Original subtitles

NARRATOR: January 2021.

The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg

rules that Russia should be held accountable

for crimes committed during its invasion of Georgia

and South Ossetia 13 years earlier.

These include acts of ethnic cleansing,

torture and ill-treatment.

But this is a forlorn attempt to try to uncover what really happened

during one of the murkiest episodes in recent European history.

- Moscow's will and capacity to use force if need be

to ensure that the countries in its immediate environment

that it regards as properly within its sphere of influence,

cannot and do not break away.

NARRATOR: August 2008.

Russian troops fight against the army

of the former Soviet republic of Georgia.

The Russians claim they are supporting

the independence uprisings in South Ossetia,

a region that for years has wanted to break away from Georgia.

- Russia has invaded a sovereign neighbouring state

and threatens a democratic government elected by its people.

NARRATOR: Tensions between Russia and Georgia

go back centuries,

but the primary objective behind the Russian invasion in 2008

is still unclear.

Many suspect the Kremlin was just testing how far the West would go

to support its allies in the region.

- What the invasion did for Putin was test international resolve.

How willing were those members to use military force

to prevent the Kremlin's ambition.

(soldier shouting)

(fires gun)

NARRATOR: The region to the south of the Russian border,

known as the Caucasus,

is where Europe meets Asia.

The nations that occupy the South Caucasus -

Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia,

all have a rich and turbulent history, dating back centuries.

- The first kingdom of Abkhazia

established itself in the eighth century,

and for a long time, it was a very powerful Christian kingdom,

which was not conquered by the Arabs

during the big Arab conquest of this area.

NARRATOR: The people we know today as South Ossetians

were an ancient and medieval Iranian nomadic people.

In the Middle Ages, they fled to the North Caucasus,

to escape the marauding Turkish-Mongol invasions.

Ever since, Abkhazians and South Ossetians have, from time to time,

nurtured ambitions to gain their independence from Georgia.

In 1921, the Soviet Red Army invaded Georgia,

establishing it as a Russian satellite state.

In recognition of the support the Ossetians lent the Bolsheviks

during their rise to power,

the Soviets established South Ossetia

as an autonomous oblast within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.

This split the country in two,

aggravating tensions between Georgians and Ossetians.

- There are two Ossetias.

There is North Ossetia, which is part of the Russian Federation,

and it was a part of the Russian Federation during the Soviet times.

And then there is South Ossetia,

which was a part of Georgia,

of the Republic of Georgia, as part of the Soviet Union.

What separates these two Ossetias are actually mountains.

So, South Ossetia is closer to Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia,

than to other autonomous republics of the Russian Federation.

NARRATOR: The era of Soviet socialism in Georgia

was characterised by rapid urbanisation, industrialisation

and rampant corruption.

Widespread bribery by party officials stoked resentment

and bitterness within the country's different factions.

More than 50 years later, under Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms,

Georgia was moving towards independence.

At the same time, however, South Ossetia saw its opportunity

to break away from Georgia and unite with North Ossetia.

In September 1990, South Ossetia formally declared its independence

from Georgia.

In response, Georgia sent in troops to enforce its sovereignty,

and armed clashes followed.

In April 1991, in the face of the imminent dissolution of the USSR,

Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet Union.

- The first president of independent Georgia was Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

Gamsakhurdia for a long time was a dissident,

under the Soviet regime.

While he very much proclaimed being a democrat

and fought for the freedom of Georgia, for the freedom of speech,

he ended up establishing a dictatorial rule.

What probably led to his demise was the strong nationalism.

NARRATOR: Gamsakhurdia repressed separatists

and imprisoned opponents,

popularising the slogan "Georgia for Georgians".

He fuelled ethnic division and conflict.

His dictatorial rule pushed the opposition towards open revolt

and by the end of the year, a civil war had broken out.

(gunfire)

NARRATOR: In December 199, Gamsakhurdia was violently deposed,

triggering running battles in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi.

When Gamsakhurdia fled the country on January 6th, 1992,

some Georgians started to dream of a better future

by allying themselves with NATO and the West.

