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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:00,250 --> 00:00:03,003 (Dynamic music) 2 00:00:03,128 --> 00:00:05,588 ♪ 3 00:00:05,714 --> 00:00:15,098 (Text on screen) 4 00:00:18,100 --> 00:00:21,187 (narrator): Descending into heavy fog above Luxembourg... 5 00:00:21,771 --> 00:00:23,147 - The hell is that?! 6 00:00:23,565 --> 00:00:25,692 (narrator): ...something goes disastrously wrong 7 00:00:25,774 --> 00:00:28,652 on Luxair Flight 9642. 8 00:00:28,736 --> 00:00:30,821 - The airplane was impossible to recover. 9 00:00:30,905 --> 00:00:32,531 (heavy crash) 10 00:00:34,241 --> 00:00:37,746 (narrator): 20 of the 22 people onboard are killed. 11 00:00:37,871 --> 00:00:39,079 - A lot of people died that day. 12 00:00:39,204 --> 00:00:41,957 It was an accident that was hard to understand. 13 00:00:42,584 --> 00:00:45,128 - I can't find anything wrong with either engine. 14 00:00:45,253 --> 00:00:47,588 (narrator): But when investigators analyze 15 00:00:47,713 --> 00:00:50,258 unusual sounds from the cockpit... 16 00:00:51,593 --> 00:00:52,886 - It's a match? - Mm-hmm. 17 00:00:53,011 --> 00:00:55,137 (narrator): ...they hear the pilots do something 18 00:00:55,262 --> 00:00:57,057 which should be impossible. 19 00:00:57,182 --> 00:00:58,600 - It's not supposed to happen. 20 00:00:58,725 --> 00:01:01,310 There's supposed to be things that prevent it from happening. 21 00:01:01,435 --> 00:01:04,063 - So it's not as foolproof as we thought. 22 00:01:07,358 --> 00:01:08,400 (♪♪) 23 00:01:08,525 --> 00:01:09,652 - Mayday! Mayday! 24 00:01:09,778 --> 00:01:13,031 (opening theme) 25 00:01:29,338 --> 00:01:30,924 (soft pensive music) 26 00:01:31,049 --> 00:01:33,093 (narrator): It's just before 10:00 in the morning 27 00:01:33,176 --> 00:01:36,137 at Luxembourg's International Airport. 28 00:01:36,721 --> 00:01:38,890 A layer of fog blankets the runway, 29 00:01:38,972 --> 00:01:41,308 preventing planes from landing. 30 00:01:42,435 --> 00:01:44,646 - Cargolux 778 maintain runway heading 31 00:01:44,771 --> 00:01:47,147 until LUTAX, then use own navigation. 32 00:01:48,816 --> 00:01:52,820 Luxair 403 enter Diekirch hold flight level 60. 33 00:01:52,945 --> 00:01:55,447 I will vector you later for ILS approach. 34 00:01:56,281 --> 00:01:58,284 (narrator): Controllers are busy putting planes 35 00:01:58,409 --> 00:02:02,287 into a holding pattern while waiting for the fog to clear. 36 00:02:02,914 --> 00:02:07,209 - Luxair 4452 enter Diekirch hold flight level 90. 37 00:02:07,334 --> 00:02:09,670 QNH is 1023. 38 00:02:10,337 --> 00:02:14,717 Luxair 8362 descend level 80 to enter Diekirch hold. 39 00:02:14,842 --> 00:02:17,804 Current RVR is 250. 40 00:02:19,430 --> 00:02:22,558 (narrator): There are three planes circling 16 miles north 41 00:02:22,683 --> 00:02:26,187 of the airport at a position known as Diekirch. 42 00:02:27,980 --> 00:02:30,817 - In a situation with low visibility, 43 00:02:30,942 --> 00:02:33,610 lots of holding, lots of aircraft 44 00:02:33,694 --> 00:02:35,155 having different requirements, 45 00:02:35,280 --> 00:02:37,824 the level of stress is fairly high. 46 00:02:37,907 --> 00:02:39,408 Focus is really important. 47 00:02:39,533 --> 00:02:42,162 You gotta concentrate on everything that you're doing. 48 00:02:43,580 --> 00:02:49,043 - Luxair 9642 enter Diekirch hold flight level 90. 49 00:02:49,169 --> 00:02:51,336 There will be vectors later for an ILS approach 50 00:02:51,420 --> 00:02:53,213 on runway 24. 51 00:02:53,756 --> 00:02:56,967 - That's all understood, Luxair 9642. 52 00:02:57,885 --> 00:02:59,512 (narrator): One of the planes being directed 53 00:02:59,637 --> 00:03:04,057 to the holding pattern is Luxair Flight 9642. 54 00:03:04,766 --> 00:03:07,187 The plane is a Fokker 50 turboprop 55 00:03:07,312 --> 00:03:09,688 heading to Luxembourg from Berlin. 56 00:03:09,771 --> 00:03:14,193 - The Fokker 50 was a great performing aircraft overall. 57 00:03:14,318 --> 00:03:17,614 It's a commuter airplane, to be flown in Europe. 58 00:03:17,739 --> 00:03:19,532 We flew the aircraft day and night, 59 00:03:19,657 --> 00:03:21,533 in all weather conditions. 60 00:03:22,284 --> 00:03:25,163 (narrator): There are 19 passengers on the flight. 61 00:03:25,246 --> 00:03:27,247 Most are German business officials 62 00:03:27,372 --> 00:03:29,292 travelling to Luxembourg. 63 00:03:31,044 --> 00:03:33,211 The first officer on this morning's flight 64 00:03:33,295 --> 00:03:36,049 is 32-year-old John Arendt. 65 00:03:36,174 --> 00:03:38,050 - I'll brief the folks. 66 00:03:38,967 --> 00:03:40,469 Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. 67 00:03:40,594 --> 00:03:44,139 Uh, unfortunately, the fog in Luxembourg is so dense 68 00:03:44,264 --> 00:03:46,600 that at the moment we cannot land. 69 00:03:47,100 --> 00:03:49,437 So we'll have to wait a little bit for an improvement. 70 00:03:49,562 --> 00:03:52,230 We will proceed to a holding pattern 71 00:03:52,314 --> 00:03:54,442 while we wait for the weather to clear. 72 00:03:54,567 --> 00:03:57,569 We'll keep you updated as soon as we have some news. 73 00:03:59,948 --> 00:04:04,076 (narrator): The captain is 26-year-old Claude Poeckes. 74 00:04:04,868 --> 00:04:07,955 - And Luxair 9642 is 75 00:04:08,080 --> 00:04:12,585 reducing speed to 160. 76 00:04:12,669 --> 00:04:14,544 - Roger 9642. 77 00:04:15,545 --> 00:04:17,923 (narrator): The crew navigates toward the holding area 78 00:04:18,048 --> 00:04:19,675 north of the airport. 79 00:04:20,425 --> 00:04:23,762 - What time can we hold till? How much fuel will we need? 80 00:04:23,846 --> 00:04:27,809 - Uh, 550... 81 00:04:27,934 --> 00:04:29,394 uh... 700. 82 00:04:29,476 --> 00:04:32,980 No, we'll need 8-50 when we leave the hold. 83 00:04:33,105 --> 00:04:36,192 - No. We need fuel to reach till our alternate 84 00:04:36,317 --> 00:04:39,612 plus 20 minutes reserve. So we'll still need 600 kilos. 85 00:04:39,696 --> 00:04:41,197 - Yes, but I want to keep-- 86 00:04:41,322 --> 00:04:43,949 (controller on radio): Luxair 9642 descend to 3,000 feet 87 00:04:44,074 --> 00:04:47,495 on 1023, turn left heading 130. 88 00:04:48,913 --> 00:04:50,956 (narrator): Before they reach the holding point, 89 00:04:51,040 --> 00:04:52,750 the crew receives instructions 90 00:04:52,834 --> 00:04:56,211 to turn towards the airport and begin descent. 91 00:04:58,172 --> 00:05:00,632 - Is that for us? - Yes. 92 00:05:01,843 --> 00:05:04,762 - Uh, descend to 3,000 feet. Say again the heading. 93 00:05:04,846 --> 00:05:06,346 (controller on radio): 130. 94 00:05:07,348 --> 00:05:12,144 - Left heading 130, Luxair 9642. 95 00:05:12,894 --> 00:05:14,396 What kind of crap is that? 96 00:05:14,521 --> 00:05:18,192 (narrator): The new instruction takes the crew by surprise. 97 00:05:19,360 --> 00:05:23,488 - If you suddenly get startled that you are now number one, 98 00:05:23,572 --> 00:05:28,286 and turning left, and descending for your approach as number one, 99 00:05:28,369 --> 00:05:30,245 this can put you in a situation 100 00:05:30,370 --> 00:05:32,706 which would add to your workload. 101 00:05:34,000 --> 00:05:35,709 - What's the RVR now? 102 00:05:35,834 --> 00:05:38,338 - I don't know, should we check with dispatch? 103 00:05:38,463 --> 00:05:39,880 - Yes. 104 00:05:40,673 --> 00:05:44,093 (narrator): RVR is Runway Visual Range. 105 00:05:44,218 --> 00:05:47,180 It's the minimum visibility on the runway required 106 00:05:47,262 --> 00:05:49,014 by a landing aircraft. 107 00:05:49,139 --> 00:05:50,516 For the Luxair Fokker, 108 00:05:50,641 --> 00:05:55,271 that distance is 300 metres, or 984 feet. 109 00:05:56,230 --> 00:05:59,483 - If the runway visual range is below 300 metres, 110 00:05:59,567 --> 00:06:01,735 you are not allowed to start the approach 111 00:06:01,860 --> 00:06:03,696 or to land the aircraft. 