All language subtitles for Defense of the Philippines, 1941 (World War II Documentary) [tpVJB1XWWLg].f251

The soldier reading these pages would do well to reflect on the wisdom of the statement

exhibited in a Japanese shrine.

What went to him who has not tasted defeat?

Brings into sharp focus the causes that led to failure, and provides a fruitful field

of study for those soldiers and laymen who seek in the past lessons for the future.

Orlando Ward, Chief of Military History, 1952.

In the near hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces attacked the US Commonwealth

of the Philippines as part of its Pacific-wide plan to seize much-needed resources and manila

strategically important harbor.

Over the next five months, American and Filipino forces would conduct a stalwart defense of

the islands that would cost many lives and end in defeat while disrupting Japan's plan

for conquest in the region.

By 7 December 1941, the Philippines, a chain of 7,000 islands in the Pacific, had been a

US territory for over 40 years.

Over 11,000 kilometers from San Francisco, but just under 3,000 kilometers from Tokyo,

it was America's first line of defense against the threat of Japanese expansionism in the

Pacific.

With Japan already in control of the island of Formosa to the north, the Marshall, Caroline

and Gilbert Islands to the east, and occupying a significant part of China to the northwest,

the US military garrison in the Philippines was all that prevented Japan from consolidating

its gains and driving south to seize the Dutch East Indies' valuable resources of oil and

rubber.

The American military, however, had concerns about the feasibility of defending the Philippines.

As early as 1914, then-second lieutenant George C. Marshall was able to demonstrate during

maneuvers simulating a Japanese invasion of Luzon how easily the capital city of Manila

and its major port could fall to aggressors.

With the coastline longer than the United States, the military appreciated just how

difficult it would be to defend the Philippines effectively.

Various changes in US policy also undermined the defense of the Philippines.

These included the Washington Naval Treaty, signed in 1922, which halted US construction

of new fortifications in the Pacific in exchange for Japan limiting the size of its fleet.

With only one reinforced stronghold set at the mouth of Manila Bay on the island of Corregidor,

the Philippines' defenses were questionable.

This realization was evident in the Joint Army and Navy's basic war plan for the Philippines.

Included in the spring of 1941, war plan Orange III prescribed a limited defense of the Philippines

that focused primarily on denying an invader the use of Manila Bay.

It also outlined a predetermined fallback plan for civilians and soldiers that acknowledged

the difficulty of halting a Japanese invasion force that US intelligence estimated could

reach 300,000 troops in a month's time as the Japanese established a blockade against

US reinforcements and resupply.

As such, the plan for the defense of the Philippines is best understood as a delay.

If properly reinforced, it was hoped that the Islands garrison could delay Japanese forces

long enough for additional troops to arrive and partners to commit to the fight.

A variation of a retrograde, a delay is when a force under pressure trades space for time

by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on enemy forces without becoming

decisively engaged.

In 1935, the US Congress voted to make the Philippines a Commonwealth with full autonomy

at the end of a 10-year transitional period.

This change to self-governance shifted the responsibility for the defense of the Islands

to the Philippines' government and its people.

However, it complicated command and control and unity of effort between US forces and

the Philippine Army.

In response, the Philippine National Assembly voted to stand up a force of 10,000 soldiers,

supplemented by 400,000 reserve troops.

After requested President Manuel Quisán, Douglas MacArthur, recently retired from the

US Army, was asked to oversee the creation of the Philippine Army as field marshal and

military advisor to the Commonwealth government of the Philippines.

From the start, MacArthur faced serious difficulties in training and preparing the Filipino forces

for the future.

With some 65 languages spoken among them, Filipino troops were often unable to effectively

communicate among themselves or with their leaders.

Additionally, the absence of schools for commissioned and non-commissioned officers was a serious

obstacle to standardizing tactics, techniques, and procedures across the highly diverse force.

Severe shortages of weapons, uniforms, and housing also hampered the Philippine Army's

training and preparation.

Such handicaps were magnified by the lack of military vehicles and permanent roads for

transporting soldiers.

A feature particularly ominous for forces tasked with conducting a delay, where maintaining

a mobility advantage over the attacking force is a necessary prerequisite for success.

These handicaps were complicated by a military communication infrastructure that relied heavily

on unreliable civilian telephone and telegraph systems.

The Philippine Army, however, was not the only military unit training on Luzon prior

to the Japanese attack.