- Now it must be democracy.

NARRATOR: But before these ideas could take hold,

the country's governance was taken over by a military council.

- We are very far away from democracy,

from real democracy.

Now people are holding rifles and heavy machine guns,

so it's very difficult now to speak about democracy.

NARRATOR: A Council of State was formed,

headed by Eduard Shevardnadze,

Gorbachev's former Foreign Minister

and former First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party.

- With the certain support of Moscow,

basically Shevardnadze is introduced as a figure

that can establish some peace, some stability,

and he becomes the president.

He was able to produce some kind of economic reforms,

also political reforms.

However, what he was not able to do

is to uproot corruption and nepotism.

He was partly successful, partly not.

NARRATOR: With his background

at the heart of the Soviet establishment,

Shevardnadze would need to work overtime

to win the trust of the new Georgia.

NARRATOR: The armed clashes that had started in South Ossetia in 1990

continued until June 1992,

when Georgian nationalists and Ossetian separatists

agreed to an uneasy ceasefire.

The very next month, however,

Abkhazia declared independence from Georgia,

creating further instability in the region.

- Very few countries recognise it as this micro-state

which has a big, big clash with Georgia

and also supported by the Russian Federation.

NARRATOR: With Gorbachev's former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

now de facto ruler of the country,

Georgia's political allegiance moved back towards the Kremlin.

In December 1993, it joined the Commonwealth of Independent States

of the Former Soviet Republics, or CIS.

Some months later, in May 1994,

a ceasefire was signed in Moscow

between the Georgians and the Abkhazians.

Although he had been in power for some years,

it was not until 1995 that Shevardnadze was formally elected

President of Georgia.

Five years later, in April 2000,

he would be elected for a second term.

Conflicts between government forces

and the separatist factions and regions

continued throughout his presidency.

Tensions arose with Russia when they accused the Georgian government

of harbouring Chechen separatists on Russia's southern border.

The tensions coincided with the arrival of Russia's new ruler,

Vladimir Putin.

- Putin came to power in the year 2000,

He has been seeking to redefine Russia's place

within the post-Soviet state,

the countries that the Russians themselves call "the near abroad".

NARRATOR: With the tension ratcheting up,

Vladimir Putin sent a letter to the UN Security Council

stating that Georgia must respond to the accusations

of harbouring Chechen rebels

or face military action from Russia.

Shevardnadze denied he had provided any help to the Chechens,

but the tension diminished only when the Georgian authorities

agreed to provide military support to Russia in their war in Chechnya.

Even as he managed to stabilise

Georgia's frayed relationship with Russia, however,

Shevardnaze's grip on power was weakening.

He tried to stimulate the Georgian economy

with measures such as the construction

of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.

But that again fell foul of the new regime in Moscow.

- During the Soviet period, anything that was taken from the Caspian Sea

went through the Soviet Union.

Along with Azerbaijan and with Turkey,

they came up with this massive pipeline over 1,700 kilometres long

that allowed them to take charge of their own energy security

and make money from that vital fossil fuel

that came from that strategically important region.

Now, obviously Russia are not very happy about this,

and they refuse to be part of anything

that cuts them out of the bidding.

NARRATOR: Despite Shevardnaze's best efforts,

Georgia's growing economic crisis eventually sapped his support.

His downfall was inevitable.

(crowd shouting)

(clamour of protests)

NARRATOR: The catalyst for his overthrow

was a deeply suspect parliamentary election in 2003,

which Georgians believed had been rigged by Shevardnadze loyalists.

A series of popular protests subsequently erupted.

Known as the Rose Revolution,

demonstrators entered parliament with roses in their hands.

(clamour)

- It was so dramatic, it was so beautiful,

it was so emotional that I cannot explain.

- You gotta frame this revolution in the post-Cold War context.

Russia was still trying to keep its spheres of influence,

that buffer between Russia and the West, between Russia and NATO.

Whereas NATO was seeking to expand,

they wanted to bring Georgia on board, closer to the West.

