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(Dynamic music)
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♪
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(Text on screen)
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(narrator): Descending into
heavy fog above Luxembourg...
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- The hell is that?!
6
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(narrator): ...something goes
disastrously wrong
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on Luxair Flight 9642.
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- The airplane was impossible
to recover.
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(heavy crash)
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(narrator): 20 of the 22 people
onboard are killed.
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00:00:37,871 --> 00:00:39,079
- A lot of people died that day.
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It was an accident that
was hard to understand.
13
00:00:42,584 --> 00:00:45,128
- I can't find anything wrong
with either engine.
14
00:00:45,253 --> 00:00:47,588
(narrator): But when
investigators analyze
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00:00:47,713 --> 00:00:50,258
unusual sounds from
the cockpit...
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00:00:51,593 --> 00:00:52,886
- It's a match?
- Mm-hmm.
17
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(narrator): ...they hear
the pilots do something
18
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which should be impossible.
19
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- It's not supposed to happen.
20
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There's supposed to be things
that prevent it from happening.
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- So it's not as foolproof
as we thought.
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(♪♪)
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- Mayday! Mayday!
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(opening theme)
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(soft pensive music)
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(narrator): It's just before
10:00 in the morning
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at Luxembourg's
International Airport.
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A layer of fog blankets
the runway,
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preventing planes from landing.
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- Cargolux 778 maintain
runway heading
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until LUTAX, then use
own navigation.
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Luxair 403 enter Diekirch
hold flight level 60.
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I will vector you later
for ILS approach.
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(narrator): Controllers
are busy putting planes
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into a holding pattern while
waiting for the fog to clear.
36
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- Luxair 4452 enter Diekirch
hold flight level 90.
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QNH is 1023.
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Luxair 8362 descend level 80
to enter Diekirch hold.
39
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Current RVR is 250.
40
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(narrator): There are three
planes circling 16 miles north
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of the airport at a position
known as Diekirch.
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- In a situation with
low visibility,
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lots of holding,
lots of aircraft
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having different requirements,
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the level of stress
is fairly high.
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Focus is really important.
47
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You gotta concentrate on
everything that you're doing.
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- Luxair 9642 enter Diekirch
hold flight level 90.
49
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There will be vectors later
for an ILS approach
50
00:02:51,420 --> 00:02:53,213
on runway 24.
51
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- That's all understood,
Luxair 9642.
52
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(narrator):
One of the planes being directed
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to the holding pattern
is Luxair Flight 9642.
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The plane is a
Fokker 50 turboprop
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heading to Luxembourg
from Berlin.
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00:03:09,771 --> 00:03:14,193
- The Fokker 50 was a great
performing aircraft overall.
57
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It's a commuter airplane,
to be flown in Europe.
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We flew the aircraft
day and night,
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in all weather conditions.
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(narrator): There are
19 passengers on the flight.
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Most are German business
officials
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travelling to Luxembourg.
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The first officer
on this morning's flight
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is 32-year-old John Arendt.
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- I'll brief the folks.
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Ladies and gentlemen,
good morning.
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Uh, unfortunately, the fog
in Luxembourg is so dense
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that at the moment
we cannot land.
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So we'll have to wait a little
bit for an improvement.
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We will proceed to
a holding pattern
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while we wait for
the weather to clear.
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We'll keep you updated as soon
as we have some news.
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(narrator): The captain is
26-year-old Claude Poeckes.
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- And Luxair 9642 is
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reducing speed to 160.
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- Roger 9642.
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(narrator): The crew navigates
toward the holding area
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north of the airport.
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- What time can we hold till?
How much fuel will we need?
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- Uh, 550...
81
00:04:27,934 --> 00:04:29,394
uh... 700.
82
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No, we'll need 8-50 when
we leave the hold.
83
00:04:33,105 --> 00:04:36,192
- No. We need fuel to reach
till our alternate
84
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plus 20 minutes reserve.
So we'll still need 600 kilos.
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- Yes, but I want to keep--
86
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(controller on radio): Luxair
9642 descend to 3,000 feet
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on 1023, turn left heading 130.
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(narrator): Before they reach
the holding point,
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the crew receives instructions
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00:04:52,834 --> 00:04:56,211
to turn towards the airport
and begin descent.
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00:04:58,172 --> 00:05:00,632
- Is that for us?
- Yes.
92
00:05:01,843 --> 00:05:04,762
- Uh, descend to 3,000 feet.
Say again the heading.
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(controller on radio):
130.
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- Left heading 130,
Luxair 9642.
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00:05:12,894 --> 00:05:14,396
What kind of crap is that?
96
00:05:14,521 --> 00:05:18,192
(narrator): The new instruction
takes the crew by surprise.
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00:05:19,360 --> 00:05:23,488
- If you suddenly get startled
that you are now number one,
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and turning left, and descending
for your approach as number one,
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this can put you in a situation
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which would add
to your workload.
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- What's the RVR now?
102
00:05:35,834 --> 00:05:38,338
- I don't know,
should we check with dispatch?
103
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- Yes.
104
00:05:40,673 --> 00:05:44,093
(narrator):
RVR is Runway Visual Range.
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00:05:44,218 --> 00:05:47,180
It's the minimum visibility
on the runway required
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by a landing aircraft.
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For the Luxair Fokker,
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that distance is 300 metres,
or 984 feet.
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- If the runway visual range
is below 300 metres,
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you are not allowed
to start the approach
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or to land the aircraft.
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00:06:04,197 --> 00:06:07,492
- Dispatch, 9642,
what's the current RVR?
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(dispatcher on radio):
Uh, 275.
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- 275 metres.
What do we do now?
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- I don't know.
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- If they don't have
that visibility, they go around
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and they'll probably get
vectored for another approach
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unless the RVR is too low,
then they're gonna be vectored
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to the holding pattern
at Diekirch.
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00:06:27,552 --> 00:06:29,846
- So are we holding or
is this for an approach?
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00:06:29,930 --> 00:06:31,723
- It's for an approach.
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(controller): Luxair 9642
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turn right heading 220.
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Cleared for approach.
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(Arendt):
- Right heading 220, and uh,
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cleared for approach, 9642.
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00:06:44,237 --> 00:06:46,197
- Tell him that if at ECHO
we don't have 300 metres
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00:06:46,279 --> 00:06:48,408
that we'll do a go-around
and enter the hold.
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00:06:49,617 --> 00:06:52,120
(narrator): The pilots
come up with a compromise.
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00:06:52,245 --> 00:06:54,079
They'll continue their approach,
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00:06:54,163 --> 00:06:56,790
but if runway visibility
doesn't improve,
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00:06:56,915 --> 00:06:59,584
they'll abort and join
the holding pattern.
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00:07:00,752 --> 00:07:03,255
(Arendt): We need 300 metres
for the approach.
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00:07:03,964 --> 00:07:05,716
- 9642, copied.
135
00:07:05,800 --> 00:07:08,218
Continue your approach.
I'll keep you advised.
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(foreboding music)
137
00:07:10,471 --> 00:07:12,264
(narrator): Passengers still
believe they're headed
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for an extended hold.
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00:07:14,350 --> 00:07:17,103
(engine buzzing)
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00:07:19,480 --> 00:07:24,944
(Arendt):
Speed's 95, 105, 109.
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00:07:25,069 --> 00:07:28,447
- Landing altitude?
- 275 metres.
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- Set.
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(narrator): The flight is now
only 5 miles from the runway
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00:07:34,245 --> 00:07:37,415
and there's no word that
visibility has improved.
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00:07:37,497 --> 00:07:39,459
Captain Poeckes makes
his decision.
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- Okay, we'll do a go-around.
Missed Approach.
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00:07:43,504 --> 00:07:45,505
- Ground Idle Stop off.
148
00:07:49,009 --> 00:07:50,761
(controller):
Luxair 9642,
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00:07:50,845 --> 00:07:53,055
RVR is 300 metres.
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00:07:53,514 --> 00:07:56,100
(narrator): But before the crew
can execute a go-around,
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the controller issues
a last-minute update
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to runway conditions.
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00:08:02,189 --> 00:08:04,817
- 9642 continuing approach.
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00:08:06,067 --> 00:08:07,528
(narrator):
The visibility now meets
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00:08:07,653 --> 00:08:09,572
the Fokker's minimum
requirements.
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00:08:09,697 --> 00:08:12,574
The crew's plans have
changed again.
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00:08:14,410 --> 00:08:16,954
(Krieger): Things change rather
quickly for a flight crew
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when they're doing an approach
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00:08:18,456 --> 00:08:20,665
which requires really
precise coordination
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among the crew members
to make sure
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that everything
goes smoothly
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00:08:23,877 --> 00:08:26,047
and that they're stabilized
on the approach.
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(engine buzzing)
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(narrator):
4 miles from the airport,
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00:08:29,425 --> 00:08:31,843
Flight 9642 is at an altitude
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of 1,500 feet.
