All language subtitles for Ten.Steps.to.Disaster.Series.1.Part.4.Deepwater.Horizon.1080p.HDTV.x264.AAC.MVGroup.org.eng

Narrator: April 20, 2010.
9:49 pm.

The deepwater horizon oil rig

Explodes in the gulf of mexico.

Oil pours out uncontrolled.

Ltd russel l. Honore:
87 days that

Well spewed oil into the gulf.

Sambhav sankar: This was without
any doubt the largest oil spill

Disaster of modern times.

Narrator: How could
a catastrophe

On this scale happen?

Antonia judhasz: It soiled
700 miles worth of coast.

It killed countless species.

It sickened tens of thousands,
if not more, people.

Brenda dardar robuchaux: The
spill had a devastating impact

On our community.

Narrator: We hear from
those who survived.

Leo lindner: It's
hard to talk about.

Gordon jones, he was
going to have a baby.

He and his wife are
expecting little max.

The guy was 28 years old.

Narrator: And
those who uncovered

The truth behind the disaster.

Steven chu: There were
enough early signs

That something was going wrong,
but those signs were ignored.

Mark davis: They were engaged in
a really high risk undertaking,

And the margins
for error were slim.

They gambled, and they lost.

Narrator: The investigators
stories reveal a series

Of catastrophic failures.

Richard a. Sears: There
were opportunities to get

Control of the situation.

Those opportunities were missed.

Narrator: In-depth analysis
and investigative reports

Expose crucial errors.

Mark davis: This had become
a faith-based operation.

Ltd russel l. Honore:
It does make me angry,

Because that's a
failure in leadership,

Which led to a loss of life
and a loss of a coastline.

And that's a crying damn shame.

Narrator: Failures
of planning transform

An accident into a catastrophe.

Sambhav sankar: Nobody
in the oil industry

Had a plan for a deepwater
spill of this magnitude

In the gulf of mexico.

Steven chu: President obama
said, chu, go down there

And help them stop the leak.

Narrator: The scale of the
tragedy is underplayed.

Antonia judhasz: Bp tried
to hide how much oil was

Being released from the well.

Narrator: We reveal
the 10 fatal steps

That led to
the deepwater horizon disaster.

Sambhav sankar: When a billion
industry operating a facility

That costs a
million dollars a day to run

Takes almost 90 days to stop
something from happening,

I can guarantee that
the reason is

They're making it up as they go.

[music playing]

Narrator: In 2010,
deepwater horizon

Is a high technology
billboard for

Cutting edge oil exploration.

It is drilling for
oil in water so deep,

It isn't even anchored
to the seabed.

Instead it floats in position
a mile above the seafloor.

Antonia judhasz:
Deepwater drilling

Became the sort of
hallmark of the industry,

And still is this technological
marvel, this ability

To go anywhere, to the deepest
depths of the ocean, basically

The equivalent of space travel
to go to these depths to drill.

Narrator: The gulf of mexico
is central to bp's plans

To leverage this deep
water technology.

Antonia judhasz:
The gulf of mexico

Was considered one of the
richest oil finds in the world.

The industry was
discovering massive oil field

After massive oil field
after a massive oil field.

Narrator: The industry brings
in hundreds of thousands

Of jobs, many to the
indigenous peoples

Of the region, who go on to
suffer most in the disaster.

Brenda dardar robuchaux: We
have a love-hate relationship

With oil and gas, and that's
because of a lot of our people

Also work in the industry.

And so for generations,
you were either a fisherman

Or you might have worked for
the oil and gas industry.

Narrator: But oil
drilling here is

Complex, expensive, and risky.

Yasmine ali: Accidents and
incidents were fairly common

In the gulf of mexico.

So about once every
two years, something

Would happen
but nothing on, quite

On the scale of the
deepwater horizon accident.

Narrator: When deepwater
horizon explodes,

The oil industry's high
tech dream is shattered.

Leo lindner: It was
just a torrent of fire

Coming out of the center.

The whole rig was set on fire.

Narrator: A trail
of critical mistakes

Leads to this disaster.

In September 2009, seven
months before the explosion,

Bp's own safety report
recommends suspending

Operations on deepwater
horizon until vital safety

Issues are fixed.

But the rig goes
back into service

Without fixing all
of these issues.

Seven months later, it blows up.

Investigations into the
tragedy identify failures

In bp's safety
management as a key error

That leads to the disaster.

And bp already has history with
exactly this kind of problem.

In 2002, a rig working
for bp called the ocean king

Suffers a major accident.