NARRATOR: By the end of these peaceful protests,

a change of government was inevitable.

With Shevardnadze's resignation,

an election was called, which took place in early 2004.

It was won by Mikheil Saakashvili,

a pro-NATO politician

who promised to restore Georgia's territorial integrity

and re-establish relations with the West.

Georgia began to enact liberal economic reforms

and changes to its constitution.

Economic reforms followed,

with the privatisation of state enterprises

and the inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.

Georgian troops even fought alongside American forces

in the Iraq War of 2003.

- Saakashvili was trying to create a situation

where he could unite Georgia.

So he was trying to shut down separatism in South Ossetia,

whilst also trying to create new economic ties for Georgia

that were away from Russia.

So this necessitated being closer to the West.

- The United States recognises the strategic significance of Georgia,

and it supports the aspiration of the Georgians

for Euro-Atlantic integration,

and also to be a part of NATO.

NARRATOR: With this new alignment,

Georgia's relations with Putin's Russia became strained once more.

In 2006, Georgian authorities uncovered

a Russian espionage network

covertly investigating Georgian defence capabilities.

As a result, the government detained four Russian intelligence officers.

The Kremlin responded by deporting Georgian citizens from Russia.

The thin thread between Russia and Georgia

was getting close to breaking point.

At the same time,

pressure internally in Georgia was increasing

from separatist movements in Ossetia.

In November 2006, South Ossetians voted overwhelmingly

for independence in a referendum that Georgia declared illegal.

Saakasshvili claimed that the Russians were financing

the separatist movements

with the intention of annexing these pro-independence regions.

With tensions rising, Georgia sent troops into South Ossetia.

Russia increased the presence of its so-called peacekeepers

in the region.

Months of skirmishes followed,

between Russian-backed South Ossetian independence fighters

and Georgian troops.

In 2007, Georgia expanded its military spending exponentially

in an attempt to meet the NATO entry-level requirements.

For Putin, this was the final straw.

- President Putin, who was elected in March 2000,

had long resented any attempts by NATO or the EU

to expand into its former Soviet zones of influence.

And it's for this reason, as tensions started to mount,

that you had Russia moving its forces towards Georgia's borders

and of course you had Georgia doing the same.

NARRATOR: From April 2008,

the Russian government gave full overt cooperation

to the separatist governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

That same month, after the postponement

of Georgia's admission to NATO,

the country accused Russia of shooting down a drone

on Georgian soil.

An email later published by WikiLeaks

claimed that assistance to Russia in this military operation

came from an unlikely source.

It stated that Israeli authorities may have supplied the codes

for Georgian unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia

in exchange for information on Iranian missile systems.

It would not be long before Saakhasvilli would take actions

that would give Russia the perfect pretext to invade.

- It's clear that the Russians had been expecting and planning

for the war in Georgia.

They didn't know exactly when it was going to happen.

But nonetheless, they had been encouraging their proxies,

their allies in South Ossetia

to keep needling the Georgians with a sometimes terrorist attacks,

sometimes cross-border artillery bombardments,

and they knew that Saakachvili, the Georgian leader,

was a volatile man who at some point was going to succumb

to the temptation to send in his troops

and give Russia the pretext for its operation.

NARRATOR: In the months leading up to August 2008,

the Russo-Georgian border had become increasingly militarised.

In July, the incursion of several Russian aircraft into South Ossetia

had been condemned by the Georgian government

as an act of open aggression.

Russia stated the overflight of its aircraft had only been carried out

to deter a possible Georgian offensive into South Ossetia.

- In the lead-up to 2008,

we'd had an increasing tempo of attacks by South Ossetian militants

against the Georgians,

and eventually Georgian president Mikhail Saakachvili decided

that enough was enough and he deployed his troops

to, as he saw it, bring South Ossetia back into the fold.

NARRATOR: In the early hours of the 8th of August, 2008,

a coordinated Georgian military offensive was launched,

aimed at seizing South Ossetia's capital, Tskhinvali.