In 1941, the US Army's Philippine Department, under the command of Major General George

Grunert, was headquartered out of Fort William McKinley with over 22,000 soldiers.

Its largest unit, the Philippine Division, was commanded by Major General Jonathan M.

Wainwright and led by American officers.

Though these two forces were originally intended to operate independently, the US forces under

Grunert and the Philippine Army under MacArthur began combined training exercises in July

1941, as war with Japan appeared more likely.

Japan, a member of the Axis Alliance, had moved military units into French Indochina and assumed

protectorate status over the territory.

For the two generals, this posturing indicated that the Japanese could be preparing for additional

offensive operations in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

They say trouble always comes in threes.

Take a good close look at this trio.

Remember these faces.

Remember them well.

If you ever meet them, don't hesitate.

Intelligence analysts assess adversary actions and the posture of their forces to determine

their intent and identify indications that can be used to warn of a pending attack.

Indications and warnings are tied to timelines that inform commanders of how long before an

adversary is capable of attacking and which course of action they are likely to pursue.

These timelines enable the planning and response framework to react in accordance with the severity

of the indication in the estimated enemy course of action.

Commanders can then execute measures to deter the enemy from continued hostile acts while

posturing friendly forces to respond if deterrence fails.

The occupation of French Indochina triggered a response from the United States designed

to ward off further aggression by the Japanese.

After placing a freeze on all U.S.-based Japanese assets, President Franklin Roosevelt then halted

shipments of rubber, iron, and fuel to Japan and began planning for the military reinforcement

of the Philippines.

President Roosevelt's actions, designed to deter further Japanese aggression in the region,

are examples of flexible deterrent options, or FDOs.

FDOs are established to deter actions before or during a crisis and may be used to prepare

for future operations.

They are developed and executed using each instrument of national power, diplomatic,

informational, military, and economic, but are most effective when used in concert.

FDOs provide options for decision makers during emerging crises to allow for gradual increases

in pressure to avoid unintentionally provoking full-scale combat, while simultaneously enabling

leaders to develop the situation and gain a better understanding of an adversary's capabilities

and intentions.

Already reeling under trade restrictions imposed the previous year, this action pushed Japanese

military leadership into a corner.

Lacking the necessary materials to continue their plans for conquest, they made the decision

to go to war by December 1941 if negotiations failed to reverse U.S. sanctions.

During the coming conflict, President Roosevelt moved to defend the Philippines by combining

the territorial Philippine Army with the U.S. Army units already stationed there.

He then placed MacArthur in command of the newly combined force, designated as United

States Army Forces Far East, or USAPI, and charged him with defending the islands.

MacArthur was also recalled to active duty in the U.S. Army and was soon promoted to

the rank of general.

After that spring, war plan Orange III had been included as part of the national war

plan known as Rainbow V. The national plan was based on a recently signed agreement between

the United States and Great Britain.

This gave priority for supply and support to the war in Europe over all other areas of

conflict.

Establishing a timetable for completion by April 1942, the General's plan called for

a reinforced defense that incorporated the island's natural terrain features to stop

and repulse attacking forces on the beaches, while relying heavily on U.S. Army air power

to actively atrit the enemy.

By building his defense around the terrain and natural obstacles present on the island,

General MacArthur illustrated a central tenet of defensive operations.

According to Army doctrine, the commander always takes advantage of the terrain when

planning how to position forces and conduct operations.

The terrain dictates where a delaying force can orient on a moving enemy force and ambush

it.

A commander conducting operations in compartmentalized terrain selects locations that restrict

the enemy's movement and prevent the enemy force from fully exploiting its combat superiority.

Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall was personally familiar with the Philippines

and after reviewing MacArthur's plan, authorized immediate transportation of the essential

supplies and reinforcements that he had requested.

To reinforce the Philippines, Army leadership deployed several National Guard units.

The 200th Coastal Artillery Regiment and the 192nd and 194th Tank Battalions equipped with

M3 Stuart tanks.

MacArthur also received reinforcements for his air arm to include P-40 Warhawk fighter

planes and B-17 flying fortress bombers.

However, shortages in shipping space meant that some items were delayed or did not arrive.

In one instance, air crews arrived in Manila ahead of their aircraft just before the start

of hostilities in December.

Since delivery of their A-24 Banshee dye bombers never occurred, these airmen spent the rest

of the war fighting as infantry.

