1 00:00:01,480 --> 00:00:06,780 The smartphone, essential to our daily lives, always with us. But have you ever 2 00:00:06,780 --> 00:00:11,700 stopped to wonder, do our smartphones know more about us than we know about 3 00:00:11,700 --> 00:00:15,280 ourselves? Our smartphones are a spy in our pockets. 4 00:00:15,660 --> 00:00:19,300 Every time you enter a store, instead of just leaving with your products, you 5 00:00:19,300 --> 00:00:22,400 leave with a spy who's walking right behind you. 6 00:00:22,640 --> 00:00:26,360 I'll be finding out how we're tracked wherever we go online. 7 00:00:26,740 --> 00:00:27,740 Kittens! 8 00:00:28,010 --> 00:00:31,210 I'm more of a dog guy. Who hasn't looked at Kitten Smash? I stopped lying. 9 00:00:31,430 --> 00:00:35,670 So when an ad pops up on our phone for something we've just talked about, are 10 00:00:35,670 --> 00:00:36,910 our phones listening in? 11 00:00:37,490 --> 00:00:41,690 I enlist the help of the family to find out. For the luscious locks? 12 00:00:41,970 --> 00:00:45,370 That's it. The curling tongs you've gone for. So we're clear with the rules. 13 00:00:45,670 --> 00:00:48,850 Talk about them amongst yourselves, particularly when you're around the 14 00:00:48,850 --> 00:00:51,070 phones. But please don't type that in. 15 00:00:51,370 --> 00:00:53,570 Where would you look for curling tongs? Online? 16 00:00:55,520 --> 00:00:58,900 I'm also going to be discovering everyday items in our homes that are 17 00:00:58,900 --> 00:01:00,760 gathering information on what we do. 18 00:01:00,980 --> 00:01:05,000 The one we tested a few years ago actually was tracking a precise location 19 00:01:05,000 --> 00:01:07,360 250 times in just five minutes. 20 00:01:07,640 --> 00:01:10,120 So it was literally going, where are you, where are you, where are you, where 21 00:01:10,120 --> 00:01:10,919 are you? 22 00:01:10,920 --> 00:01:15,400 And I hear what can happen when the personal information we so readily share 23 00:01:15,400 --> 00:01:18,300 online get into the hands of criminals. 24 00:01:18,880 --> 00:01:23,800 I felt quite sick. I was more upset for the fact that I had fallen for it, I 25 00:01:23,800 --> 00:01:25,200 think, than the loss of the money. 26 00:01:33,280 --> 00:01:35,740 Who do you think knows you best? 27 00:01:36,480 --> 00:01:40,460 What if I told you it's not a person? What if I told you it's your phone? 28 00:01:41,040 --> 00:01:44,340 Think about it. We use them to communicate, to travel with, to do 29 00:01:44,340 --> 00:01:48,580 banking, to shop. We even ask it questions and expect all the right 30 00:01:48,580 --> 00:01:53,900 answers. But have you ever wondered, is your smartphone spying on you? 31 00:01:54,980 --> 00:01:58,940 On average, we spend up to four hours a day on our smartphones. 32 00:01:59,320 --> 00:02:03,900 So how much of our information is really private? How much is being shared by 33 00:02:03,900 --> 00:02:05,920 companies you've never even heard of? 34 00:02:06,120 --> 00:02:08,560 And I'm not just talking about younger generations. 35 00:02:09,070 --> 00:02:12,910 8 out of 10 over 65s have smartphones too. 36 00:02:13,110 --> 00:02:15,330 This affects all of us. 37 00:02:18,730 --> 00:02:21,930 Our smartphones are a spy in our pockets. 38 00:02:22,330 --> 00:02:26,670 You might have bought your smartphone, but it doesn't really work for you. It 39 00:02:26,670 --> 00:02:31,010 works for hundreds of other companies for whom it's collecting your data and 40 00:02:31,010 --> 00:02:33,670 sending it throughout the day and the night. 41 00:02:33,870 --> 00:02:34,990 It logs everything. 42 00:02:35,270 --> 00:02:36,730 Every time you look at it... 43 00:02:36,960 --> 00:02:41,160 Every place you go, every person you message, everything you search for. So 44 00:02:41,160 --> 00:02:44,900 you might not remember where you were a week ago and who you talked with, but 45 00:02:44,900 --> 00:02:46,000 your phone does. 46 00:02:49,640 --> 00:02:56,120 Meet the Trussells. They don't see a big problem with any of this, even though as 47 00:02:56,120 --> 00:02:59,740 a busy working family, they're increasingly reliant on their 48 00:02:59,740 --> 00:03:03,340 smartphones. Dad Stephen is a personal trainer. 49 00:03:03,840 --> 00:03:09,740 Lucy is a busy working mum. And then there's 19-year-old Billy and the twins, 50 00:03:10,140 --> 00:03:12,040 Alfie and Louie. 51 00:03:13,020 --> 00:03:19,840 Thanks for letting me in. I just want to find out a little bit about you guys and 52 00:03:19,840 --> 00:03:22,500 how you use your tech. 53 00:03:22,820 --> 00:03:25,740 So I'm assuming you guys are glued to your phones. 54 00:03:26,240 --> 00:03:27,240 Sometimes. 55 00:03:27,700 --> 00:03:29,460 Sometimes. What? 56 00:03:29,900 --> 00:03:34,440 apps do you have on your smartphone what do you use most often uh most probably 57 00:03:34,440 --> 00:03:41,340 ticked up tick tock instagram snapchat louis the same snapchat instagram tick 58 00:03:41,340 --> 00:03:47,580 tock amazon music oh pinterest pinterest yeah that's quite sort of a posh 59 00:03:47,580 --> 00:03:54,000 instagram isn't it lucy asos zara okay i see where you're dressed as well and 60 00:03:54,000 --> 00:03:59,240 facebook On average, smartphone users like the Trussells have up to 20 61 00:03:59,240 --> 00:04:03,300 different apps running on their phones, each one collecting personal 62 00:04:03,300 --> 00:04:08,880 information. Steve, what about you? What would be your top five most used apps, 63 00:04:09,040 --> 00:04:09,679 would you say? 64 00:04:09,680 --> 00:04:11,400 Definitely Facebook, Instagram. 65 00:04:11,640 --> 00:04:15,720 I'm more Facebook than Instagram just because... But you use it for your work 66 00:04:15,720 --> 00:04:18,540 as well? Yeah, yeah. So here's a question then. Do you guys think your 67 00:04:18,540 --> 00:04:21,420 smartphones are spying on you? Are they listening in? 68 00:04:21,740 --> 00:04:23,800 No? No? I think so. 69 00:04:25,300 --> 00:04:27,100 Yes? 50-50. On the fence. 70 00:04:27,440 --> 00:04:32,000 So if I was to come to you and say, can you just give me all your search 71 00:04:32,000 --> 00:04:35,840 history, tell me all your friends, can I see all your chats as well and 72 00:04:35,840 --> 00:04:38,580 everything you've looked at and bought and everything you've talked about with 73 00:04:38,580 --> 00:04:40,420 your mates, would you share that with me? No. 74 00:04:40,900 --> 00:04:41,900 Well, why not? 75 00:04:42,140 --> 00:04:43,740 You're sharing it with your smartphone. 76 00:04:44,360 --> 00:04:45,700 Privacy concerns at all? 77 00:04:46,300 --> 00:04:50,380 No. I don't think we've got anything interesting to say. 78 00:04:51,550 --> 00:04:55,110 A lot of people think that they're no one special, but if you were no one 79 00:04:55,110 --> 00:04:59,230 special and you had nothing to hide, then all of these companies wouldn't be 80 00:04:59,230 --> 00:05:01,670 making such a big effort to get to your data. 81 00:05:04,090 --> 00:05:09,790 So how are our smartphones able to scoop up information about our private lives? 82 00:05:09,990 --> 00:05:12,910 To find out, I'm meeting up with an expert in cybersecurity. 83 00:05:13,730 --> 00:05:14,730 Big question. 84 00:05:15,030 --> 00:05:19,210 Is my smartphone spying on me? Is it spying on you? 85 00:05:19,610 --> 00:05:24,870 Yes. What they're after doing is finding out from you, by your activity on the 86 00:05:24,870 --> 00:05:30,110 phone, what you're doing. And how does that work? So how is this smartphone 87 00:05:30,110 --> 00:05:32,610 tracking me right now? 88 00:05:32,930 --> 00:05:35,930 So it knows where you've been. Yeah. It knows where you've searched. 