This outright attack by Georgia

gave the Kremlin the perfect pretext for an invasion.

Russian president Dmitry Medvedev

ordered the immediate deployment of its troops and tanks.

He also carried out a series of massive bombing raids

on the Georgian military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,

claiming that the lives and dignity of Russian peacekeeping troops

must be respected, no matter where they are.

Georgia had begun an air and ground attack.

But once Russian tanks rolled in,

they were quickly outgunned, outmanned and overpowered.

- In many ways, the 2008 war was the culmination of a long process.

Ossetians regarded themselves as separate people from the Georgians.

So, basically, this was a war that was going to happen at some point.

NATO, and in particular the United States and Great Britain,

called for an immediate ceasefire between the two nations.

- Russia has invaded a sovereign neighbouring state...

and threatens a democratic government elected by its people.

Such an action is unacceptable in the 21st century.

NARRATOR: Along with the Russian troops, the Kremlin's attack

also included a new kind of warfare,

one that the Georgian military was powerless to resist.

- Georgia was the first time that a nation state witnessed

the cyber capabilities that Russia had been developing,

used en masse.

And their utility was eye-watering,

not just in terms of military disruption

of communication networks, but in particular,

the disruption and the harm for civilians,

from the crippling of online banking systems

to the crashing of government websites.

The cyber attacks lasted for weeks and weeks.

NARRATOR: Weeks before war broke out,

Russian hackers attacked by overloading and disabling

many official and non-official websites

with what is known as zombie computers.

The attack took down hundreds of websites,

including Georgia's presidential website

and the Georgian national TV broadcaster,

shutting down the country's main servers.

- Members of NATO were sent to help shore up

the defences of Georgia

and to provide training and expertise

to try to resist potential future attacks from Russia.

It demonstrated a new frontier in conflict and warfare

and one that NATO simply didn't have the tools or the legal doctrines

to properly respond to at the time.

(computers bleeping)

NARRATOR: Who was really to blame for this conflict?

Was it Georgia, in the hope that by provoking Russia,

it would propel them into the arms of NATO?

Was it the Ossetian separatists,

agitating for their long sought-after independence?

Or was it Putin, who saw it as a perfect pretext

to annex more territory and further reinforce Russia's defensive borders

against NATO?

NARRATOR: With Georgia battling Ossetian separatists

and Russian troops,

a peace-keeping commission from the United States

and the European Union left for the former Soviet republic,

with the intention of mediating between the parties

involved in the conflict.

- The international community reacted in some ways predictably.

There was a mix of outrage and horror.

They didn't really expect that the Russians would deploy forces

into Georgia. When it became clear

quite what was happening,

there was a big international push, particularly by the French,

to try and broker some kind of a ceasefire.

NARRATOR: But the reaction of the international community

was neither strong nor swift enough

to bring about an immediate ceasefire.

By the 10th of August, the Russian militia took complete control

of the Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali,

forcing Georgian troops to retreat to the town of Gori.

Many inhabitants of Gori evacuated the city

for fear of the advancing troops,

who were pushing into central Georgia.

The Georgian authorities announced that they were ready and willing

to engage in peace talks.

But the Russian government did not respond,

and, as the casualties continued to mount,

announced that they would not back down

until South Ossetia was guaranteed protection from Georgian aggression.

- The UK condemns the violence in South Ossetia

because of the appalling effect it's having on innocent civilians.

There have been far too many casualties from this violence

and there are a lot of people now being displaced.

NARRATOR: On August 12th,

with Russian forces continuing to advance into Georgia,

President Medvedev met with French President Nicolas Sarkozy,

to discuss a diplomatic agreement to end hostilities in the region.

- France in particular emerged as the key driver of the ceasefire.

To a large extent, this seems down to the President Sarkozy's desire

to be seen as a great power broker on the world stage.

And that's always a dangerous thing.

When you actually have a world leader who has thrown

his or her reputation behind a particular initiative,

he or she needs to have some kind of a positive outcome.

This actually was a problem. The French then ended up

blessing a ceasefire, which allowed the Russians

to get away with their invasion.