112 00:06:04,197 --> 00:06:07,492 - Dispatch, 9642, what's the current RVR? 113 00:06:07,574 --> 00:06:10,452 (dispatcher on radio): Uh, 275. 114 00:06:10,577 --> 00:06:13,915 - 275 metres. What do we do now? 115 00:06:14,040 --> 00:06:16,084 - I don't know. 116 00:06:17,250 --> 00:06:19,586 - If they don't have that visibility, they go around 117 00:06:19,711 --> 00:06:21,713 and they'll probably get vectored for another approach 118 00:06:21,798 --> 00:06:24,841 unless the RVR is too low, then they're gonna be vectored 119 00:06:24,925 --> 00:06:26,552 to the holding pattern at Diekirch. 120 00:06:27,552 --> 00:06:29,846 - So are we holding or is this for an approach? 121 00:06:29,930 --> 00:06:31,723 - It's for an approach. 122 00:06:31,807 --> 00:06:33,225 (controller): Luxair 9642 123 00:06:33,350 --> 00:06:35,103 turn right heading 220. 124 00:06:35,228 --> 00:06:36,478 Cleared for approach. 125 00:06:36,603 --> 00:06:39,232 (Arendt): - Right heading 220, and uh, 126 00:06:39,357 --> 00:06:42,442 cleared for approach, 9642. 127 00:06:44,237 --> 00:06:46,197 - Tell him that if at ECHO we don't have 300 metres 128 00:06:46,279 --> 00:06:48,408 that we'll do a go-around and enter the hold. 129 00:06:49,617 --> 00:06:52,120 (narrator): The pilots come up with a compromise. 130 00:06:52,245 --> 00:06:54,079 They'll continue their approach, 131 00:06:54,163 --> 00:06:56,790 but if runway visibility doesn't improve, 132 00:06:56,915 --> 00:06:59,584 they'll abort and join the holding pattern. 133 00:07:00,752 --> 00:07:03,255 (Arendt): We need 300 metres for the approach. 134 00:07:03,964 --> 00:07:05,716 - 9642, copied. 135 00:07:05,800 --> 00:07:08,218 Continue your approach. I'll keep you advised. 136 00:07:08,302 --> 00:07:10,346 (foreboding music) 137 00:07:10,471 --> 00:07:12,264 (narrator): Passengers still believe they're headed 138 00:07:12,389 --> 00:07:14,266 for an extended hold. 139 00:07:14,350 --> 00:07:17,103 (engine buzzing) 140 00:07:19,480 --> 00:07:24,944 (Arendt): Speed's 95, 105, 109. 141 00:07:25,069 --> 00:07:28,447 - Landing altitude? - 275 metres. 142 00:07:28,572 --> 00:07:29,615 - Set. 143 00:07:30,658 --> 00:07:34,120 (narrator): The flight is now only 5 miles from the runway 144 00:07:34,245 --> 00:07:37,415 and there's no word that visibility has improved. 145 00:07:37,497 --> 00:07:39,459 Captain Poeckes makes his decision. 146 00:07:39,584 --> 00:07:42,836 - Okay, we'll do a go-around. Missed Approach. 147 00:07:43,504 --> 00:07:45,505 - Ground Idle Stop off. 148 00:07:49,009 --> 00:07:50,761 (controller): Luxair 9642, 149 00:07:50,845 --> 00:07:53,055 RVR is 300 metres. 150 00:07:53,514 --> 00:07:56,100 (narrator): But before the crew can execute a go-around, 151 00:07:56,184 --> 00:07:58,769 the controller issues a last-minute update 152 00:07:58,853 --> 00:08:00,562 to runway conditions. 153 00:08:02,189 --> 00:08:04,817 - 9642 continuing approach. 154 00:08:06,067 --> 00:08:07,528 (narrator): The visibility now meets 155 00:08:07,653 --> 00:08:09,572 the Fokker's minimum requirements. 156 00:08:09,697 --> 00:08:12,574 The crew's plans have changed again. 157 00:08:14,410 --> 00:08:16,954 (Krieger): Things change rather quickly for a flight crew 158 00:08:17,038 --> 00:08:18,331 when they're doing an approach 159 00:08:18,456 --> 00:08:20,665 which requires really precise coordination 160 00:08:20,750 --> 00:08:22,418 among the crew members to make sure 161 00:08:22,543 --> 00:08:23,752 that everything goes smoothly 162 00:08:23,877 --> 00:08:26,047 and that they're stabilized on the approach. 163 00:08:26,172 --> 00:08:27,423 (engine buzzing) 164 00:08:27,548 --> 00:08:29,341 (narrator): 4 miles from the airport, 165 00:08:29,425 --> 00:08:31,843 Flight 9642 is at an altitude 166 00:08:31,968 --> 00:08:33,846 of 1,500 feet. 167 00:08:35,639 --> 00:08:36,849 - Flaps? 168 00:08:38,183 --> 00:08:40,727 - Uh, we are flaps 10. 169 00:08:41,979 --> 00:08:44,273 - 9642, you are cleared to land, 170 00:08:44,398 --> 00:08:46,984 wind 180 degrees, 5 knots. 171 00:08:47,400 --> 00:08:49,986 (tense music) 172 00:08:50,403 --> 00:08:53,198 - Uh, gear down? - Yeah. 173 00:08:53,282 --> 00:08:55,909 - Cleared to land 9642. 174 00:08:57,953 --> 00:09:00,081 (narrator): The flight is now two minutes 175 00:09:00,206 --> 00:09:02,332 from landing in Luxembourg. 176 00:09:05,919 --> 00:09:08,755 (hubbub, whirring) 177 00:09:09,256 --> 00:09:10,924 - The hell is that?! 178 00:09:11,049 --> 00:09:12,426 (engine buzzing) 179 00:09:12,552 --> 00:09:15,471 (narrator): Something has gone wrong with the engines. 180 00:09:16,013 --> 00:09:17,347 (whirring, clicking) 181 00:09:17,431 --> 00:09:19,182 (passengers yelping) 182 00:09:20,600 --> 00:09:21,726 - Oh! 183 00:09:23,187 --> 00:09:25,565 (narrator): Now at less than 500 feet, 184 00:09:25,690 --> 00:09:29,067 Flight 9642 plummets towards the ground. 185 00:09:29,150 --> 00:09:30,235 (screaming) 186 00:09:30,318 --> 00:09:32,363 (GPWS): Terrain. Terrain. 187 00:09:34,282 --> 00:09:37,743 - Pull, pull, pull, pull, pull, pull, pull! 188 00:09:38,369 --> 00:09:40,913 - The airplane suddenly went into a rapid 189 00:09:41,038 --> 00:09:45,167 and uncontrollable descent in a very low altitude, 190 00:09:45,293 --> 00:09:47,753 which was impossible to recover. 191 00:09:47,878 --> 00:09:50,298 (engine buzzing) 192 00:09:50,423 --> 00:09:53,384 (passengers screaming) 193 00:09:58,972 --> 00:10:00,932 (devices beeping) 194 00:10:01,892 --> 00:10:03,894 - 9642, Luxembourg. 195 00:10:05,520 --> 00:10:08,606 Luxair 9642, Luxembourg. 196 00:10:10,359 --> 00:10:13,613 Luxair 9642, Luxembourg, do you read? 197 00:10:18,241 --> 00:10:20,660 We have a possible crash of a Fokker F50 198 00:10:20,785 --> 00:10:23,288 on final approach to runway 27. 199 00:10:23,371 --> 00:10:24,539 Please stand by. 200 00:10:24,664 --> 00:10:27,793 (sirens wailing in distance) 201 00:10:30,379 --> 00:10:31,714 (narrator): The wreckage is located 202 00:10:31,839 --> 00:10:34,466 2 miles east of the airfield. 203 00:10:34,966 --> 00:10:36,259 (helicopters buzzing) 204 00:10:36,344 --> 00:10:38,471 Of the 22 people on board, 205 00:10:38,596 --> 00:10:40,639 only two survive the crash, 206 00:10:40,764 --> 00:10:43,100 including Captain Poeckes. 207 00:10:43,600 --> 00:10:47,229 This is Luxembourg's deadliest aviation disaster. 208 00:10:47,355 --> 00:10:49,356 (melancholic music) 209 00:10:49,481 --> 00:10:51,149 (McNair): Well, this accident is serious 210 00:10:51,274 --> 00:10:53,485 because there was loss of life. A lot of people died that day. 211 00:10:53,610 --> 00:10:56,447 And it was, uh, an accident that was hard to understand. 212 00:10:58,198 --> 00:11:01,159 (narrator): Investigators will need to examine the wreckage 213 00:11:01,284 --> 00:11:03,828 of Flight 9642 to determine 214 00:11:03,953 --> 00:11:07,166 why a landing at a modern, well-equipped airport 215 00:11:07,291 --> 00:11:09,835 went so terribly wrong. 216 00:11:12,629 --> 00:11:15,633 (heavy music) 217 00:11:15,716 --> 00:11:17,342 - The tail hits here. 218 00:11:17,467 --> 00:11:19,803 The left wing scrapes some trees, 219 00:11:19,886 --> 00:11:22,682 and then the plane skids across the road. 220 00:11:24,140 --> 00:11:25,683 (narrator): The wreckage tells investigators 221 00:11:25,768 --> 00:11:30,690 that Flight 9642 hit the ground in a nose up position. 222 00:11:32,357 --> 00:11:35,027 - The initial hypothesis would be that, in fact, 223 00:11:35,110 --> 00:11:36,320 they were trying to avoid the ground 224 00:11:36,403 --> 00:11:38,154 when the aircraft hit the ground. 225 00:11:39,322 --> 00:11:42,033 - Engine failure? Windshear? 