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00:08:35,639 --> 00:08:36,849
- Flaps?
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00:08:38,183 --> 00:08:40,727
- Uh, we are flaps 10.
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00:08:41,979 --> 00:08:44,273
- 9642, you are cleared to land,
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00:08:44,398 --> 00:08:46,984
wind 180 degrees,
5 knots.
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00:08:47,400 --> 00:08:49,986
(tense music)
172
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- Uh, gear down?
- Yeah.
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00:08:53,282 --> 00:08:55,909
- Cleared to land 9642.
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00:08:57,953 --> 00:09:00,081
(narrator):
The flight is now two minutes
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00:09:00,206 --> 00:09:02,332
from landing in Luxembourg.
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00:09:05,919 --> 00:09:08,755
(hubbub, whirring)
177
00:09:09,256 --> 00:09:10,924
- The hell is that?!
178
00:09:11,049 --> 00:09:12,426
(engine buzzing)
179
00:09:12,552 --> 00:09:15,471
(narrator): Something has gone
wrong with the engines.
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00:09:16,013 --> 00:09:17,347
(whirring, clicking)
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00:09:17,431 --> 00:09:19,182
(passengers yelping)
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00:09:20,600 --> 00:09:21,726
- Oh!
183
00:09:23,187 --> 00:09:25,565
(narrator):
Now at less than 500 feet,
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Flight 9642 plummets
towards the ground.
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00:09:29,150 --> 00:09:30,235
(screaming)
186
00:09:30,318 --> 00:09:32,363
(GPWS):
Terrain. Terrain.
187
00:09:34,282 --> 00:09:37,743
- Pull, pull, pull, pull,
pull, pull, pull!
188
00:09:38,369 --> 00:09:40,913
- The airplane suddenly
went into a rapid
189
00:09:41,038 --> 00:09:45,167
and uncontrollable descent
in a very low altitude,
190
00:09:45,293 --> 00:09:47,753
which was impossible to recover.
191
00:09:47,878 --> 00:09:50,298
(engine buzzing)
192
00:09:50,423 --> 00:09:53,384
(passengers screaming)
193
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(devices beeping)
194
00:10:01,892 --> 00:10:03,894
- 9642, Luxembourg.
195
00:10:05,520 --> 00:10:08,606
Luxair 9642, Luxembourg.
196
00:10:10,359 --> 00:10:13,613
Luxair 9642,
Luxembourg, do you read?
197
00:10:18,241 --> 00:10:20,660
We have a possible crash
of a Fokker F50
198
00:10:20,785 --> 00:10:23,288
on final approach to runway 27.
199
00:10:23,371 --> 00:10:24,539
Please stand by.
200
00:10:24,664 --> 00:10:27,793
(sirens wailing in distance)
201
00:10:30,379 --> 00:10:31,714
(narrator):
The wreckage is located
202
00:10:31,839 --> 00:10:34,466
2 miles east of the airfield.
203
00:10:34,966 --> 00:10:36,259
(helicopters buzzing)
204
00:10:36,344 --> 00:10:38,471
Of the 22 people on board,
205
00:10:38,596 --> 00:10:40,639
only two survive the crash,
206
00:10:40,764 --> 00:10:43,100
including Captain Poeckes.
207
00:10:43,600 --> 00:10:47,229
This is Luxembourg's deadliest
aviation disaster.
208
00:10:47,355 --> 00:10:49,356
(melancholic music)
209
00:10:49,481 --> 00:10:51,149
(McNair):
Well, this accident is serious
210
00:10:51,274 --> 00:10:53,485
because there was loss of life.
A lot of people died that day.
211
00:10:53,610 --> 00:10:56,447
And it was, uh, an accident
that was hard to understand.
212
00:10:58,198 --> 00:11:01,159
(narrator): Investigators will
need to examine the wreckage
213
00:11:01,284 --> 00:11:03,828
of Flight 9642 to determine
214
00:11:03,953 --> 00:11:07,166
why a landing at a modern,
well-equipped airport
215
00:11:07,291 --> 00:11:09,835
went so terribly wrong.
216
00:11:12,629 --> 00:11:15,633
(heavy music)
217
00:11:15,716 --> 00:11:17,342
- The tail hits here.
218
00:11:17,467 --> 00:11:19,803
The left wing scrapes
some trees,
219
00:11:19,886 --> 00:11:22,682
and then the plane skids
across the road.
220
00:11:24,140 --> 00:11:25,683
(narrator): The wreckage
tells investigators
221
00:11:25,768 --> 00:11:30,690
that Flight 9642 hit the ground
in a nose up position.
222
00:11:32,357 --> 00:11:35,027
- The initial hypothesis
would be that, in fact,
223
00:11:35,110 --> 00:11:36,320
they were trying
to avoid the ground
224
00:11:36,403 --> 00:11:38,154
when the aircraft
hit the ground.
225
00:11:39,322 --> 00:11:42,033
- Engine failure? Windshear?
226
00:11:42,158 --> 00:11:43,869
Mechanical issue?
227
00:11:44,577 --> 00:11:47,123
(narrator): The debris pattern
leaves investigators
228
00:11:47,248 --> 00:11:49,667
with a few obvious
possibilities.
229
00:11:50,375 --> 00:11:53,086
(Friesacher): Aircrafts
don't crash short of runways.
230
00:11:53,211 --> 00:11:55,965
Do they have false indications?
Were the engines running?
231
00:11:56,090 --> 00:11:59,051
So there are lots of things you
have to initially think about.
232
00:11:59,844 --> 00:12:02,721
(narrator): As they gather
wreckage from the accident site,
233
00:12:02,846 --> 00:12:05,975
investigators wonder if
the controller can provide
234
00:12:06,100 --> 00:12:09,144
any insight into the flight's
final minutes.
235
00:12:10,437 --> 00:12:13,065
- Anything unusual?
Out of the ordinary?
236
00:12:13,149 --> 00:12:15,192
- The whole day was
out of the ordinary.
237
00:12:16,527 --> 00:12:18,571
(narrator): The controller
explains that the weather
238
00:12:18,653 --> 00:12:22,740
prevented planes from landing,
forcing them into a hold.
239
00:12:24,994 --> 00:12:27,078
- And that includes Flight 9642?
240
00:12:27,203 --> 00:12:28,873
- At first, yes.
241
00:12:28,956 --> 00:12:31,000
(heavy sigh)
242
00:12:31,708 --> 00:12:37,089
Luxair 9642 enter Diekirch
hold flight level 90.
243
00:12:37,173 --> 00:12:39,633
But before they reach the hold,
the weather cleared.
244
00:12:40,676 --> 00:12:45,221
Luxair 9642 descend
to 3,000 feet on 1023,
245
00:12:45,306 --> 00:12:47,515
turn left heading 130.
246
00:12:49,434 --> 00:12:50,644
(narrator): He also states
247
00:12:50,769 --> 00:12:52,229
that because of its position,
248
00:12:52,312 --> 00:12:55,191
Flight 9642 was the first plane
249
00:12:55,316 --> 00:12:56,692
directed to the airport
250
00:12:56,817 --> 00:12:58,693
when the weather began to clear.
251
00:12:59,778 --> 00:13:02,280
- They needed 300 metres
of visibility to land,
252
00:13:02,405 --> 00:13:05,283
which we got at 10:05.
253
00:13:05,366 --> 00:13:06,826
So I cleared them to land.
254
00:13:07,912 --> 00:13:10,288
- Even though they were heading
for the holding pattern,
255
00:13:10,371 --> 00:13:12,291
the controller saw
an opportunity.
256
00:13:12,374 --> 00:13:14,710
They were in an ideal position
257
00:13:14,835 --> 00:13:18,004
to the final approach fix
and also the Luxembourg Airport.
258
00:13:19,631 --> 00:13:21,008
- And then?
259
00:13:22,217 --> 00:13:23,885
- That was the last we spoke.
260
00:13:24,010 --> 00:13:26,388
- No emergency call?
- No.
261
00:13:26,514 --> 00:13:28,307
Nothing.
262
00:13:29,682 --> 00:13:31,559
(narrator):
The controller can't explain
263
00:13:31,684 --> 00:13:34,020
why the Fokker ended up
hitting the ground
264
00:13:34,145 --> 00:13:35,980
2 miles from the airport.
265
00:13:36,105 --> 00:13:39,150
(pensive music)
266
00:13:39,235 --> 00:13:40,860
- From an air traffic
control standpoint,
267
00:13:40,985 --> 00:13:42,863
there was nothing
in the communication
268
00:13:42,988 --> 00:13:45,533
between the aircraft
and air traffic
269
00:13:45,658 --> 00:13:47,826
to indicate that there was
any problem whatsoever
270
00:13:47,951 --> 00:13:49,577
with the aircraft at all.