89 00:05:36,150 --> 00:05:37,590 It knows what you've looked for. 90 00:05:37,910 --> 00:05:42,550 And it packages that information up and that'll be resold to advertising 91 00:05:42,550 --> 00:05:44,270 brokers. Does it know... 92 00:05:44,680 --> 00:05:45,760 who I'm with. 93 00:05:46,080 --> 00:05:48,480 Because this is something quite interesting. 94 00:05:48,840 --> 00:05:51,520 I'm sitting here, you've got your phone in your pocket. 95 00:05:52,020 --> 00:05:58,060 Do our phones right now, we're having this conversation, do they know that 96 00:05:58,060 --> 00:05:59,060 we're together? 97 00:05:59,360 --> 00:06:03,420 So here's the thing. The trackers know that our phones are in proximity. 98 00:06:03,860 --> 00:06:08,700 You've let your phone track you. You've let advertising trackers track your GPS 99 00:06:08,700 --> 00:06:11,880 coordinates. Is that why you think that that's a sort of a... 100 00:06:12,190 --> 00:06:17,530 It's a form of spying because I've not given permission to anyone to know that 101 00:06:17,530 --> 00:06:20,950 you and I are meeting today to do this bit of filming. That's not information 102 00:06:20,950 --> 00:06:24,610 that I've made readily available, but somewhere someone knows about it. It's 103 00:06:24,610 --> 00:06:26,090 quite creepy, isn't it? Yeah, it is. 104 00:06:29,330 --> 00:06:34,030 So if location trackers in our smartphones give away where we are, is 105 00:06:34,030 --> 00:06:37,750 it possible that they're also secretly listening into our conversations? 106 00:06:38,670 --> 00:06:43,250 Billion-dollar tech companies like Google, Apple, Meta and TikTok insist 107 00:06:43,250 --> 00:06:47,310 they don't target us with adverts by listening in to what we say. 108 00:06:48,050 --> 00:06:51,090 But try telling that to smartphone users in the UK. 109 00:06:51,510 --> 00:06:54,410 More than half simply don't believe them. 110 00:06:56,250 --> 00:07:00,850 So who's right? With the help of the Trussell family, I decided to test out 111 00:07:00,850 --> 00:07:03,710 if smartphones are secretly listening in. 112 00:07:04,610 --> 00:07:06,270 Lots of people have said, oh. 113 00:07:07,080 --> 00:07:12,880 I was talking with a friend, and we were talking about trampolines, never even 114 00:07:12,880 --> 00:07:16,340 searched for it, didn't put it in my phone. Next thing I know, on my 115 00:07:16,340 --> 00:07:20,340 Instagram feed, big advert for a trampoline. How is that possible unless 116 00:07:20,340 --> 00:07:24,160 these companies are listening in to those phones right now? 117 00:07:24,420 --> 00:07:29,920 I've brought in some subjects here, and here's the deal. Everybody picks a 118 00:07:29,920 --> 00:07:34,580 subject. I want you to talk about that subject as much as you can. 119 00:07:35,250 --> 00:07:36,950 particularly when you're around your phones. 120 00:07:37,190 --> 00:07:40,310 Keep mentioning the words, mention whatever it is that you've picked. 121 00:07:40,850 --> 00:07:43,010 But there is one hard and fast rule. 122 00:07:43,390 --> 00:07:47,650 Do not type that subject into any device. 123 00:07:48,010 --> 00:07:50,670 Never type it in for the next couple of weeks. 124 00:07:51,070 --> 00:07:55,130 And let's see what happens. Because the theory should be, if you don't type it 125 00:07:55,130 --> 00:07:58,230 in and you just talk about it, it shouldn't really come up on your phone. 126 00:07:58,410 --> 00:08:02,050 We'll save one familiar as well who's not here, but I'll put the topics, there 127 00:08:02,050 --> 00:08:03,570 we go. So who wants to pick what? 128 00:08:03,790 --> 00:08:04,790 Go ahead. 129 00:08:04,800 --> 00:08:09,760 Okay, and we'll leave Millie with... I think we've allocated her basketball. 130 00:08:10,220 --> 00:08:11,700 So, you've got vacuum cleaner. 131 00:08:11,940 --> 00:08:13,020 Yep. Do you know what that is? 132 00:08:14,480 --> 00:08:15,720 Whoa, whoa, whoa. 133 00:08:16,060 --> 00:08:17,660 Right, vacuum cleaner. Yep. 134 00:08:17,980 --> 00:08:18,980 Disneyland Paris. 135 00:08:19,180 --> 00:08:19,939 You ever been? 136 00:08:19,940 --> 00:08:21,400 No. Would you like to go? 137 00:08:21,600 --> 00:08:24,120 Yeah. Maybe you'll get an ad to go. 138 00:08:25,140 --> 00:08:26,280 Digital watch, Lucy. 139 00:08:26,600 --> 00:08:28,900 Yeah. Have you got one? No. Would you like one? 140 00:08:29,620 --> 00:08:30,620 No. 141 00:08:32,340 --> 00:08:33,340 And... 142 00:08:33,820 --> 00:08:38,820 For the luscious locks, curling tongs you've gone for. Right, so we're clear 143 00:08:38,820 --> 00:08:39,619 with the rules. 144 00:08:39,620 --> 00:08:42,900 Talk about them, talk about them amongst yourselves, particularly when you're 145 00:08:42,900 --> 00:08:43,859 around the phones. 146 00:08:43,860 --> 00:08:46,860 But please don't type that in to anything. 147 00:08:47,160 --> 00:08:50,000 And then we'll see how you get on. Okay. 148 00:08:50,200 --> 00:08:51,200 Good. 149 00:08:52,720 --> 00:08:57,160 Coming up, I'll be showing you how your smartphone finds out everything about 150 00:08:57,160 --> 00:09:01,420 you. Football? 100%. 100%. Here, we're going to put football just here. 151 00:09:02,120 --> 00:09:05,360 And how the Trussell family are getting on with our experiment. 152 00:09:06,320 --> 00:09:08,840 I want a Dyson vacuum cleaner. 153 00:09:09,080 --> 00:09:10,240 I want to go to Paris. 154 00:09:11,120 --> 00:09:15,860 I'll have advice on what you need to do to stop your phone from spying on you. 155 00:09:15,960 --> 00:09:19,820 I'm going to show you how to do that on both an Android phone and an Apple 156 00:09:19,820 --> 00:09:20,820 phone. 157 00:09:27,560 --> 00:09:31,780 Half of the British public, along with the Trussell family, suspect that their 158 00:09:31,780 --> 00:09:36,380 smartphones are listening in to their conversations in order to target them 159 00:09:36,380 --> 00:09:37,359 with ads. 160 00:09:37,360 --> 00:09:42,160 Social media giants and tech companies deny this, and many experts say they 161 00:09:42,160 --> 00:09:46,200 don't need to listen. They already know everything about us. 162 00:09:46,440 --> 00:09:47,440 There's so much... 163 00:09:47,600 --> 00:09:50,560 data that's being collected, so much that's being tracked about your 164 00:09:50,560 --> 00:09:53,560 behaviours and activities online, from the data that's being shared by your 165 00:09:53,560 --> 00:09:56,620 online interactions, including things that you post on social media, websites 166 00:09:56,620 --> 00:10:01,440 you visit, that they can build up such a detailed profile of you as an individual 167 00:10:01,440 --> 00:10:05,000 or as a consumer that they can predict what might be most interesting. 168 00:10:06,260 --> 00:10:09,900 So how do they gather all that personal information about us? 169 00:10:10,960 --> 00:10:13,400 I want to talk to you about cookies. 170 00:10:14,000 --> 00:10:17,780 Not this kind of cookie. This is for my friend Masai, who's going to be helping 171 00:10:17,780 --> 00:10:18,940 me out. It's for you. Cheers. 172 00:10:20,220 --> 00:10:24,880 Cookies, what are they? Well, they're little bits of data that websites store 173 00:10:24,880 --> 00:10:28,820 on your machine, on your smartphone, your laptop, your computer. 174 00:10:29,240 --> 00:10:34,100 And they're used to track you around the internet. So we're going to do a little 175 00:10:34,100 --> 00:10:35,140 visual experiment. 176 00:10:35,800 --> 00:10:39,060 I've got a bunch of topics here, and Masai is going to help me out. He's 177 00:10:39,060 --> 00:10:42,760 going to tell me whether this kind of topic is the kind of topic that he's 178 00:10:42,760 --> 00:10:47,620 ever looked for on the internet. Now, imagine this white coat that Masai is 179 00:10:47,620 --> 00:10:49,000 wearing. It's a clean coat. 180 00:10:49,640 --> 00:10:52,740 We know nothing about him. We don't know what he likes. We don't know what he 181 00:10:52,740 --> 00:10:55,060 doesn't like. He's a complete unknown. 