Yasmine ali: On the
8th of August in 2002,

The ocean king
experienced a blowout,

And drilling mud
went everywhere.

Narrator: At 8:30
in the morning,

Drilling fluid erupts out
of the rig's drill pipe.

35 minutes later,
highly flammable methane

From a gas pocket 3 and 1/2
thousand feet below the seabed

Bursts out onto the deck.

Yasmine ali: All of the
crew were evacuated,

But there was an explosion
and fire on that rig.

Narrator: It takes two months
and millions of dollars

To repair the ocean king,
but then

There is a second accident.

Yasmine ali: Three months
after that explosion,

Something similar happened.

So there was gas and mud
coming out of the well,

Which looked like the
well had failed to seal.

Narrator: Once again, the crew
is lucky, and no one dies.

The official response
to this double accident

Cites a chain of management
and safety failings,

Erroneous chain of decisions,
inadequate training

Of personnel, and
inadequate planning.

Yasmine ali: There
weren't really

Any serious ramifications.

The fine for the ocean king
accident was about $41,000

Which is really not very much
for an oil and gas company.

Narrator: At the time
the fine is issued,

Bp's profits are
$32 billion a year.

Yet despite the
ocean king incidents,

Seven years later
safety failures are

Still slipping through the net.

In September 2009, seven months
before the deadly disaster, bp

Runs a safety audit of
the deepwater horizon.

It picks up several
major maintenance issues

And recommends rig operations
are suspended immediately

Until they are fixed.

Yasmine ali: For an installation
like the deepwater horizon,

Maintenance is pretty serious.

It's not just like fixing a
shelf or changing a light bulb.

These are a lot
of safety systems,

So making sure that they're
maintained is absolutely vital.

And it's there to
protect the people

On that rig and the environment
that that rig is in.

Narrator: Five days
after the audit,

The rig is put back into
service without fixing

All the issues raised.

The audit also notes that one
vital piece of safety equipment

Called the blowout
preventer is 5 years

Overdue for recertification.

Mark davis: We put things into
service more than people want

To know before it's
ready, because that's

What the calendar said.

And most of the time,
it doesn't go so badly.

Narrator: It's an attitude
with a bad track record.

Mark davis: The titanic still
had workers on board when it

Set sail on its maiden voyage.

Narrator: But why doesn't
the federal regulators

Step in to make sure
that critical safety work

Gets done immediately?

That is the next mistake.

Because in reality, one
of the world's biggest

Heavy industries isn't
being properly regulated

In the gulf of mexico.

Dangerous errors like deepwater
horizon safety audit issues

Aren't flagged.

Ltd russel l. Honore: The
company was basically operating

Unsupervised by the government.

It was based on trust.

Narrator: April 20,
9:49 pm,

The deepwater horizon
drilling rig explodes.

The oil spill that
follows becomes

The greatest environmental
disaster in us history.

Antonia judhasz:
I wasn't surprised to see

A deepwater disaster.

I was very surprised at the
scale of what came next.

Narrator: The second mistake
on the road to disaster

Can be traced back to weak
regulatory oversight of the oil

Industry in the gulf of mexico.

Sambhav sankar:
It's very difficult,

As we all know, to
plan for the worst

When the worst rarely happens.

But that's the job of
a regulatory system,

And we didn't have a
functioning regulatory system.

Narrator: Over time like
all gulf oil companies,

Bp is drilling further out
and in ever deeper water

Chasing huge rewards.

Narrator: But the extreme
drilling operations

On rigs like deepwater horizon
have changed the landscape

Of oil production.

Mark davis: It's almost more
akin to supporting

A space program,

Because people have to live
and work in incredibly

Challenging environments.

Narrator: It's a mile
down from the free

Floating deepwater horizon
just to the sea floor,

And the crew is
drilling a further

2 and 1/2 miles into the rock.

So a drill pipe
almost the height

Of the tallest mountain
in north america

Is hanging off the floating rig.

Sambhav sankar: The
technology they were using

On the deepwater
horizon was far more

Advanced than the technology
used to put people on the moon.

Mark davis: To do
the kind of work they do

Requires imagination,
a degree of boldness,

And some combination of hubris
and romance that most of us

Don't have.

But it also means you can't
really trust those people

To make the decisions
that are best for you,

Because they're gambling.

Narrator: The body responsible
for keeping a lid on this risk

Taking is the us government's
minerals management service

Or mms, but by 2010,
the changing industry is

Racing ahead of the regulator.

