All language subtitles for Mayday.Air.Disaster.S25E02.Running.On.Empty.1080p.AMZN.WEB-DL.DDP5.1.H.264-BLOOM_track3_[eng]

On approach
to Cincinnati, Ohio.

The pilots of Air Tahoma Flight
1-85, face disaster.

- 23-hundred feet.
- Keep it steady.

- The airplane will fall
like a rock.

- My god.

The plane crashes
into a golf course.

Only the captain survives.

- He did not remember much
of the flight.

When you have a tragic
event happen,

the memories are not there.

The wrecked engines
provide investigators

with their first clue.

- There's no evidence
of burning or charring.

Both engines flamed out
before the crash.

But according
to the gauges,

there was ample fuel
for the flight.

- If there was still 56-hundred
pounds of fuel

in the right tank, why didn't
that fuel feed the engines?

- That was certainly something
that I had not seen before.

Air Tahoma Flight
1-85 is cruising at 15,000 feet.

It's headed for Cincinnati
Northern Kentucky

International Airport.

- The coffee's still hot
if you want some?

- No, thanks.
I'm well rested.

Captain Bruno
Pichelli is an experienced pilot

who has flown all over the world

and also worked as a firefighter
in British Columbia, Canada.

Convair-5-80 pilot
Bruno St. Jacques

has flown alongside
Captain Pichelli.

- He was a very good person,
easy to get along with.

He flew well.

Me and him, it was a very good
joint venture.

Michael Gelwicks has
logged nearly 25 hundred hours

as a pilot and flight engineer

and is now a first officer
for Air Tahoma.

Tonight's flight
from Memphis, Tennessee

to Cincinnati, Ohio
is 80 minutes.

- This was the first leg
of a round trip

and was done every weeknight
by Air Tahoma.

They're flying
a Convair 5-80,

a twin turboprop aircraft used
for short-haul flights.

- The Convair 5-80 is about
50 years old,

was used in passenger service
for a long time,

and then transitioned
to cargo service.

- It was always reputed to be a
very stable, reliable airplane.

- So, what was it like flying
as a firefighter?

- Well, uh, long hours.

Same plane as this.

Different cargo, of course.

There are five
pallets containing mail

and parcels from the courier DHL
Express onboard the aircraft.

- How's the paperwork?

- Almost done.

- The captain was focused
on some paperwork

that he needed to complete
before he landed in Cincinnati,

which he did.

- Okay.

You know what? I'm just gonna
balance out the fuel here.

Captain Pichelli
notices

that one of his fuel tanks
has more fuel than the other.

- The Convair 5-80 has two tanks
and you can use one tank

to feed both engines until both
tanks are even.

One hour into
the flight,

the crew receives
a weather update.

- Tahoma 1-85.
The winds are kinda weird today.

Suggest 10 left to Cincinnati
when able.

- Okay, 10 degrees left
to Cincinnati when able.

1-85, thank you.
- I already had it.

Right on the money.

As Air Tahoma 1-85
begins its descent,

the first officer detects
a change in the controls.

- The yoke feels funny.

- Say again?

- It feels like I need
a lot of force.

- It's pushing to the right
for some reason.

I don't know why.

- The Convair doesn't use
hydraulics

to move the control surfaces.

The pilot must use a lot
of arm strength

when the autopilot is not on.

- Four in the box.

Thirty miles
from the airport,

the controller provides
an update on the approach.

- Tahoma 1-85, fly heading
0-9-0 maintain 4,000.

- Maintain 4,000, 1-85.

- They're packed tonight so
we're gonna go bang bang bang.

- Got it.

- There was pressure on it,
because if you get late

in the sequence of the other
aircraft landing in the airport,

you're slowing down all
the airplanes behind you.

- Tahoma 1-85,

cleared for visual approach,
3-6 right.

Keep your speed up.

- Visual approach.

3-6 right. Keep the speed
up, 1-85. Thank you.

