All language subtitles for Mayday.Air.Disaster.S25E03.Power.Struggle.1080p.AMZN.WEB-DL.DDP5.1.H.264-BLOOM_track3_[eng]

Bank angle. Bank angle.

It takes
only 25 seconds

for Sriwijaya Air Flight 182
to spiral out of the sky...

Terrain. Pull up.

- ...and into the Java Sea.

- The airplane's acceleration
was nearly approaching

the speed of sound
on the way down.

The forces just literally
shattered the airplane.

- All 62 people onboard
are dead.

- As the investigator-in-charge,
I have the responsibility

to answer to the families
what caused this accident.

- When investigators
examine the flight data...

- It all started here.

- ...they discover an issue
never flagged by the airline.

- So the system allowed a defect
to slip through the cracks.

- Looks like it.

- It's actually quite startling.

- Whoa.

- I just don't understand

how they could have missed that.

Mayday, Mayday.

Pull up.

It's shortly after
two in the afternoon

at Soekarno-Hatta International
Airport in Jakarta, Indonesia.

Sriwijaya Air Flight 182

is finally taxiing
towards the runway.

Departure was delayed almost
an hour because of a monsoon.

- It looks like
it's letting up even more.

- Good thing.

- The pilot flying today
is 54-year-old Captain Afwan.

34-year-old First Officer
Diego Mamahit

is monitoring instruments.

- The captain
and the first officer

were both very
experienced pilots.

They had thousands and thousands
of hours,

both flying and on
this airplane itself.

- The cabin is only half full
due to the COVID pandemic.

All of the 56 passengers
are Indonesian nationals.

Flight 182 will turn
northeast from Jakarta,

fly over the Java Sea

to reach its destination
of Pontianak,

on the island of Borneo.

- In Indonesia, air travel
is a mainstay of transportation.

Because there are
so many islands,

customers use air transportation

as a routine means of getting
from one place to another.

- The crew performs last-minute
checks before takeoff.

- Auto-throttle.

- Armed.

- Flaps.

- Five.

- Stabilizer trim.

- Set.

- They're flying a 26-year-old
Boeing 737-500.

- In an island archipelago
like Indonesia,

the 737 series airplanes
is perfect.

It operates well
on and off of shorter runways.

It was built
for short-haul flights.

It is very on for 737s

to fly 8, 10, 12 legs in a day.

It's a workhorse.

- Sriwijaya 182,
runway two five right,

cleared for takeoff.

- Runway two five right,
cleared for takeoff,

Sriwijaya 182.

- Ready?

- Ready.

- The crew gets ready
for a busy day.

Take-Off thrust set.

- They are scheduled
to fly several legs

by the end of their shift.

- Speed increasing...

Eighty knots.

- V-1. Rotate.

V-2. Positive rate.

- Gear up.

- 400.
- Flaps one.

- Just after lift-off...

- L-nav.

- ...Captain Afwan
engages the autopilot.

- Flaps up.

- Most pilots really
enjoy having

the automatic system engaged
as soon as possible.

Because, of course,
they're not actually

hand-flying at that point,

so they have a little bit
more awareness

of what's going on
with the airplane.

- Heading select.

- Two minutes into the flight,

the Captain adjusts
the plane's course,

and the autopilot
turns the plane east

towards its destination.

In the cabin,
passengers settle in

for the 90-minute flight.

As the plane continues
its ascent,

the Captain switches
the engine power setting

from takeoff thrust
to climb thrust.

- Jet engines,
like any other engine,

sustain more wear
at very high power settings.

So once you get airborne,
you reduce

to a climb thrust setting

so that you're reducing
wear on the airplane.

- Uh, Captain?

- Almost three minutes
into the flight,

the first officer
spots something concerning.

- It looks like it might
get rough ahead.

- You always try
to give the passengers

the smoothest ride that you can.

So we don't fly
through thunderstorms.

- Let's turn a bit further east
to be safe.

Check if heading
zero seven five is open.

- Yes, Captain.

Request heading
zero seven five degrees

to avoid weather,
Sriwijaya 182.

- Sriwijaya 182,

heading zero seven five
approved.

- Zero seven five,
Sriwijaya 182.

- The crew is given permission
to divert to the right,

around the weather.

But the new route
is very busy today.

- Sriwijaya 182,
stop climbing at one one zero.

- To avoid other aircraft,

they're instructed to level off
at 11,000 feet.