Sambhav sankar: The
oil industry's pace

Of technological advancement
has been really significant,

And the government
simply can't keep up.

Antonia judhasz: The
mineral management service

Didn't have the manpower.

They didn't have the expertise.

Ltd russel l. Honore: How
can the government have used

A permit to the company
and not have the capacity

To observe what they're doing.

Narrator: And there's
a fundamental conflict

At the heart of the mms that
weakens it even further.

Mark davis: The
government that was

Supposed to also
be the regulator

Was also making money.

Antonia judhasz: Minerals
management service

Did have as its directive trying
to bring in as much income as

Possible through
the sale of leases,

And its job was really
to expand drilling.

Mark davis: It's been the
second biggest source of revenue

To the federal treasury
after income taxes.

It's big money.

So the minerals
management service

Suffered from a multiple
personality disorder,

And the pro-production
personality

Was the dominant one.

Narrator: This weakness
in the mms

Hands a lot of safety
regulation to the oil industry

For rigs like deepwater
horizon operating in the gulf.

Sambhav sankar: The
oil industry operates

With supreme self-confidence
in these environments in part

Because so much of what
it does happens safely,

Happens without incident.

Mark davis: We proceeded
as though

Bad things wouldn't ever occur.

This had become a
faith-based operation,

A faith in the industry
to have prevented

Bad things from happening.

And they came to,
I think, actually

Believe that
because it hadn't,

It was because of wisdom
and good practice

As opposed to good fortune.

And I love being lucky,
but luck's not enough.

Narrator: The
mistakes are building.

There have been issues with
bp's safety management,

And in the gulf
of mexico, no one

Spots or is willing to
look at the potential risks

Of operating without
proper regulation.

Sambhav sankar: The government
does do some inspections,

But they're few and far between,
and they're not particularly

Probing or detailed.

Ltd russel l. Honore:
11 people dead, 87 days

Of oil flowing in the gulf.

Now thousands of people
are sick from that oil,

Millions of sea life destroyed,
no federal inspector on board.

What's wrong with that picture?

Narrator: But the
mistakes don't end there.

The oil industry's
costs are enormous.

A rig like deepwater horizon
costs $1 million a day to run.

Later investigations
believe commercial pressure

Plays a critical
role in decisions

That lead to the disaster.

Sambhav sankar: So time is
money in a very real way.

That time pressure is always
a part of every operation.

Leo lindner: The stakes
are so high that there is

A constant state of pressure.

It almost becomes
like the background.

The constant application of
pressure is always there.

Narrator: When disaster strikes,
deepwater horizon is drilling

On a site named macondo
in the gulf of mexico,

But exploratory drilling
is unpredictable,

And the macondo site
hasn't been playing ball.

Richard a. Sears: Drilling
at macondo prospect

Was over time and over budget.

That happens.

It just happens.

This is the complexity
of the earth.

You don't know what to expect.

Antonia judhasz: This
is such a difficult well

One of the workers dubbed
it the well from hell.

Leo lindner: Yeah, macondo
was a particularly rough well.

By the day of the
disaster on April 20, 2010,

Drilling is almost six
weeks behind schedule

And $58 million over-budget.

That pressure for time,
for speed, for safety

Are always intentions
in every industry,

And they can be particularly
acute in the oil industry given

The particularly high costs
and the particularly high risks

Of some of the operations.

Narrator: Despite this, the
later oil spill investigation

Finds no evidence that anyone
has been told to risk safety

Decisions by speeding up.

Richard a. Sears: But still
there were a lot of decisions

Made, and when you look at
some of these decisions,

They tended to bias towards the
less time, less costly option.

Now, it doesn't mean
that they were

Always necessarily more risky,
but it does look like at least

It's in the back of their mind.

It's not an explicit pressure.

Nobody's actually talking
about it, but it's there,

And we all know it's there.

Narrator: According to the
subsequent presidential

Investigation, almost half
the deepwater horizon workers

Believe colleagues were
nervous about speaking out

Over safety concerns.

Antonia judhasz: On the final
court ruling on bp's liability

For causing the blowout, judge
carl barbier in louisiana

Said that profit was
all that mattered

In bp's decision-making, and
that is what was accurate.

Narrator: The mistakes
are stacking up.

Then on the day of the accident,
another critical mistake

Is made.

No one realizes that
the seal holding back

The flammable oil and gas at the
bottom of the well has failed.

Leo lindner: The numbers looked
right on paper, I suppose.

They showed almost utter
confidence in that one plug,

And that was like the
beginning of their problems.

