All language subtitles for JFK.A.President.Betrayed.2013.1080p.WEBRip.x264.AAC-[YTS.MX]

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1960s, MANY AMERICANS FEARED
THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS

PLANNING A SURPRISE NUCLEAR
ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES.

WHAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW WAS
THAT THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT

WAS CONSIDERING LAUNCHING
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST
THE SOVIET UNION FIRST.

HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS
INCLUDING

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFF PRESENTED A PLAN
FOR A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE

FOR A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE
TO PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY.

NO OFFICIAL RECORD
OF ITS CONTENT WAS FOUND

OF ITS CONTENT WAS FOUND
UNTIL 1993.

HELD AT A TIME WHEN KENNEDY
WAS RECEIVING VERY BELLIGERENT

ADVICE FROM SOME SENIOR
ADVISORS.

A MEMORANDUM WAS PREPARED
FOR VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON

SUMMARIZING THE SEQUENCE OF
DISCUSSION AT THE MEETING

AND THAT MEMORANDUM WAS
DECLASSIFIED IN 1993.

UNTIL WE HAD THE BURRIS
MEMORANDUM, WE DIDN'T HAVE

A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF
WHAT WAS SAID.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS BEING
PRESENTED WITH A SCENARIO FOR

LAUNCHING A PRE-EMPTIVE
SURPRISE

ATTACK BY THE UNITED STATES
ON THE SOVIET UNION.

THE SOVIETS WERE LAGGING
BEHIND IN THE NUCLEAR

ARMS RACE,
AND TOP U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS

SUGGESTED A NUCLEAR FIRST
STRIKE MIGHT BE THE BEST OPTION

BEFORE THEY CAUGHT UP.
THE UNITED STATES HAD B-52s

CIRCLING THE SOVIET UNION
IN THE AIR ON A ROTATION BASIS.

EACH ONE OF THE BOMBS THAT
ONE B-52 CARRIED HAD MANY

TIMES THE FIREPOWER
OF ONE HIROSHIMA.

YOU ALSO HAVE TO REMEMBER
THERE WERE FIXED MISSILES,

AND THERE WERE MISSILES
IN SUBMARINES.

THE PLAN SUGGESTED
A SURPRISE

ATTACK IN LATE 1963.
THE COST WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC.

IN A FULL-SCALE
NUCLEAR EXCHANGE

AN ESTIMATED 300 MILLION
PEOPLE WOULD DIE.

FACED WITH THE HORROR
OF NUCLEAR

FALLOUT INCLUDING CANCER,
LEUKEMIA, AND BIRTH DEFECTS,

THE SURVIVORS WOULD ENVY
THE DEAD.

IT'S VERY HARD TO IMAGINE
THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT

ORGANIZED HUMAN SOCIETY
WOULD HAVE SURVIVED.

THIS IS A QUESTION OF WHETHER
HUMAN LIFE, IN ANY CIVILIZED

FORM, IS GOING TO SURVIVE
AT ALL.

SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK
WROTE IN HIS MEMOIR THAT

AS THEY LEFT THE MEETING,
KENNEDY SAID TO HIM IN

DISPARAGING TONES,
"AND WE CALL OURSELVES

THE HUMAN RACE".
KENNEDY HAD AN ENTIRELY

DIFFERENT VIEW
ABOUT THE STRATEGIC FUTURE.

IT'S, I THINK, VERY CLEAR
THAT THIS MEETING INTENSIFIED

FOR HIM THE SENSE OF DANGER
THAT A WAR MIGHT BE UNLEASHED

IN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HE
MIGHT NOT BE FULLY IN

MIGHT NOT BE FULLY IN
CONTROL OF.

LIVES UNDER A NUCLEAR SORT
OF DAMOCLES, HANGING BY THE

SLENDEREST OF THREADS,
CAPABLE OF BEING CUT AT ANY

MOMENT, BY ACTION,
OR MISCALCULATION,

OR BY MADNESS.
THE WEAPONS OF WAR MUST BE

ABOLISHED, BEFORE THEY
ABOLISH US.

IN 1961, THE UNITED STATES
WAS ENGAGED IN A PROTRACTED

COLD WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION,
RED CHINA,

RED CHINA,
AND THE COMMUNIST BLOC.

PRESIDENTS HARRY TRUMAN
AND DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

HAD TRIED TO CONTAIN COMMUNISM
THEN ROLL IT BACK.

BUT SOVIET PREMIERE
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV
REMAINED DEFIANT.

ESCALATING THE PRODUCTION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
SUPERPOWERS IN CUBA, BERLIN,

AND VIETNAM THREATENED
TO TURN THE COLD WAR HOT.

IT WAS INTO THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT JOHN F. KENNEDY,

AT THE AGE OF 43,
WAS ELECTED THE 35TH PRESIDENT

WAS ELECTED THE 35TH PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES.

JANUARY 19, 1961
WAS A REMARKABLE ONE.

THERE WAS THE OLDEST PRESIDENT
IN THE HISTORY OF THE

UNITED STATES, AGE 70,
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,

SITTING DOWN WITH THE
YOUNGEST PRESIDENT EVER

TO BE ELECTED, JOHN F. KENNEDY,
THE DAY BEFORE

HIS INAUGURATION,
AND SHARING WITH HIM THE MOST

INTIMATE CONVERSATION A
PRESIDENT THOSE DAYS

COULD HAVE,
WHICH IS:

WHAT DO YOU DO IF IT COMES
TO MAKING A DECISION ABOUT

NUCLEAR USE?
HE OPENS UP THE SATCHEL

IN WHICH THE COMPUTER-LIKE
DEVICE IS IN THAT'S KNOWN

DEVICE IS IN THAT'S KNOWN
AS A "NUCLEAR FOOTBALL".

U.S. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND,
HAS STARTED ROUND-THE-CLOCK

BOMBER PROTECTION OF THE
UNITED STATES AGAINST

A POTENTIAL NUCLEAR ATTACK
BY THE SOVIETS.

EISENHOWER SAYS WHAT HE WANTS
KENNEDY TO KNOW ABOUT

KHRUSHCHEV IS,
"HE'S BRUTAL, INCALCULABLE;

HE'S GONNA RUN HOT AND COLD
ON YOU."

IT STRUCK KENNEDY THAT
EISENHOWER WAS REFERRING

TO THE SOVIETS MORE AS ANIMALS
TO BE TAMED RATHER THAN

TO BE TAMED RATHER THAN
NEGOTIATING PARTNERS.

THERE AT INAUGURATION DAY.
OH, BOY, IT WAS COLD.

I REMEMBER HE SAID, "WE MUST
NEVER NEGOTIATE OUT OF FEAR."

LET US NEVER NEGOTIATE OUT
OF FEAR, BUT LET US NEVER

FEAR TO NEGOTIATE.
[ crowd cheering ]

BUT THEN HE WENT ON TO SAY,
"BUT WE MUST NEVER FEAR

TO NEGOTIATE,"
AND I SAID, "UH OH.

THERE'S SOMETHING NEW.
WE'VE JUST TURNED,

WE'VE JUST TURNED,
TURNED THE PAGE."

PRESIDENT BORN IN THE 20th
CENTURY, INSPIRED A YOUTHFUL

GENERATION EAGER FOR
FRESH LEADERSHIP.

THERE WAS A FEELING AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE KENNEDY

ADMINISTRATION THAT A NEW ERA
HAD BEGUN.

JOHN F. KENNEDY CAME
PROMISING A NEW FRONTIER.

IT WAS GOING TO BE A TIME
OF ENDLESS OPPORTUNITY.

AND TO BE PART OF THAT ERA
WAS ONE OF THE GREAT HONORS

OF ONE'S LIFE.
I'LL NEVER FORGET THE FIRST

TIME I WALKED INTO THE
WHITE HOUSE TO SEE MY OLD

FRIEND KEN O'DONNELL,
WHO WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S

APPOINTMENT SECRETARY.
WE JUST LOOKED AT EACH OTHER

AND BURST OUT LAUGHING.
YOU KNOW, WHAT ARE PEOPLE LIKE

YOU KNOW, WHAT ARE PEOPLE LIKE
US DOING IN A PLACE LIKE THIS?

OF THE KENNEDY WHITE HOUSE.
I HAD GRADUATED FROM COLLEGE...

LAST.
EVERYBODY WAS VERY EXCITED.

WE KNEW WE WERE MAKING HISTORY.
WE WERE READY TO GO.

I TRAVELED EVERYWHERE
WITH HIM.

HE WAS SUCH AN EXCITING MAN,
BUT ALSO ONE

BUT ALSO ONE
OF GREAT PRINCIPLE.

COUNCIL, AND I WAS ASSISTANT
SPECIAL COUNCIL.

IT WAS JUST PERFECTLY OBVIOUS
THE GUY HAD A FIRST-RATE MIND,

AND HE KNEW HOW TO USE IT.
FOR EXAMPLE TAKING

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER,
THE MOST RENOWNED

HISTORIAN IN THE COUNTRY
AND MAKING HIM A SPECIAL

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
IN THE WHITE HOUSE SO THAT

THE PRESIDENT HAD REFERENCE
TO A HISTORIAN WHO COULD PUT

EVENTS IN PERSPECTIVE.
JFK PULLED DAD ASIDE

AND SAID, "BOBBY TELLS ME THAT
YOU'RE GONNA COME WORK

IN THE WHITE HOUSE."
AND DAD SAID, "WELL, OBVIOUSLY

AS A HISTORIAN IT'S A GREAT
OPPORTUNITY, I'M VERY EXCITED

ABOUT IT, BUT I REALLY DON'T
KNOW WHAT I'LL BE DOING."

AND KENNEDY SAID, "WELL, I DON'T
KNOW WHAT I WILL BE DOING

EITHER, BUT I'M SURE THERE
WILL BE PLENTY OF WORK

FOR BOTH OF US."
DURING THE KENNEDY YEARS,

I WAS A CORRESPONDENT ASSIGNED
TO JOHN KENNEDY FOR THE

1960 CAMPAIGN.
I WENT WITH HIM INTO THE

WHITE HOUSE BECAUSE I HAD
ALREADY BEEN COVERING

EISENHOWER AT THE WHITE HOUSE.
KENNEDY WAS A FORCE

IN THIS TOWN...
WELL-VERSED ON FOREIGN POLICY

WELL-VERSED ON FOREIGN POLICY
AND VERY ARTICULATE.

PRESIDENCY, KENNEDY KNEW
IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FULLY

ASSESS HIS COLD WAR ADVERSARY,
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.

ADVISERS HAD WARNED HIM
THAT THE

HOT-TEMPERED SOVIET LEADER
WOULD USE THREATS AND

INTIMIDATION
TO IMPOSE HIS WILL.

TO IMPOSE HIS WILL.
[ speaking in Russian ]

KHRUSHCHEV'S WORDS AND ACTIONS,
KENNEDY HOPED TO GAIN A TRUE

KENNEDY HOPED TO GAIN A TRUE
MEASURE OF THE MAN.

WASN'T EVEN
HOME FROM HIS INAUGURAL DAY

PARTIES WHEN KHRUSHCHEV DECIDED
TO SHOWER HIM

TO SHOWER HIM
WITH CONCILIATION.

HE DECIDED TO PUBLISH
THE ENTIRE INAUGURAL SPEECH.

THEN HE WAS READY TO RELEASE
TWO CAPTURED AIRMEN FROM THE

RECONNAISSANCE PLANE THAT HAD
BEEN SHOT DOWN THE PREVIOUS

AUGUST.
HE'D BEEN HOLDING THESE AIRMEN

SO AS NOT TO HELP
VICE PRESIDENT

NIXON IN HIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST
KENNEDY.

AND THIS WAS NOW GOING TO BE
HIS INAUGURAL GIFT.