- Stop climbing
at one one zero,

copy, Sriwijaya 182.

Captain, change altitude
to one one zero.

- One one zero.

- The Boeing 737
continues its right turn.

Three and a half minutes
into the flight...

- Approaching one one zero.

- ...it nears
the target altitude.

- One one zero.

- In the cabin,
the passengers begin to sense

the plane banking left.

It continues until
the plane is on its side.

Back in Jakarta, the Controller
realizes Flight 182

is suddenly going off course,
and radios the crew.

- Sriwijaya 182,
what's your heading?

- She gets no response.

At that moment, Flight 182
is diving towards the Java Sea

at an incredible speed.

Terrain.

- Captain do some...

- Captain Afwan is desperately

trying to regain control
of the plane.

Captain! Captain!

- But his efforts fail.

- The airplane's acceleration
was nearly approaching

the speed of sound on
the way down.

The forces just literally
shattered the airplane.

- A little more than four hours
after Sriwijaya

Air Flight 182
disappears from radar,

search and rescue teams
reach the plane's last

reported coordinates,

11 nautical miles northwest
of Jakarta,

over the Java Sea.

The teams find only
an oil slick,

small pieces of debris,
and human remains.

The Boeing 737
has disintegrated

and all 62 people on board
are dead.

With over 700 aviation
fatalities in the last decade,

Indonesia is already considered
one of the deadliest

aviation regions in the world.

- This accident needed
to be resolved fairly quickly.

People needed to understand it
to gain confidence

of flying in that region.

- Divers soon discover
that most of the wreckage

is buried in mud
50 feet below the surface.

- The scope of the wreckage
was very wide

and it was monsoon season
in Indonesia

with heavy rain and strong wind,

so it was challenging for us
to recover the wreckage.

- It's up to the team
of investigators

from Indonesia's National
Transportation Safety Committee,

the KNKT,

to find out why the 737
plunged into the sea.

The KNKT's
Lead investigator,

Ray Nurcahyo,

reviews video
of the crash site of Flight 182,

looking for the first clues
as to what went wrong.

- Nurcahyo. Hey, Ony.

Yeah, I'm looking
at the video now.

The pieces are really small.

What's the distribution area
of the wreckage?

Mm-hmm.

80 meters by 110 meters.

Okay. Alright, thanks.

- When I saw the debris,
I was quite shocked.

Even the strongest
part of the aircraft,

such as engines,
it's destroyed.

So my impression
was that the impact speed

was very high.

- Because pieces of the plane
are buried in thick mud

at the bottom of the sea,
it will be impossible to recover

the parts that might reveal
the cause of the crash.

Searchers concentrate
on finding the plane's

two black boxes instead.

- The black box contained
the information of how

the aircraft was flying,

how the aircraft
system performs,

and the conversation
of the pilots in the cockpit.

It will be very difficult for us
to determine

the cause of the accident
without the black box.

- Okay, let's pull up
the radar track.

- Until the black boxes
are found,

investigators must rely
on the evidence

they do have,
like Flight 182's radar track.

- Everything looks fine so far.

They turn right toward
the destination....

It deviates left...

...and drops like a rock.

- Flight 182 descended
more than 10,000 feet

in only 25 seconds.

- Both pilots
were experienced pilots.

So to be involved
in such catastrophic accident

showed that something
serious happened

that pilot could not handle.

- So did the crew give
any indication

they had problems
with the plane?

- None.

Investigators
contact the controller

for insight.

- But they requested
a heading change,

to avoid weather.

Request
heading zero seven five degrees

to avoid weather,
Sriwijaya 182.

- Sriwijaya 182, heading
zero seven five approved.

- Zero seven five Sriwijaya 182.

- Flying in Southeast Asia
and Indonesia

is always challenging.

The weather is very tropical,
which means that thunderstorms,

monsoon rains
are a matter of routine.

- Okay. Let's see
what they flew into.

- Did weather conditions play
a role in the accident?

- They will pull all
the meteorological data

available to see if there
are any external forces

being applied to the airplane,
such as windshear.

- So this is a storm here.

- They examine satellite images
of the weather conditions

at the time of the crash.

- Add the flight path...

They were definitely
flying around the bad weather,

not into it.

But some cloud cover.

- The pilot did not fly
in the storm cloud,

however, they were
still in a cloud

that prevent them
to see the horizon.

- Heading select.

- Without more evidence,

it will be hard to know
if the heavy clouds

played a role.