Narrator: April 20, 2010, after
11 weeks on the macondo well

Site, deepwater
horizon's crew is finally

Making preparations to move on.

Antonia judhasz: Deepwater
horizon was only there

To drill a hole and then
plug it and then move on

So that the production rig could
come next, remove the cork,

And pull out the oil.

Leo lindner: It was
a really tough well,

And I was looking forward to
getting it cemented and done.

And I think the whole
rig really felt that way.

Narrator: Before
moving off, the crew

Must ensure that the
explosive oil and gas has been

Contained at the
bottom of the well

By a specialized cement seal.

Sambhav sankar: That oil
that's deep under the ground

Is under tremendous pressure.

It wants to come to the surface,
but you don't want it to come

Out in an uncontrolled way.

Narrator: The problem
is that the plan

For the rig leaving
macondo has changed

Three times
in the last 10 days.

On the morning
of the 20th just 14 hours

Before the fatal explosion,
it changes for a fourth time.

Leo lindner: I woke
up that morning

And really it all changed.

Procedures were always hectic,
but this one in particular

Was almost frantic really--
a lot of last minute changes

To the plan.

It had to be a factor in moving
forward into the disaster.

Narrator: The
changes come so late

Their combined impact hasn't
been assessed effectively.

Leo lindner: Usually you have
at least a couple of days

Once the plan is finalized,
and even small things might

Be changed but not big ones.

And these were all big changes.

It really didn't give time
for people to assess the risk.

Narrator: In this hectic
schedule on the evening

Of the 20th, the crew
begins a critical procedure

To make sure the cement
seal that keeps the oil

And gas in the well has worked.

It's called a negative
pressure test.

Sambhav sankar: The negative
pressure test always involves

Reducing the pressure
inside the well

And seeing if the oil
flows into the well

Or whether the cement that you
put on the outside of the well

Holds the oil in place.

Narrator: The test measures
the pressure of the well

From two different pipes.

Both should give
the same reading.

Yasmine ali: There should
be nothing leaking out,

So the pressure should be zero.

Narrator: But the pressure in
one of the pipes keeps rising.

Steven chu: So
something's wrong.

So they kind of looked at it,
but they were behind schedule.

They're already come on.
What's wrong?

Finish the job.

And finally, some engineers
there said, oh, there's

This so-called bladder thing.

And other people
say, what's that?

Said, no, no, no, I've
seen it before, da, da, da.

Ok, uh-uh.

Narrator: The rising pressure
is blamed on a phenomenon

Called the bladder effect.

The problem is there's no such
thing as the bladder effect.

Leo lindner: I had never
heard of a bladder effect.

I didn't understand
it when I heard it,

But I thought maybe I
was missing something.

Narrator: What the high
pressure reading really means

Is that explosive oil and gas
are now rising up the drill pipe

Towards the floating rig,
and the crew

Doesn't realize it.

Sambhav sankar: That
was the key moment,

The moment at which we went
from a mistake to a disaster.

Narrator: Around 9:43 pm,
a fountain of mud

Pours over the deepwater
horizon's deck.

It's followed by a mass of
flammable oil and methane gas.

Antonia judhasz: I did
interviews with workers

Throughout the rig who
would describe feeling

The gas literally move past
them like a wraith moving

Through the rig.

Narrator: At 9:49 pm,
the methane explodes.

Shrouded in flame, deepwater
horizon drifts out of control.

This is when the next
mistake comes into play.

A vital emergency
device fails to work.

It's supposed to be the
last line of defense

Against the catastrophic
leak, but a court

Later finds that electrical
failures render it useless.

Yasmine ali: The explosion
on the rig was a disaster,

But the aftermath and what
happened afterwards turn

This event into a catastrophe.

Narrator: Sitting a mile beneath
the rig on the sea floor,

The 50-foot-tall blowout
preventer also known as the bop

Is the last line of defense
against major disasters.

Antonia judhasz: The
blowout preventer

Is filled with a series
of rams and metal devices

That are supposed to shear
the pipe and lock in the well.

The blowout preventer is
supposed to keep a blowout

From turning into a disaster.

Narrator: When deepwater
horizon begins to drift,

The bop control cables
are ripped away.

This should trigger automatic
emergency shutdown systems.

Yasmine ali: If electrical
power is lost from the rig,

They will kick in and
actually close the well.

Because if the power
is lost, then that

Suggests that something
catastrophic has happened.

Narrator: There are
two independent

Emergency control pods.