271
00:13:50,538 --> 00:13:52,664
(narrator):
Only Captain Poeckes can answer
272
00:13:52,748 --> 00:13:55,208
why the Fokker went down
short of the runway,
273
00:13:55,333 --> 00:13:58,504
but he's been hospitalized
and is in a coma.
274
00:13:59,087 --> 00:14:01,340
Investigators will need
to piece together
275
00:14:01,423 --> 00:14:03,424
the final minutes
of the flight without him.
276
00:14:03,551 --> 00:14:05,719
(Friesacher): With the captain
not being available,
277
00:14:05,845 --> 00:14:07,178
the objective evidence,
278
00:14:07,263 --> 00:14:09,722
the physical evidence
talks to you.
279
00:14:10,724 --> 00:14:12,350
(narrator):
They begin by studying
280
00:14:12,433 --> 00:14:15,812
the engine components
for any signs of failure.
281
00:14:17,898 --> 00:14:20,192
- They look like they're
in pretty good shape.
282
00:14:21,277 --> 00:14:22,695
(Friesacher):
Engines normally hold
283
00:14:22,778 --> 00:14:26,573
the aircraft in the air,
and they fly towards the runway.
284
00:14:26,698 --> 00:14:30,201
So I would suggest something
happened to the engines
285
00:14:30,285 --> 00:14:31,370
that they didn't make it
286
00:14:31,495 --> 00:14:33,413
to the runway
in the first place.
287
00:14:36,166 --> 00:14:39,253
- No fire, no damage
to any components,
288
00:14:39,378 --> 00:14:42,214
the rotors are fine,
fuel lines are intact,
289
00:14:42,339 --> 00:14:45,801
intake is clear, pumps
and PCUs all check out.
290
00:14:46,509 --> 00:14:49,178
I can't find anything wrong
with either engine.
291
00:14:50,221 --> 00:14:52,682
(narrator): The state of
the engines is puzzling.
292
00:14:52,765 --> 00:14:54,851
If both were in good
working order,
293
00:14:54,934 --> 00:14:57,897
what could have caused
the flight to fall from the sky
294
00:14:57,980 --> 00:14:59,899
just short of the runway?
295
00:15:00,441 --> 00:15:02,567
(mysterious piano music)
296
00:15:02,692 --> 00:15:05,946
- This is where they're turned
for the approach.
297
00:15:07,030 --> 00:15:10,241
(narrator): Investigators use
Luxembourg's radar data
298
00:15:10,326 --> 00:15:13,913
to recreate Flight 9642's
flight path.
299
00:15:14,538 --> 00:15:16,164
- Seven minutes to impact.
300
00:15:16,289 --> 00:15:17,582
- They're at 9,000 feet
301
00:15:17,707 --> 00:15:19,250
when they're cleared
for the approach.
302
00:15:19,375 --> 00:15:22,129
Now he descends even
more steeply,
303
00:15:22,254 --> 00:15:24,715
and at 7,000 feet per minute.
304
00:15:24,798 --> 00:15:27,216
- They're only 4 miles away
from the runway.
305
00:15:27,301 --> 00:15:30,428
15 seconds later,
they hit the ground.
306
00:15:33,307 --> 00:15:34,390
Here's the glideslope.
307
00:15:34,475 --> 00:15:37,561
(soft investigative music)
308
00:15:37,644 --> 00:15:38,895
- Whoa.
309
00:15:39,647 --> 00:15:42,357
(narrator): When investigators
compare the plane's descent
310
00:15:42,482 --> 00:15:43,900
with the recommended descent,
311
00:15:43,984 --> 00:15:47,613
they see that the flight was
300 feet too high
312
00:15:47,738 --> 00:15:50,783
throughout the final stages
of its approach.
313
00:15:51,616 --> 00:15:54,119
- That explains why they were
in such a hurry
314
00:15:54,244 --> 00:15:55,828
to lose altitude.
315
00:15:57,163 --> 00:16:01,125
- 300 feet above
the glide slope,
316
00:16:01,250 --> 00:16:03,796
this is a real problem
because you now try
317
00:16:03,921 --> 00:16:07,383
to descend the aircraft,
slow down the aircraft,
318
00:16:07,508 --> 00:16:09,884
and configure everything
at the same time,
319
00:16:10,009 --> 00:16:12,136
which is nearly impossible.
320
00:16:12,679 --> 00:16:15,057
(narrator): Why did the pilots
allow their plane
321
00:16:15,182 --> 00:16:17,643
to get into such
a difficult situation?
322
00:16:18,143 --> 00:16:20,229
- Not a good idea to be
rushing on an approach at all,
323
00:16:20,354 --> 00:16:23,731
especially in low RVR,
dangerous actually.
324
00:16:26,818 --> 00:16:28,778
(investigative music)
325
00:16:28,861 --> 00:16:30,072
(Poeckes on CVR):
Heavy fog.
326
00:16:30,197 --> 00:16:32,032
It will be a hard landing.
327
00:16:32,157 --> 00:16:34,909
(narrator): The team listens
to Flight 9642's
328
00:16:35,034 --> 00:16:37,663
Cockpit Voice Recording, or CVR,
329
00:16:37,788 --> 00:16:39,163
for clues that can explain
330
00:16:39,288 --> 00:16:41,833
the pilots' dangerous
predicament.
331
00:16:43,460 --> 00:16:46,129
- Okay, they know the weather's
going to be an issue.
332
00:16:46,212 --> 00:16:48,090
(Poeckes on CVR):
I'll call dispatch.
333
00:16:48,716 --> 00:16:52,009
Dispatch, good morning, 9642.
334
00:16:52,094 --> 00:16:54,138
(dispatcher):
9642, good morning.
335
00:16:54,221 --> 00:16:55,889
- How is the weather
at the moment?
336
00:16:56,014 --> 00:16:58,725
(dispatcher):
RVR is 250 at the moment.
337
00:16:58,850 --> 00:17:00,019
If it doesn't get better,
338
00:17:00,144 --> 00:17:02,229
you will be diverted
to Saarbrücken.
339
00:17:02,354 --> 00:17:03,938
- Okay, thank you.
340
00:17:04,480 --> 00:17:06,858
Oh no.
I will not go to Saarbrücken.
341
00:17:06,942 --> 00:17:07,984
(soft chuckle)
342
00:17:08,067 --> 00:17:09,153
- I'm with you.
343
00:17:09,236 --> 00:17:11,446
(terminal on CVR):
Wind 1-10, 4 knots.
344
00:17:11,571 --> 00:17:13,030
Expect ILS approach,
345
00:17:13,115 --> 00:17:16,660
runway 27, transition level 60.
346
00:17:16,743 --> 00:17:19,203
- He does not want to divert.
347
00:17:24,417 --> 00:17:27,962
(controller on CVR):
Luxair 9642 enter Diekirch
348
00:17:28,087 --> 00:17:30,089
hold flight level 90.
349
00:17:30,883 --> 00:17:33,050
- They're being directed
into the holding pattern.
350
00:17:39,391 --> 00:17:42,935
(Arendt on CVR): No. We need
fuel to reach to our alternate
351
00:17:43,060 --> 00:17:46,481
plus 20 minutes reserve.
So we'll still need 600 kilos.
352
00:17:46,940 --> 00:17:48,400
- Okay. Good.
353
00:17:48,525 --> 00:17:50,152
They want to make sure
there's enough fuel
354
00:17:50,277 --> 00:17:52,112
to reach their alternate.
355
00:17:52,237 --> 00:17:53,780
(Poeckes on CVR):
Yes, but I want to keep--
356
00:17:53,905 --> 00:17:57,951
(controller on CVR): Luxair 9642
descend to 3,000 feet on 1023,
357
00:17:58,076 --> 00:18:00,453
turn left heading 130.
358
00:18:01,371 --> 00:18:03,915
- And then they're hit
with a new plan.
359
00:18:07,126 --> 00:18:10,631
(intriguing music)
360
00:18:15,469 --> 00:18:17,637
(narrator): The recording
reveals that the pilots
361
00:18:17,762 --> 00:18:19,515
were surprised
by the instruction
362
00:18:19,640 --> 00:18:21,474
to begin their approach.
363
00:18:21,599 --> 00:18:23,519
- What kind of crap is that?
364
00:18:25,144 --> 00:18:27,439
- They were not happy about
the change of plans.
365
00:18:30,983 --> 00:18:32,318
(narrator):
The sudden change meant
366
00:18:32,443 --> 00:18:34,445
that instead of proceeding
to the hold,
367
00:18:34,570 --> 00:18:37,532
the pilots quickly
initiated a left turn,
368
00:18:37,657 --> 00:18:40,618
and began a steady descent
towards the runway
369
00:18:40,743 --> 00:18:44,205
all while configuring
their plane for landing.
370
00:18:45,082 --> 00:18:49,627
- So the crew were forced
to rush themselves
371
00:18:49,711 --> 00:18:53,132
down to the final approach fix.