182 00:10:55,640 --> 00:11:02,180 But this is how cookies start building a picture of what kind of person 183 00:11:02,180 --> 00:11:03,420 you are online. 184 00:11:03,680 --> 00:11:06,240 So, Masai, have you ever used maps online? 185 00:11:06,720 --> 00:11:08,420 Every day. Every day. OK. 186 00:11:08,800 --> 00:11:12,760 Maps. OK. So you use a train ticket. Have you tried to buy a train ticket? 187 00:11:13,240 --> 00:11:15,500 Most days when I travel, yeah. Most days when he travels. 188 00:11:16,100 --> 00:11:17,380 Knitting. Have you looked up knitting? 189 00:11:17,760 --> 00:11:18,699 Absolutely not. 190 00:11:18,700 --> 00:11:20,400 Absolutely not. We're not going to use that. 191 00:11:20,940 --> 00:11:21,940 Flights. Yes. 192 00:11:22,060 --> 00:11:23,460 Flights, yes. We like flights. 193 00:11:23,920 --> 00:11:25,220 News. Would you look at the news? 194 00:11:25,440 --> 00:11:28,000 I do look at the news. You do look at the news. So we know he likes news, 195 00:11:28,140 --> 00:11:31,580 maps, flights, train tickets, walking boots. You must have looked at some kind 196 00:11:31,580 --> 00:11:32,339 of walking boots. I have, actually. 197 00:11:32,340 --> 00:11:33,560 I have for work. Okay. 198 00:11:34,140 --> 00:11:35,140 Houses for sale. 199 00:11:35,220 --> 00:11:37,700 Do you know what? I actually always look at houses for sale. Always looks at 200 00:11:37,700 --> 00:11:38,700 houses for sale. 201 00:11:38,760 --> 00:11:39,760 Kittens. 202 00:11:39,880 --> 00:11:43,120 I'm more of a dog guy. Who hasn't looked at Kitten Smash? Stop lying. 203 00:11:43,760 --> 00:11:45,000 Biscuits, you've just had one. 204 00:11:45,400 --> 00:11:47,140 OK, social media. 205 00:11:47,420 --> 00:11:50,120 I'm on it more than anything. More than anything, that's there. 206 00:11:51,140 --> 00:11:52,140 President Trump. 207 00:11:52,240 --> 00:11:54,980 I'm always looking up Donald Trump. Are you? OK, Donald Trump there. 208 00:11:55,540 --> 00:11:56,540 Betting? Yes. 209 00:11:56,620 --> 00:11:58,120 OK, a big yes there. 210 00:11:58,380 --> 00:11:59,700 Insurance, you've got to have insurance. 211 00:11:59,920 --> 00:12:00,499 Yeah, car insurance. 212 00:12:00,500 --> 00:12:01,780 Car insurance, there we go. 213 00:12:02,190 --> 00:12:03,029 Nail bar. 214 00:12:03,030 --> 00:12:04,670 I haven't. You haven't? Well, I have before. 215 00:12:05,490 --> 00:12:08,870 Nail bar. OK, Masai. We're getting to find out more and more things. Football. 216 00:12:09,110 --> 00:12:13,210 100%. 100%. Here, we're going to put football just here. Online banking. 217 00:12:13,450 --> 00:12:15,410 Oh, every day. Every day. OK. 218 00:12:16,110 --> 00:12:17,110 I'm running out of space. 219 00:12:17,290 --> 00:12:19,070 Smartwatch. Yes, I have an Apple Watch. 220 00:12:19,290 --> 00:12:20,890 You have an Apple Watch. OK, he's there. 221 00:12:21,210 --> 00:12:23,890 Holidays. We've established that, yes, you look at holidays. 222 00:12:24,550 --> 00:12:26,190 Photo book. Make photos. OK. 223 00:12:27,980 --> 00:12:34,460 That's just some topics that we chose random. But look at what we've got now, 224 00:12:34,660 --> 00:12:40,260 right? We've got a much better picture of what Masai likes and what he doesn't 225 00:12:40,260 --> 00:12:45,520 like. So imagine this is Masai's persona when he's surfing the internet. 226 00:12:45,740 --> 00:12:52,200 And when he lands on a web page that is full of ads, what happens is those ads 227 00:12:52,200 --> 00:12:55,440 take a look at all of this. 228 00:12:56,110 --> 00:13:01,510 and they bid amongst each other to show him the ad that they think Masai is 229 00:13:01,510 --> 00:13:02,349 going to like. 230 00:13:02,350 --> 00:13:05,510 Now, my coat, if we were to do this experiment, would look completely 231 00:13:05,510 --> 00:13:09,530 different from that, and yours looks completely different from that. And we 232 00:13:09,530 --> 00:13:14,950 each have an individual coat, if you like, made up of these subjects, these 233 00:13:14,950 --> 00:13:18,870 cookies, and we wear it everywhere we go online. 234 00:13:19,190 --> 00:13:22,650 And based on that, we get ads, we get information. 235 00:13:23,320 --> 00:13:28,680 tailored to us and this is why you get ads following you around the internet 236 00:13:28,680 --> 00:13:35,480 like the plague every bit of information they can gather about you is 237 00:13:35,480 --> 00:13:40,780 used by social media platforms data brokers and third-party companies to 238 00:13:40,780 --> 00:13:41,780 profile you 239 00:13:42,920 --> 00:13:48,340 Behavioral profiling is the way companies form a picture of you, and 240 00:13:48,340 --> 00:13:52,060 they classify you in all these boxes. So they want to know what your purchasing 241 00:13:52,060 --> 00:13:56,040 power is, what kind of things interest you, what kind of things drive you, or 242 00:13:56,040 --> 00:14:00,840 the buttons that they can press that will make you do one thing or another. 243 00:14:01,160 --> 00:14:03,800 And that profile is for sale. 244 00:14:04,420 --> 00:14:08,560 It might be bought by an insurance company, by a bank, by a prospective 245 00:14:08,560 --> 00:14:10,740 employer, by a government. 246 00:14:14,090 --> 00:14:18,050 Back with the Trussells, our family are chatting about their chosen topics 247 00:14:18,050 --> 00:14:21,710 around their smartphones to see if any ads pop up. 248 00:14:22,850 --> 00:14:27,330 Every day at work, I'm in front of five or six different clients. 249 00:14:27,770 --> 00:14:30,370 So every day I've been able to almost talk about it. 250 00:14:30,670 --> 00:14:32,050 Really like a Dyson. 251 00:14:32,550 --> 00:14:35,850 But you keep saying that to your wife. I really like a Dyson. 252 00:14:36,290 --> 00:14:39,770 I also talk to the cat quite a lot. So, you know, I've asked her if she knows 253 00:14:39,770 --> 00:14:42,050 anything about curling. She's not really been able to reply. 254 00:14:43,230 --> 00:14:44,410 This has been no use at all. 255 00:14:44,990 --> 00:14:48,270 Where would you get curling tongs from? How would you buy curling tongs? Where 256 00:14:48,270 --> 00:14:50,250 would you look for curling tongs? Online? 257 00:14:51,030 --> 00:14:53,370 Or would you go to a shop to get your curling tongs? 258 00:14:55,030 --> 00:14:59,950 Under UK data laws, our smartphones and devices should never be listening in on 259 00:14:59,950 --> 00:15:05,570 us or tracking our activities unless we give our permission. But how many of us 260 00:15:05,570 --> 00:15:09,710 say yes to cookies and permissions on our apps and websites, clicking the 261 00:15:09,710 --> 00:15:10,710 consent button? 262 00:15:10,890 --> 00:15:13,270 because it's so much easier than saying no. 263 00:15:17,550 --> 00:15:18,190 In 264 00:15:18,190 --> 00:15:34,450 saying 265 00:15:34,450 --> 00:15:38,990 yes, we can be opening the door to surveillance of our most sensitive 266 00:15:38,990 --> 00:15:39,990 information. 267 00:15:40,480 --> 00:15:45,500 Matilda Davis signed up to social media when she was just 11 and regularly uses 268 00:15:45,500 --> 00:15:46,960 Instagram and Facebook. 269 00:15:47,280 --> 00:15:52,560 She's become much more vigilant after discovering how much of her health and 270 00:15:52,560 --> 00:15:55,000 financial information Meta was collecting. 271 00:15:55,320 --> 00:16:00,700 Give me an idea of what stuff jumped out at you that surprised you that they knew 272 00:16:00,700 --> 00:16:05,700 about. There was a lot of information about health on there, so... 273 00:16:06,200 --> 00:16:11,040 I use an app to get my prescriptions, which is not the NHS app, it's a private 274 00:16:11,040 --> 00:16:16,100 app. And so every time I opened that app, ordered a prescription, paid for a 275 00:16:16,100 --> 00:16:19,940 prescription, that app was sending that information to Meta. 276 00:16:20,260 --> 00:16:24,620 What? Had you at any point agreed to that information to be shared with 277 00:16:24,620 --> 00:16:27,660 Facebook? Not that I had consciously realised. 