Either can trigger the bop,
but on the day of the disaster,

Both failed to activate.

When the bop is later
retrieved, one pod is found

To have been wired incorrectly.

The later court ruling found
the other pod's battery was

Too flat to trigger the device.

Maintenance of the
blowout preventer

Is one of the recommendations
of bp's audit.

Later reports suggest
that this never happened.

Antonia judhasz:
The rigs are required

Every five years to bring
in the blowout preventer

To have it tested.

Deepwater horizon had been
out operating for 10 years

And had never had the
blowout preventer tested.

Narrator: The blowout preventer
is bp's final line of defense.

It isn't enough.

Antonia judhasz: The entire oil
spill that happened afterwards

Might have been
prevented if they

Had had batteries in the
blowout preventer that worked.

Narrator: A chain of
mistakes, misjudgments,

And bad management
has created a disaster.

Now thousands of
gallons of toxic oil

Are pouring into the ocean, and
no one knows how to stop it.

Antonia judhasz: All of
the major oil companies

In the world were all sitting
around a table, and all of them

Essentially shrugged
together and said,

Wow, we actually have no
idea how to handle this.

Narrator: Following a chain
of management, safety,

And engineering mistakes, the
deepwater horizon drilling rig

Explodes in the gulf of mexico.

But a mile below the
surface, there's an even

More catastrophic problem.

After the initial
explosion of methane,

The blaze on board
deepwater horizon

Is further fueled by
the 700,000 gallons

Of diesel stored on the rig.

In the chaos, it's not
immediately obvious

That the emergency cutoff
systems have failed,

And the well is leaking.

Narrator: On the
morning of the 22,

36 hours after the explosion,
deepwater horizon sinks.

Sambhav sankar: If this
blowout had happened,

And the crew had gotten it back
under control within a day,

I don't think many
people would have known

A whole lot about it.

The problem came when
the rig blew up and sank.

Narrator: According to
the president himself

On the evening
following the sinking,

Bp is still assuring
the government

That there is no leak.

The coast guard publicly
expresses cautious optimism

That any leaks have
been contained,

And there will be no
environmental impact.

But they are wrong.

Ltd russel l. Honore: Don't
believe the first reports.

We learned a long
time ago in the army

The first reports
are normally wrong.

Narrator: The grim reality
is that the well is leaking.

The same morning the rig
sinks, the coast guard

Reports a growing oil
slick on the surface.

Sambhav sankar: You had what
at first was a blowout that

Was happening on
the rig continue down

At the bottom of the ocean.

Narrator: The well is spewing
out oil uncontrollably fast.

It's known in the
industry as a wild well.

The mistake is that for
four precious days at the start

Of the disaster
people haven't been

Planning for the full scale
of the coming catastrophe.

Steven chu: When we
first began to realize

The magnitude of this, I have
to say, it wasn't instant.

I was watching the
estimates coming from bp

About what was leaking out.

They were assuming
that it was not so bad.

The industry, the regulators
and the country and the world

Were caught flat-footed.

Narrator: Four days
after the explosion,

Experts are trying
to figure out what scale

Of leak they're really facing.

Steven chu: So initially,
bp estimates were a thousand

Barrels a day, and
then we later found

That it's more like 50,000
instead of one thousand.

Narrator: Almost the equivalent
of the exxon valdez spill

Is being released into the
gulf of mexico every four days.

Antonia judhasz: The
scale was unimaginable.

Narrator: At the time, bp
disputes any higher numbers.

But it was later
alleged in court

That deleted texts recovered
from an oil engineer's phone

Reveal that it was known
during the disaster

That the spill rate was huge.

Antonia judhasz: Bp
continually through the course

Of the disaster minimized and
tried to hide how much oil was

Being released from the well.

Narrator: November 2012,
bp pleads

Guilty to knowingly
deceiving the government

Over the size of the oil spill.

Ltd russel l. Honore: We knew
bp was lying about the amount

Of oil coming out once they
started taking depositions

And people started talking.

Antonia judhasz: And
there was many reasons

That bp wanted to do that.

One is it is charged a fine
per barrel of oil spilled.

So the smaller the number,
the lesser

The fine it's going to face.

Steven chu: Bp wanting
to limit the damages.

They wanted to low-ball.

Narrator: Covering up the
true scale of the spill

Is a mistake with far
larger consequences

Than just a big fine.

Mark davis: It's, sort of, like
if you're a fire department.

If no one tells you
how big the fire is,

You don't know how
many trucks to send.