226 00:11:42,158 --> 00:11:43,869 Mechanical issue? 227 00:11:44,577 --> 00:11:47,123 (narrator): The debris pattern leaves investigators 228 00:11:47,248 --> 00:11:49,667 with a few obvious possibilities. 229 00:11:50,375 --> 00:11:53,086 (Friesacher): Aircrafts don't crash short of runways. 230 00:11:53,211 --> 00:11:55,965 Do they have false indications? Were the engines running? 231 00:11:56,090 --> 00:11:59,051 So there are lots of things you have to initially think about. 232 00:11:59,844 --> 00:12:02,721 (narrator): As they gather wreckage from the accident site, 233 00:12:02,846 --> 00:12:05,975 investigators wonder if the controller can provide 234 00:12:06,100 --> 00:12:09,144 any insight into the flight's final minutes. 235 00:12:10,437 --> 00:12:13,065 - Anything unusual? Out of the ordinary? 236 00:12:13,149 --> 00:12:15,192 - The whole day was out of the ordinary. 237 00:12:16,527 --> 00:12:18,571 (narrator): The controller explains that the weather 238 00:12:18,653 --> 00:12:22,740 prevented planes from landing, forcing them into a hold. 239 00:12:24,994 --> 00:12:27,078 - And that includes Flight 9642? 240 00:12:27,203 --> 00:12:28,873 - At first, yes. 241 00:12:28,956 --> 00:12:31,000 (heavy sigh) 242 00:12:31,708 --> 00:12:37,089 Luxair 9642 enter Diekirch hold flight level 90. 243 00:12:37,173 --> 00:12:39,633 But before they reach the hold, the weather cleared. 244 00:12:40,676 --> 00:12:45,221 Luxair 9642 descend to 3,000 feet on 1023, 245 00:12:45,306 --> 00:12:47,515 turn left heading 130. 246 00:12:49,434 --> 00:12:50,644 (narrator): He also states 247 00:12:50,769 --> 00:12:52,229 that because of its position, 248 00:12:52,312 --> 00:12:55,191 Flight 9642 was the first plane 249 00:12:55,316 --> 00:12:56,692 directed to the airport 250 00:12:56,817 --> 00:12:58,693 when the weather began to clear. 251 00:12:59,778 --> 00:13:02,280 - They needed 300 metres of visibility to land, 252 00:13:02,405 --> 00:13:05,283 which we got at 10:05. 253 00:13:05,366 --> 00:13:06,826 So I cleared them to land. 254 00:13:07,912 --> 00:13:10,288 - Even though they were heading for the holding pattern, 255 00:13:10,371 --> 00:13:12,291 the controller saw an opportunity. 256 00:13:12,374 --> 00:13:14,710 They were in an ideal position 257 00:13:14,835 --> 00:13:18,004 to the final approach fix and also the Luxembourg Airport. 258 00:13:19,631 --> 00:13:21,008 - And then? 259 00:13:22,217 --> 00:13:23,885 - That was the last we spoke. 260 00:13:24,010 --> 00:13:26,388 - No emergency call? - No. 261 00:13:26,514 --> 00:13:28,307 Nothing. 262 00:13:29,682 --> 00:13:31,559 (narrator): The controller can't explain 263 00:13:31,684 --> 00:13:34,020 why the Fokker ended up hitting the ground 264 00:13:34,145 --> 00:13:35,980 2 miles from the airport. 265 00:13:36,105 --> 00:13:39,150 (pensive music) 266 00:13:39,235 --> 00:13:40,860 - From an air traffic control standpoint, 267 00:13:40,985 --> 00:13:42,863 there was nothing in the communication 268 00:13:42,988 --> 00:13:45,533 between the aircraft and air traffic 269 00:13:45,658 --> 00:13:47,826 to indicate that there was any problem whatsoever 270 00:13:47,951 --> 00:13:49,577 with the aircraft at all. 271 00:13:50,538 --> 00:13:52,664 (narrator): Only Captain Poeckes can answer 272 00:13:52,748 --> 00:13:55,208 why the Fokker went down short of the runway, 273 00:13:55,333 --> 00:13:58,504 but he's been hospitalized and is in a coma. 274 00:13:59,087 --> 00:14:01,340 Investigators will need to piece together 275 00:14:01,423 --> 00:14:03,424 the final minutes of the flight without him. 276 00:14:03,551 --> 00:14:05,719 (Friesacher): With the captain not being available, 277 00:14:05,845 --> 00:14:07,178 the objective evidence, 278 00:14:07,263 --> 00:14:09,722 the physical evidence talks to you. 279 00:14:10,724 --> 00:14:12,350 (narrator): They begin by studying 280 00:14:12,433 --> 00:14:15,812 the engine components for any signs of failure. 281 00:14:17,898 --> 00:14:20,192 - They look like they're in pretty good shape. 282 00:14:21,277 --> 00:14:22,695 (Friesacher): Engines normally hold 283 00:14:22,778 --> 00:14:26,573 the aircraft in the air, and they fly towards the runway. 284 00:14:26,698 --> 00:14:30,201 So I would suggest something happened to the engines 285 00:14:30,285 --> 00:14:31,370 that they didn't make it 286 00:14:31,495 --> 00:14:33,413 to the runway in the first place. 287 00:14:36,166 --> 00:14:39,253 - No fire, no damage to any components, 288 00:14:39,378 --> 00:14:42,214 the rotors are fine, fuel lines are intact, 289 00:14:42,339 --> 00:14:45,801 intake is clear, pumps and PCUs all check out. 290 00:14:46,509 --> 00:14:49,178 I can't find anything wrong with either engine. 291 00:14:50,221 --> 00:14:52,682 (narrator): The state of the engines is puzzling. 292 00:14:52,765 --> 00:14:54,851 If both were in good working order, 293 00:14:54,934 --> 00:14:57,897 what could have caused the flight to fall from the sky 294 00:14:57,980 --> 00:14:59,899 just short of the runway? 295 00:15:00,441 --> 00:15:02,567 (mysterious piano music) 296 00:15:02,692 --> 00:15:05,946 - This is where they're turned for the approach. 297 00:15:07,030 --> 00:15:10,241 (narrator): Investigators use Luxembourg's radar data 298 00:15:10,326 --> 00:15:13,913 to recreate Flight 9642's flight path. 299 00:15:14,538 --> 00:15:16,164 - Seven minutes to impact. 300 00:15:16,289 --> 00:15:17,582 - They're at 9,000 feet 301 00:15:17,707 --> 00:15:19,250 when they're cleared for the approach. 302 00:15:19,375 --> 00:15:22,129 Now he descends even more steeply, 303 00:15:22,254 --> 00:15:24,715 and at 7,000 feet per minute. 304 00:15:24,798 --> 00:15:27,216 - They're only 4 miles away from the runway. 305 00:15:27,301 --> 00:15:30,428 15 seconds later, they hit the ground. 306 00:15:33,307 --> 00:15:34,390 Here's the glideslope. 307 00:15:34,475 --> 00:15:37,561 (soft investigative music) 308 00:15:37,644 --> 00:15:38,895 - Whoa. 309 00:15:39,647 --> 00:15:42,357 (narrator): When investigators compare the plane's descent 310 00:15:42,482 --> 00:15:43,900 with the recommended descent, 311 00:15:43,984 --> 00:15:47,613 they see that the flight was 300 feet too high 312 00:15:47,738 --> 00:15:50,783 throughout the final stages of its approach. 313 00:15:51,616 --> 00:15:54,119 - That explains why they were in such a hurry 314 00:15:54,244 --> 00:15:55,828 to lose altitude. 315 00:15:57,163 --> 00:16:01,125 - 300 feet above the glide slope, 316 00:16:01,250 --> 00:16:03,796 this is a real problem because you now try 317 00:16:03,921 --> 00:16:07,383 to descend the aircraft, slow down the aircraft, 318 00:16:07,508 --> 00:16:09,884 and configure everything at the same time, 319 00:16:10,009 --> 00:16:12,136 which is nearly impossible. 320 00:16:12,679 --> 00:16:15,057 (narrator): Why did the pilots allow their plane 321 00:16:15,182 --> 00:16:17,643 to get into such a difficult situation? 322 00:16:18,143 --> 00:16:20,229 - Not a good idea to be rushing on an approach at all, 323 00:16:20,354 --> 00:16:23,731 especially in low RVR, dangerous actually. 324 00:16:26,818 --> 00:16:28,778 (investigative music) 325 00:16:28,861 --> 00:16:30,072 (Poeckes on CVR): Heavy fog. 326 00:16:30,197 --> 00:16:32,032 It will be a hard landing. 327 00:16:32,157 --> 00:16:34,909 (narrator): The team listens to Flight 9642's 328 00:16:35,034 --> 00:16:37,663 Cockpit Voice Recording, or CVR, 329 00:16:37,788 --> 00:16:39,163 for clues that can explain 330 00:16:39,288 --> 00:16:41,833 the pilots' dangerous predicament. 331 00:16:43,460 --> 00:16:46,129 - Okay, they know the weather's going to be an issue. 332 00:16:46,212 --> 00:16:48,090 (Poeckes on CVR): I'll call dispatch. 333 00:16:48,716 --> 00:16:52,009 Dispatch, good morning, 9642. 