As the crew receives
clearance for a visual approach,

the aircraft continues pulling
to the right.

- What in the world is going on
with this plane?

This sucker is acting so funny.

- We'll do a full-control check
on the ground.

Point it down at 3,000
as quick as you can.

- Usually, an airplane flies
straight and wings level.

It wouldn't give you a nice
feeling to fly the plane,

which always want to turn on
one side.

- 1-85, runway 3-6 right,
cleared to land.

- Cleared to land, 3-6 right,
1-85.

- Runway's in sight.

- Alright, I'll give you
the in-range.

- In-range check...
cabin pressure.

- Set.

- Bypass is down.
Hydraulic pressure.

Quantity checks.

As the crew runs
the in-range checklist.

- AC pump is on.
Green light.

Boost pumps on.

The plane continues
to handle poorly.

- Man, I'm telling you,
what is wrong with this plane?

It is really funny.

Then, less than
5 miles from the airport.

And just 23 hundred
feet above the ground,

both engines lose power.

- The airplane will fall like
a rock,

because it needs at least
one engine in good shape

to bring them to the runway.

Twenty-three hundred feet...
my God.

- Cincinnati control,
Tahoma 1-85,

we're having engine problems.

- Tahoma 1-85, do you
require emergency support?

- Negative.

- I think the reason
he said no,

was he was still hoping
that somehow

he could get to the airport.

- Pull up.

Pull up.

- Keep it steady.

But they're dropping
too fast

to make it to the airport.

- Come on!

They see
an opening ahead.

- There's no time at all to
raise the gear, raise the flap,

restart the engine before you
touch the ground.

Their only option was to go
straight to the safest place

to put down the plane,
and hope for the best.

- Tahoma 1-85, please respond.

- They were at low altitude.
- Hold it up.

- They were short of the runway.
It was dark outside.

- Tahoma 1-85,
do you copy?

- The situation was very,
very dire.

- Trees!
- Pull up.

- Pull up. Pull up.

They make it
through the trees.

- Come on. Come on!

But can't keep
the plane on the ground.

Emergency vehicles
soon arrive at the crash site,

just 1. 2 miles

south of Cincinnati's
International Airport.

The body of First officer
Gelwicks

is found in the wreckage.

Incredibly,
Captain Pichelli has survived.

the National Transportation
Safety Board, or NTSB,m

rush to Cincinnati and begin
looking into the crash

of Air Tahoma Flight 1-85.

- So, what have we got so far?

- Both black boxes have been
sent to Washington for analysis.

- Good.
Structural failure?

- Take a look.

- When we first arrived what we
typically do is to look for the
four corners of the airplane,

to be able to rule out some sort
of structural failure

or a part or piece
of the airplane

departing prior to impact
with the ground.

- We found all four corners
of the plane.

We found the tail here.

We located both wing tips,
here and here.

And the nose was essentially
split in half

and fractured into small pieces.

- If it wasn't structural
failure then what?

What did the captain
have to say?

- He's still recovering
in hospital,

but I did speak
with the air traffic controller.

- And?

- She says the crew reported
having engine problems

just before crashing.

- When we heard that the crew
had reported engine problems,

it made us think,
as investigators,

whether it was one engine
or two engines.

And that would be a big
difference.

With one engine they would still
be able to make the airfield.

- Tahoma 1-85,
we're having engine problems.

If the engines
were operating before the crash,

investigators expect to find
burnt debris inside the engine.

- There's no evidence
of burning or charring.

I don't think we had combustion
on this engine.

- Ditto with engine two.

- So both engines flamed out
before the crash.

- With a dual engine failure,
that's not common,

so we would think immediately
about something with the fuel,

either the loss of fuel

or maybe even contamination
within the fuel.

Was the fuel onboard
Flight 1-85 contaminated?

- Fuel contamination is a danger
to flight safety

because it can affect both
engines at the same time.

- Do we have the results
of that fuel testing?

- Yeah, right here.

Fuel checks out.

- Well, maybe they ran
out of fuel?

- Well, it's possible.

In 1978, pilots
of United Airlines Flight 1-73

ran out of fuel while
troubleshooting

a landing gear issue.

The DC-8 crashed into
a neighborhood

in Portland, Oregon.

Ten of the 189 people
onboard were killed.

- To explore the possibility
of whether the airplane
ran out of fuel,

we wanted to look initially
at the fuel quantity indicators

in the flight deck.

Investigators
recover Flight 1-85's
instrument panel.

They focus on the left and right
fuel tank indicators.

- Zero and 56-hundred pounds.

That's odd.

- The expectation would be

that both would be approximately
the same value.

That one of them was at zero
wasn't surprising, I suppose,

but the other one being
so much different

was certainly something that
I had not seen before.

- Okay, so they didn't exactly
run out of fuel,

but why are the tanks so uneven?

- Maybe some kind of problem
in the fuel system

stopped fuel from flowing
to the engines.

- See what you can salvage
in terms of fuel pumps

and piping from the wreckage,
and we'll have a look.

- While looking at all
the different elements

of the fuel system, the hope
was that you would be able to
document something going wrong,

either loss of fuel
or fuel starvation.

Investigators slowly
piece together

elements of the plane's fuel
system.

- So these are the crossfeed
pipe and valves?

- Check it out.

The crossfeed valves
allow the pilot

to provide both engines
with fuel

from only one tank when
there's a fuel imbalance.

- Both valves are open.

That means they were
crossfeeding fuel

before the crash.

- When we found that the
crossfeed valves were open,

that was a huge discovery.

We wondered if that may have
some sort of connection

between the left tank having
no fuel

and the right tank
having excessive fuel.

- But why would the crew be
crossfeeding fuel

so close to landing?

Did they make a mistake?

- Only one person knows.

Let's see if the captain
can talk to us yet.

- The good thing in
this accident

was that the captain
did survive.

He was able to talk with us in
the hospital

because he only had
minor injuries.

- How are you feeling?

- Okay. Thanks.

- Can you tell me what you
remember of the flight?

Every detail counts.

What is
wrong with this plane?

It is really funny.

- I remember...

- Visual approach. 36 right.
Keep the speed up.

I remember talking
on the radio.

- Tahoma 1-85, you're
cleared for visual approach.

Keep your speed up.
- I saw the approach lights.

Then we weren't getting power.

Then the next thing I remember
is the impact.

- Keep it steady.

- And then...

I was standing outside.

- One more thing.

We found the crossfeed
valves open.

Do you remember crossfeeding
fuel during the flight?

- I'm... I'm sorry.

I don't.

- He did not remember much
of the flight

because when you have a tragic
event happen,

the memories are not there.

Investigators search
the wreckage for clues

that could explain why the two
crossfeed valves were open.

- It's the weight and balance
form for the flight.

- Hm.

- The weight and balance
form reflects

where the cargo pallets
are located,

whether they're towards
the front of the airplane

or towards the back
of the airplane,

and that determines whether
the airplane is nose heavy,

or tail heavy, or right where it
should be in the middle.

- That's strange.

It looks like the captain
was revising his calculations,

possibly during the flight.

- Well, this is stranger.

Here's a second one.

- This one has no corrections
and the captain signed it.

- Finding two weight and balance
sheets for the same flight

with different data on it
at the accident site

raised lots of questions for us.

What was the captain doing
during the fight?

- So it looks like the captain
was revising his numbers

on this first form almost using
it like a working copy.

And this was his hard copy
to hand in.

Did the captain's
weight and balance calculations

play a role in the crash?

- Well, the center of gravity
limits were within the envelope.

- So a mistake in his weight
and balance calculations

didn't bring down the plane.

- Well, whatever his process,

he was supposed to hand this
in before departure.

- Check with the airline.

See if the captain handed
in his numbers before takeoff.

- Taking off without having
computed the weight

and balance limits
is against procedures.

It cuts the safety margin.

- You're sure?

Okay, thanks.

- The airline just confirmed,

the plane departed without
the captain leaving a weight

and balance form behind
in Memphis.

- So... why did our captain
depart before completing
his paperwork?

- Would you like coffee?
- I'm fine, thanks.

Investigators
reinterview Captain
Bruno Pichelli

to find out why he didn't follow
proper procedure

before Flight
1-85's departure.

- So, we found some weight and
balance forms in the wreckage.

Why didn't you complete
them before taking off?

- What can I say?
I ran out of time.

Normally I fill out the form
using their handheld computer.

It had been acting up,
now it was just dead.

I'm not used to filling out
that form manually.

Frankly, I'd never been
trained to.

So, I thought I'd finish
it en route.

Captain Pichelli
explains how he determined

that Flight 1-85 was safe
to take off.

- I did my own assessment.

I checked that the plane's
maximum weight was acceptable.

I saw that the position
of the cargo pallets

were evenly balanced.

I also looked at the nose
landing gear strut.

And the plane sat
properly on it.

- If the nose wheel strut
was compressed,

that would be nose heavy,
and if it were extended,

it would be tail heavy.
But it was in a normal position.

So on that basis, he decided
that the airplane

was actually within its weight
and balance limits.

- From your corrections,

it looks like your numbers
weren't adding up.

- That's true. Yeah.
At first they didn't.

So I had to keep working
on them.

Yeah, it took me a while
to get them right.

- How long did it take?

- I don't know.

- Did it interfere with
your workflow?

- It was stressful. I mean,
I was buried in paperwork.

- Right.

- So even though the weight and
balance was not an issue

with the operation
of the engines,

it did raise questions with
regard to the crew activity.

- Hey. Any news?

With no explanation
for the cause

of Flight 185's engine failure,

the investigation finally
gets a break.

- Great.
Send it to us right away.

The lab just finished
transcribing the CVR.

We've got good data.

But we don't have impact.

The recording stops just
before the crash.

- Well, if the recording
stopped,

that means the plane must
have lost power.

- It looks like it.

And it supports a dual
engine flameout.

- Having the CVR stop about
two minutes prior to impact

is another indication that
we lost both engines

because we likely had a rollback
of both engines

and therefore a change
in electrical configuration.

- When you're ready.

Investigators listen
to the cockpit voice recording,

or CVR, to determine why
the engines flamed out

even though the plane still
had plenty of fuel.

How's
the paperwork?

- Almost done.

Okay.

You know what?

I'm just gonna balance out
the fuel here.

- The captain wanted to balance
his fuel tanks.

But he didn't remember
that at his interview.

That must be when he opened the
crossfeed valves at 12:17 a.m.

- Question is: Did he forget
to close them?

- Let's find out.

Okay ten degrees left
to Cincinnati when able.

1-85, thank you.

I already
had it.

Right on the money.

The team pays close
attention to any mention

of the crossfeed valves
being closed.

- The captain doesn't indicate
that he's stopping the crossfeed

or even mention it.

It made me wonder if they
had forgotten

that the crossfeeding operation
was going on.

Then, just minutes
before the flight's
scheduled arrival.

- AC pump is on.
Green light.

Boost pumps on.

Man,
I'm telling you,

what is wrong with this plane?
It is really funny.

- Yeah.
- Can you feel it?

It feels like it's swinging
back and forth.

- Yeah, we've got an imbalance

on this darn crossfeed
I left open.

The captain finally
realizes he forgot to stop

crossfeeding fuel from
the left tank.

- Is that what it is?

- Yeah.

- Oh, damn.

I see.

- The crossfeed's been going
on for almost half an hour.

- It looks like he never shut
the crossfeed valves.

- He forgot to close it.

That explains why the plane
was so hard to handle.