THEREAFTER, HE ALSO MADE KNOWN
THAT 500 ELDERLY SOVIETS

WOULD BE ABLE TO REUNITE WITH
THEIR FAMILIES IN THE U.S.

KHRUSHCHEV IS
ESSENTIALLY SAYING,

"WE WANT A NEW START.
WE HAVE GREAT HOPES IN

THIS RELATIONSHIP.
WE REALLY ARE GOING TO WORK

VERY EARLY IN YOUR
ADMINISTRATION FOR SOME

ADMINISTRATION FOR SOME
BREAKTHROUGHS."

WELTGESCHICHTE MIT SEINEM
SCHUH EINGEGANGEN.

IMPROVE RELATIONS

WITH UNITED STATES.
FIRST OF ALL,

HE WAS A REFORMER BECAUSE
HE REALLY STARTED REFORMATION

OF RUSSIA WHEN HE CAME TO
THE POWER AFTER THE STALIN DAY.

AND SECONDLY,
MY FATHER WAS IN TWO WARS,

AND HE EVEN COULD NOT WATCH
MOVIE ABOUT THE WAR BECAUSE

IT CAME BACK IN HIS MEMORY
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED,

AND HE COULD NOT SLEEP AFTER
THIS, SO HE WANT TO SHOW

TO THE NEW PRESIDENT
HIS POSITIVE FEELINGS

HIS POSITIVE FEELINGS
TOWARD THE UNITED STATES.

GESTURES APPEARED TO SIGNAL
A DESIRE FOR A NEW BEGINNING,

KENNEDY PLACED GREATER EMPHASIS
ON AN INFLAMMATORY SPEECH

THE SOVIET LEADER HAD GIVEN
ONLY A FEW WEEKS EARLIER.

IN IT, KHRUSHCHEV HAD SAID
HE INTENDED TO BEAT

THE UNITED STATES WITH
"SMALL WARS OF LIBERATION"

ALL OVER THE WORLD.
CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV THREW

WORLD BY ESSENTIALLY ARGUING

POLICY NOW INCREASINGLY

WOULD BE TO SUPPORT NATIONAL
INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS WHERE

THE SUPER POWERS BOTH
ESSENTIALLY TRIED TO GAIN

INFLUENCE.
KENNEDY WAS REALLY QUITE UPSET

ABOUT THIS SPEECH, AND HE GAVE
THE TEXT OF THIS SPEECH TO ALL

OF HIS ADVISORS AND SAID,
"YOU NEED TO READ THIS."

KENNEDY ENDS UP
CARRYING THIS

SPEECH AROUND IN HIS POCKET,
AND HE PULLS IT OUT

WITH EXPERTS
IN HIS NEW ADMINISTRATION, AND

HE READS FROM THE SPEECH
HE'S SO OBSESSED WITH THE

MESSAGE THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS
TRYING TO SEND HIM.

IN A DRAMATIC SHIFT IN TONE,
KENNEDY USED TOUGH LANGUAGE

TO CONFRONT THE SOVIET THREAT,
AND AT HIS FIRST

STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS,
HE ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION

TO ACCELERATE U.S. MISSILE
AND SUBMARINE PRODUCTION.

EACH DAY, WE DRAW NEARER
THE HOUR OF MAXIMUM DANGER

AS WEAPONS SPREAD AND
HOSTILE FORCES GROW STRONGER.

I FEEL I MUST INFORM THE
CONGRESS THAT OUR ANALYSIS

OVER THE LAST TEN DAYS
MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IN EACH

OF THE PRINCIPLE AREAS
OF CRISIS, THE TIDE OF EVENTS

HAS BEEN RUNNING OUT, AND TIME
HAS NOT BEEN OUR FRIEND.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATE
OF THE UNION WAS ALMOST

APOCALYPTIC IN NATURE AND
SUCH A SHIFT FROM CONCILIATION

TO CONFRONTATION.
AND HE IGNORES THE CONCILIATORY

GESTURES AND NEVER REALLY
ADEQUATELY TESTS THEM...

MAYBE THEY WOULD HAVE AMOUNTED
TO NOTHING, BUT WE'LL NEVER

KNOW BECAUSE HE NEVER REALLY
TESTED THEM.

KENNEDY'S STRUGGLE
TO UNDERSTAND HOW BEST TO DEAL

WITH THE SOVIETS
WAS ONLY JUST BEGINNING.

KENNEDY'S PRESIDENCY
WAS VERY

SUBSTANTIALLY ABSORBED BY
THE CHALLENGE OF THE COLD WAR,

WHICH PLAYED ITSELF OUT ON
STAGES ALL OVER THE WORLD:

BERLIN, CUBA, VIETNAM.
AND HE'S OBLIGED TO KEEP TABS

AND HE'S OBLIGED TO KEEP TABS
ON THESE MATTERS CONTINUALLY.

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV CALLED IT
"THE MOST DANGEROUS PLACE

ON EARTH."
SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND

WORLD WAR, SOVIET, BRITISH,
FRENCH AND AMERICAN FORCES

HAD STOOD FACE-TO-FACE IN THE
STREETS OF THE OCCUPIED CITY.

AND THE SITUATION WAS
GROWING TENSER BY THE DAY.

WITH HIM INTO THE ADMINISTRATION

VULNERABILITY OF BERLIN AND

COMMITMENT IN BERLIN.

IN 1961,
BERLIN IS AN ISLAND INSIDE

OF EAST GERMANY WITH AN
OPEN BORDER.

4 SECTORS,

THE SOVIET SECTOR HOUSING
THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT

THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT
OF EAST GERMANY.

IN THE OCCUPATION OF THE
UNITED STATES, BRITAIN,

AND FRANCE.
AND KHRUSHCHEV WANTED TO

END THAT SITUATION.
BERLIN WAS ALWAYS A SYMBOL

TO THE SOVIET UNION
OF COMMUNIST FAILURES.

EMBARRASSED BY THE NUMBERS

OF PEOPLE TRYING TO GET OUT
FROM COMMUNIST CONTROL.

THEY WERE LOSING SOME HUNDRED
THOUSAND PEOPLE EVERY YEAR...

THOUSAND PEOPLE EVERY YEAR...
MORE THAN 10,000 EVERY MONTH.

IT'S THE BEST FARMERS,
IT'S THE BEST TEACHERS,

SO THE FRONT LINE OF THE
SOVIET EMPIRE IS BEING DRAINED

OF ITS INTELLECTUAL AND
PROFESSIONAL LIFE BLOOD,

THEREFORE THREATENING THE
ENTIRE SOVIET CONSTRUCT.

IF KHRUSHCHEV WERE TO USE
MILITARY FORCE IN BERLIN,

KENNEDY AND HIS WESTERN ALLIES
HAD FEW OPTIONS.

IF THEY MARCH ON BERLIN,
WE DON'T HAVE THE TROOPS

TO FEND THEM OFF.
WHAT ARE WE GOING

TO HAVE TO DO?
WE'RE GONNA HAVE TO USE

NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
AND WHAT DOES THAT DO?

KENNEDY WAS LOOKING FOR
A CAPABLE ADVISOR WHO COULD

PROVIDE A COHERENT POLICY
FOR DEALING WITH BERLIN.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY BRINGS
DEAN ACHESON BACK INTO SERVICE,

THE LEGENDARY SECRETARY OF STATE
OF HARRY TRUMAN,

A HAWK'S HAWK WHEN IT COMES TO
DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

WHO BELIEVED THAT YOU DIDN'T

NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS,
THAT THEY ONLY

UNDERSTOOD POWER.
YOU HAD TO BE WILLING TO FIGHT,

TO GO TO THE BRINK,
TO SHOW THEM THAT YOU HAVE

THE MILITARY CAPACITY
AND THE WILLINGNESS TO USE IT.

ACHESON PRODUCES A MEMO
THAT'S TOUGH...

ESSENTIALLY SAYS YOU CAN'T GIVE
AN INCH TO THE SOVIET UNION

IN BERLIN BECAUSE THIS IS
ABOUT THE GLOBE.

IF YOU START IN BERLIN,
AND YOU GIVE GROUND IN BERLIN,

ITALY'S NEXT, FRANCE,
THE REST OF GERMANY,

THE REST OF GERMANY,
WHO KNOWS WHERE ELSE.

WITHIN WEEKS
WE HAD THE BAY OF PIGS.

IN THE YEARS PRECEDING 1961,
A REVOLUTION ON THE CARIBBEAN

ISLAND OF CUBA,
LED BY FIDEL CASTRO,

OUSTED THE COUNTRY'S REPRESSIVE
DICTATORSHIP AND SEIZED

DICTATORSHIP AND SEIZED
ALL FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY.

AN EMBARGO ON CASTRO'S REGIME,
FREEZING CUBAN ASSETS AND

SEVERING DIPLOMATIC TIES
WITH HAVANA.

THE CUBANS TURNED TO THE
SOVIET UNION FOR SUPPORT.

THAT KENNEDY ACTUALLY VIEWED

FIDEL CASTRO, IN 1960,
AS SOMEBODY WHOSE REVOLUTION

REALLY REPRESENTED THE
ASPIRATIONS, BROADLY SPEAKING,

OF THE VAST MAJORITY
OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

HE HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THAT.
AND, AND HE BELIEVED THAT IF

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
HAD HANDLED CASTRO RIGHT THAT

HE WOULDN'T HAVE TURNED TO THE
SOVIET UNION, AND OF COURSE

THERE'S PLENTY OF EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THAT POINT OF VIEW,

BUT VERY EARLY ON HE REALIZED
THAT POLITICALLY HE COULDN'T

TAKE THAT POSITION PUBLICLY.
ONLY MONTHS INTO

HIS ADMINISTRATION,
KENNEDY WOULD DISCOVER

THAT THE CUBAN PROBLEM
MIGHT LEAD TO HIS UNDOING.

AS SOON AS THE KENNEDYS GOT
INTO OFFICE THEY HAD TO WORRY

ABOUT CUBA.
THE CIA HAD COOKED UP A PLAN

TO INVADE CUBA WITH A FORCE
OF EXILES, AND THE CIA

WAS ITCHING TO USE THIS FORCE
AND OVERTHROW FIDEL CASTRO.

HE HAD INHERITED THE WHOLE
THING FROM THE EISENHOWER

THING FROM THE EISENHOWER
ADMINISTRATION.

FOR LANDING AT THE BAY OF PIGS
WAS GOING TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR HIM TO
CONSIDER THE NECESSITY FOR

USE OF MILITARY FORCE
BY THE UNITED STATES,

WE DIDN'T HAVE TO BE DIRECTLY
INVOLVED, THAT WAS THE PREMISE.

BUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY
WAS MISLED.

HIS LEADING ADVISORS,
PARTICULARLY HIS MILITARY

ADVISORS, HAD NOT GIVEN HIM
THE TRUTH...

SAME THING WAS TRUE FOR THE CIA,
BY THE WAY.

IS NOT ONE BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA.
IT IS BETWEEN THE CUBANS

THEMSELVES.
AND I INTEND TO SEE THAT WE

ADHERE TO THAT PRINCIPLE,
AND AS I UNDERSTAND IT,

THIS ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE
IS SO UNDERSTOOD AND SHARED

BY THE ANTI-CASTRO EXILES
FROM CUBA IN THIS COUNTRY.

THE INVASION DIDN'T SUCCEED,

INTRODUCE ITS OWN FORCES.

BUT THE CIA NEVER CLEARLY
COMMUNICATED THIS RATHER

ESSENTIAL FACT TO THE PRESIDENT.
PERSUADED BY CIA OFFICIALS

WHO WERE WITHHOLDING VITAL
INFORMATION AND CONCERNED

ABOUT THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
OF APPEARING WEAK ON COMMUNISM,

THE PRESIDENT AUTHORIZED THE
CIA PLAN FOR AN INVASION

OF ARMED CUBAN EX-PATRIOTS
AT THE BAY OF PIGS.

