All language subtitles for Secret.Wars.Uncovered.S02E03.1080p.WEB.h264-BAWD_Subtitles01_Unnamed

NARRATOR: January 2021.

The European Court of Human Rights
in Strasbourg

rules that Russia should be held
accountable

for crimes committed during its
invasion of Georgia

and South Ossetia 13 years earlier.

These include acts of
ethnic cleansing,

torture and ill-treatment.

But this is a forlorn attempt to try
to uncover what really happened

during one of the murkiest episodes
in recent European history.

- Moscow's will and capacity
to use force if need be

to ensure that the countries in its
immediate environment

that it regards as properly
within its sphere of influence,

cannot and do not break away.

NARRATOR: August 2008.

Russian troops fight against
the army

of the former Soviet republic
of Georgia.

The Russians claim
they are supporting

the independence uprisings
in South Ossetia,

a region that for years has wanted
to break away from Georgia.

- Russia has invaded a sovereign
neighbouring state

and threatens a democratic
government elected by its people.

NARRATOR: Tensions
between Russia and Georgia

go back centuries,

but the primary objective behind
the Russian invasion in 2008

is still unclear.

Many suspect the Kremlin was just
testing how far the West would go

to support its allies in the region.

- What the invasion did for Putin
was test international resolve.

How willing were those members
to use military force

to prevent the Kremlin's ambition.

(soldier shouting)

(fires gun)

NARRATOR: The region to the south
of the Russian border,

known as the Caucasus,

is where Europe meets Asia.

The nations that occupy
the South Caucasus -

Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia,

all have a rich and turbulent
history, dating back centuries.

- The first kingdom of Abkhazia

established itself
in the eighth century,

and for a long time, it was a very
powerful Christian kingdom,

which was not conquered by the Arabs

during the big Arab conquest
of this area.

NARRATOR: The people we know today
as South Ossetians

were an ancient and medieval Iranian
nomadic people.

In the Middle Ages,
they fled to the North Caucasus,

to escape the marauding
Turkish-Mongol invasions.

Ever since, Abkhazians and South
Ossetians have, from time to time,

nurtured ambitions to gain
their independence from Georgia.

In 1921, the Soviet Red Army
invaded Georgia,

establishing it
as a Russian satellite state.

In recognition of the support the
Ossetians lent the Bolsheviks

during their rise to power,

the Soviets established
South Ossetia

as an autonomous oblast within the
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.

This split the country in two,

aggravating tensions between
Georgians and Ossetians.

- There are two Ossetias.

There is North Ossetia, which is
part of the Russian Federation,

and it was a part of the Russian
Federation during the Soviet times.

And then there is South Ossetia,

which was a part of Georgia,

of the Republic of Georgia,
as part of the Soviet Union.

What separates these two Ossetias
are actually mountains.

So, South Ossetia is closer to
Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia,

than to other autonomous republics
of the Russian Federation.

NARRATOR: The era of Soviet
socialism in Georgia

was characterised by rapid
urbanisation, industrialisation

and rampant corruption.

Widespread bribery by party
officials stoked resentment

and bitterness within the country's
different factions.

More than 50 years later, under
Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms,

Georgia was moving towards
independence.

At the same time, however,
South Ossetia saw its opportunity

to break away from Georgia
and unite with North Ossetia.

In September 1990, South Ossetia
formally declared its independence

from Georgia.

In response, Georgia sent in troops
to enforce its sovereignty,

and armed clashes followed.

In April 1991, in the face of the
imminent dissolution of the USSR,

Georgia declared its independence
from the Soviet Union.

- The first president of independent
Georgia was Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

Gamsakhurdia for a long time
was a dissident,

under the Soviet regime.

While he very much proclaimed
being a democrat

and fought for the freedom of
Georgia, for the freedom of speech,

he ended up establishing
a dictatorial rule.

What probably led to his demise
was the strong nationalism.

NARRATOR: Gamsakhurdia repressed
separatists

and imprisoned opponents,

popularising the slogan
"Georgia for Georgians".

He fuelled ethnic division
and conflict.

His dictatorial rule pushed
the opposition towards open revolt

and by the end of the year,
a civil war had broken out.

(gunfire)

NARRATOR: In December 199,
Gamsakhurdia was violently deposed,

triggering running battles
in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi.