NARRATOR: The United States and Britain blamed Russia

for the escalation of the conflict.

- I've said to president Medvedev very directly

that Russian aggression has been condemned throughout the world,

and I think it's absolutely clear to us

that while Georgia had offered a ceasefire,

it has taken time for Russia to respond.

Now that they have responded, this must not be a temporary ceasefire,

it must be a lasting ceasefire.

NARRATOR: US President George W Bush announced

that his Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice,

would leave immediately on a diplomatic mission to the region

to seek lasting peace.

- All Russian troops and any irregular and paramilitary forces

that entered with them must leave immediately.

NARRATOR: But despite there being a suspension of hostilities,

the conflict was far from over.

On the 13th of August, a contingent of Russian troops

still occupied the city of Gori.

Three days later, on the 16th of August,

a ceasefire was finally signed by Presidents Saakashvili and Medvedev.

The agreement stipulated that Russia was to withdraw its troops

from Georgia, but that it should still be allowed

to patrol inside the country.

It was agreed that Russia would begin to withdraw its troops

on the 18th of August.

But in the days that followed, there was little sign

that the Russians were packing up and heading home.

Four days later, under threat of NATO-backed retaliation,

Russian troops finally began to withdraw from Gori.

On the 26th of August, in a parting shot,

Russian President Medvedev signed an order

recognising the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia

as independent nations and guaranteeing their protection.

Russian military bases were then established

in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

on the grounds that they would prevent Georgia

from trying to regain control of the areas.

Two months after the beginning of the war of 2008,

with nearly a thousand dead and several thousand more wounded,

Russia finally withdrew most of its forces.

But their settlements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

remain to this day.

On December 2nd, 2008,

the European Union commissioned an independent report

to determine responsibility for the conflict.

In September 2009, it stated that the Russian-Georgian conflict

left about 850 dead and some 35,000 Georgians homeless,

displacing more than 190,000 people.

- The consequences for Georgia as a state

was that it actually lost the last remnants of control

over both South Ossetia and the other breakaway region of Abkhazia,

on the coast.

NARRATOR: The report blamed both sides for the conflict.

It found that while Georgia started the war against South Ossetia,

Russia had long provoked it

and had reacted disproportionately to Georgia's military operations.

The United Nations issued a report

that categorically refuted Russia's claim

that the military intervention had been for humanitarian reasons.

Since the 2008 war ended,

a mass of evidence has emerged which suggests

that Russia had planned the invasion long before separatists

launched their first attack.

In the month prior to the outbreak of the war,

the Russian army conducted military exercises in the North Caucasus,

close to the Georgian border,

with some of the units that would later invade the country.

The exercise, called Kavkaz-2008,

took place with 8,000 soldiers,

30 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters

and 700 vehicles,

all rehearsing scenarios of a military operation

in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

. - The Russians say that they just simply responded

to what happened in South Ossetia.

However, first of all, they had just been completing military exercises,

which allowed them to make sure they had troops in the area

all ready to roll.

Forces do not just suddenly move out of their base

on day one of an operation

unless they're precisely prepared for it.

And finally, we have the examples of what have come out of South Ossetia.

The Russians and the Russian military command

may well be very tight-lipped.

But the South Ossetian militants were often much less so.

And they actually quite openly said that, yes,

of course the Russians are ready to help us at a moment's notice,

and they're waiting for it.

So I think one way or the other with piecing it together,

the Russian claims that it came as a surprise to them ring very hollow.

NARRATOR: As early as 2007,

Russia had withdrawn from the European Conventional Forces Treaty.

This had limited the number of troops

between the Ural Mountains and the Atlantic seaboard.

Removing it was a necessary first step

in any invasion plan in the Caucasus.

According to many, Georgia's failure to join NATO in April 2008

may have emboldened the Russian government and persuaded them

to act before it was too late and Georgia was out of reach.

Whatever the reality, the West was caught flat-footed

by the boldness and speed of the Russian offensive.

