All language subtitles for NOVA S51E07 Secrets in Your Data 1080p WEB h264-BAE_track3_[eng]

af Afrikaans
ak Akan
sq Albanian
am Amharic
ar Arabic
hy Armenian
az Azerbaijani
eu Basque
be Belarusian
bem Bemba
bn Bengali
bh Bihari
bs Bosnian
br Breton
bg Bulgarian
km Cambodian
ca Catalan
ceb Cebuano
chr Cherokee
ny Chichewa
zh-CN Chinese (Simplified)
zh-TW Chinese (Traditional)
co Corsican
hr Croatian
cs Czech
da Danish
nl Dutch
en English
eo Esperanto
et Estonian
ee Ewe
fo Faroese
tl Filipino
fi Finnish
fr French
fy Frisian
gaa Ga
gl Galician
ka Georgian
de German
gn Guarani
gu Gujarati
ht Haitian Creole
ha Hausa
haw Hawaiian
iw Hebrew
hi Hindi
hmn Hmong
hu Hungarian
is Icelandic
ig Igbo
id Indonesian
ia Interlingua
ga Irish
it Italian
ja Japanese
jw Javanese
kn Kannada
kk Kazakh
rw Kinyarwanda
rn Kirundi
kg Kongo
ko Korean
kri Krio (Sierra Leone)
ku Kurdish
ckb Kurdish (Soranî)
ky Kyrgyz
lo Laothian
la Latin
lv Latvian
ln Lingala
lt Lithuanian
loz Lozi
lg Luganda
ach Luo
lb Luxembourgish
mk Macedonian
mg Malagasy
ms Malay
ml Malayalam
mt Maltese
mi Maori
mr Marathi
mfe Mauritian Creole
mo Moldavian
mn Mongolian
my Myanmar (Burmese)
sr-ME Montenegrin
ne Nepali
pcm Nigerian Pidgin
nso Northern Sotho
no Norwegian
nn Norwegian (Nynorsk)
oc Occitan
or Oriya
om Oromo
ps Pashto
fa Persian
pl Polish
pt-BR Portuguese (Brazil)
pt Portuguese (Portugal)
pa Punjabi
qu Quechua
ro Romanian
rm Romansh
nyn Runyakitara
ru Russian
sm Samoan
gd Scots Gaelic
sr Serbian
sh Serbo-Croatian
st Sesotho
tn Setswana
crs Seychellois Creole
sn Shona
sd Sindhi
si Sinhalese
sk Slovak
sl Slovenian
so Somali
es Spanish
es-419 Spanish (Latin American)
su Sundanese
sw Swahili
sv Swedish
tg Tajik
ta Tamil
tt Tatar
te Telugu
th Thai
ti Tigrinya
to Tonga
lua Tshiluba
tum Tumbuka
tr Turkish
tk Turkmen
tw Twi
ug Uighur
uk Ukrainian
ur Urdu
uz Uzbek
vi Vietnamese
cy Welsh
wo Wolof
xh Xhosa
yi Yiddish
yo Yoruba
zu Zulu
Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:00,566 --> 00:00:02,766 (bright music) 2 00:00:04,766 --> 00:00:07,533 - A man checks his smartwatch. - Our modern, 3 00:00:07,533 --> 00:00:10,766 digital lives offer limitless convenience, community, 4 00:00:10,766 --> 00:00:14,100 and easy to access everything. 5 00:00:14,100 --> 00:00:16,766 - [Speaker] The internet opens unbelievable opportunities. 6 00:00:18,500 --> 00:00:21,633 - [Host] But there's a trade-off. Your personal data. 7 00:00:21,633 --> 00:00:23,266 - [Speaker] Pretty much everything you do on the web 8 00:00:23,266 --> 00:00:25,066 is being tracked and logged. 9 00:00:25,066 --> 00:00:26,833 - Who you are, what you're doing, and where you're going. 10 00:00:26,833 --> 00:00:28,400 - This is the mothership. 11 00:00:28,400 --> 00:00:31,600 Can you show me what I've inadvertently given up? 12 00:00:31,600 --> 00:00:34,833 And that personal data is worth a fortune. 13 00:00:34,833 --> 00:00:37,166 - People expect it to grow to $400 billion. 14 00:00:38,300 --> 00:00:40,400 - To completely avoid data collection 15 00:00:41,466 --> 00:00:45,066 requires you to go live in a cave. 16 00:00:45,066 --> 00:00:46,666 - [Host] Thankfully, there are tools 17 00:00:46,666 --> 00:00:50,433 to help maintain your privacy and security online. 18 00:00:50,433 --> 00:00:54,466 - Let's create some strong and unique passwords. 19 00:00:54,466 --> 00:00:56,500 - Everything has privacy settings. 20 00:00:56,500 --> 00:00:59,600 We can dial to whatever level we feel comfortable. 21 00:00:59,600 --> 00:01:03,200 - [Host] And some coders are rewriting the rules of the web. 22 00:01:03,200 --> 00:01:05,366 - The decentralized web is our antidote 23 00:01:05,366 --> 00:01:07,466 to the web as we now think of it. 24 00:01:07,466 --> 00:01:09,533 - New technologies can proliferate 25 00:01:09,533 --> 00:01:11,800 without centralized control. 26 00:01:11,800 --> 00:01:14,600 - This is about technological self-determination. 27 00:01:14,600 --> 00:01:19,366 - [Host] Secrets in your Data right now on "NOVA." 28 00:01:19,366 --> 00:01:48,133 (triumphant upbeat music) 29 00:01:49,200 --> 00:01:51,666 (phone camera clicking) 30 00:01:51,666 --> 00:01:54,166 PATEL: Our world runs on data. 31 00:01:54,166 --> 00:01:56,133 When you're shopping online, 32 00:01:56,133 --> 00:01:58,100 streaming your favorite shows... 33 00:01:58,100 --> 00:01:59,166 (mouse clicking) 34 00:01:59,166 --> 00:02:00,666 posting family pics-- 35 00:02:00,666 --> 00:02:02,200 that's all your personal data 36 00:02:02,200 --> 00:02:04,133 leaving your device. 37 00:02:04,133 --> 00:02:06,600 (on phone): What's up, everyone? 38 00:02:06,600 --> 00:02:07,800 I'm about to head to the hospital 39 00:02:07,800 --> 00:02:08,800 for a night shift... 40 00:02:08,800 --> 00:02:11,166 (voiceover): I'm Alok Patel, a pediatrician, 41 00:02:11,166 --> 00:02:12,033 medical journalist, 42 00:02:12,033 --> 00:02:15,266 and all-around social media enthusiast. 43 00:02:15,266 --> 00:02:16,566 (on phone): Just got here at the children's hospital... 44 00:02:16,566 --> 00:02:18,233 (voiceover): I kinda love our connected lives, 45 00:02:18,233 --> 00:02:20,133 and I haven't been shy at all 46 00:02:20,133 --> 00:02:23,333 about sharing mine pretty publicly. 47 00:02:23,333 --> 00:02:25,133 (on phone): 30 million children... 48 00:02:25,133 --> 00:02:27,200 (voiceover): And I know that sharing personal data 49 00:02:27,200 --> 00:02:28,233 can have major upsides. 50 00:02:28,233 --> 00:02:29,566 The media's reported 51 00:02:29,566 --> 00:02:30,666 on some of the most dramatic examples. 52 00:02:30,666 --> 00:02:34,566 NARRATOR (archival): ...is conducting several studies 53 00:02:34,566 --> 00:02:37,133 to see how far wearables can go in detecting disease. 54 00:02:37,133 --> 00:02:38,833 A California man, rescued yesterday 55 00:02:38,833 --> 00:02:41,066 after going missing credits a social media post 56 00:02:41,066 --> 00:02:42,400 for helping save his life. 57 00:02:42,400 --> 00:02:44,366 Six out of ten people with Alzheimer's or dementia 58 00:02:44,366 --> 00:02:45,633 will wander away from home, 59 00:02:45,633 --> 00:02:48,000 and that's where this little box comes in. 60 00:02:48,900 --> 00:02:51,700 PATEL: There's no doubt, our data is out there, 61 00:02:51,700 --> 00:02:54,200 but did you ever wonder where it goes 62 00:02:54,200 --> 00:02:56,166 and how it's used? 63 00:02:56,166 --> 00:02:57,233 I do. 64 00:02:57,233 --> 00:02:59,833 I want to know: what are the benefits of sharing 65 00:02:59,833 --> 00:03:01,666 and the risks? 66 00:03:01,666 --> 00:03:05,200 And what can we do to make our connected world safer 67 00:03:05,200 --> 00:03:08,100 and just generally better for everyone? 68 00:03:12,466 --> 00:03:14,700 First, the basics. 69 00:03:14,700 --> 00:03:16,200 I want to know: 70 00:03:16,200 --> 00:03:19,500 how much personal data have I been sharing? 71 00:03:19,500 --> 00:03:22,633   Meet Hayley Tsukayama, tech journalist 72 00:03:22,633 --> 00:03:24,466 and data privacy advocate. 73 00:03:24,466 --> 00:03:26,300 (chuckles) PATEL: You must be Hayley. 74 00:03:26,300 --> 00:03:27,633 Hi, nice to meet you. 75 00:03:27,633 --> 00:03:29,766 What is going on? 76 00:03:29,766 --> 00:03:32,133 (voiceover): Okay, hold on, wasn't expecting this. 77 00:03:32,133 --> 00:03:35,533 She's already got my whole life up on the screen. 78 00:03:35,533 --> 00:03:38,533 So this is a data report gathered about you 79 00:03:38,533 --> 00:03:40,766 from social media posts, 80 00:03:40,766 --> 00:03:42,666 from the images of you that may be on the internet, 81 00:03:42,666 --> 00:03:45,166 from publicly available information. 82 00:03:45,166 --> 00:03:47,166 This is like a family business. 83 00:03:47,166 --> 00:03:48,666 That's my dad's cell phone number. 84 00:03:48,666 --> 00:03:50,500 Why is this available? 85 00:03:50,500 --> 00:03:52,700 (groaning): Oh, this is my address! 86 00:03:52,700 --> 00:03:54,066 This is just available? 87 00:03:54,066 --> 00:03:55,200 Just available online. 88 00:03:55,200 --> 00:03:56,666 Okay, you guys are going to 89 00:03:56,666 --> 00:03:58,600 blur all this, right? Please? 90 00:03:58,600 --> 00:04:01,166 There's-- oh, okay, cool, there's my cell phone number. 91 00:04:01,166 --> 00:04:03,833 Oh, this is concerning. 92 00:04:03,833 --> 00:04:06,633 As a medical doctor, 93 00:04:06,633 --> 00:04:09,100 we all have license numbers 94 00:04:09,100 --> 00:04:11,333 and issue dates and expiration dates. 95 00:04:11,333 --> 00:04:13,166 (chuckling): And it's literally right here. 96 00:04:13,166 --> 00:04:15,066 This is so weird, 97 00:04:15,066 --> 00:04:16,500 these are the names of my neighbors 98 00:04:16,500 --> 00:04:18,033 from my childhood home. 99 00:04:18,966 --> 00:04:21,200 (whispering): Why do you have this information? 100 00:04:21,200 --> 00:04:23,600 Like, I haven't seen these names in... 101 00:04:23,600 --> 00:04:25,100 years. 102 00:04:25,100 --> 00:04:26,033 (voiceover): Not gonna lie, 103 00:04:26,033 --> 00:04:28,700 I expected some of my data to be out there, 104 00:04:28,700 --> 00:04:29,700 but this is... 105 00:04:29,700 --> 00:04:31,833 this is just creepy. 106 00:04:31,833 --> 00:04:33,366 How is there a report 107 00:04:33,366 --> 00:04:36,466 about who my neighbors were in the '80s? 108 00:04:36,466 --> 00:04:38,333 LEVY: You can be assured that pretty much 109 00:04:38,333 --> 00:04:39,600 everything you do on the web 110 00:04:39,600 --> 00:04:40,600 and with a browser 111 00:04:40,600 --> 00:04:42,266 is being tracked and logged. 112 00:04:42,266 --> 00:04:44,566 Where you go, what you look at, 113 00:04:44,566 --> 00:04:46,066 what apps you use. 114 00:04:46,066 --> 00:04:48,700 SAFIYA NOBLE: Modern life has been arranged 115 00:04:48,700 --> 00:04:51,133 so that every aspect of 116 00:04:51,133 --> 00:04:52,633 what we do and how we live can be captured. 117 00:04:52,633 --> 00:04:55,833 MEREDITH WHITTAKER: They pick up our faces as we walk down the street. 118 00:04:55,833 --> 00:05:00,333 They track our keystrokes while we're at work 119 00:05:00,333 --> 00:05:02,133 on behalf of our employer. 120 00:05:02,133 --> 00:05:03,033 (keys clacking) 121 00:05:03,033 --> 00:05:04,766 GALPERIN: And ad networks use a bunch of 122 00:05:04,766 --> 00:05:07,200 creepy and nefarious ways of figuring out 123 00:05:07,200 --> 00:05:09,000 who you are, what you're doing, and where you're going. 124 00:05:09,900 --> 00:05:12,233 PATEL: What happened to the web I grew up with? 125 00:05:12,233 --> 00:05:15,166 ♪ ♪ 126 00:05:15,166 --> 00:05:18,200 I came of age when the internet was a fun and weird party, 127 00:05:18,200 --> 00:05:19,233 and everyone was invited. 128 00:05:19,233 --> 00:05:21,300 Remember GeoCities, 129 00:05:21,300 --> 00:05:23,200 AOL Instant Messenger, 130 00:05:23,200 --> 00:05:26,100 or the dancing "ooga chacka, ooga chacka" baby? 131 00:05:26,100 --> 00:05:27,600 ♪ ♪ 132 00:05:27,600 --> 00:05:29,466 Today, it's clear that innocence is gone. 133 00:05:30,700 --> 00:05:31,733 Is the party over? 134 00:05:34,233 --> 00:05:38,700 To understand the present, I want a refresher on the past. 135 00:05:38,700 --> 00:05:40,166 (machinery whirring) 136 00:05:40,166 --> 00:05:42,633 So I'm visiting the Computer History Museum 137 00:05:42,633 --> 00:05:44,200 in Silicon Valley. 138 00:05:44,200 --> 00:05:45,733 (video game music, Patel chuckling) 139 00:05:45,733 --> 00:05:48,433 MARC WEBER: Okay, I'm headed straight for the sun... 140 00:05:48,433 --> 00:05:50,833 PATEL: I'm meeting computer historian Marc Weber. 141 00:05:50,833 --> 00:05:52,800 What a maneuver! There's a straight line 142 00:05:52,800 --> 00:05:54,333 of bullets coming right at you-- 143 00:05:54,333 --> 00:05:55,500 (exploding sound effect, Patel groans) 144 00:05:55,500 --> 00:05:56,733 (voiceover): ...Who just wasted me 145 00:05:56,733 --> 00:05:59,200 in the cosmic battlefield of "Space War," 146 00:05:59,200 --> 00:06:00,633 one of the first video games. 