278 00:16:28,280 --> 00:16:32,960 Right, OK, so health information had gone to Facebook without you knowing it. 279 00:16:33,020 --> 00:16:35,280 What else? It went so granular that... 280 00:16:35,610 --> 00:16:42,310 If I went onto an NHS Trust website, clicked to find advice about 281 00:16:42,310 --> 00:16:47,810 bowel cancer, for example, Meta had all of that information. 282 00:16:48,330 --> 00:16:50,310 It's a serious invasion of privacy. 283 00:16:50,810 --> 00:16:54,650 Hugely, yeah. So one of the other areas that really stood out to me was 284 00:16:54,650 --> 00:16:55,650 financial information. 285 00:16:55,810 --> 00:17:01,750 So things like my online banking apps were all, every time I opened the app... 286 00:17:02,060 --> 00:17:03,920 were sending that information to Meta. 287 00:17:04,720 --> 00:17:09,599 Anytime I looked up financial advice online for a mortgage or things like 288 00:17:09,599 --> 00:17:12,500 that, that was also all being sent to Meta. 289 00:17:12,780 --> 00:17:14,240 This is just outrageous. 290 00:17:15,000 --> 00:17:16,280 Yeah, absolutely horrifying. 291 00:17:16,980 --> 00:17:23,640 For me, what I started thinking was, how personal am I willing 292 00:17:23,640 --> 00:17:25,579 to go with this data? 293 00:17:26,060 --> 00:17:30,960 Like, if some of my, like, deepest held kind of secret... 294 00:17:32,000 --> 00:17:36,680 personal thoughts, am I willing to hand those over to advertisers to let them do 295 00:17:36,680 --> 00:17:37,680 whatever they want with? 296 00:17:38,000 --> 00:17:42,300 And for me, the answer is no. That, to me, feels like an invasion of privacy. 297 00:17:44,040 --> 00:17:45,420 Data can be very abstract. 298 00:17:46,090 --> 00:17:50,330 hard to get your head around it. But if you were to make it physical, you can 299 00:17:50,330 --> 00:17:54,530 imagine yourself going shopping and every time you enter a store, when you 300 00:17:54,530 --> 00:17:58,690 leave, instead of just leaving with your products, you leave with a spy who's 301 00:17:58,690 --> 00:18:03,050 walking right behind you into the next store and into the doctor's office and 302 00:18:03,050 --> 00:18:05,410 into your neighbor's house and then into your own bedroom. 303 00:18:07,149 --> 00:18:11,930 This is one of the most popular news gathering websites on the planet, okay? 304 00:18:12,110 --> 00:18:15,130 They make it very easy for you to hit accept. It's a nice big green button. 305 00:18:15,270 --> 00:18:19,210 But if you decide to look a little bit further into what you're accepting, 306 00:18:19,510 --> 00:18:22,010 well, then it tells a whole different story. 307 00:18:22,310 --> 00:18:26,110 Glasses on because the print gets really small, which is part of the problem. 308 00:18:26,490 --> 00:18:32,710 Okay, so if I click accept, there's a word called partners here. If we click 309 00:18:32,710 --> 00:18:33,710 on that... 310 00:18:33,850 --> 00:18:37,430 They're telling us who they're working with. So they're saying, look, if you 311 00:18:37,430 --> 00:18:42,150 accept, we're going to use your personal data and we're going to share it with 312 00:18:42,150 --> 00:18:43,009 our partners. 313 00:18:43,010 --> 00:18:44,630 So how many partners have you got? 314 00:18:44,990 --> 00:18:51,870 Well, in this occasion, 1,276 different partners who may access 315 00:18:51,870 --> 00:18:55,510 data from my session on this website. 316 00:18:55,850 --> 00:18:59,850 Now, if you scroll a little bit further down, store or access information on 317 00:18:59,850 --> 00:19:00,829 device. 318 00:19:00,830 --> 00:19:03,610 that's pretty important these these companies are going to be able to put 319 00:19:03,610 --> 00:19:09,070 stuff on my device or read stuff from my device so if i click on that how many 320 00:19:09,070 --> 00:19:15,070 549 vendors of people i've never heard of who are going to either put something 321 00:19:15,070 --> 00:19:21,550 on my phone or read something from my phone now all that to 322 00:19:21,550 --> 00:19:28,070 access this news website i'm not quite sure people are aware of how 323 00:19:28,070 --> 00:19:29,070 much 324 00:19:29,440 --> 00:19:32,980 They're giving permission to be used across the internet. 325 00:19:34,980 --> 00:19:38,500 Those things are deliberately written in an inaccessible way. 326 00:19:38,720 --> 00:19:42,000 But if that information hasn't been communicated in a way that is 327 00:19:42,000 --> 00:19:45,720 transparent and accessible, that consent is not fully informed. It's not 328 00:19:45,720 --> 00:19:50,000 meaningful. That's a real problem for enabling people to make informed 329 00:19:50,000 --> 00:19:51,000 choices. 330 00:19:51,920 --> 00:19:56,520 Even if you do read the small print, it doesn't always stop the tech giants from 331 00:19:56,520 --> 00:19:58,100 using your personal information. 332 00:19:58,640 --> 00:20:02,720 to target you with ads that you might not want or that could be harmful 333 00:20:02,720 --> 00:20:09,640 tanya o'carroll has taken the bold step of 334 00:20:09,640 --> 00:20:15,400 suing the multi-billion dollar tech giant meta in a bid to stop this it got 335 00:20:15,400 --> 00:20:21,400 very personal for me when i was pregnant in 2017 and realized for the first time 336 00:20:21,400 --> 00:20:25,580 that you know an experience that many people watching may have also had of 337 00:20:25,580 --> 00:20:30,280 realizing that um facebook knows something that even some of your family 338 00:20:30,280 --> 00:20:33,400 and friends don't yet know which in my case was that i was pregnant and that i 339 00:20:33,400 --> 00:20:37,460 started seeing these ads popping up around life as a parent and as a mother 340 00:20:37,460 --> 00:20:40,820 and i remember it being very jarring because i just at the time it just was 341 00:20:40,820 --> 00:20:41,960 too it was too new 342 00:20:43,690 --> 00:20:47,830 I felt that this was quite creepy and invasive and went into the advertising 343 00:20:47,830 --> 00:20:51,910 settings and found that there was hundreds of these behavioral traits, 344 00:20:52,090 --> 00:20:56,310 characteristics about me that Facebook had decided were things that I was 345 00:20:56,310 --> 00:20:59,550 interested in or things about me that they were selling to advertisers. 346 00:20:59,930 --> 00:21:03,470 And among them, I found more than one that were to do with pregnancy and 347 00:21:03,470 --> 00:21:08,490 birth. Tanya switched these off, detagging them so that she would stop 348 00:21:08,490 --> 00:21:11,070 receiving adverts and posts about pregnancy. 349 00:21:11,450 --> 00:21:12,850 But they didn't stop. 350 00:21:13,400 --> 00:21:19,100 And it felt to me that there was this incredibly invasive just profiling going 351 00:21:19,100 --> 00:21:23,140 on that I had absolutely no agency over and no control over. 352 00:21:23,760 --> 00:21:28,080 Tanya had a healthy baby, but many mothers have complained that Meta has 353 00:21:28,080 --> 00:21:32,760 continued to haunt them with adverts about babies and motherhood after 354 00:21:32,760 --> 00:21:35,480 they've suffered a miscarriage or pregnancy loss. 355 00:21:35,720 --> 00:21:39,320 Like Tanya, their efforts to block the adverts failed. 356 00:21:39,660 --> 00:21:41,480 Really, this case is about giving back. 357 00:21:41,930 --> 00:21:47,230 users and individuals a chance to choose how their data is used online and to say 358 00:21:47,230 --> 00:21:52,270 you know you may be a vital piece of communications infrastructure so I don't 359 00:21:52,270 --> 00:21:56,150 feel I can leave but I want to turn off the surveillance part which is able to 360 00:21:56,150 --> 00:21:58,610 gather so much intimate and intrusive data about my life. 361 00:21:59,450 --> 00:22:04,050 Since this interview Meta settled with Tanya just days before going to trial. 