Narrator: If they had known
how bad it was early on,

The initial response
might have been

Bigger and faster or maybe not.

Because one of the
biggest mistakes of all

Is that literally no one
has a clue how to stop it.

Sambhav sankar: Nobody
in the oil industry

Had a plan for a deepwater
spill of this magnitude

In the gulf of mexico.

Every oil industry person
wanted to help bp cap the well,

And nobody could do it.

There was no plan.

Narrator: Despite
the size of the leak,

There is initial confidence that
the oil industry can handle it.

Antonia judhasz: The industry
has said in their applications

To drill in the gulf of
mexico that they could

Handle an oil spill
three times larger

Than the deepwater horizon.

They knew how to
stop the blowout.

They knew how to clean it up
and that it certainly wouldn't

Damage the environment
or reach the shore

In any significant way.

So when I first saw the
photos of the explosion,

I really did believe that
whatever was going to happen

Was going to be stopped.

Narrator: The oil industry does
have techniques for sealing

Shallow underwater wells, but a
mile down in the gulf of mexico

Conditions are very different.

Mark davis: We're working
in environments where

When bad things happen,

Your ability to go in
and fix it is nil.

It's almost like trying
to fix things on the moon.

Narrator: It's cold
and pitch black.

The pressure is 150 times
greater than at the surface.

No one has really considered
how to cap a leaking well

Under these conditions.

Narrator: All they
can try are

Their well known
shallow water solutions.

Yasmine ali: One of them was
a containment dome,

Which is like
an upside down funnel.

Steven chu: This is a huge
thing that enveloped this blowup

Prevention platform, this
2 and 1/2 story high thing

Spewing oil gas.

And it's a loose funnel.

You have a pipe, and
maybe you can slurp up

A large fraction of it.

Narrator: But because
containment domes are not

Designed to work at the immense
pressure thousands of feet

Below the surface, it fails.

Yasmine ali: The
containment dome

Didn't work because
of a phenomenon

Called hydrate formation.

So as gas comes out of the
well, it crystallizes into ice

Essentially and blocks up the
channel of this dome and just

Simply doesn't work.

Steven chu: It should
not have been a surprise

That it would've plugged.

Hydrates are something that's
known in the oil business.

They plug lots of oil lines.

It was really doomed to fail.

Antonia judhasz: And the oil
just kept pouring and pouring

And pouring and pouring.

Narrator: 20 days
after the disaster,

The white house is growing
increasingly concerned.

The president approaches his
energy secretary about it.

Steven chu: President obama
came up to me

After a cabinet meeting,
and he said, chu, go down there

And help them stop the leak.

So I said, yes sir.

Narrator: The only other way
to quickly stop the leak

Is a so-called top kill.

It's a technique that sealed
many oil wells in the iraq war,

But these were
smaller and on land.

Steven chu: The idea is
the oil is coming up.

We can force it down.

This would be great.

And then once you stop
the flow, you won.

Narrator: Heavy drilling
fluid and a collection

Of other material known
as a junk shot are forced

Into the well to block it.

Steven chu: So they would
first try some fluids.

They try little
bits of foam rubber.

They tried golf balls.

Narrator: A step by step plan
is agreed for a top kill.

But as soon as the
first attempt fails,

The energy secretary
is alarmed to discover

The engineers are starting
to make it up as they go.

2:00 am in the morning,
I throw a temper tantrum.

It went sort of like,
wait a minute.

You guys promised you're
going to follow the plan.

And I said, this is not
the way to do things.

What's going on?

Now it helps if you're a cabinet
member in those situations,

Because you can pick up the
phone and call the president.

And so they said all right.

All right, we'll
follow the plan.

Narrator: The
agreed plan involves

Taking careful measurements
of the pressure in the well.

They are alarmingly high.

Steven chu: In the morning,

We're looking at pressure
measurements.

They were looking at
pressure measurements,

And we don't think
this is a good sign.

We think the well
could be damaged.

Narrator: The pressure needed
to force fluid into the well

Is so high, the well
pipe could burst.

If the oil gets out into
the surrounding rock,

They will never stop it.

In reality, top kill
was never going to work,

Because bp was lowballing
the real leak rate.

If one really knew how much
oil and gas was coming up,

The idea of throwing stuff down
to overwhelm

The stuff coming up
would not have been tried.

Because this humongous amount
of oil and gas coming up,

Nothing they put down,
pieces of foam, drilling mud,

Anything could overwhelm
that upward momentum.

Mark davis: Nobody had
a plan, because nobody

Wanted to put one together.

