B 1-3-4
was sent

to a second location just
10 minutes away at Peak View.

- Your new heading
is zero-eight-five.

- Copy that Cooma FCC.
Zero-eight-five.

- Even though it was the
C 1-30 crew's decision,

they didn't get a complete
picture of the risky conditions

they were flying into.

- If additional sources
had warned the C 1-30

of the conditions in the area,

the crew may have rejected
the task at Peak View.

- The ability of flight crews
to make the most informed

decision about the safety
of continuing these operations

in a high-risk environment
relies on clear,

solid communication of all
of the available information,

whether that be from
local crews and their activities

or from task rejections
based on previous experience.

- In the ATSB's final report,

they make many detailed
recommendations,

including fitting wind shear
warning systems

on all C 1-30 firebombers.

Above all, the ATSB highlights
the need for new procedures

for making risk-based decisions.

- Aerial firefighting pilots
are not reckless individuals.

They're very smart
and methodical.

This is definitely
a brotherhood of pilots.

And I believe that
in aerial firefighting,

when a pilot's lost,
it's not only felt

by one person and their family,

the families of the pilots,
the company,

but it's felt throughout
the whole industry.

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