362 00:22:04,430 --> 00:22:09,090 They have agreed to stop using personal information to target individuals with 363 00:22:09,090 --> 00:22:10,090 ads. 364 00:22:12,050 --> 00:22:16,830 Information we share online can also be collected by data brokers and sold to 365 00:22:16,830 --> 00:22:19,750 businesses, from insurers to loan companies. 366 00:22:20,610 --> 00:22:23,990 So when data gets collected, it gets sold in lists. 367 00:22:24,270 --> 00:22:28,890 And one is the list that marketing companies use to target people, and the 368 00:22:28,890 --> 00:22:32,090 other is the list that data brokers use to sell this data on. 369 00:22:32,850 --> 00:22:36,530 These can be based on income, political preferences, age. 370 00:22:36,790 --> 00:22:40,370 You might be a new mum, a value shopper, or a theatre lover. 371 00:22:40,940 --> 00:22:44,620 But there can also be a darker side to some data broker lists. 372 00:22:45,700 --> 00:22:51,600 And they include things like women who have been the victims of rape, men who 373 00:22:51,600 --> 00:22:57,080 suffer from premature ejaculation, patients who suffer from HIV, people who 374 00:22:57,080 --> 00:23:00,340 have lost a child, people who tend to be paranoid. 375 00:23:00,860 --> 00:23:05,860 So you can see how what they're looking for is where you hurt, what makes you 376 00:23:05,860 --> 00:23:07,200 vulnerable, what makes you tick. 377 00:23:07,640 --> 00:23:11,320 Because if they know what makes you vulnerable, they know how to influence 378 00:23:11,320 --> 00:23:13,660 your behaviour and they know what they can sell to you. 379 00:23:14,320 --> 00:23:18,700 Coming up, I'll be discovering how some smart devices can keep a watchful eye on 380 00:23:18,700 --> 00:23:19,700 us in our homes. 381 00:23:20,960 --> 00:23:25,680 The one we tested actually was tracking your precise location 250 times in just 382 00:23:25,680 --> 00:23:26,619 five minutes. 383 00:23:26,620 --> 00:23:29,120 So it was literally going, where are you, where are you, where are you, where 384 00:23:29,120 --> 00:23:29,899 are you? 385 00:23:29,900 --> 00:23:33,620 And I'll be finding out what can go wrong when our personal information 386 00:23:33,620 --> 00:23:35,380 falls into criminals' hands. 387 00:23:36,250 --> 00:23:37,770 I felt quite sick. 388 00:23:37,970 --> 00:23:42,470 I was more upset for the fact that I had fallen for it, I think, than the loss of 389 00:23:42,470 --> 00:23:43,069 the money. 390 00:23:43,070 --> 00:23:44,070 Wow. 391 00:23:44,290 --> 00:23:45,290 That is scary. 392 00:23:53,270 --> 00:23:55,490 Alexa, what's the weather today? 393 00:23:55,810 --> 00:23:56,810 Good morning, Lucy. 394 00:23:57,070 --> 00:23:58,070 Good morning. 395 00:23:58,570 --> 00:24:01,390 It's two degrees Celsius with cloudy skies. 396 00:24:01,630 --> 00:24:02,429 Oh, what? 397 00:24:02,430 --> 00:24:03,570 It's forecast to fog. 398 00:24:04,880 --> 00:24:09,840 In the Trussell household, smartphones aren't the only devices keeping tabs on 399 00:24:09,840 --> 00:24:14,500 them. One in three UK households now have a smart speaker, like an Amazon 400 00:24:14,500 --> 00:24:15,500 Alexa. 401 00:24:15,780 --> 00:24:19,400 84% of families have some sort of smart entertainment. 402 00:24:20,180 --> 00:24:24,920 Everything from our printers to our fridges and doorbells want to know who 403 00:24:24,920 --> 00:24:26,680 we are and what we're doing. 404 00:24:32,010 --> 00:24:36,130 Consumer Association Which has been testing these devices and found that 405 00:24:36,130 --> 00:24:40,830 many of them collect far more personal information about us than is needed for 406 00:24:40,830 --> 00:24:45,110 the product to function, sharing data with the likes of TikTok, Meta and 407 00:24:45,110 --> 00:24:46,110 Google. 408 00:24:46,470 --> 00:24:50,370 Let's talk about some of the products you've actually looked at, which we've 409 00:24:50,370 --> 00:24:54,630 got some of them here. Yes. I'm really intrigued because I've got a special 410 00:24:54,630 --> 00:24:57,750 relationship with air fryers. What's it sharing about you? 411 00:24:58,080 --> 00:25:03,160 It could be how often and frequently you cook, what times you cook, what you like 412 00:25:03,160 --> 00:25:03,899 to cook. 413 00:25:03,900 --> 00:25:07,560 I mean, all these things seem quite innocuous in singularity. And people 414 00:25:07,560 --> 00:25:11,360 often think, oh, well, I've got nothing to hide, so why should I care? 415 00:25:12,190 --> 00:25:16,170 I don't really see it that way. I much more see it what someone else has got to 416 00:25:16,170 --> 00:25:17,710 gain from understanding that. 417 00:25:17,910 --> 00:25:22,030 Because knowing, say, maybe 10,000, 20,000, 100,000 people like to cook 418 00:25:22,030 --> 00:25:26,050 across a geographic area, you can certainly see how that data is valuable. 419 00:25:26,350 --> 00:25:28,670 It's also quite intrusive as well when you think about it. 420 00:25:28,910 --> 00:25:32,490 That's my personal home life. I don't necessarily want it broadcast to the 421 00:25:32,490 --> 00:25:36,690 world, you know? The witch research looked at several different air fryers. 422 00:25:37,130 --> 00:25:41,370 Did you find it was sharing anything else about people, stuff away from 423 00:25:41,370 --> 00:25:44,850 Airfryer? Well, a lot of time it requests this information, so it might, 424 00:25:44,910 --> 00:25:48,770 on the account setup, ask, you know, your name, your address, your date of 425 00:25:48,770 --> 00:25:49,770 birth even sometimes. 426 00:25:49,970 --> 00:25:51,050 Where's that information going? 427 00:25:51,510 --> 00:25:56,110 All over the world. I mean, it could be servers and locations in Europe, in the 428 00:25:56,110 --> 00:25:57,550 UK. It could be America. 429 00:25:57,770 --> 00:26:00,690 It could be as far afield as, say, Russia, China. 430 00:26:01,030 --> 00:26:05,730 And will it share things related to your social media accounts, for example? 431 00:26:06,520 --> 00:26:11,260 A lot of the times when you download apps, it will give you the option to log 432 00:26:11,260 --> 00:26:17,680 on through your social media. Log on via Google, Facebook, X, or using those 433 00:26:17,680 --> 00:26:22,600 accounts. What happens if you do that? Are you giving the keys to your social 434 00:26:22,600 --> 00:26:24,840 media account to your air fryer? 435 00:26:25,480 --> 00:26:26,480 Often, yes. 436 00:26:26,620 --> 00:26:30,180 And actually, I always say to people to be very cautious about logging in that 437 00:26:30,180 --> 00:26:32,900 way because usually there is a much bigger data trade-off. 438 00:26:33,390 --> 00:26:36,330 But equally, you might think, well, I don't use Facebook. Well, actually, 439 00:26:36,470 --> 00:26:38,430 Facebook's got your data, whether you like it or not. 440 00:26:38,650 --> 00:26:42,990 Wait a minute. So I don't have a Facebook account, but I'm using the 441 00:26:42,990 --> 00:26:47,670 smart speaker, the air fryer, the smartphone and the watch. 442 00:26:48,630 --> 00:26:52,210 And I'm sending my data to Facebook, even though I don't have an account. 443 00:26:52,430 --> 00:26:53,430 Yeah, absolutely. 444 00:26:54,090 --> 00:26:58,670 And then there's the smartwatch. Around four million people use them to keep fit 445 00:26:58,670 --> 00:26:59,770 and monitor their health. 446 00:27:00,870 --> 00:27:05,890 You also looked at a wearable, smart watches. What did you find they were 447 00:27:05,890 --> 00:27:08,730 sharing? A smart watch can take a huge amount of information. 