334 00:16:52,094 --> 00:16:54,138 (dispatcher): 9642, good morning. 335 00:16:54,221 --> 00:16:55,889 - How is the weather at the moment? 336 00:16:56,014 --> 00:16:58,725 (dispatcher): RVR is 250 at the moment. 337 00:16:58,850 --> 00:17:00,019 If it doesn't get better, 338 00:17:00,144 --> 00:17:02,229 you will be diverted to Saarbrücken. 339 00:17:02,354 --> 00:17:03,938 - Okay, thank you. 340 00:17:04,480 --> 00:17:06,858 Oh no. I will not go to Saarbrücken. 341 00:17:06,942 --> 00:17:07,984 (soft chuckle) 342 00:17:08,067 --> 00:17:09,153 - I'm with you. 343 00:17:09,236 --> 00:17:11,446 (terminal on CVR): Wind 1-10, 4 knots. 344 00:17:11,571 --> 00:17:13,030 Expect ILS approach, 345 00:17:13,115 --> 00:17:16,660 runway 27, transition level 60. 346 00:17:16,743 --> 00:17:19,203 - He does not want to divert. 347 00:17:24,417 --> 00:17:27,962 (controller on CVR): Luxair 9642 enter Diekirch 348 00:17:28,087 --> 00:17:30,089 hold flight level 90. 349 00:17:30,883 --> 00:17:33,050 - They're being directed into the holding pattern. 350 00:17:39,391 --> 00:17:42,935 (Arendt on CVR): No. We need fuel to reach to our alternate 351 00:17:43,060 --> 00:17:46,481 plus 20 minutes reserve. So we'll still need 600 kilos. 352 00:17:46,940 --> 00:17:48,400 - Okay. Good. 353 00:17:48,525 --> 00:17:50,152 They want to make sure there's enough fuel 354 00:17:50,277 --> 00:17:52,112 to reach their alternate. 355 00:17:52,237 --> 00:17:53,780 (Poeckes on CVR): Yes, but I want to keep-- 356 00:17:53,905 --> 00:17:57,951 (controller on CVR): Luxair 9642 descend to 3,000 feet on 1023, 357 00:17:58,076 --> 00:18:00,453 turn left heading 130. 358 00:18:01,371 --> 00:18:03,915 - And then they're hit with a new plan. 359 00:18:07,126 --> 00:18:10,631 (intriguing music) 360 00:18:15,469 --> 00:18:17,637 (narrator): The recording reveals that the pilots 361 00:18:17,762 --> 00:18:19,515 were surprised by the instruction 362 00:18:19,640 --> 00:18:21,474 to begin their approach. 363 00:18:21,599 --> 00:18:23,519 - What kind of crap is that? 364 00:18:25,144 --> 00:18:27,439 - They were not happy about the change of plans. 365 00:18:30,983 --> 00:18:32,318 (narrator): The sudden change meant 366 00:18:32,443 --> 00:18:34,445 that instead of proceeding to the hold, 367 00:18:34,570 --> 00:18:37,532 the pilots quickly initiated a left turn, 368 00:18:37,657 --> 00:18:40,618 and began a steady descent towards the runway 369 00:18:40,743 --> 00:18:44,205 all while configuring their plane for landing. 370 00:18:45,082 --> 00:18:49,627 - So the crew were forced to rush themselves 371 00:18:49,711 --> 00:18:53,132 down to the final approach fix. 372 00:18:53,965 --> 00:18:55,217 (narrator): The rushed approach 373 00:18:55,342 --> 00:18:58,470 now becomes the focus of the investigation. 374 00:19:00,221 --> 00:19:03,808 (controller on CVR): Luxair 9642 turn right heading 220. 375 00:19:03,892 --> 00:19:05,434 Cleared for approach. 376 00:19:05,519 --> 00:19:08,271 - Okay, they're starting their approach. 377 00:19:09,021 --> 00:19:11,817 - For a low visibility approach, 378 00:19:11,942 --> 00:19:14,027 properly briefed and performed, 379 00:19:14,153 --> 00:19:17,698 it's very structured, organized, and standardized, 380 00:19:17,823 --> 00:19:19,490 so each pilot knows exactly 381 00:19:19,615 --> 00:19:22,493 which task they have to do at which time. 382 00:19:23,912 --> 00:19:25,497 - Should we switch the seatbelt sign on? 383 00:19:25,622 --> 00:19:27,915 - Yes, yes. Not a bad idea. 384 00:19:28,541 --> 00:19:31,002 (soft pensive music) 385 00:19:31,086 --> 00:19:33,588 Localizer captured. 386 00:19:34,047 --> 00:19:35,464 - Uh, check. 387 00:19:35,548 --> 00:19:37,342 Missed approach heading. 388 00:19:37,467 --> 00:19:39,219 - They're not running a checklist. 389 00:19:39,344 --> 00:19:42,263 They're just throwing out random steps. 390 00:19:42,638 --> 00:19:44,182 (narrator): Over the next few minutes, 391 00:19:44,307 --> 00:19:46,727 investigators hear several clear indications 392 00:19:46,852 --> 00:19:51,022 that the pilots are improvising this unexpected approach. 393 00:19:51,606 --> 00:19:53,901 (Hildebrand): You must be fully established, 394 00:19:54,026 --> 00:19:57,028 which means gear down, flaps extended, 395 00:19:57,112 --> 00:19:58,614 landing checklist completed, 396 00:19:58,739 --> 00:20:01,825 speed and altitude all at the correct spot. 397 00:20:02,366 --> 00:20:03,951 - Hey, are we at the beacon yet? 398 00:20:04,076 --> 00:20:06,203 - You should have it dialled in by now. 399 00:20:06,704 --> 00:20:08,707 - I can use the DME instead. 400 00:20:09,249 --> 00:20:10,875 - Yeah, yeah, yeah. 401 00:20:11,460 --> 00:20:13,961 (narrator): Even basic steps such as configuring 402 00:20:14,086 --> 00:20:17,089 the navigation system aren't performed. 403 00:20:17,214 --> 00:20:18,759 (Friesacher): Flying an aircraft is about 404 00:20:18,884 --> 00:20:24,388 a precise following of certain steps at certain times. 405 00:20:24,472 --> 00:20:27,893 It's starting on an approach involving all the crew members. 406 00:20:27,976 --> 00:20:30,144 It's about detailed planning. 407 00:20:33,690 --> 00:20:36,567 - They're skipping steps and improvising the procedures. 408 00:20:36,652 --> 00:20:39,403 The change of plans caught them by surprise. 409 00:20:43,991 --> 00:20:47,788 (pensive music) 410 00:20:49,914 --> 00:20:52,125 - They're racing against the clock. 411 00:20:54,294 --> 00:20:55,921 - They started to rush themselves 412 00:20:56,003 --> 00:20:58,673 in a quite high workload environment, 413 00:20:58,798 --> 00:21:03,553 trying to get the airplane down, and doing the approach briefing, 414 00:21:03,636 --> 00:21:07,766 all at once, which was quite tricky to achieve. 415 00:21:08,599 --> 00:21:11,228 (narrator): Did the rushed approach result in the pilots 416 00:21:11,310 --> 00:21:13,939 being too high as they neared the runway? 417 00:21:14,815 --> 00:21:17,608 - They're getting closer and closer to the airport. 418 00:21:18,151 --> 00:21:20,903 And at 3.5 miles out, 419 00:21:20,988 --> 00:21:23,365 they should be at 2,500 feet, 420 00:21:23,490 --> 00:21:26,285 but they're at 3,000 instead. 421 00:21:27,493 --> 00:21:29,621 (♪♪) 422 00:21:31,498 --> 00:21:34,542 (Arendt): Flaps? - Oh, we are flaps 10. 423 00:21:34,667 --> 00:21:37,878 (controller): 9642, you are cleared to land. 424 00:21:38,462 --> 00:21:41,465 (narrator): Instead of managing their altitude and speed, 425 00:21:41,549 --> 00:21:45,178 they're rushing to get their plane properly configured. 426 00:21:45,304 --> 00:21:47,180 (Hildebrand): Speed and altitude control 427 00:21:47,306 --> 00:21:49,348 is actually important for every approach, 428 00:21:49,473 --> 00:21:53,019 but especially for a low visibility approach 429 00:21:53,144 --> 00:21:54,563 where you have to be established 430 00:21:54,688 --> 00:21:57,606 much earlier than on a normal approach. 431 00:21:59,192 --> 00:22:00,986 - So why all the confusion? 432 00:22:01,111 --> 00:22:02,820 It can't just be the last-minute approach. 433 00:22:02,945 --> 00:22:05,198 - I don't think they thought they'd be able to land. 434 00:22:05,699 --> 00:22:07,159 Have a look. 435 00:22:08,701 --> 00:22:12,538 - RVR, RVR, RVR... 436 00:22:13,332 --> 00:22:15,334 (narrator): The cockpit recording makes it clear 437 00:22:15,416 --> 00:22:17,544 to investigators that the crew didn't think 438 00:22:17,669 --> 00:22:21,131 they'd have the required visibility to make the landing. 439 00:22:22,339 --> 00:22:24,259 - What's the RVR now? 440 00:22:24,384 --> 00:22:26,845 - I don't know, should we check with dispatch? 441 00:22:26,928 --> 00:22:28,221 - Yes. 442 00:22:28,721 --> 00:22:32,224 - They're told they have a visual range of 275 metres. 