With the crossfeed
valves open for 29 minutes,

only the left fuel tank fed
both engines.

As the tank emptied,
it created an imbalance,

which made it difficult
to control the aircraft.

- That also explains why
the left tank was empty.

- Yeah, but if there was still
56-hundred pounds of fuel

in the right tank, why didn't
that fuel feed the engines?

- Do you have the list?
Thanks.

- Alright, let's figure
this out.

Did the pilots
of Air Tahoma Flight 1-85

follow the correct procedure
for balancing their fuel?

- The question that it raised,
for me in the investigation is:

If there is ample fuel
in the right tank,

why did both engines fail?

- Alright, to crossfeed fuel
from the left tank

to both engines first
the crew has to open

the crossfeed valves here
and here.

Investigators
consult the wreckage inventory.

- And we know from the wreckage

the crew did the first
step correctly.

The valves were open.

- Second, they're supposed to
close the right fuel pump here.

- Got it. It was turned off at
the time of the crash.

- Step three:

they were supposed to close

the right tank fuel
shutoff valve here.

- It looks like the right one
was left open.

- They didn't shut the valve.

- So they did the procedure
incorrectly.

- So the question we had was,

by leaving the right fuel
tank valve open,

did that somehow lead
to the engine failure?

- I know they made a mistake,
but I'm still confused.

If they didn't close the valve

why wasn't fuel flowing from
the right tank

all the way to both engines?

And why would the engines
flame out?

- There's only one way
to find out.

- As the investigation
progressed,

we decided to run a test
to determine

what occurred during
the accident flight.

Investigators build
a replica

of Flight 1-85's fuel system
to better understand

how both engines
could have failed.

- Lets simulate what
the captain did.

Step one: open the
crossfeed valves.

- Crossfeed valves open.

- Alright. Step two: turn off
the right fuel pump.

- Right fuel pump off.

- Step three:

he didn't close the right fuel
tank shutoff valve.

- So we've got this in
the open position.

- Let's see what happens.

- Okay.

It looks like the left fuel pump
is sending fuel

from the left fuel tank
to both engines.

So that part's working
out just fine.

- Yeah, but fuel from the left
fuel tank

is also flowing
to the right tank.

With the right shut
off valve open,

the left pump supplied fuel
not only to both engines

but also to the right fuel tank.

- Look how quickly the left fuel
tank emptied.

- This was new to me.

I had never seen a case where
fuel is transferred to the point

of the one tank being emptied.

- So the left tank ran dry.

And with that pump
still running,

that means that air
was likely being pumped

through the whole system.

Investigators
now understand

why the plane's engines flamed
out just before the crash.

Once the left tank was empty,

air was pumped into
the fuel system,

causing both engines
to flame out.

- Turbine engines require
a steady flow of fuel.

When you start entering air
into the system,

the air bubbles then cause
the interruption

of the ignition of the fuel,

and that will cause the engines
to roll back and stop.

- So if the captain had just
followed procedure

and shut off that valve...

- If he had, there would have
been enough fuel

in the left fuel tank to power
both engines to the airport.

- I'm just gonna balance out
the fuel here.

The captain's
failure to close

the right fuel tank shutoff
valve, sealed their fate.

- So, why didn't
he follow procedure?

- As the investigation
progressed

and new information
came to light,

it was helpful to go back
to the captain

to discuss his recall
of what happened.

- In your airline's handbook,
they instruct pilots

to shut the right tank valve
during the crossfeed procedure.

You didn't shut the valve.

- I don't... I don't remember
doing a crossfeed on the day,

but, uh, typically when
I do the procedure,

I leave the tank valve open.

- Really?

- This was a surprise because
that is totally contrary

to the flight operating manual.

- I heard if you shut that valve
it might fail.

Then you have no access
to your fuel.

- So you've heard
the valve is faulty?

- I sure have.

And my old employer allowed me
to do it this way.