448 00:27:08,970 --> 00:27:13,350 You know, we think about, like, kind of the health and well-being stats that we 449 00:27:13,350 --> 00:27:16,530 tend to put in these things. This one's actually quite sort of basic, but 450 00:27:16,530 --> 00:27:20,250 there's ones which can take a range of different metrics about how you sleep, 451 00:27:20,450 --> 00:27:24,650 your hydration, your diet, even potentially with some of your mental 452 00:27:24,650 --> 00:27:29,380 health. um and that is really sensitive information the one we tested a few 453 00:27:29,380 --> 00:27:34,340 years ago actually was tracking your precise location 250 times in just five 454 00:27:34,340 --> 00:27:37,420 minutes so it was literally going where are you where are you where are you 455 00:27:37,420 --> 00:27:43,680 where are you it is a little bit strange that the majority of the people in the 456 00:27:43,680 --> 00:27:48,900 uk don't want things like id cards for example And yet they're very happy to 457 00:27:48,900 --> 00:27:54,340 share their data on social media or with apps that control their air fryers or 458 00:27:54,340 --> 00:27:55,339 their toasters. 459 00:27:55,340 --> 00:27:57,200 It doesn't seem to make sense. 460 00:27:57,480 --> 00:28:02,720 What really doesn't make sense is that we have yet to grasp that our data, our 461 00:28:02,720 --> 00:28:07,000 names, our addresses, what we do, where we eat, where we travel, all that 462 00:28:07,000 --> 00:28:11,120 information is possibly the most valuable commodity on the planet. 463 00:28:11,340 --> 00:28:13,240 And we're just giving it away for free. 464 00:28:14,720 --> 00:28:16,060 So we live in the UK. 465 00:28:16,560 --> 00:28:20,020 But the problem is these ad tracking companies are global and they will sell 466 00:28:20,020 --> 00:28:25,160 our data to whoever wants to pay for it. So it could be sold in a territory 467 00:28:25,160 --> 00:28:28,340 where, for example, they don't have the same levels of data protection. 468 00:28:28,580 --> 00:28:30,020 So we need to be really careful. 469 00:28:30,220 --> 00:28:34,860 It's not just about us living in the UK. This is a global market for our data. 470 00:28:43,710 --> 00:28:48,690 have all suffered data breaches exposing millions of people's data to cyber 471 00:28:48,690 --> 00:28:54,710 criminals your personal data is constantly in demand if you want to sign 472 00:28:54,710 --> 00:28:58,430 up to any online services you're going to have to give a lot of information 473 00:28:58,430 --> 00:29:01,370 away sometimes a little too much information 474 00:29:02,090 --> 00:29:06,550 Take this clothing website. It's one of the UK's most popular websites to buy 475 00:29:06,550 --> 00:29:09,830 clothes on. They ask for name and address. Fair enough, they're going to 476 00:29:09,830 --> 00:29:11,730 send you stuff. Your email address, okay. 477 00:29:12,010 --> 00:29:13,990 But they also want to know my date of birth. 478 00:29:14,330 --> 00:29:18,170 Why do I have to give my date of birth in order to buy some trousers? 479 00:29:18,550 --> 00:29:23,170 Now remember, the more personal data you give away about yourself, the more 480 00:29:23,170 --> 00:29:25,910 targeted you can be by cyber criminals. 481 00:29:34,700 --> 00:29:40,040 For the best part of 20 years, Eleanor Young has been helping to raise funds to 482 00:29:40,040 --> 00:29:43,120 save a medieval churchyard close to her home. 483 00:29:43,560 --> 00:29:48,660 It meant becoming more active online, and it has left her wondering whether 484 00:29:48,660 --> 00:29:52,900 that's how criminals got the information they used to defraud her. 485 00:29:53,840 --> 00:29:56,160 It started with a phone call. 486 00:29:57,160 --> 00:30:00,460 This very polite gentleman introduced himself. 487 00:30:01,210 --> 00:30:06,670 and said he was phoning from the fraud department about my bank account because 488 00:30:06,670 --> 00:30:09,670 there had been unusual transactions. 489 00:30:11,610 --> 00:30:16,490 And he said, well, for security, he would need to go through one or two bits 490 00:30:16,490 --> 00:30:17,389 and pieces. 491 00:30:17,390 --> 00:30:20,050 He confirmed my address. 492 00:30:20,390 --> 00:30:22,850 He confirmed my date of birth. 493 00:30:23,110 --> 00:30:28,910 And just for security, he confirmed the last transaction that had been on my 494 00:30:28,910 --> 00:30:29,910 bank account. 495 00:30:30,890 --> 00:30:35,630 That was what convinced me. The fact that he knew how much money I had spent 496 00:30:35,630 --> 00:30:41,330 recently. Next thing he said that because of this they would need to close 497 00:30:41,330 --> 00:30:47,890 my account and open a new account as soon as possible and that I should 498 00:30:47,890 --> 00:30:53,110 immediately go to the branch and withdraw three and a half thousand 499 00:30:53,110 --> 00:30:54,110 pounds. 500 00:30:54,990 --> 00:30:58,710 Convinced that only the bank could know her most recent transactions. 501 00:30:59,400 --> 00:31:04,060 When the man called again, this time ringing her mobile phone, she followed 502 00:31:04,060 --> 00:31:05,060 his instructions. 503 00:31:05,500 --> 00:31:11,640 I was told to put the money in an envelope and I came home and the next 504 00:31:11,640 --> 00:31:17,060 thing is a courier, the courier supposedly, arrived. He was dressed in 505 00:31:17,060 --> 00:31:20,140 black. He was wearing a black Covid mask. 506 00:31:20,820 --> 00:31:25,840 He gave me the code number and that was it. I handed it over. 507 00:31:27,280 --> 00:31:30,420 My husband's busy saying, what are you doing, what are you doing? And I 508 00:31:30,420 --> 00:31:35,040 couldn't even tell him. I was choked. I was choked up and couldn't tell him for 509 00:31:35,040 --> 00:31:35,839 a while. 510 00:31:35,840 --> 00:31:41,280 I felt quite sick, absolutely sick. I was more upset for the fact that I had 511 00:31:41,280 --> 00:31:45,160 fallen for it, I think, than the loss of the money. 512 00:31:45,820 --> 00:31:48,160 Eleanor didn't get her money back. 513 00:31:48,500 --> 00:31:50,620 The criminals were never caught. 514 00:31:51,040 --> 00:31:55,400 To this day, she doesn't know where they got her personal information from. 515 00:31:56,240 --> 00:32:00,940 It's always quite tricky to be able to tell where a breach happened when 516 00:32:00,940 --> 00:32:04,320 someone's personal details were stolen. 517 00:32:04,580 --> 00:32:10,040 But with Eleanor's case, we think we know maybe where the problem came. So we 518 00:32:10,040 --> 00:32:14,240 checked her email address. We put it in one of those websites. We could check if 519 00:32:14,240 --> 00:32:16,840 that email address has been involved in a data breach. 520 00:32:17,120 --> 00:32:21,020 And I've put Eleanor's email address here, and she's been part of seven. 521 00:32:21,560 --> 00:32:28,140 breaches now two very very big ones one is a genealogy website where just about 522 00:32:28,140 --> 00:32:33,800 90 million customers had their details stolen and a social media website as 523 00:32:33,800 --> 00:32:39,100 well where about 200 million details were stolen now look the problem arises 524 00:32:39,100 --> 00:32:44,860 when people use the same email address and password to protect different things 525 00:32:44,860 --> 00:32:50,480 because if that information is out on the world wide web and you're in trouble 526 00:32:53,260 --> 00:32:58,400 Jake Moore is an expert in cybersecurity and a former police officer working in 527 00:32:58,400 --> 00:32:59,660 digital forensics. 528 00:33:00,000 --> 00:33:04,840 He's uncovered evidence of how criminals get access to people's emails and 529 00:33:04,840 --> 00:33:10,740 passwords through data breaches and then sell them or even release them for free 530 00:33:10,740 --> 00:33:12,340 on social media platforms. 531 00:33:13,050 --> 00:33:16,550 If I was to go to one platform, in fact, I'm going to use Telegram. 532 00:33:17,330 --> 00:33:20,710 It's like a social media, but it also acts as a messaging platform. 