- What do you do when a big country like Russia,

which is essentially throwing its weight around in its neighbourhood,

deploys troops in a very quick war, in a country far away from NATO,

far away from Europe?

In practical terms, what else could the international community do?

They couldn't send troops.

But by the time it had begun to get its act together,

the war was already over.

When it comes down to it,

it doesn't matter whether it's Russia or China

or whether it's other countries that have thrown their weight around,

the international community has proven to be relatively toothless.

NARRATOR: There has been much speculation about a trap

having been very cleverly set by Russia.

When Georgia attacked South Ossetia,

it played directly into Russia's hands.

NARRATOR: Russia's decisive intervention in the 2008 conflict

between Georgia and the Ossetians

gave her the perfect opportunity to flex her military muscles

and win popularity at home,

as well as boosting her profile and prominence on the world stage.

- The idea that the Russian state requires external enemies

in order to solidify its domestic audience

and to give justification for its arms build-ups

has been a key part of Soviet foreign policy

and the West's understanding of how it behaves.

The Putin regime was essentially looking for a foreign distraction.

It was looking for a way to rally its public behind it

and looking to test international frontiers and boundaries

and to see just how much it could flex its muscles and expand.

NARRATOR: With the fragile ceasefire in the Caucasus,

another battle began - a public relations war.

Both Russia and Georgia invested huge sums

in aggressive marketing and PR

to justify their actions to the international community.

The Abkhazian and South Ossetian authorities

hired American PR agencies, as did the Russian government.

Georgia, meanwhile, retained a London PR firm

led by a former political editor of the Sunday Times.

Russia's PR campaign was headlined by the claim

that their invasion was justified

on the basis that Georgia was brutally suppressing

a peacefully protesting people.

Georgia, meanwhile, claimed it was THEY who were the injured party

and the victims of very obvious Russian aggression.

Though crude in its methods,

the geopolitical and strategic triumph was indisputably Russia's.

- All the international community managed to do

was to retrospectively provide some kind of rationale

for what the Russians had already done.

They clearly were not about to go and invade the rest of Georgia.

They came in, they consolidated their hold over South Ossetia,

they pushed a little bit further,

just to make the point that they could, and then they withdrew.

NARRATOR: Russia had managed to consolidate its position

in the region and, at the same time,

highlight the powerlessness of the West.

- The lesson that Moscow learned was that if you act decisively,

if you act fast, if you change the facts on the ground quickly,

before anyone else really has a chance to respond

at the usual slow pace of diplomatic negotiations,

then in that way you can get away with literally murder in some cases,

but certainly war and annexation in others.

NARRATOR: There was a further, major economic benefit to Russia

which had yet to be fully realised.

At 1,768 kilometres,

the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline,

which was opened in Georgia three years before the conflict

and became operational in 2006,

is the second longest in the world.

This pipeline was the only way to export oil to Europe

from the Caspian Sea, without involving Russia.

Just days before the outbreak of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war,

the pipeline was attacked

in the section that passes through eastern Turkey.

In 2014, an investigation determined that the pipeline explosion

was caused by hacking into the computer system

that controls it.

US intelligence agencies believe that the perpetrators

were none other than their Russian counterparts,

a claim Russia has strenuously denied.

In 2015, the fence marking South Ossetia's border

was moved inside Georgia

to the point where it incorporated more than a kilometre section

of the pipeline.

This meant that South Ossetia and, in effect, Russia,

now had a stake in its activities.

This appropriation of Georgian territory

was in direct contravention of the ceasefire terms

agreed seven years earlier.

- More South Ossetians, for example, getting Russian passports,

so they become Russian citizens,

which means that Russia always has an excuse to defend them.

And also a slight effort to push back the borders of South Ossetia.

People will try and move border markers

just to get an extra little sliver of land

and then next week, maybe another sliver of land.

So, although there is still distinct grounds

for trouble in the region,

at the moment, the status quo is fixed.

NARRATOR: In 2016, the International Criminal Court in The Hague

found reasonable grounds to authorise an investigation

into possible war crimes

by the Russian and Georgian governments in 2008.