- Previous employers
had told him

it was the captain's discretion
whether he closes

the shutoff valve or not.

And we confirmed that that was
their position.

Was there a history

of fuel tank shutoff
valves failing?

- I've gone through the FAA's
Service Difficulty Reports
database and I found nothing.

- I can't find anything either.

- I don't think that valve
has ever failed.

- There was no evidence
of the valve getting stuck.

This was a fiction that had
somehow spread

among the pilot community

that simply did not have
an accurate basis.

- This is the part I don't get.

So, what were they doing
for 29 minutes?

- Twenty-nine minutes
is a long time to miss

that there's
a crossfeed problem,

especially when the first
officer reports

that there are handling
difficulties as well.

And so it was very important
to look into

what might have caused this.

- Keep it steady.

- Alright, the captain started
the crossfeed at 12:17 a.m.

He didn't notice the mistake
until 29 minutes later.

What happened in between?

Investigators return
to Flight 1-85's CVR

to determine why the pilots
didn't notice

that there was a growing
fuel imbalance.

- It looks like the captain
finished his paperwork
at 12:26 a.m.,

but he kept talking about it.

- All this time I couldn't
figure out why

on the landing I was out,

and I was okay on
the takeoff.

And it was my chicken scratch.
- Ah.

- Yeah.
The momentum is 1-6-6-7,

but I thought my chicken scratch
I put 1-0-6-7.

I couldn't work it out.
- Ah.

- It was my own doing.
- Ah damn.

I had it all along.

We were okay all along.

- Is that right?
- Yeah.

- Oh, man.

- Okay, first he's distracted
by his paperwork

and then he keeps talking
about it.

- Yeah. The captain's focus is
on his paperwork for a while

instead of monitoring
the flight.

- What about after that?
Any mention of the fuel gauges?

- What about the first officer?

How come he didn't pick
up on this?

- Twenty minutes after
the crossfeed was opened,

the first officer knew something
was wrong.

- The yoke feels funny.

- Say again?

- It feels like I need
a lot of force.

It's pushing to the right for
some reason, I don't know why.

I'm trying to...

I'm not sure what's going on.

- Alright, the first officer
reports a problem with
the flight controls,

but he doesn't check his fuel
gauges for an imbalance. Why?

- Well, according
to his work record,

he was still pretty new
at flying the plane.

Plus he'd only been with
the airline three months.

- To his credit,
he was assertive

that he was having difficulty
in the handling characteristics.

So he was completely appropriate
in asking for help.

And unfortunately,
the captain did not respond

as a pilot in command would
be expected.

- It feels like I need
a lot of force.

- Tahoma 1-85, fly heading
0-9-0 maintain 4,000.

- 0-9-0, 4,000, 1-85.
Thank you.

0-9-9, 4,000.

- How many times did he alert
the captain to the problem?

- He repeated his concerns
at least seven times.

Finally, the captain replied.

- We'll do a full-control check
on the ground then.

- He missed the cues
from his co-pilot.

- How long has he been
a captain?

- Here's the thing.

He's been in a cockpit
for over 20 years,

but only 100 hours
or so as a captain.

- As captain, we would expect
him to actually help

the first officer troubleshoot
why the aircraft was flying

in a non-normal state.

- Still, wouldn't they have
caught this mistake

during the in-range checklist?

- That's a good point.

- The purpose of the in-range
checklist is to prepare
the airplane for landing.

And that includes a review
of the cockpit instruments,

including the fuel gauges.

- So, did they perform
the in-range checklist?

- Yup. They started
the checklist at 12:45 a.m.

- I'll give you the in-range.

AC pump is on.
Green light. Fuel panel.

Boost pumps on.

- Man, I'm telling you what
is wrong with this plane?

It is really funny.

- Yeah.

We have an imbalance on this
darn crossfeed I left open.

- Is that what it is?

- Yeah.

- Oh damn.

I see.
- Yeah.

- We're gonna flameout
if we don't, aren't we?