533 00:33:20,990 --> 00:33:26,470 I can simply type in a word that I know is associated with these data breaches, 534 00:33:26,510 --> 00:33:31,270 and it'll list all of the corresponding usernames and passwords. 535 00:33:31,570 --> 00:33:35,910 So if I go and click that in right now, and then open what is actually a very 536 00:33:35,910 --> 00:33:38,350 big file, right, it's loaded. 537 00:33:38,970 --> 00:33:45,330 uh yeah i am now looking at 380 000 usernames and passwords that are 538 00:33:45,330 --> 00:33:50,770 connected with spotify netflix and others very easy that's how quick it was 539 00:33:56,490 --> 00:34:00,690 I asked Jake to visit the Trussell family and find out whether their use of 540 00:34:00,690 --> 00:34:05,270 smartphones could have led to their logins and passwords being hacked and 541 00:34:05,270 --> 00:34:09,170 sold on. Hi, how you doing? Nice to meet you. They're most commonly sold on the 542 00:34:09,170 --> 00:34:13,469 dark web, a part of the internet that's not accessible using regular web 543 00:34:13,469 --> 00:34:18,429 browsers. And it's a place where criminality flourishes because users are 544 00:34:18,429 --> 00:34:19,889 able to remain anonymous. 545 00:34:20,550 --> 00:34:25,120 So... We've had a look at your information to see what's actually out 546 00:34:25,120 --> 00:34:30,699 there on the dark web. So, am I right in thinking that I've got a couple of your 547 00:34:30,699 --> 00:34:36,060 emails here, lucy.juicy, for example? Yeah. 548 00:34:36,540 --> 00:34:42,699 So, would I be right in thinking these three may be some of your passwords? 549 00:34:43,679 --> 00:34:44,638 Yeah, yeah. 550 00:34:44,639 --> 00:34:47,260 Do you use the same password across...? Yeah. 551 00:34:48,639 --> 00:34:49,639 That's bad. 552 00:34:50,170 --> 00:34:55,489 One in five people use the same password across multiple websites, and more than 553 00:34:55,489 --> 00:35:00,070 half use easily identifiable information like birth dates or the names of their 554 00:35:00,070 --> 00:35:01,390 family or pets. 555 00:35:01,830 --> 00:35:08,110 So when someone gets hold of, say, one password from one data attack, they're 556 00:35:08,110 --> 00:35:10,670 then able to use it across all your other accounts. 557 00:35:10,890 --> 00:35:14,990 Now they're potentially into your social media or into your email, and then 558 00:35:14,990 --> 00:35:17,830 they've got access to pretty much everything that you've got access to. 559 00:35:20,170 --> 00:35:21,890 A little bit worrying? A little bit. Yeah. 560 00:35:22,390 --> 00:35:28,130 It's really important to have unique passwords for all of your apps and never 561 00:35:28,130 --> 00:35:30,770 to use the same password more than once. 562 00:35:31,010 --> 00:35:32,310 So what about Stephen? 563 00:35:32,630 --> 00:35:36,230 Was Jake able to find his personal information on the dark web? 564 00:35:36,530 --> 00:35:40,570 So there's one other email address that I had a look at, and I believe it might 565 00:35:40,570 --> 00:35:45,050 be yours, Stephen, and it's got a connected password with this email 566 00:35:45,050 --> 00:35:48,710 address. Yeah. Now, just take a look at this and tell me if that is actually... 567 00:35:49,150 --> 00:35:50,230 A corresponding password. 568 00:35:52,770 --> 00:35:57,730 That is something I've used, yes. Yeah. So it would be connected to, say, some 569 00:35:57,730 --> 00:36:01,790 personal information to you that criminals could take advantage of. 570 00:36:02,030 --> 00:36:03,030 Wow. 571 00:36:03,230 --> 00:36:04,230 That is scary. 572 00:36:05,470 --> 00:36:06,710 But there was more. 573 00:36:07,010 --> 00:36:10,830 Stephen's personal information has been put up for sale on the dark web not 574 00:36:10,830 --> 00:36:12,230 once, but twice. 575 00:36:12,590 --> 00:36:17,050 So is this the email that you use for this fitness app? 576 00:36:17,310 --> 00:36:21,840 Yes. Okay, well, I have to say, unfortunately, a few years ago, that 577 00:36:21,840 --> 00:36:26,200 fitness app had all of its information breached in a cyber attack. 578 00:36:26,580 --> 00:36:31,580 And your email address, and therefore all of your information, was scooped up 579 00:36:31,580 --> 00:36:36,680 in there. So it might be worth looking at what information you've given that 580 00:36:36,680 --> 00:36:40,820 app, and I would advise to change the password for that app as well. Okay. 581 00:36:42,240 --> 00:36:45,020 So how surprised are you at what we found here? 582 00:36:45,360 --> 00:36:47,580 Very. Yeah, it's eye-opening. 583 00:36:48,170 --> 00:36:52,430 quite what's out there and how easy it is, I guess, you know, and how easy 584 00:36:52,430 --> 00:36:56,130 we're also making it, you know, at the same time, you know, like opening the 585 00:36:56,130 --> 00:36:57,130 door and letting them in. 586 00:36:57,410 --> 00:37:01,850 Coming up, as our experiment comes to an end, I'll be finding out whether the 587 00:37:01,850 --> 00:37:04,510 Trussell smartphones are listening in. 588 00:37:04,970 --> 00:37:08,310 So we have had conversations at the dinner table and, you know, I've tried 589 00:37:08,310 --> 00:37:10,990 to remind everyone to try and talk about it as much as possible. 590 00:37:11,250 --> 00:37:15,750 I've been talking about digital watches for the last couple of days to my phone. 591 00:37:16,010 --> 00:37:17,310 I want a Dyson. 592 00:37:21,250 --> 00:37:25,750 And I'll have some useful tips on reducing how much personal information 593 00:37:25,750 --> 00:37:29,690 you are giving away. I want to show you how to do that on both an Android phone 594 00:37:29,690 --> 00:37:31,370 and an Apple phone. 595 00:37:40,730 --> 00:37:44,410 heading back to the trussell family where i'm hoping to find out once and 596 00:37:44,410 --> 00:37:51,210 for all if our smartphones are listening in on us lucy hello i also 597 00:37:51,210 --> 00:37:54,490 want to know if they're still as comfortable with big tech companies 598 00:37:54,490 --> 00:38:01,210 having such easy access to their lives so good to see you all again how did you 599 00:38:01,210 --> 00:38:05,650 get on with your experiment let's remind ourselves what we had i remember millie 600 00:38:05,650 --> 00:38:11,900 had basketball yeah louis you had disneyland power disneyland paris uh 601 00:38:11,900 --> 00:38:18,420 the vacuum vacuum cleaner digital what digital watch and curling tongs so did 602 00:38:18,420 --> 00:38:22,160 you manage to sort of like talk about all these things in front of the phones 603 00:38:22,160 --> 00:38:26,140 in front of yeah probably more repetition for me the boys at school 604 00:38:26,140 --> 00:38:29,640 they're not allowed their phones they've got no signal at school right right so 605 00:38:29,640 --> 00:38:35,140 actually of all the people you're probably with your phone the most right 606 00:38:35,140 --> 00:38:38,730 because you're it's on me all the time it's on you Whereas you guys have got to 607 00:38:38,730 --> 00:38:39,468 go to school. 608 00:38:39,470 --> 00:38:43,830 So, did Millie get any basketball adverts? No. No. 609 00:38:45,010 --> 00:38:48,670 Did you get Disney, was it? Yeah. Did you get any Disney ads? 610 00:38:48,930 --> 00:38:49,930 No. No, okay. 611 00:38:50,170 --> 00:38:52,710 Alfie, did you get anything for vacuum cleaners? 612 00:38:52,930 --> 00:38:54,070 No. No adverts. 613 00:38:54,850 --> 00:38:56,830 Very disappointed, I can tell. No, no. 614 00:38:57,050 --> 00:38:58,330 Gutted. Digital watches? 615 00:38:58,570 --> 00:39:01,870 No. So perhaps our fans are not listening to us. No. Did you get curling 616 00:39:01,870 --> 00:39:02,930 tongs? I did. 617 00:39:03,380 --> 00:39:08,000 No! I got three different hits of three different companies. So we're clear, you 618 00:39:08,000 --> 00:39:10,980 didn't search for it? Not at all. No, not at all. 619 00:39:11,380 --> 00:39:12,680 Have you got the ads on your phone? 