Two years before, Georgia had already won the first legal battle

when the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg

ruled that the arrest, detention, and collective expulsion

of Georgians from Russia

violated the European Convention of Human Rights.

In 2019, the Court ruled Russia had to pay ten million euros

in compensation for damages related to that mass deportation.

And in January 2021,

after a 12-year legal battle,

Georgia finally won a third trial against Russia

in the European Court.

In an historic adjudication,

the court ruled that Moscow was indeed responsible

for human rights violations during the war in South Ossetia.

But none of this has changed the new realities in the region.

- At the moment in Georgia, there are frozen conflicts.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia are both now really pseudo states,

unrecognised states that Russian military and economic support

keeps alive. But on the other hand, this is unlikely to change.

Tbilisi is not going to abandon its claims to these territories,

the Russians aren't going to abandon their willingness to protect them.

But neither side at the moment is willing or wants

to create any more conflict.

NARRATOR: It is unclear what will happen in the future

between the two countries,

the disputed territories and their ongoing conflicts.

But one thing IS clear.

Russia's dominance in the region has been even greater

since the war of 2008

and they are showing no signs of leaving any time soon.

- In many ways, the Russian invasion of Georgia served as a testbed

for what would later come with Crimea.

Various weapon systems were tested for the first time,

along with shock tactics, cyber warfare techniques

and new methods of causing confusion amongst the populace

and were experimented with and later honed,

not just for the Crimea, but more broadly against Ukraine as a whole.

But perhaps most importantly, what the invasion did for Putin

was test international resolve, especially that of NATO members.

And the message that came from that attack...

..was that Russia could push

and expand,

and that there was very little pushback and resistance

from a distracted and disunited NATO.

NARRATOR: Despite all the setbacks and the difficulties

with its much larger, all-powerful neighbour,

Georgia is still trying to strengthen its ties with the West.

- Georgia still has very high hopes to become a member of NATO.

The problem is that this is clearly one of Russia's red lines, first.

And secondly, Georgia is a fair way away.

It's not part of Europe in the sense of contiguous land border

with any other NATO member states.

The key element of NATO is what's called Article Five,

the central element which says an attack on one NATO member state

is an attack on all.

And it depends on that being a credible deterrent.

- The trouble is with Georgia,

can we really imagine that say if the Russians rolled into Georgia,

that NATO forces would try and attack Russia from the west?

It seems very implausible.

Therefore there is a big concern, actually amongst NATO commanders,

that if Georgia were allowed in,

it actually would undermine the credibility of the NATO alliance.

NARRATOR: This is a problem not only for Georgia.

Every time that a neighbouring country of Russia

aspires to turn their sights westward, conflicts emerge.

- It's argued that if NATO and the US had acted more robustly

in reaction to Russia's advances into Georgia,

then you might not have had the annexation of Crimea

six years later.

But the simple answer to this is that the US was never going to risk

going to war with Russia over Georgia.

And that is a lesson that is still being learned in that region today.

And it's a lesson that was so clearly learned in Ukraine as well,

when President Obama made a similar decision not to invade

and risk war with Russia.

- In the wake of the attack on Georgia,

President Putin made it clear to the President of Georgia,

Mikheil Saakashvili, at the time,

Putin had said directly to Saakashvili,

"Your Western allies, your Western partners,

promised a great deal. They didn't deliver.

I threatened. I delivered."

So, Putin is always looking out to see if there is any hint

that we will not follow through on promises that we have made,

because he will always follow through on a threat,

as indeed he ultimately did. He threatened Ukraine in 2008

and it wasn't until 2014

when Ukraine tried to conclude an association agreement

with the European Union, that he struck.

NARRATOR: Putin has stayed true to his word.

Hostilities persist in Ukraine today,

suggesting that Russian interference in surrounding countries

is far from over.

It will continue for as long as it serves his purpose

of consolidating and expanding his power base abroad,

whilst discouraging the West and NATO

from interfering in Russia's backyard.

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