147 00:06:00,633 --> 00:06:03,100 (laughing) This is actually really fun. 148 00:06:03,100 --> 00:06:04,666 ♪ ♪ 149 00:06:04,666 --> 00:06:06,733 This is cool. 150 00:06:06,733 --> 00:06:10,200 ICBM computer from a nuclear missile. 151 00:06:10,200 --> 00:06:11,333 Woah. 152 00:06:11,333 --> 00:06:13,133 Human-computer interaction. 153 00:06:13,133 --> 00:06:15,533 PATEL: Now, this looks fascinating. 154 00:06:15,533 --> 00:06:16,700 I can't tell if this is like, 155 00:06:16,700 --> 00:06:19,600 this universal clock apparatus, 156 00:06:19,600 --> 00:06:21,133 or what's happening here? 157 00:06:21,133 --> 00:06:24,533 This is the first punch card machine. 158 00:06:24,533 --> 00:06:27,133 And this was an invention 159 00:06:27,133 --> 00:06:29,766 to make the U.S. census faster. 160 00:06:29,766 --> 00:06:30,800 PATEL (voiceover): It's kind of wild, 161 00:06:30,800 --> 00:06:34,200 but the dawn of automated personal data collection 162 00:06:34,200 --> 00:06:36,066 looks like this-- 163 00:06:36,066 --> 00:06:39,366 census info poked into humble little punch cards. 164 00:06:39,366 --> 00:06:42,166 Marc, can you explain punch cards to me? 165 00:06:42,166 --> 00:06:43,200 Because when I think punch cards, 166 00:06:43,200 --> 00:06:45,600 I'm thinking lottery tickets, 167 00:06:45,600 --> 00:06:49,200 or "buy nine cups of coffee, and your tenth is free." 168 00:06:49,200 --> 00:06:54,066 Well, it was the first way to record machine-readable data. 169 00:06:54,066 --> 00:06:58,100 PATEL: Okay, let's make sense of the census. 170 00:06:58,100 --> 00:07:00,466 This kind of data collection 171 00:07:00,466 --> 00:07:02,166 has been going on for centuries. 172 00:07:02,166 --> 00:07:04,566 But starting in 1890, 173 00:07:04,566 --> 00:07:06,666 data was recorded in a pattern of holes 174 00:07:06,666 --> 00:07:08,833 "punched" into a census card. 175 00:07:08,833 --> 00:07:11,500 So the cards were used to collect census data. 176 00:07:11,500 --> 00:07:14,200 What exact questions were on there? 177 00:07:14,200 --> 00:07:18,033 So things like age, gender, number of children. 178 00:07:18,900 --> 00:07:20,833 PATEL: When a card passes through the machine, 179 00:07:20,833 --> 00:07:24,166 the holes allow pins to make electrical connections 180 00:07:24,166 --> 00:07:25,166 through the card. 181 00:07:25,166 --> 00:07:27,533 A counter keeps a running tally 182 00:07:27,533 --> 00:07:28,533 in each census category 183 00:07:28,533 --> 00:07:31,133 as more cards pass through. 184 00:07:31,133 --> 00:07:33,233 Census data is how the government 185 00:07:33,233 --> 00:07:35,633 allocates resources for schools and hospitals; 186 00:07:35,633 --> 00:07:38,166 draws the lines for districts; 187 00:07:38,166 --> 00:07:40,100 and decides how many representatives 188 00:07:40,100 --> 00:07:42,100 each state will send to congress. 189 00:07:42,100 --> 00:07:46,366 It's a reminder of the value of collecting data, 190 00:07:46,366 --> 00:07:47,766 but it's a far cry from 191 00:07:47,766 --> 00:07:49,466 having my every move tracked on the internet. 192 00:07:51,400 --> 00:07:53,100 To help connect the dots, 193 00:07:53,100 --> 00:07:54,833 Marc shows me the next surprising step 194 00:07:54,833 --> 00:07:57,533 in the evolution of data collection. 195 00:07:57,533 --> 00:08:00,200 ♪ ♪ 196 00:08:00,200 --> 00:08:01,333 I look at this and I'm almost like, 197 00:08:01,333 --> 00:08:03,700 "Oh, this looks like a modern office building to me." 198 00:08:03,700 --> 00:08:06,066 WEBER: Exactly. Each one of those 199 00:08:06,066 --> 00:08:08,733 is one of these giant terminals here. 200 00:08:08,733 --> 00:08:10,066 (static hissing) 201 00:08:10,066 --> 00:08:12,133 PATEL: During the Cold War, 202 00:08:12,133 --> 00:08:13,833 IBM figured out how to hook up computers 203 00:08:13,833 --> 00:08:16,066 from all across the country to monitor 204 00:08:16,066 --> 00:08:18,366 U.S. airspace in real-time. 205 00:08:18,366 --> 00:08:20,133 (rocket blasting off) 206 00:08:20,133 --> 00:08:24,433 So, this is a terminal from SAGE. 207 00:08:24,433 --> 00:08:28,000 (beeping, static) 208 00:08:29,600 --> 00:08:33,166 PATEL: It was the first real-time networked data system. 209 00:08:33,166 --> 00:08:35,366 Real-time is just that: 210 00:08:35,366 --> 00:08:36,600 instantaneous. 211 00:08:36,600 --> 00:08:40,066 And "networked" means connected. 212 00:08:40,066 --> 00:08:41,633 Computers from all across the country 213 00:08:41,633 --> 00:08:42,833 were hooked up to each other, 214 00:08:42,833 --> 00:08:45,133 so they could share data in real time, 215 00:08:45,133 --> 00:08:48,000 Sort of like the internet. 216 00:08:48,900 --> 00:08:53,266 WEBER: The whole point was to track incoming Soviet bombers, 217 00:08:53,266 --> 00:08:55,633 and they built, arguably, 218 00:08:55,633 --> 00:08:58,566 the first computer network in the world. 219 00:08:58,566 --> 00:09:00,133 PATEL: IBM soon realized 220 00:09:00,133 --> 00:09:02,666 that their aircraft-tracking computers 221 00:09:02,666 --> 00:09:04,500 could be used commercially. 222 00:09:04,500 --> 00:09:08,200 ♪ ♪ 223 00:09:08,200 --> 00:09:11,200 So In 1960, along came SABRE. 224 00:09:11,200 --> 00:09:13,733 (beeping, static) 225 00:09:13,733 --> 00:09:15,800 A real-time networked data system 226 00:09:15,800 --> 00:09:19,200 that shared personal data. 227 00:09:19,200 --> 00:09:21,366 WEBER: The story goes that 228 00:09:21,366 --> 00:09:24,833 the head of American Airlines met with IBM, 229 00:09:24,833 --> 00:09:27,200 and they decided to do a partnership, 230 00:09:27,200 --> 00:09:29,700 the key idea being real time. 231 00:09:29,700 --> 00:09:32,833 They could look at your age, your name, 232 00:09:32,833 --> 00:09:34,533 financial information, 233 00:09:34,533 --> 00:09:35,833 what flights you'd been on before, 234 00:09:35,833 --> 00:09:39,133 your dietary preferences for your meal, 235 00:09:39,133 --> 00:09:41,666 all of this right then in real time. 236 00:09:41,666 --> 00:09:44,666 PATEL: We went from tracking bombs to 237 00:09:44,666 --> 00:09:45,666 tracking butts on planes. 238 00:09:45,666 --> 00:09:46,733 WEBER: Exactly. 239 00:09:48,666 --> 00:09:50,733 PATEL (voiceover): Between "Pong," punch cards, 240 00:09:50,733 --> 00:09:52,200 and planes... Whoa, whoa, whoa! 241 00:09:52,200 --> 00:09:55,266 PATEL (voiceover): I could see how data started connecting the world-- 242 00:09:55,266 --> 00:09:57,400 the military to our airspace 243 00:09:57,400 --> 00:09:59,466 and companies to their customers. 244 00:10:00,333 --> 00:10:02,766 But what if those customers all over the world 245 00:10:02,766 --> 00:10:05,166 were linked up to each other? 246 00:10:05,166 --> 00:10:06,833 What would we even call that? 247 00:10:06,833 --> 00:10:10,300 Oh yeah, the World Wide Web. 248 00:10:10,300 --> 00:10:12,500 PRESENTER: The World Wide Web is a part of our lives 249 00:10:12,500 --> 00:10:14,766 and getting bigger every day. 250 00:10:14,766 --> 00:10:17,300 But what about the man who dreamt it all up? 251 00:10:17,300 --> 00:10:19,733 PATEL: News reports opened our eyes 252 00:10:19,733 --> 00:10:21,633 to this innovation and its creator, 253 00:10:21,633 --> 00:10:23,533 Tim Berners-Lee. 254 00:10:23,533 --> 00:10:24,800 PRESENTER: He simply wanted 255 00:10:24,800 --> 00:10:27,366 to give it away for the benefit of others. 256 00:10:28,133 --> 00:10:29,600 TIM BERNERS-LEE: When the web started, 257 00:10:29,600 --> 00:10:32,166 anybody could make a website. 258 00:10:32,166 --> 00:10:34,200 You could make your own style, 259 00:10:34,200 --> 00:10:36,200 your own poems, your own blogs, 260 00:10:36,200 --> 00:10:37,633 and you could link to other people. 261 00:10:37,633 --> 00:10:41,633 The feeling and the sense was of tremendous empowerment. 262 00:10:41,633 --> 00:10:43,200 (modem dialing up) 263 00:10:43,200 --> 00:10:45,366 NOBLE: Some of us remember the internet 264 00:10:45,366 --> 00:10:48,366 when it was managed and curated by people. 265 00:10:48,366 --> 00:10:49,800 Where it was, you know, 266 00:10:49,800 --> 00:10:51,666 bulletin board systems and chat rooms. 267 00:10:51,666 --> 00:10:54,166 ♪ ♪ 268 00:10:54,166 --> 00:10:55,633 PATEL: In the late '90s, small start-ups 269 00:10:55,633 --> 00:10:58,200 were maturing into big tech companies-- 270 00:10:58,200 --> 00:11:01,766 with lots of users and user data. 271 00:11:02,833 --> 00:11:05,066 KAHLE: As the web grew, 272 00:11:05,066 --> 00:11:06,533 we ended up with a very few companies 273 00:11:06,533 --> 00:11:08,200 going and doing all of the hosting. 274 00:11:08,200 --> 00:11:11,133 It wasn't your actual personal computer doing it. 275 00:11:11,133 --> 00:11:15,800 NOBLE: The large platforms that have emerged are dependent 276 00:11:15,800 --> 00:11:18,233 upon user-generated content 277 00:11:18,233 --> 00:11:19,800 and user engagement. 278 00:11:19,800 --> 00:11:24,400 The modern internet is a wholly commercial kind of internet. 279 00:11:24,400 --> 00:11:27,700 PATEL: And as web traffic started to flow more and more 280 00:11:27,700 --> 00:11:29,533 through just a few companies, 281 00:11:29,533 --> 00:11:32,566 they began to realize the value of all this personal data 282 00:11:32,566 --> 00:11:35,066 piling up on their servers. 283 00:11:35,066 --> 00:11:37,433 ALEKSANDRA KOROLOVA: Google started to understand 284 00:11:37,433 --> 00:11:40,166 the power of individual's data. 285 00:11:41,100 --> 00:11:43,200 They have information about 286 00:11:43,200 --> 00:11:44,333 not just how the websites 287 00:11:44,333 --> 00:11:45,600 are interconnected, 288 00:11:45,600 --> 00:11:49,166 but also information about the individuals. 289 00:11:49,166 --> 00:11:51,100 HILL: The big technology companies. 290 00:11:51,100 --> 00:11:53,233 They're looking at where you are, 291 00:11:53,233 --> 00:11:54,600 They're wanting to know what your gender is, 292 00:11:54,600 --> 00:11:55,733 what your age is, 293 00:11:55,733 --> 00:11:57,400 you know, how much you have to spend, 294 00:11:57,400 --> 00:12:00,200 what your political beliefs are. 295 00:12:00,200 --> 00:12:02,300 They have a lot of power to determine 296 00:12:02,300 --> 00:12:03,633 what our privacy is. 297 00:12:03,633 --> 00:12:06,100 RASKAR: That's trillions of dollars 298 00:12:06,100 --> 00:12:08,166 of economic value that's out there, 299 00:12:08,166 --> 00:12:09,533 and there's a constant struggle 300 00:12:09,533 --> 00:12:11,100 between who owns the data. 301 00:12:11,100 --> 00:12:12,100 We create the data, 302 00:12:12,100 --> 00:12:14,166 but somebody else monetizes it. 303 00:12:15,800 --> 00:12:17,633 PATEL: As big tech was maturing, 304 00:12:17,633 --> 00:12:20,400 early data collection on websites was pretty limited. 305 00:12:21,433 --> 00:12:23,400 So what happened to supercharge it? 306 00:12:23,400 --> 00:12:26,066 To create the vast tracking infrastructure 307 00:12:26,066 --> 00:12:29,100 that allowed Hayley to find out so much about me? 308 00:12:29,100 --> 00:12:31,600 It turns out things really got going 309 00:12:31,600 --> 00:12:33,766 when someone invented... 310 00:12:33,766 --> 00:12:35,100 Cookies? 311 00:12:36,000 --> 00:12:38,633 A cookie is not actually a tasty snack. 312 00:12:38,633 --> 00:12:40,766 When you go to a website, 313 00:12:40,766 --> 00:12:43,833 the website sends 314 00:12:43,833 --> 00:12:45,700 a small file to your browser. 315 00:12:45,700 --> 00:12:46,733 (keys clacking) 316 00:12:46,733 --> 00:12:49,066 PATEL: That small file allows the websites 317 00:12:49,066 --> 00:12:50,766 to collect information about your visit, 318 00:12:50,766 --> 00:12:53,733 and update it every time you come back. 319 00:12:53,733 --> 00:12:55,833 You might have heard of cookies 320 00:12:55,833 --> 00:12:57,266 because a lot of websites 321 00:12:57,266 --> 00:12:58,733 pop up with messages prompting you 322 00:12:58,733 --> 00:13:00,300 to accept theirs. 