To compensate for his lack of updated equipment and well-trained personnel, MacArthur's plan

relied heavily on close integration with the Filipino forces.

Recalling all 10 divisions of the Philippine Army from reserve for training and refitting,

he task-organized them into five distinct forces.

The North Luzon Force, under the command of Major General Wainwright, defended strategically

important areas of Luzon.

These included the only beaches wide enough and deep enough to accommodate a large-scale

amphibious landing.

The North Luzon Force also had responsibility for the Baton Peninsula.

Warplan Orange's designated fallback area should the Japanese invasion prove unstoppable.

Organizationally, the North Luzon forces consisted of the horse-mounted 26 cavalry regiment and

the 1st Battalion 45th Infantry, both of which were fully equipped and extensively trained

Philippine scouts.

These units were accompanied by two batteries of 155 mm artillery and one battery of 2.95

inch mountain guns.

Three Philippine Army infantry divisions, the 11th, 21st, and the 31st, completed Wainwright's

command.

MacArthur planned to support the North Luzon Force with the Philippine 71st Infantry Division,

held in reserve at Manila.

This division could only be released with MacArthur's permission.

Following the war, Wainwright recalled the situation when he took over command of the

North Luzon Force.

Let me give you an example of the training status of the Philippine Army's divisions

on the eve of the attack.

Infantrymen trained on an average of three to four weeks before being forced to fight.

Engineers got no training at all.

Artillery never fired a practice shot.

Indeed, its first shot was aimed in the general direction of the approaching enemy.

We had no combat practice, no combat training, and little or no rifle or machine gun practice.

The divisions did not have a full complement of artillery.

There was no means of transportation for any artillery.

We got practically no transportation for any purpose.

The divisions were badly undermanned.

They were all short of ammunition.

We were terribly short of hand grenades, 50 caliber machine gun, and infantry mortar

ammunition.

My command was spread over an area 75 miles from north to south and 100 miles from east

to west.

But the only means of communication with the various divisions was through the public telephone

lines.

The South Luzon Force, commanded by Brigadier General George M. Parker Jr., was responsible

for defending his own covering the capital of Manila, all the way south to the tip of

Luzon.

These forces were comprised of two Philippine Army infantry divisions, the 41st and 51st,

that found themselves in the same training and equipment shortage situation as the North

Luzon Force.

They were supplemented by a battery from the 86th Field Artillery of the Philippine Scouts.

MacArthur's 3rd Force was organized to defend the Bissei and Mindanao Islands area.

It fell under the command of Brigadier General William F. Sharp and included three Philippine

Army infantry divisions, the 61st, 81st, and 101st.

The Harbor Defense Force, under the command of Major General George F. Moore, was MacArthur's

4th Force and was comprised of four regiments of coastal artillery and one regiment of air

defense artillery.

The 5th and final force, located north of Manila, was the Reserve Force, under MacArthur's

direct command.

Along with USAPI headquarters, the Reserve's operational forces consisted of the Philippine

91st Division and the U.S. Philippine Division consisting of three infantry regiments and

the Division Artillery or DEVARTI.

It also included the 1st Provisional Tank Group consisting of two tank battalions.

Rounding out General MacArthur's command was the Far East Air Force, commanded by Major

General Louis H. Braritan, which, in December of 1941, was the largest concentration of

Army Air Corps aircraft outside of the continental United States.

Logistical support, including food, ammunition, weapons, and medical supplies, were transferred

from depots on Bataan and the island of Corregidor and distributed to each defending force.

This was done to support MacArthur's desire to defend as far forward as possible.

The 16th Naval District, under the command of Rear Admiral Francis W. Rockwell, was also

a vital part of the defense force.

With installation at Cabity, Olongapol, and Corregidor, it included cruisers, destroyers,

submarines, patrol boats, and the 4th Marine Regiment.

Though under orders to assist in the defense of the Philippines, it remained independent

of Yusafi and instead reported to the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, headquartered in Manila, under

the command of Admiral Thomas C. Hart.

A testament to the early growing pains associated with creating a joint force, this lack of

a unified command was not unique to the Philippines and plagued U.S. operations throughout much

of the Pacific Campaign.

For MacArthur and Rockwell, it upset unity of effort and further complicated their defense

of the island.