443 00:22:32,351 --> 00:22:34,478 But they need 300 minimum to land. 444 00:22:34,560 --> 00:22:36,855 - They're not sure how to proceed. 445 00:22:45,614 --> 00:22:47,740 - Their plan is to do a go-around 446 00:22:47,865 --> 00:22:50,493 if the visibility hasn't increased by the time 447 00:22:50,576 --> 00:22:52,496 they get to the outer marker here. 448 00:22:53,079 --> 00:22:58,085 - The outer marker can be seen as a decision or a cutoff point. 449 00:22:58,210 --> 00:22:59,711 Once you pass the outer marker, 450 00:22:59,836 --> 00:23:04,048 the RVR must be at the required minimum. 451 00:23:04,799 --> 00:23:06,843 - But as soon as they get to the outer marker, 452 00:23:06,926 --> 00:23:08,010 they get the magic words... 453 00:23:08,095 --> 00:23:10,221 - "300 metres." 454 00:23:12,432 --> 00:23:14,101 - Luxair 9642, 455 00:23:14,226 --> 00:23:16,394 RVR is 300 metres. 456 00:23:16,478 --> 00:23:20,440 You are cleared to land, wind 180 degrees, 5 knots. 457 00:23:20,565 --> 00:23:24,236 - But they're too high and need to lose altitude fast. 458 00:23:25,528 --> 00:23:26,988 (narrator): The CVR explains why 459 00:23:27,114 --> 00:23:30,409 the pilots ended up above their target altitude. 460 00:23:30,534 --> 00:23:32,411 They were rushed into the approach 461 00:23:32,536 --> 00:23:35,579 and fixated on the poor runway visibility. 462 00:23:37,082 --> 00:23:42,336 - Okay, so how does that lead to a crash 35 seconds later? 463 00:23:43,422 --> 00:23:46,423 (controller on CVR): 9642, you are cleared to land. 464 00:23:47,299 --> 00:23:48,926 (Arendt on CVR): Uh, gear down? 465 00:23:49,051 --> 00:23:50,220 (Poeckes on CVR): Yeah. 466 00:23:50,303 --> 00:23:52,931 (Arendt on CVR): Cleared to land 9642. 467 00:23:56,726 --> 00:23:57,935 And done. 468 00:23:58,019 --> 00:23:59,229 (hubbub) (static, whirring) 469 00:23:59,311 --> 00:24:00,939 (Poeckes on CVR): The hell is that?! 470 00:24:02,022 --> 00:24:03,357 (exhales) Oh! 471 00:24:03,482 --> 00:24:05,652 (GPWS): Terrain. Terrain. 472 00:24:07,863 --> 00:24:09,280 - What just happened? 473 00:24:10,073 --> 00:24:13,410 - In the last few seconds of the CVR recording, 474 00:24:13,492 --> 00:24:14,618 there was a loud noise. 475 00:24:14,702 --> 00:24:16,288 The crew was startled by this. 476 00:24:17,538 --> 00:24:20,208 - What happened in those last 20 seconds? 477 00:24:20,333 --> 00:24:22,251 - And what was that noise we heard? 478 00:24:22,335 --> 00:24:25,838 (investigative music) 479 00:24:25,963 --> 00:24:28,799 (hubbub, whirring) 480 00:24:29,217 --> 00:24:30,384 - The hell was that?! 481 00:24:30,509 --> 00:24:31,928 (passengers yelping) 482 00:24:32,011 --> 00:24:33,805 (engine buzzing) 483 00:24:35,515 --> 00:24:36,766 (♪♪) 484 00:24:36,849 --> 00:24:38,018 (narrator): Investigators hope 485 00:24:38,143 --> 00:24:40,854 the Flight Data Recorder, or FDR, 486 00:24:40,979 --> 00:24:43,190 can solve the mystery of what went wrong 487 00:24:43,315 --> 00:24:46,984 in Flight 9642's final seconds. 488 00:24:47,109 --> 00:24:51,865 - Okay, cruising along at 3,000 feet and 160 knots, 489 00:24:51,990 --> 00:24:55,285 then they start to descend, go flaps 10 490 00:24:55,367 --> 00:24:58,163 and accelerate rapidly towards the ground. 491 00:24:58,872 --> 00:25:00,999 - Let's see what the engines were doing. 492 00:25:02,625 --> 00:25:04,544 - What's happening here? 493 00:25:04,669 --> 00:25:07,672 Turbine RPMs drop, 494 00:25:07,756 --> 00:25:09,840 torque drops down to zero. 495 00:25:09,924 --> 00:25:11,843 Looks like he's gone down below Flight Idle, 496 00:25:11,926 --> 00:25:13,428 into Ground Mode. 497 00:25:15,888 --> 00:25:18,974 (narrator): Ground Mode changes the angle of the propellers 498 00:25:19,058 --> 00:25:20,809 so they can move the plane forward 499 00:25:20,894 --> 00:25:22,604 while it's on the ground. 500 00:25:22,729 --> 00:25:25,022 It's never used in the air. 501 00:25:26,066 --> 00:25:27,901 - But then... 502 00:25:28,026 --> 00:25:30,653 Turbine RPM spikes, 503 00:25:30,737 --> 00:25:33,155 fuel flow and torque increase. 504 00:25:33,240 --> 00:25:36,367 - All while the altitude starts to plunge. 505 00:25:36,910 --> 00:25:38,869 - Could they have gone into Beta Mode? 506 00:25:38,994 --> 00:25:40,622 (intriguing music) 507 00:25:40,747 --> 00:25:42,039 (engine rumbling) 508 00:25:42,123 --> 00:25:45,251 (narrator): Beta Mode is basically reverse thrust. 509 00:25:45,376 --> 00:25:48,003 The propellers are positioned to move air forward 510 00:25:48,087 --> 00:25:49,548 instead of back. 511 00:25:49,631 --> 00:25:53,384 It's used to help stop the plane after it touches down. 512 00:25:55,845 --> 00:25:57,846 - If you would put the power levers 513 00:25:57,931 --> 00:26:00,224 into Beta Mode in the air, 514 00:26:00,307 --> 00:26:03,144 this could lead to loss of control 515 00:26:03,269 --> 00:26:05,896 where recovery might not be possible. 516 00:26:05,980 --> 00:26:08,357 (narrator): Did the pilots of Flight 9642 517 00:26:08,441 --> 00:26:12,194 put their engines into reverse and if so, why? 518 00:26:12,278 --> 00:26:15,030 - Can we hear the last 20 seconds of that CVR again? 519 00:26:17,200 --> 00:26:18,326 (Arendt on CVR): And done. 520 00:26:18,451 --> 00:26:20,077 (hubbub) (static, whirring) 521 00:26:20,161 --> 00:26:21,578 (Poeckes on CVR): The hell is that?! 522 00:26:22,913 --> 00:26:23,914 Oh! 523 00:26:24,039 --> 00:26:26,209 (GPWS): Terrain. Terrain. 524 00:26:31,298 --> 00:26:33,842 - It's the propellers going into reverse. 525 00:26:34,342 --> 00:26:36,760 (narrator): Investigators now have an explanation 526 00:26:36,845 --> 00:26:39,596 for the deafening sound on the CVR. 527 00:26:40,222 --> 00:26:42,142 - This is almost like hitting the brakes. 528 00:26:42,267 --> 00:26:46,020 The aircraft would immediately dive into a rapid 529 00:26:46,145 --> 00:26:48,355 and uncontrollable descent. 530 00:26:49,231 --> 00:26:52,943 - How could the engines end up going into Ground Mode 531 00:26:53,068 --> 00:26:55,154 and then into reverse Beta Mode? 532 00:26:55,279 --> 00:26:57,615 How is that even possible? 533 00:26:59,534 --> 00:27:02,244 - The turboprop airplane, like the F50, 534 00:27:02,328 --> 00:27:06,665 it had a lot of safety, uh, features that would prevent 535 00:27:06,790 --> 00:27:10,127 the propeller from going into Beta Range in flight. 536 00:27:11,421 --> 00:27:14,507 (narrator): Before a plane can be put into reverse mode, 537 00:27:14,633 --> 00:27:18,470 the thrust levers must first pass through Ground Mode. 538 00:27:18,595 --> 00:27:21,388 A lock prevents this from happening. 539 00:27:21,513 --> 00:27:23,974 Pilots can switch the lock off in flight 540 00:27:24,099 --> 00:27:25,684 to prepare for landing. 541 00:27:25,809 --> 00:27:27,269 (engine rumbling) 542 00:27:28,813 --> 00:27:30,315 - Ground Idle Stop off. 543 00:27:30,856 --> 00:27:33,317 (narrator): First Officer Arendt performed that step 544 00:27:33,401 --> 00:27:36,488 as part of his Descent and Approach checklist. 545 00:27:37,071 --> 00:27:38,239 With the lock disabled, 546 00:27:38,365 --> 00:27:41,326 pilots can lift the Ground Range Selector 547 00:27:41,451 --> 00:27:43,994 and move the thrust levers to Ground Mode 548 00:27:44,119 --> 00:27:46,830 after landing to help slow the plane. 549 00:27:47,499 --> 00:27:50,669 But instead, the data reveals that the engines 550 00:27:50,751 --> 00:27:54,923 went into Ground Mode 25 seconds before the plane crashed. 551 00:27:55,048 --> 00:27:58,675 (dramatic music) 552 00:27:59,385 --> 00:28:01,721 - Did they do it on purpose? 553 00:28:02,638 --> 00:28:05,974 (McNair): The question is, "How did they get there?" Did the crew select it? 554 00:28:06,058 --> 00:28:07,434 Did they do it deliberately? 