372
00:18:53,965 --> 00:18:55,217
(narrator):
The rushed approach
373
00:18:55,342 --> 00:18:58,470
now becomes the focus
of the investigation.
374
00:19:00,221 --> 00:19:03,808
(controller on CVR): Luxair 9642
turn right heading 220.
375
00:19:03,892 --> 00:19:05,434
Cleared for approach.
376
00:19:05,519 --> 00:19:08,271
- Okay, they're starting
their approach.
377
00:19:09,021 --> 00:19:11,817
- For a low visibility approach,
378
00:19:11,942 --> 00:19:14,027
properly briefed and performed,
379
00:19:14,153 --> 00:19:17,698
it's very structured, organized,
and standardized,
380
00:19:17,823 --> 00:19:19,490
so each pilot knows exactly
381
00:19:19,615 --> 00:19:22,493
which task they have
to do at which time.
382
00:19:23,912 --> 00:19:25,497
- Should we switch
the seatbelt sign on?
383
00:19:25,622 --> 00:19:27,915
- Yes, yes. Not a bad idea.
384
00:19:28,541 --> 00:19:31,002
(soft pensive music)
385
00:19:31,086 --> 00:19:33,588
Localizer captured.
386
00:19:34,047 --> 00:19:35,464
- Uh, check.
387
00:19:35,548 --> 00:19:37,342
Missed approach heading.
388
00:19:37,467 --> 00:19:39,219
- They're not running
a checklist.
389
00:19:39,344 --> 00:19:42,263
They're just throwing out
random steps.
390
00:19:42,638 --> 00:19:44,182
(narrator):
Over the next few minutes,
391
00:19:44,307 --> 00:19:46,727
investigators hear several
clear indications
392
00:19:46,852 --> 00:19:51,022
that the pilots are improvising
this unexpected approach.
393
00:19:51,606 --> 00:19:53,901
(Hildebrand):
You must be fully established,
394
00:19:54,026 --> 00:19:57,028
which means gear down,
flaps extended,
395
00:19:57,112 --> 00:19:58,614
landing checklist completed,
396
00:19:58,739 --> 00:20:01,825
speed and altitude all
at the correct spot.
397
00:20:02,366 --> 00:20:03,951
- Hey, are we at the beacon yet?
398
00:20:04,076 --> 00:20:06,203
- You should have it
dialled in by now.
399
00:20:06,704 --> 00:20:08,707
- I can use the DME instead.
400
00:20:09,249 --> 00:20:10,875
- Yeah, yeah, yeah.
401
00:20:11,460 --> 00:20:13,961
(narrator): Even basic steps
such as configuring
402
00:20:14,086 --> 00:20:17,089
the navigation system
aren't performed.
403
00:20:17,214 --> 00:20:18,759
(Friesacher):
Flying an aircraft is about
404
00:20:18,884 --> 00:20:24,388
a precise following of certain
steps at certain times.
405
00:20:24,472 --> 00:20:27,893
It's starting on an approach
involving all the crew members.
406
00:20:27,976 --> 00:20:30,144
It's about detailed planning.
407
00:20:33,690 --> 00:20:36,567
- They're skipping steps
and improvising the procedures.
408
00:20:36,652 --> 00:20:39,403
The change of plans
caught them by surprise.
409
00:20:43,991 --> 00:20:47,788
(pensive music)
410
00:20:49,914 --> 00:20:52,125
- They're racing against
the clock.
411
00:20:54,294 --> 00:20:55,921
- They started
to rush themselves
412
00:20:56,003 --> 00:20:58,673
in a quite high
workload environment,
413
00:20:58,798 --> 00:21:03,553
trying to get the airplane down,
and doing the approach briefing,
414
00:21:03,636 --> 00:21:07,766
all at once, which was
quite tricky to achieve.
415
00:21:08,599 --> 00:21:11,228
(narrator): Did the rushed
approach result in the pilots
416
00:21:11,310 --> 00:21:13,939
being too high as
they neared the runway?
417
00:21:14,815 --> 00:21:17,608
- They're getting closer
and closer to the airport.
418
00:21:18,151 --> 00:21:20,903
And at 3.5 miles out,
419
00:21:20,988 --> 00:21:23,365
they should be at 2,500 feet,
420
00:21:23,490 --> 00:21:26,285
but they're at 3,000 instead.
421
00:21:27,493 --> 00:21:29,621
(♪♪)
422
00:21:31,498 --> 00:21:34,542
(Arendt): Flaps?
- Oh, we are flaps 10.
423
00:21:34,667 --> 00:21:37,878
(controller):
9642, you are cleared to land.
424
00:21:38,462 --> 00:21:41,465
(narrator): Instead of managing
their altitude and speed,
425
00:21:41,549 --> 00:21:45,178
they're rushing to get their
plane properly configured.
426
00:21:45,304 --> 00:21:47,180
(Hildebrand):
Speed and altitude control
427
00:21:47,306 --> 00:21:49,348
is actually important
for every approach,
428
00:21:49,473 --> 00:21:53,019
but especially for
a low visibility approach
429
00:21:53,144 --> 00:21:54,563
where you have to be established
430
00:21:54,688 --> 00:21:57,606
much earlier than
on a normal approach.
431
00:21:59,192 --> 00:22:00,986
- So why all the confusion?
432
00:22:01,111 --> 00:22:02,820
It can't just be
the last-minute approach.
433
00:22:02,945 --> 00:22:05,198
- I don't think they thought
they'd be able to land.
434
00:22:05,699 --> 00:22:07,159
Have a look.
435
00:22:08,701 --> 00:22:12,538
- RVR, RVR, RVR...
436
00:22:13,332 --> 00:22:15,334
(narrator): The cockpit
recording makes it clear
437
00:22:15,416 --> 00:22:17,544
to investigators that
the crew didn't think
438
00:22:17,669 --> 00:22:21,131
they'd have the required
visibility to make the landing.
439
00:22:22,339 --> 00:22:24,259
- What's the RVR now?
440
00:22:24,384 --> 00:22:26,845
- I don't know,
should we check with dispatch?
441
00:22:26,928 --> 00:22:28,221
- Yes.
442
00:22:28,721 --> 00:22:32,224
- They're told they have
a visual range of 275 metres.
443
00:22:32,351 --> 00:22:34,478
But they need 300 minimum
to land.
444
00:22:34,560 --> 00:22:36,855
- They're not sure
how to proceed.
445
00:22:45,614 --> 00:22:47,740
- Their plan is to do
a go-around
446
00:22:47,865 --> 00:22:50,493
if the visibility hasn't
increased by the time
447
00:22:50,576 --> 00:22:52,496
they get to the outer
marker here.
448
00:22:53,079 --> 00:22:58,085
- The outer marker can be seen
as a decision or a cutoff point.
449
00:22:58,210 --> 00:22:59,711
Once you pass the outer marker,
450
00:22:59,836 --> 00:23:04,048
the RVR must be at
the required minimum.
451
00:23:04,799 --> 00:23:06,843
- But as soon as they get
to the outer marker,
452
00:23:06,926 --> 00:23:08,010
they get the magic words...
453
00:23:08,095 --> 00:23:10,221
- "300 metres."
454
00:23:12,432 --> 00:23:14,101
- Luxair 9642,
455
00:23:14,226 --> 00:23:16,394
RVR is 300 metres.
456
00:23:16,478 --> 00:23:20,440
You are cleared to land,
wind 180 degrees, 5 knots.
457
00:23:20,565 --> 00:23:24,236
- But they're too high and need
to lose altitude fast.
458
00:23:25,528 --> 00:23:26,988
(narrator):
The CVR explains why
459
00:23:27,114 --> 00:23:30,409
the pilots ended up above
their target altitude.
460
00:23:30,534 --> 00:23:32,411
They were rushed
into the approach
461
00:23:32,536 --> 00:23:35,579
and fixated on the poor
runway visibility.
462
00:23:37,082 --> 00:23:42,336
- Okay, so how does that lead
to a crash 35 seconds later?
463
00:23:43,422 --> 00:23:46,423
(controller on CVR):
9642, you are cleared to land.
464
00:23:47,299 --> 00:23:48,926
(Arendt on CVR):
Uh, gear down?
465
00:23:49,051 --> 00:23:50,220
(Poeckes on CVR):
Yeah.
466
00:23:50,303 --> 00:23:52,931
(Arendt on CVR):
Cleared to land 9642.
467
00:23:56,726 --> 00:23:57,935
And done.
468
00:23:58,019 --> 00:23:59,229
(hubbub)
(static, whirring)
469
00:23:59,311 --> 00:24:00,939
(Poeckes on CVR):
The hell is that?!
470
00:24:02,022 --> 00:24:03,357
(exhales)
Oh!
471
00:24:03,482 --> 00:24:05,652
(GPWS):
Terrain. Terrain.
472
00:24:07,863 --> 00:24:09,280
- What just happened?