Running low on resources in the summer of 1941, the Japanese prioritized the seizing

of the Dutch East Indies and the Malay Peninsula ahead of all other goals.

We were in their way.

We had to be removed.

We were in the Japanese way.

To do this, they understood that the U.S. Naval Forces stationed at Pearl Harbor needed

to be neutralized and that the threat from U.S. Naval and air power in the Philippines

had to be addressed.

Deciding on his final attack plans in mid-November, Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned

Lieutenant General Masuharu Homa and his 14th Army to conquer the Philippines.

Lieutenant General Homa's Army was made up of the 16th and 48th Infantry Divisions,

augmented with additional armor regiments and mountain artillery brigades.

Although they were called regiments, Japanese armor regiments were equivalent to American

armor battalions and Japanese tanks were of poor quality, their medium tank being smaller

than the American Stuart light tank.

The Japanese invasion of the Philippines was planned down to the hour and by integrating

land, sea, and air power, they quickly overwhelmed U.S. and Filipino forces, establishing several

key lodgements.

These plans called for the complete destruction of the Far East Air Force and the seizure

of several key airfields throughout the island chain.

This would give the Japanese air superiority, enabling Homa's divisions to attack without

being harassed from the air.

To do this, Japanese infantry would seize the key airfield on Batan Island, north of

Luzon, while fighters and bombers stationed on Formosa would attack airfields on Luzon.

Japanese infantry would then continue to other fields at Aparri, Vigand, and Lagospe,

further south, culminating with the seizure of the airfield at the bow on the large island

of Mindanao, south of Luzon.

With air superiority established and several airfields secured, the 14th Army would be

free to begin its main landings on Luzon.

The 14th Army's main effort would then come ashore at Lingayen Gulf, some 200 kilometers

north of Manila, and begin attacking towards the capital.

A smaller force would land at Limon Bay, 120 kilometers south of Manila, and proceed north

to link up with the larger force in a combined assault on the city.

After capturing the capital, the Japanese could then seize Manila Bay and defeat any remaining

US and Philippine forces on Luzon, placing them in firm control of the largest and most

important island in the Philippines.

The attack on Pearl Harbor signaled the start of the invasion of the Philippines.

US-Asian fleet headquarters in Manila was the first to be notified at 0-2-30 hours local

time on 8 December.

General MacArthur, however, was not notified of the event until an hour later when his

chief of staff heard the news over the radio.

MacArthur immediately put his troops on alert.

Attacked four months earlier than intelligence estimates predicted, MacArthur had only a

fraction of the necessary equipment and supplies he needed to defend the Philippines.

As the Japanese began their invasion, the majority of MacArthur's soldiers, and in particular

the Philippine Army troops, lacked even the most basic necessities, from boots and helmets

to serviceable rifles and ammunition.

More importantly, they lacked the training necessary to fight as units in the field.

In contrast, the Japanese forces were better trained and well equipped, with units having

prior battlefield experience obtained during the ongoing Sino-Japanese War.

Concerned that his airfields and aircraft might suffer the same fate as those in Hawaii,

Major General Brereton requested permission for his B-17s to begin bombing the Japanese

airfield on Formosa.

However, due to delays in miscommunication between Brereton and MacArthur's staff,

Brereton's fighters and bombers did not mount an attack against Formosa.

Instead, Japanese fighters and bombers, based only 800 kilometers away on Formosa, arrived

over Clark and Iba airfields.

With little opposition from antiquated anti-aircraft guns, the enemy attacked both facilities,

destroying their radar equipment, and strafing or bombing the aircraft that had been holding

for permission to attack the Japanese.

According to plan, Japanese infantry landed unopposed on Pattan Island that same morning.

They then proceeded to seize and secure the U.S. airfield located there, and to establish

a base for their short-range fighters.

More importantly, the destruction of over half of Army Air Force assets at Clark and

Iba airfields established Japanese air superiority over the Philippines on the first day of the

war.

The next day, 9 December, Japanese bombers from Formosa struck Nichols Field, destroying

more aircraft and seriously damaging the installation.

Opposition was light.

Understanding that his ships could not expect protection from aerial attack, Admiral Hart

dispatched the majority of his fleet south to Australia.

Following their departure, the Japanese attacked the naval facilities at Kabiti on 10 December.

As Kabiti burned, Japanese infantry, supported by naval aircraft and gunfire from the Japanese

fleet, landed on Kamegan Island, north of Luzon.