It would have cost time.

It would have cost money,
and it would

Have admitted that there
were risks out there

That you needed to plan for.

Narrator: A catalog of mistakes
causes this catastrophe,

But the underplaying of
the scale of the leak

And the lack of a plan
to cap deep water wells

Makes the disaster bigger
and more far reaching.

And there are still
two more mistakes

That make a bad situation
much, much worse.

Four months after the tragic
deepwater horizon explosion

Kills 11 oil workers,
a complex drilling

Operation finally
seals the leaking well

Permanently with cement.

The leak has spewed around
210 million gallons of oil.

Oil slicks have extended over
more than 57,500 square miles

Of the gulf of mexico.

Antonia judhasz: You
could see it on the ocean.

You could see it on the shore.

You could see it blanketing
animals, all sorts

Of different species, and
it just kept coming and kept

Coming and kept coming.

Narrator: Mistake number
nine is that bp's cleanup plan

Is hopelessly flawed.

It makes the disastrous
spill even worse.

Sambhav sankar:
Neither bp nor much

Of the rest of the industry
were paying serious attention

To spill or disaster
containment plans,

Because they didn't think
this could ever happen.

Narrator: A year
before the disaster,

Bp submits a detailed
583-page spill response plan

To federal authorities,
but the plan

Contains embarrassing mistakes.

Antonia judhasz:
That plan was copy

And pasted from the arctic.

So it included things
like how do you protect

Walruses from an oil spill.

So there are definitely
walruses in the us arctic.

There are no walruses
in louisiana.

Mark davis: I think out
of sight, out of mind

Was precisely the foundation
that these response plans had,

Which is whatever goes
wrong will be experienced

By a small group of people and
probably some critters that

No one's really looking after.

Ltd russel l. Honore:
What the hell?

It's just the gulf of mexico.

Nothing but a bunch
of fish out there.

Who the hell cares
about the fish?

Narrator: Cleanup efforts
deploy floating booms to contain

The oil slicks, but this
technology hasn't really

Changed since it
was used with very

Mixed results on the
exxon valdez disaster

20 years previously.

And just like back then, it
only partially contains

The deepwater horizon
oil slicks.

Ltd russel l. Honore:
They just threw money

At these small contractors to
go out and try to put booms out.

It kind of looked
like amateur hour.

Narrator: Bp also employs
a chemical dispersant

To break the oil down,
but no one has ever

Used it on a spill this big.

Antonia judhasz: Bp
conducted a massive science

Experiment in the gulf.

They used the chemical
dispersant corexit

In a manner and
quantities in which

It has never been used before.

Narrator: It doesn't
even get rid of the oil.

Antonia judhasz: The dispersant
doesn't eliminate the oil.

It just disperses it.

So what it meant was
that you sacrificed

The ocean for the shore.

You dispersed the oil
out so that it covered

A greater amount of the ocean.

Narrator: Some of the
dispersed oil droplets sink

Forming large subsurface clouds
of oil invisible from above.

Mark davis: It was not just
what happened at the surface,

But it was the entire water
column, thousands of feet.

Narrator: And some of the
mixed oil and dispersant sludge

Still makes it to shore.

Antonia judhasz: So
this chemical goo

Would pour onto beaches,
and it looked

Like excrement coming
out of the ocean

And pouring onto the sand.

Ltd russel l. Honore:
You could smell it.

It was like someone left
a can of diesel open,

And I've spent 37 years
in the army.

I know how to smell that.

You could smell
the petroleum in the air

Constantly even
with the breeze blowing.

That's how thick
the dispersant was.

Narrator: The combination of oil
and dispersant is catastrophic.

Antonia judhasz: It was known
that the type of corexit

They used is a chemical toxin.

It's known that crude oil
is a chemical toxin.

And what we then
learned afterwards

Was that the combination
of the two

Was more toxic than either
item separately.

Narrator: Despite
all this, by 2014,

Bp is claiming that the
worst of the oil spill

Has been dealt with, but that
leads to the final mistake.

The long-term impact of
the spill on the environment,

On health, and on
the local economy

Is bigger than
anyone had imagined.

And it's still going on today.

Brenda dardar robuchaux: The
spill had a devastating impact

On our community.

People were not
able to go trawling.

The oyster beds
were contaminated.

They stopped being able to
sell any type of oysters,

Any type of seafood.

Narrator: The effects of
the deepwater horizon oil spill

Have been long lasting
and destructive.

In 2014, antonia judhasz
got a firsthand look

At the ongoing damage.