555 00:28:07,559 --> 00:28:09,186 Was it something bad that happened, 556 00:28:09,311 --> 00:28:10,646 the safety defences didn't work? 557 00:28:10,730 --> 00:28:12,856 These are all things that have to be looked at. 558 00:28:14,275 --> 00:28:16,443 - Okay, we're recording. 559 00:28:17,069 --> 00:28:19,614 Let's start with the taxi lights. 560 00:28:21,574 --> 00:28:24,243 (narrator): To find out if the crew intentionally put 561 00:28:24,368 --> 00:28:27,622 the plane into Ground Mode before they were on the ground, 562 00:28:27,747 --> 00:28:29,915 they record a number of different sounds 563 00:28:30,040 --> 00:28:32,585 in the cockpit of another Fokker 50. 564 00:28:32,711 --> 00:28:35,712 (pensive music) 565 00:28:37,089 --> 00:28:41,219 - Every switch has a sound attached to it. 566 00:28:41,845 --> 00:28:45,222 - Okay, let's try flaps to 10. 567 00:28:47,349 --> 00:28:51,145 (intriguing music) 568 00:28:52,439 --> 00:28:55,232 And now the Ground Range Selector. 569 00:29:03,825 --> 00:29:05,242 And that does it. 570 00:29:05,367 --> 00:29:08,078 - And this, uh, can be forensically analyzed 571 00:29:08,203 --> 00:29:10,414 and filtered out. 572 00:29:12,250 --> 00:29:15,795 - And you compare that to what you find from the Cockpit Voice Recorder. 573 00:29:16,462 --> 00:29:18,757 - These three sounds were picked up on the CVR. 574 00:29:18,839 --> 00:29:21,425 Let's start with this. 575 00:29:22,134 --> 00:29:23,260 (clicking) 576 00:29:23,385 --> 00:29:24,929 We were able to confirm that this sound 577 00:29:25,012 --> 00:29:27,640 is the taxi lights being switched on. 578 00:29:29,933 --> 00:29:30,934 (clicking) 579 00:29:31,019 --> 00:29:33,770 (♪♪) 580 00:29:33,855 --> 00:29:35,355 (rattling) 581 00:29:35,898 --> 00:29:38,817 The test recording confirms that that's the flap handle 582 00:29:38,942 --> 00:29:41,195 being moved to flaps 10 position. 583 00:29:42,821 --> 00:29:44,865 (rattling) 584 00:29:45,700 --> 00:29:47,451 And there's this. 585 00:29:48,536 --> 00:29:49,913 (clicking) 586 00:29:50,663 --> 00:29:53,750 We compared it to the sound recorded on the test plane. 587 00:29:53,833 --> 00:29:55,794 - It's a match? - Mm-hmm. 588 00:29:55,876 --> 00:29:58,212 (narrator): The audio analysis confirms 589 00:29:58,337 --> 00:30:00,464 that Captain Poeckes deliberately lifted 590 00:30:00,548 --> 00:30:03,509 the Ground Range Selector and moved his throttle 591 00:30:03,634 --> 00:30:05,929 to Ground Mode while the plane was making 592 00:30:06,011 --> 00:30:07,971 its approach to the airport. 593 00:30:08,640 --> 00:30:11,142 - The key element found in the sound spectrum study 594 00:30:11,226 --> 00:30:13,102 was the power lever was, in fact, moved 595 00:30:13,185 --> 00:30:14,561 below the Flight Idle gate. 596 00:30:14,686 --> 00:30:17,315 And this was something that meant the pilot had to do it. 597 00:30:17,397 --> 00:30:19,776 (soft investigative music) 598 00:30:19,858 --> 00:30:20,984 - Okay. 599 00:30:21,486 --> 00:30:23,779 So we know he did this on purpose. 600 00:30:24,530 --> 00:30:25,824 But why? 601 00:30:27,407 --> 00:30:30,494 - There is no maneuver or procedure 602 00:30:30,619 --> 00:30:34,833 asking the pilots to actually lift the Ground Range Selector 603 00:30:34,915 --> 00:30:39,336 in flight and pull the power levers below Flight Idle. 604 00:30:39,461 --> 00:30:42,173 It's a prohibited, non-standard procedure 605 00:30:42,298 --> 00:30:45,300 and should never be done by the pilots. 606 00:30:46,051 --> 00:30:47,846 (narrator): What could have prompted the pilots 607 00:30:47,971 --> 00:30:50,847 to put their engines into Ground Mode? 608 00:30:52,474 --> 00:30:54,269 - He's 5 miles away from the airport 609 00:30:54,394 --> 00:30:56,770 when he decides to land, but he's 300 feet 610 00:30:56,895 --> 00:31:00,191 above the glideslope and his speed is 165 knots. 611 00:31:00,275 --> 00:31:02,067 If he wants to get down to the glideslope, 612 00:31:02,192 --> 00:31:04,028 he needs to descend rapidly, 613 00:31:04,153 --> 00:31:06,364 but his speed is already quite fast. 614 00:31:06,489 --> 00:31:09,784 So instead, he slams on the brakes. 615 00:31:11,493 --> 00:31:13,872 - Once the power levers are in Ground Idle, 616 00:31:13,997 --> 00:31:17,333 this will produce extra drag on the propellers, 617 00:31:17,416 --> 00:31:21,336 reducing the speed, and also allowing the aircraft 618 00:31:21,421 --> 00:31:23,631 to descend at the same time. 619 00:31:24,923 --> 00:31:28,803 (controller): Luxair 9642, RVR is 300 metres. 620 00:31:29,429 --> 00:31:32,432 (narrator): Investigators believe that when the crew is told 621 00:31:32,557 --> 00:31:34,726 that runway visibility has improved, 622 00:31:34,808 --> 00:31:37,854 Captain Poeckes moved his engines to Ground Mode 623 00:31:37,936 --> 00:31:41,523 to quickly reduce speed and lose altitude. 624 00:31:45,944 --> 00:31:47,279 - Not sure that'll do it. 625 00:31:47,404 --> 00:31:50,575 9642 continuing approach. 626 00:31:52,201 --> 00:31:53,411 Flaps? 627 00:31:53,952 --> 00:31:57,164 - They should have made a better decision and go around, 628 00:31:57,289 --> 00:31:59,584 reposition, and fly a proper approach, 629 00:31:59,709 --> 00:32:02,921 or divert to the alternate and not forcing it in. 630 00:32:03,296 --> 00:32:07,383 - Okay, we can explain putting the engines into Ground Mode, 631 00:32:08,134 --> 00:32:09,760 but reverse? 632 00:32:11,887 --> 00:32:14,057 (hubbub) (beeping, whirring) - The hell is that?! 633 00:32:16,142 --> 00:32:19,436 (passengers screaming) 634 00:32:20,313 --> 00:32:21,605 Oh! 635 00:32:22,856 --> 00:32:24,776 (engine buzzing) 636 00:32:26,318 --> 00:32:30,073 - So the lock is only released when the plane is on the ground. 637 00:32:30,865 --> 00:32:35,452 (narrator): Investigators know the pilots of Luxair Flight 9642 638 00:32:35,536 --> 00:32:39,039 put their plane into Ground Mode before landing, 639 00:32:39,499 --> 00:32:42,125 but it doesn't explain why the throttles were moved 640 00:32:42,210 --> 00:32:43,586 further back to reverse, 641 00:32:43,670 --> 00:32:46,798 while they were still hundreds of feet in the air. 642 00:32:46,881 --> 00:32:48,883 - It should be impossible to do. 643 00:32:49,549 --> 00:32:53,221 - To get to that range in flight, it's not supposed to happen. 644 00:32:53,346 --> 00:32:56,223 There's supposed to be two things that prevent it from happening. 645 00:32:57,517 --> 00:33:00,353 (narrator): An electrical lock prevents the power levers 646 00:33:00,478 --> 00:33:03,355 from being moved into reverse in flight. 647 00:33:03,980 --> 00:33:05,566 Once the plane is on the ground 648 00:33:05,692 --> 00:33:08,903 and the wheels are spinning at at least 20 miles an hour, 649 00:33:09,028 --> 00:33:11,321 a signal is sent to an electrical switch 650 00:33:11,446 --> 00:33:15,159 that releases the Flight Idle Stop and allows the throttles 651 00:33:15,242 --> 00:33:17,619 to move to the reverse position. 652 00:33:18,078 --> 00:33:20,163 - This system is only meant to be used on the ground, 653 00:33:20,248 --> 00:33:21,582 and that's why they have a lot of protections 654 00:33:21,708 --> 00:33:24,501 to make that the only possibility that's gonna happen. 655 00:33:25,877 --> 00:33:28,338 - Could the lock have somehow failed? 656 00:33:30,173 --> 00:33:32,551 - The mechanical stop is installed 657 00:33:32,676 --> 00:33:36,263 so that the pilots can, under no circumstances, 658 00:33:36,388 --> 00:33:38,766 physically move the power levers 659 00:33:38,891 --> 00:33:40,268 beyond Ground Idle, 660 00:33:40,393 --> 00:33:44,689 so no reverse thrust possible. 661 00:33:46,148 --> 00:33:48,192 (narrator): Investigators study the components 662 00:33:48,317 --> 00:33:50,903 that make up the locking system. 663 00:33:51,028 --> 00:33:52,904 - The anti-skid system checks out, 664 00:33:53,029 --> 00:33:54,531 the wheel speed relays are fine, 665 00:33:54,656 --> 00:33:57,160 and there's nothing wrong with the lock switch. 666 00:33:57,242 --> 00:33:58,952 (investigative music) 667 00:33:59,077 --> 00:34:02,330 (narrator): Investigators also check the anti-skid sensors 668 00:34:02,414 --> 00:34:04,166 which measure wheel speed, 669 00:34:04,250 --> 00:34:06,586 the computer that receives those signals, 670 00:34:06,711 --> 00:34:09,505 and the switch controlling the lock. 671 00:34:11,548 --> 00:34:13,217 - Everything seemed to check out normally. 672 00:34:14,342 --> 00:34:17,554 - It shouldn't unlock unless the wheels are spinning. 673 00:34:17,679 --> 00:34:19,431 So what went wrong? 674 00:34:20,056 --> 00:34:21,559 (narrator): Investigators scrutinize 675 00:34:21,684 --> 00:34:24,519 the electrical lock system that should have prevented 676 00:34:24,603 --> 00:34:28,023 Flight 9642 from going into reverse. 677 00:34:28,106 --> 00:34:29,817 - Anything in the maintenance record? 678 00:34:29,942 --> 00:34:31,402 - There's this. 679 00:34:32,612 --> 00:34:34,237 (narrator): They discover an incident 680 00:34:34,322 --> 00:34:37,074 that happened 14 years earlier. 681 00:34:38,992 --> 00:34:44,916 - "Power lever setting below Flight Idle possible in flight." 682 00:34:45,041 --> 00:34:46,291 Huh. 683 00:34:46,793 --> 00:34:48,251 (narrator): In 1988, 684 00:34:48,376 --> 00:34:51,797 the Flight Idle Stop disengaged inadvertently 685 00:34:51,922 --> 00:34:54,092 on another Fokker 50. 686 00:34:55,467 --> 00:34:58,054 - So it's not as foolproof as we thought. 687 00:34:58,887 --> 00:35:02,766 - The system design was actually well designed by Fokker. 688 00:35:02,891 --> 00:35:05,353 But they knew the system had a problem. 689 00:35:06,646 --> 00:35:08,648 (narrator): When the landing gear is lowered, 690 00:35:08,773 --> 00:35:11,900 an electrical pulse could be sent to activate 691 00:35:11,983 --> 00:35:14,402 the plane's anti-skid control unit. 692 00:35:14,487 --> 00:35:16,989 That sends out a false indication 693 00:35:17,114 --> 00:35:18,699 that the plane is on the ground, 694 00:35:18,824 --> 00:35:22,452 just enough to unlock the Flight Idle Stop. 695 00:35:24,204 --> 00:35:26,541 - This particular pulse in the anti-skid control unit 696 00:35:26,666 --> 00:35:28,626 could, in fact, allow the power levers to go 697 00:35:28,708 --> 00:35:30,043 back into the Beta range. 698 00:35:30,168 --> 00:35:31,336 (engine buzzing) 699 00:35:31,461 --> 00:35:33,463 (narrator): At the time, Fokker said the chance 700 00:35:33,588 --> 00:35:36,217 of an inadvertent unlocking due to the glitch 701 00:35:36,342 --> 00:35:38,594 was extremely unlikely. 702 00:35:42,597 --> 00:35:46,643 - These three conditions must be met for the stop to unlock: 703 00:35:46,726 --> 00:35:50,106 Gear down, the left and right gear locks releasing 704 00:35:50,188 --> 00:35:52,108 at precisely the same instant, 705 00:35:52,190 --> 00:35:55,152 and the power levers below Flight Idle. 706 00:35:55,987 --> 00:35:57,280 - A lot of components had to line up 707 00:35:57,362 --> 00:36:00,324 in very great precision to make it happen, 708 00:36:00,407 --> 00:36:03,244 the perfect storm of bad things happening together. 709 00:36:03,369 --> 00:36:05,538 - Could they have triggered the glitch? 710 00:36:06,289 --> 00:36:08,666 (narrator): Investigators return to the voice recording 711 00:36:08,748 --> 00:36:13,003 and flight data to determine if a short-lived electrical anomaly 712 00:36:13,086 --> 00:36:17,340 allowed the engines to go into reverse while in flight. 713 00:36:18,384 --> 00:36:20,135 - We know from the sound analysis the click 714 00:36:20,219 --> 00:36:23,972 that we heard on the CVR is the Ground Range Selector being lifted. 715 00:36:24,056 --> 00:36:25,557 (clicking) 716 00:36:27,101 --> 00:36:29,686 Approximately 30 seconds before impact, 717 00:36:29,811 --> 00:36:32,356 the captain moves his power levers below Flight Idle. 718 00:36:32,481 --> 00:36:35,610 - Okay, so condition one is met. 719 00:36:37,485 --> 00:36:39,655 - The first officer lowers the landing gear 720 00:36:39,739 --> 00:36:42,782 13 seconds later and they unlock at the exact same time. 721 00:36:43,534 --> 00:36:45,202 - Now that the conditions to trigger the glitch 722 00:36:45,286 --> 00:36:47,829 have been met, for the next 16 seconds, 723 00:36:47,914 --> 00:36:50,875 the levers can be moved to reverse. 724 00:36:51,751 --> 00:36:54,378 - The aircraft thinks it's on the ground 725 00:36:54,503 --> 00:36:57,882 and it will go into reverse in flight. 726 00:36:59,007 --> 00:37:02,844 - And just three seconds later, the propellers go into reverse. 727 00:37:02,929 --> 00:37:04,179 - That's it. 728 00:37:04,262 --> 00:37:07,266 (jazzy investigative music) 729 00:37:10,061 --> 00:37:11,728 - Ground Idle Stop off. 730 00:37:12,438 --> 00:37:14,065 (narrator): They believe that in an effort 731 00:37:14,148 --> 00:37:15,733 to lose altitude quickly, 732 00:37:15,815 --> 00:37:19,402 the pilots of Flight 9642 unknowingly triggered 733 00:37:19,487 --> 00:37:22,239 the electrical anomaly that allowed them to put 734 00:37:22,364 --> 00:37:24,574 their engines into reverse. 735 00:37:26,284 --> 00:37:27,911 The sequence of events begins 736 00:37:28,036 --> 00:37:29,538 with the captain moving the throttles 737 00:37:29,621 --> 00:37:33,208 to Ground Mode to reduce speed and altitude. 738 00:37:35,126 --> 00:37:36,711 - I'm not sure that'll do it. 739 00:37:36,795 --> 00:37:39,673 9642 continuing approach. 740 00:37:39,798 --> 00:37:42,760 (narrator): The maneuver doesn't have the desired effect. 741 00:37:42,842 --> 00:37:45,179 The plane is still too high. 742 00:37:48,431 --> 00:37:51,309 (Arendt): Flaps? - Uh, we are flaps 10. 743 00:37:51,851 --> 00:37:53,521 (narrator): The crew extends the flaps 744 00:37:53,646 --> 00:37:55,773 to reduce speed even further. 745 00:37:55,856 --> 00:37:57,315 Then... 746 00:37:57,817 --> 00:37:59,150 (clicking) 747 00:37:59,277 --> 00:38:01,277 - Uh, gear down? - Yeah. 748 00:38:01,403 --> 00:38:03,989 (narrator): As Captain Poeckes keeps his throttles 749 00:38:04,114 --> 00:38:06,284 pulled as far back as they can go, 750 00:38:06,409 --> 00:38:08,619 the first officer lowers the landing gear, 751 00:38:08,744 --> 00:38:11,246 unaware it will trigger the conditions 752 00:38:11,329 --> 00:38:13,541 to unlock reverse. 753 00:38:14,875 --> 00:38:16,210 (hubbub, whirring) 754 00:38:16,335 --> 00:38:17,585 - The hell is that?! 755 00:38:17,670 --> 00:38:18,838 Oh! 756 00:38:20,172 --> 00:38:22,132 - There will be a loud bang. 757 00:38:22,257 --> 00:38:23,842 Overall, everybody will hear that 758 00:38:23,967 --> 00:38:25,552 in the cockpit and in the cabin. 759 00:38:25,677 --> 00:38:28,972 There will be an immense increase in drag, 760 00:38:29,097 --> 00:38:33,561 so you will literally feel your body shifting and shaking. 761 00:38:36,063 --> 00:38:37,940 (engines whistling) 762 00:38:38,858 --> 00:38:42,360 (narrator): Captain Poeckes doesn't even realize what's happened. 763 00:38:42,485 --> 00:38:44,447 - Pull, pull, pull, pull, pull! 764 00:38:44,530 --> 00:38:45,572 Ah! (GPWS): Terrain. 765 00:38:45,697 --> 00:38:47,824 (horrified scream) (GPWS): Terrain. 766 00:38:49,201 --> 00:38:50,661 (Hildebrand): Once the landing gear 767 00:38:50,744 --> 00:38:52,746 was selected by the first officer, 768 00:38:52,871 --> 00:38:56,375 suddenly both engines went into full reverse. 769 00:38:56,500 --> 00:38:59,085 It was too late to recover. 770 00:38:59,878 --> 00:39:02,047 (narrator): 25 seconds after the throttle 771 00:39:02,172 --> 00:39:04,425 is inadvertently moved to reverse, 772 00:39:04,550 --> 00:39:08,094 the plane crashes, resulting in 20 deaths. 