The few U.S. aircraft left operational, attacked units of the 2nd Formosa Regiment as it came

ashore at Vigun and Apari, sinking one Japanese minesweeper and damaging four other vessels.

Comprised of 3rd Battalion and half of the 1st Battalion's 2nd Formosa Regiment, the

2000 strong Kano Detachment came ashore at Vigun.

Another similarly sized force, known as the Tanaka Detachment, comprised of the 2nd Battalion

and the other half of 1st Battalion's 2nd Formosa Regiment, attacked Apari.

These multiple landings were supported by two heavy cruisers, two destroyers, and defensive

counter air provided by fighter aircraft from Batan Island.

Over the next few days, the two detachments broke out from their initial lodgements at

Apari and Vigun and began moving south towards Manila along the coast on Route 3.

On 12 December, 2,500 Japanese soldiers, known as the Kimura Detachment, came ashore approximately

500 kilometers southeast of Manila at Legaspi.

General Parker, commander of the South Luzon Force, sent untried elements from the 41st

and 51st Philippine Army divisions to counterattack.

But these were soon routed by the better trained Japanese.

After successfully seizing its objective at Legaspi, the Kimura Detachment began its march

north on Route 1 to link up with the forces landing at Limone Bay for the advance on Manila.

Keeping to Lieutenant General Homo's timetable for the taking of the Philippines, enemy landings

until now had been minor incursions.

However, on 22 December, Homo's main effort came ashore along the Lingaian Gulf.

Comprised of the entire Japanese 48th Division, with attached elements of the 16th Division,

Homo's Lingaian force totaled just over 40,000 soldiers.

Following a carefully timed plan that called for landings at three different locations,

along a 24 kilometer stretch of the Gulf, the first wave of Japanese landing craft approached

the beaches at 0500.

Beginning in the south, units of the 47th Infantry Regiment and elements of the 48th Mountain

Artillery landed at the village of Agu'u.

Overcoming rough seas and weak resistance from unseasoned units of the 11th Philippine

Infantry Division, the Japanese landed most of their forces with minimal loss.

The middle landing was conducted by units of the 1st Formosa Infantry Regiment and

elements of the 48th Mountain Artillery at the village of Ahringay.

The landings were virtually unopposed and the 1st Formosa troops soon turned south on Route

3 to join their comrades of the 47th Infantry Regiment who had landed at Agu'u.

The final landing, two hours later, by units of the Kamijima Detachment, composed primarily

of the 9th Infantry Regiment, occurred further north at the village of Baowang.

Being ashore through rough waters, they briefly encountered stiff resistance from troops of

the 12th Philippine Infantry Regiment before seizing the village.

Breaking out from their lodgement, they dispatched patrols along Route 3 to make contact with

Colonel Tanaka's detachment as it came south along the road.

Advancing against light resistance, a unit of the Kamijima Detachment attacked along

the Baowang Bagu'u Road that ran to Rosario through the Cordillera Mountains and then seized

the airfield at Nagyliyan.

The enemy's success forced the 71st Philippine Regiment and elements of the 11th Philippine

Division to withdraw.

Meanwhile, the main body of the Kamijima Detachment seized the village of Bagu'u further east

to prevent U.S. forces from outflanking the landing force and to act as a rear guard for

the Japanese advance on Manila.

As the enemy began its move inland, Wainwright's 21st Division defended the southern shores.

This left the soldiers of the 26th Calvary Philippine Scouts led by Colonel Clinton A.

Pierce to defend against Japanese movement south along Route 3 from the village of Puzoorobiu.

Advancing south along Route 3, Colonel Hifumi E. Mies, 1st Formosa Regiment and elements

of the 48th Mountain Artillery received little opposition from the inexperienced and lightly

armed 11th Division as they advanced towards the village of Damortiz.

Along the way, they linked up with the 48th Reconnaissance 9th Infantry Regiment and

the 4th Tank Regiment, both that come ashore earlier north of Damortiz.

After advancing out of Agu'u, Colonel Isamu Yanagi's 47th Infantry and a battalion of

the 48th Mountain Artillery faced weak resistance from a battalion of the 11th Infantry Division,

which then retreated to Damortiz.

Aware of the growing advance on Damortiz, General Wainwright ordered the 26th Calvary

to move from Puzoorobiu through Rosario and onto Damortiz to aid in its defense.