473
00:24:10,073 --> 00:24:13,410
- In the last few seconds
of the CVR recording,
474
00:24:13,492 --> 00:24:14,618
there was a loud noise.
475
00:24:14,702 --> 00:24:16,288
The crew was startled by this.
476
00:24:17,538 --> 00:24:20,208
- What happened in those
last 20 seconds?
477
00:24:20,333 --> 00:24:22,251
- And what was that noise
we heard?
478
00:24:22,335 --> 00:24:25,838
(investigative music)
479
00:24:25,963 --> 00:24:28,799
(hubbub, whirring)
480
00:24:29,217 --> 00:24:30,384
- The hell was that?!
481
00:24:30,509 --> 00:24:31,928
(passengers yelping)
482
00:24:32,011 --> 00:24:33,805
(engine buzzing)
483
00:24:35,515 --> 00:24:36,766
(♪♪)
484
00:24:36,849 --> 00:24:38,018
(narrator):
Investigators hope
485
00:24:38,143 --> 00:24:40,854
the Flight Data Recorder,
or FDR,
486
00:24:40,979 --> 00:24:43,190
can solve the mystery
of what went wrong
487
00:24:43,315 --> 00:24:46,984
in Flight 9642's final seconds.
488
00:24:47,109 --> 00:24:51,865
- Okay, cruising along
at 3,000 feet and 160 knots,
489
00:24:51,990 --> 00:24:55,285
then they start to descend,
go flaps 10
490
00:24:55,367 --> 00:24:58,163
and accelerate rapidly
towards the ground.
491
00:24:58,872 --> 00:25:00,999
- Let's see what the engines
were doing.
492
00:25:02,625 --> 00:25:04,544
- What's happening here?
493
00:25:04,669 --> 00:25:07,672
Turbine RPMs drop,
494
00:25:07,756 --> 00:25:09,840
torque drops down to zero.
495
00:25:09,924 --> 00:25:11,843
Looks like he's gone down
below Flight Idle,
496
00:25:11,926 --> 00:25:13,428
into Ground Mode.
497
00:25:15,888 --> 00:25:18,974
(narrator): Ground Mode changes
the angle of the propellers
498
00:25:19,058 --> 00:25:20,809
so they can move
the plane forward
499
00:25:20,894 --> 00:25:22,604
while it's on the ground.
500
00:25:22,729 --> 00:25:25,022
It's never used in the air.
501
00:25:26,066 --> 00:25:27,901
- But then...
502
00:25:28,026 --> 00:25:30,653
Turbine RPM spikes,
503
00:25:30,737 --> 00:25:33,155
fuel flow and torque increase.
504
00:25:33,240 --> 00:25:36,367
- All while the altitude
starts to plunge.
505
00:25:36,910 --> 00:25:38,869
- Could they have gone
into Beta Mode?
506
00:25:38,994 --> 00:25:40,622
(intriguing music)
507
00:25:40,747 --> 00:25:42,039
(engine rumbling)
508
00:25:42,123 --> 00:25:45,251
(narrator): Beta Mode is
basically reverse thrust.
509
00:25:45,376 --> 00:25:48,003
The propellers are positioned
to move air forward
510
00:25:48,087 --> 00:25:49,548
instead of back.
511
00:25:49,631 --> 00:25:53,384
It's used to help stop the plane
after it touches down.
512
00:25:55,845 --> 00:25:57,846
- If you would put
the power levers
513
00:25:57,931 --> 00:26:00,224
into Beta Mode in the air,
514
00:26:00,307 --> 00:26:03,144
this could lead
to loss of control
515
00:26:03,269 --> 00:26:05,896
where recovery might
not be possible.
516
00:26:05,980 --> 00:26:08,357
(narrator): Did the pilots
of Flight 9642
517
00:26:08,441 --> 00:26:12,194
put their engines into
reverse and if so, why?
518
00:26:12,278 --> 00:26:15,030
- Can we hear the last
20 seconds of that CVR again?
519
00:26:17,200 --> 00:26:18,326
(Arendt on CVR):
And done.
520
00:26:18,451 --> 00:26:20,077
(hubbub)
(static, whirring)
521
00:26:20,161 --> 00:26:21,578
(Poeckes on CVR):
The hell is that?!
522
00:26:22,913 --> 00:26:23,914
Oh!
523
00:26:24,039 --> 00:26:26,209
(GPWS):
Terrain. Terrain.
524
00:26:31,298 --> 00:26:33,842
- It's the propellers
going into reverse.
525
00:26:34,342 --> 00:26:36,760
(narrator): Investigators
now have an explanation
526
00:26:36,845 --> 00:26:39,596
for the deafening sound
on the CVR.
527
00:26:40,222 --> 00:26:42,142
- This is almost like
hitting the brakes.
528
00:26:42,267 --> 00:26:46,020
The aircraft would immediately
dive into a rapid
529
00:26:46,145 --> 00:26:48,355
and uncontrollable descent.
530
00:26:49,231 --> 00:26:52,943
- How could the engines end up
going into Ground Mode
531
00:26:53,068 --> 00:26:55,154
and then into reverse Beta Mode?
532
00:26:55,279 --> 00:26:57,615
How is that even possible?
533
00:26:59,534 --> 00:27:02,244
- The turboprop airplane,
like the F50,
534
00:27:02,328 --> 00:27:06,665
it had a lot of safety, uh,
features that would prevent
535
00:27:06,790 --> 00:27:10,127
the propeller from going
into Beta Range in flight.
536
00:27:11,421 --> 00:27:14,507
(narrator): Before a plane can
be put into reverse mode,
537
00:27:14,633 --> 00:27:18,470
the thrust levers must first
pass through Ground Mode.
538
00:27:18,595 --> 00:27:21,388
A lock prevents this
from happening.
539
00:27:21,513 --> 00:27:23,974
Pilots can switch
the lock off in flight
540
00:27:24,099 --> 00:27:25,684
to prepare for landing.
541
00:27:25,809 --> 00:27:27,269
(engine rumbling)
542
00:27:28,813 --> 00:27:30,315
- Ground Idle Stop off.
543
00:27:30,856 --> 00:27:33,317
(narrator): First Officer Arendt
performed that step
544
00:27:33,401 --> 00:27:36,488
as part of his Descent
and Approach checklist.
545
00:27:37,071 --> 00:27:38,239
With the lock disabled,
546
00:27:38,365 --> 00:27:41,326
pilots can lift the Ground
Range Selector
547
00:27:41,451 --> 00:27:43,994
and move the thrust levers
to Ground Mode
548
00:27:44,119 --> 00:27:46,830
after landing to help
slow the plane.
549
00:27:47,499 --> 00:27:50,669
But instead, the data reveals
that the engines
550
00:27:50,751 --> 00:27:54,923
went into Ground Mode 25 seconds
before the plane crashed.
551
00:27:55,048 --> 00:27:58,675
(dramatic music)
552
00:27:59,385 --> 00:28:01,721
- Did they do it on purpose?
553
00:28:02,638 --> 00:28:05,974
(McNair): The question is,
"How did they get there?"
Did the crew select it?
554
00:28:06,058 --> 00:28:07,434
Did they do it deliberately?
555
00:28:07,559 --> 00:28:09,186
Was it something bad
that happened,
556
00:28:09,311 --> 00:28:10,646
the safety defences didn't work?
557
00:28:10,730 --> 00:28:12,856
These are all things that
have to be looked at.
558
00:28:14,275 --> 00:28:16,443
- Okay, we're recording.
559
00:28:17,069 --> 00:28:19,614
Let's start with
the taxi lights.
560
00:28:21,574 --> 00:28:24,243
(narrator): To find out if
the crew intentionally put
561
00:28:24,368 --> 00:28:27,622
the plane into Ground Mode
before they were on the ground,
562
00:28:27,747 --> 00:28:29,915
they record a number
of different sounds
563
00:28:30,040 --> 00:28:32,585
in the cockpit of
another Fokker 50.
564
00:28:32,711 --> 00:28:35,712
(pensive music)
565
00:28:37,089 --> 00:28:41,219
- Every switch has
a sound attached to it.
566
00:28:41,845 --> 00:28:45,222
- Okay, let's try flaps to 10.
567
00:28:47,349 --> 00:28:51,145
(intriguing music)
568
00:28:52,439 --> 00:28:55,232
And now the Ground Range
Selector.
569
00:29:03,825 --> 00:29:05,242
And that does it.
570
00:29:05,367 --> 00:29:08,078
- And this, uh, can be
forensically analyzed
571
00:29:08,203 --> 00:29:10,414
and filtered out.
572
00:29:12,250 --> 00:29:15,795
- And you compare that
to what you find from
the Cockpit Voice Recorder.
573
00:29:16,462 --> 00:29:18,757
- These three sounds were
picked up on the CVR.
574
00:29:18,839 --> 00:29:21,425
Let's start with this.