THE CUBAN EXILES LANDED
AT THE BAY OF PIGS.

IT WAS A DISASTER FROM
THE GET-GO.

A THOUSAND OF THEM WERE
BASICALLY DRIVEN INTO THE SEA

OR CAPTURED.
MOST IMPORTANTLY,

MOST IMPORTANTLY,
THERE WAS NO AIR COVER.

OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY PRESSURED
THE PRESIDENT TO AUTHORIZE

U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION.
KENNEDY REFUSED.

HIS ARGUMENT AT THE TIME
IS, IF THE U.S. GETS DIRECTLY

INVOLVED, IF AMERICAN
FINGERPRINTS ARE TOO CLEARLY

ON THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION,
THAT KHRUSHCHEV WILL USE THAT

AS AN EXCUSE TO ACT ON BERLIN.
KENNEDY WAS WORRIED BECAUSE

HE WAS COMING UP TO A SUMMIT
MEETING, HE HOPED, WITH

KHRUSHCHEV, AND HE DIDN'T
WANT TO DISTRACT FROM THAT

SUMMIT MEETING BY HAVING
TOO MUCH ATTENTION BE PAID

TOO MUCH ATTENTION BE PAID
TO CUBA.

BAY OF PIGS QUICKLY
SHOWED WAS THAT THE

DOMINANT FORCES IN THE
ADMINISTRATION WERE PEOPLE

THAT KENNEDY HAD NEVER APPOINTED
THAT HE HAD INHERITED FROM

HIS PREDECESSORS IN THE CIA
AND THE MILITARY,

AND THEY BASICALLY WERE
ASSUMING THAT THEY COULD

ASSUMING THAT THEY COULD
PUSH KENNEDY AROUND.

BUILT INTO THE WHOLE SCENARIO,
AND KENNEDY REALIZED THAT, TOO,

AND WAS NOT ABOUT TO BECOME
A PRESIDENT THAT WAS ENTRAPPED.

JOHN F. KENNEDY CLEARLY FELT
THAT HE HAD BEEN MISLEAD,

THAT HIS LEADING ADVISORS
HAD NOT GIVEN HIM THE TRUTH

AND THAT HE HAD TO BE VERY
CAUTIOUS IN THE FUTURE

ABOUT ACCEPTING ANYTHING
THAT THEY SAID.

THE CIA WAS VERY UNHAPPY
BECAUSE THEY HAD CONFIDENTLY

ASSUMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD
APPROVE OF AIR STRIKES AGAINST

CASTRO'S FORCES IF THE BRIGADE
GOT IN TROUBLE ON THE BEACH.

THE BAY OF PIGS WAS A MAJOR
DISASTER FOR THE UNITED STATES,

NOT NECESSARILY BECAUSE WE
HAD BEEN DEFEATED,

BUT BECAUSE IT SHOWED THE
WORLD OUR BALD AGGRESSION

AGAINST CUBA.
AND IT GAVE CUBA A VICTORY

AND IT GAVE CUBA A VICTORY
OVER THE GOLIATH OF THE NORTH.

VERY, VERY PERSONALLY
BECAUSE HE SAW IT AS

A PERSONAL FAILURE.
YOU KNOW, YOU DO THE BEST YOU

CAN AND THINGS DON'T WORK OUT
SOMETIMES, WELL, OKAY.

BUT THAT WASN'T THE CASE HERE.
AND HE BLAMED HIMSELF,

HE BLAMED HIMSELF FOR
NOT ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS.

NOBODY LIKES TO TAKE A HIT,
ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU'RE SO

BUT YEAH, I THINK HE LEARNED,

AND WHAT HE LEARNED IS...
KNOW WHOSE ADVICE TO RELY ON.

KENNEDY RALLIED IN A
NUMBER OF WAYS.

FOR ONE THING, HE TOLD THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT IT WAS

HIS RESPONSIBILITY.
HE USED A FAMOUS PHRASE,

THAT A "VICTORY HAS A THOUSAND
FATHERS BUT DEFEAT IS AN

ORPHAN."
BUT HE TOOK RESPONSIBILITY

FOR IT, AND INTERESTINGLY,
HIS POLL RATINGS SHOT UP

TO ABOUT 90%.
AMERICANS LIKE IT WHEN

AMERICANS LIKE IT WHEN
POLITICIANS TAKE RESPONSIBILITY.

HAD ENORMOUS INFLUENCE

FOREIGN POLICY MAKER.

THE JOINT CHIEFS FELT THAT
HE WAS SOFT, HE SHOWED THAT

HE DID NOT HAVE THE CREDENTIALS,

TO BE ABLE TO STAND UP.

THERE WAS AMBIVALENCE
ABOUT JFK.

HE WAS A WHIPPERSNAPPER.
HE WAS GREEN.

IN WORLD WAR II.

HE SAID, "I WAS A LIEUTENANT
JUNIOR GRADE, AND THOSE GUYS

WERE RUNNING THE WAR.
AND I JUST DIDN'T

ASK THE QUESTIONS THAT
I HAD ON MY MIND.

JOHN F. KENNEDY EMERGED
FROM THAT CATASTROPHIC FOREIGN

POLICY FAILURE
CHASTENED IN TERMS OF THE

PITFALLS OF THE USE OF FORCE
AND WITH A DEGREE OF WISDOM

ABOUT LISTENING TO THE
ADVICE OF HIS TOP GENERALS,

HIS TOP CIA OFFICIALS,
AND OTHER ADVISORS RATHER

THAN LISTENING TO HIS GUT.
AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS,

JACK KENNEDY SAID HE WANTED
TO BREAK THE CIA INTO A

THOUSAND PIECES HE WAS SO MAD
AT THEM,

AND HE ALMOST DID.
HE GOT RID OF ALLEN DULLES,

THE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA,
AND RICHARD BISSELL,

AND RICHARD BISSELL,
THE COVERT OPERATIONS CHIEF.

FIASCO, KENNEDY SENT SIGNALS
THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN

HOLDING A SUMMIT MEETING WITH
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.

FRUSTRATED BY THE SLOW PACE
OF BUREAUCRACY AT THE

STATE DEPARTMENT,
THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO REACH

OUT TO THE SOVIET LEADER
THROUGH UNOFFICIAL CHANNELS.

ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH

THE SOVIET UNION
AND TO SEE IF THERE WERE

ISSUES THAT COULD BE RESOLVED
AND RECONCILED WITHOUT

CONSTANT MILITARY
CONFRONTATION.

THE KENNEDYS OPERATED ON MAY
LEVELS, AND THEY LIKED BACK

CHANNELS AS A WAY OF DOING
BUSINESS.

AND THEY FOUND ONE ALMOST
BY ACCIDENT.

IT WAS ONE OF THE MOST
UNUSUAL BACK CHANNELS AMONG

MAJOR LEADERS IN HISTORY,
OF HIS BROTHER THE

BOBBY KENNEDY, WHO KNOWS

MOST INTIMATE THOUGHTS

AND A SOVIET MILITARY SPY,
GEORGI BOLSHAKOV, BASED IN

WASHINGTON, WHO REALLY CAN'T
KNOW ANYTHING VERY INTIMATELY

ABOUT KHRUSHCHEV.
ROBERT KENNEDY, WHEN HE MET

WITH BOLSHAKOV, WANTED TO
COMMUNICATE A COUPLE OF THINGS:

ONE, THAT CUBA WAS A MISTAKE,
BUT ALSO THAT HE WANTED

TO HAVE A SUMMIT.
THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO MEET

KHRUSHCHEV AT THE SUMMIT
THAT JUNE, AND THAT SET IN

THAT JUNE, AND THAT SET IN
MOTION THE SUMMIT MEETING.

JUNE AND WENT DIRECTLY TO THE

U.S. AMBASSADOR

IN HIETZING, WHICH IS A
BEAUTIFUL AREA,

BEAUTIFUL AREA,
VERY POSH AREA IN VIENNA.

PROBLEMS IN VIENNA,
WHICH IS SOMETHING THAT THE

PUBLIC DIDN'T KNOW AT ALL.
HIS DOCTORS RECOMMENDED HIM

TO USE CRUTCHES, BUT KENNEDY,
OF COURSE, DID NOT

TAKE CRUTCHES
ON TO VIENNA.

IF YOU ASK ME WHAT THE
MYSTERIOUS TERM "CHARISMA" IS,

MYSTERIOUS TERM "CHARISMA" IS,
I WOULD SAY THAT'S KENNEDY.

WITH KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV
DURING ALL THESE CONVERSATIONS.

HE WAS YOUNG, ENERGETIC,
YET HUMAN...

AND COULD BE FRAIL,
AS ALL HUMANS ARE AT SOME POINT.

MY AMERICAN COUNTERPART WAS
ALEXANDER AKALOVSKY

ALEXANDER AKALOVSKY
ON THE AMERICAN SIDE.

SO I KNEW HOW HE BEHAVES.

HE WAS A VERY VOLATILE PERSON.
HE COULD, YOU KNOW, BE ENRAGED

THEN CALM DOWN RIGHT AWAY,
AND SAY, "LET'S MAKE PEACE,"

AND SAY, "LET'S MAKE PEACE,"
AND THINGS LIKE THAT.

KHRUSHCHEV LOOKED INTENTLY
AT THE PRESIDENT

AND THEN ASKED,
"MR. PRESIDENT,

HOW OLD ARE YOU?"
AND KENNEDY SAID,

"WELL, I'M FORTY-FOUR."
THERE CAME INTO KHRUSHCHEV'S

EYES A VERY WISTFUL LOOK
AND HE SAID, "YES, FORTY-FOUR.

WELL, YOU KNOW, MY SON
WOULD HAVE BEEN THAT AGE,

WOULD HAVE BEEN THAT AGE,
BUT HE WAS KILLED IN THE WAR."

CONVERSATIONS WITH KHRUSHCHEV,
KENNEDY GOT OFF ON THE WRONG

FOOT BECAUSE THEY ENGAGED
IN A PRETTY INTENSE

IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE.
PEOPLE LIKE KHRUSHCHEV,

THEY KNOW MARXIST IDEOLOGY
VERY WELL.

YOU CAN'T REALLY HOLD YOUR
OWN AGAINST THEM

IN SUCH A DISCUSSION.
KENNEDY,

HE BEGAN TO FIDGET IN HIS CHAIR;
I LATER LEARNED THAT THAT WAS

BECAUSE HIS BACK WAS HURTING.
AFTER THE FIRST ROUND OF

TALKS, AS A FORM OF RELAXATION
THEY WENT OUT INTO THE GARDEN

THEY WENT OUT INTO THE GARDEN
AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE.

ABOUT MISCALCULATION.
THE PRESIDENT USED THAT

A NUMBER OF TIMES...
THAT TERM "MISCALCULATION."

AND KHRUSHCHEV SAID HE COULDN'T
REALLY UNDERSTAND WHAT

THAT MEANT.
AND AT THAT POINT HE SAID,

"WELL, YOU KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE,
I MADE A MISJUDGMENT IN CUBA."

HE SAID "WHAT HAPPENED IN
CUBA, THE BAY OF PIGS."

THE INFERENCE WAS THAT HE HAD
INHERITED THAT PROBLEM FROM THE

PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION.
IT WAS NOT REALLY OF HIS DOING.

INHERITED OR NOT,
KHRUSHCHEV SUGGESTED THAT A GAP

EXISTED BETWEEN AMERICAN IDEALS
AND AMERICAN SELF-INTEREST.