- Ten seconds later,
the engines flamed out.

- Wow.

The plane had become
one gigantic glider

about to hit the ground.

- They were too late to save it.

- They found out about
the crossfeed issue

at the same time
they lost their engines.

- Did they start the checklist
too late?

- They were at about 3,000 feet
when they started.

- According to the airline's
operating manual,

they should have started
the checklist at 12,000 feet.

- They should have started
at least 10 minutes earlier.

- If they had, they would have
caught their mistake

with enough time to save
the plane.

- If you're not monitoring
the fuel gauges,

when you run the in-range
checklist that will remind you.

But they waited
until it was so late,

they didn't have time to prevent
the engines from flaming out.

- It still bugs me.

Even with all the distractions
and the inexperience,

all professional pilots

are trained to scan
their instruments.

Why didn't they?

- Maybe the fuel gauges
are hard to see?

- Could the pilots actually see
the fuel gauges

from the seating positions
that they were at?

- Alright, so both our seats
are fully forward.

Investigators now
visit a Convair 5-80 cockpit

to determine if its layout
somehow prevented the pilots

from monitoring
their fuel gauges.

- So both fuel gauges
are visible.

But is that the case
for every seat position?

- Let's make an adjustment.

- Wow.

From this angle, the fuel gauges
are much harder to see.

The throttle control console
is in the way.

- It depended on what position
the seat was in.

When the seat was aft it was
more difficult to see

the fuel gauges.

- So the degree to which the
fuel gauges are obscured changes

depending on the seat position.

Hard to say if it played a role.

- Unfortunately, because of the
destruction of the aircraft,

the wreckage did not allow us
to determine

whether the captain's seat was
forward or aft.

- What in the world is going on
with this plane?

This sucker is acting so funny.

- In this case there was a
concern about the fuel gauges

and their location

and whether they could be seen
by the pilots.

- Yes, he would have to rise up
just a little bit

to look over the thrust levers
to be able to see the gauges,

but it's your job to know
what those instruments
are saying at all times.

- I've been told some pilots
put this sign up

during a crossfeed
as a reminder.

Investigators have
pieced together

what led to the crash
of Flight 1-85.

- You know what?

I'm just gonna balance out
the fuel here.

When the captain
decides to even out

the fuel in the tanks, he skips
a key step in the procedure

and leaves the right fuel tank
shutoff valve open.

- If the captain had shut
the right fuel tank valve,

there may have been enough fuel
to complete the flight.

It's my chicken scratch.

I had it all along.

Then, he forgets
to close the crossfeed valves.

- It was my own doing.
- Oh, man.

- There are priorities
when you're flying

and you don't wanna
be distracted

by something like doing
paperwork that's overdue.

- Yoke feels funny.

As fuel drained out
of the left fuel tank...

- Say again?

- It feels like I need
a lot of force.

...the plane
became unbalanced.

- It's pushing to the right
for some reason.

I don't know why.

- When you have a flight
control problem,

that's an urgent problem.

You have to deal
with it immediately.

- The runway's in sight.

- I'll give you the in-range.

Then the pilots
started the in-range checklist

later than required.

- Yeah.

We've got an imbalance on that
darn crossfeed I left open.

When the captain
finally realized there was a
fuel problem, it was too late.

- Fuel is life in an airplane.

You have no more fuel,

there's only one way
you're gonna go and it's down.

- Pull up.
- Keep it steady.

- Pull up. Pull up.

- I think the lesson
to be learned is that

regardless of the airplane
that you're flying

and the conditions, that you
should adhere to the procedures

as they're provided to you.

In its report
on Flight 1-85,

the NTSB makes a recommendation
to all Convair 5-80 operators.

- One of the main
recommendations

was to inform pilots that
they should shut off

the fuel shutoff valves
if they are crossfeeding.

Ultimately, if flight crews
follow the procedures

that they are given, they will
get on the ground safely.

Subtitling: difuze