323 00:13:00,300 --> 00:13:04,300 But what happens after you hit "accept"? 324 00:13:04,300 --> 00:13:06,133 GALPERIN: It then uses cookies 325 00:13:06,133 --> 00:13:08,700 to track who you are and what you're doing, 326 00:13:08,700 --> 00:13:10,233 including in many cases, 327 00:13:10,233 --> 00:13:12,366 all of the other websites that you go to. 328 00:13:12,366 --> 00:13:15,266 RUMMAN CHOWDHURY: Cookies have the cutest name, 329 00:13:15,266 --> 00:13:17,800 but they're actually a really important 330 00:13:17,800 --> 00:13:20,533 piece of information about you. 331 00:13:20,533 --> 00:13:22,133 Every time you click on a menu, 332 00:13:22,133 --> 00:13:23,333 every time you look at an item 333 00:13:23,333 --> 00:13:24,666 or put it in your cart, 334 00:13:24,666 --> 00:13:27,166 every time you want to buy something 335 00:13:27,166 --> 00:13:29,666 and click out of the website and come back in. 336 00:13:29,666 --> 00:13:31,300 A cookie is what's enabling you to do that. 337 00:13:31,300 --> 00:13:33,166 It's a piece of tracking information. 338 00:13:33,166 --> 00:13:36,400 You can impute data and information about you 339 00:13:36,400 --> 00:13:39,366 from the seemingly innocent behavior online 340 00:13:39,366 --> 00:13:41,133 that's tracked via cookies. 341 00:13:41,133 --> 00:13:43,566 Do you have certain lifestyle conditions? 342 00:13:43,566 --> 00:13:45,200 What age are you? 343 00:13:45,200 --> 00:13:46,366 What gender or race are you? 344 00:13:46,366 --> 00:13:48,300 Do you have children? 345 00:13:50,200 --> 00:13:52,066 PATEL: Okay, so I'm starting to get 346 00:13:52,066 --> 00:13:53,666 that these tech companies 347 00:13:53,666 --> 00:13:55,400 use things like cookies to keep track of 348 00:13:55,400 --> 00:13:56,833 what sites I'm on, what I'm shopping for, 349 00:13:56,833 --> 00:13:58,200 and what I'm watching. 350 00:13:58,200 --> 00:14:01,066 ♪ ♪ 351 00:14:01,066 --> 00:14:02,566 (doorbell chimes) 352 00:14:02,566 --> 00:14:03,733 But do they have other ways 353 00:14:03,733 --> 00:14:05,566 of learning the secrets in my data? 354 00:14:06,566 --> 00:14:08,200 To learn more, 355 00:14:08,200 --> 00:14:10,100 I'm tracking down a data security expert 356 00:14:10,100 --> 00:14:11,500 in his hacking high-tech superhero lair... 357 00:14:11,500 --> 00:14:13,800 naturally. 358 00:14:13,800 --> 00:14:17,100 (door rolling open) 359 00:14:17,100 --> 00:14:19,100 Are you Patrick Jackson? My name's Alok. 360 00:14:19,100 --> 00:14:20,100 Yes, I am. 361 00:14:20,100 --> 00:14:21,333 Awesome, I'm in the right place. 362 00:14:21,333 --> 00:14:23,733 (door rolls shut) 363 00:14:23,733 --> 00:14:25,333 Your phone is sending this extra data 364 00:14:25,333 --> 00:14:26,333 to these people that 365 00:14:26,333 --> 00:14:27,566 you don't know exist. 366 00:14:27,566 --> 00:14:29,166 PATEL: Patrick Jackson has been 367 00:14:29,166 --> 00:14:31,166 all over the news for his work as 368 00:14:31,166 --> 00:14:33,066 a former NSA research scientist, 369 00:14:33,066 --> 00:14:34,633 and is now chief tech officer 370 00:14:34,633 --> 00:14:37,200 for the internet security firm Disconnect. 371 00:14:37,200 --> 00:14:39,166 And if anyone can help me 372 00:14:39,166 --> 00:14:41,833 understand how my personal data is leaking, 373 00:14:41,833 --> 00:14:43,533 it's him. 374 00:14:43,533 --> 00:14:45,833 Patrick, when I think about 375 00:14:45,833 --> 00:14:50,433 the main control of my work, life, play, 376 00:14:50,433 --> 00:14:52,400 what I'm doing at home, when I'm on the road, 377 00:14:52,400 --> 00:14:53,666 this is the mothership. 378 00:14:53,666 --> 00:14:56,133 If I were to relinquish control 379 00:14:56,133 --> 00:14:58,100 of this precious device for a few moments, 380 00:14:58,100 --> 00:15:00,100 can you show me, like, 381 00:15:00,100 --> 00:15:01,400 what I've inadvertently given up? 382 00:15:01,400 --> 00:15:02,566 Yes, yeah. 383 00:15:02,566 --> 00:15:04,200 I can show you what these data companies 384 00:15:04,200 --> 00:15:06,100 know about you and what they're collecting. 385 00:15:06,900 --> 00:15:08,666 PATEL (voiceover): Using a hacking technique 386 00:15:08,666 --> 00:15:10,066 called a "man-in-the-middle attack," 387 00:15:10,066 --> 00:15:12,633 Patrick can intercept the personal data 388 00:15:12,633 --> 00:15:14,233 that's leaving my device, 389 00:15:14,233 --> 00:15:17,100 essentially eavesdropping on a conversation 390 00:15:17,100 --> 00:15:18,600 between me and the websites 391 00:15:18,600 --> 00:15:21,200 and applications I use. 392 00:15:21,200 --> 00:15:22,566 JACKSON: Contact information, 393 00:15:22,566 --> 00:15:24,466 name, phone number, email address. 394 00:15:24,466 --> 00:15:26,600 When you agree to allow them to have your location, 395 00:15:26,600 --> 00:15:30,100 I can see not only where you're at on a map, 396 00:15:30,100 --> 00:15:32,133 but also where you're at in your house, 397 00:15:32,133 --> 00:15:33,666 whether you're at the back of the house 398 00:15:33,666 --> 00:15:35,366 or the front of the house. 399 00:15:35,366 --> 00:15:37,500 When you look at the data 400 00:15:37,500 --> 00:15:39,700 leaving the phone, every time you open an app, 401 00:15:39,700 --> 00:15:42,166 you send about, maybe, 402 00:15:42,166 --> 00:15:44,366 500 kilobytes of data to their servers. 403 00:15:44,366 --> 00:15:48,433 That is equivalent to about 125 pages of text 404 00:15:48,433 --> 00:15:50,400 that you would print in a printer. 405 00:15:54,066 --> 00:15:57,466 PATEL (voiceover): It's one thing if the apps on my phone are collecting data, 406 00:15:57,466 --> 00:15:59,166 I chose to download them. 407 00:15:59,166 --> 00:16:02,066 But Patrick says that other companies 408 00:16:02,066 --> 00:16:04,266 have even sneakier ways to get my data. 409 00:16:04,266 --> 00:16:05,766 Like something as harmless 410 00:16:05,766 --> 00:16:07,400 as a marketing email. 411 00:16:07,400 --> 00:16:09,600 To demonstrate, Patrick sends me 412 00:16:09,600 --> 00:16:11,633 a mock promotional email. 413 00:16:11,633 --> 00:16:13,600 I have an email that says 414 00:16:13,600 --> 00:16:15,166 "Shoe Sale." 415 00:16:15,166 --> 00:16:17,266 It says "open to view the shoe sale," 416 00:16:17,266 --> 00:16:19,833 and I want to open it, so I'm going to. 417 00:16:19,833 --> 00:16:23,400 "Hi, Alok, get ready for upcoming shoe sale." 418 00:16:23,400 --> 00:16:25,466 I like this graphic, and there's like, 419 00:16:25,466 --> 00:16:27,633 social media icons. This looks legit. 420 00:16:27,633 --> 00:16:28,833 (voiceover): It turns out, 421 00:16:28,833 --> 00:16:31,600 emails can include a tracking pixel-- 422 00:16:31,600 --> 00:16:35,400 also known as a spy or invisible pixel. 423 00:16:35,400 --> 00:16:38,100 JACKSON: An invisible pixel is a type of image 424 00:16:38,100 --> 00:16:40,100 you're never intended to see, 425 00:16:40,100 --> 00:16:43,400 but it still initiates a handshake of data 426 00:16:43,400 --> 00:16:46,233 from your device to these data companies. 427 00:16:46,233 --> 00:16:47,600 (keys clacking) 428 00:16:47,600 --> 00:16:49,433 Most of the emails that you receive 429 00:16:49,433 --> 00:16:51,333 likely have these tracking pixels in them. 430 00:16:51,333 --> 00:16:54,133 Most? Most. 431 00:16:55,266 --> 00:16:56,833 This invisible pixel is actually 432 00:16:56,833 --> 00:16:58,566 disguised as the banner 433 00:16:58,566 --> 00:17:00,166 in that email. 434 00:17:00,166 --> 00:17:04,200 In other cases, the tracking pixel will be a one-pixel, 435 00:17:04,200 --> 00:17:05,633 very, very tiny image 436 00:17:05,633 --> 00:17:07,266 that you would never see with your eyes, 437 00:17:07,266 --> 00:17:09,166 and it's not meant to be seen. 438 00:17:09,166 --> 00:17:10,466 (zooming in) 439 00:17:10,466 --> 00:17:12,066 PATEL: That little pixel, that little spy. 440 00:17:12,066 --> 00:17:14,133 See it? Right there. 441 00:17:14,133 --> 00:17:16,600 It can hide in images embedded in an email, 442 00:17:16,600 --> 00:17:19,533 like a banner, or even an "unsubscribe" button. 443 00:17:19,533 --> 00:17:21,333 And when you open the email, 444 00:17:21,333 --> 00:17:25,100 it contacts a tracking website to collect data about you. 445 00:17:25,100 --> 00:17:27,133 It can suck up your device model, 446 00:17:27,133 --> 00:17:29,133 location, and even some browsing history. 447 00:17:30,033 --> 00:17:33,133 JACKSON: This is essentially a digital fingerprint 448 00:17:33,133 --> 00:17:35,266 of your device. PATEL: No! 449 00:17:35,266 --> 00:17:38,266 JACKSON: That fingerprint would identify you as who you are, 450 00:17:38,266 --> 00:17:39,733 and somebody else in the future 451 00:17:39,733 --> 00:17:41,066 could look at that fingerprint, 452 00:17:41,066 --> 00:17:43,200 make you do a new fingerprint, 453 00:17:43,200 --> 00:17:46,200 and they would know that this is the same person. 454 00:17:46,200 --> 00:17:49,066 PATEL: Companies are snatching copies of my digital fingerprints 455 00:17:49,066 --> 00:17:51,100 wherever I go online. 456 00:17:51,100 --> 00:17:53,166 And by following that trail... 457 00:17:53,166 --> 00:17:55,166 JACKSON: Companies are, over time, 458 00:17:55,166 --> 00:17:57,566 collecting everything about you. 459 00:17:57,566 --> 00:18:00,100 That's how they build up this, 460 00:18:00,100 --> 00:18:02,066 this digital profile about you. 461 00:18:04,100 --> 00:18:07,333 HILL: The internet is this data collection machine, 462 00:18:07,333 --> 00:18:09,366 and as we're moving through the internet, 463 00:18:09,366 --> 00:18:10,533 there are these companies 464 00:18:10,533 --> 00:18:11,700 whose whole job is 465 00:18:11,700 --> 00:18:13,266 to reassemble that trail. 466 00:18:14,300 --> 00:18:17,633 PATEL: So now I know how my digital profile is out there, 467 00:18:17,633 --> 00:18:19,200 but why? 468 00:18:19,200 --> 00:18:20,733 Who really cares that 469 00:18:20,733 --> 00:18:22,366 I take pictures doing handstands 470 00:18:22,366 --> 00:18:24,133 and own way too many sneakers? 471 00:18:26,133 --> 00:18:28,200 Turns out, there's a whole industry 472 00:18:28,200 --> 00:18:29,833 devoted to selling my data. 473 00:18:29,833 --> 00:18:32,366 It's the data brokers. 474 00:18:32,366 --> 00:18:34,500 ♪ ♪ 475 00:18:34,500 --> 00:18:36,633 Data brokers are companies that are set up to 476 00:18:36,633 --> 00:18:38,766 collect information, repackage it, 477 00:18:38,766 --> 00:18:40,333 and resell it or re-share it 478 00:18:40,333 --> 00:18:42,266 to other companies that may want to know 479 00:18:42,266 --> 00:18:44,200 information about you. 480 00:18:44,200 --> 00:18:47,566 So what do data brokers want with all our personal data? 481 00:18:47,566 --> 00:18:50,366 Why do they care that I love chicken mole 482 00:18:50,366 --> 00:18:51,633 and that "Cool Runnings" 483 00:18:51,633 --> 00:18:54,100 is in my top five movies of all-time? 484 00:18:54,100 --> 00:18:55,800 TSUKAYAMA: They collect all this information, 485 00:18:55,800 --> 00:18:57,733 and then they're really trying to slice and dice it 486 00:18:57,733 --> 00:18:59,466 in ways that are appealing to customers. 487 00:18:59,466 --> 00:19:01,233 You know, it could be an employer 488 00:19:01,233 --> 00:19:02,833 who's doing research on you, 489 00:19:02,833 --> 00:19:05,166 it could be a retailer who wants to know 490 00:19:05,166 --> 00:19:07,533 what kind of customers they can target with ads. 491 00:19:08,800 --> 00:19:10,200 That kind of information 492 00:19:10,200 --> 00:19:12,200 is really valuable for advertisers, 493 00:19:12,200 --> 00:19:13,300 because they want to target advertising 494 00:19:13,300 --> 00:19:14,633 to a certain type of person. 