When the 26th Scout Carplatoon arrived at Damortiz, they found the town unoccupied.

The platoon then moved north on Route 3 where it made contact with the Japanese 48th Reconnaissance

and 4th Tank Regiment.

Unable to advance, the platoon returned to Damortiz, where the 26th Calvary was ordered

to hold in a delaying action should a force withdrawal of the North Luzon Force become

necessary.

At 1300, Japanese aircraft, armor and infantry units began the attack on Damortiz.

In response, Colonel Pierce asked for additional support from General Wainwright, who requested

the company of tanks from Brigadier General James Weaver, the Provisional Tank Group commander.

Due to a fuel shortage, Weaver was only able to send a platoon of five tanks, all of which

were either destroyed or damaged by 47mm anti-tank fire or the enemy's tanks.

By 1600, additional Japanese units joined the battle, and by 1900, Damortiz had fallen into

Japanese hands.

After the withdrawal, Colonel Pierce's Calvary paid a heavy price in lives and horses, while

performing successful delaying actions to protect the 11th Division's right flank.

Attacked by the Japanese upon their arrival in Rosario, the 26th Calvary Regiment was

forced to withdraw again, this time further to the south, where they were ordered to hold

the road junction between Rosario and Baguio until its defenses became untenable.

By the morning of 23 December, elements of the 71st Division were in place along Route

3, south of Cissan, preparing their defense while the 26th Calvary passed south through

their position on their way to Puzerobio.

Although it may seem simple, a rearward passage of lines conducted under pressure from an

attacking enemy is a difficult operation that requires close coordination and planning between

the stationary and passing units to prevent fratricide.

Rearward passage of lines are also important enabling operations for a delay or other retrograde,

maintaining enemy contact while allowing for the recovery of security or other forward forces.

While similar in planning and execution to a forward passage of lines, a rearward passage

of lines is more difficult, as the enemy likely has the initiative, and the rearward passing

soldiers are often fatigued and disorganized from battle.

Only forces may also be more difficult to recognize because the enemy may be intermixed

with them.

To mitigate these issues, the passing and stationary units co-locate their command posts and agree

upon clearly defined, often restrictive, control measures.

They identify a battle handover line to delineate the area that the stationary unit commander

will assume control of, once two-thirds of the passing force has crossed.

They coordinate for fires and ensure the stationary force is capable of providing indirect fire

support for the rearward passing force.

Finally, if time is available, the units reconnoiter the contact points, passage points, lanes,

and assembly areas the passing unit will use to pass through the stationary force.

They also identify any obstacles and friendly battle positions in the AO.

The rearward passage of lines begins when the passing unit links up with the guides

from the stationary unit at the predetermined contact points.

The guides then lead the passing force to the passage points and along the lanes through

the stationary force.

The order of march is typically sustainment units first, followed by the main command

post, functional units, such as engineers, and finally combat units.

If the enemy force continues to press its attack during the passage, the passing unit

controls the battle while the stationary unit monitors the passage of lines until the battle

handover occurs.

Once the passing unit hands over control of the battle to the stationary unit, the stationary

unit initiates and clears calls for all fires forward of its location.

While the 26th Calvary Regiment executed its rearward passage of lines, the 91st Division

recently attached to the North Luzon Force and held in reserve, sent the 91st Regimental

Combat Team to reinforce the 71st Division by taking up a position just north of Puzorobio

along the road.

The first attack of the morning was made by the Japanese 47th Infantry Regiment against

the 71st Division, whose artillery held up their advance until noon.

Reinforced by the 48th Reconnaissance and 4th Tank Regiments, the Japanese directed close

air support on their positions, forcing the 71st to fall back to a line in front of the

town of Puzorobio, where they were to link up with the 91st Regimental Combat Team already

in place.

After a hasty meeting of the American commanders, the 26th Calvary Regiment was then ordered

to retire to Binanlonan and set up an outpost for the Division to fall back through should

it become necessary.

The Japanese entered the town of Cissan around 1900, while the 26th Calvary Regiment moved

south and the 91st Combat Team prepared their defense outside Puzorobio.

Later that same night, the Japanese attacked the 91st and secured the town, placing them

in position to seize the critical bridges across the Egnon River to the south.

General Wainwright, recognizing the staggering pace of the Japanese advance, realized that

MacArthur's plan to repulse the enemy on the Luzon beaches was no longer viable.