WITH LITTLE ACCOMPLISHED,
THE TWO LEADERS RESOLVED

TO RESUME THEIR TALKS
THE FOLLOWING DAY.

AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY,
ALL THE TALK WAS ABOUT BERLIN.

TIRADE ABOUT BERLIN.
HE KEPT REITERATING THAT

BY THAT VERY WINTER
THE SOVIET UNION WOULD

BLOCK OFF WEST BERLIN,
WHILE EAST BERLIN WOULD BECOME

THE OFFICIAL SEAT OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF EAST GERMANY.

KHRUSHCHEV KEPT SAYING THAT
THE DECISION TO CONCLUDE

A PEACE TREATY
WITH EAST GERMANY

WAS IRREVOCABLE;
IT WILL HAPPEN,

NOBODY COULD STOP HIM...
NOBODY IN THE WORLD.

THAT'S HIS WORDS.
AND KENNEDY WAS UNPREPARED

FOR THIS AND WAS SHOCKED
AT THE IDEA THAT HIS LEADING

COUNTERPART IN THE COLD WAR
WAS SEEMINGLY SO IRRATIONAL.

KHRUSHCHEV AT
ONE POINT SAID,

"YOU KNOW, BERLIN IS LIKE
THE SCROTUM IN OUR HANDS,

WHICH WE CAN SQUEEZE AT ANY
TIME WE WANT."

HOW THE PRESIDENT TOOK IT:
HE TURNED TO ME AND HE ASKED,

HE TURNED TO ME AND HE ASKED,
"ALEX, IS HE ALWAYS LIKE THAT?"

WARNINGS THAT HE ISSUED ABOUT
POTENTIAL WAR.

IN THE EYE AND SAID,

IT MIGHT AS WELL BE NOW."

KENNEDY, WITH HIS HANDS
IN HIS COAT POCKETS

IN A TYPICALLY KENNEDY-ESQUE
GESTURE REMARKED,

"WELL, IT'S GONNA BE
A COLD WINTER."

JOHN F. KENNEDY WAS A VERY
CONFIDENT MAN IN SO MANY WAYS,

EVEN COCKY, BUT HE WAS HUMBLED
BY HIS EARLY FOREIGN POLICY

EXPERIENCES.
TO HAVE THE FIASCO

OF THE BAY OF PIGS AND THEN
GET BULLIED BY KHRUSHCHEV

AT VIENNA WAS A PRETTY TOUGH
ONE-TWO PUNCH THAT MADE HIM FEAR

ONE-TWO PUNCH THAT MADE HIM FEAR
FOR THE SAFETY OF THE WORLD.

THAT HE'S FAILED IN THE MOST

PRESIDENCY AND BELIEVING

THE STAKES ARE NUCLEAR.

FROM VIENNA, HIS BROTHER,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

FOUND HIM AT THE WHITE HOUSE,
AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS

IN TEARS.
AND HE SAID, "YOU KNOW, BOBBY,

YOU AND ARE ADULTS,
WE'VE HAD A GOOD LIFE.

BUT I JUST...
OUR CHILDREN, I JUST CAN'T

STOMACH THE IDEA OF OUR
CHILDREN NOT HAVING A CHANCE.

THE SUMMER OF 1961
WAS A TIME

FRAUGHT WITH GREAT DANGER.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY GOT HIS

THERE WERE A SERIES OF

MEETINGS ABOUT WHAT TO DO
ABOUT BERLIN.

ON THE ONE HAND, YOU HAVE
THE HARDLINERS ON BERLIN,

LED BY DEAN ACHESON.
AND THEN YOU HAVE THE

SOFTLINERS ON BERLIN,
LED BY ARTHUR SCHLESINGER.

BUT ACHESON WAS THE ONLY
ONE WITH A PLAN.

AND IT'S A TOUGH ONE.
ACHESON WANTED THE PRESIDENT

OF THE UNITED STATES TO DECLARE
A NATIONAL EMERGENCY,

RAISE TAXES, FULLY MOBILIZE THE
MILITARY, INCREASE THE DEFENSE

SPENDING BY FIVE BILLION
DOLLARS, GO EVERYTHING

RIGHT UP TO THE EDGE OF WAR.
WHAT IS KENNEDY DOING

IN THIS THING?
AGAIN, HE'S ASKING QUESTIONS,

CONSTANTLY ASKING QUESTIONS.
AND THE QUESTION HE'S CONSTANTLY

COMING BACK TO IS:
WHAT DOES THE OTHER GUY DO

WHAT DOES THE OTHER GUY DO
IF WE DO THIS?

BY THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPT
TO LABEL BERLIN AS A HOT BED

OF WAR.
THERE IS PEACE IN BERLIN TODAY.

THE SOURCE OF WORLD TROUBLE
AND TENSION IS MOSCOW,

NOT BERLIN.
AND IF WAR BEGINS,

IT WILL HAVE BEGUN IN MOSCOW
AND NOT BERLIN.

MISCALCULATED WITH JOHN KENNEDY.

HE WAS A LOT TOUGHER THAN
KHRUSHCHEV THOUGHT HE WAS.

KENNEDY CLEARLY WANTED
TO SEND A SIGNAL

TO KHRUSHCHEV.
HE WAS READY TO CONFRONT HIM

MILITARILY IF THAT IS WHAT HE
CHOSE; IF HE WANTED WAR,

THE UNITED STATES
WOULD BE READY.

WE MUST MEET OUR OFTEN-STATED
PLEDGE TO THE FREE PEOPLES

OF WEST BERLIN AND MAINTAIN
OUR RIGHTS AND THEIR SAFETY

EVEN IN THE FACE OF FORCE
IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE

CONFIDENCE OF OTHER FREE PEOPLES
IN OUR WORD AND OUR RESOLVE.

THE MESSAGE SEEMED TO BE
HOW TOUGH HE WAS BEING WITH

THE SOVIET UNION,
HOW HE WAS STANDING UP TO THEM.

BUT FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
AND FOR KHRUSHCHEV,

BETWEEN THE LINES IS A VERY
CLEAR MESSAGE, WHICH IS:

WHAT I CARE ABOUT IS OUR TROOPS
IN WEST BERLIN AND OUR ACCESS

TO WEST BERLIN.
WHAT I DON'T CARE ABOUT

WHAT I DON'T CARE ABOUT
IS EAST BERLIN.

TO DEFEND OUR INTEREST,
WE SHALL ALSO BE READY

TO SEARCH FOR PEACE:
IN QUIET EXPLORATORY TALKS,

IN FORMAL OR INFORMAL
MEETINGS.

WE DO NOT WANT MILITARY
CONSIDERATIONS TO DOMINATE

THE THINKING OF EITHER
EAST OR WEST.

ONE CAN UNDERSTAND KENNEDY'S
APPROACH TO BERLIN

AT THAT TIME.
HE'S LESS CONCERNED ABOUT

BERLIN AND MORE CONCERNED
ABOUT THE DANGERS

OF NUCLEAR WAR.
HE THINKS THAT IF HE CAN HELP

KHRUSHCHEV SOLVE HIS PROBLEM
OF THE REFUGEE FLOOD FROM

BERLIN THAT HE MIGHT HAVE
A MORE AMICABLE, COOPERATIVE

NEGOTIATING PARTNER ON A
HOST OF OTHER ISSUES.

WITHIN DAYS OF
KENNEDY'S SPEECH,

KHRUSHCHEV APPROVED EAST
GERMAN PLANS TO SEAL THE

BORDER IN BERLIN.
ON AUGUST 13, 1961,

COMMUNIST FORCES ERECTED
BARRICADES AND

STOOD GUARD ALONG
THE PERIMETER OF WEST BERLIN.

RESIDENTS OF EAST BERLIN SOON
FOUND THEMSELVES TRAPPED

BEHIND A BARRIER THAT WOULD
BECOME THE NOTORIOUS

BECOME THE NOTORIOUS
BERLIN WALL.

AS BEING THIS TERRIBLE MOMENT
IN THE COLD WAR...

A SYMBOLIC MOMENT WHEN THE WALL
GOES UP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

ACTUALLY, IT WAS A RELIEF
TO KENNEDY BECAUSE IT WAS SUCH A

CRISIS FOR THE SOVIET UNION
TO HAVE THIS MASS MIGRATION,

PEOPLE JUST FLEEING EAST
TO WEST, THAT BY PUTTING

UP THE WALL IT STOPPED THAT,
AND IN A WAY, IT DIFFUSED

THAT CRISIS AND MADE BERLIN
LESS OF A CRISIS POINT.

SO IN THE LONG RUN, IT HELPED
THE WEST TO HAVE A BERLIN WALL.

THAT THE PEOPLE WHO WERE

WERE BEING FRUSTRATED

BY KENNEDY'S POLICIES,
WERE ANGRY, WERE FRUSTRATED.

THEY WERE TALKING AMONG
THEMSELVES, PUTTING HIM DOWN.

DEAN ACHESON HAD GROWN SO
FRUSTRATED THAT DURING A

SMALL WORKING GROUP MEETING
ON BERLIN HE SAID,

"GENTLEMAN YOU MIGHT AS WELL
FACE IT: THIS NATION IS

FACE IT: THIS NATION IS
WITHOUT LEADERSHIP."

OF THE UNITED STATES,
SOMEONE TRYING TO FRAME

HIS MOST IMPORTANT POLICIES,
TALKING IN FRONT OF A GROUP

OF EXPERTS AND SAYING THIS
ABOUT THE PRESIDENT OF

THE UNITED STATES...
AND HE SAID IT IN EVEN HARSHER

TERMS IN A LETTER TO HIS
FORMER BOSS, HARRY TRUMAN

A FEW WEEKS LATER.
FOR A LOT OF AMERICANS,

KENNEDY'S EARLY FOREIGN POLICY
DAYS WERE AMATEUR HOUR,

AND IT WAS UNSETTLING.
THE COUNTRY WAS SCARED IN THE

SUMMER OF 1961 THAT THEIR LEADER
MAYBE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT

MAYBE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT
HE WAS DOING.

THAT BY ACQUIESCING TO THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BERLIN WALL

HE WOULD HAVE A MORE
CONCILIATORY

NEGOTIATING PARTNER
IN THE SOVIET LEADER WERE

DASHED DAYS THEREAFTER,
WHEN KHRUSHCHEV RESUMES

WHEN KHRUSHCHEV RESUMES
ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTING.

TO BE CONCILIATORY.
HE FINALLY HAS TO GIVE UP THAT

COURSE, AND HE HAS TO RESUME,
THOUGH HE WAS VERY RELUCTANT

TO DO SO, HIS OWN TESTING
PROGRAM.

KHRUSHCHEV SAID ONE PHRASE,
WHICH I DISTINCTLY REMEMBER.

HE SAID, "WELL, I PITY
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO HAVE

ELECTED SUCH A MAN
TO BE THEIR PRESIDENT."

KHRUSHCHEV PERCEIVED KENNEDY
AS BEING INDECISIVE AND WEAK

REGARDING BERLIN AND THE
BERLIN CRISIS.

AND BECAUSE OF THAT,
HE WAS WILLING TO ESCALATE

RHETORIC, NUCLEAR TESTING, ETC.
SO, BY ACQUIESCING TO THE

BERLIN WALL, HE'S FACING A
SOVIET LEADER THAT IS BECOMING

EVEN MORE TROUBLESOME
AND PROBLEMATIC.

IN THE FALL OF 1961,
KENNEDY WOULD FACE YET ANOTHER

GRAVE FOREIGN
POLICY DECISION...

THIS TIME IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
A COMMUNIST-BACKED INSURGENCY

WAS GAINING MOMENTUM IN
SOUTH VIETNAM, DESTABILIZING

SOUTH VIETNAM, DESTABILIZING
THE REGIME OF NGO DINH DIEM.

INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS BELIEVED
THE INSURGENCY

COULD BE DEFEATED
AND LOBBIED

FOR THE INTRODUCTION
OF U.S. COMBAT TROOPS.

BUT THOSE FAMILIAR WITH THE
FAILED FRENCH COLONIAL WAR

IN VIETNAM,
JUST A DECADE EARLIER,

JUST A DECADE EARLIER,
HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS.

BECAUSE HE HAD
BEEN IN VIETNAM DURING THE

WANING YEARS OF THE FRENCH
COLONIAL PRESENCE THAT

IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY
IMPOSSIBLE TO DEFEAT A

VIETNAMESE MOVEMENT, WHETHER IT
WAS COMMUNIST-LED OF NOT,

THAT HAD NATIONALIST
CREDENTIALS, THAT HAD...

THAT REPRESENTED VIETNAMESE
NATIONALISM.

IN INDOCHINA HAS NOT HAD

OF THAT AREA AND THE PEOPLE

HAVE MAINTAINED TOO GREAT A

OF THE PEOPLE.

AND THEREFORE,
THE COMMUNIST UNDER HOCHI MINH

ARE ABLE TO CLAIM THAT THEY ARE
FIGHTING FOR INDEPENDENCE,

AND THE FRENCH APPEAR TO BE
FIGHTING FOR A MAINTENANCE

OF COLONIAL RULE.
I, THEREFORE, BELIEVE THAT

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES
MOVES IN, IN ANY DEGREE,

THAT INDEPENDENCE MUST BE
GRANTED TO THE PEOPLE;

THAT THE PEOPLE MUST SUPPORT
THE STRUGGLE BECAUSE UNLESS,

AS I SAID, THAT SUPPORT
IS FORTHCOMING, ANY INTERVENTION

BY THE UNITED STATES
IS BOUND TO BE FUTILE.

THE AGE OF COLONIALISM WAS OVER.

GOING TO INTRODUCE COMBAT TROOPS

INTO VIETNAM.

FUNDAMENTAL POSITION OF TRYING
TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES OUT

OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
CAME IN 1961.

THE CONSENSUS VIEW IN THE
MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE

ESTABLISHMENT WAS THAT WE HAD
TO PROTECT SOUTH VIETNAM,

THAT THAT WAS OUR CLIENT,
OUR ALLY, THAT WE HAD A

MORAL OBLIGATION TO STAND
BY PRESIDENT DIEM,

AND TO PROTECT SOUTH VIETNAM
FROM NORTH VIETNAM.

THE MILITARY, THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF REALLY HAD

BOUGHT INTO THE IDEA THAT WE
COULD WIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM

COULD WIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM
MILITARILY.

UP IN NOVEMBER OF 1961 WITH
THE TAYLOR-ROSTOW REPORT,

WHICH RECOMMENDS THE
INTRODUCTION OF COMBAT TROOPS.

THIS WAS SAYING WE WANT
40,000 TROOPS TO GO

INTO SOUTH VIETNAM
AND DEFEAT THE VIETCONG.

AND THEN WE WANT TO HAVE
125 TO 130,000 TROOPS JUST IN

CASE NORTH VIETNAM AND CHINA
INTERVENE, JUST TO HANDLE

THAT POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY.
JFK TOLD HIS NATIONAL SECURITY

ADVISORS, "WE'RE NOT GOING
TO DO THIS, BASED ON

MY EXPERIENCE AND MY KNOWLEDGE,
MY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

OF VIETNAM.
THIS ISN'T GOING TO WORK, AND

THIS IS NOT AN INTEREST THAT
DESERVES THE UNITED STATES

GOING TO WAR."
SO, IT WAS A VERY DECISIVE

MOMENT WHEN A U.S. PRESIDENT
REALLY RESPONDED TO A VERY

SERIOUS PROPOSAL FOR GOING
TO WAR WITH A VERY LOUD "NO".

HOWEVER, AS PART OF THE
POLITICAL POSITIONING THAT

HE FELT THAT HE HAD TO ASSUME,
HE THEN MADE A DEAL THAT HE

WOULD AGREE TO THEIR REQUEST
FOR THOUSANDS OF U.S. ADVISORS.

"ADVISORS" IS AN IMPORTANT
WORD; THEY WERE MILITARY

FOR THE MOST PART,
A LOT OF THEM

WERE ECONOMIC AID PEOPLE, TOO.
BUT IT WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S

INSISTENCE THAT IT NOT BE OUR
WAR THAT LIMITED OUR INVOLVEMENT

IN THAT KIND OF WAY.
WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING

WE COULD TO ADVISE
AND TO TRAIN,

BUT KENNEDY WAS DETERMINED THAT
IT WOULDN'T BE US THAT WOULD

IT WOULDN'T BE US THAT WOULD
BE IN THE FRONT LINES.

YEAR IN THE WHITE HOUSE,
MORE FORMIDABLE

CHALLENGES WOULD
BESET THE YOUNG PRESIDENT...

SUBORDINATES WOULD QUESTION
HIS LEADERSHIP...

AND THE CALCULATIONS OF HIS
ADVERSARIES WOULD BRING

THE WORLD TO THE BRINK
OF NUCLEAR WAR.

AT THE BEGINNING OF '62,
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,

PARTICULARLY LED BY
CURTIS LEMAY,

AIR FORCE, WERE VERY SCATHING

TO DEAL WITH THE CASTRO PROBLEM.

VIVA...
EL INTERNACIONALISMO

PROLETARIADO!
AND THEY FELT THAT

IN THE END, A INVASION
OF THE ISLAND WOULD BE NECESSARY

AND THEN MADE DETAILED PLANS
FOR AN INVASION OF CUBA

AND, IN FACT, MADE A FORMAL
RECOMMENDATION TO THE PRESIDENT

THAT AN INVASION SHOULD
BE LAUNCHED.

AT THE SAME TIME,
KHRUSHCHEV HAD VERY REAL

CONCERNS ABOUT
THE UNITED STATES

INVADING CUBA.
BOTH CASTRO AND KHRUSHCHEV WERE

CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICANS
WOULD TRY AGAIN.

KHRUSHCHEV WAS DETERMINED
TO SAVE CUBA ONE WAY

OR THE OTHER.
AND HE CAME UP WITH THIS

IDEA THAT NOBODY ELSE HAD
PREDICTED OF DEPLOYING

PREDICTED OF DEPLOYING
NUCLEAR MISSILES TO CUBA.

SOVIET UNION TO OPENLY
SEND THESE MISSILES TO CUBA.

THE SOVIET UNION POSITIONING

MISSILES IN CUBA.

THE UNITED STATES,
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,

HAD DEPLOYED SIMILAR MISSILES
IN TURKEY AND ITALY.

IT WAS THE POLITICS THAT
WORRIED NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.

HE BELIEVED THAT IF HE TRIED
TO OPENLY DEPLOY THESE MISSILES

TO CUBA, THE UNITED STATES
WOULD OBJECT.

AND SO KHRUSHCHEV CAME UP WITH
THIS PLAN TO SURREPTITIOUSLY

TRANSPORT THE MISSILE PARTS AND
THE PERSONNEL IN A WAY THAT

WOULD KEEP THEM SECRET UNTIL
THEY WERE READY TO BE ANNOUNCE,

AND AT THAT POINT, KHRUSHCHEV
PLANNED TO GO TO CUBA

AND ANNOUNCE A FAIT ACCOMPLI
AND HAVE THOSE MISSILES THERE AS

A DETERRENT
AGAINST ANOTHER BAY OF PIGS.

HE WANT TO PREVENT
AMERICAN INVASION.

SIGNAL THAT WE ARE SERIOUS.

AND THAT MEAN TO HIM WE WILL
SEND THESE MISSILES

TO CUBA THAT
WILL CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS:

WILL CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS:
BE CAUTIOUS, DON'T DO THIS.

BEGIN KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET
TRANS-ATLANTIC DEPLOYMENT

TRANS-ATLANTIC DEPLOYMENT
OF SOVIET MISSILES TO CUBA...

SOUTH VIETNAM, SOME OF
THE NEWLY ARRIVED U.S. ADVISERS

WERE DEFYING ORDERS
AND ACTUALLY

AND ACTUALLY
ENGAGING IN COMBAT.

LEADERSHIP,
THEY WERE VERY VULNERABLE,

OF INTERVENTION BY THE

SOUTH VIETNAM.

POSSIBLE TO AVOID THAT.

AND SO THEY DID, IN FACT,
BEGIN TO TALK ABOUT THE

NECESSITY FOR SOME KIND
OF NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT,

SOME KIND OF NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

THAT INFORMATION REACHED
KENNEDY'S APPOINTED AMBASSADOR

TO INDIA,
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH.

ONE OF THE REASONS THAT
PRESIDENT KENNEDY CHOSE MY

TO INDIA RATHER THAN KEEPING

HIM IN WASHINGTON
WAS THAT THIS PERMITTED

KENNEDY TO CALL ON MY FATHER
AS A FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR.

HE HAD THE EXPERIENCE OF
WATCHING THE FRENCH DEFEAT IN

INDOCHINA IN 1954,
SO HE HAD

VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS, AND
THOSE VIEWS WERE CLOSE TO

THOSE VIEWS WERE CLOSE TO
KENNEDY'S OWN.

TO KENNEDY IN APRIL OF 1962.
WHAT GALBRAITH WAS SUGGESTING

WAS THAT THEY COULD GET THE
INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO HELP

ESTABLISH SOME KIND OF CONTACT
WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

THERE COULD BE SOME TALK
ABOUT A DEAL UNDER WHICH,

IF THEY WOULD LOWER
THE LEVEL OF INSURGENCY,

WE WOULD THEN BEGIN TO
WITHDRAW TROOPS, WE COULD TALK

ABOUT SOME
CORRESPONDING EFFORTS

OR MOVES TO REDUCE TENSIONS
AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF WAR.

AND JFK DEFINITELY BOUGHT
INTO THAT.

BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS
FILLED UP WITH HOLDOVERS

FROM THE EISENHOWER
ADMINISTRATION:

PEOPLE WHO HAD THESE VERY
RIGHT-WING VIEWS ON

EAST ASIAN POLICY.
AND SO, JFK UNDERSTOOD THAT;

HE KNEW HE WAS GOING TO HAVE
TO WORK AROUND THE

STATE DEPARTMENT BUREAUCRACY
AND REALLY, HARRIMAN WAS

THE LOGICAL PERSON FOR HIM
TO TURN TO.

AVERELL HARRIMAN WAS A VERY
EXPERIENCED DIPLOMAT.

HE HAD BEEN AMBASSADOR TO THE
SOVIET UNION IN THE SECOND

WORLD WAR.
HE'D BEEN GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK.

HARRIMAN HAD CALLED FOR
AVOIDING SENDING TROOPS

TO VIETNAM IN NOVEMBER OF 1961,
BUT WHAT HAPPENED WAS THAT

HARRIMAN MIGRATED FROM JFK'S
SIDE OF THE LEDGER TO THE

COALITION OF MILITARY AND STATE
DEPARTMENT PEOPLE WHO WERE

CALLING FOR SENDING TROOPS
TO SOUTH VIETNAM.

AND I DON'T THINK JFK UNDERSTOOD
THE DEGREE TO WHICH HE HAD

REALLY TURNED TO THE OTHER SIDE
ON THAT QUESTION.

JFK ORDERED AVERELL HARRIMAN
TO SEND A CABLE THAT INSTRUCTED

GALBRAITH TO ESTABLISH
A NEGOTIATING CHANNEL WITH

NORTH VIETNAM.
WHAT IS SO INTERESTING ABOUT

THE DOCUMENT
IS THAT IMMEDIATELY

HARRIMAN, IN VERY HEAVY
PENCIL, CROSSES OUT THE PART

OF THE DIRECTION FROM THE
PRESIDENT THAT CALLS

PRESIDENT THAT CALLS
FOR MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION.