773 00:39:08,219 --> 00:39:10,806 (sorrowful piano music) 774 00:39:11,556 --> 00:39:14,018 - If Fokker knew about this anomaly in 1988, 775 00:39:14,143 --> 00:39:16,311 why didn't they just fix it? 776 00:39:18,773 --> 00:39:20,690 (narrator): Investigators examine reports 777 00:39:20,775 --> 00:39:23,277 to explain why Flight 9642 778 00:39:23,402 --> 00:39:26,864 was allowed to fly despite the aircraft manufacturer 779 00:39:26,989 --> 00:39:29,367 knowing about a potential glitch. 780 00:39:29,909 --> 00:39:31,534 - They said the probability of this happening 781 00:39:31,659 --> 00:39:36,039 was so low that no immediate action was required. 782 00:39:38,208 --> 00:39:40,878 - It's a very short duration power up, 783 00:39:41,003 --> 00:39:43,880 so therefore the timing has to be very precise 784 00:39:44,005 --> 00:39:46,050 and the likelihood of it happening was low, 785 00:39:46,175 --> 00:39:49,552 there's no doubt about it, but certainly it was not zero. 786 00:39:50,929 --> 00:39:52,722 - They eventually came up with a modification 787 00:39:52,847 --> 00:39:56,143 and issued this service bulletin about it a few years later. 788 00:39:57,811 --> 00:40:00,648 (narrator): The manufacturer of the skid control unit 789 00:40:00,773 --> 00:40:02,358 had issued a service bulletin 790 00:40:02,440 --> 00:40:04,902 suggesting a simple fix that would prevent 791 00:40:04,985 --> 00:40:07,445 the erroneous signal from being sent. 792 00:40:10,407 --> 00:40:12,326 (McNair): To modify the anti-skid control unit 793 00:40:12,451 --> 00:40:15,454 to the newer version that would not provide this power up pulse, 794 00:40:15,579 --> 00:40:18,581 one merely had to add a few diodes and a capacitor, 795 00:40:18,706 --> 00:40:20,835 so it wasn't a complicated fix. It wasn't difficult to do. 796 00:40:20,960 --> 00:40:22,253 It wasn't expensive. 797 00:40:23,503 --> 00:40:25,505 (narrator): But the notification was issued 798 00:40:25,630 --> 00:40:27,048 as a Service Bulletin, 799 00:40:27,132 --> 00:40:29,260 not an Airworthiness Directive 800 00:40:29,385 --> 00:40:32,179 which would have made the fix mandatory. 801 00:40:33,139 --> 00:40:35,474 (Friesacher): If an aircraft manufacturer is making 802 00:40:35,599 --> 00:40:39,103 a modification to an aircraft, it gives out a Service Bulletin. 803 00:40:39,186 --> 00:40:40,771 You don't need to do it. 804 00:40:40,855 --> 00:40:44,983 An Airworthiness Directive is a state hazardous to the safety 805 00:40:45,108 --> 00:40:47,277 of the operation of the aircraft 806 00:40:47,402 --> 00:40:50,822 that might even ground the whole world fleet 807 00:40:50,947 --> 00:40:53,492 of the aircraft till it's modified. 808 00:40:54,452 --> 00:40:56,619 (narrator): Luxair never performed the suggested 809 00:40:56,704 --> 00:41:01,500 1992 modification to its fleet of Fokker aircraft. 810 00:41:02,168 --> 00:41:03,543 - If it comes as an Airworthiness Directive, 811 00:41:03,668 --> 00:41:05,753 they would have complied, no doubt about that. 812 00:41:05,838 --> 00:41:07,630 And the problem would have been fixed. 813 00:41:10,050 --> 00:41:12,177 - The accident didn't happen here. 814 00:41:12,594 --> 00:41:14,304 It happens here 815 00:41:14,387 --> 00:41:17,474 when they accepted an approach they weren't prepared for. 816 00:41:18,684 --> 00:41:20,478 - How much fuel will we need? 817 00:41:20,561 --> 00:41:22,146 - Uh... 818 00:41:22,896 --> 00:41:24,773 550... 819 00:41:24,856 --> 00:41:27,275 We need 850 when we leave the hold. 820 00:41:27,358 --> 00:41:30,528 - No. We need fuel to reach till our alternate 821 00:41:30,653 --> 00:41:33,907 plus 20 minutes reserve, so we'll still need 600 kilos. 822 00:41:34,032 --> 00:41:35,659 - Yes, but I want to keep-- 823 00:41:35,784 --> 00:41:37,244 (controller): Luxair 9642, 824 00:41:37,369 --> 00:41:40,079 descend to 3,000 feet on 1023, 825 00:41:40,206 --> 00:41:42,625 turn left heading 130. 826 00:41:42,708 --> 00:41:44,835 - Is that for us? - Yes. 827 00:41:45,585 --> 00:41:47,128 (narrator): Investigators believe 828 00:41:47,213 --> 00:41:50,882 that the main cause of the crash of Flight 9642 829 00:41:51,007 --> 00:41:52,842 was the crew's decision to accept 830 00:41:52,927 --> 00:41:57,431 the approach instruction rather than join a holding pattern. 831 00:41:58,014 --> 00:42:02,478 - Left heading 130, Luxair 9642. 832 00:42:03,269 --> 00:42:05,105 What kind of crap is that? 833 00:42:06,231 --> 00:42:08,067 (Friesacher): At the time they got their first heading 834 00:42:08,192 --> 00:42:11,570 for the intercept for the localizer for the runway, 835 00:42:11,695 --> 00:42:12,612 they should have said, 836 00:42:12,737 --> 00:42:15,240 "No, we are not ready for the approach." 837 00:42:16,282 --> 00:42:18,827 (Krieger): Had they simply rejected the approach 838 00:42:18,911 --> 00:42:20,996 when the controller gave them those additional headings 839 00:42:21,079 --> 00:42:23,248 and descent down to 3,000 feet, 840 00:42:23,373 --> 00:42:25,626 the controller would have said that's fine. 841 00:42:26,543 --> 00:42:28,628 - Here, they still don't have the visibility 842 00:42:28,753 --> 00:42:32,215 they need to land, they're too high and too fast, 843 00:42:32,298 --> 00:42:35,094 and still aren't properly configured. 844 00:42:36,262 --> 00:42:38,764 If ever there was a case for a go-around. 845 00:42:41,432 --> 00:42:44,228 - 9642 continuing approach. 846 00:42:45,478 --> 00:42:48,065 (narrator): The investigators also fault the crew 847 00:42:48,148 --> 00:42:50,233 for not executing a missed approach 848 00:42:50,317 --> 00:42:53,237 when they had so much going against them. 849 00:42:54,070 --> 00:42:56,364 (Hildebrand): Once the crew was surprised 850 00:42:56,447 --> 00:42:59,242 by the ATC clearance to start the approach 851 00:42:59,326 --> 00:43:04,414 as number one, a lot of events started, 852 00:43:04,498 --> 00:43:07,083 putting the pilots in a kind of a tunnel vision, 853 00:43:07,166 --> 00:43:09,585 or into a continuation bias, 854 00:43:09,670 --> 00:43:12,463 focusing only on the approach and the landing, 855 00:43:12,590 --> 00:43:15,509 without considering any other options. 856 00:43:16,467 --> 00:43:18,219 (narrator): To prevent the plane from being put 857 00:43:18,304 --> 00:43:21,556 into reverse in the air, the team also recommends 858 00:43:21,639 --> 00:43:24,393 that the modification to the skid control box, 859 00:43:24,476 --> 00:43:26,603 which stops any erroneous signal, 860 00:43:26,728 --> 00:43:30,608 be made mandatory for all Fokker 50 airplanes. 861 00:43:31,233 --> 00:43:33,110 Luxair makes the modification 862 00:43:33,193 --> 00:43:36,322 to its entire fleet of Fokker aircraft. 863 00:43:37,322 --> 00:43:39,240 - The accident, in fact, proves the fact 864 00:43:39,324 --> 00:43:41,619 it was that serious and should have been addressed. 865 00:43:42,494 --> 00:43:44,704 (narrator): Captain Poeckes was charged 866 00:43:44,829 --> 00:43:46,914 with involuntary manslaughter. 867 00:43:46,998 --> 00:43:49,126 He was fined and sentenced 868 00:43:49,251 --> 00:43:51,753 to three-and-a-half years' probation. 869 00:43:53,588 --> 00:43:58,344 - The lessons we have learned from this tragic Luxair accident 870 00:43:58,469 --> 00:44:01,889 is always stick to standard operating procedures. 871 00:44:02,014 --> 00:44:04,474 Stick to the aircraft's limitations. 872 00:44:04,557 --> 00:44:08,061 Be aware of operational bulletins. 873 00:44:08,603 --> 00:44:11,815 Unfortunately, most of these things were not done 874 00:44:11,940 --> 00:44:17,028 by the Luxair crew and this led to this tragic accident. 875 00:44:39,217 --> 00:44:43,429 Subtitling: difuze 67253

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