Intending to strengthen his right flank long enough to prepare a counterattack, he requested

permission from Yusafi Headquarters to direct his soldiers to withdraw behind the Egnon

River.

With his request approved and while preparing his plan of attack, he received a call from

Headquarters, notifying him that MacArthur had scrapped his defense plan and put the

original warplan orange into effect.

Wainwright later wrote in his memoirs,

It was a bitter pill to swallow.

For warplan orange number three meant the last ditch.

The long ago planned desperation withdrawal to Baton.

That was not all, but MacArthur, I learned, was about to leave Manila and take his headquarters

to Corrigidor.

The soldiers' world is where he is fighting.

Mine was falling to pieces.

Wainwright could not have known it at the time, but MacArthur's decision to revert

to warplan orange and fall back to Baton would upset Homer's timetable, enough that it would

delay Japanese warplans across the entire South Pacific.

Christmas Eve arrived with the landing of Japan's Lamon Bay Force, 322 kilometers to

the south of the Lingean Gulf, under the command of Lieutenant General Susumu Morioka.

Coming ashore with 7,000 soldiers of the 16th Division at three different locations, they

could not have picked a better moment to attack.

Having been denied permission to move any artillery defending the western approach to

Manila, the South Luzon Force was also in the process of repositioning its maneuver

forces when the Japanese began landing.

The first attack came at Malban, where elements of the first regiment, Philippine First Regular

Division, defended against the enemy by laying down effective, infallating fire.

By 0830, the Japanese had seized Malban and forced the defenders to fall back 8 kilometers

to the west.

There, they vigorously defended their position, delaying the enemies further advance.

Further south, at the town of Sion, the second landing force came ashore at 0700 and met

with little resistance.

The Japanese then divided their forces, advancing elements along the Manila Railroad toward

Taiyavis Bay, while other units moved south to link up with the Komura Detachment, currently

marching up Route 1 along Sumulong Bay.

The third and main landing force came ashore south of Antimonan, where it engaged with Company

A, 52nd Infantry Regiment, Philippine 51st Division.

The Japanese seized the town at 1100.

A Japanese reconnaissance unit, supported by light bombers, also advanced to seize the

town of Malikbhai.

Sustained attacks by enemy aircraft forced the defenders to fall back from the village

and set up defensive positions 6.4 kilometers to the west, near the town of Binihon.

By the evening of the 24th, while still attempting to delay the enemy from advancing along Route

1 toward Pagbilau, the defenders were overwhelmed and fell back under cover of darkness.

The day ended with MacArthur ordering General Parker, the South Luzon Force commander, to

organize the Baton Defense Force and prepare the peninsula's defenses.

24 December was a difficult day for the North Luzon Force as well.

With the Japanese already advancing on the Agno River, the 26th Calvary Regiment attempted

to delay them north and west of Binihonan.

Mounting a fierce defense, the 26th stopped the first attack made by the Imperial Japanese

Army's 4th Tank Regiment.

The tanks then swung to the west to bypass the 26th, but the Calvary counterattacked

and the Japanese were once again unable to advance.

The Japanese then sent up more tanks and the 2nd Formosa Regiment as reinforcements.

This put the cavalry at serious risk, but they were too deeply engaged to break contact.

General Wainwright, who was in Binihonan when the heavy fighting began, ordered Colonel

Pierce and his 26th Calvary Regiment, now reduced to only 450 soldiers, to fight a delaying

action while falling back southeast from the Agno River to Tayug.

For more than four hours, the outnumbered Calvary delayed the enemy, until finally leaving

Binihonan to the Japanese around 1530.

By the end of Christmas Eve 1941, the Japanese Lingayan Gulf and Lamombe forces had both established

their beach hits, secured their initial objectives, and were in positions to the north and south

to advance on Manila and a strategically important harbor.

We interrupt our previously scheduled program to bring you this important news bulletin.

Japanese soldiers have seized control of the Philippines' capital city of Manila and are

marching against our remaining forces dug in on Baton.

As a result, President Roosevelt has ordered General Douglas MacArthur to leave the territory

immediately.

Without the ability to send supplies and reinforcements or to rescue those soldiers remaining behind,

they are now left to rely more than ever on their skills and courage to survive.

These people know how to work, the kind of people that idolize this American because

he stands for everything we promised and are doing for the Philippines.