495 00:19:15,600 --> 00:19:18,366 PATEL: Our data ends up eventually getting compiled 496 00:19:18,366 --> 00:19:20,066 into reports like these, 497 00:19:20,066 --> 00:19:22,133 that are then sold to... 498 00:19:22,133 --> 00:19:23,533 whoever's interested? 499 00:19:23,533 --> 00:19:25,233 TSUKAYAMA: Data brokers are able to say, 500 00:19:25,233 --> 00:19:27,166 "Look, we have a group of people 501 00:19:27,166 --> 00:19:29,666 "that will fit the audience of your product. 502 00:19:29,666 --> 00:19:33,200 "We really are happy to serve this list of people to you," 503 00:19:33,200 --> 00:19:35,400 or to make a score about how likely they might be 504 00:19:35,400 --> 00:19:37,366 to purchase your product. 505 00:19:39,166 --> 00:19:41,300 Okay, I know people say 506 00:19:41,300 --> 00:19:43,066 "Oh, your phones aren't listening to you," 507 00:19:43,066 --> 00:19:45,833 but we were just talking about retro video games, 508 00:19:45,833 --> 00:19:48,066 and here is an ad for 509 00:19:48,066 --> 00:19:50,100 home mini-arcade machines-- 510 00:19:50,100 --> 00:19:51,433 which looks kind of cool-- but how did it know 511 00:19:51,433 --> 00:19:53,200 we were just talking about that? 512 00:19:53,200 --> 00:19:54,333 Is my phone listening? 513 00:19:54,333 --> 00:19:55,533 Is it a psychic? 514 00:19:55,533 --> 00:19:57,400 What's happening? 515 00:19:57,400 --> 00:19:58,566 People always say, 516 00:19:58,566 --> 00:19:59,633 "I was talking about this product, 517 00:19:59,633 --> 00:20:01,133 and then I saw an ad for it. 518 00:20:01,133 --> 00:20:03,833 "Matt, are they listening through my phone?" 519 00:20:03,833 --> 00:20:05,166 And I'm like, "Well, they didn't hear you, 520 00:20:05,166 --> 00:20:06,666 they didn't listen to anything." 521 00:20:06,666 --> 00:20:07,833 The truth is actually more frightening. 522 00:20:07,833 --> 00:20:09,833 You talked about that thing 523 00:20:09,833 --> 00:20:11,733 because they influenced you 524 00:20:11,733 --> 00:20:14,133 into having this conversation. 525 00:20:14,133 --> 00:20:16,833 It's because the algorithm took you to this place. 526 00:20:16,833 --> 00:20:18,733 And that's the situation with our data. 527 00:20:19,500 --> 00:20:22,166 PATEL: There have been some outlier examples 528 00:20:22,166 --> 00:20:24,366 of ad tech companies listening without consent, 529 00:20:24,366 --> 00:20:25,766 but that's against the law. 530 00:20:25,766 --> 00:20:28,700 For the most part, advertising algorithms 531 00:20:28,700 --> 00:20:30,833 know you so well that they can predict 532 00:20:30,833 --> 00:20:32,500 what you would find interesting. 533 00:20:32,500 --> 00:20:34,733 They are so good because they've studied 534 00:20:34,733 --> 00:20:36,633 all the data gathered about you-- 535 00:20:36,633 --> 00:20:38,333 from the data brokers. 536 00:20:40,133 --> 00:20:41,133 There's this kind of dossier 537 00:20:41,133 --> 00:20:42,600 that's being created about you 538 00:20:42,600 --> 00:20:43,833 as you're wandering around the internet, 539 00:20:43,833 --> 00:20:45,833 and it's being used to, 540 00:20:45,833 --> 00:20:48,333 you know, decide what ad you see. 541 00:20:50,200 --> 00:20:53,233 PATEL: Advertising fuels the economics of the internet. 542 00:20:53,233 --> 00:20:55,233 And advertising is fueled by 543 00:20:55,233 --> 00:20:57,266 you, me, us-- 544 00:20:57,266 --> 00:20:59,533 our personal data. 545 00:20:59,533 --> 00:21:03,633 So how do the algorithms actually work? 546 00:21:03,633 --> 00:21:05,533 You land on a webpage, 547 00:21:05,533 --> 00:21:07,566 and that webpage 548 00:21:07,566 --> 00:21:09,233 gets your I.P. address. 549 00:21:09,233 --> 00:21:11,633 A unique identifier is returned to a data broker. 550 00:21:11,633 --> 00:21:13,066 That data broker 551 00:21:13,066 --> 00:21:14,333 looks up all the facts 552 00:21:14,333 --> 00:21:15,700 that were ever gleaned about you. 553 00:21:15,700 --> 00:21:19,233 A dossier that describes you. 554 00:21:19,233 --> 00:21:21,733 PATEL: And then advertisers literally bid, 555 00:21:21,733 --> 00:21:24,166 they bid on you, in a real-time auction 556 00:21:24,166 --> 00:21:26,300 based on the only lesson I remember 557 00:21:26,300 --> 00:21:30,100 from Econ 101: supply and demand. 558 00:21:30,100 --> 00:21:31,066 DOCTOROW: The demand-side platform 559 00:21:31,066 --> 00:21:34,333 that the advertiser is on says, "I have here 560 00:21:34,333 --> 00:21:36,200 "an 18- to 34-year-old man-child 561 00:21:36,200 --> 00:21:37,766 "with an Xbox in Southern California. 562 00:21:37,766 --> 00:21:40,533 "Who wants to pay to cram something 563 00:21:40,533 --> 00:21:42,266 nonconsensually into his eyeballs?" 564 00:21:42,266 --> 00:21:45,166 And that takes place in a marketplace, 565 00:21:45,166 --> 00:21:47,066 and you have advertisers on the other side 566 00:21:47,066 --> 00:21:48,400 who have standing orders. 567 00:21:48,400 --> 00:21:49,833 They're like, "I want to advertise to 568 00:21:49,833 --> 00:21:52,300 "18- to 34-year-old man-children in Southern California 569 00:21:52,300 --> 00:21:53,600 who own Xboxes," 570 00:21:53,600 --> 00:21:56,333 and the marketplace conducts 571 00:21:56,333 --> 00:21:58,766 an automated high-speed auction where it's just like, 572 00:21:58,766 --> 00:22:01,333 "I'll pay so many fractions of a cent," 573 00:22:01,333 --> 00:22:02,833 "I'll pay that plus ten percent." 574 00:22:02,833 --> 00:22:04,266 (auction bell rings) 575 00:22:04,266 --> 00:22:06,133 The high bidder gets to show you an ad. 576 00:22:07,533 --> 00:22:09,600 PATEL: All of this happens nearly instantly. 577 00:22:09,600 --> 00:22:12,533 And it's possible because data brokers 578 00:22:12,533 --> 00:22:14,433 sort and cull personal data 579 00:22:14,433 --> 00:22:16,533 into super detailed consumer groups. 580 00:22:16,533 --> 00:22:19,300 This is the process that delivers 581 00:22:19,300 --> 00:22:21,233 relevant personalized ads 582 00:22:21,233 --> 00:22:22,833 for cute shoes 583 00:22:22,833 --> 00:22:24,166 or that new tea club-- 584 00:22:24,166 --> 00:22:25,800 if you're into that sort of thing-- 585 00:22:25,800 --> 00:22:27,633 which all the ads seem to know about you. 586 00:22:29,100 --> 00:22:30,733 TSUKAYAMA: Here we have, for example, Soccer Mom. 587 00:22:30,733 --> 00:22:32,133 PATEL: Okay. 588 00:22:32,133 --> 00:22:33,300 I might be able to identify with that. 589 00:22:34,333 --> 00:22:38,066 A sporting goods retailer could then go and check out a file 590 00:22:38,066 --> 00:22:40,766 on what a Soccer Mom's online activity is like. 591 00:22:40,766 --> 00:22:43,433 TSUKAYAMA: What are the things that they tend to spend money on, 592 00:22:43,433 --> 00:22:44,566 and do they like to save? 593 00:22:44,566 --> 00:22:45,700 Are there certain times of year 594 00:22:45,700 --> 00:22:47,500 where they might spend more or less? 595 00:22:47,500 --> 00:22:51,833 PATEL: With all this data about Soccer Mom's consumer habits, 596 00:22:51,833 --> 00:22:55,433 retailers can send personalized ads with uncanny timing. 597 00:22:56,300 --> 00:22:59,833 Some people like the results-- soccer moms get deals. 598 00:22:59,833 --> 00:23:03,100 Advertisers keep websites we love in business. 599 00:23:03,100 --> 00:23:04,400 But... 600 00:23:04,400 --> 00:23:07,066 some consumer categories can be more concerning. 601 00:23:07,066 --> 00:23:09,100 HILL: Sometimes they'll have categories 602 00:23:09,100 --> 00:23:10,200 that are like, 603 00:23:10,200 --> 00:23:13,133 "This person has erectile dysfunction, 604 00:23:13,133 --> 00:23:15,166 "this person has a gambling problem. 605 00:23:15,166 --> 00:23:17,433 "This is a list of, kind of, 606 00:23:17,433 --> 00:23:20,333 people that are likely to fall for frauds." 607 00:23:20,333 --> 00:23:23,166 So these can be really powerful and damaging lists. 608 00:23:24,700 --> 00:23:26,066 TSUKAYAMA: So this one, for example, 609 00:23:26,066 --> 00:23:28,166 diabetes. PATEL: Wow. 610 00:23:28,166 --> 00:23:30,200 Okay, healthcare demographic... 611 00:23:30,200 --> 00:23:32,666 The thing about that, right, is like, 612 00:23:32,666 --> 00:23:35,100 when you're thinking particularly about health data, 613 00:23:35,100 --> 00:23:36,233 that indicates that you're probably 614 00:23:36,233 --> 00:23:38,066 in a pretty sensitive situation. 615 00:23:38,066 --> 00:23:42,200 PATEL: I'm now thinking about all the patients I take care of. 616 00:23:42,200 --> 00:23:43,666 And I shudder to think 617 00:23:43,666 --> 00:23:45,366 at the targeted ads that are 618 00:23:45,366 --> 00:23:47,133 deliberately targeting these individuals. 619 00:23:47,133 --> 00:23:48,533 (keys clacking) 620 00:23:48,533 --> 00:23:51,100 TSUKAYAMA: Data brokers have lists about sexual assault victims, 621 00:23:51,100 --> 00:23:53,400 they have lists about dementia sufferers. 622 00:23:53,400 --> 00:23:55,300 Those are some really concerning types of categories, 623 00:23:55,300 --> 00:23:57,333 and you could definitely see how 624 00:23:57,333 --> 00:23:59,700 an advertising company could take advantage 625 00:23:59,700 --> 00:24:01,300 of people on those lists. 626 00:24:03,100 --> 00:24:05,100 So I think a lot of people's first reaction 627 00:24:05,100 --> 00:24:06,466 on seeing these data broker reports 628 00:24:06,466 --> 00:24:08,200 is like, where has all of this come from? 629 00:24:08,200 --> 00:24:11,766 There are a lot of places where data brokers get information. 630 00:24:11,766 --> 00:24:13,366 Most commonly apps that 631 00:24:13,366 --> 00:24:14,833 you download that have deals 632 00:24:14,833 --> 00:24:17,266 with data brokers to share information. 633 00:24:17,266 --> 00:24:20,233 PATEL: All right, I knew that apps were getting my data, 634 00:24:20,233 --> 00:24:23,366 but I had no idea some were sharing it with data brokers. 635 00:24:23,366 --> 00:24:26,233 How is that even legal? 636 00:24:26,233 --> 00:24:28,366 TSUKAYAMA: How often have you seen a terms and conditions screen 637 00:24:28,366 --> 00:24:29,833 just like this? 638 00:24:29,833 --> 00:24:31,733 All the time. Anytime I download 639 00:24:31,733 --> 00:24:34,433 anything, basically. (both chuckle) 640 00:24:34,433 --> 00:24:37,800 I download apps all the time 641 00:24:37,800 --> 00:24:40,100 for work, play, life, convenience. 642 00:24:40,100 --> 00:24:42,166 I just scroll all the way down and hit accept. 643 00:24:42,166 --> 00:24:42,833 because I'm over it. Right. 644 00:24:42,833 --> 00:24:44,366 And I think that's how 645 00:24:44,366 --> 00:24:46,166 most people feel about it. 646 00:24:46,166 --> 00:24:48,166 PATEL: "By accepting these terms, 647 00:24:48,166 --> 00:24:50,166 you allow the platform to freely..." 648 00:24:50,166 --> 00:24:51,233 "...content for demonstration, promotion, and..." 649 00:24:51,233 --> 00:24:52,766 TSUKAYAMA: Terms and conditions are really long. 650 00:24:52,766 --> 00:24:54,700 Cool, I'm in a commercial 651 00:24:54,700 --> 00:24:57,133 and don't even know about it. 652 00:24:57,133 --> 00:24:58,633 TSUKAYAMA: Carnegie Mellon once did a study that said it would take 653 00:24:58,633 --> 00:25:01,300 days for somebody to get through all of the terms and conditions. 654 00:25:01,300 --> 00:25:03,100 They actually use the word exploiting. 655 00:25:03,100 --> 00:25:04,833 "You represent and warrant..." 656 00:25:04,833 --> 00:25:07,666 TSUKAYAMA: That puts people in a really difficult position 657 00:25:07,666 --> 00:25:10,633 when we're supposed to manage our own privacy, 658 00:25:10,633 --> 00:25:12,733 but we're also supposed to use all these things 659 00:25:12,733 --> 00:25:14,833 that are products that will make our lives better. 660 00:25:14,833 --> 00:25:17,100 (papers rustling, teacup clatters) 661 00:25:19,633 --> 00:25:22,433 Data brokers are a big industry. 662 00:25:22,433 --> 00:25:25,100 It's about a $200 billion industry right now. 663 00:25:25,100 --> 00:25:27,200 I think a lot of people expect it to grow to, 664 00:25:27,200 --> 00:25:29,533 you know, $400 billion in the next few years. 665 00:25:31,233 --> 00:25:34,566 NOBLE: That level of data from our past, 666 00:25:34,566 --> 00:25:37,066 all the things we've done being used 667 00:25:37,066 --> 00:25:38,200 and put into systems 668 00:25:38,200 --> 00:25:39,233 to help predict our futures, 669 00:25:39,233 --> 00:25:41,100 that's unprecedented, 670 00:25:41,100 --> 00:25:45,466 and that's rife with the potential for discrimination, 671 00:25:45,466 --> 00:25:47,200 for harm, for exclusion. 672 00:25:49,133 --> 00:25:50,266 PATEL: Okay, I know I said 673 00:25:50,266 --> 00:25:52,500 that I'm not the type to log in to... 674 00:25:52,500 --> 00:25:54,166 (voiceover): Look, I love being online. 675 00:25:54,166 --> 00:25:56,133 I like sharing what I'm up to on social media, 676 00:25:56,133 --> 00:25:58,533 and I'm not afraid to share my thoughts. 677 00:25:58,533 --> 00:26:01,133 Okay, bugs, I don't bite you, 678 00:26:01,133 --> 00:26:02,133 you don't bite me. 679 00:26:02,133 --> 00:26:02,900 It's that easy. 680 00:26:02,900 --> 00:26:05,533 But some of this personal data 681 00:26:05,533 --> 00:26:07,333 is, well, personal. 682 00:26:07,333 --> 00:26:08,833 So, now I need to know: 683 00:26:08,833 --> 00:26:11,100 What can I do to make my digital life 684 00:26:11,100 --> 00:26:13,100 more private and secure? 685 00:26:13,100 --> 00:26:17,366 GALPERIN: Privacy and security are not the same thing. 686 00:26:17,366 --> 00:26:18,766 For example, uh, 687 00:26:18,766 --> 00:26:20,833 Facebook is extremely interested 688 00:26:20,833 --> 00:26:22,400 in protecting your security. 689 00:26:22,400 --> 00:26:25,233 They want to make sure that it is always you 690 00:26:25,233 --> 00:26:26,666 logging in to your account. 691 00:26:26,666 --> 00:26:28,733 They will go through a great deal of trouble 692 00:26:28,733 --> 00:26:31,433 to keep your account secure. 693 00:26:32,233 --> 00:26:35,366 But you enter all kinds of data into that account. 694 00:26:35,366 --> 00:26:37,100 You tell it where you are located. 695 00:26:37,100 --> 00:26:38,500 You send it all of your pictures. 696 00:26:38,500 --> 00:26:40,200 You send messages 697 00:26:40,200 --> 00:26:43,166 and Facebook collects all of that data. 698 00:26:43,166 --> 00:26:45,100 They don't want you to keep it private. 699 00:26:45,100 --> 00:26:48,533 They want you to hand it to them so that they can use it in order 700 00:26:48,533 --> 00:26:51,566 to serve you targeted ads and make them money. 701 00:26:51,566 --> 00:26:53,600 PATEL (voiceover): My accounts are mostly secure 702 00:26:53,600 --> 00:26:55,700 when I control access to them. 703 00:26:55,700 --> 00:26:58,566 But that doesn't mean the data I put in them 704 00:26:58,566 --> 00:27:01,500 stays private, far from it. 705 00:27:01,500 --> 00:27:05,066 Privacy and security are not the same. 706 00:27:05,066 --> 00:27:07,700 But they are two sides of the same coin, 707 00:27:07,700 --> 00:27:09,266 and I have to understand both 708 00:27:09,266 --> 00:27:10,566 if I'm gonna protect 709 00:27:10,566 --> 00:27:12,100 my personal data. 710 00:27:12,100 --> 00:27:14,566 MITCHELL: When your privacy is taken from you, 711 00:27:14,566 --> 00:27:16,466 your agency is taken from you. 712 00:27:16,466 --> 00:27:19,100 Privacy is that whisper. 713 00:27:19,100 --> 00:27:21,766 When you think you're whispering to your friend, 714 00:27:21,766 --> 00:27:24,200 but you're shouting in a crowded elevator, 715 00:27:24,200 --> 00:27:26,100 you're robbed of something. 716 00:27:26,100 --> 00:27:29,000 And that's why privacy is so important. 717 00:27:29,966 --> 00:27:33,100 PATEL: What can I do right now to protect my privacy 718 00:27:33,100 --> 00:27:34,200 and my security? 719 00:27:35,366 --> 00:27:38,766 To learn tips and tools to preserve my data on both fronts, 720 00:27:38,766 --> 00:27:42,200 I'm chatting with hacker and educator Matt Mitchell 721 00:27:42,200 --> 00:27:46,233 and cybersecurity expert Eva Galperin. 722 00:27:46,233 --> 00:27:49,100 First up: privacy. 723 00:27:49,100 --> 00:27:50,300 Sorry. 724 00:27:50,300 --> 00:27:52,200 (whispering): Privacy. 725 00:27:52,200 --> 00:27:54,366 Matt is a privacy advocate 726 00:27:54,366 --> 00:27:56,600 at CryptoHarlem, as in cryptography, 727 00:27:56,600 --> 00:28:00,666 the process of hiding or coding information. 728 00:28:00,666 --> 00:28:03,400 Hey. I'm Matt. Thanks for coming to CryptoHarlem. 729 00:28:03,400 --> 00:28:07,633 MITCHELL (voiceover): CryptoHarlem is anti-surveillance workshops 730 00:28:07,633 --> 00:28:09,366 for the Black community 731 00:28:09,366 --> 00:28:11,400 and all marginalized communities around the world. 732 00:28:12,200 --> 00:28:15,500 And our mission is to develop people's digital skills 733 00:28:15,500 --> 00:28:17,133 so they can actually help us in the fight 734 00:28:17,133 --> 00:28:19,500 to push back on digital harms. 735 00:28:19,500 --> 00:28:22,133 MITCHELL: Privacy is not secrecy. 736 00:28:22,133 --> 00:28:23,066 Privacy is just a door. 737 00:28:23,066 --> 00:28:25,100 A door in your home. 738 00:28:25,100 --> 00:28:26,233 There's a sense of, like, 739 00:28:26,233 --> 00:28:28,333 I want to control what can be seen, 740 00:28:28,333 --> 00:28:30,000 what can't be seen just for me. 741 00:28:30,800 --> 00:28:32,766 PATEL (voiceover): And I want to close that door. 742 00:28:32,766 --> 00:28:33,833 So how do I do this? 743 00:28:33,833 --> 00:28:35,633 Even just a little? 744 00:28:35,633 --> 00:28:37,100 PATEL: Okay, what do I do 745 00:28:37,100 --> 00:28:39,566 to make all this safer for me? 746 00:28:39,566 --> 00:28:42,133 What do I do, who do I talk to, how do I start? 747 00:28:42,133 --> 00:28:43,333 You have to ask yourself, 748 00:28:43,333 --> 00:28:45,300 "Is this a problem that needs to be fixed?" 749 00:28:45,300 --> 00:28:47,100 Privacy isn't a switch. 750 00:28:47,100 --> 00:28:48,400 It's a dial. 751 00:28:48,400 --> 00:28:50,633 You get to control how much you share 752 00:28:50,633 --> 00:28:52,166 with who and with what. 753 00:28:52,166 --> 00:28:54,500 PATEL (voiceover): Let's start with a big one, 754 00:28:54,500 --> 00:28:57,066 something I use all the time, every day, 755 00:28:57,066 --> 00:28:59,133 and I bet you do, too. 756 00:28:59,133 --> 00:29:02,266 Have you ever used this website called Google? 757 00:29:02,266 --> 00:29:03,533 I've heard of it. Yeah. 758 00:29:03,533 --> 00:29:04,766 Well, let's check this out. 759 00:29:04,766 --> 00:29:06,100 Well, if we go here 760 00:29:06,100 --> 00:29:11,400 to myactivity.google.com... 761 00:29:13,200 --> 00:29:16,366 ...it'll show us all the things that you've been doing. 762 00:29:16,366 --> 00:29:17,566 So for example, 763 00:29:17,566 --> 00:29:19,133 when we go here, 764 00:29:19,133 --> 00:29:22,733 we see all the different Google services that you use. 765 00:29:22,733 --> 00:29:24,766 I don't think they make a service you don't use. 766 00:29:25,566 --> 00:29:28,633 PATEL (voiceover): These platforms are so deeply embedded in many of our lives 767 00:29:28,633 --> 00:29:30,133 and for good reason. 768 00:29:30,133 --> 00:29:33,133 They make products that can be really useful. 769 00:29:33,133 --> 00:29:34,566 It's hard for me to imagine 770 00:29:34,566 --> 00:29:36,300 going a single day without searching the web 771 00:29:36,300 --> 00:29:38,466 or using a navigation app. 772 00:29:38,466 --> 00:29:41,200 But they also suck up a lot of our data. 773 00:29:41,200 --> 00:29:43,466 It's a trade-off that I'm comfortable making, 774 00:29:43,466 --> 00:29:45,100 within reason. 775 00:29:45,100 --> 00:29:49,333 I've used literally everything Google has ever offered. 776 00:29:49,333 --> 00:29:51,633 And it knows what you've used. 777 00:29:51,633 --> 00:29:53,700 And it records everything you've ever used 778 00:29:53,700 --> 00:29:55,166 and how you've used it. 779 00:29:55,166 --> 00:29:56,600 Every search term you've used, 780 00:29:56,600 --> 00:30:00,100 every, uh, you know, shopping item you've used. 781 00:30:00,100 --> 00:30:05,066 But this is the dashboard to delete it. 782 00:30:05,066 --> 00:30:07,100 PATEL (voiceover): I didn't know this, but I can literally just delete 783 00:30:07,100 --> 00:30:10,100 huge amounts of data that Google is storing about me. 784 00:30:10,100 --> 00:30:13,400 And the same is true for a lot of other services. 785 00:30:13,400 --> 00:30:16,100 We can dial to whatever level we feel comfortable. 786 00:30:16,100 --> 00:30:17,633 For example, on LinkedIn, 787 00:30:17,633 --> 00:30:19,100 you would just click on me, 788 00:30:19,100 --> 00:30:23,333 and then you would go to your settings and privacy. 789 00:30:23,333 --> 00:30:25,066 Here, when we go to manage your activity, 790 00:30:25,066 --> 00:30:27,266 it tells you that, you know, 791 00:30:27,266 --> 00:30:28,533 you started sharing your LinkedIn data 792 00:30:28,533 --> 00:30:30,566 with a permitted application. 793 00:30:30,566 --> 00:30:35,066 PATEL (voiceover): Treating privacy like a dial means it's not all or nothing. 794 00:30:35,066 --> 00:30:39,200 You can have your data cake and eat it, too. 795 00:30:39,200 --> 00:30:41,466 Like now I'm thinking I want to log into everything-- 796 00:30:41,466 --> 00:30:44,500 all my social media, my email, my LinkedIn, everything-- 797 00:30:44,500 --> 00:30:48,133 regularly and look to see who is using these. 798 00:30:48,133 --> 00:30:50,566 Exactly, it is about awareness. 799 00:30:50,566 --> 00:30:52,733 Furthermore, the companies, 800 00:30:52,733 --> 00:30:55,433 they know how many people actually use 801 00:30:55,433 --> 00:30:56,433 the privacy controls. 802 00:30:56,433 --> 00:30:58,066 And by you even peeking in it, 803 00:30:58,066 --> 00:31:02,166 you're saying I believe privacy matters. 804 00:31:02,166 --> 00:31:05,400 At the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 805 00:31:05,400 --> 00:31:08,200 Eva shows me how I can take my privacy game 806 00:31:08,200 --> 00:31:09,433 to the next level... 807 00:31:09,433 --> 00:31:13,166 learning some Surveillance Self-Defense. 808 00:31:13,833 --> 00:31:19,333 Although, apparently not that kind of self-defense. 809 00:31:19,333 --> 00:31:21,266 GALPERIN: So, the next step in your privacy journey 810 00:31:21,266 --> 00:31:23,366 is fighting back against 811 00:31:23,366 --> 00:31:25,166 types of corporate surveillance. 812 00:31:25,166 --> 00:31:27,100 I-- and one of the things 813 00:31:27,100 --> 00:31:29,700 that websites really like to do when, uh, 814 00:31:29,700 --> 00:31:32,333 is not just to track what you are doing on their website, 815 00:31:32,333 --> 00:31:34,733 but to track all the other websites that you go to. 816 00:31:34,733 --> 00:31:36,466 And they do this using cookies. 817 00:31:36,466 --> 00:31:37,766 There's some companies I trust, 818 00:31:37,766 --> 00:31:39,666 and I'm like, fine, you have these cookies. 819 00:31:39,666 --> 00:31:41,566 They're chocolate chip. I know where they were made. 820 00:31:41,566 --> 00:31:42,800 I know what you're doing with them. 821 00:31:42,800 --> 00:31:44,066 But then there's these third party companies, 822 00:31:44,066 --> 00:31:46,166 I don't want them around me. 823 00:31:46,166 --> 00:31:48,166 You can use a browser extension 824 00:31:48,166 --> 00:31:50,566 to eat these cookies, uh, 825 00:31:50,566 --> 00:31:51,833 and fight back against this kind of tracking 826 00:31:51,833 --> 00:31:54,466 and keep those websites from seeing where else you're going. 827 00:31:54,466 --> 00:31:58,100 PATEL (voiceover): Browser extensions are add-ons for your web browser 828 00:31:58,100 --> 00:32:01,266 that give it extra features and functionality, 829 00:32:01,266 --> 00:32:03,333 like eating cookies. 830 00:32:03,333 --> 00:32:04,566 I'm imagining this, 831 00:32:04,566 --> 00:32:07,833 like, digital Cookie Monster that's eating up 832 00:32:07,833 --> 00:32:11,233 all these pieces of my online activity 833 00:32:11,233 --> 00:32:14,133 so that companies don't know what I'm doing online. 834 00:32:14,133 --> 00:32:16,200 And it reduces the amount of privacy tracking. 835 00:32:16,200 --> 00:32:17,566 Am I understanding that? 836 00:32:17,566 --> 00:32:19,366 What these browser extensions 837 00:32:19,366 --> 00:32:24,333 do is they get rid of, uh, the tracking cookies 838 00:32:24,333 --> 00:32:26,166 that these websites use to see 839 00:32:26,166 --> 00:32:28,066 all the other sites that you're going to, 840 00:32:28,066 --> 00:32:29,100 which is none of their business. 841 00:32:29,100 --> 00:32:31,166 (knuckles crack) 842 00:32:31,166 --> 00:32:33,100 PATEL (voiceover): My personal digital world is starting to feel 843 00:32:33,100 --> 00:32:36,033 comfy, controlled and a lot more private. 844 00:32:37,000 --> 00:32:39,633 I've learned how to close the doors and blinds. 845 00:32:39,633 --> 00:32:43,166 But still, someone could open them right back up. 846 00:32:43,166 --> 00:32:44,733 I could get hacked. 847 00:32:44,733 --> 00:32:47,133 How do I lock my doors? 848 00:32:47,133 --> 00:32:49,466 Time to talk about security. 849 00:32:49,466 --> 00:32:50,833 MITCHELL: The tragedy of 850 00:32:50,833 --> 00:32:52,266 this recent pandemic teaches us 851 00:32:52,266 --> 00:32:55,133 that we're all pretty vulnerable. 852 00:32:55,133 --> 00:32:56,833 And without that herd immunity, 853 00:32:56,833 --> 00:32:59,200 without that community response, 854 00:32:59,200 --> 00:33:01,566 you can't just say, "I'm okay, 855 00:33:01,566 --> 00:33:05,066 and therefore I don't have to worry about this." 856 00:33:05,066 --> 00:33:07,300 This is the first time that I've ever heard 857 00:33:07,300 --> 00:33:10,100 someone compare data privacy 858 00:33:10,100 --> 00:33:14,066 to epidemiology and herd immunity. 859 00:33:14,066 --> 00:33:17,666 All you need is one person to make a mistake 860 00:33:17,666 --> 00:33:19,366 and it's game over. 861 00:33:19,366 --> 00:33:23,700 That's what happens to so many other corporations, businesses, 862 00:33:23,700 --> 00:33:25,766 even hospitals during a ransomware attack 863 00:33:25,766 --> 00:33:28,300 that'll freeze all machines and stop them from working 864 00:33:28,300 --> 00:33:30,600 until someone pays a bunch of hackers. 865 00:33:30,600 --> 00:33:33,100 My one error could compromise the security 866 00:33:33,100 --> 00:33:35,266 of my entire institution. 867 00:33:35,266 --> 00:33:36,533 MITCHELL: Human beings will make mistakes. 868 00:33:36,533 --> 00:33:39,200 Folks won't wash their hands sometimes, right? 869 00:33:39,200 --> 00:33:43,300 But we try to teach best practices to prevent the worst. 870 00:33:43,300 --> 00:33:44,766 Okay, Matt, you have my wheels spinning. 871 00:33:44,766 --> 00:33:47,466 I do not want to be patient zero 872 00:33:47,466 --> 00:33:50,300 in this, like, massive infectious data leak. 873 00:33:50,300 --> 00:33:52,666 What can I do to start pulling it back 874 00:33:52,666 --> 00:33:54,466 and better protecting my information? 875 00:33:54,466 --> 00:33:56,600 Well, I got something for that, okay? 876 00:33:56,600 --> 00:33:58,666 Oh, you have, like, a bag of tricks. I've got a bag. 877 00:33:58,666 --> 00:34:00,600 I thought you were just gonna say, like, change your password. 878 00:34:00,600 --> 00:34:02,533 We got to go all the way. 879 00:34:02,533 --> 00:34:04,200 This is a privacy screen. 880 00:34:04,200 --> 00:34:06,733 And this will keep people from being able 881 00:34:06,733 --> 00:34:08,166 to look over your shoulder. 882 00:34:08,166 --> 00:34:09,400 Shoulder surfers beware. 883 00:34:09,400 --> 00:34:10,566 Can't look through that. 884 00:34:10,566 --> 00:34:11,733 This is for like, using my computer 885 00:34:11,733 --> 00:34:13,300 in a public space, the airplane. 886 00:34:13,300 --> 00:34:15,466 Everywhere. 887 00:34:15,466 --> 00:34:17,233 This is a Faraday bag. 888 00:34:17,233 --> 00:34:18,800 You got to keep your phone in here. 889 00:34:18,800 --> 00:34:20,500 This blocks RF signals. 890 00:34:20,500 --> 00:34:21,833 It's basically aluminum foil... PATEL (voiceover): Yo, Matt? 891 00:34:21,833 --> 00:34:23,833 Can we slow this down a little bit? 892 00:34:23,833 --> 00:34:25,700 You can't get hacked when you're not attached to anything. 893 00:34:25,700 --> 00:34:28,200 Is this really necessary, a Faraday bag? 894 00:34:28,200 --> 00:34:31,200 PATEL (voiceover): Okay, this looks a little more complicated than I expected. 895 00:34:31,200 --> 00:34:33,400 I guess I just have to become Dr. 007. 896 00:34:33,400 --> 00:34:35,666 We also have a Wi-Fi pineapple. 897 00:34:35,666 --> 00:34:38,200 This is a portable access point. 898 00:34:38,200 --> 00:34:39,833 And we also could use it to detect 899 00:34:39,833 --> 00:34:42,200 and stop access points from going bad. 900 00:34:42,200 --> 00:34:44,400 PATEL (voiceover): Okay, Matt, now you've just gone rogue. 901 00:34:44,400 --> 00:34:46,400 MITCHELL: Let's say you have a hard drive 902 00:34:46,400 --> 00:34:48,300 with some important files from work in it. 903 00:34:48,300 --> 00:34:49,500 What happens if you lose it? 904 00:34:49,500 --> 00:34:50,833 Someone can plug that in and have access 905 00:34:50,833 --> 00:34:51,633 to all your stuff. 906 00:34:51,633 --> 00:34:54,100 Not if it's an encrypted hard drive. 907 00:34:54,100 --> 00:34:56,400 I understand-- There's more. 908 00:34:56,400 --> 00:34:58,166 How do you know that you're not being bugged? 909 00:34:58,166 --> 00:34:59,533 This is nuts. 910 00:34:59,533 --> 00:35:01,400 This is something I could use to find out 911 00:35:01,400 --> 00:35:04,433 if there is a audio bug in the room. (beeping) 912 00:35:04,433 --> 00:35:06,100 I can find Wi-Fi signals... (device beeps) 913 00:35:06,100 --> 00:35:07,733 Oops, something's here, right? 914 00:35:08,566 --> 00:35:11,733 PATEL (voiceover): Honestly, I thought being a spy would be more fun. 915 00:35:11,733 --> 00:35:14,433 But I'm starting to feel shaken, not stirred. 916 00:35:14,433 --> 00:35:17,300 How am I supposed to keep track of all this stuff? 917 00:35:17,300 --> 00:35:20,366 I'm no hacker genius like Matt. 918 00:35:21,200 --> 00:35:25,233 What if I just left all of this behind and just quit. 919 00:35:25,233 --> 00:35:27,433 Goodbye, digital world. 920 00:35:32,133 --> 00:35:37,166 (clock ticking) 921 00:35:40,400 --> 00:35:42,133 (yawning) 922 00:35:45,533 --> 00:35:46,666 Do you know if there's breaking news? (cat meows) 923 00:35:46,666 --> 00:35:47,733 Look in my eyes and tell me. 924 00:35:47,733 --> 00:35:49,166 What are we doing here? 925 00:35:49,166 --> 00:35:50,400 What are we doing? 926 00:35:50,400 --> 00:35:51,400 Like, I don't even know 927 00:35:51,400 --> 00:35:52,666 how many steps I've taken today. 928 00:35:52,666 --> 00:35:54,533 Because my step counter is not on my hand. 929 00:35:54,533 --> 00:35:57,400 I'm technically disconnected, this isn't cheating, 930 00:35:57,400 --> 00:35:59,500 but can someone tell me what the Suns score is? 931 00:35:59,500 --> 00:36:01,266 CREW MEMBER: Uh, down by 11 at the half. 932 00:36:01,266 --> 00:36:02,266 (groans) 933 00:36:02,266 --> 00:36:04,166 (cat purring) 934 00:36:04,166 --> 00:36:06,400 Oh, I am supposed to pick up my daughter. 935 00:36:06,400 --> 00:36:09,366 How long do I have to do this for? 936 00:36:10,166 --> 00:36:12,366 (voiceover): All right, maybe it's not that easy. 937 00:36:12,366 --> 00:36:14,066 But there's got to be some middle ground 938 00:36:14,066 --> 00:36:16,533 between Inspector Gadget and Fred Flintstone 939 00:36:16,533 --> 00:36:18,700 that's right for me. 940 00:36:18,700 --> 00:36:21,533 Instead of going completely off the grid, 941 00:36:21,533 --> 00:36:23,766 I'm checking back in with Eva 942 00:36:23,766 --> 00:36:26,166 for some more surveillance self-defense. 943 00:36:26,166 --> 00:36:31,500 And the best place to start is with the basics: passwords. 944 00:36:31,500 --> 00:36:33,533 I'll be honest, 945 00:36:33,533 --> 00:36:34,800 my current password 946 00:36:34,800 --> 00:36:36,066 is basically a combination 947 00:36:36,066 --> 00:36:38,566 of my first pet's name plus my birthday 948 00:36:38,566 --> 00:36:40,833 or a favorite video game or song. 949 00:36:40,833 --> 00:36:43,066 I don't think any hacker's really gonna guess that. 950 00:36:43,066 --> 00:36:46,200 But you're telling me that there is still a vulnerability there. 951 00:36:46,200 --> 00:36:48,133 Yes. 952 00:36:48,133 --> 00:36:49,733 Hackers can go find out information 953 00:36:49,733 --> 00:36:50,933 about you from data brokers, 954 00:36:50,933 --> 00:36:54,233 including, you know, the name of the street you grew up on 955 00:36:54,233 --> 00:36:57,266 or the city where you went to college. 956 00:36:57,266 --> 00:37:01,233 So you wouldn't want a password like the name of your pet. 957 00:37:01,233 --> 00:37:02,766 Or password123. 958 00:37:02,766 --> 00:37:07,300 Well, I did have a pet fish, and his name was Password123. 959 00:37:07,300 --> 00:37:09,066 So, I guess that kind of, like, 960 00:37:09,066 --> 00:37:11,433 hits both boxes and makes me more vulnerable. 961 00:37:11,433 --> 00:37:16,700 Let's start by, uh, creating some strong and unique passwords 962 00:37:16,700 --> 00:37:18,800 for all of your, uh, your different accounts. 963 00:37:18,800 --> 00:37:20,833 And that will make them much more hacker-proof. 964 00:37:20,833 --> 00:37:22,633 I'm all ears. Fantastic. 965 00:37:22,633 --> 00:37:28,100 Well, we're going to start by rolling these five dice. 966 00:37:29,400 --> 00:37:32,133 GALPERIN (voiceover): There are easy ways to create passwords 967 00:37:32,133 --> 00:37:34,566 that are long and strong 968 00:37:34,566 --> 00:37:37,100 and easy to remember that are not based on information 969 00:37:37,100 --> 00:37:40,266 that attackers can easily find about you. 970 00:37:40,266 --> 00:37:43,366 And the way that we do that is we use word lists and dice. 971 00:37:44,266 --> 00:37:48,100 The word list is essentially just a long list 972 00:37:48,100 --> 00:37:52,100 of dictionary words with numbers attached. 973 00:37:52,100 --> 00:37:54,133 So what we're going to do is we're going 974 00:37:54,133 --> 00:37:55,833 to write down the numbers on this dice. 975 00:37:55,833 --> 00:37:58,766 45263, my new lucky numbers. Okay. 976 00:37:58,766 --> 00:38:01,733 And now we are going to look up 977 00:38:01,733 --> 00:38:05,600 45263 in this book. 978 00:38:05,600 --> 00:38:08,100 So there are words that correlate to the numbers 979 00:38:08,100 --> 00:38:09,700 that I just randomly rolled. Yes. 980 00:38:09,700 --> 00:38:12,066 Okay. I want a cool word like "tiger." 981 00:38:12,066 --> 00:38:14,533 The word is "presoak." 982 00:38:14,533 --> 00:38:16,033 "Presoak?" "Presoak." 983 00:38:17,166 --> 00:38:21,400 34115. 984 00:38:21,400 --> 00:38:22,666 "Henna." 985 00:38:22,666 --> 00:38:24,333 Okay, I like this. 986 00:38:24,333 --> 00:38:26,200 PATEL (voiceover): The idea behind this dice game 987 00:38:26,200 --> 00:38:29,133 is that it's both random and long. 988 00:38:29,133 --> 00:38:32,133 Hackers using fast, powerful computers 989 00:38:32,133 --> 00:38:34,366 and sophisticated password-cracking software 990 00:38:34,366 --> 00:38:37,700 are able to try many, many passwords a second. 991 00:38:37,700 --> 00:38:40,066 A recent study by a security firm 992 00:38:40,066 --> 00:38:42,600 showed that a seven-character password can be cracked 993 00:38:42,600 --> 00:38:44,700 in just a few seconds. 994 00:38:44,700 --> 00:38:46,266 But a 12-character password 995 00:38:46,266 --> 00:38:48,100 with uppercase letters and symbols 996 00:38:48,100 --> 00:38:50,500 is much more difficult to break. 