NEGOTIATING CABLE AND, IN FACT,
WHEN ONE OF HIS SUBORDINATES

TRIED TO WRITE A CABLE THAT
WAS HEADED IN THAT DIRECTION,

HE SAID, "NO, WE'RE NOT GOING
TO DO THAT."

AND THERE WAS NEVER
A CABLE SENT.

SO, IT WAS AN ASTONISHING CASE
OF A LEADING OFFICIAL

OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT
COMPLETELY SUBVERTING

AN EXPLICIT ORDER FROM THE
PRESIDENT FOR TRYING TO CARRY

PRESIDENT FOR TRYING TO CARRY
OUT A DIPLOMATIC POLICY.

WAS A REFLECTION OF A MUCH
BROADER PATTERN IN WHICH ALL

OF THESE ADVISORS WERE
ESSENTIALLY SUBVERTING WHAT

ESSENTIALLY SUBVERTING WHAT
JFK WANTED TO DO.

THAT SAID
"NO NEGOTIATIONS FROM WEAKNESS"

IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND UNTIL THAT

SITUATION TURNS ITSELF AROUND
AND WE CAN NEGOTIATE FROM

STRENGTH AND THE COMMUNISTS
UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE WINNING

AND NOT LOSING, OF COURSE
WE ARE NOT GOING TO NEGOTIATE.

GALBRAITH WOULD
LAUGH AT THAT

AND SAY,
"WEAKNESS, THE GREATEST COUNTRY

IN THE WORLD, THE STRONGEST
NATION IN THE WORLD,

A COUNTRY OF 50 MILLION PEOPLE,

THAT HAS NO INDUSTRY, AND

THAT IS JUST EMERGING AS A
NATION, THE UNITED STATES

HAS TO BE AFRAID OF THAT
AND NOT SHOW WEAKNESS?"

AND IT'S NOT WEAKNESS,
WHICH THE PRESIDENT SAID

IN HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS.
IT IS NOT WEAKNESS TO DISCUSS

IT IS NOT WEAKNESS TO DISCUSS
OR TO NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH.

NEGOTIATIONS HELD BY MANY
U.S. OFFICIALS WENT MUCH

DEEPER THAN DISDAIN FOR
KENNEDY'S TRACK RECORD

IN FOREIGN POLICY.
FOR THOSE WHO FOUGHT AND WON

THE SECOND WORLD WAR,
ONE OF THE GREATEST ERRORS A

LEADER COULD MAKE WAS TO
TAKE AN ENEMY AT HIS WORD.

IN 1938, BRITISH PRIME MINISTER
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN

HAD BELIEVED
HE COULD NEGOTIATE PEACE

WITH ADOLF HITLER.
AS A RESULT, BRITISH WAR

PRODUCTION WAS DELAYED,
AND ENGLAND NEARLY

AND ENGLAND NEARLY
LOST THE WAR.

A DIRTY WORD BY A GENERATION OF
U.S. MILITARY LEADERS WHO KNEW

ALL TOO WELL THE HUMAN
PRICE OF NAÏVE LEADERSHIP.

AND DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA
WERE ABOUT TO TEST THEM

WERE ABOUT TO TEST THEM
TO THE LIMIT.

CRISIS WERE LARGE, MEDIUM RANGE
AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR

TIPPED BALLISTIC MISSILES.
THESE ARE MISSILES THAT CAN

FLY TO THE UNITED STATES,
HIT TEXAS AND NEW YORK CITY

AND A WIDE RANGE OF U.S.
TARGETS.

MISSILES, AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY

WAS BRIEFED.
THE PRESIDENT ASKED BUNDY,

"HOW MANY DAYS DO WE HAVE BEFORE

AND BUNDY SAID,

"MAYBE A WEEK."
WE WERE RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE

OF POLITICAL ELECTION IN OCTOBER
OF '62, AND KENNEDY IS TORN

OF '62, AND KENNEDY IS TORN
LOTS OF DIFFERENT WAYS.

A SPECIAL GROUP THAT THEY CALLED
THE EXCOMM TO HELP HIM DEAL

WITH THIS.
ALL OF THE JOINT CHIEFS,

INCLUDING THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS, MAXWELL TAYLOR,

WHO WAS A FAVORITE
OF KENNEDY'S,

MISSILES FOLLOWED BY

AN INVASION.

"I'LL TAKE CARE OF THIS,

AND THE PRESIDENT SAID, "NO."

AND THEN THE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY WANTED TO INVADE,

OF THE ARMY WANTED TO INVADE,
AND THE PRESIDENT SAID, "NO."

FEW DAYS TO REFLECT, HE THOUGH,
"WELL, A WISER COURSE OF ACTION

WILL BE TO IMPOSE SOME KIND
OF NAVAL BLOCKADE ON CUBA

TO PREVENT MORE MISSILES FROM
REACHING THE ISLAND."

HE DECIDES TO
FORGO VIOLENCE,

KNOWING THAT IF HE NEEDS TO
LATER ON, HE CAN INVADE CUBA,

AND ADOPT AN INTERIM STEP
OF QUARANTINE, WHICH BUYS TIME

FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH
THE SOVIET UNION.

WHEN CURTIS LEMAY HEARD THAT
KENNEDY WAS NOT GOING TO ATTACK

CUBA IMMEDIATELY,
HE WAS FURIOUS AND COMPARED THIS

TO CHAMBERLAIN'S APPEASEMENT
OF HITLER AT MUNICH.

AND LEMAY KNEW EXACTLY WHAT
THAT WAS ABOUT BECAUSE

JFK'S FATHER, OF COURSE,
WAS A GREAT SUPPORTER

OF NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN AND
BELIEVED IN TRYING TO

BELIEVED IN TRYING TO
DEAL WITH HITLER.

THE CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE
SAYS TO THE PRESIDENT,

"YOU'RE IN A BIG FIX,
MR. PRESIDENT," AND KENNEDY

IS TAKEN ABACK AND HE SAID,
"WHAT, WHAT DID YOU SAY?

AND LEMAY SAID,
"YOU'RE IN A BAD FIX!"

AND THE PRESIDENT SAID,
"AND YOU'RE RIGHT IN IT

"AND YOU'RE RIGHT IN IT
WITH ME."

ON THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 22,
1962 AND GAVE WHAT IS CERTAINLY

THE MOST CHILLING, FRIGHTENING
OF PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES

TO THE NATION AND THE WORLD
THAT HAS EVER BEEN GIVEN.

WHEN HE CAME INTO THE ROOM,
HE WAS DELIBERATE, COOL.

I THOUGHT HE WAS NERVOUS.
BUT ONCE THE RED LIGHT WENT ON,

LOOKED IN THE CAMERAS,

AND HE SAID "GOOD EVENING"
TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,

AND TALKED ABOUT WHAT HE HAD TO
DO, BUT HE WAS A DIFFERENT GUY.

THIS GOVERNMENT, AS PROMISE,
HAS MAINTAINED THE CLOSEST

SURVEILLANCE OF THE SOVIET
MILITARY BUILD UP ON THE ISLAND

OF CUBA.
WITHIN THE PAST WEEK,

UNMISTAKABLE EVIDENCE HAS
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT A

SERIES OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE
SITES IS NOW IN PREPARATION

ON THAT IMPRISONED ISLAND.
TO HALT THIS

OFFENSIVE BUILD-UP,
A STRICT QUARANTINE ON ALL

OFFENSIVE MILITARY EQUIPMENT
UNDER SHIPMENT TO CUBA

IS BEING INITIATED.
ALL SHIPS OF ANY KIND BOUND

FOR CUBA FROM WHATEVER NATION OR
PORT, WERE THEY FOUND

TO CONTAIN
CARGOS OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS,

BE TURNED BACK.
IT SHALL BE THE POLICY OF THIS

NATION TO REGARD ANY NUCLEAR
MISSILE LAUNCHED FROM CUBA

AGAINST ANY NATION IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AS AN ATTACK

BY THE SOVIET UNION ON
THE UNITED STATES REQUIRING A

FULL RETALIATORY RESPONSE
UPON THE SOVIET UNION.

WITH BOMBERS, JET FIGHTERS,
NAVY VESSELS AND OVER A HUNDRED

THOUSAND COMBAT PERSONNEL
ASSEMBLED IN THE GULF,

U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS
PUSHED FOR AN INVASION.

THE INVASION WOULD HAVE BEEN
VERY SIMILAR IN SCALE TO THE

INVASION OF NORMANDY ON D-DAY
IN 1944.

BUT THEY DID NOT KNOW
THAT SOVIETS HAVE 94 TECHNICAL

THAT SOVIETS HAVE 94 TECHNICAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE.

BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR
WEAPONS THAT

THE CIA NEVER REALLY UNDERSTOOD
WERE THERE.

THE SOVIETS HAD NUCLEAR
WEAPONS ON THE BEACH

WAITING FOR AN AMERICAN
INVASION FORCE, AND THAT COULD

HAVE BEEN EASILY THE BEGINNING
OF NUCLEAR WAR.

CASTRO SENT A MESSAGE TO
KHRUSHCHEV SAYING THAT

IF THE AMERICANS INVADE CUBA,
"YOU SHOULD ATTACK THE UNITED

"YOU SHOULD ATTACK THE UNITED
STATES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS."

MARCHING ALMOST INEVITABLY
TOWARDS A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.

THE U.S. MILITARY WAS NOT
ONLY PRIMED TO ATTACK CUBA,

THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND WAS
PREPARED TO LAUNCH A NUCLEAR

STRIKE ON THE SOVIET UNION
ITSELF.

OVER 150 NUCLEAR MISSILES
AND TWELVE HUNDRED AIRPLANES

CARRYING NEARLY THREE
THOUSAND NUCLEAR WARHEADS

WERE ON STANDBY SHOULD
THE PRESIDENT GIVE THE ORDER.

WITH THE WORLD TEETERING
ON NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION,

BOTH KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNEDY
WERE DETERMINED TO FIND A

WAY OUT THAT WOULD NOT INVOLVE
ARMED CONFLICT.

WE KNOW TODAY THAT THE CRISIS
WAS OVERCOME THROUGH A SERIES

OF PERSONAL LETTERS EXCHANGED
BETWEEN NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

BETWEEN NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV
AND JOHN KENNEDY.

TO KENNEDY
IS AN EXCHANGE OF SOVIET

MISSILES IN CUBA FOR U.S.
MISSILES IN TURKEY AND ITALY.

THIS POSES A VERY DIFFICULT
PROBLEM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BECAUSE HE'S ALREADY BEEN
ACCUSED OF WEAKNESS BY THE JOINT

CHIEFS, BY HIS REPUBLICAN
OPPONENTS.

HE SECRETLY HAS HIS BROTHER
INFORM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT
ONLY PUBLICLY GUARANTEE THAT

WE WON'T BE INVADING
CUBA IN THE

FUTURE, IF THE SOVIETS WITHDREW
THEIR MISSILES, BUT SECRETLY

THE UNITED STATES AND JOHN
KENNEDY PLEDGES TO START TO

DISMANTLE U.S. MISSILES
IN TURKEY SO THAT KHRUSHCHEV

CAN WALK AWAY FROM THIS
FEELING THAT HE GOT

FEELING THAT HE GOT
SOMETHING HE NEEDED.

THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT;
IT'S A MATTER OF HOURS BECAUSE

THE PRESIDENT IS COMING UNDER
PRESSURE FROM HIS SENIOR

MILITARY LEADERS TO DO
SOMETHING.