Three days after the crash,

the search for the black boxes
is successful.

The flight data
recorder has been found.

They also find
the cockpit voice recorder's

locator beacon.

But the CVR itself
has disintegrated

and the critical
memory card is missing.

They will need to continue
sifting through the mud

to find it.

Will the flight data be enough

to determine why the pilots
lost control of Flight 182?

It will take us
two to five days

to read the record.

Hopefully, everything
will be fine

and the mystery of this
incident can be unveiled.

Within days
of finding

Sriwijaya Air Flight 182's
flight data recorder,

investigators review
the plane's flight parameters.

- Look at that.

The thrust levers should
always be moving together.

But they split,

causing the right engine
to stay at full power

and the left moved to idle.

- The team discovers
the thrust levers

powering the left
and right engines

were at significantly
different settings.

- Finding the thrust lever split

was a breakthrough
to the investigations.

It answer our questions

why the aircraft deviate
from the flight path

and dive in such ways.

- That amount of split...

will push a plane on its side.

- There was a lot more thrust
on the right side

of the airplane than the left
side of the airplane.

- But what could have caused
the thrust levers to split?

- It all started here,

when they change
from Take-Off mode

to Climb mode.

- Two-and-a-half minutes
into the flight,

the Captain switches
the autopilot

and auto-throttle settings
to reduce engine power.

- Less power is needed,

so the auto throttle should be
pulling both thrust levers back,

but the right one doesn't budge.

- To reach the lower
combined engine power,

the auto-throttle pulls
the left thrust lever

much further back than normal

to compensate for the stuck
right thrust lever.

- Clearly, something
was preventing it

from coming back,
whether the auto-throttle

was not commanding it properly,

or was there something
mechanical holding the throttle

from not coming back?

- But even if the auto-throttle
caused an asymmetry,

pilots are trained to deal
with this kind of issue.

- During the investigations,
one of our question was:

Why such significant differences

between left and right
thrust lever

resulting in
the catastrophic event?

- A minute after
the split starts,

the plane starts rolling left.

And then it takes
about 15 seconds

before the pilot disengages
the auto-pilot

and takes control.

That's not the only
strange thing.

- Instead of leveling the plane,

the captain turned it
into a steeper left bank.

Bank angle. Bank angle.

- Why would the captain turn
the control wheel the wrong way?

I see.

It looks like the control wheel
was holding right.

- The autopilot
held the control wheel right

to fight the left roll.

With the right
engine creating more thrust,

it caused the plane to bank
to the left.

The autopilot fought
to level the plane,

but it ultimately failed.

- Maybe when the captain
looks at the control wheel,

he thinks the plane
is turning right.

- The captain grabs
the control wheel,

disengages the autopilot,
and turns left.

- But of course,
this was exactly

the opposite action
that they should have taken.

- The left turn quickly becomes
an irreversible left roll.

Bank angle. Bank angle.

- Bank angle! Captain!

- Eight seconds before plunging
into the water,

the captain tries to salvage
the situation.

Captain! Captain!

- Captain Afwan finally pulls
the right thrust lever to idle,

but it's too late.

- What would have been
a minor overbank condition

resulted in a loss
of control in flight

that resulted in a loss
of the airplane.

- Why did the pilots end up
in this situation

in the first place?

- Investigators still need
to find out what caused

the right thrust lever
to jam at takeoff power.

But with most
of the plane's wreckage

still on the bottom of the sea,

they'll have to look
elsewhere for clues.

The investigation
into the crash

of Sriwijaya Air Flight 182

now focuses on the Aircraft
Maintenance Log

to explain why the aircraft's
right thrust lever

didn't move back.

- So, you've got
the records now?

- Yeah, but it's going to take
a while to get through these.

- The records date back to 2012,

the year Sriwijaya Air
leased the then

18-year-old Boeing 737.

- Aircraft Maintenance Logs
are a great source of history

that lets you recreate
the overall health

of the airplane and ensure that
it's being maintained correctly.

- After every flight,
a technician checks

the maintenance log.

It lists issues the pilot
reported during the flight,

and the action taken
to address them..

- The plane flew an average
of seven flights per day.

It adds up to over 10,000 pages.

Okay, let's get to it.

- It will take time
to review each record.

Meanwhile, the victims' families
are desperate for answers.

- As the investigator-in-charge,
I have the responsibility

to answer to the families
and the public

what caused this accident.

Such tragic accidents
need a good explanation

for the family to understand
why they lost their loved ones.

- We found something.

- After several weeks
of searching maintenance logs,

investigators discover
an alarming pattern.

- The accident aircraft
enters Sriwijaya's fleet

in the spring of 2012

and crashes in 2021.

On November 7, 2013,

a pilot reports
an auto-throttle malfunction.

From then until five days
before the accident flight,

there are 64 more reports
of auto-throttle malfunctions.

That's a lot.

- And none of the reports
are very detailed.

- In fact, not a single
pilot report

mentions the thrust
levers splitting.

- The auto-throttle system
was routinely written up

as either "unserviceable"
or "causing problems".

There was not a lot
of specific information.

- How'd they follow up?

- They tried a number of things.

Most of the time,
they only cleaned the connectors

on the auto throttle computer,

checked the computer systems,

the bare minimum.

- When maintenance gets back
a report

that the auto-throttle
malfunctioned,

their first action is to verify

if the computing system
is working or not.

- To do that,
technicians disconnect

the auto-throttle computers
from the system,

clean the electrical connectors

and then re-attach them.

They then perform
a computer test in the cockpit

that detects
and diagnoses faults.

- So they'd clean
the connectors,

do a test,
get a "no faults" result,

and consider the case closed.

- But the auto-throttle problems
kept on happening.

- The quick fix work
such as cleaning

and reconnecting
is not the correct action

for the problem.
The line maintenance engineers

should go to the next step
to fix the problem.

- Did they try anything else?

- Yes.

From 2014 up until a week
before the accident flight,

they replaced various
computers and other components.

And then they would
do the same test,

get a "no faults" report,

and put the plane
back in service,

only for the same
auto-throttle problem

to pop up again
within a few weeks or less.

- So why wasn't the computer
test catching the problem?

- Because the test has limits.

- The post maintenance test
only checked

the auto-throttle system's
computers and power supply.

- It wasn't capable
of finding any faults

in the auto-throttle
mechanical systems,

like the cable to the engines.

- They were doing
what I would consider

limited troubleshooting.

They were utilizing
the flight management computer,

but interrogating a very small
portion of the system.

- We double-checked the logs
to see if they ever inspected

the cabling all the way
to the engines.

- And?
- They never did.

- Was there a persistent
mechanical malfunction

that Sriwijaya's maintenance
department failed to detect?

With much of Flight 182's
shattered wreckage

still sitting on the floor
of the Java Sea,

the Indonesian investigators
come up with a novel way

of finding the answer.

- Does Sriwijaya have any other
737-500s like this one?

- Let me check.

They do.

Same age. Entered the fleet
the same time.

- Let's check its logs
and see if it's plagued

with similar issues.

- Could the examination
of a similar Sriwijaya plane

explain why Flight 182's
right thrust lever jammed?

Investigators turn
their attention

to another 737-500

under maintenance
in Sriwijaya Air's fleet

to understand why
the right thrust lever

of Flight 182 might have jammed.

- Well, we can't recreate
the computer test.

But we can still check out
the thrust lever.

There's resistance.

When we know
that it is hard

to move the thrust lever,
that means there's an obstacle

or a friction on the cables.

- Okay. Let's see
what's going on.

- The investigators check
the inner workings

of the throttle assembly.

- Whoa.

It's been awhile since
anyone cleaned this out,

if ever.

Let's check the condition
of the cables.

- Looking at the thrust
lever mechanisms

in one particular area
is not enough.

You have to look at
where it's originating from

and where it's going to.
In this case,

from the flight deck
into the engine.

- Pass that up here.

- They examine the cables
running down from the cockpit

and through the equipment bay
to see if they can find

something that could cause
thrust levers to jam.

- When you're in the electronic
and equipment bay,

you're doing two things:
You're visually inspecting,

and you're also feeling
for anything

that could be
binding or sticky.

- Check out the dried lubricant.

Add some dirt and some rust,

that's a recipe
for cable binding.

- Binding prevents
the thrust lever

from being pushed or pulled.

It's like it's pinched.

- So, the planes
are the same type,

the same age,

maintained in the same ways.

It follows that
the accident plane

would have the same problem.

- The team assumes
that the cable

for the right thrust lever
bound,

preventing it from moving.

To compensate,
the autopilot had to keep

pulling back the left lever.

What's unclear is why Sriwijaya

let the throttle system
deteriorate so badly.

- You never let an airplane
go with binding or friction.

It's something that
every line maintenance engineer

or technician understands,
that you have to isolate

the problem and not accept
any form of binding

or friction
in a control surface.

- Okay, thanks for your time.

- Investigators interview
officials from Sriwijaya Air

to determine why the airline
did not address

the cable-binding in the plane's
throttle system.

- Well, that was enlightening.

- How so?

- Management didn't think
the auto-throttle issues

occurred frequently enough
to warrant a grounding

or an inspection.

So they never knew
that the cables

weren't moving properly.

- How could 65 malfunctions

not be considered
frequent enough?

- Because...

it didn't meet
the regulations' definition

of a "repetitive defect".

- According to the Indonesian
Ministry of Transportation,

for an issue to be considered
a repetitive defect,

it must occur three times
over fifteen flights

on the same aircraft.

None of Sriwijaya Flight
182's auto-throttle issues

met that condition.

- So the system allowed a defect
to slip through the cracks.

- It looks like it.

- It just seems strange
that the thrust levers

could split so much without
some warning kicking in.

Does the airplane
have some failsafe mechanism

for preventing thrust lever
asymmetry?

- I'll look into it.

- The 737 was unique

by having independent
thrust lever controls

for the left
and the right engines.

And so, that inherently
provided for failure modes

that could cause
one thrust lever to be driven

differently from the other.

- You were right.

737 Classics have a system

that disconnects
the auto-throttle.

- The system is called
the Cruise Thrust Split Monitor

or CTSM.

It detects any
significant difference in thrust

between the left
and right engines.

- The CTSM is designed
to disconnect the auto-throttle

before the split
gets to be so much

that the autopilot
can't fight it.

- Was the CTSM
working properly?

- Okay. The auto-throttle
is supposed to disconnect

under these three conditions:

The flaps are less than
12.5 degrees,

the difference in power
between the two engines

is at least 700 pounds,

and either spoiler
is extended

more than 2.5 degrees

for more than 1.5 seconds.

- Flight spoilers are surfaces
on the wings

that work in tandem
with the ailerons

to control an airplane's bank.

Did flight 182's
flight parameters

meet the conditions
to automatically

disconnect the auto-throttle?

- Okay, so...

their flaps were at zero.

- Condition one, met.

- And the difference
in power between the engines...

hits 700 pounds

early in the flight.

- Condition two, met.

- The spoiler hit 2.5 degrees

for one-and-a-half seconds here.

- Condition three, met.

- Except the auto-throttle
disengages 30 seconds

after the spoilers
met their condition.

- Investigators now know
the CTSM,

the plane's last
line of defense

against the thrust asymmetry,

activated too late.

- The CTSM should have
disconnected the autopilot

and the auto-throttle.

Had the alarm sounded
on the auto-throttle disconnect,

the flight crew members'
attention would have been turned

to the thrust levers,

and they would have
seen the split.

- So,

why did it take 30 seconds

for the spoiler
to trigger the CTSM?

- The wreckage won't
give us that answer.

- Even though the debris
at the bottom of the sea

could not tell us about
the flight spoiler,

we tried to find
the evidence somewhere else.

- Investigators search
the maintenance records

of the crashed 737

for evidence that would explain

why the spoiler malfunctioned.

- Anything?

- Nothing.

And it looks like there
was no requirement to check it.

- We found that there was
no instruction

from the aircraft manufacturer

to inspect
the flight spoiler system

unless there was an abnormality.

- As a result, the investigators
have no way to determine

what exactly caused
the critical 30 second delay.

- Here's the thing,

even though
the auto-throttle disengaged

30 seconds later
than it should have,

it doesn't explain
why the pilots

never caught the thrust
asymmetry in the first place.

- We need that CVR.

- Hearing what happened
inside the cockpit

may be the only way
to explain why the crew

was late responding
to the split thrust.

- Captain!

Nearly three months
after the accident,

the investigation
gets a big break.

Divers find the memory card

from Sriwijaya Air Flight 182's
cockpit voice recorder.

We did it
systematically

and thank God, last night
at 8 o'clock, we found it.

- Will the CVR explain
why the pilots failed to notice

the split in the thrust levers,

and why the captain turned
the plane the wrong way?

- Okay, let's start here

when the thrust levers
begin to diverge.

Let's see if they notice it.

Request heading
change to zero seven five

degrees to avoid weather,
Sriwijaya 182.