575
00:29:22,134 --> 00:29:23,260
(clicking)
576
00:29:23,385 --> 00:29:24,929
We were able to confirm
that this sound
577
00:29:25,012 --> 00:29:27,640
is the taxi lights
being switched on.
578
00:29:29,933 --> 00:29:30,934
(clicking)
579
00:29:31,019 --> 00:29:33,770
(♪♪)
580
00:29:33,855 --> 00:29:35,355
(rattling)
581
00:29:35,898 --> 00:29:38,817
The test recording confirms
that that's the flap handle
582
00:29:38,942 --> 00:29:41,195
being moved to flaps 10
position.
583
00:29:42,821 --> 00:29:44,865
(rattling)
584
00:29:45,700 --> 00:29:47,451
And there's this.
585
00:29:48,536 --> 00:29:49,913
(clicking)
586
00:29:50,663 --> 00:29:53,750
We compared it to the sound
recorded on the test plane.
587
00:29:53,833 --> 00:29:55,794
- It's a match?
- Mm-hmm.
588
00:29:55,876 --> 00:29:58,212
(narrator):
The audio analysis confirms
589
00:29:58,337 --> 00:30:00,464
that Captain Poeckes
deliberately lifted
590
00:30:00,548 --> 00:30:03,509
the Ground Range Selector
and moved his throttle
591
00:30:03,634 --> 00:30:05,929
to Ground Mode while
the plane was making
592
00:30:06,011 --> 00:30:07,971
its approach to the airport.
593
00:30:08,640 --> 00:30:11,142
- The key element found
in the sound spectrum study
594
00:30:11,226 --> 00:30:13,102
was the power lever was,
in fact, moved
595
00:30:13,185 --> 00:30:14,561
below the Flight Idle gate.
596
00:30:14,686 --> 00:30:17,315
And this was something that
meant the pilot had to do it.
597
00:30:17,397 --> 00:30:19,776
(soft investigative music)
598
00:30:19,858 --> 00:30:20,984
- Okay.
599
00:30:21,486 --> 00:30:23,779
So we know he did this
on purpose.
600
00:30:24,530 --> 00:30:25,824
But why?
601
00:30:27,407 --> 00:30:30,494
- There is no maneuver
or procedure
602
00:30:30,619 --> 00:30:34,833
asking the pilots to actually
lift the Ground Range Selector
603
00:30:34,915 --> 00:30:39,336
in flight and pull the power
levers below Flight Idle.
604
00:30:39,461 --> 00:30:42,173
It's a prohibited,
non-standard procedure
605
00:30:42,298 --> 00:30:45,300
and should never be done
by the pilots.
606
00:30:46,051 --> 00:30:47,846
(narrator): What could have
prompted the pilots
607
00:30:47,971 --> 00:30:50,847
to put their engines
into Ground Mode?
608
00:30:52,474 --> 00:30:54,269
- He's 5 miles away
from the airport
609
00:30:54,394 --> 00:30:56,770
when he decides to land,
but he's 300 feet
610
00:30:56,895 --> 00:31:00,191
above the glideslope
and his speed is 165 knots.
611
00:31:00,275 --> 00:31:02,067
If he wants to get down
to the glideslope,
612
00:31:02,192 --> 00:31:04,028
he needs to descend rapidly,
613
00:31:04,153 --> 00:31:06,364
but his speed is
already quite fast.
614
00:31:06,489 --> 00:31:09,784
So instead,
he slams on the brakes.
615
00:31:11,493 --> 00:31:13,872
- Once the power levers are
in Ground Idle,
616
00:31:13,997 --> 00:31:17,333
this will produce extra drag
on the propellers,
617
00:31:17,416 --> 00:31:21,336
reducing the speed, and also
allowing the aircraft
618
00:31:21,421 --> 00:31:23,631
to descend at the same time.
619
00:31:24,923 --> 00:31:28,803
(controller): Luxair 9642,
RVR is 300 metres.
620
00:31:29,429 --> 00:31:32,432
(narrator):
Investigators believe that
when the crew is told
621
00:31:32,557 --> 00:31:34,726
that runway visibility
has improved,
622
00:31:34,808 --> 00:31:37,854
Captain Poeckes moved
his engines to Ground Mode
623
00:31:37,936 --> 00:31:41,523
to quickly reduce speed
and lose altitude.
624
00:31:45,944 --> 00:31:47,279
- Not sure that'll do it.
625
00:31:47,404 --> 00:31:50,575
9642 continuing approach.
626
00:31:52,201 --> 00:31:53,411
Flaps?
627
00:31:53,952 --> 00:31:57,164
- They should have made a better
decision and go around,
628
00:31:57,289 --> 00:31:59,584
reposition, and fly
a proper approach,
629
00:31:59,709 --> 00:32:02,921
or divert to the alternate
and not forcing it in.
630
00:32:03,296 --> 00:32:07,383
- Okay, we can explain putting
the engines into Ground Mode,
631
00:32:08,134 --> 00:32:09,760
but reverse?
632
00:32:11,887 --> 00:32:14,057
(hubbub)
(beeping, whirring)
- The hell is that?!
633
00:32:16,142 --> 00:32:19,436
(passengers screaming)
634
00:32:20,313 --> 00:32:21,605
Oh!
635
00:32:22,856 --> 00:32:24,776
(engine buzzing)
636
00:32:26,318 --> 00:32:30,073
- So the lock is only released
when the plane is on the ground.
637
00:32:30,865 --> 00:32:35,452
(narrator): Investigators know
the pilots of Luxair Flight 9642
638
00:32:35,536 --> 00:32:39,039
put their plane into Ground Mode
before landing,
639
00:32:39,499 --> 00:32:42,125
but it doesn't explain why
the throttles were moved
640
00:32:42,210 --> 00:32:43,586
further back to reverse,
641
00:32:43,670 --> 00:32:46,798
while they were still hundreds
of feet in the air.
642
00:32:46,881 --> 00:32:48,883
- It should be impossible to do.
643
00:32:49,549 --> 00:32:53,221
- To get to that range
in flight, it's not supposed
to happen.
644
00:32:53,346 --> 00:32:56,223
There's supposed to be
two things that prevent it
from happening.
645
00:32:57,517 --> 00:33:00,353
(narrator): An electrical lock
prevents the power levers
646
00:33:00,478 --> 00:33:03,355
from being moved into
reverse in flight.
647
00:33:03,980 --> 00:33:05,566
Once the plane is on the ground
648
00:33:05,692 --> 00:33:08,903
and the wheels are spinning at
at least 20 miles an hour,
649
00:33:09,028 --> 00:33:11,321
a signal is sent
to an electrical switch
650
00:33:11,446 --> 00:33:15,159
that releases the Flight Idle
Stop and allows the throttles
651
00:33:15,242 --> 00:33:17,619
to move to the reverse position.
652
00:33:18,078 --> 00:33:20,163
- This system is only meant
to be used on the ground,
653
00:33:20,248 --> 00:33:21,582
and that's why they have
a lot of protections
654
00:33:21,708 --> 00:33:24,501
to make that the only
possibility that's gonna happen.
655
00:33:25,877 --> 00:33:28,338
- Could the lock have
somehow failed?
656
00:33:30,173 --> 00:33:32,551
- The mechanical stop
is installed
657
00:33:32,676 --> 00:33:36,263
so that the pilots can,
under no circumstances,
658
00:33:36,388 --> 00:33:38,766
physically move the power levers
659
00:33:38,891 --> 00:33:40,268
beyond Ground Idle,
660
00:33:40,393 --> 00:33:44,689
so no reverse thrust possible.
661
00:33:46,148 --> 00:33:48,192
(narrator): Investigators
study the components
662
00:33:48,317 --> 00:33:50,903
that make up the locking system.
663
00:33:51,028 --> 00:33:52,904
- The anti-skid system
checks out,
664
00:33:53,029 --> 00:33:54,531
the wheel speed relays are fine,
665
00:33:54,656 --> 00:33:57,160
and there's nothing wrong
with the lock switch.
666
00:33:57,242 --> 00:33:58,952
(investigative music)
667
00:33:59,077 --> 00:34:02,330
(narrator): Investigators also
check the anti-skid sensors
668
00:34:02,414 --> 00:34:04,166
which measure wheel speed,
669
00:34:04,250 --> 00:34:06,586
the computer that receives
those signals,
670
00:34:06,711 --> 00:34:09,505
and the switch controlling
the lock.
671
00:34:11,548 --> 00:34:13,217
- Everything seemed
to check out normally.
672
00:34:14,342 --> 00:34:17,554
- It shouldn't unlock unless
the wheels are spinning.
673
00:34:17,679 --> 00:34:19,431
So what went wrong?
674
00:34:20,056 --> 00:34:21,559
(narrator):
Investigators scrutinize
675
00:34:21,684 --> 00:34:24,519
the electrical lock system
that should have prevented
676
00:34:24,603 --> 00:34:28,023
Flight 9642 from going
into reverse.