997 00:38:50,500 --> 00:38:52,100 Studies show it could take hackers 998 00:38:52,100 --> 00:38:54,366 well over 100 years to crack. 999 00:38:54,366 --> 00:38:56,133 That's safe. 1000 00:38:56,133 --> 00:38:59,133 But also more difficult to type or remember. 1001 00:38:59,133 --> 00:39:00,733 Eva's six-word random passphrase 1002 00:39:00,733 --> 00:39:04,066 is easier to remember than a random string of 12 characters 1003 00:39:04,066 --> 00:39:06,466 and practically impossible to break. 1004 00:39:06,466 --> 00:39:07,500 "Stinging." 1005 00:39:07,500 --> 00:39:08,700 "Ignition." 1006 00:39:11,166 --> 00:39:13,333 Six is "Clutch." "Clutch," okay. 1007 00:39:13,333 --> 00:39:17,833 "Presoak Henna Stinging Ignition Clutch Handbrake." 1008 00:39:17,833 --> 00:39:19,300 (bell dings) Fantastic. 1009 00:39:19,300 --> 00:39:20,500 Now you have a passphrase. 1010 00:39:20,500 --> 00:39:21,500 These six words. 1011 00:39:21,500 --> 00:39:23,533 It is long. It's unique. 1012 00:39:23,533 --> 00:39:25,266 It's difficult to guess. 1013 00:39:25,266 --> 00:39:26,833 And it's relatively easy to remember, 1014 00:39:26,833 --> 00:39:29,166 considering how long it is. 1015 00:39:29,166 --> 00:39:31,266 It is a very good way of creating random passwords, 1016 00:39:31,266 --> 00:39:34,733 but a lot of password managers will automatically 1017 00:39:34,733 --> 00:39:36,566 do this for you. 1018 00:39:36,566 --> 00:39:39,600 PATEL (voiceover): Once you have a passphrase, you can use this 1019 00:39:39,600 --> 00:39:42,800 to unlock a password manager that generates 1020 00:39:42,800 --> 00:39:47,100 strong random passwords and stores them securely. 1021 00:39:47,100 --> 00:39:51,233 Now I have this beautiful random password or passphrase, 1022 00:39:51,233 --> 00:39:53,500 but what happens if someone steals this? 1023 00:39:53,500 --> 00:39:55,700 Is it just game over, efforts are gone? 1024 00:39:55,700 --> 00:39:56,833 No, it is not. 1025 00:39:56,833 --> 00:40:00,100 Uh, that leads us to the next step on your surveillance 1026 00:40:00,100 --> 00:40:03,400 self-defense journey, and that is two-factor authentication. 1027 00:40:04,400 --> 00:40:07,800 PATEL (voiceover): This may sound like a hacker ninja term, 1028 00:40:07,800 --> 00:40:10,100 but it's just an added layer of security, 1029 00:40:10,100 --> 00:40:13,833 requiring an additional method of confirming your identity. 1030 00:40:13,833 --> 00:40:16,433 Most of the time, it's just a simple text message. 1031 00:40:16,433 --> 00:40:17,633 GALPERIN: Because it requires 1032 00:40:17,633 --> 00:40:19,233 that you have two things 1033 00:40:19,233 --> 00:40:20,600 in order to log into your account. 1034 00:40:20,600 --> 00:40:24,200 You will need both your password and also this code, 1035 00:40:24,200 --> 00:40:27,800 so the site will send you a text message. 1036 00:40:27,800 --> 00:40:30,600 There is also an authenticator app. 1037 00:40:30,600 --> 00:40:35,166 The site will ask you to take a photo of and then go to 1038 00:40:35,166 --> 00:40:37,566 the site in a QR code. 1039 00:40:37,566 --> 00:40:40,166 The best way to be a security superhero 1040 00:40:40,166 --> 00:40:43,100 is to find the stuff that works for you 1041 00:40:43,100 --> 00:40:44,833 and implement it as sort of smoothly 1042 00:40:44,833 --> 00:40:47,433 and seamlessly as you can. 1043 00:40:48,500 --> 00:40:50,800 PATEL (voiceover): These data self-defense tweaks are great 1044 00:40:50,800 --> 00:40:52,833 for me and my own data. 1045 00:40:52,833 --> 00:40:55,066 But what about everyone else? 1046 00:40:55,066 --> 00:40:58,833 I'm wondering, is there a way for all of us to share data 1047 00:40:58,833 --> 00:41:00,833 and get all the sweet benefits, 1048 00:41:00,833 --> 00:41:02,733 without sacrificing privacy and security? 1049 00:41:05,100 --> 00:41:06,600 At M.I.T.'s Media Lab, 1050 00:41:06,600 --> 00:41:09,300 I'm meeting up with Ramesh Raskar, 1051 00:41:09,300 --> 00:41:12,066 who is working on a way to access the benefits 1052 00:41:12,066 --> 00:41:13,533 of personal health data-- 1053 00:41:13,533 --> 00:41:15,533 finally, a topic I understand-- 1054 00:41:15,533 --> 00:41:18,266 without compromising our private information. 1055 00:41:19,400 --> 00:41:21,433 At Ramesh's Camera Culture Lab, 1056 00:41:21,433 --> 00:41:23,500 they're building some data collecting tools 1057 00:41:23,500 --> 00:41:26,233 that seem straight out of a science fiction movie. 1058 00:41:26,233 --> 00:41:29,333 PATEL: Love when a sign says "Danger: Laser." 1059 00:41:29,333 --> 00:41:31,266 You know important things are happening in here. 1060 00:41:31,266 --> 00:41:35,766 (voiceover): They've got cameras that can literally see around corners. 1061 00:41:35,766 --> 00:41:37,566 PATEL: Get out! (both laughing) 1062 00:41:37,566 --> 00:41:40,033 RASKAR: We are not violating the laws of physics. 1063 00:41:40,900 --> 00:41:44,233 PATEL (voiceover): And cameras that can see inside our own bodies. 1064 00:41:44,233 --> 00:41:47,133 That's about as personal as it gets. 1065 00:41:47,133 --> 00:41:51,566 For Ramesh, protecting patient privacy is paramount. 1066 00:41:51,566 --> 00:41:54,066 But he's found a drawback in how we do that. 1067 00:41:54,066 --> 00:41:56,200 Since data is locked up for privacy, 1068 00:41:56,200 --> 00:42:00,066 advancement in medical science is not as fast as it could be. 1069 00:42:00,066 --> 00:42:03,466 Because, think about it, access to tons of personal health data 1070 00:42:03,466 --> 00:42:06,233 could help researchers make major medical breakthroughs. 1071 00:42:06,233 --> 00:42:10,166 But today, researchers have to ask for your consent 1072 00:42:10,166 --> 00:42:13,133 to peek at your data in order to learn from it. 1073 00:42:13,133 --> 00:42:14,566 RASKAR: When we talk about consent, 1074 00:42:14,566 --> 00:42:17,066 someone's still peeking into your data. 1075 00:42:17,066 --> 00:42:19,433 A no-peek privacy, on the other hand, 1076 00:42:19,433 --> 00:42:21,133 is where nobody can peek at your data. 1077 00:42:21,933 --> 00:42:23,633 PATEL (voiceover): No-peek privacy? 1078 00:42:23,633 --> 00:42:25,466 But how could researchers learn anything? 1079 00:42:25,466 --> 00:42:27,233 RASKAR: There are many ways 1080 00:42:27,233 --> 00:42:29,500 to create no-peek privacy. 1081 00:42:29,500 --> 00:42:33,300 First one is the notion of smashing information. 1082 00:42:36,733 --> 00:42:39,200 PATEL (voiceover): No, not literally smashing your phone. 1083 00:42:39,200 --> 00:42:41,133 But I'm not gonna lie... 1084 00:42:42,700 --> 00:42:44,833 ...that was really fun. 1085 00:42:44,833 --> 00:42:47,366 Smashing is basically the idea of taking raw data 1086 00:42:47,366 --> 00:42:49,666 and smashing it into just the wisdom. 1087 00:42:50,733 --> 00:42:53,066 PATEL (voiceover): According to Ramesh, smashing data 1088 00:42:53,066 --> 00:42:54,266 is simply the process 1089 00:42:54,266 --> 00:42:56,466 of extracting the useful information, 1090 00:42:56,466 --> 00:42:58,166 which he calls the "wisdom," 1091 00:42:58,166 --> 00:43:00,466 while obscuring the private data. 1092 00:43:00,466 --> 00:43:03,833 In other words, a collection of private health records 1093 00:43:03,833 --> 00:43:06,133 contains two kinds of data. 1094 00:43:06,133 --> 00:43:08,700 One kind is the personal data-- 1095 00:43:08,700 --> 00:43:10,833 the names, conditions, and histories, 1096 00:43:10,833 --> 00:43:13,800 the stuff we absolutely want to protect. 1097 00:43:13,800 --> 00:43:19,133 But collectively, the records may contain valuable information 1098 00:43:19,133 --> 00:43:20,166 about patterns in health care. 1099 00:43:20,166 --> 00:43:22,533 The wisdom. 1100 00:43:22,533 --> 00:43:24,733 I'm thinking about examples in health care, 1101 00:43:24,733 --> 00:43:28,300 and the individual data, the patient data 1102 00:43:28,300 --> 00:43:31,133 is protected, and you can't reverse engineer it. 1103 00:43:31,133 --> 00:43:33,666 Let's take a concrete example of COVID. 1104 00:43:35,200 --> 00:43:37,666 Imagine during the early days of the pandemic, 1105 00:43:37,666 --> 00:43:39,266 we could have sent medical experts 1106 00:43:39,266 --> 00:43:42,466 from here in Boston to China, to Korea, to Italy, 1107 00:43:42,466 --> 00:43:45,333 and embedded them in those hospitals to understand 1108 00:43:45,333 --> 00:43:48,700 what COVID pneumonia looks like on a chest X-ray. 1109 00:43:48,700 --> 00:43:50,433 And they could have come back to Boston, 1110 00:43:50,433 --> 00:43:52,066 all those medical experts, 1111 00:43:52,066 --> 00:43:55,700 and said, "Hey, together, we can figure out what this is." 1112 00:43:56,600 --> 00:44:00,300 PATEL (voiceover): So, the experts would return back with just the wisdom, 1113 00:44:00,300 --> 00:44:02,066 an understanding of COVID 1114 00:44:02,066 --> 00:44:04,700 derived from being exposed to large data sets. 1115 00:44:04,700 --> 00:44:08,100 But they wouldn't come back with specific patient info. 1116 00:44:08,100 --> 00:44:12,166 None of the raw, sensitive, and private data. 1117 00:44:12,166 --> 00:44:14,133 But of course, that would require 1118 00:44:14,133 --> 00:44:16,700 initially sharing patient data; 1119 00:44:16,700 --> 00:44:19,166 a non-starter. 1120 00:44:19,166 --> 00:44:21,166 Because of privacy, because of regulations, 1121 00:44:21,166 --> 00:44:23,266 because of national security issues, they couldn't. 1122 00:44:24,433 --> 00:44:27,433 PATEL (voiceover): This is where A.I., Artificial Intelligence, 1123 00:44:27,433 --> 00:44:28,666 comes in. 1124 00:44:28,666 --> 00:44:31,100 Instead of sending experts to each hospital, 1125 00:44:31,100 --> 00:44:34,400 Ramesh is working on a way to send A.I. to learn instead. 1126 00:44:35,200 --> 00:44:38,166 An A.I. model could be trained on patients' lung X-rays 1127 00:44:38,166 --> 00:44:40,266 to learn what signs of COVID look like. 1128 00:44:40,266 --> 00:44:44,166 The private health data would never be copied 1129 00:44:44,166 --> 00:44:46,666 and would never leave the hospital or the patient's file. 1130 00:44:46,666 --> 00:44:49,366 The A.I. would only transmit its conclusions, 1131 00:44:49,366 --> 00:44:52,066 the wisdom, the smashed data. 1132 00:44:52,066 --> 00:44:53,300 RASKAR: It's not enough to just 1133 00:44:53,300 --> 00:44:56,133 remove the name from the chest X-ray, 1134 00:44:56,133 --> 00:44:58,066 but make sure that you don't send 1135 00:44:58,066 --> 00:45:00,066 any of the pixels of the chest X-ray at all. 1136 00:45:01,000 --> 00:45:04,066 PATEL (voiceover): The A.I. can learn patterns and gain knowledge 1137 00:45:04,066 --> 00:45:06,200 without having to keep hold of everyone's data. 1138 00:45:06,200 --> 00:45:09,200 So the "wisdom" from one hospital 1139 00:45:09,200 --> 00:45:11,700 can be combined with the "wisdom" of others. 1140 00:45:11,700 --> 00:45:16,300 RASKAR: Achieving privacy and benefits of the data simultaneously, 1141 00:45:16,300 --> 00:45:19,500 it's like having a cake and eating it, too; it's available. 1142 00:45:19,500 --> 00:45:22,233 And it's just a matter of convincing large companies 1143 00:45:22,233 --> 00:45:24,566 to play along those rules. 1144 00:45:24,566 --> 00:45:28,366 PATEL: Smashed data is one way we can learn to stop worrying 1145 00:45:28,366 --> 00:45:31,100 and love sharing our personal data. 1146 00:45:31,100 --> 00:45:34,066 But every corporate network would have to agree 1147 00:45:34,066 --> 00:45:36,666 to smash our raw data. 1148 00:45:38,066 --> 00:45:40,100 I'm not convinced we should wait around 1149 00:45:40,100 --> 00:45:42,400 for big tech companies to do this. 1150 00:45:43,200 --> 00:45:44,833 HILL: The big technology companies, 1151 00:45:44,833 --> 00:45:47,800 they have built the infrastructure 1152 00:45:47,800 --> 00:45:48,833 of the whole internet. 