Antonia judhasz:
When we got down

To the bottom of the ocean,
what we were supposed to see

Was a wealth of marine life
that simply wasn't present.

What we saw instead was
what I would describe

As more of a moonscape.

Anything that could get
out of the way of the oil

Got out of the way,
and everything

That couldn't was killed.

Narrator: Until 2010,
entire communities

Along the gulf coast
line had been reliant

On the abundant marine life.

Brenda dardar robuchaux:
It was just heartbreaking

To see the sea life
come ashore,

You know what I mean,
to see the tar balls

Coming ashore, to
see our fragile wetlands

Just inundated with oil.

Sambhav sankar:
The fishing industry,

Both fin fish and shellfish,
were decimated

As a result of the spill.

Brenda dardar robuchaux: It
was really more challenging

For the younger generation.

They had children at home.

They had typical
family bills to pay.

When your income totally stops,
it's devastating.

You saw a lot of houses being
repossessed, cars, boats.

Narrator: For many,
the only work available

Is cleaning up the oil spill.

Ltd russel l. Honore: The people
hardest hit by this disaster

Are primarily poor people,
people trying to make

A living to feed their family.

And companies came in
to hire day workers

To go out and clean up
the oil dispersant

And to clean up
the tar balls.

Narrator: The 1.8 million
gallons of corexit oil

Dispersant is a known toxin.

Ltd russel l. Honore: We know
that the us safety council had

Recommended to the companies
that when the workers were

Exposed to the dispersant
they should

Have protective uniforms.

Narrator: But some of the
workers who carried out

The cleanup claim
they were denied

Suitable protection against the
chemicals they were handling.

Some cleanup workers
have since been

Found to have toxic chemicals
in their bodies.

Ltd russel l.
Honore: That exposure

Has led to over 3,000 citizens
seeking medical assistance.

Brenda dardar robuchaux:
We see a lot of people who

Are no longer able to work,
no longer able to provide

For their family.

And so people are still
feeling the effects of it now.

Sambhav sankar: You can't put
that much toxic crude oil out

In the environment
and not have impacts

On people's lives and health.

Ltd russel l. Honore: This
is destroying people

For an industrial purpose,
to get oil.

Brenda dardar
robuchaux: My dad never

Was compensated for his
trawling, for his fishing,

Never was.

It still brings tears to my
eyes after all these years

To see the impact
they had on our family

And what they did to my dad.

And I mean, our family wasn't
alone in the struggles,

And so the entire coast will
never recover or get over it.

Narrator: In the aftermath
of the disaster,

The federal regulator, the mms,
is replaced by separate bodies

For revenue and enforcement.

In 2014, bp is
once again allowed

To bid for oil and gas leases.

Leo lindner: Bp was supposedly
punished, because it had to pay

A $20 billion settlement,
right, but the government

Came right back and gave them
a $15 billion tax credit.

I understand if a guy's
selling crack, he gets life.

But if an oil company
ruins the gulf,

They get a $15 billion
tax credit.

I don't understand that mindset.

Narrator: Because of the world's
insatiable demand for oil,

Deepwater offshore
drilling continues today.

Some investigators
believe little

Has changed since the disaster.

Sambhav sankar: My hope after
the disaster was that somebody

Might read our report and
say maybe we ought to kick

The tires a little harder.

In fact, 11 years later,
I can say, nope.

Things just went back
to the way they were.

Narrator: Many still living with
the consequences of the spill

Feel the same.

Brenda dardar
robuchaux: The sad part

Is it's just a matter of
time before it happens again.

Will it be my generation?

Will it be my children's
generation or my grandchildren?

We're going to face it again,
because nothing's

Been really done to address it.

Antonia judhasz:
I interviewed a scientist

Who said a thousand years
from now people

Will go down to the bottom of
the ocean, and they'll say,

Oh, this is where the deepwater
horizon disaster happened,

That the oil that is at
the bottom of the ocean

Is going to stay there
forever, that the impacts

Will continue forever as well.

Because that oil
washes to shore.

That oil interacts with species.

Brenda dardar robuchaux:
Our youth are not

Going to be able to
experience the beauty

Of what I grew up with.

They're not going to have those
opportunities to be able to go

Out on a fishing boat and
experience what I grew

Up experiencing with my dad.

Just they're not going to
have the beautiful communities

Because of the impact
of the oil spill.

Antonia judhasz: We will
feel the repercussions

Of this disaster for as long
as we're still able to be here.

[music playing]