677
00:34:28,106 --> 00:34:29,817
- Anything in
the maintenance record?
678
00:34:29,942 --> 00:34:31,402
- There's this.
679
00:34:32,612 --> 00:34:34,237
(narrator):
They discover an incident
680
00:34:34,322 --> 00:34:37,074
that happened 14 years earlier.
681
00:34:38,992 --> 00:34:44,916
- "Power lever setting below
Flight Idle possible in flight."
682
00:34:45,041 --> 00:34:46,291
Huh.
683
00:34:46,793 --> 00:34:48,251
(narrator): In 1988,
684
00:34:48,376 --> 00:34:51,797
the Flight Idle Stop
disengaged inadvertently
685
00:34:51,922 --> 00:34:54,092
on another Fokker 50.
686
00:34:55,467 --> 00:34:58,054
- So it's not as foolproof
as we thought.
687
00:34:58,887 --> 00:35:02,766
- The system design was actually
well designed by Fokker.
688
00:35:02,891 --> 00:35:05,353
But they knew the system
had a problem.
689
00:35:06,646 --> 00:35:08,648
(narrator): When the landing
gear is lowered,
690
00:35:08,773 --> 00:35:11,900
an electrical pulse could be
sent to activate
691
00:35:11,983 --> 00:35:14,402
the plane's anti-skid
control unit.
692
00:35:14,487 --> 00:35:16,989
That sends out
a false indication
693
00:35:17,114 --> 00:35:18,699
that the plane is on the ground,
694
00:35:18,824 --> 00:35:22,452
just enough to unlock
the Flight Idle Stop.
695
00:35:24,204 --> 00:35:26,541
- This particular pulse in
the anti-skid control unit
696
00:35:26,666 --> 00:35:28,626
could, in fact, allow
the power levers to go
697
00:35:28,708 --> 00:35:30,043
back into the Beta range.
698
00:35:30,168 --> 00:35:31,336
(engine buzzing)
699
00:35:31,461 --> 00:35:33,463
(narrator): At the time,
Fokker said the chance
700
00:35:33,588 --> 00:35:36,217
of an inadvertent unlocking
due to the glitch
701
00:35:36,342 --> 00:35:38,594
was extremely unlikely.
702
00:35:42,597 --> 00:35:46,643
- These three conditions must be
met for the stop to unlock:
703
00:35:46,726 --> 00:35:50,106
Gear down, the left and right
gear locks releasing
704
00:35:50,188 --> 00:35:52,108
at precisely the same instant,
705
00:35:52,190 --> 00:35:55,152
and the power levers
below Flight Idle.
706
00:35:55,987 --> 00:35:57,280
- A lot of components had
to line up
707
00:35:57,362 --> 00:36:00,324
in very great precision
to make it happen,
708
00:36:00,407 --> 00:36:03,244
the perfect storm of bad things
happening together.
709
00:36:03,369 --> 00:36:05,538
- Could they have triggered
the glitch?
710
00:36:06,289 --> 00:36:08,666
(narrator): Investigators return
to the voice recording
711
00:36:08,748 --> 00:36:13,003
and flight data to determine if
a short-lived electrical anomaly
712
00:36:13,086 --> 00:36:17,340
allowed the engines to go
into reverse while in flight.
713
00:36:18,384 --> 00:36:20,135
- We know from the sound
analysis the click
714
00:36:20,219 --> 00:36:23,972
that we heard on the CVR is
the Ground Range Selector
being lifted.
715
00:36:24,056 --> 00:36:25,557
(clicking)
716
00:36:27,101 --> 00:36:29,686
Approximately 30 seconds
before impact,
717
00:36:29,811 --> 00:36:32,356
the captain moves his power
levers below Flight Idle.
718
00:36:32,481 --> 00:36:35,610
- Okay, so condition one is met.
719
00:36:37,485 --> 00:36:39,655
- The first officer lowers
the landing gear
720
00:36:39,739 --> 00:36:42,782
13 seconds later and they unlock
at the exact same time.
721
00:36:43,534 --> 00:36:45,202
- Now that the conditions
to trigger the glitch
722
00:36:45,286 --> 00:36:47,829
have been met,
for the next 16 seconds,
723
00:36:47,914 --> 00:36:50,875
the levers can be
moved to reverse.
724
00:36:51,751 --> 00:36:54,378
- The aircraft thinks
it's on the ground
725
00:36:54,503 --> 00:36:57,882
and it will go into reverse
in flight.
726
00:36:59,007 --> 00:37:02,844
- And just three seconds later,
the propellers go into reverse.
727
00:37:02,929 --> 00:37:04,179
- That's it.
728
00:37:04,262 --> 00:37:07,266
(jazzy investigative music)
729
00:37:10,061 --> 00:37:11,728
- Ground Idle Stop off.
730
00:37:12,438 --> 00:37:14,065
(narrator):
They believe that in an effort
731
00:37:14,148 --> 00:37:15,733
to lose altitude quickly,
732
00:37:15,815 --> 00:37:19,402
the pilots of Flight 9642
unknowingly triggered
733
00:37:19,487 --> 00:37:22,239
the electrical anomaly that
allowed them to put
734
00:37:22,364 --> 00:37:24,574
their engines into reverse.
735
00:37:26,284 --> 00:37:27,911
The sequence of events begins
736
00:37:28,036 --> 00:37:29,538
with the captain moving
the throttles
737
00:37:29,621 --> 00:37:33,208
to Ground Mode to reduce
speed and altitude.
738
00:37:35,126 --> 00:37:36,711
- I'm not sure that'll do it.
739
00:37:36,795 --> 00:37:39,673
9642 continuing approach.
740
00:37:39,798 --> 00:37:42,760
(narrator): The maneuver doesn't
have the desired effect.
741
00:37:42,842 --> 00:37:45,179
The plane is still too high.
742
00:37:48,431 --> 00:37:51,309
(Arendt): Flaps?
- Uh, we are flaps 10.
743
00:37:51,851 --> 00:37:53,521
(narrator):
The crew extends the flaps
744
00:37:53,646 --> 00:37:55,773
to reduce speed even further.
745
00:37:55,856 --> 00:37:57,315
Then...
746
00:37:57,817 --> 00:37:59,150
(clicking)
747
00:37:59,277 --> 00:38:01,277
- Uh, gear down?
- Yeah.
748
00:38:01,403 --> 00:38:03,989
(narrator): As Captain Poeckes
keeps his throttles
749
00:38:04,114 --> 00:38:06,284
pulled as far back
as they can go,
750
00:38:06,409 --> 00:38:08,619
the first officer lowers
the landing gear,
751
00:38:08,744 --> 00:38:11,246
unaware it will trigger
the conditions
752
00:38:11,329 --> 00:38:13,541
to unlock reverse.
753
00:38:14,875 --> 00:38:16,210
(hubbub, whirring)
754
00:38:16,335 --> 00:38:17,585
- The hell is that?!
755
00:38:17,670 --> 00:38:18,838
Oh!
756
00:38:20,172 --> 00:38:22,132
- There will be a loud bang.
757
00:38:22,257 --> 00:38:23,842
Overall, everybody
will hear that
758
00:38:23,967 --> 00:38:25,552
in the cockpit and in the cabin.
759
00:38:25,677 --> 00:38:28,972
There will be an immense
increase in drag,
760
00:38:29,097 --> 00:38:33,561
so you will literally feel
your body shifting and shaking.
761
00:38:36,063 --> 00:38:37,940
(engines whistling)
762
00:38:38,858 --> 00:38:42,360
(narrator):
Captain Poeckes doesn't even
realize what's happened.
763
00:38:42,485 --> 00:38:44,447
- Pull, pull, pull, pull, pull!
764
00:38:44,530 --> 00:38:45,572
Ah!
(GPWS): Terrain.
765
00:38:45,697 --> 00:38:47,824
(horrified scream)
(GPWS): Terrain.
766
00:38:49,201 --> 00:38:50,661
(Hildebrand):
Once the landing gear
767
00:38:50,744 --> 00:38:52,746
was selected by
the first officer,
768
00:38:52,871 --> 00:38:56,375
suddenly both engines
went into full reverse.
769
00:38:56,500 --> 00:38:59,085
It was too late to recover.
770
00:38:59,878 --> 00:39:02,047
(narrator):
25 seconds after the throttle
771
00:39:02,172 --> 00:39:04,425
is inadvertently
moved to reverse,
772
00:39:04,550 --> 00:39:08,094
the plane crashes,
resulting in 20 deaths.
773
00:39:08,219 --> 00:39:10,806
(sorrowful piano music)
774
00:39:11,556 --> 00:39:14,018
- If Fokker knew about this
anomaly in 1988,
775
00:39:14,143 --> 00:39:16,311
why didn't they just fix it?