620 00:39:12,880 --> 00:39:13,779 I do, yeah. 621 00:39:13,780 --> 00:39:16,360 So that was the first one. 622 00:39:17,340 --> 00:39:21,980 With a video of how to do it as well. She's very happy with her curls. 623 00:39:22,420 --> 00:39:23,560 That was the second one. 624 00:39:23,900 --> 00:39:26,320 I mean, it's not what I would call curling tongs, but it's definitely a 625 00:39:26,320 --> 00:39:28,180 device to curl her hair. 626 00:39:28,420 --> 00:39:30,080 And soon, buy one, get one free. 627 00:39:30,460 --> 00:39:32,560 Looks like a Breville toaster for your hair. 628 00:39:33,320 --> 00:39:35,260 You got quite a lot of stuff. I did. 629 00:39:35,500 --> 00:39:37,460 Then another one to find curls. 630 00:39:37,740 --> 00:39:42,440 Again, curling tongs. 70,000 women have used them to awaken their natural curls. 631 00:39:44,080 --> 00:39:45,640 So what's going on here? 632 00:39:45,900 --> 00:39:50,240 According to experts, the most likely reason we see adverts about products or 633 00:39:50,240 --> 00:39:54,320 services we've been talking about is something known as proximity 634 00:39:54,320 --> 00:39:55,320 advertising. 635 00:39:57,020 --> 00:40:01,100 It's highly unlikely that the phone would have been listening to him and 636 00:40:01,100 --> 00:40:03,320 then serving adverts based upon what he said. 637 00:40:03,560 --> 00:40:08,480 Ad tracking is so advanced now that if you look for something on your phone and 638 00:40:08,480 --> 00:40:11,520 then you spend time with someone else and their phone in a similar location 639 00:40:11,520 --> 00:40:15,260 for a period of time, the trackers will start to jump to conclusions that 640 00:40:15,260 --> 00:40:19,880 something they look for might be of interest to you. And that's often where 641 00:40:19,880 --> 00:40:20,880 we perceive. 642 00:40:21,210 --> 00:40:25,010 phones as having listened to us because a conversation we had was actually based 643 00:40:25,010 --> 00:40:28,330 on something they were looking at on their phone because your phones are 644 00:40:28,330 --> 00:40:32,610 close to each other it's reasonable to assume you might be interested too but 645 00:40:32,610 --> 00:40:37,510 we know our smartphones and devices are listening to us if we're using a virtual 646 00:40:37,510 --> 00:40:43,470 assistant like siri or alexa they have to listen for the wake word like hey 647 00:40:43,470 --> 00:40:45,350 siri or alexa 648 00:40:46,700 --> 00:40:49,760 It just shows, you know, we don't know what the company's doing. That's the 649 00:40:49,760 --> 00:40:52,920 point. We don't know. We're supposed to just take them at their word. And what 650 00:40:52,920 --> 00:40:56,560 we really want is law to come into this space so that there are clear red lines 651 00:40:56,560 --> 00:40:59,220 on what they can and can't do and that we all have more control and choice. 652 00:41:00,020 --> 00:41:05,760 Look, now that we've done this experiment, have you been surprised by 653 00:41:05,760 --> 00:41:11,420 the amount of information about yourselves that you've been kind of 654 00:41:11,420 --> 00:41:12,440 unknowingly sharing? 655 00:41:12,700 --> 00:41:14,340 Yeah. Yeah. Possibly, yeah. Yeah? 656 00:41:14,750 --> 00:41:18,130 Do you feel that you've got absolute privacy when you use your phone? 657 00:41:18,390 --> 00:41:20,110 No. No. No. 658 00:41:20,330 --> 00:41:22,750 No one here feels like they've got privacy. 659 00:41:23,210 --> 00:41:29,490 So I guess then my final question would be, will you change your 660 00:41:29,490 --> 00:41:36,010 behaviour? Yeah, I think with the accepting all cookies and 661 00:41:36,010 --> 00:41:40,510 when you say with an app, allow location, it's something I need to look 662 00:41:40,510 --> 00:41:41,850 at more and consider. 663 00:41:45,320 --> 00:41:48,420 Data collection should not be the default. 664 00:41:48,720 --> 00:41:53,120 The default should be no data collection and people should have to opt in and it 665 00:41:53,120 --> 00:41:56,500 should be effortful to have their data collected. It's a much more rational 666 00:41:56,500 --> 00:42:01,380 system. You wouldn't need to spend hours saying no to cookies every time you 667 00:42:01,380 --> 00:42:05,140 don't want your data collected and it would protect the citizenry better. 668 00:42:06,420 --> 00:42:11,600 So I think we really need to give it a good hard think about who has access and 669 00:42:11,600 --> 00:42:13,380 what access and actually... 670 00:42:13,660 --> 00:42:16,600 Do they need to know where we are all the time? Because what if that 671 00:42:16,600 --> 00:42:17,900 information got into the wrong hands? 672 00:42:18,340 --> 00:42:19,840 It's scary just to think about it. 673 00:42:20,750 --> 00:42:27,190 All this may feel a little overwhelming, but there are things that we can do. So 674 00:42:27,190 --> 00:42:29,630 for a start, third-party applications. 675 00:42:29,870 --> 00:42:34,110 Now, those are the apps that you actually put onto your phone after it 676 00:42:34,110 --> 00:42:38,030 comes out of the box. So anything that you would have gone to the Apple Store 677 00:42:38,030 --> 00:42:42,650 or to the Google Store and put onto your phone. Those are the apps that sometimes 678 00:42:42,650 --> 00:42:46,710 take liberties in the permissions that they use on your phone. So things like 679 00:42:46,710 --> 00:42:51,790 your location, your contact list, your photo. your microphone. 680 00:42:52,380 --> 00:42:57,760 But the good news is you can actually take those permissions away from those 681 00:42:57,760 --> 00:43:01,340 apps. And it's actually a really simple and easy thing to do. So I'm going to 682 00:43:01,340 --> 00:43:05,480 show you how to do that on both an Android phone and an Apple phone. On an 683 00:43:05,480 --> 00:43:10,400 Apple phone, you go to the system settings and you hit the privacy and 684 00:43:10,400 --> 00:43:11,400 security tab. 685 00:43:11,420 --> 00:43:17,120 Now, if you scroll down, you'll start to see Bluetooth, camera, local network, 686 00:43:17,400 --> 00:43:22,500 microphone. These are all the functions that apps have. So if I click on 687 00:43:22,500 --> 00:43:26,220 microphone, it tells me all the apps that are using my microphone. 688 00:43:26,420 --> 00:43:30,820 Now, this one's a taxi app. I don't want them to use my microphone. I can switch 689 00:43:30,820 --> 00:43:31,738 that off. 690 00:43:31,740 --> 00:43:34,220 Now, the same applies to an Android phone. 691 00:43:34,440 --> 00:43:38,420 It's really simple. If you go into your system settings and you search for 692 00:43:38,420 --> 00:43:40,200 permission manager. 693 00:43:40,840 --> 00:43:44,440 And it will just come up and again gives you the same stats, contacts, camera, 694 00:43:44,600 --> 00:43:48,860 files, location, microphone. Let's click on the microphone here. It gives me all 695 00:43:48,860 --> 00:43:52,040 the apps that have got access to the microphone. 696 00:43:52,650 --> 00:43:58,490 on this phone so little by little sit down instead of scrolling on reels or 697 00:43:58,490 --> 00:44:03,230 tick tock just spend half an hour and just go through those third-party apps 698 00:44:03,230 --> 00:44:07,030 and make sure that they don't have permission to use things like your 699 00:44:07,030 --> 00:44:11,950 location where they don't really need to and little by little you can start 700 00:44:11,950 --> 00:44:17,340 taking control of what companies can find out from your phone Meta told us 701 00:44:17,340 --> 00:44:21,760 protecting the privacy and security of people's data is fundamental to how our 702 00:44:21,760 --> 00:44:25,380 business works. That's why we have invested heavily in features like 703 00:44:25,380 --> 00:44:30,600 privacy checkup and ads preferences that provide more transparency and controls 704 00:44:30,600 --> 00:44:33,800 for people to understand and manage their privacy preferences.