1153 00:45:48,833 --> 00:45:51,333 You're not just interacting with these companies 1154 00:45:51,333 --> 00:45:53,033 when you know you're interacting with them. 1155 00:45:54,266 --> 00:45:56,133   PATEL: Even if it seems like you're on 1156 00:45:56,133 --> 00:46:00,200 a totally independent website, big tech still sees you. 1157 00:46:00,200 --> 00:46:03,100 For example, tons of websites, 1158 00:46:03,100 --> 00:46:06,233 like some of the ones owned by NASA, Pfizer, BMW, 1159 00:46:06,233 --> 00:46:09,466 even PBS, use Amazon Web Services, 1160 00:46:09,466 --> 00:46:13,633 which means Amazon gets some data when you visit them. 1161 00:46:13,633 --> 00:46:16,233 Or when you visit any app on your iPhone, 1162 00:46:16,233 --> 00:46:18,100 Apple knows. 1163 00:46:18,100 --> 00:46:20,233 Also, every time you've been to a webpage 1164 00:46:20,233 --> 00:46:22,466 that has a Facebook "like" button, 1165 00:46:22,466 --> 00:46:25,600 Facebook gets to gobble up your personal data. 1166 00:46:25,600 --> 00:46:27,166 KAHLE: So it may seem 1167 00:46:27,166 --> 00:46:28,400 like the web is decentralized 1168 00:46:28,400 --> 00:46:29,833 because it comes from many different places. 1169 00:46:29,833 --> 00:46:30,733 But in fact, 1170 00:46:30,733 --> 00:46:33,466 there's centralized points of control. 1171 00:46:34,266 --> 00:46:37,666 CHOWDHURY: Right now, for example, when you are in a social media app, 1172 00:46:37,666 --> 00:46:38,833 you're sort of locked in, right? 1173 00:46:38,833 --> 00:46:40,500 All your information is on there. 1174 00:46:40,500 --> 00:46:42,200 It's hard to leave a social media app 1175 00:46:42,200 --> 00:46:43,300 because you're like, "All my friends are there, 1176 00:46:43,300 --> 00:46:44,700 all my photos are there. 1177 00:46:44,700 --> 00:46:46,400 "If I move to another app, 1178 00:46:46,400 --> 00:46:47,733 I have to rebuild that community." 1179 00:46:48,666 --> 00:46:52,066 GALPERIN: Those social media websites are controlled 1180 00:46:52,066 --> 00:46:53,566 by a very small number of companies. 1181 00:46:53,566 --> 00:46:56,100 And the rules about using those websites, 1182 00:46:56,100 --> 00:47:00,566   who has access to them and what kind of behavior is acceptable 1183 00:47:00,566 --> 00:47:04,100 on them, are set by the websites themselves. 1184 00:47:05,233 --> 00:47:10,266 PATEL: This centralized data monopoly, how do we start to dismantle it? 1185 00:47:10,266 --> 00:47:12,566 That's exactly what proponents of an idea 1186 00:47:12,566 --> 00:47:16,333 called the decentralized web want to do. 1187 00:47:17,200 --> 00:47:19,833 GALPERIN: The decentralized web is sort of our antidote, 1188 00:47:19,833 --> 00:47:24,166 the antithesis of the web as we now think of it. 1189 00:47:24,166 --> 00:47:26,533 CHRISTINE LEMMER-WEBBER: The decentralized web can be seen in contrast 1190 00:47:26,533 --> 00:47:28,700 to the centralized web, of course. 1191 00:47:28,700 --> 00:47:31,433 Instead of what has become, 1192 00:47:31,433 --> 00:47:35,233 on the internet, of a few big players kind of controlling 1193 00:47:35,233 --> 00:47:36,733 a lot of the web and the internet space, 1194 00:47:36,733 --> 00:47:38,733 we're really kind of rolling things back 1195 00:47:38,733 --> 00:47:40,500 to kind of what the vision of the internet was. 1196 00:47:41,500 --> 00:47:44,133 PATEL: I'm wondering what a decentralized web 1197 00:47:44,133 --> 00:47:46,300 would look and feel like? 1198 00:47:46,300 --> 00:47:49,733 So I'm meeting up with coder Christine Lemmer-Webber, 1199 00:47:49,733 --> 00:47:51,500 who is working on writing the standards and rules 1200 00:47:51,500 --> 00:47:55,633 for how social media could work on a decentralized web. 1201 00:47:55,633 --> 00:47:57,300 LEMMER-WEBBER: Most people are familiar 1202 00:47:57,300 --> 00:47:59,300 with social networks: you know, they've used, 1203 00:47:59,300 --> 00:48:01,266 you know, X-slash-Twitter; 1204 00:48:01,266 --> 00:48:03,333 they've used Facebook; they've used Instagram. 1205 00:48:03,333 --> 00:48:06,100 The decentralized social web is 1206 00:48:06,100 --> 00:48:09,066 like that, but no one company, 1207 00:48:09,066 --> 00:48:10,833 no one gatekeeper controls the thing. 1208 00:48:10,833 --> 00:48:13,100 We want to be able to have 1209 00:48:13,100 --> 00:48:15,066 all of our different social media sites, 1210 00:48:15,066 --> 00:48:17,300 all of our different online communication tools 1211 00:48:17,300 --> 00:48:19,400 be able to talk to each other. 1212 00:48:19,400 --> 00:48:20,633 DOCTOROW: A decentralized web 1213 00:48:20,633 --> 00:48:23,200 is one that is focused on 1214 00:48:23,200 --> 00:48:25,166 the self-determination of users. 1215 00:48:25,166 --> 00:48:26,300 You're not locked in. 1216 00:48:27,533 --> 00:48:30,266 So you find a service, and you like it. 1217 00:48:30,266 --> 00:48:31,566 (duck quacks) 1218 00:48:31,566 --> 00:48:33,333 And then you and they start to part ways. 1219 00:48:34,133 --> 00:48:37,833 The art you made, the stories you told are there. 1220 00:48:37,833 --> 00:48:41,133 In a decentralized web, you go somewhere else. 1221 00:48:41,133 --> 00:48:43,766 You go somewhere else, and you don't lose any of that. 1222 00:48:47,666 --> 00:48:51,166 PATEL (voiceover): But imagine, instead of having one Facebook-type company, 1223 00:48:51,166 --> 00:48:54,100 we each had our own data live on our own devices, 1224 00:48:54,100 --> 00:48:56,700 and it was easy to join or merge with others, 1225 00:48:56,700 --> 00:48:58,433 or disconnect from them. 1226 00:48:58,433 --> 00:49:00,700 Leaving one group and joining another 1227 00:49:00,700 --> 00:49:02,833 wouldn't mean rebuilding everything from scratch 1228 00:49:02,833 --> 00:49:06,100 because your data moves with you. 1229 00:49:07,200 --> 00:49:09,066 It sounds like a tech fantasy. 1230 00:49:09,066 --> 00:49:11,133 But it's actually something we've already proven 1231 00:49:11,133 --> 00:49:12,433 works online. 1232 00:49:12,433 --> 00:49:16,066 Consider something you may use every day, 1233 00:49:16,066 --> 00:49:19,100 or if you're like me, every minute: email. 1234 00:49:19,100 --> 00:49:21,066 LEMMER-WEBBER: So what a lot of people don't realize 1235 00:49:21,066 --> 00:49:22,833 is that they use decentralized networks every day. 1236 00:49:22,833 --> 00:49:24,833 It doesn't matter if somebody's on Gmail, 1237 00:49:24,833 --> 00:49:26,366 or if they're on Hotmail, 1238 00:49:26,366 --> 00:49:28,100 they're on their university email. 1239 00:49:28,100 --> 00:49:29,333 They don't even have to think about it. 1240 00:49:29,333 --> 00:49:31,133 They type an email to their friend, 1241 00:49:31,133 --> 00:49:33,266 and they send it off, and it gets there, right? 1242 00:49:33,266 --> 00:49:35,200 At the heart of it, that's kind of the basics 1243 00:49:35,200 --> 00:49:36,233 of what we're doing. 1244 00:49:37,533 --> 00:49:41,166 PATEL: In other words, you can get an email sent from Hotmail 1245 00:49:41,166 --> 00:49:42,766 even if you have a Gmail account. 1246 00:49:42,766 --> 00:49:46,466 Or you can create your own email server, for that matter. 1247 00:49:46,466 --> 00:49:49,566 It doesn't matter what email service you use 1248 00:49:49,566 --> 00:49:52,233 because the protocol, the rules, are written 1249 00:49:52,233 --> 00:49:55,666 to allow the email servers to talk to one another. 1250 00:49:56,500 --> 00:49:58,733 LEMMER-WEBBER: That's because there's a shared protocol that says, 1251 00:49:58,733 --> 00:50:01,333 here's how we get the messages from place to place. 1252 00:50:01,333 --> 00:50:03,766 Social networks could just work like email. 1253 00:50:04,566 --> 00:50:07,066 PATEL: And in fact, there are plenty of decentralized projects 1254 00:50:07,066 --> 00:50:08,700 out there like Mastodon 1255 00:50:08,700 --> 00:50:09,800 and Blue Sky 1256 00:50:09,800 --> 00:50:11,700 putting the user's profile and data 1257 00:50:11,700 --> 00:50:13,066 back into the users' hands. 1258 00:50:13,966 --> 00:50:15,666 LEMMER-WEBBER: In the systems we're moving towards 1259 00:50:15,666 --> 00:50:17,366 that will be much more the case 1260 00:50:17,366 --> 00:50:19,633 where private communication is much more private. 1261 00:50:19,633 --> 00:50:22,666 They're, by default, secure in that type of way. 1262 00:50:22,666 --> 00:50:25,700 We're building new foundations 1263 00:50:25,700 --> 00:50:28,166 for the internet that allow for healthier, 1264 00:50:28,166 --> 00:50:32,400 safer, more decentralized systems, gatekeeper-free. 1265 00:50:32,400 --> 00:50:35,400 That's the vision and the future we're trying to build. 1266 00:50:36,833 --> 00:50:40,366 PATEL: No doubt, there are secrets in your data. 1267 00:50:40,366 --> 00:50:43,700 NOBLE: Everything we touch is increasingly datafied, 1268 00:50:43,700 --> 00:50:46,066 every dimension of our lives. 1269 00:50:46,066 --> 00:50:49,200 CHOWDHURY: All of this data goes into feed algorithms. 1270 00:50:49,200 --> 00:50:51,666 And algorithms make predictions 1271 00:50:51,666 --> 00:50:53,133 about how long you will live, 1272 00:50:53,133 --> 00:50:55,200 or your health, or your lifestyle. 1273 00:50:56,033 --> 00:50:58,166 PATEL (voiceover): And while I learned how to protect 1274 00:50:58,166 --> 00:51:00,300 my personal privacy and security, 1275 00:51:00,300 --> 00:51:03,133 there's only so much I can do myself. 1276 00:51:03,133 --> 00:51:04,533 HILL: There are things that individuals 1277 00:51:04,533 --> 00:51:06,466 can do to protect their privacy. 1278 00:51:06,466 --> 00:51:08,266 Ultimately, in order to 1279 00:51:08,266 --> 00:51:12,000 avoid a huge crisis, it requires systemic change. 1280 00:51:12,900 --> 00:51:17,100 GALPERIN: There are limits to what we can do as individuals. 1281 00:51:17,100 --> 00:51:19,333 There are also things that need to be addressed 1282 00:51:19,333 --> 00:51:21,700 through regulation, through litigation, 1283 00:51:21,700 --> 00:51:26,333 and through legislation in order to make all of us safer. 1284 00:51:26,333 --> 00:51:29,566 PATEL: It's comforting to know there are techies out there 1285 00:51:29,566 --> 00:51:32,466 trying to protect us and our data, 1286 00:51:32,466 --> 00:51:35,100 designing new ways to enjoy the fun and convenience 1287 00:51:35,100 --> 00:51:38,333 of the digital world without being exploited. 1288 00:51:38,333 --> 00:51:42,133 KAHLE: New technologies, new games can proliferate 1289 00:51:42,133 --> 00:51:43,833 without centralized points of control. 1290 00:51:43,833 --> 00:51:47,200 That's the excitement of the decentralized web. 1291 00:51:47,200 --> 00:51:50,566 LEMMER-WEBBER: I can't wait for people to see this vision 1292 00:51:50,566 --> 00:51:54,100 we're building for collaborative, more consensual, 1293 00:51:54,100 --> 00:51:55,700 decentralized social networks. 1294 00:51:55,700 --> 00:51:58,600 That's going to be really exciting. 1295 00:51:59,400 --> 00:52:01,733 PATEL: The future we're building might not look too different 1296 00:52:01,733 --> 00:52:04,566 from the internet of today. 1297 00:52:04,566 --> 00:52:07,133 But it could be much more private and secure, 1298 00:52:07,133 --> 00:52:10,266 if we get it right. 1299 00:52:10,266 --> 00:52:13,233 DOCTOROW: This is about how technological self-determination 1300 00:52:13,233 --> 00:52:15,500 and regulation work together 1301 00:52:15,500 --> 00:52:19,066 to make a world that is more safe for human habitation. 1302 00:52:41,100 --> 00:52:44,166 ♪ ♪ 1303 00:52:45,100 --> 00:52:52,433 ♪ ♪ 1304 00:52:56,266 --> 00:53:04,066 ♪ ♪ 1305 00:53:07,700 --> 00:53:15,233 ♪ ♪ 1306 00:53:17,066 --> 00:53:24,400 ♪ ♪ 1307 00:53:25,833 --> 00:53:33,566 ♪ ♪ 100630

Can't find what you're looking for?
Get subtitles in any language from opensubtitles.com, and translate them here.