Sriwijaya 182,

heading zero seven five
approved.

- Zero seven five,
Sriwijaya 182.

Approaching
one one zero.

One one zero.

- Not a word about
the thrust levers.

So now...

...the plane is starting
to roll left.

- It's what the investigators
don't hear that stands out.

- They don't notice.
- They're not paying attention

to the aircraft.

- This is the time
when the pilots should have time

to monitor the aircraft.

- The FDR shows the pilots
had several indications

that things were going wrong
on Flight 182.

If they had monitored
their primary flight display,

they would have noticed
that they were in a left bank

instead of a right one.

If they had looked
at the control column,

they would have seen
that it didn't return to center

after commanding the right turn.

And most importantly,

if they had checked
their thrust levers,

they would have realized
that they were split.

- These are three
major breakdowns

in the way the airplane
is supposed to be operating,

any one of which should have
drawn the attention

of either flight crew member.

- They gave all responsibility
for flying the plane

to the auto-throttle
and the autopilot.

- Auto-throttle.

- Armed.

- It's what investigators call

the "ironies of automation".

- Flight crews become
more and more confident

that the automatic system
is gonna fly

the airplane safely.

And so, the pilot's
not really thinking

that the airplane is going
to be in any kind of difficulty.

- So, when did they finally
clue in

to the fact that they were
banking left instead of right?

- Okay, let's hear more.

Set standard.

Sriwijaya 182,
climbing to altitude

one three zero, roger.

- One three zero?
- One three zero.

Bank angle. Bank angle.

Bank angle. Bank angle.

Bank angle. Bank angle.

- They seem confused.

- They're totally unaware
of their situation

because they're flying in clouds
but not looking

at their instruments.

It's the bank angle warning
that clues them in.

- The crew was clearly startled.

They didn't understand
what was going on.

Bank angle. Bank angle.

Terrain. Pull up.

- The captain hears
the bank angle warning,

looks at his control wheel,

sees it deflected right,
and then turns it left,

making the situation worse.

- Did the first officer provide
any assistance to the captain?

- Bank angle!

Captain!

Captain! Upset! Upset!

Pull up.
Bank angle.

Bank angle.

Bank angle. Bank angle.

- The First Officer
isn't helping at all.

He's completely forgotten
all his procedures.

Bank angle. Bank angle.

- The co-pilot did not
provide significant information

to the captain.

The aircraft attitude,

whether left or right
or pitching down or

pitching up as described
in the procedures.

- Even after the auto-throttle
disengages,

it still takes
the captain 10 seconds

to bring the right thrust lever
back to idle.

If the auto-throttle disengaging
doesn't prompt him to do that,

what does?

- It was the overspeed warning.

Fifteen seconds
into the dive,

the plane is accelerating
to near the speed of sound.

It's on the verge
of breaking up,

so the cockpit's overspeed
warning sounds.

- With the overspeed condition,

that's when he finally realizes

that both engines
need to be at idle

and they make that correction.

- He finally corrects
the asymmetry,

but it's too little,
too late.

- If the aircraft
flying higher,

maybe 30,000 feet,

the aircraft
might have recovered.

In the final report,

released more than
a year-and-a-half after

the crash,
investigators highlight

the many failings
that contributed

to the crash of Flight 182.

Chief among them
was the failure of the pilots

to pay attention to what
their plane was telling them

during the flight.

What happened
was the sense of confidence

and complacency towards
the automation system

may have caused poor monitoring
and awareness

of other instruments
and activities.

The report also
highlights the failure

of maintenance, both at the line
and management levels,

in recording a history
of auto-throttle malfunctions.

- For them not to take the time

to take the aircraft
out of service

and effectively troubleshoot it

in today's era is just
not heard of.

You have to ensure
that you're upholding safety

and you're taking every action

to troubleshoot
and inspect the airplane.

- It was tragic that no pilot
reported thrust lever split

in their failures.
They always reported them

as auto-throttle issues.

But they didn't say the words
"thrust lever split."

If the pilots don't
report the problem accurately,

nobody's gonna fix it.

- Sriwijaya Air committed
to improving its training

for both pilots
and maintenance engineers.

But today, the airline
is a much smaller operation.

Its fleet consists
of four aircraft.

Only one of its 737-500s
is still in use.

This accident
gave the world a valuable lesson

that simple problems could lead
to a catastrophe.

It is our hope
that this kind of incident

will never happen again
in the future.

Subtitling: difuze