THE CUBAN MISSILES CRISIS
OFFICIALLY ENDED WITH A

BROADCAST ON SOVIET RADIO
OF NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

AGREEING TO JOHN KENNEDY'S
PUBLIC PROPOSAL OF A

NON-INVASION PLEDGE OF CUBA,
THE MORNING OF

OCTOBER 28, 1962.
The Soviet government has

ordered the dismantling of
weapons in Cuba, as well as

their crating and return
to the Soviet Union.

KHRUSHCHEV TOOK THE
INITIATIVE TO HAVE IT BROADCAST

OVER MOSCOW RADIO IN ENGLISH,
AND IT WAS THE MESSAGE THAT

AND IT WAS THE MESSAGE THAT
FINALLY BROKE THE CRISIS.

CRISIS, WHEN THE SOVIETS
ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE

PULLING THEIR MISSILES OUT,
WHICH REALLY WAS A GREAT

VICTORY FOR THE WEST, KENNEDY
WISELY PUT THE WORD OUT,

"DO NOT GLOAT.
DO NOT BRAG ABOUT THIS.

DON'T TREAT THIS AS A VICTORY."
HE WAS VERY CAREFUL.

YOU NEVER RUB YOUR VICTORY
INTO YOUR OPPONENT'S FACE.

AT THE END
OF THE MISSILE CRISIS

CURTIS LEMAY BELLOWED,
"WE LOST, WE SHOULD HAVE GONE IN

THERE AND CLEARED THEM OUT
WITH MISSILES AND BOMBS."

KENNEDY'S GREATNESS IN THE
MISSILE CRISIS WAS HE THOUGHT

IN TERMS OF AVOIDING THE
POINTLESS DEATHS OF MILLIONS OF

PEOPLE, WHETHER THEY WERE
AMERICANS OR RUSSIANS.

SO IN THAT SENSE, HE HAD
A KIND OF UNIVERSAL HUMANISM.

THERE'S A WEIRD SCENE AT THE
END OF THE MISSILE CRISIS

WHEN JACK AND BOBBY ARE TOGETHER
AND JACK KENNEDY, I GUESS

THINKING ABOUT LINCOLN
AFTER THE CIVIL WAR ON THE

NIGHT OF HIS ASSASSINATION,
LINCOLN WENT TO THE THEATER,

AND JACK KENNEDY SAYS TO
BOBBY, "THIS IS THE NIGHT

I SHOULD GO TO THE THEATRE."
AND BOBBY SAYS,

AND BOBBY SAYS,
"IF YOU GO, I WILL GO, TOO."

OF THE UNITED STATES
UNDERSTANDS THAT HIS LIFE

IS AT RISK.
AND I THINK JOHN KENNEDY,

WHO HAD HIS OWN VERY PERSONAL
SENSE OF MORTALITY THROUGH

THE DEATH OF HIS BROTHER,
THROUGH HIS OWN WOUNDING

IN THE WARS IN THE PACIFIC,
HAD A VERY REAL SENSE

HAD A VERY REAL SENSE
OF THE POSSIBILITIES.

MISSILE CRISIS,
KENNEDY HOPED TO FORGE A

NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV AND RESTART

TALKS FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN.
INFORMED THAT NORMAN COUSINS,

EDITOR OFTHE SATURDAY REVIEW
AND A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

ACTIVIST, WAS HEADED
TO THE SOVIET UNION,

KENNEDY ASKED THAT HE CARRY
A PERSONAL MESSAGE

KENNEDY DID WANT MY FATHER

WAS NO ONE IN THE UNITED STATES

MORE EAGER THAN HE
TO PUT ALL THESE

TO PUT ALL THESE
DIFFERENCES ASIDE.

COUSINS WAS GOING TO BE IN
THE SOVIET UNION.

SAW AN INFLUENTIAL PRIVATE

CITIZEN WHO WAS ABLE TO BE A
GOOD BACK CHANNEL ENVOY,

AND JFK WAS INTERESTED IN
RESTARTING THE TEST BAN TREATY

TALKS WHICH HAD BROKEN DOWN
BECAUSE THERE WAS A

MISCOMMUNICATION ABOUT HOW
MANY ON-SITE TEST BAN VISITS

MANY ON-SITE TEST BAN VISITS
EACH SIDE WOULD GET EACH YEAR.

US THAT KENNEDY SAID HE WAS
VERY SCARED OF THE POWER OF THE

MILITARY IN THE UNITED STATES,
AND WHAT HE WAS SCARED OF IS

WHETHER THE MILITARY WOULD
SOMEHOW POSITION ITSELF AND

SOMEHOW POSITION ITSELF AND
UNDERMINE HIS EXECUTIVE POWER.

TO SEE KHRUSHCHEV IN THE
SOVIET UNION WERE

SOVIET UNION WERE
ANDREA AND CANDICE COUSINS.

STAYING AT THIS LOVELY RETREAT
ON THE EDGE OF THE BLACK SEA;

IT WAS SORT OF THE CAMP DAVID
OF THE SOVIET UNION.

WE CAME INTO THIS BEAUTIFUL
INDOOR/OUTDOOR ROOM WITH A

POOL, AND THERE WERE GLASS
PANELS, AND KHRUSHCHEV

PRESSED A BUTTON AND THE PANELS
FOLDED BACK.

AND THEN TO OUR SURPRISE,
HE SAYS TO MY SISTER ANDREA

AND TO ME,
"WHILE YOUR FATHER AND I

ARE TALKING,
WHY DON'T YOU TAKE A SWIM?"

WHILE WE WERE
PADDLING AROUND

IN THE SWIMMING POOL,
MY FATHER AND KHRUSHCHEV

THE FATE OF THE WORLD BASICALLY,

I DON'T KNOW IF WE REALLY

UNDERSTOOD AT THAT TIME
HOW SERIOUS, HOW ENORMOUS

THESE QUESTIONS WERE,
AND HOW MUCH WAS AT STAKE.

WHAT KENNEDY WANTED FOR MY
FATHER TO CONVEY

TO KHRUSHCHEV WAS THAT
IT WAS TIME TO START AFRESH...

AND TO SEE IF THEY COULD GO
FORWARD WITH THEIR BASIC SHARED

FORWARD WITH THEIR BASIC SHARED
INTENTION OF A TEST BAN TREATY.

"WE'RE WILLING TO RESTART THESE
TALKS AND GET SOMETHING GOING,

BUT THE BALL'S IN JFK'S
COURT IN TERMS OF DOING IT."

EVENTUALLY,
THEY CAME AND GOT

US AND BROUGHT US BACK UP
TO KHRUSHCHEV'S STUDY, AND

KHRUSHCHEV TOOK OUT A GREAT
BIG COAT

AND WAS FOOLING AROUND WITH
THE COAT, SORT OF PLAYING

HIDE AND SEEK, COVERING
HIMSELF UP WITH IT AND THROWING

IT OFF AND GROWLING, AND
THEN COVERING HIMSELF UP AGAIN.

IT WAS REALLY DELIGHTFUL
THAT THIS MAN...

HE WAS UNDER SO MUCH PRESSURE,
AND YET, HE HAD THIS CAPACITY

AND YET, HE HAD THIS CAPACITY
TO PLAY AND TO BE SILLY.

THIS PERSONAL VIEW OF HIM
WITH THE WAY HE WAS PICTURED

IN THE AMERICAN MEDIA,
YOU KNOW, POUNDING HIS SHOE

AT THE U.N...
"WE'LL BURY YOU."

YOU KNOW, IT WAS REALLY
HARD TO SQUARE THOSE TWO THINGS.

SO, COUSINS COMES BACK
IN APRIL OF 1963,

VISITS THE WHITE HOUSE ON
APRIL 22 AND REPORTS TO KENNEDY

THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS INTERESTED,
BUT SOME OF THE HARDLINERS ARE

VERY SKEPTICAL AND READY
TO DENOUNCE THE U.S.

COUSINS FOLLOWS UP
WITH A LETTER

TO JFK WHERE HE SUGGESTS A
SPEECH OF BREATHTAKING

IMPORTANCE EXPRESSING HIS
FRIENDSHIP FOR THE SOVIETS,

UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THEY
WENT THROUGH IN THE WAR,

AND HE POINTS OUT THAT THE
SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS

GOING TO MEET IN JUNE OF
THAT YEAR, AND SAYS THAT

WOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO DO IT.
AND, OF COURSE, JFK FORWARDS

THE LETTER ON TO TED SORENSON,
HIS CHIEF SPEECH WRITER,

AND THEY AGREE THAT SINCE JFK IS
GOING TO SPEAK AT AMERICAN

UNIVERSITY ON JUNE 10,
THAT WOULD BE THE TIME FOR SUCH

THAT WOULD BE THE TIME FOR SUCH
A SPEECH.

TIME AND PLACE TO DISCUSS A
TOPIC ON WHICH IGNORANCE TOO

OFTEN ABOUNDS AND THE TRUTH TOO
RARELY PERCEIVED,

AND THAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT
TOPIC ON EARTH, PEACE.

WHAT KIND OF A PEACE DO I MEAN
AND WHAT KIND OF A PEACE DO WE

SEEK?
NOT A "PAX AMERICANA,"

ENFORCED ON THE WORLD BY
AMERICAN WEAPONS OF WAR;

NOT THE PEACE OF THE GRAVE,
OR THE SECURITY OF THE SLAVE.

I AM TALKING ABOUT GENUINE
PEACE, THE KIND OF PEACE THAT

MAKES LIFE ON EARTH
WORTH LIVING.

CERTAINLY THE AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY SPEECH WAS A BREAK

WITH THE PREVAILING WISDOM
AND A BREAK WITH THE

ESTABLISHMENT, WHAT THE
ESTABLISHMENT VIEW OF

THE COLD WAR WAS AND WHETHER
OR NOT WE CAN SURVIVE AND

OR NOT WE CAN SURVIVE AND
LIVE WITH THE SOVIETS.

WHO DESPAIRS OF WAR AND WISHES
TO BRING PEACE SHOULD BEGIN BY

LOOKING INWARD BY EXAMINING HIS
OWN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE

POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE,
TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION,

TOWARDS THE COURSE
OF THE COLD WAR,

AND TOWARDS FREEDOM AND PEACE
HERE AT HOME.

FIRST, EXAMINE OUR ATTITUDE
TOWARDS PEACE ITSELF.

TOO MANY OF US
THINK IT IS IMPOSSIBLE.

TOO MANY THINK IT IS
UNREAL, BUT THAT IS A DANGEROUS,

DEFEATIST BELIEF.
IT LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION

THAT WAR IS INEVITABLE,
THAT MANKIND IS DOOMED,

THAT WE ARE GRIPPED BY FORCES
WE CANNOT CONTROL.

WE NEED NOT ACCEPT THAT VIEW.
OUR PROBLEMS ARE MAN-MADE,

THEREFORE THEY CAN BE SOLVED
BY MAN.

WHEN KENNEDY DELIVERED HIS
SPEECH AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY,

SOVIET PEOPLE THAT THERE COULD

BE A NEW BEGINNING.
TO MAKE CLEAR OUR GOOD FAITH

AND SOLEMN CONVICTIONS
ON THIS MATTER,

I NOW DECLARE THAT
THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT

PROPOSE TO CONDUCT NUCLEAR
TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE,

SO LONG AS OTHER STATES
DO NOT DO SO.

WE WILL NOT...
[ applause ]

WE WILL NOT BE THE FIRST
TO RESUME.

SUCH A DECLARATION IS NO
SUBSTITUTE FOR A FORMAL, BINDING

TREATY, BUT I HOPE IT WILL
HELP US ACHIEVE ONE.