776
00:39:18,773 --> 00:39:20,690
(narrator):
Investigators examine reports
777
00:39:20,775 --> 00:39:23,277
to explain why Flight 9642
778
00:39:23,402 --> 00:39:26,864
was allowed to fly despite
the aircraft manufacturer
779
00:39:26,989 --> 00:39:29,367
knowing about a potential
glitch.
780
00:39:29,909 --> 00:39:31,534
- They said the probability
of this happening
781
00:39:31,659 --> 00:39:36,039
was so low that no immediate
action was required.
782
00:39:38,208 --> 00:39:40,878
- It's a very short
duration power up,
783
00:39:41,003 --> 00:39:43,880
so therefore the timing
has to be very precise
784
00:39:44,005 --> 00:39:46,050
and the likelihood of it
happening was low,
785
00:39:46,175 --> 00:39:49,552
there's no doubt about it,
but certainly it was not zero.
786
00:39:50,929 --> 00:39:52,722
- They eventually came up
with a modification
787
00:39:52,847 --> 00:39:56,143
and issued this service bulletin
about it a few years later.
788
00:39:57,811 --> 00:40:00,648
(narrator): The manufacturer
of the skid control unit
789
00:40:00,773 --> 00:40:02,358
had issued a service bulletin
790
00:40:02,440 --> 00:40:04,902
suggesting a simple fix
that would prevent
791
00:40:04,985 --> 00:40:07,445
the erroneous signal
from being sent.
792
00:40:10,407 --> 00:40:12,326
(McNair): To modify
the anti-skid control unit
793
00:40:12,451 --> 00:40:15,454
to the newer version that would
not provide this power up pulse,
794
00:40:15,579 --> 00:40:18,581
one merely had to add a few
diodes and a capacitor,
795
00:40:18,706 --> 00:40:20,835
so it wasn't a complicated fix.
It wasn't difficult to do.
796
00:40:20,960 --> 00:40:22,253
It wasn't expensive.
797
00:40:23,503 --> 00:40:25,505
(narrator):
But the notification was issued
798
00:40:25,630 --> 00:40:27,048
as a Service Bulletin,
799
00:40:27,132 --> 00:40:29,260
not an Airworthiness Directive
800
00:40:29,385 --> 00:40:32,179
which would have made
the fix mandatory.
801
00:40:33,139 --> 00:40:35,474
(Friesacher): If an aircraft
manufacturer is making
802
00:40:35,599 --> 00:40:39,103
a modification to an aircraft,
it gives out a Service Bulletin.
803
00:40:39,186 --> 00:40:40,771
You don't need to do it.
804
00:40:40,855 --> 00:40:44,983
An Airworthiness Directive is
a state hazardous to the safety
805
00:40:45,108 --> 00:40:47,277
of the operation of
the aircraft
806
00:40:47,402 --> 00:40:50,822
that might even ground
the whole world fleet
807
00:40:50,947 --> 00:40:53,492
of the aircraft
till it's modified.
808
00:40:54,452 --> 00:40:56,619
(narrator): Luxair never
performed the suggested
809
00:40:56,704 --> 00:41:01,500
1992 modification to its fleet
of Fokker aircraft.
810
00:41:02,168 --> 00:41:03,543
- If it comes as
an Airworthiness Directive,
811
00:41:03,668 --> 00:41:05,753
they would have complied,
no doubt about that.
812
00:41:05,838 --> 00:41:07,630
And the problem would
have been fixed.
813
00:41:10,050 --> 00:41:12,177
- The accident didn't
happen here.
814
00:41:12,594 --> 00:41:14,304
It happens here
815
00:41:14,387 --> 00:41:17,474
when they accepted an approach
they weren't prepared for.
816
00:41:18,684 --> 00:41:20,478
- How much fuel will we need?
817
00:41:20,561 --> 00:41:22,146
- Uh...
818
00:41:22,896 --> 00:41:24,773
550...
819
00:41:24,856 --> 00:41:27,275
We need 850 when
we leave the hold.
820
00:41:27,358 --> 00:41:30,528
- No. We need fuel to reach
till our alternate
821
00:41:30,653 --> 00:41:33,907
plus 20 minutes reserve,
so we'll still need 600 kilos.
822
00:41:34,032 --> 00:41:35,659
- Yes, but I want to keep--
823
00:41:35,784 --> 00:41:37,244
(controller): Luxair 9642,
824
00:41:37,369 --> 00:41:40,079
descend to 3,000 feet on 1023,
825
00:41:40,206 --> 00:41:42,625
turn left heading 130.
826
00:41:42,708 --> 00:41:44,835
- Is that for us?
- Yes.
827
00:41:45,585 --> 00:41:47,128
(narrator):
Investigators believe
828
00:41:47,213 --> 00:41:50,882
that the main cause of
the crash of Flight 9642
829
00:41:51,007 --> 00:41:52,842
was the crew's decision
to accept
830
00:41:52,927 --> 00:41:57,431
the approach instruction rather
than join a holding pattern.
831
00:41:58,014 --> 00:42:02,478
- Left heading 130, Luxair 9642.
832
00:42:03,269 --> 00:42:05,105
What kind of crap is that?
833
00:42:06,231 --> 00:42:08,067
(Friesacher): At the time
they got their first heading
834
00:42:08,192 --> 00:42:11,570
for the intercept for
the localizer for the runway,
835
00:42:11,695 --> 00:42:12,612
they should have said,
836
00:42:12,737 --> 00:42:15,240
"No, we are not ready
for the approach."
837
00:42:16,282 --> 00:42:18,827
(Krieger): Had they simply
rejected the approach
838
00:42:18,911 --> 00:42:20,996
when the controller gave them
those additional headings
839
00:42:21,079 --> 00:42:23,248
and descent down to 3,000 feet,
840
00:42:23,373 --> 00:42:25,626
the controller would have
said that's fine.
841
00:42:26,543 --> 00:42:28,628
- Here, they still don't
have the visibility
842
00:42:28,753 --> 00:42:32,215
they need to land,
they're too high and too fast,
843
00:42:32,298 --> 00:42:35,094
and still aren't properly
configured.
844
00:42:36,262 --> 00:42:38,764
If ever there was a case
for a go-around.
845
00:42:41,432 --> 00:42:44,228
- 9642 continuing approach.
846
00:42:45,478 --> 00:42:48,065
(narrator): The investigators
also fault the crew
847
00:42:48,148 --> 00:42:50,233
for not executing
a missed approach
848
00:42:50,317 --> 00:42:53,237
when they had so much
going against them.
849
00:42:54,070 --> 00:42:56,364
(Hildebrand): Once the crew
was surprised
850
00:42:56,447 --> 00:42:59,242
by the ATC clearance
to start the approach
851
00:42:59,326 --> 00:43:04,414
as number one,
a lot of events started,
852
00:43:04,498 --> 00:43:07,083
putting the pilots in a kind
of a tunnel vision,
853
00:43:07,166 --> 00:43:09,585
or into a continuation bias,
854
00:43:09,670 --> 00:43:12,463
focusing only on the approach
and the landing,
855
00:43:12,590 --> 00:43:15,509
without considering
any other options.
856
00:43:16,467 --> 00:43:18,219
(narrator): To prevent the plane
from being put
857
00:43:18,304 --> 00:43:21,556
into reverse in the air,
the team also recommends
858
00:43:21,639 --> 00:43:24,393
that the modification
to the skid control box,
859
00:43:24,476 --> 00:43:26,603
which stops any erroneous
signal,
860
00:43:26,728 --> 00:43:30,608
be made mandatory for
all Fokker 50 airplanes.
861
00:43:31,233 --> 00:43:33,110
Luxair makes the modification
862
00:43:33,193 --> 00:43:36,322
to its entire fleet
of Fokker aircraft.
863
00:43:37,322 --> 00:43:39,240
- The accident, in fact,
proves the fact
864
00:43:39,324 --> 00:43:41,619
it was that serious and should
have been addressed.
865
00:43:42,494 --> 00:43:44,704
(narrator):
Captain Poeckes was charged
866
00:43:44,829 --> 00:43:46,914
with involuntary manslaughter.
867
00:43:46,998 --> 00:43:49,126
He was fined and sentenced
868
00:43:49,251 --> 00:43:51,753
to three-and-a-half years'
probation.
869
00:43:53,588 --> 00:43:58,344
- The lessons we have learned
from this tragic Luxair accident
870
00:43:58,469 --> 00:44:01,889
is always stick to standard
operating procedures.
871
00:44:02,014 --> 00:44:04,474
Stick to the aircraft's
limitations.
872
00:44:04,557 --> 00:44:08,061
Be aware of operational
bulletins.
873
00:44:08,603 --> 00:44:11,815
Unfortunately, most of these
things were not done
874
00:44:11,940 --> 00:44:17,028
by the Luxair crew and this led
to this tragic accident.
875
00:44:39,217 --> 00:44:43,429
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