All language subtitles for Fiasco S01E03 A Difficult Dilemma 1080p AMZN WEB-DL DDP5 1 H 264-FLUX (1)_track3_[eng]

A revolution in Nicaragua

brings a new government
into power,

and President Reagan
believes the Cold War

now has a new front.

When the White House
launches a secret campaign

to support an opposition
movement known as the Contras,

Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North
is tapped to lead the effort.

in Augusta, Georgia
each year

beckons to the greats
of the golf world.

The royalty of golf holds sway
over the crowded galleries

on their tours
around the difficult course.

One of the perks
of being president

is that if you feel like
playing a few rounds of golf

at one of the most prestigious
clubs in the world,

you can just make that happen.

In October of 1983,
it was a golfing weekend

for President and Mrs. Reagan.

They were going to
the Augusta National Golf Club.

The club was actually closed,

so it was a perfect time
for the Reagans to go.

It was good weather,

and...it was supposed to be
a very quiet weekend.

Reagan was playing golf
on the 16th hole...

And someone drove their pickup
truck through the gate.

They actually rammed
the chain-link fence.

He took two White House staff
as hostages at gunpoint,

held them, and said he wanted
to meet with President Reagan.

The hostage taker
was named Charles R. Harris,

and it was remarkable that
he made it as far as he did.

Remember, there had been
an assassination attempt

made on Reagan in 1981.

Heightened security
had become the norm.

The Augusta National Golf Club
was totally fenced in,

and it was pointed out
that security is quite good,

in addition to our
Secret Service and everything.

They knocked the gate down.
Initially, the truck backed up,

rammed the gate again,

knocked it completely down,
and rode over it.

It was suggested
by Chief of Staff Don Regan

to just communicate with him,

try to do it by phone
and go from there.

But we've got to get
our two hostages,

our two staff, freed.

The president called
the phone in the pro shop

to see if he could talk
to Harris and broker a deal.

Harris didn't believe

that it was actually Reagan
on the line.

So he hung up and pulled
the phone out of the wall.

Augusta National
was sealed off,

and Air Force One
prepared for evacuation.

And then, almost as quickly
as it started,

the crisis was over.

About 2 1/2 hours later,

after demands
for whiskey and food,

the seventh hostage bolted
from the room where he was held

and escaped unharmed.

The subject was captured.

Harris would later say

that a combination
of his recent job loss,

Reagan's economic policies,
and a bottle of tequila

drove him to go to the Augusta
National Club that day.

As hostage incidents go,

this one resolved itself
pretty easily.

But if it had happened
on any other day,

it would have been
a much bigger story.

Good afternoon.

The count of American dead
in today's terrorist attack

on the U.S. Marine compound
in Beirut stands at 135.

In the middle of the night,
in Beirut, at the airport,

where we had
marines stationed,

a truck drove
through a checkpoint

loaded with dynamite,
detonated--a suicide attack.

The explosion in Lebanon
was the deadliest attack

against U.S. Marines
since Iwo Jima.

It was terrible, terrible
time for President Reagan.

There are no words

to properly
express our outrage

and I think the outrage
of all Americans.

In many ways, the ongoing
conflict in Lebanon

would define
Reagan's second term.

The blood feud
in the Mideast continues.

Lebanon is the arena
for nearly everybody's battle.

The country is
bleeding for nine years.

We have not more--we want
the world not to bleed anymore.

It is the key
to understanding how Reagan

would become a captive
of his own hostage crisis,

just like Jimmy Carter had
before him.

Four Lebanese employees
of the Associated Press

in Beirut have disappeared.

Once again,

Americans are held hostage
in the Middle East.

They are beating
the passengers.

They are threatening
to kill them now.

The president had campaigned on
the idea of American strength.

I don't understand

why 52 Americans
have been held hostage

for almost a year now.

What would he do
now that tough talk

was suddenly not enough?

To what lengths would he go

to bring his fellow
Americans home?

We've never let up,
and we never will

in trying to obtain the freedom
of all the hostages.

I'm Leon Neyfakh.

This is "
the Story of Iran-Contra."

At Beirut, the jet-set
arrive in the same way

they do at all the airports
in the world.

Lebanon has always
wielded great influence

in the Arab world.

The capital city of Beirut
was its pearl.

I was born
and raised in Beirut.

It was a lovely childhood,

growing up in a country
that was, um, peaceful.

Lebanon was
a very cosmopolitan place.

We spent a lot of time
at the beach.

We spent summers
in the mountains.

And family life was really
what it should be.

And I think, looking back,
it's what sustained me

during the many hard years
of the war in Lebanon.

It was during the mid-1970s,

after nearly
two decades of peace,

that Lebanon erupted
in civil war.

Lebanon was struggling
to maintain a political order

that had been established
in the '50s,

something that was called
the Compact,

where ethnic groups,
as groups,

agree on a balance of power
and assigned roles.

One group
is the prime minister.

One group gets the presidency.

One group gets the speaker
of the parliament.

And that was the structure
that had endured.

But it was under severe attack
because of the civil war.

Things had kind
of started brewing

in '75 and '74.

And then I went
for my master's,

and the country
blew up in flames.

It's now a year
since Lebanon's social tensions

finally and inevitably
exploded into war.

There were days
that were normal.

There were lulls
in the fighting.

And there were days when
it was extremely dangerous.

We always had the radio
up to our ear

to listen to the news flashes

on the various
Lebanese radio stations,

representing various factions.

What was really changing
was the most impoverished,

the least powerful, the Shia,
were now being emboldened

and strengthened
by the resurgence of Iran

under Khomeini.

And so what we saw was

a further splintering
of Lebanese democracy,

more violence, more terrorism,

more intimidation.

The Syrian military
had intervened.

The Israelis had invaded.

Everyone who was anyone
was involved in Lebanon.

Back in Washington,

Reagan's National
Security Council

was keeping a close eye
on events in the Middle East.

They relied in part on
the global alert system

housed in Oliver North's office,
room 392.

The flashboard was
where we put up

the latest incidents--

who was working on them
and what was happening,

and, you know,
what were all the steps

that needed to be taken.

And, you know, was sort
of a real-time picture

of global terrorism.

Here, again,
it's important to go back

to the year 1979.

The year when revolution
took hold in Nicaragua,

Ayatollah Khomeini
took power in Iran,

52 American citizens
were held hostage in Tehran

for 444 days.

The turbulence of that year

had a ripple effect
even after it ended.

This was especially the case
in the Muslim world.

Khomeini and Iran
saw Lebanon

as a way to buffer itself

against American retribution
or punishment.

It was a very convenient and
strategic alliance with Iran

that continues to this day.

Before the civil war,

Lebanon had been an ally
to the United States.

But the instability
of the country

had put that in danger.

Now the Khomeini regime
in Iran

was trying to stake out
a position in Lebanon.

If Iran succeeded in gaining
influence in the region,

it would be a disaster
for the U.S.,

an upset
in the global balance of power.

Sensing that things
were spiraling out of control,

President Reagan sent
an emissary to Lebanon

to negotiate a cease-fire.

Ambassador Habib
has informed me

that a plan to resolve
the West Beirut crisis

has been agreed upon
by all the parties involved.

As part of this plan,

the government of Lebanon
has requested,

and I have approved,

the deployment of United States
forces to Beirut

as part of
a multinational force.

Our purpose will be to assist
the Lebanese armed forces

in carrying out
their responsibility

for enduring--
ensuring the departure

of PLO leaders,

officers, and combatants
in Beirut

from Lebanese territory

under safe
and orderly conditions.

But Reagan's attempt
to contain the civil war

didn't work.

What was meant to be
a peacekeeping mission

turned into something else.

When Marines took fire
in Lebanon,

the U.S. retaliated.

And they were accused
of taking sides.

And so the efforts
by the United States

to bring about the removal
of all foreign forces...

failed.

Terror and chaos
reign in Beirut.

Fighting was as bad,
or nearly as bad,

as anything
since the civil war

began back in 1975.

from the Iranian hostage
crisis of 1979...

of the Associated Press
here in Beirut this morning

are still missing.

began to take hostages.

The Iranians weren't
the first to do this.

There was a long tradition
in Lebanon,

as part of a fight
between clans

or between ethnic groups
of taking people hostage.

Some argue the
Islamic Fundamentalist movement

at the base
of the hostage taking

has grown not just in numbers
but also in fanaticism.

After 1979,
the Iranians came to learn,

as did everybody else
in the region,

that you can get
a lot of leverage

out of a couple of hostages

when it came to dealing
with the United States.

An American diplomat
is being held

by kidnappers in Beirut
this morning.

Several U.S. citizens
have been kidnapped.

a fundamentalist Muslim group

called the Party of God.

And it's threatening
what they called a "black fate"

if Washington
tries any retaliation.

Our approach--
long, drawn out,

attracting constant
media attention--

that just played
to the Iranians

and to the hostage takers.

Any kind of hostage situation
creates a huge dilemma--

whether you're going
to be able

to recover those hostages
safely and securely

or whether or not
you are going to be

in a situation where,

because you can't pay ransom,

you're going to basically have
to risk losing their lives.

It's a very difficult dilemma.

They hold all the cards

once they have these people
in their power.

I can get mad enough now
to think of a couple of things

we could do to retaliate.

But I would probably
be sentencing

a number of Americans
to death if I did it.

They knew they had
created a business,

and they could extract
all kinds of value from it.

And as long
as we were not willing

to make anyone pay
for this behavior,

it was going to continue,
and it did.

In February of 1984,

Reagan withdrew
American troops from Lebanon.

It was a controversial move.

Critics believed it signified
a win for Islamic terrorism.

It was a low point
in the Reagan presidency.

But things were
about to get much worse.

Between 1984 and 1985,

seven Americans
were taken hostage in Beirut.

Among them was
Reverend Benjamin Weir,

a Presbyterian minister

who had lived and worked
in Lebanon for 30 years.

An American clergyman
has been kidnapped in Beirut.

The story is still unfolding.

My father was
the representative

of the Presbyterian Church

to the people of Lebanon,
Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

He knew a lot of people.

He was well-known.
He was well-liked.

Early on the morning
of May 8, 1984,

Reverend Weir
and his wife, Carol,

were leaving their apartment.

Police here say
he and his wife

were walking down
a narrow lane in West Beirut

when three unarmed men
overpowered him

and then forced him into
a car, which sped away.

My mom tried
to fight them off,

and they basically
just muscled him into the car

and drove off.

I don't think
he was kidnapped

for anything that
he has said or done.

I think he was kidnapped
to give visibility

to the disillusionment
people have here

with the American policies
in this area.

My father was very aware
of his situation

and his surroundings.

He didn't go out that much,
to be honest.

I was never really worried
about that happening.

In addition to Weir,

the group of hostages
included a Catholic priest,

a correspondent
for the Associated Press,

and three employees of the
American University in Beirut.

The White House
was most concerned

with one hostage
in particular:

a U.S. official
named William Buckley.

There is no word at all
from Beirut tonight

on the whereabouts of American
diplomat William Buckley.

The political officer
at the U.S. embassy

was kidnapped this morning
as he left for work.

But William Buckley
wasn't just a diplomat.

He was a CIA agent.

Before his capture, Buckley's
mission had been to rebuild

the agency's Middle Eastern
intelligence network.

It was a huge, important job.

CIA director Bill Casey
had handpicked Buckley

for the position

after the U.S. embassy bombing
in Beirut in 1983.

Buckley was just leaving

his apartment building
in his car this morning

when three gunmen
in a white sedan

suddenly drove up
and blocked the street.

Buckley had been
with the CIA for decades.

His capture was
a major security liability

for the Reagan administration,

and his well-being
became a top concern

for President Reagan.

The watchman
at Buckley's apartment

said one of the gunmen walked
up to the diplomat's car,

put a gun to his head,

and ordered him
into their car.

But CIA director
Casey was especially troubled.

Buckley was one of his men,

and he knew a lot of secrets

that his kidnappers
would surely try

to torture out of him.

Bill Casey understood that

if you really want to keep
morale up in your agency,

you better let people know
you're gonna do everything

you can to not
leave them behind.

We tried to use every
diplomatic channel we could

to reach the captors.

We didn't know
if he was dead or not.

Generally, there's a rule
that we had

when I was
secretary of defense:

you never leave
anybody behind.

You owe that person
who was taken

every effort to try
to get that person back

securely and safely.

While the Reagan administration

looked for ways
to save Buckley,

the family of Benjamin Weir
remained in the dark.

Have you had any indication
from the state department

or anyone else
that your dad is alive?

Well, we hear
from time to time

through other sources
that he is alive and well.

And everyone assumes
that he is alive.

But from day to day, we really
don't know if he is alive.

We are wanting to try
to have an appointment

with the secretary of state
and to the president

to see if we can't speed up
the release of these men.

I remember talking
to my sisters

and my sisters being upset
and my mom being very upset.

You know, just the complete
lack of information.

My mother was just
very worried

about what people
would do to him.

She would always say,
you know,

"He's a very gentle man."

You know, I think
she was worried

that he would be injured
in some way

or killed in some way.

And then, suddenly,
there was news.

The letter was dated
February 15th.

It was mailed February 19th
from Beirut.

Reverend Weir's captors
released videos and letters,

giving his family the proof of
life they were desperate for.

"I am writing to ask you

"to do everything in your means
to demand

"that the U.S. government
intervene effectively

with the government of Kuwait."

The Shia group
holding Reverend Weir

wanted the U.S. to negotiate
a prisoner swap with Kuwait,

but the Reagan administration
was unwilling to assist.

While President Reagan
clearly wanted

to bring about freedom
for the hostages,

the American policy was,

"We don't make concessions
to terrorists.

We're not gonna compromise."

The United States gives
terrorists no rewards

and no guarantees.

We make no concessions.
We make no deals.

"We make no deals."

What started
as a talking point

in Reagan's campaign

had become a mantra
for the administration.

Let me further make it plain
to the assassins in Beirut

and their accomplices

that America will never make
concessions to terrorists.

We have tried our best,
through every kind of channel,

to establish
their whereabouts.

It is an extremely difficult,
seemingly impossible task.

And no, we haven't
given up on them.

We have never given up.

It's--as you can realize,

it's very frustrating.

We're doing everything
that can be done,

and I have no further comments

that I'm going to make
at this time.

Every government
in the modern era

has had to figure out

what to do about
hostage-taking and terrorism.

Some governments
are more known

for being willing
to strike deals.

The United States has
almost always had a policy

of no negotiation--
at least a formal policy.

The Reagan White House had
made a lot of political hay

out of Jimmy Carter's issues
with the hostages in Iran.

We've endured
this humiliation

for just lacking one week
of a year now.

People have been telling me

that Jimmy Carter's
doing his best,

and that's our problem.

It was pretty clear to us

that they were
kind of suppressing,

as much as they could,

discussion of hostages
or use of the word "hostages,"

and they did not want
to have a hostage problem

like Jimmy Carter'd had.

Promising retaliation
had been easy

when Reagan
was welcoming hostages home.

Let terrorists be aware
that when the rules

of international behavior
are violated,

our policy will be one of swift
and effective retribution.

Now it was
another thing altogether.

We have used every effort

to see if we can locate
who has them, where they are,

whether they're together
or separated.

For now,
this new hostage crisis

was not receiving the same
level of public attention

the 1979 crisis had,

and that was convenient
for President Reagan.

But it wouldn't last.

It's been 311 days

since an American
Presbyterian minister

was grabbed on the streets
of Beirut,

one of four missing Americans
presumed to be in the hands

of extremist Shiite Muslims
in Lebanon.

As Carol Weir continued
to search for answers,

she relied on
the personal contacts

she had made during
her 30 years in Lebanon.

She knew people,
and she knew the players.

Though my mother
was not in tune

to all the local
political details

like my dad was,

she certainly, you know,
was politically aware

of some of the things
that were going on.

And, you know, she started
trying to figure out

who had him,
what was going on,

what did they want,
what could she do

to accelerate the process
of getting my dad released.

But Carol Weir's questions
to Washington

were going unanswered.

We met with Secretary
of State George Schultz--

my mother, myself,

and a couple of the executives
of the program agency,

and we found that to be a very,
very frustrating meeting

and that Secretary Shultz

really did not have
very much information.

We had asked for a meeting
with the president.

He said he would convey
that to the president.

We were never given
an appointment

with the president.

We were told
he wouldn't have time.

It was just a very discouraging

and rather disillusioning time
for me.

When she finally
did hear something,

she was assured
the U.S. government

was doing all they could.

They were just
being quiet about it.

It became described
as "quiet diplomacy."

You know,
"You just need to be patient."

To Reagan, quiet diplomacy
was working with our allies,

working with the countries

where we had
established relationships,

not necessarily holding summits

or press conferences,

but coming up with some kind
of at least

a short-term or daily strategy

to try to get
the hostages freed.

That was not an answer

that my mother
was willing to accept.

None of the American officials
were able or willing

to give her
any significant information.

And it didn't seem, to her,

that they were
making any progress.

So she was very frustrated.

Carol Weir decided then

to take matters
into her own hands.

It's been more
than ten months

since the Reverend
Benjamin Weir

was kidnapped outside
his apartment

by terrorists in Beirut.

- Good morning, Mrs. Weir.
- Good morning.

Do you think the government

has been doing all it can
to gain his release?

Well, I think the government
has been at work,

but I think a special effort
needs to be made now,

and that's what I'd like
to see happen.

Weir began
what was essentially

a cross-country press tour.

This has been
nearly 11 months

since my husband,
the Reverend Benjamin Weir,

was kidnapped
in Beirut, Lebanon.

She gave speeches at churches,
on TV shows

to anyone who would listen.

I'm convinced
that the administration

is not doing enough
to get my husband released.

I would like
the United States government

to open all channels
of communication.

He was kidnapped not because
of any relationship

we have had with the Lebanese,

but he was kidnapped
because he is an American.

And once they had
the attention of the media,

the Weirs renewed
their lobbying efforts.

I am asking
the administration

to give a higher priority
to this matter.

And I need your help too.

I urge you to write
to the president

seeking his personal
intervention

for the release of Ben

and the other hostages
being held.

We were constantly
trying to come up

with a way
of delivering the message

that this had gone on
long enough.

Part of it was just keeping it
in the public eye,

reminding the White House
that we were there,

hoping that somebody
would be able

to come up with an answer.

- Mrs. Weir, good luck.
- Thank you.

We're--we're all with you.

Finally, the Weirs got
in direct contact

with the president.

Nope. Not that one.

We asked for a meeting
with Jimmy Carter

and put out some feelers,

and some people responded
that they could set it up.

So we flew to the airport
in Atlanta,

and Jimmy Carter met us
in a lounge at the airport.

That the Weirs wanted to meet
with former President Carter

may come as a surprise.

Then again,
he did have experience

navigating a hostage crisis.

And he was a very humble guy,
very modest.

He said, "You know,

I'm not really sure
you're gonna want my advice."

And we said,

"No, you know, we really
want to hear from you.

"You know, what can we do?

What aren't we doing
that we should be doing?"

He said, "You know,
Bud McFarlane works

"in the current
administration,

"in the National
Security Council.

And Bud is a good guy."

And here we should step back
to introduce

one of the key players
in the Iran-Contra scandal:

Robert "Bud" McFarlane,

who became Reagan's National
Security Adviser in 1983.

Mr. President,
there's several things

this morning on the agenda.

For McFarlane,

the job of National
Security Adviser

was a logical step
in a distinguished career

that included two tours
in Vietnam

and stints as an aide

for some of the top
political minds of his era.

I had worked for Henry
Kissinger for four years.

Was on the staff of the Senate
Armed Services Committee.

Henry was and remains

a profoundly important
influence in my life

in shaping how I go about
defining a problem.

As an assistant
to Henry Kissinger in 1971,

McFarlane witnessed Kissinger's
landmark achievement

of opening relations
with China.

And ever since,
he had aspired

to a foreign policy trophy
of his own.

He had a framework
within his mind,

which I admired and generally
adopted for my own behavior

in analyzing
a given set of problems.

My first impressions
of Bud McFarlane

was that he was a hard-nosed,
strategic thinker.

And I was extremely excited
about the prospect

of actually working
with someone who had studied

and worked
with Henry Kissinger.

Another member of
the National Security Council

was Reagan's secretary
of state, George Schultz.

And, as it turned out,

Schultz had a different view
of the NSC than McFarlane.

As national security adviser,
Bud McFarlane had Reagan's ear.

So the Weirs traveled to
Washington to meet with him.

McFarlane's an extremely
deliberate speaker.

Very thoughtful guy.

Very calm.

He said, "You know,
I understand what's going on.

"We're working on this.

"We're well aware
of what you guys are doing.

"And you guys
should keep it up.

"And I got a guy on my staff,

"Lieutenant Colonel
Oliver North,

"and he will be
your contact person.

"And if you have any questions
or any issues,

Colonel North will make
himself available to you."

The Weirs were thankful

to have a contact
in the White House.

But, initially, at least,
Oliver North didn't seem

to deliver
any further breakthroughs.

Colonel North would provide
information from time to time

about trips he was taking.

He wouldn't give any details,
but he would say,

"Well, you know, I flew
in an F-14 to go to Europe

for a quick meeting
that was really important."

They never really gave us
any solid information.

It was never really clear
to us what they were up to

or what they were doing,
and when they thought

the hostage situation
would be resolved.

But we did feel like
we were finally talking

to the right people.

The Weirs
were cautiously optimistic.

But President Reagan's hostage
crisis was just beginning.

110 hostages, at least 85

and possibly as many
as 102 of them Americans.

Only a few feet
from the cockpit.

I can see Captain John
Testrake.

When TWA 847 was hijacked,

that specific hostage situation

became nearly all-consuming.

There was very little
that happened

where the president
didn't ask about hostages.

They said that
they would shoot

an American every five minutes

if they did not get
their demands.

The hijacking took
Reagan's hostage problem

to a new level.

The CBS movie will
begin immediately

following the CBS News report
on today's hijacking.

This hijacking
took TWA Flight 847

on a horror-filled odyssey
from almost one end

of the Mediterranean
to the other.

TWA Flight 847 lifts off

from Athens, Greece
bound for Rome.

Two men who were
sitting in the rearmost seats

of the aircraft got up and ran
to the front of the plane.

20 minutes into a routine flight
from Athens to Rome,

two Shia militants
took control of Flight 847

and the 145 passengers aboard,
most of them Americans.

They went into the cockpit.

One of them re-emerged
with a--with a gun.

The TWA hijackers
eventually redirected

the flight to
Beirut International Airport.

Pleads from the plane
crew became more urgent.

He wants to fuel now.

Immediately.
Five minutes, at the most,

or he's going
to kill passengers.

We are doing our best.

The hijackers
collected passports

and began
separating passengers.

Those with
Jewish-sounding names

were moved to the front.

Three members of the U.S.
military were identified,

putting their lives in danger.

Among them was a U.S. navy
diver named Robert Stethem.

Fuel was not all
they wanted.

The hijackers demanded that
all Lebanese Shiite Muslims

held by Israel be released
to the Red Cross.

There are some 700
in Israeli prisons.

the plane was refueled
in exchange for the release

of 17 women and two children.

I hope everybody back home
will pray for us.

But even with their release,

the situation on the plane
continued to deteriorate.

That afternoon, the plane
is forced to fly to Algiers,

the first of two very
long round-trip journeys

the terrorists will make
in a day and a half.

We have been flying
all day long.

The pilot told the
control tower the hijackers

were now threatening
to throw one of the Americans

out of the plane.

The runway was cleared
and lit.

The plane landed with only
a few minutes fuel remaining.

The White House
had been monitoring

the situation closely.

But before President Reagan
could deliver

an official address
on the hijacking,

tragedy struck.

Robert Stethem
was brought to the tarmac

and shot in the temple.

Reagan couldn't stay silent
any longer.

His murder and the fate
of the other American hostages

still being held in Beirut
underscore an inescapable fact:

the United States is tonight
a nation being attacked

by international terrorists
and want--

and who wantonly kill

and who seize our innocent
citizens as their prisoners.

Two days
after Stethem's murder,

Reagan called
an emergency meeting

of the National
Security Council.

He began by unfolding a letter
and reading it out loud.

The letter, written by 29
of the American hostages

on Flight 847,

was addressed directly
to Reagan.

This letter from the TWA
hostages was very painful.

It was clear
that the president was in pain.

In the letter,

the hostages made a desperate
plea for the president

to negotiate their release,
to convince the Israelis

to free the 700
Lebanese prisoners

the hijackers had demanded.

When the president
finished reading,

he looked around at his aides

and asked them
what could be done.

But then you have to say,

"We're gonna do everything
we can to get you out,

"but we're not going to change
"our principles or our morality

"or the things we believe in
just to save you.

We're not gonna compromise."

The risk was that we would
be seen as a country

that would pay money
for hostages,

and that put everybody
at risk.

So it was very important
to bring an end to that idea.

With the pushback from Reagan's
secretary of state

and the rest of his
National Security Council,

the conversation stalled.

But Reagan kept thinking
about the letter.

The humanity was visible
to everyone.

Everyone was moved.

And I'm sure
it actually hardened

the president's determination

to bring about
a peaceful solution.

Reagan's sense was,

"This is something
that I can really

"make an impact on
as President.

"It's my job--

it's my responsibility
to get them back."

Facts are hard to come by,
difficult to confirm.

As sure as anything can be
in the hurly-burly and horror

of a murderous hijacking...

You now had global coverage.

We know what the power
of television still is,

and it was very powerful then.

And no one understood that
better than Ronald Reagan.

In Beirut, five of
the Americans held hostage

were put on display
by terrorists holding them,

paraded into a room
and surrounded

by about 100 teenagers
with machine guns.

Sit down, sit down!

When they were having
their first conference,

it really scared us,
really scared us.

There had never been
anything like it.

It was a worldwide first:
competitive journalists

interviewing captors
with captives.

We, as a group do
most importantly want

to beseech President Reagan
and our fellow Americans

to refrain from any form
of military or violent means

as an attempt,
no matter how noble or heroic,

to secure our freedom.

I miss my wife very much.
I want to go home.

And God willing,
we'll be home soon.

Critics call
the coverage excessive

and accuse journalists
of interfering in a crisis,

of turning from observers
to negotiators.

There were a lot of ethical
concerns at the time.

I always felt that we had
the responsibility

to keep people apprised
of what was happening.

The families needed to know.

The American government
needed to know.

But we were also giving
a free platform

to these groups
that were using us.

The terrorists
in the TWA crisis

received
immeasurable attention.

But it was the way
they got it

that has inflamed
the new debate over the role

and responsibility
of the news media.

Here, you had a situation

of human beings isolated
from their families,

totally controlled by the--
by the thugs,

knowing that men with AK-47s

were prepared
to blow them away,

knowing they were gonna
leave that room

and go back into--into prison,

and yet that press conference

was dealt with as though
it was normal people

talking to us
in a normal setting.

That's crazy.

We were kind of caught
in the middle.

I remember reporting

with a very uneasy
feeling at the time.

Yet, in a way,
we were held hostage,

because it was a story
that could not be ignored.

Reagan became
further preoccupied

with the task
of freeing the TWA hostages.

Reagan met with his national
security team every morning.

At what point can you
pay off the terrorists

without endangering people
from here on out

once they find out
that their tactics succeed?

That question always came up

because he never wanted them
not to be focused on it,

wanted it on the tops
of their minds

as it was on Reagan's--

and to find a way
to get them back.

On July 1, after more than
two weeks in captivity...

...the TWA hostages
were finally released.

And three days later,

the Israeli government
freed 300 Lebanese prisoners.

The U.S. denied any connection
to the release,

and Israel claimed the timing
was just a coincidence.

There's only one thing to say,

and I say it from
the bottom of my heart,

in the name of all the people
of our country:

welcome home.

The release of the TWA hostages

should have brought
a measure of relief for Reagan.

But there were still seven
American hostages in Beirut

who needed his help.

We can be thankful
that our faith, courage,

and firmness have paid off.

But this is no moment
for celebration.

Let it be clearly understood
that the seven Americans

still held captive in Lebanon
must be released

along with other innocent
hostages from other countries.

In the emotionally fraught days
after the TWA crisis,

Bud McFarlane took a meeting
with a trusted associate

who seemed to offer a way
to help the Beirut hostages.

An Israeli diplomat
named David Kimche.

David Kimche was

the director-general
of Israel's Foreign Ministry.

I think that this is a test
of the sincere attitude

of our neighboring countries
to terrorism.

They had their relationship
going back several years.

They knew each other
quite well.

And they regularly met
and talked about the world.

So this was another
one of those meetings.

But at this meeting,

Kimche came up
with a particular suggestion.

Out of respect for David
and his wisdom,

I listened to what he said,
and it was simply stated

that there are elements
in the Iranian Army

that are prepared to open
a dialogue with us.

Kimche was offering
a back channel to Iran

that could help de-escalate
the hostage crisis.

Given the relationship between
the U.S. and Iran at the time,

the possibility of such
a back channel was astonishing.

But there was no one happier
to entertain the idea

than Bud McFarlane.

McFarlane had long believed
it was possible

that there were moderates
within the Iranian government

who would be receptive
to a diplomatic relationship

with the United States.

I really didn't imagine

that we had
a plausible prospect

of being able to engage
with this government.

I did think, however,
that there were reasons

why the circumstances
facing Iran

might give us an opportunity
to influence a regime change.

It was essentially
just a hunch,

but it was guided
by the same strategic thinking

that he had learned
from his mentor,

Henry Kissinger.

But there was a catch.

David's opinion was that

the people that
his intermediary

was dealing with
in the Iranian Army

were people who had the military
and political wit,

and for them to engage
with us at all,

being at risk
and us being at risk,

each would have
to show evidence

to their own constituencies.

Iran wanted the U.S.
to supply them with weapons

for use in their war with Iraq.

It was a big request.

But the Iranians were offering
something valuable in return,

something that Reagan
was desperate for.

As long as those people
are there and threatened,

we cannot give up on them.

And I hope that they have
confidence in that.

Kimche was saying

Iran could help free
the hostages in Beirut.

He proposed a meeting
between McFarlane

and an Iranian intermediary

who could move
the conversation forward.

Kimche presented it
as their being able to achieve

the release of the hostages.

And while his name
may be unfamiliar to most,

he is an essential character
in the Iran-Contra story.

So, where should we resume?

We want to talk
about Ghorbanifar.

The Iranian intermediary

for the Iran initiative,
as we called it,

was a man named
Manucher Ghorbanifar.

He was a short, overweight,

balding, bearded guy

who you certainly
wouldn't have taken

for an international
arms dealer.

But that's what he was.

Ghorbanifar played
this pivotal role,

sort of a classic
rug merchant role--

try to bring
the sides together.

He had a relationship
with the Israeli government,

and he convinced them

that there were
elements in Iran

that were now becoming
more pragmatic,

who wanted to talk.

And after a few weeks
of discussion,

a proposal was made:

100 American missiles
would be traded

for all seven
American hostages.

It was straightforward,

but presented
some major risks.

There was only
an acceptable risk

if you had
very high confidence

in the good faith
of the Iranian counterparts.

And I didn't know any of them.

Even though McFarlane
didn't know Ghorbanifar,

his reputation preceded him.

We called him Gorba,

and that was the polite name
we had for him.

He was a prevaricator, liar,

thief of the first magnitude,

well-known
for these attributes

amongst various agencies.

Ghorbanifar was well-known
to the CIA.

And although the CIA concluded
he was a fabricator,

many countries,
including Israel,

continued to deal with him.

They wanted
to re-establish diplomatic,

government-to-government
relations with Iran.

And oh, by the way,
we get the hostages out too.

It was a noble idea, I guess.

But they picked
the wrong communicator

in this guy Gorba.

McFarlane was also troubled

by the terms of the deal,
specifically the weapons.

After the 1979
hostage crisis...

Americans held
hostage. Pictures of their--

...there was
an international effort

to stop weapons sales to Iran.

The United States had promoted
and upheld the policy.

If the rules of international
behavior are violated...

If it leaked out that they

were secretly
selling weapons to Iran,

it would be
a diplomatic disaster.

So there was a lot
for McFarlane to look past.

But he decided to bring
the proposal to the president.

There was
an unexpected development

for President Reagan today

during an operation to remove
a small polyp from his colon.

Doctors discovered a second
larger growth on his intestine.

That will require
major surgery.

Around the time of McFarlane

and Ghorbanifar's
conversations,

President Reagan
underwent surgery.

The hostages were
one of the first things

he asked about
when he woke up.

How you feeling?

And so it was at the hospital

that McFarlane spoke with Reagan
for the first time

about the idea of trading arms
for hostages with Iran.

I gave him the factual summary
of what Kimche had said--

that he, Kimche,
had concluded

that there were
disaffected officers,

portrayed them as being open
to working with us.

McFarlane told Reagan
that the Iranian moderates

were willing to pressure
their associates in Beirut

to release
the American hostages

still being held in Lebanon.

And he brightened immediately
and said,

"We really ought to keep
the dialogue going."

I said, "This is a very
high-risk venture for you,

"politically--
that it's very uncertain

"that this can be maintained
in clandestine terms."

But he focused
upon what Kimche had said.

"But we can't let
an opportunity

of that--though
it's risky--go by."

It might be surprising

that Reagan was willing
to accept the idea so quickly.

Negotiating with terrorists,
after all, would violate

one of the core principles
of Reagan's presidency.

Working on the Middle East
and terrorism

was a constant struggle
of reconciling contradictions.

It was important for us
to have a clear policy

that we do not negotiate
with terrorists.

Having said that,

sometimes realists
have to break principles

and do what is necessary
to try to achieve a goal.

Almost from the outset,
the administration was divided

on the viability
of the proposal.

McFarlane had tried
to push this idea earlier

and had gotten laughed
out of town, basically.

Caspar Weinberger,
the secretary of defense,

said something like,

"This is almost too absurd
to comment on.

"It would be like inviting
Gaddafi of Libya

for a cozy chat."

So McFarlane was shut down,
but he didn't give up.

George Schultz was
indifferent about it.

Thought that it had merit,
but was uneasy.

Weinberger was totally
opposed to it.

In the end,
it was Reagan who said,

"Just do it. Let's go.
It has to be done now."

Bud had his marching orders,
and he did not relent.

He didn't hold back,
and it went forward.

So how was the United States

going to sell a cache
of missiles to Iran

without anyone knowing?

We didn't want to use
any American military aircraft,

so the Israelis became
the sort of logistical center,

in part due to geography,
but also because Ghorbanifar,

the Iranian middleman,
had approached the Israelis.

And the Israelis
were very cooperative.

And so it was decided.

American-owned weapons
would pass through Israel,

and Israel would make
the sale to Iran.

With the big picture
worked out,

McFarlane turned
the operation over

to one of his
most trusted deputies--

Oliver North.

Terrorists, be on notice.

We will fight back against you
in Lebanon and elsewhere.

We will fight back
against your cowardly attacks

on American citizens
and property.

We will not rest
until justice is done

The Weir family and the families
of the other hostages

still remained largely
in the dark.

With the information they had,
all they could do was hope.

Well, I'm one
of the family members

that tries not to get excited,

because we ride quite
an emotional roller coaster,

going from the peaks, during
these rumors, to the valleys,

where you don't hear anything
for many months on end.

So I'm very hopeful.

But I'm not going to change
any of my plans

until I'm certain it's true.