When Gamsakhurdia fled the country
on January 6th, 1992,

some Georgians started to dream of
a better future

by allying themselves with NATO
and the West.

- Now it must be democracy.

NARRATOR: But before these ideas
could take hold,

the country's governance was taken
over by a military council.

- We are very far away from
democracy,

from real democracy.

Now people are holding rifles
and heavy machine guns,

so it's very difficult now to speak
about democracy.

NARRATOR:
A Council of State was formed,

headed by Eduard Shevardnadze,

Gorbachev's former Foreign Minister

and former First Secretary
of the Georgian Communist Party.

- With the certain support of
Moscow,

basically Shevardnadze is introduced
as a figure

that can establish some peace,
some stability,

and he becomes the president.

He was able to produce some kind of
economic reforms,

also political reforms.

However, what he was not able to do

is to uproot corruption and
nepotism.

He was partly successful,
partly not.

NARRATOR:
With his background

at the heart of the Soviet
establishment,

Shevardnadze would need to work
overtime

to win the trust of the new Georgia.

NARRATOR: The armed clashes that had
started in South Ossetia in 1990

continued until June 1992,

when Georgian nationalists and
Ossetian separatists

agreed to an uneasy ceasefire.

The very next month, however,

Abkhazia declared independence
from Georgia,

creating further instability
in the region.

- Very few countries recognise it
as this micro-state

which has a big, big clash with
Georgia

and also supported by
the Russian Federation.

NARRATOR: With Gorbachev's former
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

now de facto ruler of the country,

Georgia's political allegiance
moved back towards the Kremlin.

In December 1993, it joined the
Commonwealth of Independent States

of the Former Soviet Republics,
or CIS.

Some months later, in May 1994,

a ceasefire was signed in Moscow

between the Georgians
and the Abkhazians.

Although he had been in power
for some years,

it was not until 1995 that
Shevardnadze was formally elected

President of Georgia.

Five years later, in April 2000,

he would be elected
for a second term.

Conflicts between government
forces

and the separatist factions
and regions

continued throughout his presidency.

Tensions arose with Russia when
they accused the Georgian government

of harbouring Chechen separatists
on Russia's southern border.

The tensions coincided with the
arrival of Russia's new ruler,

Vladimir Putin.

- Putin came to power
in the year 2000,

He has been seeking to redefine
Russia's place

within the post-Soviet state,

the countries that the Russians
themselves call "the near abroad".

NARRATOR: With the tension
ratcheting up,

Vladimir Putin sent a letter to
the UN Security Council

stating that Georgia must respond to
the accusations

of harbouring Chechen rebels

or face military action from Russia.

Shevardnadze denied he had provided
any help to the Chechens,

but the tension diminished only when
the Georgian authorities

agreed to provide military support
to Russia in their war in Chechnya.

Even as he managed to stabilise

Georgia's frayed relationship with
Russia, however,

Shevardnaze's grip on power was
weakening.

He tried to stimulate the Georgian
economy

with measures such as
the construction

of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
oil pipeline.

But that again fell foul of the new
regime in Moscow.

- During the Soviet period, anything
that was taken from the Caspian Sea

went through the Soviet Union.

Along with Azerbaijan
and with Turkey,

they came up with this massive
pipeline over 1,700 kilometres long

that allowed them to take charge of
their own energy security

and make money from that vital
fossil fuel

that came from that strategically
important region.

Now, obviously Russia are not very
happy about this,

and they refuse to be part of
anything

that cuts them out of the bidding.

NARRATOR:
Despite Shevardnaze's best efforts,

Georgia's growing economic crisis
eventually sapped his support.

His downfall was inevitable.

(crowd shouting)

(clamour of protests)

NARRATOR:
The catalyst for his overthrow

was a deeply suspect parliamentary
election in 2003,

which Georgians believed had been
rigged by Shevardnadze loyalists.

A series of popular protests
subsequently erupted.

Known as the Rose Revolution,

demonstrators entered parliament
with roses in their hands.

(clamour)

- It was so dramatic,
it was so beautiful,

it was so emotional that
I cannot explain.

- You gotta frame this revolution
in the post-Cold War context.

Russia was still trying to keep
its spheres of influence,

that buffer between Russia and the
West, between Russia and NATO.

Whereas NATO was seeking to expand,

they wanted to bring Georgia on
board, closer to the West.

NARRATOR: By the end of these
peaceful protests,

a change of government
was inevitable.

With Shevardnadze's resignation,

an election was called, which
took place in early 2004.

It was won by Mikheil Saakashvili,

a pro-NATO politician

who promised to restore
Georgia's territorial integrity

and re-establish relations
with the West.

Georgia began to enact liberal
economic reforms

and changes to its constitution.

Economic reforms followed,

with the privatisation of
state enterprises

and the inauguration of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.

Georgian troops even fought
alongside American forces

in the Iraq War of 2003.

- Saakashvili was trying to create
a situation

where he could unite Georgia.

So he was trying to shut down
separatism in South Ossetia,

whilst also trying to create new
economic ties for Georgia

that were away from Russia.

So this necessitated being closer
to the West.

- The United States recognises the
strategic significance of Georgia,

and it supports the aspiration of
the Georgians

for Euro-Atlantic integration,

and also to be a part of NATO.

NARRATOR: With this new alignment,

Georgia's relations with Putin's
Russia became strained once more.

In 2006, Georgian authorities
uncovered

a Russian espionage network

covertly investigating Georgian
defence capabilities.

As a result, the government detained
four Russian intelligence officers.

The Kremlin responded by deporting
Georgian citizens from Russia.

The thin thread between Russia
and Georgia

was getting close to breaking point.

At the same time,

pressure internally in Georgia was
increasing

from separatist movements
in Ossetia.

In November 2006,
South Ossetians voted overwhelmingly

for independence in a referendum
that Georgia declared illegal.

Saakasshvili claimed that
the Russians were financing

the separatist movements

with the intention of annexing
these pro-independence regions.

With tensions rising, Georgia sent
troops into South Ossetia.

Russia increased the presence of
its so-called peacekeepers

in the region.

Months of skirmishes followed,

between Russian-backed South
Ossetian independence fighters

and Georgian troops.

In 2007, Georgia expanded its
military spending exponentially

in an attempt to meet the NATO
entry-level requirements.

For Putin, this was the final straw.

- President Putin, who was elected
in March 2000,

had long resented any attempts by
NATO or the EU

to expand into its former
Soviet zones of influence.

And it's for this reason, as
tensions started to mount,

that you had Russia moving its
forces towards Georgia's borders

and of course you had Georgia
doing the same.

NARRATOR: From April 2008,

the Russian government gave full
overt cooperation

to the separatist governments of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

That same month,
after the postponement

of Georgia's admission to NATO,

the country accused Russia of
shooting down a drone

on Georgian soil.

An email later published by
WikiLeaks

claimed that assistance to Russia in
this military operation

came from an unlikely source.

It stated that Israeli authorities
may have supplied the codes

for Georgian unmanned aerial
vehicles to Russia

in exchange for information
on Iranian missile systems.

It would not be long before
Saakhasvilli would take actions

that would give Russia the perfect
pretext to invade.

- It's clear that the Russians had
been expecting and planning

for the war in Georgia.

They didn't know exactly when it was
going to happen.

But nonetheless, they had been
encouraging their proxies,

their allies in South Ossetia

to keep needling the Georgians with
a sometimes terrorist attacks,

sometimes cross-border artillery
bombardments,

and they knew that Saakachvili,
the Georgian leader,

was a volatile man who at some point
was going to succumb

to the temptation to send in
his troops

and give Russia the pretext for its
operation.

NARRATOR: In the months leading up
to August 2008,

the Russo-Georgian border had become
increasingly militarised.

In July, the incursion of several
Russian aircraft into South Ossetia

had been condemned by the Georgian
government

as an act of open aggression.

Russia stated the overflight of its
aircraft had only been carried out

to deter a possible Georgian
offensive into South Ossetia.

- In the lead-up to 2008,

we'd had an increasing tempo of
attacks by South Ossetian militants

against the Georgians,

and eventually Georgian president
Mikhail Saakachvili decided

that enough was enough and he
deployed his troops

to, as he saw it, bring South
Ossetia back into the fold.

NARRATOR: In the early hours of the
8th of August, 2008,

a coordinated Georgian military
offensive was launched,

aimed at seizing South Ossetia's
capital, Tskhinvali.

This outright attack by Georgia

gave the Kremlin the perfect pretext
for an invasion.

Russian president Dmitry Medvedev

ordered the immediate deployment
of its troops and tanks.

He also carried out a series of
massive bombing raids

on the Georgian military bases
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,

claiming that the lives and dignity
of Russian peacekeeping troops

must be respected,
no matter where they are.

Georgia had begun an air
and ground attack.

But once Russian tanks rolled in,

they were quickly outgunned,
outmanned and overpowered.

- In many ways, the 2008 war was
the culmination of a long process.

Ossetians regarded themselves as
separate people from the Georgians.

So, basically, this was a war that
was going to happen at some point.

NATO, and in particular the United
States and Great Britain,

called for an immediate ceasefire
between the two nations.

- Russia has invaded a sovereign
neighbouring state...

and threatens a democratic
government elected by its people.

Such an action is unacceptable
in the 21st century.

NARRATOR: Along with the Russian
troops, the Kremlin's attack

also included a new kind of warfare,

one that the Georgian military was
powerless to resist.

- Georgia was the first time that
a nation state witnessed

the cyber capabilities that Russia
had been developing,

used en masse.

And their utility was eye-watering,

not just in terms of military
disruption

of communication networks,
but in particular,

the disruption and the harm
for civilians,

from the crippling of
online banking systems

to the crashing of government
websites.

The cyber attacks lasted
for weeks and weeks.

NARRATOR:
Weeks before war broke out,

Russian hackers attacked by
overloading and disabling

many official and non-official
websites

with what is known as zombie
computers.

The attack took down
hundreds of websites,

including Georgia's
presidential website

and the Georgian national TV
broadcaster,

shutting down the country's
main servers.

- Members of NATO were
sent to help shore up

the defences of Georgia

and to provide training and
expertise

to try to resist potential
future attacks from Russia.

It demonstrated a new frontier
in conflict and warfare

and one that NATO simply didn't have
the tools or the legal doctrines

to properly respond to at the time.

(computers bleeping)

NARRATOR: Who was really to blame
for this conflict?

Was it Georgia, in the hope that
by provoking Russia,

it would propel them into the arms
of NATO?

Was it the Ossetian separatists,

agitating for their long
sought-after independence?

Or was it Putin, who saw it as a
perfect pretext

to annex more territory and further
reinforce Russia's defensive borders

against NATO?

NARRATOR: With Georgia battling
Ossetian separatists

and Russian troops,

a peace-keeping commission
from the United States

and the European Union left for
the former Soviet republic,

with the intention of
mediating between the parties

involved in the conflict.

- The international community
reacted in some ways predictably.

There was a mix of outrage
and horror.

They didn't really expect that
the Russians would deploy forces

into Georgia.
When it became clear

quite what was happening,

there was a big international push,
particularly by the French,

to try and broker some kind of
a ceasefire.

NARRATOR: But the reaction of
the international community

was neither strong nor swift enough

to bring about an immediate
ceasefire.

By the 10th of August, the Russian
militia took complete control

of the Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali,

forcing Georgian troops to retreat
to the town of Gori.

Many inhabitants of Gori evacuated
the city

for fear of the advancing troops,

who were pushing into
central Georgia.

The Georgian authorities announced
that they were ready and willing

to engage in peace talks.

But the Russian government
did not respond,

and, as the casualties continued
to mount,

announced that they would not
back down

until South Ossetia was guaranteed
protection from Georgian aggression.

- The UK condemns the violence
in South Ossetia

because of the appalling effect
it's having on innocent civilians.

There have been far too many
casualties from this violence

and there are a lot of people
now being displaced.

NARRATOR: On August 12th,

with Russian forces continuing to
advance into Georgia,

President Medvedev met with French
President Nicolas Sarkozy,

to discuss a diplomatic agreement
to end hostilities in the region.

- France in particular emerged
as the key driver of the ceasefire.

To a large extent, this seems down
to the President Sarkozy's desire

to be seen as a great power broker
on the world stage.

And that's always a dangerous thing.

When you actually have a world
leader who has thrown

his or her reputation behind
a particular initiative,

he or she needs to have some kind of
a positive outcome.

This actually was a problem.
The French then ended up

blessing a ceasefire,
which allowed the Russians

to get away with their invasion.

NARRATOR: The United States and
Britain blamed Russia

for the escalation of the conflict.

- I've said to president Medvedev
very directly

that Russian aggression has been
condemned throughout the world,

and I think it's absolutely clear
to us

that while Georgia had offered
a ceasefire,

it has taken time for Russia
to respond.

Now that they have responded, this
must not be a temporary ceasefire,

it must be a lasting ceasefire.

NARRATOR: US President
George W Bush announced

that his Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice,

would leave immediately on
a diplomatic mission to the region

to seek lasting peace.

- All Russian troops and any
irregular and paramilitary forces

that entered with them
must leave immediately.

NARRATOR: But despite there being
a suspension of hostilities,

the conflict was far from over.

On the 13th of August, a contingent
of Russian troops

still occupied the city of Gori.

Three days later, on the 16th
of August,

a ceasefire was finally signed by
Presidents Saakashvili and Medvedev.

The agreement stipulated that Russia
was to withdraw its troops

from Georgia, but that it should
still be allowed

to patrol inside the country.

It was agreed that Russia would
begin to withdraw its troops

on the 18th of August.

But in the days that followed,
there was little sign

that the Russians were packing up
and heading home.

Four days later, under threat of
NATO-backed retaliation,

Russian troops finally began to
withdraw from Gori.

On the 26th of August,
in a parting shot,

Russian President Medvedev signed
an order

recognising the regions of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia

as independent nations and
guaranteeing their protection.

Russian military bases were then
established

in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

on the grounds that they would
prevent Georgia

from trying to regain control of
the areas.

Two months after the beginning
of the war of 2008,

with nearly a thousand dead and
several thousand more wounded,

Russia finally withdrew
most of its forces.

But their settlements in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia

remain to this day.

On December 2nd, 2008,

the European Union commissioned
an independent report

to determine responsibility
for the conflict.

In September 2009, it stated that
the Russian-Georgian conflict

left about 850 dead and some 35,000
Georgians homeless,

displacing more than 190,000 people.

- The consequences for Georgia
as a state

was that it actually lost
the last remnants of control

over both South Ossetia and the
other breakaway region of Abkhazia,

on the coast.

NARRATOR: The report blamed
both sides for the conflict.

It found that while Georgia started
the war against South Ossetia,

Russia had long provoked it

and had reacted disproportionately
to Georgia's military operations.

The United Nations issued a report

that categorically refuted Russia's
claim

that the military intervention
had been for humanitarian reasons.

Since the 2008 war ended,

a mass of evidence has emerged
which suggests

that Russia had planned the invasion
long before separatists

launched their first attack.

In the month prior to the outbreak
of the war,

the Russian army conducted military
exercises in the North Caucasus,

close to the Georgian border,

with some of the units that would
later invade the country.

The exercise, called Kavkaz-2008,

took place with 8,000 soldiers,

30 fixed-wing aircraft
and helicopters

and 700 vehicles,

all rehearsing scenarios of
a military operation

in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

. - The Russians say that they just
simply responded

to what happened in South Ossetia.

However, first of all, they had just
been completing military exercises,

which allowed them to make sure
they had troops in the area

all ready to roll.

Forces do not just suddenly move out
of their base

on day one of an operation

unless they're precisely prepared
for it.

And finally, we have the examples of
what have come out of South Ossetia.

The Russians and the Russian
military command

may well be very tight-lipped.

But the South Ossetian militants
were often much less so.

And they actually quite openly said
that, yes,

of course the Russians are ready
to help us at a moment's notice,

and they're waiting for it.

So I think one way or the other
with piecing it together,

the Russian claims that it came as
a surprise to them ring very hollow.

NARRATOR: As early as 2007,

Russia had withdrawn from the
European Conventional Forces Treaty.

This had limited the number of
troops

between the Ural Mountains
and the Atlantic seaboard.

Removing it was a necessary
first step

in any invasion plan
in the Caucasus.

According to many, Georgia's failure
to join NATO in April 2008

may have emboldened the Russian
government and persuaded them

to act before it was too late
and Georgia was out of reach.

Whatever the reality, the West was
caught flat-footed

by the boldness and speed of
the Russian offensive.

- What do you do when a big country
like Russia,

which is essentially throwing its
weight around in its neighbourhood,

deploys troops in a very quick war,
in a country far away from NATO,

far away from Europe?

In practical terms, what else could
the international community do?

They couldn't send troops.

But by the time it had begun to get
its act together,

the war was already over.

When it comes down to it,

it doesn't matter whether
it's Russia or China

or whether it's other countries that
have thrown their weight around,

the international community has
proven to be relatively toothless.

NARRATOR: There has been much
speculation about a trap

having been very cleverly set
by Russia.

When Georgia attacked South Ossetia,

it played directly into Russia's
hands.

NARRATOR: Russia's decisive
intervention in the 2008 conflict

between Georgia and the Ossetians

gave her the perfect opportunity
to flex her military muscles

and win popularity at home,

as well as boosting her profile
and prominence on the world stage.

- The idea that the Russian state
requires external enemies

in order to solidify
its domestic audience

and to give justification for
its arms build-ups

has been a key part of Soviet
foreign policy

and the West's understanding of
how it behaves.

The Putin regime was essentially
looking for a foreign distraction.

It was looking for a way to rally
its public behind it

and looking to test international
frontiers and boundaries

and to see just how much it could
flex its muscles and expand.

NARRATOR: With the fragile ceasefire
in the Caucasus,

another battle began -
a public relations war.

Both Russia and Georgia invested
huge sums

in aggressive marketing and PR

to justify their actions
to the international community.

The Abkhazian and South Ossetian
authorities

hired American PR agencies,
as did the Russian government.

Georgia, meanwhile, retained
a London PR firm

led by a former political editor
of the Sunday Times.

Russia's PR campaign was headlined
by the claim

that their invasion was justified

on the basis that Georgia was
brutally suppressing

a peacefully protesting people.

Georgia, meanwhile, claimed it was
THEY who were the injured party

and the victims of very obvious
Russian aggression.

Though crude in its methods,

the geopolitical and strategic
triumph was indisputably Russia's.

- All the international community
managed to do

was to retrospectively provide
some kind of rationale

for what the Russians
had already done.

They clearly were not about to go
and invade the rest of Georgia.

They came in, they consolidated
their hold over South Ossetia,

they pushed a little bit further,

just to make the point that they
could, and then they withdrew.

NARRATOR: Russia had managed
to consolidate its position

in the region and, at the same time,

highlight the powerlessness of
the West.

- The lesson that Moscow learned was
that if you act decisively,

if you act fast, if you change
the facts on the ground quickly,

before anyone else really has
a chance to respond

at the usual slow pace of diplomatic
negotiations,

then in that way you can get away
with literally murder in some cases,

but certainly war and annexation
in others.

NARRATOR: There was a further,
major economic benefit to Russia

which had yet to be fully realised.

At 1,768 kilometres,

the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline,

which was opened in Georgia
three years before the conflict

and became operational in 2006,

is the second longest in the world.

This pipeline was the only way to
export oil to Europe

from the Caspian Sea,
without involving Russia.

Just days before the outbreak of
the 2008 Russia-Georgia war,

the pipeline was attacked

in the section that passes through
eastern Turkey.

In 2014, an investigation determined
that the pipeline explosion

was caused by hacking into
the computer system

that controls it.

US intelligence agencies believe
that the perpetrators

were none other than their Russian
counterparts,

a claim Russia has strenuously
denied.

In 2015, the fence marking
South Ossetia's border

was moved inside Georgia

to the point where it incorporated
more than a kilometre section

of the pipeline.

This meant that South Ossetia
and, in effect, Russia,

now had a stake in its activities.

This appropriation of
Georgian territory

was in direct contravention of
the ceasefire terms

agreed seven years earlier.

- More South Ossetians, for example,
getting Russian passports,

so they become Russian citizens,

which means that Russia always has
an excuse to defend them.

And also a slight effort to push
back the borders of South Ossetia.

People will try and move
border markers

just to get an extra little
sliver of land

and then next week,
maybe another sliver of land.

So, although there is still
distinct grounds

for trouble in the region,

at the moment,
the status quo is fixed.

NARRATOR: In 2016, the International
Criminal Court in The Hague

found reasonable grounds
to authorise an investigation

into possible war crimes

by the Russian and Georgian
governments in 2008.

Two years before, Georgia had
already won the first legal battle

when the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg

ruled that the arrest, detention,
and collective expulsion

of Georgians from Russia

violated the European Convention
of Human Rights.

In 2019, the Court ruled Russia had
to pay ten million euros

in compensation for damages related
to that mass deportation.

And in January 2021,

after a 12-year legal battle,

Georgia finally won a third trial
against Russia

in the European Court.

In an historic adjudication,

the court ruled that Moscow was
indeed responsible

for human rights violations during
the war in South Ossetia.

But none of this has changed
the new realities in the region.

- At the moment in Georgia,
there are frozen conflicts.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia
are both now really pseudo states,

unrecognised states that Russian
military and economic support

keeps alive. But on the other hand,
this is unlikely to change.

Tbilisi is not going to abandon
its claims to these territories,

the Russians aren't going to abandon
their willingness to protect them.

But neither side at the moment is
willing or wants

to create any more conflict.

NARRATOR: It is unclear what will
happen in the future

between the two countries,

the disputed territories
and their ongoing conflicts.

But one thing IS clear.

Russia's dominance in the region
has been even greater

since the war of 2008

and they are showing no signs of
leaving any time soon.

- In many ways, the Russian invasion
of Georgia served as a testbed

for what would later come
with Crimea.

Various weapon systems
were tested for the first time,

along with shock tactics,
cyber warfare techniques

and new methods of causing confusion
amongst the populace

and were experimented with
and later honed,

not just for the Crimea, but more
broadly against Ukraine as a whole.

But perhaps most importantly,
what the invasion did for Putin

was test international resolve,
especially that of NATO members.

And the message that came
from that attack...

..was that Russia could push

and expand,

and that there was very little
pushback and resistance

from a distracted and disunited
NATO.

NARRATOR: Despite all the setbacks
and the difficulties

with its much larger, all-powerful
neighbour,

Georgia is still trying to
strengthen its ties with the West.

- Georgia still has very high hopes
to become a member of NATO.

The problem is that this is clearly
one of Russia's red lines, first.

And secondly,
Georgia is a fair way away.

It's not part of Europe in the sense
of contiguous land border

with any other NATO member states.

The key element of NATO
is what's called Article Five,

the central element which says
an attack on one NATO member state

is an attack on all.

And it depends on that
being a credible deterrent.

- The trouble is with Georgia,

can we really imagine that say if
the Russians rolled into Georgia,

that NATO forces would try and
attack Russia from the west?

It seems very implausible.

Therefore there is a big concern,
actually amongst NATO commanders,

that if Georgia were allowed in,

it actually would undermine the
credibility of the NATO alliance.

NARRATOR: This is a problem
not only for Georgia.

Every time that
a neighbouring country of Russia

aspires to turn their sights
westward, conflicts emerge.

- It's argued that if NATO and
the US had acted more robustly

in reaction to Russia's advances
into Georgia,

then you might not have had
the annexation of Crimea

six years later.

But the simple answer to this is
that the US was never going to risk

going to war with Russia
over Georgia.

And that is a lesson that is still
being learned in that region today.

And it's a lesson that was so
clearly learned in Ukraine as well,

when President Obama made a similar
decision not to invade

and risk war with Russia.

- In the wake of the attack
on Georgia,

President Putin made it clear
to the President of Georgia,

Mikheil Saakashvili, at the time,

Putin had said directly
to Saakashvili,

"Your Western allies,
your Western partners,

promised a great deal.
They didn't deliver.

I threatened. I delivered."

So, Putin is always looking out
to see if there is any hint

that we will not follow through
on promises that we have made,

because he will always follow
through on a threat,

as indeed he ultimately did.
He threatened Ukraine in 2008

and it wasn't until 2014

when Ukraine tried to conclude
an association agreement

with the European Union,
that he struck.

NARRATOR: Putin has stayed true
to his word.

Hostilities persist in Ukraine
today,

suggesting that Russian interference
in surrounding countries

is far from over.

It will continue for as long as
it serves his purpose

of consolidating and expanding
his power base abroad,

whilst discouraging the West
and NATO

from interfering
in Russia's backyard.

Subtitles by Sky Access Services