IN SHORT, KENNEDY MADE AN
ADVANCE TOWARDS KHRUSHCHEV,

TOWARDS THE NEED FOR MORE
DISCUSSIONS AND FOR A CLOSER

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO,
AND THAT DID NOT FALL ON DEAF

AND THAT DID NOT FALL ON DEAF
EARS, LET ME ASSURE YOU.

KENNEDY GREW THROUGH THESE
YEARS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.
MY FATHER REPEATED THAT

WE DEFEND OUR SYSTEMS

THEY'RE DIFFERENT,

WE HAVE ONE IN COMMON:
WE WANT TO PREVENT THE WAR.

AND I CAN DEAL WITH THE
PRESIDENT KENNEDY."

I THINK THE AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY SPEECH

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS...

NO QUESTION ABOUT IT.

KENNEDY'S STYLE,
HE BROUGHT KHRUSHCHEV

AROUND, AND WE HAVE A TEST
BAN TREATY TODAY.

MANY HAVE ARGUED THAT THE
LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

WAS KENNEDY'S GREATEST
ACCOMPLISHMENT AS PRESIDENT.

HOW THIS ACHIEVEMENT WOULD RANK
HAD KENNEDY LIVED AND BEEN

PERMITTED TO FULFILL HIS OTHER
FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES

FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES
IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE.

DECISION TO BRING THE

THEN-EXISTING U.S. FORCES
IN VIETNAM OUT OVER

IN VIETNAM OUT OVER
A CERTAIN TIMETABLE.

MEMORANDUM 263
WAS A DECISION DOCUMENT

THAT BASICALLY
SUMMARIZED KENNEDY'S

APPROVAL TO BRING OUT
THE 17,000 OR SO U.S. FORCES

THAT WERE IN VIETNAM
AT THAT TIME.

THE FIRST 1,000 WOULD BE
WITHDRAWN BY THE END OF

1963, THE REMAINDER WOULD
BE OUT BY THE END OF '65.

AND THAT WAS A FORMAL
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION.

IT WAS THE POLICY
OF THE UNITED STATES

ON THE DAY HE DIED.
THAT'S, IN FACT, NO LONGER,

I THINK,
HISTORICALLY CONTROVERSIAL.

THE MOST IMPORTANT
INDICATION

OF THE THINKING OF JFK
ABOUT HIS POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM

SHOT DOWN, HE HAD A CONVERSATION

WITH HIS NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL STAFF MEMBER,

WHO WORKED ON SOUTHEAST ASIA,
MICHAEL FORRESTAL, IN WHICH

HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO
INITIATE A COMPLETE, THOROUGH

REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD
VIETNAM, AND THAT THE REVIEW

HAD TO INCLUDE OR INVOLVE THE
WHOLE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE

UNITED STATES SHOULD BE THERE
AT ALL.

PERHAPS EVEN MORE STARTLING
THAN KENNEDY'S PLAN TO WITHDRAW

PERSONNEL FROM VIETNAM
WAS HIS SECRET EFFORT TO ENGAGE

WAS HIS SECRET EFFORT TO ENGAGE
FIDEL CASTRO IN A DIALOGUE.

RESPONSIBLE FOR SOME OF THE
MOST INFAMOUS ACTS

OF AGGRESSION
AGAINST CUBA AND YET,

SECRETLY HE WAS,
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH,

PURSUING AN ACCOMMODATION
WITH FIDEL CASTRO.

WAS BURIED IN SECRET DOCUMENTS

THAT WERE IN A VAULT AT THE
KENNEDY LIBRARY UNTIL I ASKED

FOR THE ENTIRE FILE,
WHICH WAS TITLED,

"CONTACTS WITH CUBAN
LEADERS TO BE DECLASSIFIED

LEADERS TO BE DECLASSIFIED
IN THE LATE 1990s."

ACTUALLY NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY
WITH CASTRO?

TOP STATE DEPARTMENT AIDES
WERE SAYING, "THE UNITED STATES

WON'T TALK TO CUBA UNLESS CUBA
THROWS THE SOVIET UNION OUT

AND PROMISES, GUARANTEES
THAT IT WILL STOP SCREWING

AROUND IN THE REST OF LATIN
AMERICA AND PROMOTING

REVOLUTION
AGAINST THE U.S. INTERESTS.

AND KENNEDY ACTUALLY TOOK A
VERY DIFFERENT POSITION.

HE TOLD MCGEORGE BUNDY,
HIS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,

"I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD BOX
FIDEL CASTRO INTO A CORNER.

I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD MAKE
PRE-CONDITIONAL DEMANDS

FOR TALKING TO HIM
THAT HE MAY NOT BE ABLE

TO MEET."
MY FATHER,

HE REPEATEDLY TOLD
FIDEL CASTRO THAT,

"I TRUST KENNEDY.
I TRUST THAT HE WILL NOT INVADE

YOUR COUNTRY, AND WE HAVE
ANOTHER SIX YEARS BECAUSE

I BELIEVE THAT HE WILL
BE REELECTED."

WHILE U.S. EFFORTS TO
DESTABILIZE FIDEL CASTRO'S

GOVERNMENT CONTINUED,
KENNEDY WORKED THROUGH BACK

CHANNELS TO EXPLORE
THE POSSIBILITY OF TALKS.

IN NOVEMBER OF 1963,
A BREAKTHROUGH SEEMED NEAR,

AND KENNEDY SENT WORD TO CASTRO
THAT HE WAS OPEN TO NEGOTIATING

AN AGREEMENT.
HE SENT HIS OWN EMISSARY

TO TALK TO FIDEL CASTRO,
A FRENCH JOURNALIST

NAMED JEAN DANIEL WHO HAD
COME TO WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER,

MET WITH THE PRESIDENT,
AND WHEN THE PRESIDENT

FOUND OUT THAT HE WAS ON
HIS WAY TO CUBA, HE BASICALLY

SENT A MESSAGE TO FIDEL CASTRO
WITH JEAN DANIEL.

AND JEAN DANIEL WAS GIVING
THIS MESSAGE TO FIDEL CASTRO

THIS MESSAGE TO FIDEL CASTRO
ON NOVEMBER 22, 1963.

THAT KENNEDY MIGHT BECOME
A HISTORIC PRESIDENT,

ONE OF THE FIRST PRESIDENTS
WHO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE WORLD

WAS A DIVERSE PLACE AND THAT
THE UNITED STATES COULD LIVE

WITH COMMUNIST REGIMES
PEACEFULLY.

AND SO THEY WERE TALKING
ABOUT THIS WHEN, DRAMATICALLY,

AN AIDE CAME IN AND SAID,
"THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

"THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES HAS BEEN SHOT."

AND SAID,
"THERE GOES YOUR MISSION

"THERE GOES YOUR MISSION
OF PEACE."

BECAUSE HE DIDN'T KNOW
WHO COULD DO IT.

AND THAT MEAN THAT SOME
HAWKISH AMERICANS

KILLED THE PRESIDENT WHO WANT
TO PRESERVE PEACE AND MAYBE

TOMORROW THEY WILL START
NUCLEAR WAR AGAINST

THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE
KILLING AMERICAN PRESIDENT,

IT IS NOT A SMALL EVENT,
SO HE WAS VERY NERVOUS.

ONE OF THE SADNESSES OF MY
GROWING UP WAS THAT WHEN

I WAS A BOY AND KENNEDY CAME TO
OFFICE... I WAS 10 YEARS OLD

WHEN HE WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT...
THERE WAS THIS GREAT BELIEF IN

PUBLIC SERVICE, IN PUBLIC LIFE
AND BY THE TIME I WAS A YOUNG

MAN BECAUSE OF VIETNAM AND
WATERGATE, THAT HOPEFULNESS HAD

TURNED TO CYNICISM AND APATHY.
THAT'S A GREAT SADNESS TO ME,

AND WE'VE NEVER QUITE
OVERCOME IT.

THOSE WHO WERE
LIVING ON THIS

PLANET AT THAT TIME HAD NEVER
EXPERIENCED A PRESIDENT BEING

SHOCK BEYOND BELIEF.

STAGGERING, YEAH.

I THINK THE MOST IMPORTANT
THINGS THAT KENNEDY DID FOR US

AND FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE
PLANET WAS THAT HE WAS ABLE TO

GO AGAINST A GROUP THAT WAS
POWERFUL AND SPEAK UP IN SPITE

OF THE FACT THAT HE WAS ALONE.
I THINK THAT THAT'S A...

MAYBE THE HARDEST THING
FOR A PERSON TO DO.

"ONE MAN CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE,

AND EVERYONE SHOULD TRY."
THAT IS PROFOUNDLY TRUE.

AND IT'S NOT JUST TRUE OF
PRESIDENTS AND WITH PRESIDENTS.

IT'S TRUE OF ALL OF US,
WHEREVER WE MAY BE,

WHEREVER WE MAY BE,
WHEREVER WE MAY BE IN LIFE.

ONLY STILL WITH US,
BUT IT'S GREATER THAN EVER.

AND IT IS POSSIBLE
TO TAKE A STAND AGAINST IT.

BUT TAKING A STAND AGAINST IT,
AS WE KNOW FROM KENNEDY,

IS NOT JUST A DIFFICULT THING,
BUT IT'S A DANGEROUS THING.

BUT IT'S A DANGEROUS THING.
BUT IT MUST BE DONE ANYWAY.

Male announcer: IN A 1964 COUP,
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV WAS REMOVED

FROM POWER BY SOVIET
CONSPIRATORS WHO CLAIMED HIS

RESIGNATION WAS DUE TO
ADVANCED AGE AND POOR HEALTH.

SOURCES IN MOSCOW
LATER REVEALED

THAT BEHIND KHRUSHCHEV'S
DISMISSAL WAS THE HUMILIATION

OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
AND DISSATISFACTION WITH HIS

LEADERSHIP.
FORCED FROM PUBLIC LIFE,

KHRUSHCHEV'S NAME WAS OMITTED
FROM RUSSIAN HISTORY BOOKS,

AND IN 1971, THE FORMER SOVIET
LEADER WAS DENIED

A STATE FUNERAL.
ACCORDING TO DECLASSIFIED

RECORDS, IN THE MONTH FOLLOWING
HIS BROTHER'S ASSASSINATION,

ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F.
KENNEDY SENT A MEMO

TO SECRETARY
OF STATE DEAN RUSK SEEKING AN

END TO THE U.S. TRAVEL BAN
TO CUBA, CALLING IT

"INCONSISTENT WITH TRADITIONAL
AMERICAN LIBERTIES."

TODAY AT THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, A RESOLUTION

CALLING FOR AN END TO THE
ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, AND

FINANCIAL BLOCKADE IMPOSED BY
THE UNITED STATES ON CUBA

WAS ADOPTED BY A MARGIN OF
188 TO 3.

THIS MARKS THE 21st CONSECUTIVE
YEAR THE UNITED STATES HAS

IGNORED U.N. CONDEMNATION OVER
ITS CUBAN POLICIES.

PENTAGON PAPERS MADE PUBLIC
TODAY REVEALED NEW DETAILS

SURROUNDING THE EARLY DAYS
OF THE VIETNAM WAR.

ACCORDING TO THE PAPERS,
PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S PLAN FOR

DISENGAGEMENT OF ALL U.S.
MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOUTH

VIETNAM BY 1965 WAS REVERSED
BY THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

LESS THAN A YEAR
AFTER KENNEDY’S

DEATH.
TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE

HAVE TAKEN PART IN CELEBRATIONS
TO MARK 30 YEARS SINCE THE END

OF THE VIETNAM WAR TODAY.
BY THE TIME THE UNITED STATES

WITHDREW ITS FORCES IN 1975,
THE TRAGIC CONFLICT HAD CLAIMED

THE LIVES OF SOME 60,000
AMERICANS, 1 MILLION VIETNAMESE

SOLDIERS, AND NEARLY HALF A
MILLION VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS.